Recent Developments in TMDL Litigation: 1999-2002

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By

James R. May
Widener University School of Law
Wilmington, Delaware
The last few years of TMDL case law has provided plenty of drama. Leading and long-litigated cases in California, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, Maryland, Missouri and Virginia have concluded. Eight other cases settled by consent decree. Some of the news is good, but more is dubious, for TMDL enthusiasts. Ten highlights follow.

(Familiarity with CWA § 303 and ESA § 7, and their attendant acronyms, is presumed.)

First, the Ninth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation of § 303(d) to include all impaired waters. Thus, states still need to have their § 303(d) lists include waters impaired by point sources, nonpoint sources, or a combination of the two (“blended waters”).

Second, regardless of legal theory (constructive submission, mandatory duty, arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion, unreasonable delay, etc), the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and lower courts in New Jersey, Maryland and New York declined to order EPA to step in to set TMDLs. The standard for ordering EPA to comply is nearly insurmountable, requiring both (1) an explicit refusal by a state to take any TMDL action, and (2) unreasonable EPA delay in declaring such refusal a “constructive submission” of no TMDLs. Not surprisingly, no state is so bold as to declare the intent to refuse to participate in the TMDL program, and EPA has many reasons for delay. Thus, despite the hype, the constructive submission doctrine and related theories appear moribund.

Third, the Eleventh Circuit held that neither § 303(d) nor the consent decree in the Georgia TMDL case require EPA to ensure TMDLs have implementation plans.

Fourth, the Second Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation that “total maximum daily loads” do not have to be expressed in daily loads, and that an annual load may suffice. It also upheld EPA’s approval of margins of safety on a TMDL by TMDL basis.

Jim May is a Professor of Law at Widener University. Professor May was lead counsel in cases involving monitoring, listing, TMDL, CPP, ESA and related issues in Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey and Maryland, and is counsel for amici in the national TMDL rulemaking litigation. The assistance of Jim Stuhltrager, Esq., Mid-Atlantic Environmental Law Center, Wilmington, DE, and the research of Susan Mack, Widener Law School ’01, on this paper are acknowledged with gratitude.
Fifth, EPA resolved TMDL litigation in one-half dozen states by entering into consent decrees to backstop TMDL development. Circuit Courts for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits dismissed industry appeals of consent decrees in the Missouri and Virginia TMDL cases, due to lack of standing or ripeness.

Sixth, federal courts in the Maryland and New Jersey cases upheld EPA rationales for approving state § 303(d) lists of impaired waters (1) de-listing previously listed waters if the state “considers” but elects not to list the water, or (2) omitting arguably impaired waters when there is a lack of “quality assured data.” Yet courts in Hawaii and New Jersey reversed and remanded EPA list approvals when presented with irrefutable evidence of impairment. With lists for 2002 due in October, further litigation developments in this area are likely.

Seventh, federal courts in Maryland and New Jersey held EPA’s TMDL and listing decisions are not “rules” implicating notice and comment rulemaking under the APA.

Eighth, the court in the Maryland TMDL case ordered EPA to approve or disapprove a CPP for Maryland. Circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to show EPA has met this duty. Given the elevated role EPA now maintains that CPPs have in implementing TMDLs, they also could prove an active litigation area.

Ninth, courts in the Maryland and New Jersey TMDL cases agreed EPA’s TMDL and listing decisions trigger the ESA’s consultation requirements. Post decisional consultation, however, seems sufficient. Absent EPA national policy to subject § 303(d) decisions to § 7 ESA requirements, this area could engender further litigation.

Last, courts in the California and New Jersey TMDL cases did not deviate from the general principle that absent good cause or bad faith, discovery in TMDL cases is limited to the administrative record. The court in the Maryland TMDL case, however, ordered EPA to complete the record to include all documents the agency directly or indirectly considered, including e-mails. It also rejected EPA’s use of the deliberative process and joint defense privilege.

A new TMDL rulemaking may undo whatever progress TMDL litigation has spurred. Litigation surrounding EPA’s withdrawn 2000 TMDL rule has been suspended until at least March 2003. EPA has announced its intent to promulgate new rules that largely concede the program to state and industry interests. If EPA ever gets around to issuing a new TMDL rule, more litigation is certain.

The denouement of so much litigation that focused on TMDL efforts augers in a “seismic shift from the offense to the defense.”¹ The next Act in the Shakespearean tragedy the TMDL program has become is likely to be played out more often in state courtrooms.²

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² See Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths That Threaten the TMDL Program, 32 ELR 11133 (Sept. 2002) (“One inevitable truth emerges -- the only insurmountable problem with the TMDL program is the lack of political will, at both the state and federal levels, to implement it.”)
1. **The TMDL Program Applies to Waters Impaired by Nonpoint Sources.**

In a watershed decision affirming § 303(d) applies to all impaired waters, the Ninth Circuit upheld EPA's interpretation that § 303(d) must include waters impaired by point sources, nonpoint sources, or a combination of the two ("blended waters"). In Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1132-1133 (9th Cir. May 31, 2002) ("Pronsolino II"), the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court's holding that the TMDL program applies to waters that do not meet water quality standards solely because of nonpoint sources of pollution, and by extension, to blended waters. In Pronsolino et al. v. Marcus et al., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1338 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Pronsolino I"), EPA set a TMDL to reduce sediment loadings from silvicultural and agricultural runoff into the Garcia River, a water listed on California's § 303(d) list as impaired by sediment. Implementing the TMDL, California's Department of Forestry issued Pronsolino a timber-harvesting permit that required erosion and other controls to reduce sediment loadings. Pronsolino challenged EPA's authority to set the underlying TMDL, arguing § 303(d) does not apply to waters impaired solely by nonpoint sources. Pronsolino maintained nonpoint sources of pollution are only subject to § 319's voluntary program. Id.

The district court disagreed, holding "[n]o substandard river or water was immune [from § 303(d)] by reason of its sources of pollution." Id. at 1356. First, turning to the language of § 303(d), the court found both the listing and TMDL preparation requirements of § 303(d) apply to waters impaired solely by nonpoint sources. Id. at 1346-1347 ("[O]nly those [waters] redeemable through the imposition of state-of-the-art technology on point sources...were expressly excused from the [303(d)] list."). Moreover, the term "pollutant" specifically includes "sediment, regardless of whether it comes from a point source or a nonpoint source." Id. at 1352.3

The court extended its reasoning to waters impaired by both point and non-point sources ("blended waters"), with the exception of those for which effluent limitations alone were sufficient to achieve water quality standards. Id. at 1347 (finding waters impaired "regardless of pollution source ... were included in the universe for which listing and TMDLs were required.").

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3 As the Court noted, EPA identifies "‘all pollutants, under proper technical conditions, as being suitable for the calculation of total maximum daily loads.'" Id. at 1354 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 42303 (Sept. 20, 1978)). "‘Proper technical conditions' means ‘the availability of analytical methods, modeling techniques and databases necessary to develop a technology defensible TMDL.'" Id. at 1354 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 42303 (Sept. 20, 1978)).

