U.N. Peacekeeping: The Establishment of Electoral Processes—Success or Blunder?

James A Wilson
U.N. Peacekeeping: The Establishment of Electoral Processes-Success or Blunder?

James A. Wilson

Eastern Kentucky University
The U.N. and Peacekeeping Background

United Nations peacekeeping operations first began in 1948 in the Middle East. This operation was known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The mission was aimed at bringing an end to the Arab-Israeli war, and supervising a truce between the parties involved in the conflict.¹ Large amounts of military observers were willing to stay after the ceasefire to ensure an armistice agreement was met that would provide peace and safety to that area of the Middle East. This operation marked the beginning of a mission, by the United Nations, which would help bring justice and freedom to many parts of the world that had rarely experienced it.

Since the beginning of the first United Nations Peacekeeping tour, there have been a total of 66 peacekeeping operations launched around the world in over 120 countries.² Many of these operations have taken place in third world countries that are in the midst of civil war, or a parallel strife. Political turmoil, disease, hunger, and poverty tend to prevent these countries from establishing order and peace for their people. The peacekeeping operations allow for the United Nations to create a mandate, with the consent of the parties involved, to try and bring an end to the conflict through the use of non-force methods, unless attacked or defending the mandate, and help establish an impartial treaty with the parties.³ Once these objectives are accomplished, the U.N. leaves observers behind in order to report to the secretary general as to the progress made in the country.


³ Ibid.
There have been three generations of U.N. Peacekeeping in the history of the U.N. The first lasted from the formation of the U.N. up until the mid-eighties. This was in an effort to guarantee “international peace and security.” The first generation was characterized by the deployment of light armed peacekeeping forces and U.N. military observers. Troops were mobilized to countries around the world to maintain peace, but it was on a much smaller scale than the future generations were. This generation is usually regarded as the “cold-war generation.”

The second generation of peacekeeping stretched from the mid-eighties into the early nineties. It was in this generation that we really see U.N. peacekeeping increase around the world. There were only 5 operations in 1988, but by December of 1994 the U.N. was involved in over 16 operations around the world. While an increase in Peacekeeping Operations was evident, a far greater characteristic that helped define this generation was the installation of the “Electoral Process” into U.N. mandates. This was an encouraging factor in peacekeeping because it helped ensure policy makers that free and fair elections would be held in these countries with the help of the U.N. The citizens would elect their leaders in order to provide a more democratic foundation for these chaotic countries.

The third generation is characterized by an even larger growth of peacekeeping operations around the world. This generation has lasted from the end of the nineties to the present. During this time, humanitarian assistance has strongly been pushed. The expansion of NGO’s in peacekeeping missions has played a huge part in helping improve the overall health of

---

these countries. While many nations have their own agenda when it comes to peacekeeping, NGO’s such as the “American Red Cross and Red Crescent Moon” base their beliefs on the principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. The theory of conflict resolution was also been expanded in this time period in order to prevent future civil wars and instability in the country. While many of the missions in this generation have been pushed due to political pressure, it has been essential for the U.N. to come up with a plan to minimize any chances of having a peacekeeping mission in the same country twice.

The Electoral Process

In 1990, during their 45th session the General Assembly placed into effect an electoral process that would be used to assist countries in implementing and promoting elections as part of the U.N.’s peacekeeping operations. This was a huge step for the U.N. in promoting democracy throughout the world. The implementation of the electoral process ensured that political stability would come to these countries and that all the citizens of the nation would be involved in helping to elect the people they wanted to govern them. Some of the ways the U.N. assists countries in this process is through technical assistance in forms such as police patrols at voting booths, and security to politicians who are campaigning. The U.N. also provides observers to oversee the entire election and report to the Security General as to the success of the elections and the electoral process as a whole.

Although the U.N. has established an implicit confidence in the minds of their supporters that the organization can help implement free and just elections because of the process they put into effect in 1990, the question of whether that process has been completely effective remains cloudy in some people’s minds. The question that should be asked is this: Should the U.N. continue to involve itself in other countries elections? This is a fair question that many throughout the world believe the U.N. should respect and ask itself. So much money is poured into these peacekeeping missions, and the longevity of the missions leads to a budget that is more expensive to keep.

