A great deal of research using data from eBay auctions has been conducted to study a variety of issues. Almost all of these studies structure their research framework around a standard model of auctions which assumes that the number of bidders is exogenous and independent from auction to auction. However, auctions on eBay deviate in many important ways from the standard auction model. The literature on online auctions has recently begun to analyze the consequences of these deviations, but no one model encompasses all of the differences in one model. This leaves an incomplete picture of the incentives that bidders face when participating in eBay auctions. This paper reviews several recent theoretical advances designed to model the eBay marketplace, and discusses the predictions that might arise from a model that matches more of the particular institutional details of the eBay market. It then shows empirically that one of these predictions is supported empirically: bidders place a bid in an auction only if it offers a standing bid that is among the lowest available and the auction is scheduled to be the next to close.
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jeffrey_livingston/12/