4 The Court explained the relationship between the technology and water-quality based portions of the Act:

"The [CWA] superimposed the technology-driven mandate of point-source effluent limitations [on the pre-existing water-quality driven statutory scheme]. To assess the impact of the new strategy on the monumental clean-up task facing the nation, Congress called for a list of the unfinished business expected to remain even after application of the new cleanup strategy. In calling for such a list, it was unnecessary to reference nonpoint pollution. Any polluted waterway—whether its sources were point,
Second, the court held Pronsolino's position ill-served the remainder of § 303. Essential to the court's ruling was the belief that failing to include waters impaired by nonpoint sources would necessarily impede achievement of water quality standards, the CWA's "central objective." Id. The court viewed TMDLs as a necessary step in the achievement of § 303(c) water quality standards, regardless of pollutant source. It observed § 303(d) provides the "required engineering data" that must be "incorporated" into water quality management plans developed pursuant to the CPP. Id. at 1346-1347. ("To have excluded the large number of rivers and waters polluted solely by agricultural and logging runoff would have left a chasm in the otherwise 'comprehensive' statutory scheme.").

Third, the court ruled construing § 303(d) to include all impaired waters best protects state interests. The CWA left to the states to decide which land-management practices to adopt to mitigate nonpoint source pollution. Id. at 1355. But without TMDLs, states are unable to "evaluate and develop land-management practices to mitigate nonpoint-source pollution." Id. at 1347, 1355 ("California is free to select whatever, if any, land-management practices it feels will achieve the load reductions called for by the TMDL. California is also free to moderate or to modify the TMDL reductions, or even refuse to implement them, in light of countervailing state interests. Although such steps might provoke EPA to withhold federal environmental grant money, California is free to run the risk.").

Last, the court held nothing in § 319 preempts, conflicts or duplicates the listing and loading requirements of § 303(d). Id. at 1352. To the contrary, the court noted just as TMDLs must be incorporated into water quality plans under the state's CPP, TMDLs are needed for the planning required under § 319. Id. at 1354. Therefore, § 303(d) is consistent with § 319's aims. Id.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding § 303(d) applies "whether a water body receives pollution from point sources only, nonpoint sources only, or a combination of the two." Pronsolino v. Nasti, 291 F.3d 1123, 1132-1133 (9th Cir. May 31, 2002). The Ninth Circuit found EPA's reading of § 303(d) to be to be consistent with the statutory structure, purpose, language and intent of the CWA. Id. at 1135-1140. With a contrary interpretation, the Circuit reasoned, "it would be impossible to implement the applicable water quality standard." Id. at 1139. ("There is no statutory basis for concluding that Congress intended such an irrational regime."). The standard of review, whether under Chevron or Mead, would not have affected the outcome. Id. at 1132-1133. 5

nonpoint or a combination—had to be listed if it would not be cleansed by the new approach." Id. at 1347.

5 Appellants have filed a motion for rehearing en banc. See Susan Bruninga, Farm Groups Seek Rehearing of Case Allowing TMDLs for Polluted Waters, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1658 (July 26, 2002).
2. **EPA Has no Duty to Establish TMDLs Unless a State Explicitly Refuses to do Anything and EPA's Delay in Responding is Not Unreasonable**

Regardless of whether the constructive submission doctrine is viable in theory, most courts have refused to apply it unless (1) a state expressly refuses to do anything, and (b) EPA's delay in responding is unreasonable. Not surprisingly, in the last 18 months, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and courts in New Jersey, New York, Maryland and elsewhere, save one, have not found a set of facts suitable to apply the doctrine or its vestiges. In more or less reverse sequential order, here's the latest:

In *San Francisco Baykeeper v. Browner*, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14394 at *13 (9th Cir. July 17, 2002) the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court's refusal to invoke the constructive submission doctrine unless a state “clearly and unambiguously” indicates refusal “to submit any TMDLs and has no plans to remedy the situation.” *Id.* at *10*. In the Circuit's view, California's establishment of “some” TMDLs, coupled with its dedication of “substantial resources” to the development of its TMDL program, precludes the use of the constructive submission doctrine. *Id.* at *6*. Because California had completed more than 46 TMDLs as of the decision, agreed to an MOA with EPA to complete all TMDLs within 12 years, and allotted $7 million to TMDLs annually, the court found no indicia of an intent to do nothing. *Id.* at *10-13*. Therefore, the Circuit held the constructive submission theory did not apply. *Id.*

*Baykeeper* capped a series of recent federal decisions in New Jersey, Maryland and New York that under similar reasoning did not apply the constructive submission doctrine or otherwise order EPA to step in and set TMDLs for a recalcitrant state. First, the court in *American Littoral Society et al. v. EPA et al.*, 199 F.Supp. 2d 217, 238-242 (D. N.J. March 28, 2002) applied a tougher than *Baykeeper* “constructive submission” standard. Observing “the constructive submission doctrine is an exercise in judicial lawmaking, existing only by judicial gloss on the CWA,” the court holds it only applies when a plaintiff can prove (1) “both that a state submit no TMDLs and has no plan to remedy that total failure,” and (2) EPA’s corresponding delay in response is unreasonable. *Id.* at 241 (emphasis in original).

Meeting this standard seems all but impossible. To prove a state lacks *any* plan to do *any* TMDL, plaintiffs must demonstrate a state “entirely failed” to act, or has “flatly chosen not to act” based on the record EPA assembles (citations omitted). Worse still, the court conflates this standard with that for determining whether an EPA failure to step in is “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” and by extension, whether that failure may be “unreasonably delayed.” *Id.* In other words, CWA and APA claims seem to suffer the same fate regardless of circumstance.

The court thus had no trouble finding New Jersey had not “totally failed” to act. *Id.* at 242. It felt comforted by the State’s submission of at least one TMDL, coupled with proposed program rules on TMDLs, a performance partnership agreement “presumably” discussing

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6 The Circuit also held that a State does not need to submit a TMDL for an impaired water concurrent with that water's inclusion on the § 303(d) list. *Id.*
TMDL commitments, and an unenforceable New Jersey/EPA MOA to perform TMDLs within 15 years. Id. at *53.7

TMDLs developed prior to filing vitiate a constructive submission claim. In Hayes et al. v. Whitman et al., 264 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. August 29, 2001), the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision finding that Oklahoma submitted TMDLs, which EPA approved, before the lawsuit was filed; therefore, a constructive submission of "no TMDLs" had not occurred. The Circuit Court held the constructive submission theory "applies only when the state's actions clearly and unambiguously express a decision to submit no TMDL for a particular impaired waterbody." Id. at 1024. Finding "uncontradicted evidence ... that Oklahoma has submitted a number of TMDLs and is making progress toward completing about 1500 TMDLs over a twelve-year period," it held "a constructive submission claim is not viable." Id. at 1024.8

Second, in Sierra Club v. EPA, 162 F.Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2001)("Maryland II"), the court held EPA's decision not to step in and establish TMDLs in Maryland was not an abuse of discretion. Applying nearly the same legal standard it used earlier to dismiss the "constructive submission" claim, the court concluded it was not an abuse of discretion for EPA "to leave TMDL implementation in the hands of Maryland." Id. at 19. In the earlier action, the court held an EPA decision not to set TMDLs in Maryland satisfied the requirement that it "approve or disapprove" TMDLs, thus vitiating the constructive submission doctrine. Sierra Club et al. v. EPA et al., Civil Action 97-3838 (D. Md. September 13, 2000) ("Maryland I"), Slip op. at 20.

