Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance linkAccounting and Finance
Date of this Version1-1-2016
Document TypeJournal Article
AbstractWe provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority- and majority-independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay– performance link. In addition, a majority-independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.
Citation InformationPamela Kent, Kim Kercher and James Routledge. "Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link" Accounting and Finance (2016) p. 1 - 31 ISSN: 0810-5391 print , 1467-629X online
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/james_routledge/22/