A way to answer this question would be to examine U.N. peacekeeping electoral cases. Cases like Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador, and Cambodia are four examples of the U.N.’s implementation of elections during the early years of the electoral processes existence. Of the four, I feel that the Mozambique and El Salvador electoral processes were a success; the Cambodian and Angolan ones were not. This is based on two questions being asked. First: With the help of the U.N. what were the outcomes of the electoral processes in these countries? Second: Was the U.N. able to help the countries establish fair and legitimate elections? These are two questions that need to be answered. The examination of these four cases should help. The final question to answer is: Should the U.N. continue to involve itself in other countries elections?

**The Case of Mozambique**

Mozambique obtained its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a hard fought revolution led by the Frente Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO). Two years later that same

---

liberation party took governmental power, declaring themselves to be a Marxist-Leninist party. That same year, 1977, the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) started a civil war in opposition to the FRELIMO policies.\(^{10}\) The civil war lasted 14 years, mostly because the FRELIMO were supplied weapons and other essentials by the U.S.S.R, while South Africa supported the RENAMO resistors.\(^{11}\) The fighting went all the way up until 1992, when both parties were willing to agree on a negotiated treaty that brought the war to a halt.\(^{12}\) By that time, much of the country was in devastation. Hundreds of thousands of refugees had fled the country due to the carnage and violence. The RENAMO were particularly violent towards the civilians, and lost much of the support that they originally sought to be able to win the war. The U.N. stepped in to help the two sides negotiate a peace agreement, and brought in humanitarian aid for the civilians within the country, while also helping to put together an electoral process for the parties involved.

The steps made towards conducting elections in Mozambique were not as smooth as anticipated. Even after the agreements were signed by the two parties, violence continued to erupt. Complaints about military attacks, and movements of troops, were reported.\(^{13}\) This was a big hit to the U.N.’s peacekeeping task force who planned to conduct a swift electoral process in order to bring immediate political stability to the country. The country at that time was divided, with the RENAMO controlling only 25% of the country, which totaled 6% of the population.\(^{14}\)


\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) U.N. *The Blue helmets: a review of United Nations peacekeeping*, 322.

They continued to fight, fearing that they would be overcome by the much bigger FRELIMO. They refused to give up their land and stalled humanitarian aid from coming into their area.\textsuperscript{15} The elections that were scheduled to begin in October 1993 were now forced to be rescheduled for the next year. This was an immediate blow to the U.N. in their hopes of carrying out a peaceful operation in order to get the country back to a stable state.

The elections that were scheduled to begin in October 1993 were now forced to be rescheduled for the next year. This was an immediate blow to the U.N. in their hopes of carrying out a peaceful operation in order to get the country back to a stable state.

The U.N. decided on a second deadline for elections, which would take place October 1994. Turmoil continued to ensue because of the REMANO’s refusal to give or disarm their military. In September 1994, two agreements were reached. The first called for the RENAMO and the FRELIMO, who controlled the government at the time, to integrate into the state administration all the areas that had originally been under RENAMO control.\textsuperscript{16} Second, both parties agreed to allow the U.N. to monitor, not only, all police activities in the country but also the rights and liberties of the Mozambican people, and provide technical support to the police commission.\textsuperscript{17} Although both sides formally agreed to these two provisions, the RENAMO delayed in carrying them out. Their stalling caused many U.N. officials to contemplate extending the deadline, once more, for the elections. However, the Secretary-General visited Mozambique in order to break the stalemate.\textsuperscript{18} This was a successful move by him because it brought an end to the political strife that had prevented the electoral process from moving right along. Even with his appearance in the country, there was still opposition that prevented the U.N. from immediately starting the electoral process. The Secretary-General began to train and mobilize an army that consisted of numerous peace-keeping troops, and trained Mozambican police, to try and stabilize the country. Troops were mobilized throughout the three regions that the country

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} U.N. The Blue helmets: a review of United Nations peacekeeping, 326.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
had been divided into: Northern, Central and Southern region.\textsuperscript{19} This move helped end the military threat that the REMANO held against the other parties, and the country as a whole.