Following commencement of the action in 1997, EPA approved three TMDLs, agreed to a Memorandum of Agreement with a 12-year schedule for Maryland to set loads for the balance of the State's 250 WQLSs, and issued a decision that "EPA does not believe it is necessary at this time to develop TMDLs for the State of Maryland." The court held these developments amounted to an "approval" of Maryland's program, thus discharging any duty to approve or disapprove Maryland's TMDL submissions, whether constructive or not. Id. at 20 (duty discharged by EPA "clearly indicating its approval of the actual submissions, Maryland's decision not to submit other TMDLs at this time, and the state's schedule for developing TMDLs."). Instead, the court found, EPA's decisions were ripe for "abuse of discretion" review under the APA, paving the way for Maryland II. Id. at 21.

7 The Court decided the matter under the "constructive submission" theory even though it had already dismissed this claim. See American Littoral Society et al. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23044 at *10-11 (D.N.J. 1999) ("ALS I") (following NRDC II to hold EPA's decision whether to establish TMDLs in the face of inaction by the states was discretionary and, therefore, outside the scope of citizen suit enforcement). In ALS I, the Court instead invited further proceedings under plaintiffs' alternative claims that EPA's failure to set TMDLs in New Jersey was "unreasonable delay" under the APA. Id. at *17-18.

8 The Circuit Court dismissed plaintiffs' corresponding APA claim for EPA "unlawfully withholding" TMDL efforts because review of this claim was available, even when it proved unsuccessful, under the CWA's citizen suit section. Id. at 1027. Last, the Circuit Court upheld the lower court's discretion to refuse to allow plaintiffs to amend to add additional APA claims. Id.
Third, the serpentine path in the New York TMDL case ended with the court deciding EPA’s delay in setting TMDLs was neither “arbitrary” nor “unreasonable” under the APA. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("NRDC III"). In an earlier decision, the court accepted the validity of the “constructive submission” doctrine, and held state subjective “plans” to develop TMDLs was immaterial. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153, 157-158 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("NRDC I") However, the court denied the motions for summary judgment because a triable issue of fact existed regarding whether TMDLs had been created by the state and “whether they were adequate under 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) to prevent the triggering of the EPA's duties by a constructive submission.” Id. at 158.

The court in NRDC II dismissed plaintiffs’ “constructive submission” claim, concluding it is within EPA’s discretion to determine whether and when a “constructive submission” has occurred. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Fox, 30 F. Supp. 2d 369, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("NRDC II") ("EPA has at least some discretion to determine at what point it is appropriate to deem state inaction a ‘constructive submission’ meriting intervention.”) The court cited the lack of any express requirement in the statute for EPA to deem state inaction a constructive submission by any particular date and concluded that “inference upon inference” would be required to determine a precise date for EPA to exercise this implied duty to act in the face of inaction. Id. at 375-6. Instead, the court concluded EPA’s duties regarding submission and approval of TMDLs is discretionary subject to APA review. Id. at 377.

In NRDC III, the court held EPA’s actions were neither arbitrary nor unreasonably delayed. The court ruled EPA deciding not to deem a “constructive submission” of no TMDLs is not an abuse of discretion unless a state “refuses” to act. Id. at 538 (“EPA’s ‘deeming duty’ arises only in the face of complete nonfeasance by the State; i.e., in order to declare a constructive submission of inadequate TMDLs, EPA must conclude that the State is ignoring its TMDL obligation entirely.”).

The court then concluded New York had not “refused” to act. Id. at 542 (“Despite New York’s understandably slow pace in the face of EPA’s early neglect of the TMDL program, the record amply supported EPA’s conclusion that New York has not in the past ‘refused,” and is not presently ‘refusing,’ to act in furtherance of the TMDL program mandated by the CWA ...[S]o long as New York continues to participate actively and meaningfully in the effort to promulgate TMDLs ... the State has not ‘refused’ to act, and EPA therefore is under no duty to declare a ‘constructive submission’ of inadequate TMDLs by New York.”).

The court cited as instructive New York’s cooperation in satisfying its § 303(d) listing and TMDL obligations, though admittedly the State’s efforts only began in “earnest” after the lawsuit was filed. Id. at 539. The court also was swayed by future plans between EPA and the State to develop a substantial number of TMDLs and evidence that the State had submitted some TMDLs and “dedicated substantial resources to the problem.” Id. at 539-40. In addition, the court cited evidence the “TMDL program is in a state of flux,” that new TMDL regulations were under consideration, and that EPA’s current belief was that “the states reasonably require a total of 8 to 13 years to complete their TMDL development.” Id. at 540.
Furthermore, the court concluded that EPA’s decision to maintain a partnership and work with the State rather than declare a “constructive submission” was reasonable. Id. at 545. It observed: “plaintiffs are wrong to suggest that the court may punish defendants for any past inadequacies by interfering with EPA’s presently acceptable oversight of the TMDL program.” Id. at 548. The court refused to extend the “sense of temporal urgency” in the specific CWA deadlines to the judge-made “constructive submission” approach. Id. at 545 (“[I]t is not unreasonable for EPA to conclude that getting the job done right is preferable to getting it done quickly.”).

Last, the court was unconvinced of the relationship between the delay in developing TMDLs and harm to public health. Id. at 545-6. Hence, it was skeptical that justice delayed was justice withheld. Id. at 547 (finding requiring EPA to intervene would “interfere with EPA’s ability to order its own priorities and allocate its resources”). In addition, the court found the TMDL development schedule established by EPA and the state was reasonable. Id. at 547. Hence, the court found no reason to impose “intrusive equitable relief.” Id. at 547.

Exceptions exist when a state has done or is doing nothing. First, in Kingman Park Civic Association v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999), the court refused to dismiss the action under the constructive submission doctrine when the District of Columbia had not submitted any TMDLs prior to commencement of the action. Plaintiffs sued to force EPA to disapprove the District of Columbia’s “constructive submission” of no TMDLs and to establish TMDLs. Id. (“So important is Section 303(d) to the CWA’s overall structure that Congress compelled both the states and EPA to abide by strict, date-certain deadlines for submitting and implementing the TMDLs” and incorporate them into the state’s water-quality management plans under § 303(e)). The District had failed to submit any TMDL to EPA for approval in eighteen years, and only submitted its first TMDL four months after the plaintiffs submitted their notice of intent to file suit. Id. at 3.

