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Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link
Accounting and Finance
  • Pamela Kent, University of Adelaide
  • Kim Kercher, Bond University
  • James Routledge, Bond University
Date of this Version
1-1-2016
Document Type
Journal Article
Publication Details

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Kent, P., Kercher, K., & Routledge, J. (2016). Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link. Accounting and Finance.

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© 2016 AFAANZ

Abstract

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority- and majority-independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay– performance link. In addition, a majority-independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.

Citation Information
Pamela Kent, Kim Kercher and James Routledge. "Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay-performance link" Accounting and Finance (2016) p. 1 - 31 ISSN: 0810-5391 print , 1467-629X online
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/james_routledge/22/