Imperfect recall and solution concepts in extensive gamesBond Business School Publications
Date of this Version2-20-2002
Document TypeWorking Paper
AbstractWe consider some implications of imperfect recall for existence and subsetting results over various equilibrium concepts in extensive games. Our analysis focuses on commonly time-structured games which allow us to see more clearly in games of imperfect recall. We find that in a game of imperfect recall, a sequential equilibrium may not be a Nash equilibrium, and a perfect equilibrium may not be a sequential equilibrium. A perfect equilibrium exists in every one-player game, but a sequential equilibrium may not exist. We also give su¢ciency conditions weaker than perfect recall, for the standard subsetting results between perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
Citation InformationJeffrey J. Kline. "Imperfect recall and solution concepts in extensive games" (2002)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/jeffrey_kline/10/