Global and regional determinants of regime type: Pakistan

Jakob A Friedman
Global and regional determinants of regime type: Pakistan

Senior Project submitted to

The Division of Social Studies

at Bard College

By

Jakob Arthur Friedman

Annandale-on-Hudson, New York

May 2014
I would like to thank all the people who made this project possible. It is with great honor that I thank all of the professors of the Political Studies and Social science department at Bard College who have helped me through my academic career here. Firstly, my advisors James Ketterer, and Roger Berkowitz, as well as Sanjib Baruah, professor of South Asian studies. It was through their advice that I was able to create a final project that I can be proud of. My family; My brother Max, my parents Marty and Melissa, and my Aunt Hannah to whom I owe everything for providing me with the love and support I needed to complete my project and pursue higher education. Without them I could have never come this far. Finally I would like to thank all of my friends who showed support throughout this process: Leo, Nick, Harrison, Max, Tatanka, Justin, Brigette, Cassidy, Amelia, Naja, Sydney, Caia, Dalia, Ian, Wyler, Sebastian, Alan, Dylan, Zeke, Casay, Cy, Olmo and Alessio.
Table of Contents

4     Introduction
33    Chapter 1: Zulfikar Bhutto, General Zia and the Islamization of Pakistan
42    Chapter 2: The Transition to Democracy
58    Chapter 3: A Return To Military Governance
75    Chapter 4: Musharraf and the War on Extremism
101   Chapter 5: The End of Military Rule and a Return to Civilian Governance
118   Conclusion- Looking Forward
124   Sources Cited
Abstract: Traditional fields of study for international relations (IR) scholars have revolved around the question of how regimes interact with one another in the international sphere. This paper deals with answering the question of how regimes emerge in the first place. To this end, there are two competing narratives in IR, which seek to explain the origins of regime type. The first is that regimes are shaped entirely by a given nation's regional security concerns, the other is that regimes emerge in response to global political paradigms. Throughout the exploration of the political history of Pakistan, this paper seeks to explain how in most nations, like in Pakistan, regimes emerge due to a variety of factors both regional, and global. These factors shift in relative importance over time. When regional concerns become more pressing, global concerns have less of a direct effect on individual regimes, and vice versa. By looking at Pakistan, a nation directly impacted by both the Cold War, and the Global War on Terror, its tumultuous modern history can be explained through tracking the fluctuation of security concerns both regional and global that have allowed certain regimes to flourish while condemning others to failure.

How do regimes emerge? This is perhaps the most essential question surrounding societies and governance since the beginning of recorded time. In looking at regime type, and the available literature on regime type, one quickly finds that most political thinkers concern themselves with the interrelation between certain types of regimes within the international arena. Work on so-called “democratic peace theory”, and other theories, which seek to predict the behavior between nations with particular forms of governance, seem to miss a vital point about regimes themselves.¹ There is a tension between global and regional affairs, and it is this tension, which I believe is the catalyst for regime change. This is often ignored in favor of oversimplifying, all-encompassing theories that seek to explain global politics as having been entirely a product of a singular cataclysmic event, such as the Cold War, or World War Two.² Although these events very tangibly shaped global politics, they provided an impetus for a shift in the global paradigm, while regional

¹ Correa, Hector. *A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Relationship between Type of Government and Propensity to Peace and War*. 89.
² Waltz, Kenneth. *Structural Realism After the Cold War*. 24
affairs truly gave shape to the government that would emerge in any given nation. This tension between global paradigms and regional affairs is not constant, and fluctuates over time. It is for this reason that findings concerning one era cannot be re-applied to answer questions about new case studies that emerge, as the pull of global forces can be at times greater than that of regional actors, while this dynamic is reversed at other points in time.

With something that changes over time such as the forces influencing a given nations regime type, charting those changes across time then becomes an important measure, when trying to identify the forces contributing to regime change. For this reason, this paper is structured into five parts, divided by time period, and observing the shifting influence of both regional actors, such as India and Afghanistan, and international (hegemonic) actors, such as the US and the Soviet Union, on Pakistan. This begins in part one from the 1971 war with India over the fate of East Pakistan, to the late 1980’s with the death of Pakistan’s most prolific military leader; General Zia. The second part of this paper begins after Zia’s death in 1988, in the period of democratic governance that lasted up until 1999, shared between Nawaz Sharif, and Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the late Zulfikar Bhutto. The third part focuses on the 1999 military coup by Pervez Musharraf, and a return to military governance, which lasted until 2008. The fourth part follows the Musharraf regime from post September 11th, with the reentrance of the U.S. into Afghanistan, up until 2008. The fifth part of the paper starts in 2008 with the departure of Musharraf, with the return to civilian governance and goes up until 2013 with the return of Nawaz Sharif. Each of these sections are divided by what I see as a distinct shift in regime type due to a shift in the dynamic between foreign intervention and regional security concerns for a particular

---

3 Fawcett, Louise. *International Relations of the Middle East.* 198
4 Singh, Baljit. *India’s Security Concerns: National, Regional, and Global.* 347
time period. I have found that when foreign intervention and interests are involved, the political climate of South Asia becomes far less stable and cohesive, and Pakistan, as a result of outside intervention remains authoritarian, while western politicians call for democracy.\(^5\) At no time has any nation been afflicted by exclusively regional or only global conceptions of security, it always has been, and always will be a mix of both.

This paper is a cross case comparison, however unlike most literature which seeks to compare one nation to another, I found that it could be just as effective to look at one particular nation, treating different time periods in that nation’s history as entirely separate cases. The litmus test I have used to delineate one time period from another is a change not only in regime type, but also in balance of powers. For this reason, I separate a period of democratic rule from one of military rule, but also distinguish military backed rule from pure civilian government. Where the military is clearly in charge, albeit informally, it is important to talk about that influence, recognizing the limitations of a civilian government constrained by an empowered military staff. It is also for this reason that it is important to keep in mind that no two regimes are exactly alike, even within the same nation. The Zia military government of the 80’s was distinct from the Musharraf administration of the early 2000’s, as were the Bhutto and Sharif governments of the early 90’s, from the Sharif government and Zardari governments of the late 2000’s. To distinguish between these time periods it is also important to follow the amendments to the Pakistani constitution that have been passed over the years, most notably the 18\(^{th}\) amendment, that which gives the president the power to dissolve parliament, and has been the most instrumental legal tool for military backed political leaders to depose civilian

governments, repealed in 2010 giving shape to a new organization of power that remove the powers of the president to dissolve the national assembly, and places power in the hands of the regional governments.  

This shifting dynamic is exemplified by almost every nation, but in no other nation is this constantly fluctuating dynamic of both outside, and internal forces influencing regime type clearer than in Pakistan. Influenced from its inception by India and its foreign policy, Pakistan has tried with all of its strategic capabilities to resist a condition of Indian hegemony in South Asia. Attempts to balance have resulted not only in Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan, but also in the disputed Kashmiri territory in an attempt to pacify its neighbor. These are examples of the regional issues impacting Pakistan, and have given rise to nationalist regimes throughout Pakistani history, which existed to maintain some semblance of a cohesive state despite the many internal forces pulling it apart.

