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Unpublished Paper
Imperfect recall and solution concepts in extensive games
Bond Business School Publications
  • Jeffrey J. Kline, Bond University
Date of this Version
2-20-2002
Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Details
Jeffrey J. Kline (2002) Imperfect recall and solution concepts in extensive games

School of Business Working Paper ; No. 4, Feb. 20, 2002

© Copyright J. Jude Kline and the School of Business, Bond University

Abstract
We consider some implications of imperfect recall for existence and subsetting results over various equilibrium concepts in extensive games. Our analysis focuses on commonly time-structured games which allow us to see more clearly in games of imperfect recall. We find that in a game of imperfect recall, a sequential equilibrium may not be a Nash equilibrium, and a perfect equilibrium may not be a sequential equilibrium. A perfect equilibrium exists in every one-player game, but a sequential equilibrium may not exist. We also give su¢ciency conditions weaker than perfect recall, for the standard subsetting results between perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
Citation Information
Jeffrey J. Kline. "Imperfect recall and solution concepts in extensive games" (2002)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jeffrey_kline/10/