Once the electoral process began, the U.N. had decided that their roles in the elections were to monitor the registration of voters. This was to be done through appointed observers. The U.N. also wanted to watch the casting and counting of votes in order to guarantee that this election would be considered valid. The parties involved in the election would be able to campaign safely without threats of violence and intimidation hovering over them. Also, voting would be done in a just manner. They would be counted by U.N. Observers so that no fraud could be committed by any of the parties. There were still many refugees who had fled to neighboring countries during the war, but were expected to return. Their votes would play a significant factor in these parties’ strategies to try and get their leaders elected. The estimated number of voters who were eligible to vote in the upcoming election was estimated at 7,894,850.\textsuperscript{20} This meant that the election would have an excellent turnout. Thousands of soldiers had been mobilized around many of the areas that the parties were campaigning in order to guarantee safety. Large amounts of police were installed in positions around cities, and voting booths, for the upcoming election. Thousands of electoral observers were deployed around the country in order to observe and verify the polling and counting of votes.\textsuperscript{21}

19 November 1994 marked an historic date in Mozambique’s history; their first real democratic election results were made public with the incumbent President Joaquim Chissano winning 53.3% of the votes.\textsuperscript{22} Chissano was the FRELIMO president that was originally in

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 331.
\textsuperscript{20} U.N. The Blue helmets: a review of United Nations peacekeeping, 332.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 333.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
charge during the provisional government era beginning in 1977. In the election for legislative seats FRELIMO again received the majority of the vote with 44.3%.\textsuperscript{23} The elections were deemed free and conducted in a fair manner for all participating parties. On November 19, the Secretary-General’s Representative issued a statement that said the electoral process had been conducted in an impartial manner with the dedication and high professionalism of the electoral authorities.

**Success**

To reach the conclusion of the Mozambique electoral process, one must only look at what they had to overcome in the months, and years leading up to the historic election. Surrounded by revolution and political strife, they were able to eventually come to an agreement which helped bring about a cease fire and the disarmament of the two armies that fought each other during the Mozambican civil war. One of the big reasons why Mozambique was a big success was because of how smoothly the aftermath of the elections went. There were numerous complaints of voter fraud by some of the political parties. These allegations were investigated by the U.N. and found to be false. The fact that violence at the voter booths had not occurred during the election is another big reason why this can be considered a success. Another reason is because there was no retaliation from the losing parties. The elections were considered free and fair, and the losing parties did not oppose the outcome in any violent manner.

**The Case of El Salvador**


\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
(FMLN). The problem came from a complex negotiation initiated by the two parties in September of 1989. The negotiation, however, had culminated from a decade long war fought by the two groups. This war had been violent and tore apart much of the country, politically and economically. The U.N. sending in observers to try and negotiate a cease fire would prove to be difficult, and it would not be until 1992 that the two parties actually laid down their arms in full willingness to negotiate in order to set up a politically stable government.

The first real substantive agreement that was reached by the two sides was signed on 26 of July 1990 at San Jose, Costa Rica; it was known as the “Agreement on Human Rights.” This agreement brought the two sides together on an issue they had both violated for the past decade. This was a sign, though, that both sides were willing to recognize the rights of their citizens. This agreement was for both sides to pledge unrestricted respect for international human rights laws and standards. This set the stage for the U.N. to be able to lead a verification mission in order to be certain that this pledge was being followed; that both sides were willing to respect the laws that were established internationally by Geneva. Once again, a big step was made towards helping El Salvador become a stable and peaceful country.

The U.N. Verification Mission had five goals: To establish communications with any individual or group on the issue of human rights violations; to interview anyone freely and politely they felt could help them complete their mission effectively; visit any establishment freely and without prior notice; to carry out an educational and informational campaign on

---

24 Ibid, 425.
25 El Salvador ONUSAL, Prepared by the Department of Public Information, United Nations, August 1996.
27 Ibid.
human rights; and to use whatever legal action they felt was appropriate in helping promote and defend human rights.\textsuperscript{28}

Once the country became stable again, and a cease fire had been reached, the total loss of life from the 11 year war was in excess of 100,000 deaths.\textsuperscript{29} Most of these deaths came from innocent citizens who were not part of either army. Full scale engagements were, many times, conducted in rural areas, although some of the carnage did take places in urban settings. The capital San Salvador became the subject of much scrutiny because of the government’s use of violence to subdue any uprisings. The attacks that happened in this town usually involved bombs, or small shootings, which were used as quick engagements in order to produce maximum damage on a minimum casualty list. This process, which ensued for 11 years, cost the government a substantial amount of money and it left the country devastated.