Most of the literature around Pakistani politics revolves around micro-level views that frame Pakistan as a two dimensional nation, in constant conflict with India, and holds that India has been the main protagonist in the evolution of Pakistan. This is a view that breaks down once you look beyond the immediate security concerns of Pakistan and observe that it has been a shifting dynamic of both regional, and global threats that have shaped the Pakistani state. It is true that the India-centric view of Pakistan does have a great deal of validity, as India has been a major player in defining Pakistani identity both in contrast ethnically, and politically. This however fails to explain the emergence of

---

6 Siddiqui, Dr. Shadid. *18th Amendment and Education*. October 11th 2010.
7 Clary, Christopher. *Deterrence, Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia*. 34.
democratic governance in Pakistan, a nation constantly balancing against a much larger, and more stable neighbor. This view is best illustrated by Stephen Cohen’s book “The Idea of Pakistan”, which frames the Pakistani experience as being defined by Islam, and the desire to balance against India as the dominant factor in South Asian affairs.\(^8\) While India, as the hegemonic power in South Asia has been a key actor in influencing decisions and actions taken by the Pakistani state, this relationship does not stand alone in observing Pakistan. Unfortunately this does not provide an explanation for how this desire has translated into action. For the answer to this question one must look at the actors that have affected the status quo in South Asia, namely the Soviet Union, and the United States.

In the literature that holds regional security concerns as the main factor influencing regime type in Pakistan, are those political thinkers who hold ethno-nationalist separatist groups as the primary aspect of Pakistani society that has restrained Pakistan from emerging as a true power, as its geo-strategic placement would suggest it has the capability of becoming. This view is illustrated by writers such as Adeel Khan who wrote a journal article for the publication *Asian Survey* in 2009 titled “Renewed Ethnonationalist Insurgency in Baluchistan: Pakistan”.\(^9\) This paper illustrates important aspects of the many separatist movements in Pakistan, and the factionalism, which it ferments within Pakistani society, but it fails to address how this factional mentality also breeds pluralism, a necessary element of democracy. Throughout the years most every democratic election that has been held in Pakistan, each ethnic group is well represented by their respective political leaders. Although it has made it difficult for a mandate to emerge, something that would signify cohesion in Pakistan, it certainly has precluded the ability of any one


ethnicity to seize control in Pakistan due to a wide range of groups enjoying representation in the federal assembly.\textsuperscript{10}

By far, the most egregious example of monolithic writing on Pakistan is that, which deals solely with US involvement in Pakistan, and the war on terror. The work of Christine Fair deals entirely with Pakistan in relation to the US led war on terror. In her work entitled, “Pakistan: Ten Years of the War on Terror”, Fair paints Pakistan as a passive actor in US global policy following the 9/11 attacks, and fails to point out the internal factors that have destabilized Pakistan, namely sectarian violence, and ethno-nationalism that have caused it to constantly fluctuate in its ability to combat or readily identify “extremists and terrorists.”\textsuperscript{11} How extremism is viewed within Pakistan has shifted over the years, with popular opinion moving towards supporting state condemnation of violence in the name of Islam. Although religiousness remains high in Pakistan, with almost 95\% of people identifying as Muslim (90\% Sunni, 10\% Shia) in 2013, opinions on extremists have shifted to a predominantly negative view since violence within Pakistan erupted after the creation of the Pakistani Taliban in 2007.\textsuperscript{12} It has been an internal shift of the military against extremism that has in many ways been the catalyst for change within Pakistan; the war on terror itself was the antithesis to anti-extremism efforts, instead exacerbating the situation.

Although Fair’s work does a good job of laying out the geopolitical factors acting on Pakistan, her two dimensional perspective becomes clear in sentences such as this; “while Americans were celebrating the death of Bin Laden, Pakistanis woke up to a morning of

\begin{footnotes}
\item Waseem, Mohammad.\emph{ Pluralism and Democracy in Pakistan}. 167.
\item Fair, Christine C. \emph{Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the ”War on Terror”}.
\item Index Mundi. \emph{Pakistan Demographics Profile 2013}.
\end{footnotes}
confusion, outrage, and embarrassment” (Pakistan in 2011; Fair; 102). The importance of this is that it shows how the author views Pakistan as nations whose interests are, or should be, in line with those of the U.S. However, as this study will demonstrate, this is not entirely the case. Pakistani’s support various groups depending on their individual demographic, and in many cases, these are regarded to some degree to be extremist, or even terrorist organizations. It is important to remember that domestically these groups provide education, food, and even shelter to Pakistani’s who the government does not provide for. To most people living in Pakistan this is the only aspect of the religious organization that they experience, while the US experience deals with an entirely different perspective on these organizations. For Fair to think that most Pakistani’s were angry at their government for harboring Bin Laden, misses the point entirely, that Bin Laden had no bearing on the life of the average Pakistani and they could have cared less that he was living within their borders. The reality was that finding Bin Laden in Pakistan was embarrassing for the US, who had spent 10 years working closely with the very country that had been hiding the man, the US was looking for. Finding Bin Laden invalidated a decade of foreign aid sent by the US, and revealed how ineffective the war on terror had in fact been.

Alternately, some work I have found to be too focused on the internal mechanisms of the Pakistani state in explaining its evolution. The work of Hassan Abbas, specifically his book entitled, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism* gives a detailed yet only partially explanatory view of the evolution of Pakistan. Although Abbas’s work is filled with interesting facts about the leader of Pakistan, and the cabinets they kept, little is discussed about the larger

---

13 Fair, Christine C. *Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the "War on Terror"*. 102.
14 Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism.*
political paradigm at each time period discussed. While Abbas does talk about the Cold War era as an impetus for General Zia to retain power, his book does little to explain how this manifested itself in the form of foreign rhetoric. Painting a very preliminary picture of the world gives the reader the false impression that the first Afghan war was entirely co-opted by the CIA and the ISI, with minimal intervention from US politicians, or Pakistani politicians. This however leaves out large gaps in identifying who approved funding for the covert operations in the US, and which politicians and generals were responsible for delegating funding to the mujahideen. In reality, General Zia had to defer to his generals to execute the training and delegate weaponry to militants in Afghanistan. Abbas tends to focus on the central governance of Pakistan as opposed to the regional leaders, something I believe is very limiting when trying to convey the intricacies of nation as factionalized as Pakistan. In this vein, it follows that Abbas fails to point out the incompatibility of the Pashtun aims at controlling Afghanistan with the Baloch, Sindhi and Punjabi aspirations for equal representation in Pakistan, something that was undermined by attempts to expand the Pashtun population of Pakistan to include many Afghani's displaced by the war. Such subtleties are not explored in Abbas's work, and although he gives a very interesting narrative of Pakistani history, he fails in many ways to flesh out the conflicting forces acting both on, and within Pakistan.

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, is the work that explores IR theory as it pertains to the Arab world. In F. Gregory Gause III’s work, entitled Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World. Although Pakistan is not an Arab state, it is a state that holds many similarities with Arab nations, most notably the prominence of Islam within the state ideology, and an emphasis on Islamic law, and culture.
Although Pakistani’s are not ethnically Arab, their world-view is quite similar to that of many middle eastern states, almost more so than it is to India or Bangladesh. Gause asserts in his work that the emergence of democratic governance, or as he puts it, “opening of the political process” has in the Arab world, largely been the result of a carefully weighed decision by the leaders of any given nation to ameliorate dissatisfaction through welcoming democratic or liberal institutions such as civilian governance and plurality at a time of their choosing rather than allowing tensions between the regime and the people to reach critical levels.\textsuperscript{15} I believe that this, while an interesting take on regime change, does not explain the external factors that weigh on regimes that greatly impact decisions to liberalize their own domestic political systems. It can be said that although regimes sometimes do respond to domestic calls for liberalization, however one must recognize how geo-political trends such as the Global War on Terror, or more recently, the Arab Spring, weigh heavily on leaders who attempt to gauge where their own populations sentiment is headed and act accordingly. While Gause addresses the issues created by single export economies (rentier states), he properly addresses what I believe to be the most salient argument for regime type in the example of Kuwait. Gause says that oil wealthy states are not immune to domestic political upheaval, as with the case of Iran, where oil wealth has caused a demand for responsible government, but it is in relation to the international arena where you see larger political shifts occurring as seen in Kuwait. Although Kuwait had vast oil supplies, and a government backed by Saudi Arabia, a nation highly opposed to democratic governance, the invasion of Iraq, and the entrance of the U.S. into the region in what was

\textsuperscript{15} Gause III, F. Gregory. \textit{Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World}. 283.
the first Gulf War in 1991 tipped the scales in favor of democracy. It was in Kuwait, just as in Afghanistan and Pakistan that international involvement provided the impetus to destabilize domestic and regional politics from the status quo, and cause a change in regime type.