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9 The Court explained EPA’s longstanding noncompliance was immaterial to the claim: “[a]s the Court’s sole power in this context is to require EPA to conform its present conduct to the law, EPA’s past noncompliance is irrelevant to the question of agency’s present compliance, and to whether the Court will grant the narrow relief prescribed by the Court ... Plaintiffs did not, and could not, acquire rights by virtue of EPA’s past failings, and the Court cannot, accordingly, provide any relief that goes beyond ensuring EPA’s present compliance with statutory mandates.” Id. at 536.

10 The Court admonished EPA that it “should not read this Opinion as inviting endless delay of the New York TMDL program ... The Court reminds both sides that the courthouse doors remain open, should defendants fail to require the State’s substantial compliance with the timetable set forth in the MOA [between EPA and New York establishing a TMDL development schedule].” Id. at 549.

11 The Court dismissed plaintiffs’ APA claims, finding them duplicative of the claims under the citizen-suit provision of the CWA that the Court had accepted as valid. Id. at 9.
In rejecting the EPA’s motion to dismiss, the court held that “a state’s consistent, longstanding failure to submit TMDL calculations can be construed as a submission that calls forth the Administrator’s nondiscretionary duties under § 303(d)(2) [of the CWA].” Id. at 2. It concluded that “[a]n eighteen-year failure to calculate and submit TMDLs constitutes a constructive—if not outright—determination that no TMDLs are necessary.” Id. at 6.

The court rejected EPA’s argument that, while it had a nondiscretionary duty to impose TMDL limits on states that submit incomplete or inadequate TMDLs, it has no duty to act if a state never submits a TMDL. Id. at 5-7 (“To interpret ‘submission’ in the excessively literal manner that EPA advocates is entirely unreasonable. Although EPA’s briefs are long on literalism, they are conspicuously short on reconciling their interpretation with the structure of the CWA and Congress’ intent ... [B]y enacting Section 303(d)(2), Congress has already made the policy choice of depriving the agency of all discretion over when it must approve or disapprove a state’s TMDL submission. In light of this choice, it is implausible that Congress would wish to preserve EPA’s discretion over establishing TMDLs when a state has essentially decided that no TMDLs are necessary.”). The court held “a state cannot immunize itself from the CWA’s important TMDL provisions through the simple expedient of refusing to submit TMDL calculations to the EPA.” Id. at 6. The case settled by consent decree.

Second, in Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210-1211 (D. Mont. 2000) (“Wild Swan III”), the court turned aside the State of Montana’s challenge to the court’s order for EPA to backstop TMDLs for nearly 900 waters. The case capped plaintiff’s multi-year effort to have EPA develop TMDLs for Montana’s 900 impaired waters. In Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1190 (D. Mont. 1999) (“Wild Swan I”), after rejecting application of the constructive submission doctrine and unreasonable delay claims, the court held that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to disapprove Montana’s submission of only 130 TMDLs for the approximately 3,000 it needed. Id. at 1195-6 (EPA “fail[ed] to meet the CWA’s requirement that states promptly develop TMDLs for the WQLSs they identify ... The tight deadline for submission of TMDLs [in the CWA] emphasizes an obvious congressional mandate that TMDLs be established in a matter of years, not decades.”).

12 While the Court accepted the plaintiffs’ constructive submission argument, it rejected the claim that EPA’s disapproval of a single TMDL submitted by the District of Columbia triggered EPA’s nondiscretionary duty to establish TMDLs for every water-quality limited segment in the District. Id. at 8-9.

13 The plaintiffs claimed EPA’s failure to identify Montana’s WQLSs and develop TMDLs constituted agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed in violation of APA § 706(1). The Court rejected this claim for the same reason it rejected the citizen suit claim: EPA’s approval of the state’s 1992 303(d) list and one TMDL in 1996 “cured EPA’s original failure to act” and mooted any duty to act created between 1979 and 1992 under the constructive submission theory. Id. at 1192 (“For agency action to be unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld, there must be a duty imposed upon an agency to undertake a particular action,” a duty which no longer existed after the state submitted, and EPA approved, a 303(d) list and a TMDL).
In the subsequent remedy ruling, the court refused to remand the matter to EPA for further proceedings because EPA continued to insist that it was not required to consider the pace at which TMDLs are submitted in deciding whether to approve a state's submission. Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201 (D. Mont. 2000) ("Wild Swan II") ("On the contrary, the Clean Water Act requires the EPA to consider pace .... "A TMDL must be developed quickly if it is to be useful in 'implement[ing] the applicable water quality standards'.") In Wild Swan II, the court refused to "create an escape hatch in the heart of the Act whereby both the State and the federal agency could frustrate Congressional imperatives simply by refraining from action." Id. at 1202. Thus, the court set a May 5, 2007 deadline for completion of "all necessary TMDLs" for all WQLSs. Id. at 1202.

The State of Montana moved to stay the order pending appeal, objecting primarily to the requirement that TMDLs be developed for WQLSs before any new or increased-discharge permits are issued to point sources on those segments. Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210-1211 (D. Mont. 2000) ("Wild Swan III"). In denying the request for the stay in Wild Swan III, the court explained "[t]o require the State to develop TMDLs before it issues new or increased-discharge permits is to require the State to proceed in the fashion it should have proceeded had it complied with the law for the past twenty-eight years. A requirement to abide by the law is not an 'injunction.'" Id. at 1211.

Moreover, rejecting the State's contention it would suffer irreparable harm if the order were not stayed, the court pointed out that the State had not completed a single TMDL in the year since the court rendered its summary judgment decision. Id. at 1211 ("Even when it has the fullest possible range of discretion, the State seems unable to act. These facts indicate that it is Plaintiffs, and the general public, who will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is granted."). The court thus held the order to be in the public interest. Id. at 1213. ("[t]he public interest is best served by prompt action, even any meaningful action, on the part of the State and EPA to comply with the law's charge. A stay is not in the public interest. ... Granting a stay would, in effect, condone the State's continued dereliction of duty.").

Decisions to order EPA to intervene should be based on the court's - and not a special master's - considered judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's adaptation of a 1998 "Report of Special Master" recommending EPA submit a schedule for establishing TMDLs for all of Louisiana's impaired waters. Sierra Club v. Browner, 257 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2001). The Circuit court was unconvinced a congested docket, the complexity of issues, and the extensive amount of time required for a trial constituted "exceptional conditions" that justified referring the merits to a special master. See Sierra Club v. Clifford, No. 96-0527, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16031 (E.D. La. June 16, 1998) (Report of Special Master) and Sierra Club v. Clifford, No. 96-0527, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15841 (E.D. La. Sept. 22, 1998) (Order adopting Report of Special Master and ordering EPA to file with the court within 90 days a reasonable schedule for establishing TMDLs for waters on Louisiana's 303(d) list, and to provide the Special Master with the administrative record for its most recent approval of Louisiana's 303(d) list so the Special Master could consider whether EPA's approval of the list was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law); and Sierra Club v. Clifford, No. 96-0527 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 1999) (Order granting summary judgment for plaintiffs on listing claims.) The case settled by consent decree.
3. **EPA Has No Duty to Ensure TMDLs Have Implementation Plans.**

The Eleventh Circuit recently held EPA does not need to ensure TMDLs have implementation plans. In *Sierra Club v. Whitman*, 296 F.3d 1021 (11th Cir. July 2, 2002) ("Georgia III"), the court held neither a 1997 consent decree nor the CWA requires EPA to ensure TMDLs have implementation plans and reasonable assurances of achieving standards. The district court entered the consent decree in 1997 for EPA to establish TMDLs for impaired waters in Georgia within seven years. A Sierra Club et al. v. Hankinson, No. 1:94-cv-2501-MHS (N.D. Ga. September 29, 2000) ("Georgia II") Slip op., at 3. In response to Sierra Club's subsequent motion to enforce the decree, the district court ordered the EPA to establish TMDLs for eight waters Georgia had removed from its list, and gave the state additional time to develop implementation plans for TMDLs already established.