The path to an electoral process being established in the country was put into reality with the establishment of the Electoral Division of ONUSAL in September of 1993. ONUSAL was determined to prevent atrocities, such as human rights violations, from occurring again. Much of this had already been put into perspective with the creation of the Commission On The Truth, which was supposed to oversee the disarmament and destruction of FMLN weapons.\textsuperscript{30} The election of the legislative assembly was to begin on 20 January 1994. The election was eventually postponed so ONSUAL could set up, and monitor, more registration booths. For the

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Enrique ter Horst, “El Salvador and Haiti Revisited: The Role of the U.N. Peace Operations, International IDEA.
\textsuperscript{30} El Salvador ONUSAL, Prepared by the Department of Public Information, United Nations, August 1996.
most part, the electoral process was carried out without much corruption, or violence, from the parties involved.

Election Day was on the 20 March 1994. There were only about 1.5 million, or 55% of persons on the electoral rolls, who actually voted. ARENA, the party that was in charge of the government during the civil war, won the majority of the seats for the legislative assembly. The FMLN, which had combined with the Nacional Revolucionaria in order to form a coalition government, came in second in the voting. The presidential election was not able to grab enough of a majority of the vote to be able to establish a winner. A second round of voting was held in April of that year in which Mr. Calderon Sol, the candidate for the ARENA was elected president with the majority of the vote over the Coalition’s candidate.

**Success**

The electoral process was a success in this case because of the hard work done by ONUSAL, and the parties involved, to try and establish free and fair elections. Unlike what usually happens in these processes, there was little to no violence during the campaign. Evidence for intimidation by the parties did not exist, which was backed up by the fact that there were no complaints to ONUSAL about unfair elections. Both candidates for President seemed to be fully in favor of a democratically elected process. When Ruben Zamora, the candidate for the Coalition, acknowledged the victory of his opponent, he did so in a manner that reaffirmed his commitment to the process of peace and reconciliation in El Salvador. ONUSAL was able to complete almost all aspects of their mandate by June 1994. This was an electoral process that the U.N. and the people of El Salvador can be proud of.

---

31 Ibid, 438.
32 Ibid, 440.
The Case of Angola

Angola is an excellent example of a country where political partisanship by the parties could was not able to exist. Angola had originally been a colony of the Portuguese. They used this colony as a checkpoint for ships that went from Portugal to India. In 1960, a civil war began by the Angolans for independence. After a fifteen year struggle that consisted mostly of guerrilla tactics the Portuguese finally left. The three liberation parties that were left in control were the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA), and the Unaio Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). When the groups met to try and reach an agreement they unable to come to common ground on many issues, so civil war ensued. This bloodshed would continue up until 1991. The U.N. Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM) began in 1989. Much of the reason why a mission was first sent was because of the discovery that foreign countries were providing aid to the groups. Some of the countries involved in the strife were the U.S., Cuba, South Africa and the U.S.S.R. These countries provided aid in the form of weaponry to the groups. The MPLA emerged as the strongest of the three. Even though their organizations doctrine believed in Marxist-Leninist theories, they decided to abandon their ideology in 1990 with the shaky political existence of the U.S.S.R. in jeopardy.

The first Peace Agreement was reached in 1991. This agreement included the disarmament of the liberating forces and the mobilization of peacekeeping troops and police. The establishment of an electoral process was the next step on UNAVEM’s agenda. An election was set for September of 1992. This would allow UNAVEM to achieve all of the objectives in their

---

33 Ibid, 233.
mandate by that exact date. But by the time the election had come around, the peace agreement with the three parties involved was shaky at best. There were many reports of corruption and violence within the campaigns. Also, political intimidation had taken a toll on some of the smaller parties, forcing them to relinquish their spot in the race.

UNAVEM II would oversee the elections. The first UNAVEM had already been cleared by the Secretary-General; now the second one would be in charge of the electoral process of Angola. On Election Day, 1 October 1992, UNAVEM II announced that the MPLA had won the majority of the vote, giving their party the most seats in the Legislative Assembly. The Presidential election was not able to be decided that day as neither candidate won the 50% majority of the votes needed. MPLA’s candidate, then governmental leader President Don Santos, had won 49.57% which gave him the lead over the other candidates. Mr. Savimbi, UNITA’s candidate, refused to concede to President Santos and even refused to have a second election. Another civil war broke out between the two parties, ending UNAVEM’s hope for Angola to elect a democratic leader.

