Horace William Brindley Joseph (1867–1943)

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to make interpersonal comparisons: "The tippler may esteem two pints of beer doubly as much as one; the hero may feel double satisfaction in saving two lives instead of one; but who shall weigh the pleasure of a pint of beer against the pleasure of saving a fellow-creature's life?" (p. 526). On this matter, Jevons sided with Bentham and opposed Mill. He argued that all types of pleasure might be reduced to measurable quantities in terms of (1) intensity; (2) duration; (3) certainty or uncertainty; (4) propriety or remuneration; (5) pecuniary (the "chance that pleasures have of being followed by sensations of the opposite kind"); and (6) extent (the "chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind") and (7) extent (the number of people affected) (p. 527).

To secure happiness at the individual level, one chooses the course that is "likely to —that is, will in the majority of cases—bring happiness" (Jevons, 1879, p. 529). Here, Jevons begins sharply to part company with Mill, maintaining that the apparently qualitative difference between "high" and "low" pleasures might be analysed in terms of quantities along the lines of the Benthamite characteristics listed above. Supposing pleasures differ only in quantities, then the social happiness created by various policies might be quantified and compared to reveal which policy would generate the most overall happiness. Jevons argued, for instance, that one might use this method to compare the happiness associated with a library to that of a race track.

It was a higher pleasure to build a Free Library than to establish a new Race Course; not because there is a Free-Library-building emotion, which is essentially better than a Race-Course-establishing emotion, each being a simple unsatisfiable feeling, but because we may, after the model of inquiry given by Bentham, resolve into its elements the effect of one action and the other upon the happiness of the community (p. 533).

On balance, although he was cautious in this regard, Jevons took a step towards a cardinal approach to utility. While he recognized that individual utility was difficult, perhaps impossible, to measure, he maintained that it might be measured indirectly from its effects. More than this, social utility entails broader concerns than individual actions in a marketplace, is said to involve a subjective weighing of a wide range of pleasures and pains. Here, Jevons called his intertemporal and interpersonal weighting of the balance of utility. So, in State in Relation to Labour (1882), he suggested that policy makers who aimed to enhance the general happiness must consider the "economia" and "moral," "sanitary" and "political" probabilities associated with any policy (Jevons, 1882, p. 30). For this, intertemporal comparisons of utility (at a point in time and over time) would be necessary. "It is not sufficient to show by direct experiment or other inconceivable evidence that an addition of happiness is made. We must also assure ourselves that there is no equivalent or great subtraction of happiness,—a subtraction which may take effect either as regards other people or subsequent times" (p. 28).

Like utilitarian political economists before him, Jevons's utilitarianism was characterized reform-minded. He urged that "social transformation would be too great to be commenced and attempted" provided one could be "clearly shown to lead to the greatest happiness of the community" (Jevons, 1882, p. 11). On utilitarian grounds, the "State is justified in passing any law, or even in doing any single act which without ulterior consequences, adds to the sum total of happiness." Good done is sufficient justification of the act, in the absence of evidence that equal or greater evil will subsequendy follow" (p. 12). With an abundance of water, the marginal utility of water is small, but the utility of diamonds ensures that their marginal utility is high. As Jevons put it in a memorable passage in The Theory of Political Economy, "we must carefully discriminate between the true utility belonging to any commodity and utility belonging to any particular portion of it. Thus the total utility of the food we eat consists in maintaining life, and may be considered as infinitely great; but if we were to consume a tenth part from what we eat daily, no loss would be but slight" (Jevons, 1871, p. 65). This deep integration of utility with economic explanations of behaviour doubtlessly increased the attractiveness of the utilitarian philosophy to economists, as it seemed a simple matter to go from explaining how individuals maximize their well-being to explaining how societies could maximize the well-being of maximizing agents.

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Further Reading
David Levy
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and Sandra Pearl
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See also BENTHAM, JEREMY; CARDINAL UTILITY; ECONOMICS, INTERPERSONAL UTILITIES; MAXIMIZATION; MEASUREMENTS OF UTILITY; MILL, JOHN STUART; PAINS; PLEASURES; POLITICAL ECONOMY; WELFARE (WELFARE).