Two years after entry of the decree, only one of the 124 impaired waters governed by the decree complied with standards. Id. at 11. Dissatisfied, plaintiffs moved the district court to reopen the decree and compel EPA to develop TMDL implementation plans and assurances. Id. at 7-12. Sierra Club believed to have TMDLs without implementation plans renders the process mere "academic exercises." It argued EPA knew implementation was part of the decree, and urged the district court to exercise its "authority under the Consent Decree to adjust the obligations of the parties in furtherance of the goals of the decree." Id. at 8. Alternatively, Sierra Club asserted that 1991 and 1997 EPA guidance documents, as well as EPA regulations and the CWA itself, contemplate implementation plans. Id. at 8. EPA argued neither the decree nor the CWA requires them implement TMDLs. Id. at 7, 9. EPA also urged the court to allow Georgia voluntarily to provide implementation plans by April 19, 2001, a process the state had agreed to undertake. Id. at 10.

The lower court deferred ruling to give the State time to complete development of implementation plans, as it had promised EPA it would do. Id. at 12. Thereafter, Georgia submitted implementation plans for each of the 124 impaired waters governed by the consent decree, and EPA then moved to dismiss plaintiffs' implementation argument as moot. Persuaded Georgia's plans were inadequate, however, the court held "TMDL implementation plans are required [of EPA] by the Consent Decree," and ordered EPA to "ensure" Georgia's implementation plans were adequate. Id.

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14 October 1997 Consent Decree modified an earlier 1996 Consent Decree that ordered TMDL establishment within five years.

15 The district court concluded that the Consent Decree required EPA to establish the eight contested TMDLs, despite the fact that Georgia had removed the eight listed waters from its Year 2000 § 303(d) list. Id. at 6 ("Removing the waters from the 2000 list does not remedy the violation of the Consent Decree's requirements regarding the TMDLs that were to be established in 1997. EPA cannot avoid its obligations to establish TMDLs by having listed waters removed from subsequent lists."). The Court noted that EPA already had established TMDLs for similarly impaired waters in another state, and EPA conceded they would be "fairly simple" to establish. Ibid.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. In Georgia III, 296 F.3d at 1021, the Eleventh Circuit determined (a) the court below modified the decree, and (b) the modification was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1021. First, the court held the district court’s actions modified the decree because “the decree as written and entered did not require EPA to prepare implementation plans for the TMDLs ... [and this requirement would] change[] the legal relationship of the parties by changing the command of the earlier injunction.” Id. at 1023 (internal citation omitted). Second, there was neither "a significant change either in factual conditions or in law," nor was "the proposed modification [] suitably tailored [any] changed circumstance." Id at 1024 (“Clean water may have been Sierra Club's motivation, its reason for bringing the lawsuit to begin with, but the bargain it struck with EPA which produced the consent decree was much more limited.”). Thus, the Circuit Court concluded, the lower court’s action constituted a modification that abused its discretion.\textsuperscript{16}

State litigation surrounding TMDLs looms large. For example, a court in California voided a permit that required “no-net loading" if no TMDL were set for dioxins by 2012 “because [it is] not a numeric limit" as required by the CWA. Communities for a Better Environment v. State Water Resources Control Board, Cal. Super. Ct., No. 319575 (July 19, 2002). A court in Texas decided that the City of Waco’s challenge to the potential issuance of future permits for confined animal feeding operations so long as they did not worsen the “status quo,” but before the State set a TMDL for affected streams, was ripe. City of Waco v. Texas Nat'l Res. Conservation Comm. et al., 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS *3231 (May 9, 2002). Cf., Lowes et al. v. Vermont Agency of Nat’l Res. (Conservation organizations challenge to Vermont Water Resources Board issuance of final decision granting Lowe's permit to discharge stormwater into impaired Potash Brook, a tributary of Lake Champlain, finding discharge would not exacerbate existing impairment) (July 2002).

4. EPA Has Wide Discretion to Approve TMDL Content.

Courts give EPA wide latitude to approve TMDL content. In NRDC et al. v. EPA et al., 268 F. 2d 91 (October 11, 2001) (“NRDC IV”), the Third Circuit largely upheld the lower court’s decision that EPA approval of a TMDL with an annual load and 10 percent margin of safety is not arbitrary and capricious. First, notwithstanding the language of § 303(d) (requiring “daily loads”), the Circuit Court ruled the “overall structure and purpose” of the CWA allowed EPA to approve a TMDL with annual phosphorus loads for New York City’s drinking water reservoirs. Id. at 98 (“We believe ... the term ‘total maximum daily load’ is susceptible to a broader range of meanings.”). The Circuit Court, however, remanded to EPA “to justify how the annual period of measurement takes seasonal variations into account” for the approved phosphorus TMDL. Id. at 99.

\textsuperscript{16} The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling is likely to have little, if any, practical impact. Prior to the ruling, EPA announced it had incorporated “implementation strategies” into Georgia’s TMDLs. See Susan Bruninga, Georgia TMDLs Have Implementation Plans, Despite EPA’s Claim They Are Not Required, 33 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 637 (Mar. 22, 2002).
Second, the Circuit Court upheld EPA's approval of New York's use of a 10 percent margin of safety, even though neither EPA nor the State provided a scientific or mathematical justification for the margin. Id. at 103 ("As long as Congress delegates power to an agency to regulate on the borders of the unknown, courts cannot interfere with reasonable interpretations of equivocal evidence.") (internal citation omitted). Last, the Circuit Court deferred to EPA's choice of what was the proper underlying water quality standard to implement. Id at 101. ("EPA's determination that New York can formulate its TMDL for phosphorus using an aesthetic criterion" is reasonable).

Similarly, the court in Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1184 (D. Mont. 1999) ("Wild Swan I"), rejected challenges to 129 TMDLs. The court found that the TMDLs included both wasteload allocations and load allocations, although (1) the load allocations could not be "precisely determined" due to data and technical limitations; (2) the state considered seasonal variation by calculating TMDLs for different seasons of the year and different environmental conditions; and, (3) the TMDLs provided a margin of safety because they were based on a "semi-worst case condition of low flow." Id.