My work is an attempt to remediate all of these problems in conveying the political climate of Pakistan that I have found while doing my research. Problems that include western-centric views of Pakistan, and South Asian-centric views of Pakistan, I find can be solved giving both perspectives, and refraining from imagining Pakistan as a single cell organism that changes entirely in response to just one stimulant. Instead, I believe Pakistan can be best understood through the use of multiple perspectives in explaining how certain events came to be, with certain individuals in power. Understanding the state sponsoring of extremism for example, makes little sense when looking at it from a U.S. perspective, but if you dig into the geo-political environment of South Asia in the 1980's it becomes clear why Pakistan employed the use of militant Islamists to defend the Afghan border, fend of separatists in Balochistan, and to fight against India in Kashmir. A state struggling to balance against a much larger neighbor (India) ultimately must employ creative means to tip the scales in their favor. For Pakistan, this involved raising a generation of jihadi fighters. Subsequently, when Pakistan found itself plagued by these same militants at the turn of the century, it followed that they would move to eradicate these forces in the hope of gaining foreign aid from the US who had a vested interest in dismantling these religious organizations.

---

16 Ibid. 296.
In the first part of my paper, I examine the 1970’s and 1980’s, looking particularly at the post 1971 environment in South Asia whereby Pakistan had been cut in half, and its primary concern was surviving in direct competition with its powerful neighbor India. The later part of the 1970’s, and throughout the 1980’s was marked by an Islamization process carried out by General Zia, which began with the military and quickly seeped into all facets of Pakistani life, impacting not only military personnel, but average citizens as well who began to see opportunities for devout individuals open up in government, spots which had previously been inaccessible to those not born into the upper classes. This was a period of radicalization, which not only coincided with the entrance of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan in 1980, but also was arguably necessitated by it. With the entrance of the Soviets into Afghanistan, the affairs of Pakistan grew to include exerting control over Afghanistan, as the United States began talks with the Zia government, particularly with the regimes intelligence branch, the ISI to fund counter-insurgent operations within Afghanistan, something that served Pakistani regional policy quite well. In this period, from 1979-1989 when the soviets left, General Zia retained control over Pakistan, solidifying his power and using it to create a nation in his own image, a distinctly Muslim nation, far removed from the one dreamt up by Ali Jinnah 40 years prior. With US funding and backing, the Zia military government was able to exist unopposed for over a decade, as they helped support the mujahideen fight against the soviet backed government in Afghanistan.

After 1971, relations between these three nations strained further as it became clear that the new nation would balance against Pakistan by aligning with India over the

---

17 Hussain, Zahid. *Frontline Pakistan*. 19
Kashmir issue, and regional politics in general. During the late 1970’s however, India was not Pakistan’s sole concern, and another, less immediately identifiable factor, which highly influenced Pakistani foreign policy was the emergence of an immeasurably strong Soviet Union, which extended just 400 miles from Islamabad.\(^\text{19}\) As the USSR grew in strength it sought to balance against the US in the form of arms support for various political organizations that showed support for the communist system throughout the world. The US did the same for groups that showed willingness to oppose communist regimes, culminating in the “proxy wars” of the cold war.

Soviet intervention began following the start of the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in 1978, which placed the Khalq faction of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in power. The Khalq were backed by the USSR due to the compatible socialist ideologies they both shared, and as such found themselves supporting the leader of the Khalq, Hafizullah Amin.\(^\text{20}\) Amin however, was an unpopular leader, and although he did encapsulate and propagate a communist agenda, he was an ineffective leader, one who the Soviets soon tried to distance themselves from, and ultimately killed when soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December of 1979. Immediately after his death, the Soviets replaced Amin with Babrak Karmal as General Secretary of the PDPA.\(^\text{21}\) Karmal was believed to be a man who espoused soviet values, and thus was perceived to be someone who the USSR could use to control Afghanistan. Once Soviet boots touched the ground, the involvement of the United States was sure to follow, something that the Pakistani’s knew could potentially

\(^{19}\) Sial, Safdar. *Pakistan’s Role and Strategic Priorities in Afghanistan since 1980*. 2.


\(^{21}\) Ibid. 54.
favor them in the long run by helping Pakistan gain footing over India as a power in the South Asian subcontinent.\textsuperscript{22}

The response to a soviet controlled Afghanistan came swiftly from the United States in the form of military aid. Sharing a large amount its western border with Afghanistan, as well as deeply rooted cultural ties, Pakistan became the most logical place for the US to invest in to combat the soviets. At the time, in the year 1980, the US faced multiple perceived threats from communism around the world, and had directly intervened in some, while choosing to indirectly fund counter-insurgent operations in others to avoid public backlash. In Afghanistan, to directly intervene would be disastrous for US- Indian diplomacy, and even worse for US- Soviet diplomacy (even if no semblance of diplomacy appeared to remain).

In the interest of avoiding a diplomatic incident, the US opted to fund the anti-Soviet fight in Afghanistan by having the CIA embezzle funds from the US into Pakistani military intelligence bank accounts. Codenamed Operation Cyclone, the partnership of the CIA and the ISI in funding the Afghan mujahideen began in 1979. This money was then distributed to resistance leaders within Afghanistan (without any oversight beyond that of the CIA) by the Pakistani intelligence agency the ISI. The ISI was responsible for the delegation of hundreds of millions in US tax dollars to the Afghan Mujahideen who were fighting against their Soviet backed government.\textsuperscript{23} This funding enabled the Pakistani military (through the ISI) to make connections with warlords, and tribal leaders who were previously inaccessible to the Pakistani army which so desperately wanted to gain their favor. The ISI gained hundreds of contacts including future Taliban leadership that enabled them to work

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. 93.
\textsuperscript{23} Bergen, Peter. \textit{Holy War, Inc.} 68.
directly with groups that were off limits to civilian leadership, and even most of the military. Once they received, and disseminated US funds, the ISI was able to continue to act in the interest of Pakistani state, occasionally coinciding with US interests as well. This massive influx of funding from the US, empowered militant forces to fight against the Soviet backed PDPA government, yet gave them enough material capability to pursue their own interests as well. Over time, the Mujahideen forces that had been brought to power by US money and Pakistani training soon took on a new form in the Afghan Taliban, and in the many sub organizations that splintered off from it once the flow of US money began to stop. It is safe to say that the US nor Pakistan ever had complete control over the groups it was funding, however, by removing themselves from the actual transfer of funds and purchase of equipment for the Mujahideen to use, the US precluded the possibility of exerting influence over these organizations itself, through direct contact, early on.