JOSEPH HORACE WILLIAM BRINDLEY (1867-1943) Horace William Brindley Joseph was born on 28 September 1867 in Chatham, Kent. He was educated at Chalons grammar school in Wimborne, Allhallows School, Hoxton, Winchester College, and New
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College, Oxford, where he obtained firsts in classical moderations (1888) and literae humaniores (1890). In 1891, he was elected a fellow of New College, where he lectured in philosophy. Joseph had a profound grasp of Classical thought, one that went beyond the theoretical. His first major publication was The Labour Theory of Value in Karl Marx (1832), while in moral philosophy he published Some Problems in Ethics (1931)—intended as a contribution to a dis-
cussion begun by his friend H. A. Prichard in an article in Mind in 1931, entitled "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?"—and continued in his inaugural lecture Duty and Interest (1829). Prichard took the intentional position to reject utilitarian ethics and argues that our obligation to perform a right act is simply because it is right divorced from any further claims as to its goodness. Against this, Joseph maintained that both morality and what counts as "good" matter in char-
acterizing actions as right. Further, in dis-
missing G. E. Moore's "ideal utilitarianism," Joseph employed the Platonistic doctrine of an absolute good, whose form determines how our good ought to be, to offer a criteria between a rigid distinction between the "right" and the "good" and a utilitarianism that reduced "right" conduct to a choice of means to achieve the end of satisfying desire.

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"Utility is the mother of justice and equity." Jeremy Bentham proposed this line from

Hobbes (1651) synthetized and elaborated these tra-
ditions. He argued that the only secure escape from a condition of perpetual, deadly social conflict is for individuals mutually to reli-
quish their rights of private judgment and deem the judgment of an all-powerful sover-
agent as public reason for all, on the condition that the sovereign gives its command the shape of general, publicly accessible, mani-
factured authentic laws, administered by judges accountable to the sovereign. The sovereign is bound to secure the peace and welfare of individual members of the commonwealth through the instrumentality of laws which, those members are bound by their covenant to obey, unless doing so directly risks death. Natural law principles guide these efforts, but the sovereign must be above civil law and answerable no human judge for them.

Like Hobbes, Hume thought law's pri-
mary task was to "cut off all occasions of discord and confusion" (Hume, p. 322), but he modeled law more after informal custom than sovereign commands. Convention, emerging over time from intelligent social interplay, rather than contract, lay at the foundations of law: informal social prac-
tices, endorsed and extended by courts and markets, supply the rules of law. As social cooperation enables small groups to thrive and expand, natural relations based on trust and propriety become strained and less per-
sonal and more formal devices are needed to do, instead, and enforce the informal con-
tacts that initially governed social rela-
tions. Formal legal institutions supplement the less supplant informal conventions of justice. Hume argued, and the ground of both is public utility—"mutual benefit arising from a stable system of social cooperation securing possession of resources necessary for survival and a decent social life. The special utility of conventions of justice arises from their systematic independence, working together like stones in a gorgeous wall. Thus, although adherence to the rules sometimes appears to disserve public utility, the rules secure the systemic benefits they promote only if they are followed without exception.

In the 1770s, Bentham set out to "re-
ner the fabric of felony by the hands of reason and law" (Bentham, 1770, p. 11). Learn-
ing from Hume to take public utility as the measure of all vice and from Hume to focus his energies on law, Bentham forged a public philosophy in which the principle of utility figured as the fundamental principle of institutional design and law as the all-purpose instrument for broad-scale social and political reform. He began his career with a reflection on the foundations of petal civil, but deep problems encountered in this project forced him to take an increasingly wider view, which eventually encompassed procedural, evidential, constitutional, and international laws, and resulted in the most comprehensive, systematic, and sophisti-
cated articulation of utilitarian jurispru-
dence in the history of legal theory.

Two supplementary notions ground Ben-

thm's theory: utility and publicity. Legisla-
tions must formulate satisfactions of public acts in terms addressed to the community, he argued. To this end, their judge-
ments must transcend arbitrary sentiments and more say so ("stated") and find expression in a language of publicly accessi-
ble reason. Reasons of utility viewed impartially, regarding the happiness of each person as if of equal standing and importance, in his, shone much this demand. Moreover, when designing legal institutions, legislators must fix attention on promoting the uni-

versal interest—interests common to every