The court also approved of "explicit or implicit" pounds per day limitations in most of the TMDLs, and found that the "averaging periods used in calculating [the] pounds per day limitations appear[ed] reasonable." Id. at 1195. It agreed that for some TMDLs "a mass per time designation was inappropriate due to the type of pollutant, such as temperature or fecal coliform bacteria." Id. at 1195.17

Most recently, members of the regulated community have started what will no doubt be numerous challenges to the content of TMDLs.18

5. EPA Settled By Consent Decree a Dozen More TMDL Cases; Industry Challenges to Consent Decrees Either Lack Standing or Are Not Ripe

EPA resolved TMDL litigation in a dozen states by entering into consent decrees to backstop TMDL development over a period of time varying in length from 1 to 13 years for

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17 The Court also found no fault with the state submitting TMDLs that were not in conformance with the § 303(d) priority designations, that is, for low priority WQLSs, because the TMDLs were necessarily developed as part of the process for issuing a point source discharge permit. Id. at *1195.

18 For example, a group of Southern California cities has filed a federal action challenging a TMDL that set a zero limit for trash in the Los Angeles River. See Carolyn Whetzel, 22 Cities Challenge Federal Rule Setting Zero Limit for Trash in Los Angeles River, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) (July 12, 2002).
cases in Hawaii (1 year, partial), D.C. and Montana (7), Iowa (9), Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, and Tennessee (10 each) Virginia (12), S. California and Florida (13).^{20}

The Eighth and Fourth Circuits have rejected industry challenges to consent decrees in the Missouri and Virginia TMDL cases. Most recently, the Eighth Circuit threw out an industry appeal to a consent decree on ripeness grounds. ACA et al. v. EPA et al., 289 F. 3d 509 (8th Cir. May 6, 2002) (“Missouri I”). In American Canoe Association v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. 98-1195-CV-W-SOW-ECF, (W.D. Mo. June 11, 1999) (“Missouri I”), the court denied EPA’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims that (1) EPA had improperly approved the 1998 § 303(d) list and had failed to exercise its mandatory duty to promulgate an acceptable § 303(d) list in the state’s place,^{21} and (2) EPA had a mandatory duty to promulgate TMDLs for impaired waters when the state failed to do so. The court held that EPA’s final approval of the 1998 § 303(d) list submitted by Missouri did not moot the case, adopting the reasoning in American Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. USEPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917-919 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“ACA I”). Slip op. at 5-6. The court in Missouri I also followed ACA I in holding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to force the defendants to act on the § 303(d) list and promulgate TMDLs under a “constructive submission” theory. Id. at 6-7 (citing ACA I, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 921 n. 14).^{22} Thus, the court ruled plaintiffs’ constructive submission claim survived dismissal. Id. at 7.

The court entered a consent decree to settle the case over Intervenor Missouri Soybean Association’s opposition. The Association maintained there is a lack of sufficient data and information to deem various waters as impaired for TMDL development on the decree’s operative list, including the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. The Association was concerned about what it considered the inevitable regulatory burden the decree would havoc on its members who discharged into listed waters. Nevertheless, the district court entered the decree, and the Soybean Association appealed.

The Eighth Circuit Court found the appeal not ripe, and dismissed it without prejudice. Missouri II at 513. The court held Association members would not be affected until TMDLs

^{19} The cities challenging the trash TMDL have also asked the court to set aside the consent decree. See Carolyn Whetzel, 22 Cities Challenge Federal Rule Setting Zero Limit for Trash in Los Angeles River, 33 Env’t Rep. (BNA) (July 12, 2002).


^{21} The State of Missouri submitted a list of 169 water-quality limited segments in 1998, which EPA approved. Id. at *4. The ACA and Sierra Club claimed the list was underinclusive, while the Missouri Soybean Association claimed it was overinclusive. Id. at *5.

^{22} In chastising the EPA for making the same legal arguments that had already been denied by the Virginia court, the Court expressed concern “that the EPA would make arguments that not only lack legal merit, but also lack common sense.” Id. at 9.
were established and implemented. Id. at 513. Regardless, speculative loss in property values was not sufficient hardship to warrant judicial intervention. Id.

Similarly, the Fourth Circuit threw out industry’s challenge to a consent decree for lack of standing. VAMWA v. ACA et al., Case No. 99-1981 (4th Cir. March 23, 2000) ("ACA IV"). Intervenor Virginia Association of Municipal Wastewater Agencies ("VAMWA") opposed the entry of a consent decree with an 11-year schedule for establishing TMDLs for impaired Virginia waters. American Canoe Association v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 54 F. Supp. 2d 621,625 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("ACA III"). Id. at 625. VAMWA asserted that without a judicial or EPA finding of constructive submission of no TMDLs, the consent decree violates regulatory requirements that EPA set the TMDL submission schedule in consultation with the State of Virginia. Id. at 625. In addition, VAMWA claimed that EPA is without authority to establish TMDLs in Virginia’s place if Virginia fails to comply with the TMDL schedule in the consent decree. Id. at 625.

The court in ACA IV found that EPA regulations do not require the state and EPA jointly to determine every particular of the TMDL submission schedule. Id. at 628. Because Virginia entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") that defined the "overarching schedules" for TMDL development, and the MOA schedule "merely refined by the consent decree," the court concluded that Virginia participated sufficiently in the process. Id. at 628. In addition, the court rejected VAMWA’s assertion that as long as Virginia made some incremental progress toward developing and submitting TMDLs for its waterways, EPA could not step in and establish TMDLs in its place. Id. at 628 ("EPA clearly has the authority to construe Virginia’s failure to comply with the decree’s TMDL schedule, if such failure should occur, as a constructive submission of no TMDLs [and promulgate its own TMDLs]."). The court observed that under VAMWA’s interpretation, “the requirements of the CWA could easily be rendered a dead letter by state subterfuge and recalcitrance.” Id. at 628.

The court also found the consent decree was fair to third parties, because it provided for the normal public notice and comment for proposed TMDLs and during the biennial § 303(d) listing process. Id. at 629.

VAMWA appealed, challenging both the jurisdiction of the court to enter an order for EPA to comply, EPA’s authority to submit to a court order constraining its discretionary authority, and various listing and TMDL obligations. VAMWA v. ACA et al., Case No. 99-1981 (4th Cir. March 23, 2000). Plaintiffs opposed jurisdiction on standing and ripeness grounds. Plaintiffs first argued VAMWA had failed to carry its burden to prove standing; VAMWA had not submitted any evidence demonstrating injury in fact, causation or redressability, or how its objectives were germane the Association’s purposes, or why its challenge did not need to be brought by individual members of the Association. Id. In the alternative, plaintiffs contended VAMWA’s opposition was not yet ripe because VAMWA’s issues were not fit for review, and withholding review would not impose a hardship to VAMWA or its members. Following full briefing on the merits, the Fourth Circuit summarily dismissed the appeal without elaboration on standing grounds. VAMWA v. ACA et al., Case No. 99-1981 (4th Cir. March 23, 2000)(Order dismissing VAMWA’s appeal for “lack of standing”).