The most tangible threat that emerged from the cold war in South Asia was Islamic extremism. For oil rich Saudi’s, and Persian Gulf states such as the UAE, the most effective way to maintain their standing and wealth was through propagating several forms of extremist Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism, Sufism, and, Salafism, all which placed emphasis on the role of non-muslim's, known as kafir (un-believer/ infidel) in being responsible for the poverty and social ailments experienced by faithful Muslims. To this effect, the Saudi’s and the UAE spent billions of dollars throughout the 1980’s to promote these forms of Islam through the building of a network of religious schools called Deobandi Madrassa’s designed to promote Wahhabi Islam and train a new generation of holy

---

26 Ibid. 2.
warriors to fight the soviets and the Americans in Afghanistan or wherever they may emerge in the Middle East. This process is what led to the creation of Pan-Islamism, the guiding principle behind the Mujahideen, and ultimately the formation of Al-Qaeda 10 years later.

This process of the radicalization of the Middle East cannot be oversimplified to Saudi funding, and Afghan holy warriors, as another impetus, which fueled the Afghan war was Pakistan. Pakistan, as the nation bordering Afghanistan, and an ally of the United States was responsible for doling out funding from the US to combat the Soviet backed government in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was unique as a Cold War era conflict in that the US never formally entered into Afghanistan, nor were ground troops ever deployed to Afghanistan during the late 70’s and throughout the 1980’s. The US instead pursued covert avenues that ran directly through Pakistan to address this perceived threat of communist influence. The CIA, and not the military spearheaded the US operation in Afghanistan, something typical of Cold War era tactics, as demonstrated in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs debacle, and throughout the unfolding of the Iran-Contra scandal, but this involvement, or lack their of was far more detrimental in Afghanistan. By providing funding to Pakistan to carry out the US operations in Afghanistan, the US entrusted Pakistan entirely with carrying out the anti-communist campaign in South Asia. This decision would ultimately prove to be one of the most costly of the Cold War. Trusting the Pakistan military regime, via its intelligence services to carry out anti-soviet activities came in the form of supporting

---

the Mujahideen with vast military aid including stinger missiles and simulators to train them in their use.\textsuperscript{28}

The Cold War era geo-political environment precluded the emergence of a democratic regime in Pakistan, a nation that gave strategic depth to the US operation in Afghanistan, however this was not the only factor limiting Pakistani politics at the time. Following the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, the nation was left demoralized and vulnerable, leaving only half its former territory behind, and cutting its population, as well as its army in half.\textsuperscript{29} Additional challenges to the Pakistani state came in the form of separatist movements drawn on ethnic lines. The Balochistan separatist movement in the south had existed virtually since the creation of the state, and subsequent movements which emerged in the 1970’s such as the separatist movement in the Sindh region, modeled after the Baluch movement, and the Pashtun movement in the northwest, which contested the legitimacy of the Durand line, which separated Pakistan from Afghanistan provided further difficulty in defining the territorial boundaries of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{30} The Pashtun nationalism movement aimed to create a Pashtun state: Pashtunistan, as did all other ethno-nationalist movements in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{31} In Pakistan there are far more movements dedicated to the fractionalization of the country than there are dedicated to maintaining it. With the various forces pulling away from Islamabad, it was indicative of the genuine fear felt by average Pakistani people of the nation coming apart at the seams, that the Pakistani people have rarely been opposed to the emergence of a military regime in order to

\textsuperscript{28} Coll, Steven. \textit{Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War}. July 19\textsuperscript{th} 1992
\textsuperscript{29} Cohen, Stephen. \textit{The Idea of Pakistan}. 75.
\textsuperscript{30} Akhtar, Aasim Sajjad. \textit{Balochistan versus Pakistan}. 74
\textsuperscript{31} Ghufran, Nasreen. \textit{Pushtun Ethnonationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan}. 1097.
galvanize what remained of their fractionalized state, something which remains true today in Pakistan where only one in five people feel that the military should never be allowed to take control of the state.  

With the death of general Zia in ’88, the departure of the soviets from Afghanistan in 1989, and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world, as well as Pakistan experienced a paradigm shift. Without US funding, the Pakistani’s found themselves struggling to make up for an economic shortfall, and with the death of their longest serving military leader, General Zia, Pakistan found itself with a decade later with a monolithic Islamic identity, a radicalized society, and an impossibly robust military who’s fate had become intrinsically linked to that of the state itself. However with the post soviet environment, the US turned to pursuing an agenda of promoting the spread of democracy, departing from their Cold War era tendency of support authoritarian regimes. Pakistan however was not one of the targets of this initiative, and as such the US did little to ensure that the military handover of power to a civilian government would be more than just a façade. The civilian government led by president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, one of Zia’s closest supporters, had come to power through gaining favor of the military, and thus was determined not to alter the internal dynamic of Pakistani politics by diluting the vast presidential powers Zia left behind. This transfer of power from military to civilian was only visible from the outside to those who diluted themselves about what was really going on, and was by no means a substantive change. The military had become too powerful under Zia to give up its control over

32 Fair, Christine C., Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance? . 7.  
33 Sial, Safdar. Jihad, Extremism and Radicalization: A Public Perspective. 8  
34 De Hoyos, Linda. Pakistan in Iron Grip of Ghulam Ishaq Khan. 43
Pakistani affairs by the time civilian government emerged with the election of Benazir Bhutto in late 1988.

Throughout the 1990’s, the democratic governance of Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif, was undermined not only by their own corrupt actions while in the position of Prime Minister, but also by the military backed president Khan who deposed both leaders twice in under a decade. This was in large part attributable to widespread corruption by both Sharif and Bhutto, in funneling national funds into private accounts, however the larger problem looming was ability of the military to pick and choose popularly elected leaders based on their ability to work with and not against the military complex, if they couldn’t be reasoned with, they were promptly deposed. The military continued to take a back seat however and allow elections during this time, as to gain a favorable image in the global community as to the progressiveness of the nation itself. While maintaining a façade of democracy for the west to point to as a crowning achievement of Cold War era activities, the military retained an iron grip on the nation and its affairs, changing very little in its attitudes towards India, and in its ambitions to assert itself in regional affairs, particularly Kashmir.

Throughout the 1990’s the continuation of the conflict in Kashmir put Pakistan and Indian relations at a volatile point, increasing the need for Pakistan to continue to have a good working relationship with the US to ensure it would receive the military aid it needed to fend off Indian hegemony in South Asia. With the involvement of Pakistan in supporting the Taliban, nations in Central Asia, as well as Iran felt threatened by the Pakistani advances towards exerting control over an area that had the potential to link

35 Fruman, Sheila. *Will the Long March to Democracy in Pakistan Finally Succeed?* 7.
trade between South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Pakistan also suffered as the Indian economy began to boom with the expansion of the textile sector and dramatic increase in exports to Europe, the US and Asia. Pakistan soon found itself clamoring to hold onto any semblance of competition with what it perceived to be its rival nation, India. The economy of Pakistan had traditionally been based in agriculture, but it had remained unchanged for decades without the emergence of a new sector that could raise its international profile to garner the attention of foreign investment. As a result, inflation remained at double-digit levels for seven out of ten years in the 1990’s. This was compounded by the cost of funding proxy wars in Kashmir, and northwest Pakistan/Afghanistan something that for the first time began to appear far too costly to keep up in an economy that was experiencing virtually no annual growth. With Pakistani intellectuals either leaving the country or finding themselves preoccupied with the foreign policy of the nation, it continued to stagnate at the end of the 1990’s.

