The standard model of vertical precedent is part of the deep structure of our legal system. The rules governing that model are largely intuitive, often taught only in passing at law school, and rarely addressed by positive law. While the application of these rules of precedent can be difficult in practice, we rarely struggle with whether a given decision of a court within a particular hierarchy is potentially binding at all. A Ninth Circuit opinion, for instance, is binding on district courts within the Ninth Circuit and on subsequent Ninth Circuit panels; it is not binding on Second Circuit panels.

That standard model of precedential rules, however, breaks down when Congress or the courts alter the standard structure and process of federal appellate review. This paper examines several of these unusual structures. For instance, when Congress provides for exclusive D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over rulemaking challenges in environmental statutes, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), does the D.C. Circuit's decision involving that rule bind other circuit courts despite the strong tradition of independent thinking between different geographic circuits? Similarly, where petitions for review of an agency decision are filed in multiple circuits but consolidated in a single circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2112, is the decision that ultimately issues binding on just that court, on all the circuits transferring petitions to that court, or is it binding nationwide?

There are no well-accepted answers to these questions. Courts are generally able to sidestep the precedential problems, while a recent surge in scholarly examination of precedent has primarily (though not exclusively) focused on constitutionally-driven issues of stare decisis, or "horizontal precedent." As this Article concludes, however, the structure of the court system within which judicial decisions are made – the structure of the appellate universe – is critical to defining what the rules of binding precedent look like. By better defining this relationship between structure and precedent, the Article better positions observers to answer questions about the role of precedent within our Constitutional structure, to understand why we have certain assumptions and intuitions about precedent, and to ensure a more careful and rational discussion of precedential rules in the future.