Recent cases in New Jersey, Maryland, Montana and Hawaii indicate the reluctance of judges to overturn EPA's discretion concerning a listing decision unless plaintiffs produce data accepted as quality assured or a state provides no support for a listing decision.

Despite finding plaintiffs had standing to pursue their listing claims, except for five waters impaired by toxics, the court in the New Jersey case dismissed all challenges to EPA's approval of the State's 1998 list because the State provided "good cause" to exclude waters. ALS et al. v EPA et al., 199 F.Supp 2d 217 (D. N.J. March 28, 2002). The court sanctioned New Jersey's "rationale" to omit waters absent "quality assured data" showing ongoing impairment. Id. at 234. Thus, the court upheld EPA's approval despite the omission of 25 waters on New Jersey's § 319 Nonpoint Source Impairment Report, ("based on the supplementation of preliminary information with subsequent intensive data"), as well as 30 waters from its § 304(l) Toxics Hot Spots "long list" ("[i]nsofar as waters listed under section 304(l) due to toxics impairment are concerned, the long list merely duplicates the final short and mini lists."). Id. at 236. Nonetheless, the court granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment to add five toxic hot spots EPA had "inadvertently" omitted from New Jersey's 1998 list. Id. n. 11 (and accompanying text).

The court also upheld EPA's approval of listing omissions despite New Jersey's withholding of data and information showing impairment of antidegradation and thermal standards. Id at 237. The court noted that plaintiffs had not produced "evidence," presumably "quality assured data," of ongoing violations of either thermal standards ("plaintiffs have failed to identify any § 316(a) waters that are impaired or threatened by thermal discharges") or antidegradation requirements. Id. at 238. ("Because EPA's decision is presumed valid and Plaintiffs bear the burden of overcoming this presumption, Plaintiff's failure to provide any evidence to support their position provides no basis" for reversal.).

Similarly, the court in Sierra Club v. EPA, 162 F.Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2001), rejected plaintiffs' challenge to EPA's approval of Maryland's list, citing a lack of empirical information proving omitted waters failed to meet water quality standards. Unless plaintiffs produce "evidence" to the contrary, the court held states do not need to list waters identified as (a) impaired on a State's 305(b) Water Quality Inventory if "there is no data showing actual impairment ... or that existing pollution controls are insufficient", (b) "toxic hot spots," without "evidence that any of the omitted waters remain impaired," (c) impaired by federal agencies, if the State provides an "adequate explanation", or (d) violating thermal or anti-degradation WQSs where plaintiffs did not identify impaired waters. Id. at 414-416. As plaintiffs did not produce independent evidence the contested waters currently did not meet standards, the court dismissed the claim.

23 "The present case is not one in which an organization's members allege stigmatic injury in the form of members' mere knowledge that waters are polluted." Id. at 232-232 (listing specific injuries).
Thus plaintiffs’ burden to show impairment is a heavy one. In Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1191 (D. Mont. 1999) (“Wild Swan I”), the court declined to overturn EPA’s approval of Montana’s 1998 § 303(d) list despite the omission of 83 streams plaintiffs identified as impaired during the public comment period. Id. at 1193. In the court’s view, EPA’s decision should be upheld if the state provides a “reasonable basis” not including the segments. Id. at 1193-4 (“Although states are required to ‘assemble and evaluate’ all existing and readily available data and information in developing lists of WQLSs, a state can discount or reject certain data and information as long as it provided a reasonable basis for doing so.”) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(5); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(6)(iii)). As plaintiffs’ data was not in a readily usable form and required the state to collect additional data, the court upheld EPA’s approval. Id. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the list’s priorities, public process, and contention EPA has a duty to assess the quality of state waters.

The court also decided that a state’s submission of an inadequate list does not trigger any CWA mandatory duties for EPA. Instead, the court ruled, any challenge to a list approval should be pursued under the APA. Id. at 1191.

24 The plaintiffs complained that several streams with native trout should have been designated “high priority,” and the failure to do so showed that nonpoint source pollution was not properly considered. Id. at 1194 (“States are required to consider the severity of the pollution in the waterbody and the beneficial uses offered by the waterbody in assigning priority rankings to waterbodies.”). Because the state had ranked some cold water fisheries as high priority, and explained in response to public comments that it considered the health of native fisheries in the prioritization process, the Court found EPA’s approval of the priority ranking was not arbitrary and capricious. Ibid.

25 The Court rejected plaintiffs’ contention EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the § 303(d) list, alleging Montana had inadequately responded to comments the plaintiffs had submitted during the public comment period. Id. at 1194-5. (“Although EPA regulations require states to ‘involve’ the public in the process of identifying WQLSs, the regulations do not specifically require states to respond to every comment they receive from the public.”).

26 The plaintiffs maintained that EPA’s approval of the § 303(d) list and TMDLs was arbitrary and capricious because of inadequate monitoring and assessment. Id. at 1192. The Court found, however, held “neither the CWA nor the EPA regulations require a state to assess all of its waterbodies before making a submission of WQLSs.” Id. at 1193. The lists only need to reflect “existing and readily available water quality-related data and information.” Id. at 1193 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(5)).

27 The Court rejected the argument that EPA had unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed agency action, and that EPA’s approval of the 1998 § 303(d) list was arbitrary and capricious due to failure to identify all of Montana’s impaired waters, failure to include certain segments on the list, failure to consider the effect of nonpoint source pollution on cold water fisheries, failure to adequately respond to public comment, and inadequate TMDL content. Id. at 1187.
A reversal is warranted when a State provides no basis for de-listing previously listed waters. In Hihiwai Stream Restoration Coalition ("HSRC") v. Whitman, Civil Action No. 00-00477 (D. Ha. September 5, 2001), the court found arbitrary and capricious EPA’s approval of Hawaii’s 1998 list. The court ruled EPA should not have approved Hawaii’s 1998 list after Hawaii removed most of the waters it listed in 1996 without producing new supporting data or information. Slip Op. at 10. Compelling to the court was that Hawaii’s 1998 list, which identified only 10 impaired waters, was based on identical data used for the 1996 EPA approved list, which identified 69 impaired waters. Slip Op. at 12. EPA approved the 1998 list based on the State’s unsubstantiated representation that “too little quantitative information is available for most of the impaired waters to base listing decision [sic] on quantitative decision criteria.” Id. at 13. Noting Hawaii’s “assessments were replete with information indicating that the waters were polluted,” the court was not persuaded by a 10-page EPA explanation of the basis for its approval. Id. at 16.

EPA’s role is more than one of oversight. The court refused to accept EPA’s position that the agency’s role reviewing lists “is one of oversight … merely to ensure that the State is properly exercising its discretion,” and that the court’s “role here is merely to pay substantial deference to the EPA’s decision, who in turn pays substantial deference to the State’s decision.” Id. at 13. To the contrary, the court reasoned, it could not “ignore what has become clear evidence of either an arbitrary decision, or a capricious error.” Id. at 12-13. The court remanded EPA’s approval back to the agency "to carefully reconsider Hawaii's submitted 1998 303(d) list, and to do so consistently with the law … so that remand here is not a hollow remedy.” Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).