By the late 1990’s, Pakistan was actively assisting the Taliban in conducting its operations within the region, providing the bulk of the Afghan regime’s material support and logistical planning for the government it had helped create. It was well known to regional leaders and politicians that Pakistan was supplying aid to the Taliban, a group born out of the mujahideen without a soviet backed government to fight against, and thus the most cohesive and well positioned to assume control of post soviet Afghanistan by 1996. With the exit of the soviets in May of 1989, the US followed suit and withdrew

---

39 Ibid. 188.
much of its material and financial support that had been going to the Taliban, via Pakistani institutions. To the Pakistani’s, this sent a clear message that the US did not care about Pakistan beyond its capability for aiding the US fight against the now defunct soviet system. This left Pakistani leaders, specifically the army with a pessimistic and mistrusting view of the Americans who proved that their alliance was highly conditional, and thus could not be relied on in the future.41

In 1999, it became painfully clear the military was running things in Pakistan as tensions between the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the military brass became increasingly public. Ultimately Sharif was deposed by one of his generals in late 1999, Pervez Musharraf.42 This began what would be almost a decade of military rule under Musharraf. The course of history however would change in 2001. Prior to 2001, the US spent much of the 1990's involved in various conflicts beyond the middle-east, greatly ignoring Pakistan.43 It was with this disinterest that the US gave very little input at the time of Musharraf’s coup as to its position on the matter of democracy in Pakistan. This changed however when in 2000, the US elected George W. Bush, a president with a moralist agenda who’s interests were quite similar to the soviet era US politicians pushing for democracy as a quick fix for issues afflicting the global community. In 2001 this changed as the US responded to a string of attacks on September 11th of that year, seeking a renewed partnership with Pakistan. Had this attack come two years earlier it is likely the US would have been more vocal in the military takeover of Pakistan, however the timing of the attack

forced the US to work with Musharraf, a military leader who had consolidated his power in the two years between his coup and the 9/11 attacks.  

By 2000 both India and Pakistan had demonstrated nuclear capabilities, and were in the process of normalizing nuclear relations between the two countries, with both engaging in the talks on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but to little avail. Repeated attempts by Pakistan to undermine territory claims in Kashmir had hindered diplomacy between the two, and India’s economy was booming, experiencing double-digit annual growth, while the Pakistani economy had remained stagnant for almost a decade. The emergence of a new doctrine of pre-emptive warfare after the 9/11 attacks, known as the Bush doctrine, snapped Pakistan back into a Cold War era paradigm whereby the US required the help of Pakistan in carrying out its operations against Al-Qaeda. This time, unlike during the Cold War, the US would have a physical presence in Afghanistan, and relied on Pakistan to serve as a launching space for its operations. This meant using Pakistani trade routes, air bases, and the cooperation of Pakistani officials in giving US troops lay of the land. This reinvigorated the Pakistani economy as agreement to grant the US unfettered access to its military bases prompted US president Bush to advocate for international aid to be doled out the Pakistani government led by Pervez Musharraf.

For this reason, Musharraf’s tenure has been remembered mainly in regards to his willingness to cooperate with the United States, something deeply troubling for most Pakistani’s who felt that the US presence in the Af-Pak region was a violation of Pakistani

---

44 Carothers, Thomas. US Democracy Promotion: During and After Bush. 4.
45 Koch, Andrew. Nuclear Testing In South Asia and the CTBT. 103
46 McCartney, Matthew. Pakistan, Growth, Dependency, and Crisis.77
47 Ibid. 84.
sovereignty. The decision to invade Kargil in 1999 left Pakistan without many allies, and even China, which had pledged its support for the nation began to shy away following its advice that Pakistani foreign policy focus on economic development rather than military objectives. Thus, entering into 2001, Pakistan stood to benefit from US involvement in the region, but the goals of the state this time came into direct conflict with the goals of the US operation in Afghanistan. During the first Afghan war, the US gave absolute control of the operation over to the Pakistan ISI and the military. This allowed Pakistan to actively work towards achieving its own strategic aims for the region with US funding, while the US enjoyed the illusion that its goals were being achieved as well. The second Afghan war would not be so beneficial, as the US now asked Pakistan to help in dismantling the very system and power structure in Afghanistan, which the US had helped to create, in funding extremism, and the Taliban.

With the re-entrance into Afghanistan by the US in 2001 after 9/11, the US took on a new roll, not as a supporter of the Taliban but as their opponent. The US quickly changed gears from its foreign policy of containment, to a doctrine of preventative warfare under the Bush administration. In light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which served as a rude awakening for US policy makers who had previously never thought that any aspect of their policy would backfire, US president George Bush targeted the Taliban, an organized group that could be singled out and made an example of in order to support the idea that they were actively combating terror. Granted Al Qaeda, and similar organizations did not care who we gave funding to specifically, but the fact that the US was anywhere involved in the

50 Burke, Jason. *Frankenstein the CIA Created.* January 17th 1999.
middle east, attempting to control political affairs was an affront to extremists who believed in the conservative agenda of pan-Islamism. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the US was guilty of doing just this. The US had thought nothing of giving millions and millions of dollars to support Islamic militants whom we knew nothing about and had no control over. Before 2001 the Taliban was a group essentially born and sustained out of American financing, but afterwards, it became re-appropriated by western politicians as a group that symbolized political and religious oppression, as well as global jihad (despite its localized operations that primarily had to do with the cultivation and sale of heroin, through which they funded political ambitions. As US forces prepared to enter Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan faced a serious decision between partnering with the United States in dismantling the Taliban, or continuing to exert control over Afghanistan through exerting its influence over the Taliban. Without the Taliban in power, the Pakistani goal of balancing against India faced serious difficulty. However, continued support for the Taliban ran the risk of further denigrating the standing of Pakistan in the international community as a state sponsor of terrorism, and an opponent of the US in their war against the Taliban.

Thus a decision had to be made by the Pakistani military as to the future of its relationship with the Taliban. The decision was made unofficially, that the military would allow Taliban leaders, most notably Mullah Omar in escaping across the border into Pakistan where they could continue operations in Afghanistan from a proximal location in Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the FATA). This solution allowed Pakistan to continue to assist the Taliban domestically, while denying any affiliation with the Taliban operations on the ground in Afghanistan. Of course most US intelligence estimates

---

51 Johnson, Thomas H., *Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan*. 89.
predicted that Pakistan would make this choice, but the US was determined to gain the cooperation of Pakistan, as it provided immense strategic value in allowing the flow of material support for US troops from Pakistan into Afghanistan, vital in order to conduct a war in a foreign territory.\(^\text{53}\) Than president, George Bush attempted to use terrorism as a monolithic concept that would polarize the Pakistani government into working with the US in Afghanistan; the US president’s rhetoric of “your either with us or your against us” played a heavy hand in the decision in Islamabad to not overtly support the Taliban, but instead passively allowed their rank and file to enter into Pakistan.\(^\text{54}\)

From the perspective of the Pakistani military, this was not only an unrealistic goal, but also one that ran completely contrary to the goals of the Pakistani state. Manipulating Afghanistan for its own strategic purposes had been the most effective strategy for ensuring an endless supply of jihadi’s for use in Kashmir, in the Northwest Tribal regions, and in the separatist movements in Sindh and in Baluchistan.\(^\text{55}\) To please the US, Musharraf had to say one thing and do another. He explicitly pledged his support to the US in accordance with the US President’s now infamous ultimatum to world leaders following 9/11, “you’re either with us or you’re against us”. For all intensive purposes however, Musharraf circumvented this promise by granting the US limited access to Pakistani bases, and military intelligence, but actively allowed for the free flow of jihadi’s, Taliban leadership, and former mujahideen into Pakistan. While the US was looking for Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, they were quickly moving their operations onto Pakistani soil


\(^{55}\) Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan. 44.
where it is widely believed they were given protection by the state. Musharraf however gave political concessions to please both Pakistani’s and the United States, resigning as military leader and assuming the presidency in June of 2001 after the resignation of the interim president Rafiq Tarar who took over following the exile of Nawaz Sharif. A year later, in 2002 Musharraf held elections at the behest of the Supreme Court, which had ordered Musharraf to do so in 2000. Since Musharraf left office in 2008, Pakistan has experienced several democratically elected leaders, including most notably the return on Nawaz Sharif in 2013, and the return of Benazir Bhutto in 2008, ultimately leading to her assassination.