With the failure of the elections, the cease fire had lasted for a full 16 months from 31 May 1991- 11 October 1992. Immediately the U.N. prepared to mobilize troops in order to minimize and eventually quell the revolution. The fact that the two parties involved in conflict, the MPLA and the Coalition Party, refused to negotiate a ceasefire only added to the UNAVEM II difficulty in absolving the issues it had to face. Brutality towards the innocent citizens of Angola escalated and large amounts of refugees fled the country. This war would ensue for 2

more years, leaving the country devastated economically, politically and humanitarian wise. Efforts to improve the situation were conducted in an immediate manner so that health organizations could attempt to help the poor and homeless in the country. The 30 year conflict that had been presumed finished had just started up again.

Blunder

It is not difficult to see why this tragedy was not considered a success. First off: neither side was able to come to a complete halt in violence until well after the U.N. had inserted itself in the country. Both sides tore the country apart for two decades before a brief ceasefire had been put into place. Second: the election was not run in a peaceful and democratic way. There were reports, especially from the smaller parties, of intimidation and violence from the big parties. Parties were not able to campaign properly due to this. Both the MPLA and the Coalition Party won a massive majority of the vote because of their campaign tactics. Third: the election never finished. The presidency was not won by either party because a majority could not be reached. This angered the Coalition Party, who refused to have a recount or recognize MPLA’s presidential candidate as the winner, so they started the civil war up again. Angola would eventually be able to reach a cease fire agreement among their warring groups. They were able to have elections and decide on a president. This was not done, however, before the near destruction of the country had taken place. It is obvious to see how this election turned out to be a blunder.

---

The Case of Cambodia

The cases of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) and Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) are difficult to decipher. Unlike the other three cases, they are not as simple as “successful or unsuccessful.” To fully understand what allowed the country to fall into such a devastating state, a person must look back many years; all the way to 1979. This marked the ending of Pol Pot’s “Khmer Rouge,” which had devastated the country and cost the lives of about 1.7 out of 7 million Cambodians in the country.\(^{38}\) Once his regime lost power, the U.N.’s General-Assembly took up the matter in an effort to try and bring peace and humanitarian aid to the ravaged Cambodian people. A total of over three hundred thousand people fled into Thailand because of how violent the regime had been and now the U.N. was interested in getting those refugees to move back into Cambodia.

From the very beginning of the U.N.’s involvement in the country, other foreign powers also took a distinct interest in Cambodia. Countries like the U.S., U.S.S.R, Vietnam, China and many others believed that they had an investment in seeing that the U.N. mission in Cambodia was a successful one. A meeting was held in 1990 by different countries throughout the world; they came together to form the “Paris Peace Accords.” This establishment gave the U.N. full authority to establish their Advance Mission and Transitional Authority Mission in Cambodia. It also created sets of guidelines which set forth the parameters needed for UNAMIC and UNTAC to conduct a successful mission in Cambodia.

Once the Paris Accords were put together, the U.N. went into Cambodia in full force. The two political entities that were fighting at the time were the Phnom Penh Government and the

Coalition Party. The Phnom Penh was backed by the Vietnamese and Soviet Union, and controlled some 80-90% of the country. The Coalition Party received support from the U.S, China and the Association of the South-East Asian Nations (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand).\textsuperscript{39} The backings of these countries helped supply the two armies with weapons, which made the war much bloodier. The U.N. was eventually able to get the two armies to enter into a cease fire. Prince Sihanouk, who was the leader of the Phnom Penh, asked for 200 United Nation personnel observers to be sent to oversee the cease fire.\textsuperscript{40} Sections of the ceasefire agreement included the disarmament of forces from both sides; the turning over of all weapons; and the willingness to take part in diplomatic negotiations with one another. Both sides agreed to the provisions made.

In 1991, the second Paris Conference was held in which elections were discussed. It was eventually decided that the electoral period would last from April 1993 to May of that same year. By the time the electoral period had come around there were multiple problems with the mission. The ceasefire had been broken more than once. There had been reports of Vietnamese-speaking villagers massacred along border towns. Even more rampant had been the outbreaks of violence that had gone on within the cities which had been instrumented by the different political parties that had formed to campaign against each other. This violence led to a steep and overwhelming sense of uncertainty going into the electoral period.