State courts may prove the laboratory for listing issues. A state administrative law judge upheld a Florida rule that allowed a two-step process for listing impaired waters. Lane v. Department of Environmental Protection, Fla. DOAH Case No. 01-1332 RP (May 13, 2002). The rule allows the State to place “potentially” impaired waters on a “planning list,” but not have the waters “verified” for listing under § 303(d) until after the State evaluates the underlying data. Id. The West Virginia Court of Appeals found the state Environmental Control Board exceeded its authority when it reviewed and overturned the Virginia Department of Environmental Protection’s inclusion for biological impairment of the Upper Blackwater River, reasoning such a challenge should instead be to EPA’s approval of the TMDL. Monongahela Power Co. et al. v. Virginia Dept. Env’t Prot. et al., 2002 W. Va. LEXIS 129 (Sup. Ct. App. W. Va. July 1, 2002). Accord, Missouri Soybean Assn. v. Missouri Clean Water Comm., 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 49 (W.D. Ct. App. Mo. January 15, 2002); Cf. City of Rehobeth v. Delaware Dept. of Nat’l Res. & Env’t Control, 2000 Del. Super. LEXIS 73 (Feb. 29, 2000)(Finding State Environmental Appeals Board had jurisdiction to hear challenge to TMDL set for Inland Bays in Southern Delaware).

7. EPA TMDL and Listing Decisions do Not Trigger Notice and Comment Rulemaking.

The court in Maryland II found EPA’s decision to approve or disapprove lists and TMDLs is not a “rule” triggering “notice and comment” rulemaking under § 553 of the APA. Id. at 420 (“it is only the actual development of the list or load that is rule making.”) Accord, New Jersey II, supra. Most state courts have thus far reached the same conclusion. See e.g., Missouri Soybean Assn. v. Missouri Clean Water Comm., 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 49 (W.D. Ct. App. Mo. January 15, 2002) (Finding State’s development of list not rulemaking under state law).
8. **EPA Must Approve or Disapprove a State Continuing Planning Process.**

A recent case in Maryland underscores EPA's mandatory duty to approve or disapprove CPPs for each state. The court in *Maryland II*, supra, held EPA had never approved or disapproved a CPP for Maryland, and ordered it to do so within 90 days. *Id.* at 421. It rejected EPA's reliance on circumstantial evidence (the preamble to the 1985 TMDL rule) to prove it had performed this duty. *Id.*

9. **EPA TMDL and Listing Decisions Trigger ESA Consultation.**

Recent cases in Maryland and New Jersey confirm that EPA’s decisions about TMDLs, lists and water quality standards are subject to § 7 of the ESA’s “consultation” requirements. The court in *Maryland II* held EPA had failed to comply with ESA § 7 requirements prior to approving Maryland’s WQSs and §303(d) submissions, ordered EPA to comply, and demanded future adherence. *Id.* at 423 ("EPA is to abide by the ESA in any future actions it may take in regard to Maryland’s duties under the Clean Water Act."). Though assuming the § 7 applied, the court in the New Jersey case dismissed as moot the ESA claim because five years into the litigation EPA finally initiated consultation. *New Jersey II*, 199 F. Supp.2d. at 244-248.

10. **Discovery is Limited to the Administrative Record Absent Good Cause, But the Record Must be Complete**

Barring exceptional circumstances, courts are hesitant to allow discovery outside of the administrative record in TMDL cases. In *Baykeeper* and *ALS*, the courts repeatedly turned asunder plaintiffs’ efforts to conduct discovery outside the record and to strike unsubstantiated, layered hearsay statements EPA added to its TMDL record virtually at will. *Baykeeper* at *21-22 (allowing EPA submission of unreviewable “Program Review Document”); *New Jersey II* at 228-229 (allowing EPA submission of numerous extra-record EPA affidavits reporting results of telephone conversations with unnamed sources allegedly explaining New Jersey’s TMDL plans).

In *American Canoe Association v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency*, 46 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("ACA II"), EPA moved for a protective order limiting discovery to the administrative record. *Id.* at 474. The plaintiffs had sought extra-record discovery, including interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents. *Id.* at 474. The court determined that judicial review of CWA and ESA citizen suit claims is limited to the administrative record in most circumstances, just as APA claims are so limited. *Id.* at 475-477. The court imposed this limitation because the citizen suit provisions themselves provide no standard for judicial review, and legal authority holds “uniformly” that the standard of review governing CWA and ESA citizen suits is the APA standard of review. *Id.* at 475-6. As a result, the court held “discovery in plaintiffs’ CWA and ESA citizen suits are properly limited to APA record review.” *Id.* at 477.

Nevertheless, the court recognized that some circumstances could justify expanding the record or permitting discovery, including “a failure in the record to explain administrative action as to frustrate judicial review, the agency’s reliance on materials or documents not included in
the administrative record, or the need to supplement the record to explain or clarify technical
terms or other difficult subject matter included in the record.” Id. at 477.

Courts have, however, ordered completion of the record when EPA acts beyond the pale. The Federal District Court for the District of Maryland ordered additional discovery and production after rejecting EPA’s varied attempts to shield information from the record. The court in Sierra Club et al. v. EPA et al., Civil Action 97-3838 (D. Md. September 13, 2000) granted plaintiffs’ motion to compel e-mails, communications with Maryland, and other withheld materials. The court ordered EPA to review and either produce relevant e-mail messages (“Reviewing hundreds of e-mail documents is not unduly burdensome upon the federal agency and, without reviewing the documents, the EPA is without persuasive grounds to argue that the messages are not relevant.”), or identify withheld e-mails on a privilege log. Id. at 28. The decision enforced an earlier order that EPA complete the to include “all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by the agency regarding the merits of agency action.” Sierra Club et al. v. EPA et al., Civil Action 97-3838 (D. Md. July 20, 1999).

The court in the Maryland case also rejected EPA’s assertion of both the Deliberative Process Privilege ("the EPA’s communications with a state government entity are not afforded an exemption under the deliberative process privilege because they are not internal communications") and Joint Defense Privilege (finding communications with Maryland were “prepared in the ordinary course of EPA’s business.”). Id. at 30. Last, the court ordered EPA to produce “all reasonably segregable factual material in any privileged document.” Id. at 32 (emphasis in original).

Challenge to TMDL Rule Stayed Until at Least March 2003

Meanwhile, the mega-challenge to EPA’s withdrawn July 2000 TMDL rule was in turn suspended until March 2003 to allow EPA to consider revisions to the rule. In the summer of 2002, EPA announced plans to propose a new rule that gives the states even more leeway over listing and TMDL decisions, and responds to industry interests by allowing for open pollutant trading, and by shifting TMDL implementation almost entirely to whatever water quality management plans a state may have developed under its CPP. Any new rule is bound to be challenged no matter the content.

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28 American Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Whitman, No. 00-1320 (D.D.C. July 18, 2000). See Houck, at 10404 (“it is likely that the Agency will, in the end, concede most if not all of the industry complaints.”).
29 See Malone at 11135.