The existence of two US led campaigns in Afghanistan, both under military leadership in Pakistan, but both with separate evolutions, demonstrates in many ways the existence of shifting paradigms, and a spectrum of forces acting on Pakistani politics. In 1978, the US depended on a military government to achieve its aims, but 20 years later, a different military government, under a different set of pressures from the US was encouraged to make the transition to democracy. Empirically, this implies that a different set of geo-political factors were at work in influencing the regime type in Pakistan at the time. However, the story in the late 70's and 80's is quite similar to the one today. An influx of $19 billion in US funding from 2002-2011 directly injected into the Pakistani budget has yielded many of the problems in 2014 that the US found its funding of the first Afghan war

---
59 Associated Press. *Musharraf says he has no plans to step down in 2002*. November 11th 2001
resulted in.\textsuperscript{60} The money that was supposed to go to fighting the soviet forces in the 80’s empowered the Mujahideen, ultimately creating the Taliban. Similarly, the money given in the 2002-2011 period, it has been revealed, has helped to strengthen the Taliban operating within Pakistan, an entity now beyond the control of the Pakistan that has turned on the Pakistani state, leading to a very real problem containing extremism.\textsuperscript{61} In many ways, the complacency of the Pakistani government in working with the US in the “war on terror”, expedited the disillusionment of extremists over the role of the Pakistani state in actively working against the goals of pan-Islamism, and jihad.\textsuperscript{62}

This gross mistrust for India has manifested itself in the form of waging proxy wars in Jammu & Kashmir, as well as trying to balance against India by seeking to control Afghanistan. Both of these conflict regions (J&K, and Afghanistan) have been fought using the same, misguided tactic. The army has, through its intelligence services agency, the ISI, supported and helped organize extremist militant forces, most of which had been created from the anti-Soviet resistance forces from the first Afghan war, which have helped to further the states interests in key regions of South Asia. The army has used this strategy as a low cost way of keeping India busy, diverting resources and manpower to fight against militants who do not fight for Pakistan explicitly, but against India.\textsuperscript{63} Through these proxy forces such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan)(TTP), Pakistan has been effectively sustaining these campaigns without accruing much debt or public admonishment for its roll in supporting non-state militant groups, as it

\begin{itemize}
\item Fair, Christine C., \textit{Why the Pakistani Army is here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance}? 1.
\item BBC News. \textit{Musharraf admits USAID diverted}. September 14\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\item Fair, Christine C., \textit{Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the “War on Terror”}. 107.
\item Fair, Christine C., \textit{Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations}. 492
\end{itemize}
is often difficult to prove a connection between the Pakistani state and these organizations until after an attack (such as the 2008 attack by LeT in Mumbai, when Pakistan refused to prosecute or extradite leaders of LT despite calls by India to do so). TTP is in many ways reflective of how this strategy of supporting militant organizations has overwhelmingly backfired. The support for these groups has always come with the assumption that they would never turn on their handlers, as the funding that Pakistan provided them, and the training from the ISI had traditionally been the single largest source of support these groups received. The thought was that this should be enough to blind them from their being used as pawns in Pakistan’s regional strategy, and for a while it was. With the increase in strength jihadi organizations, many of the roles the ISI (and thus its leverage) used to play in training and arming militants have become functions of mullah’s and their organizations, which are divorced from the state entirely. With the emergence of a secondary non-state source of support, this base assumption has proven dead wrong, as militants have turned against the state itself. This has culminated in the evolution of the TTP; from a sheltered entity taking refuge in Pakistan, to an autonomous agency that promotes regional acts of terrorism, primarily within Pakistan. This has in many ways been a factor in the breakdown between Paki-Indo relations as the state sponsoring of terrorism by Pakistan has grown grossly apparent, and begun to spill over into India (most notably in the 2008 Mumbai attack by LT), leaving Pakistan at fault, but without recourse in containing these violent attacks.

Since the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011 by the United States, marking 10 years since the global war on terror (GWOT) began, Pakistan has

64 Rashid, Ahmed. *Pakistan on the Brink*. 57.
65 Ibid. 18.
once again become viewed with skepticism within the international community. The global perception of Pakistan has changed from a state willing to cooperate in combating aggressive non-state actors, to one that actively supports global terror networks and provides a space for them to operate.\textsuperscript{66} In western media, Pakistan is portrayed as a nation much like Afghanistan with no form of central leadership, and lacking in resources to secure its territory from warlords and radical Islamists. In many ways this is owed to the ease by which western leaders have time and again been able to undermine Pakistani leaders, most recently, with drone strikes, calling into question how expansive the power they exert over their territory is in the first place.\textsuperscript{67} This however, is not the case. Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy that has held elections; albeit intermittently, since its formation in 1947, while Afghanistan has only recently begun to dabble in democracy. Historically speaking, the president and the prime minister have almost never truly had power, with the exception of the one military leader turned politician, Musharraf. Rather it is the military, which has always been over-inflated in size and influence, with its chief of the army staff at the head, who wields the vast majority of power in Pakistan. The head of the army has always been the deciding party in affairs of the state, and has historically exerted control over the parliament, president, and prime minister. As the entity that dictates, and upholds the goals of the state, the army has a mandate of power that goes unquestioned by most citizens and political figures. The army has defined state identity in a way that calls for it to always be on the defensive against India. Primarily the perception of

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid. 6.
\textsuperscript{67} Woods, Chris. \textit{CIA drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty, says senior diplomat}. August 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2012.
India as an untrustworthy, and aggressive nation has dictated the actions of the Pakistani military, and thus the state as a whole.\textsuperscript{68}

Now, with civilian governance re-emerging in Pakistan after a decade of military rule ended in 2008, the question of how to de-radicalize the nation, and de-militarize the government has returned to the forefront of the political agenda. Asif Ali Zardari in his 5-year term was able to do little to abrogate the vast powers of the president imbued by Pervez Musharraf, a source of concern for many advocates of democracy in Pakistan. With the return of Nawaz Sharif from exile, and his election as prime minister in 2013, many hope he will be able to negotiate a balance of power within the executive branch of the Pakistani government that would ensure a smooth transition of power from one regime to the next. This however, will be contingent on several factors relating to the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan slated for this year, something likely to impact Pakistan economically and politically.

\textbf{Chapter 1: Zulfikar Bhutto, General Zia and the Islamization of Pakistan}

The political and societal landscape, which we see today in Pakistan did not always exist, and came into being over a contentious 50 years of military dominated history from 1960 on. Beginning with Yahya Kahn, who came to power after spearheading the 1965 war with India, the military became increasingly powerful, lending itself to the idea that the aims of the Pakistani state and the military were inseparable, essentially one in the same.