There were a total of 20 parties that campaigned that spring for the May election. The campaigning was very intense with many parties claiming to drive out, metaphorically, foreign forces in order to establish a sense of nationalism within Cambodia. By the time the election

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 451.
rolled around 93% of those registered turned out to vote.\textsuperscript{41} The winner of the election was the candidate from the Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC). Shortly afterward, the U.N. made plans to withdraw their mission from Cambodia in order to focus attention on Somalia.

**Blunder**

This electoral process was a failure, despite what many objectors would say, for a few reasons. UNTAC’s major failure is that it was never able to disarm the combatants.\textsuperscript{42} Like what happened in Angola, violence against innocent civilians went on during the campaign. The U.N. tried to mobilize forces within the cities in order to protect centralized populations, but along many of the mountainous borders in the east, violence ensued upon helpless villagers. The U.N. also worked in stationing police around the different polling stations, but complaints of illegal activities were made during the campaigning process. There were certain areas which UNTAC forbid parties to campaign, or poll stations to be opened in certain sections of the country, such as those controlled by the PDK. This was because UNTAC was forbidden, as numerous other parties were, from entering into the area by the PDK.\textsuperscript{43} Elections cannot be democratically or even fairly decided if parties are not able to operate and campaign freely as they please. Villagers must also be protected from intimidation and violence in order for a proper electoral process to be run. Dr. Carol Garrison, a witness to the Peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, remarked that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Carole Garrison, “Armed Conflict in Cambodia and the U.N. Response,” 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Judy L. Ledgerwood, "UN Peacekeeping Missions: The lesson from Cambodia," *Asia-Pacific*, (1994).
\item \textsuperscript{43} U.N., *The Blue helmets: a review of United Nations peacekeeping*, 469.
\end{itemize}
“the election, which appeared to be a success by the U.N. at the surface, was not free and fair, but rather credible and survivable.\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Conclusion}

With the help of the U.N. what were the outcomes of the electoral processes in these countries? Was the U.N. able to help the countries establish fair and legitimate elections? These were two of the questions that I based my conclusion on. I have answered each briefly at the end of every case in the concluding paragraph. It is very easy to see Peacekeeping missions as a complete disaster. It is easier to see the electoral processes they set up as even bigger blunders by the U.N. There are many ways how someone could compare these four Peacekeeping Missions, electorally, as two successes and two blunders. In the Mozambique and El Salvador elections there were very few illegal activities going on during the campaign portion of them. Voter intimidation was not present, nor was violence against civilians. El Salvador is an excellent case of a country where both sides were willing to come together to help form a politically stable government. In Angola, quite the opposite was present. Neither side cared to work together. They were not even willing to recognize a winner in order to finalize the elections. Cambodia had, possibly, the most difficult path to a successful electoral process. The people had to overcome 30 years of internal violence which continued even after the election, until 1997 which was well after UNTAC had left.\textsuperscript{45} Mozambique had a difficult time establishing order to be able to have the elections, but once they did, they were able to run an efficient enough electoral process to help stabilize the country. The measurement of whether the electoral processes in these four


cases was not based on the civil war, or conflict, that was apparent before the U.N. came in. It was not based on how many civilians died in the fight to gain peace. It is based on how the election was run; whether or not the U.N. able to stick to their mandate and the timeframe for the election; and did the election actually provide political stability to the country in order to provide peace and freedom for their people. All four had difficulties to overcome. None of the four were perfect in the running a smooth electoral process, but two of them definitely outshined the others. This is why two of them were successes and two were blunders.

The final question that I attempted to answer through this thesis was “should the U.N. continue to involve itself in other countries elections?” I believe they should because they have provided a service that other countries would not have been able to provide for themselves. The four countries I have named here would have had a near impossible task in trying to set up an electoral campaign, let alone conducting free and fair elections. The U.N. is involved in providing three necessary tasks that help countries become politically stable through an electoral process; technical assistance, election monitoring, and organization and supervision of elections. None of the four countries were able to maintain a ceasefire, devise a plan for an electoral campaign, or hold democratic elections. Without the U.N.’s assistance in the electoral division, it would have been nearly impossible for these countries to elect their leaders without corruption taking place. This is why it is pivotal for the Electoral Division of the U.N. to press on.

Bibliography