\textsuperscript{68} Fair, Christine C., \textit{Why the Pakistan Army is here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance?}. 7.
Khan served as the Chief of army staff, and President of Pakistan from 1969-71, including leading Pakistan during the 1971 war with Bangladesh and commanding the army during the 1969-70 military campaign in what was then known as, “East Pakistan” which was marked by mass atrocities against Bengali people. These atrocities eventually culminated in India’s decision to come to the aid of Bangladesh against Pakistan for the cause of Bengali liberation. The result was the loss of East Pakistan, the formation of Bangladesh, and the end of Yahya Khan’s career.69

In December of 1971, a foreign minister under president Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, leader of the newly created Pakistani People’s Party rose to power, and was elected as the first president of Pakistan since it was cut in half after the 1971 war that ended in the liberation of Bangladesh.70 As the first civilian leader of the newly delineated Pakistan, Bhutto attempted to take Pakistan in a new direction, adopting the 1973 constitution, the first of its kind that came from a popularly elected leader.71 After 1971 Pakistan was a different nation than the one founded by Jinnah in 1947, and thus it needed a new set of guiding principals and goals in order to progress from the defeat of 1971. Although the new era of Pakistani history began with the election of a civilian leader, this would prove to be an anomaly moving forward. Once elected, Bhutto found he inherited a Pakistan, which was literally pulling itself apart. The loss of East Pakistan gave way to instability, allowing for the rise of a separatist movement in Balochistan, and in the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP) known today as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). These movements crippled the ability of the central government under Bhutto to accomplish many of its goals legally and

70 Ibid. 75.
71 Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 78.
ethically. As a result, Bhutto employed the use of covert operations to suppress separatist movements, and the use of the military to suppress dissidents. Quickly, this civilian leader soon appeared increasingly authoritarian, utilizing the Pakistani military as the go to option in achieving its policy aims.\footnote{Ibid. 80.}

Bhutto also played a key role in Afghanistan, particularly in so far as he assisted the original Mujahideen leaders; Burnhanuddin Rabbani, (Jamiat-e-Islami) Gulbadin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e-Islami), and Jalaluddin Haqqani (Haqqani Network) in gaining influence in attempting to fight against the Soviet imposed Afghani leader, Daoud Khan.\footnote{Ibid. 81.}

To this effect, Bhutto utilized the newly empowered ISI to funnel money into Afghanistan in order to train and arm mujahideen against the Soviet backed government. The hope was that by funding these groups, they would rise to power in Afghanistan, giving Pakistan strategic depth over India in the region by allowing Pakistani intelligence service agents to have control of these political figures. These fighters would ultimately become the group of individuals whom the Taliban leadership was comprised of twenty years later after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.\footnote{Laub, Zachary. \textit{The Taliban in Afghanistan}. February 25th 2014.}

Utilizing the ISI as the means by which to widen the reach of Islamabad’s influence had several impacts on both the region and on Pakistan itself. When Mullah Mohammed Omar created the Taliban in 1991 Pakistan was his greatest ally, and essentially the nation that along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave his group legitimacy.\footnote{Arbabzadah, Nushin. \textit{The 1980’s mujahideen, the Taliban and the shifting idea of jihad}. April 28th 2011.} By 1995 the Taliban derived their legitimacy from the additional support of influential individuals within
Afghanistan such as Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had been supported by Pakistan since the 1970’s, and continued to receive support once he joined in with the Taliban. Haqqani had helped to form the rebellion against Afghan president Daoud Khan in 1975, and thus was the recipient of much aid from Pakistan (through the ISI) during the first Afghan war, and from the US, funneled through the CIA.\textsuperscript{76} The formation of the Haqqani network began under Bhutto, but it did not truly begin to flourish until Bhutto was removed from office by Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, a military general who seized power after planning for several years prior (1976-8) to overthrow the increasingly unpopular leader. Under Zia, the Haqqani network broadened with massive influx of funding coming from the Pakistani ISI, by way of the American CIA.

Zia-ul-Haq came to power in 1978, through a coup d’état, the third since the inception of Pakistan hardly thirty years prior. The military leader assumed power from the first popularly elected leader, Zulfikar Bhutto, for whom Zia had been his top general. It was a fairly smooth transition as the civilian leader had begun to act increasingly more authoritarian as his term went on, making a military government less than a drastic transition. General Zia derived much of his support from the military itself, an entity more influential and capable than the political mechanisms of Pakistan, or what was at the time a highly underdeveloped civil society.\textsuperscript{77} However, at a time when the world was attempting to balance against the soviet union, the nation at the front line of the South Asian proxy war in Afghanistan, Pakistan, needed a military government to meet the needs of an

\textsuperscript{77} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 100.
international community looking to Pakistan to eradicate the communist threat to the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{78}

Bhutto, who had done nothing to endear himself to the Islamist parties of Pakistan had attempted to utilize Islam to unite Pakistan behind him, but did nothing substantive to appease religious leaders. Upon Zia’s arrival into the presidency, he denounced Bhutto as a panderer, and utilized his (fabricated) devoutly religious persona to appeal for a truly Islamic Pakistan. His first act was to arrest Bhutto, charging him with murder. Although the charges were thin, based more on the reality of the ability of Zia to prosecute and convict Bhutto than any actual crime, Zia had the backing of the largest religious organizations in Pakistan and thus Bhutto was quickly found guilty, and sentenced to death.\textsuperscript{79} While Zia promised to hold elections while Bhutto was detained, this promise never manifested itself, and Zia remained an unelected president of Pakistan, deriving his legitimacy from the religious machine of Pakistan within the country, and the support of the US abroad.\textsuperscript{80}

Although Zia was hardly a religious man, he used Islam to his advantage by not just talking about Islamic ideas, but instead actually implementing them. He began by changing Pakistani legal code from the British model, to sharia (religious) law. Under Zia, the state also began to collect religious tax, something usually done by the local mosque. This sent a strong message to the public that the nation was becoming expressly Islamic.\textsuperscript{81} The second way in which Zia changed Pakistan is by reforming the military. Throughout the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s the army was comprised mostly of social elites, while religious figures and

\textsuperscript{78} Ahmed, Bilal. \textit{Pakistan’s Uncertain Future}. January 27\textsuperscript{th} 2014.
\textsuperscript{79} Business Recorder. \textit{The way one goes to the gallows is remembered by history}. April 5\textsuperscript{th} 2014.
\textsuperscript{80} Shah, Jamal. \textit{Zia-Ul-Haque and the Proliferation of Religion in Pakistan}. 314.
\textsuperscript{81} Ghafour, Hamida. \textit{Zia ul-Haq’s legacy in Pakistan ‘enduring and toxic’}. August 26\textsuperscript{th} 2013.
religion as a whole were absent in military life. Zia changed this entirely by awarding merit based in part on religious devoutness displayed by military personnel. He abandoned the British Indian army model of merit and instruction, and replaced many parts of military education with Islamic education. Zia believed that Pakistan was a Muslim state, and needed soldiers trained not only in combat, but versed in Islam as well. Under Zia, not only were religious figures placed in military positions, they began to outrank non-religious military members.

Zia ultimately may have been his own undoing, as the Islamist’s began to gain prominence within his government and the military, Pakistani’s practiced more conservative Islam, as Islamic groups became protected entities under the care of the Pakistani government. By promoting an Islamic and not an agnostic education within the military, Zia welcomed a new breed of officer into the army, one who was far more receptive to extremist views, and influence. As a result, the environment of the military changed as Islamic groups, namely Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) gained powerful friends in those within the army whom their propaganda reached. High-ranking officers within the Pakistani military encouraged JI to interact freely with lower ranking officers, often authorizing the dissemination of propaganda. Although JI was a supporter of Zia’s regime, their goal was ultimately to infiltrate the army through the use of Islam, gain support, and seize control of the Pakistani state.

By the mid 1980’s Zia had felt some of the ramifications of injecting religion into the military in the form of several failed coup attempts against him, planned amongst his own

---

83 Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. 102.
generals. The entrance of the Soviets into Afghanistan in 1978, however proved several
years later to be the saving grace for Zia, who, now in the midst of his downswing became
suddenly invaluable to the United States in their efforts to stop the spread of communism.\footnote{Wright, Lawrence. \textit{The Double Game: The unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan}. May 16\textsuperscript{th} 2011.}

Internal strife however, still plagued the Zia government. While religion had in the past
been utilized by Pakistani regimes to further national interests, educating and allowing
military personnel to enter into religious affairs inspired many members of the military to
join the cause of Jihad in neighboring Afghanistan, equipping militant groups not only with
weapons but intelligence that religious officers shared with them.\footnote{Sinah, P.B.}
The mixing of military
and civilian elements within Pakistani life gave rise to militias stemming from otherwise
innocuous religious organizations.\footnote{Waseem, Mohammad. \textit{Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan}. 22.}

These militant organizations provided one aspect of
support, while higher ranking military and intelligence officers from the ISI met face to face
with the leaders of radical Afghan Islamist organizations. This network between the
military, the intelligence services, and the Afghan Jihad organizations laid the groundwork
for a nexus of unabated extremism.\footnote{Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 115.}

In many ways, Zia was arrogant in thinking he would be able to control Afghan
affairs, and found himself supporting men such as Gulbadin Hekmatyar leader of Hezb-e-
Islami a faction of the Afghan mujahideen, with the hope he would ascend to power in
Kabul.\footnote{Khan, Tahir. \textit{Bloody déjà vu: Hekmatyar raises spectre of 1990s-like civil war}. January 14\textsuperscript{th} 2014}
The only tangible result of the attempts to back Jamiat-e-Islami was that following
the withdrawal of the Soviets after Zia’s death, most mujahideen groups united in their
contempt for the Pakistani government which tried to utilize the Afghan jihad for its own national agenda.⁹⁰

By 1985 Zia had been in power for almost 7 years, and had solidified his power through Islamic and military avenues, but also legal ones. By the time he decided to lift martial law in late 1985 Zia had greatly enlarged his powers to extend past the executive, and gone through great lengths to undermine the National Assembly, placing most of their powers in his hands. In 1985 trying to move away from the authoritarian image that had complicated the first 7 years of his rule in having normal relations with the west, and to avoid incriminating himself in attempts to yield power, he hand picked a prime minister, a man by the name of Mohammed Khan Junejo. With a new prime minister in place, Zia had Junejo petition the national assembly to grant Zia, all his generals, and individuals involved in the 1977 coup immunity, in exchange for the lifting of martial law. The national assembly obliged, and in December of 1985 Zia removed martial law, and continued on as president of Pakistan.⁹¹

By 1987 Pakistan was housing 3 million refugees from the Afghan war, and, as the nation, which was harboring the Mujahideen, the Afghan government launched a full offensive. That year, 700, out of 780 total terrorist attacks occurred on Pakistani soil.⁹² Fully supporting the Afghan resistance had come with a cost, and Zia hoped to recoup that cost by implementing Hekmatyar as the president of Afghanistan. This unfortunately proved to be wasteful of Pakistani resources, as the US failed to back the Pakistani efforts to implement Hekmatyar as president, instead focusing on combating the soviets and pro-

⁹² Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. 122.
soviet forces, ignoring what would need to occur to prevent post-soviet Afghanistan from descending into chaos. The events of the Afghan war were orchestrated beyond the control of Afghan’s, yet they had a profound effect on the nation, linking its fate to the decisions made by the Pakistani Military at the time. As the soviet backed government was forced to fight against US funded, Pakistani trained forces, the Afghan government was rendered entirely impotent in its latter years, giving rise to the Taliban movement that emerged as the popular front representing the segment of society that favored Islamic governance.

By 1988 Zia faced stark resistance from his prime minister. Zia eager to regain or at least rally American support tried to pursue diplomatic avenues for resolution in Afghanistan. To this effect he tried to convince the foremost Mujahideen groups reach some common ground with the pro-Soviet regime. This did nothing to attract the US, but deeply insulted the Mujahideen organizations he had sought to appeal to. The US never had interest in preparing a provisional government after the Soviet exit (made clear by the talks between the US and the USSR in Geneva in 1987-88), and Pakistan under Zia was in no position to broker a deal. Zia’s Prime Minister Junejo however was more pragmatic. Junejo simultaneously attempted to broker a deal with the leaders of the 7 united Mujahideen groups to elect a leader to the post of president in an interim government in post-Soviet Afghanistan. This, combined with the attempted sacking of one of Zia’s generals, Abdur Rahman, and an attempt to slash defense spending led Zia to remove Junejo as Prime minister on May 29th 1988 on grounds of “corruption”.

---

94 Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 121
95 Ibid. 124.
President Zia died in a plane crash along with most of his generals, and the US ambassador to Afghanistan, Arnold Raphael on August 17th, thirty-one people in all were killed in the crash. Although the exact cause remains unknown, there has been no shortage of speculation. Many have cause to believe it was planned in the ranks of the Pakistani military, while members of the military often place blame with Israeli and Indian intelligence services. Overall it is widely accepted the cause of the crash was sabotage, however in the US press, mechanical failure was the given as the official explanation. Zia’s death came just months after beginning a purge of his government, removing powers from, and subsequently dissolving the National Assembly on May 29th of 1988.

Under Zia, the United States intervention in Afghanistan not only empowered the military, but also gave Zia’s government legitimacy in the form of an unlimited source of foreign aid that he used to prop up his otherwise corrupt government. The decision of the U.S. to work with Zia was illustrated by the faith placed in him to distribute the aid received from the CIA to the mujahideen rather than for the U.S. to distribute it first-hand. In Zia, the U.S. found a leader willing to fight their war on communism in South Asia, a quality often held by a military government that could act unilaterally to carry out the goals and meet the needs of wartime, decisive prompt action.

Chapter 2: The transition to Democracy

With Zia’s death came a swift transfer of military power to his top remaining general, General Mirza Aslam Beg. Beg believed that it was impossible for Pakistan to

96 Ibid. 127.
97 Ibid. 124.
sustain fighting wars on two fronts (in the west in Afghanistan, and in the east in J&K).

Beg’s ideology was a stark departure from his predecessor who firmly believed that fueling the Afghan conflict provided depth to Pakistani strategic defense. Beg on the other hand felt Zia was misguided in that the continued involvement of Pakistan in Afghanistan in fact threatened the security of Pakistan’s eastern regions. The about face in policy between these two generals can be explained almost entirely by the plane crash whereby most of general Zia’s inner circle were killed and Beg, somewhat of an outsider was the last remaining high ranking general, one who happened to be less in favor of funding extremism than most of his former peers.98 Beg was ostensibly the next in line to become president of Pakistan in light of the death of general Zia, however in the interest of starting anew, and allowing the military to play a role behind the scenes instead of directly in the spotlight, he declined the presidency and allowed the head of the senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan to assume the presidency.99 The decision to allow Khan to take over came at a time when the U.S. began to reward democratization, hoping to allow Pakistan to continue to benefit from the military aid provided by the U.S. to the Pakistani military and the ISI, the military found a willing figurehead in Ghulam Ishaq Khan who would carry out the goals of the military under the guise of elected civilian government.

In November of 1988, the daughter of the late Zulfikar Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, ran for prime minister as head of her late father’s political party the Pakistani Peoples Party, against Nawaz Sharif, founder of the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz or PLM-N. She returned to Pakistan after 6 years of self-imposed exile, following almost half a decade of imprisonment and house arrest by general Zia in the early 1980’s. In December she was

98 Ibid.
popularly elected, and at the behest of the acting president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, (former minister of finance under general Zia), used the PPP to form a coalition government in the ashes of the Zia regime.\(^{100}\) She formed this government in conjunction with the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM). The MQM run by Altaf Hussein initially made a good working partner for the Bhutto government, although it soon came to light he had committed thousands of counts of corruption over the years.\(^{101}\) The MQM promoted a non-religious philosophy, compatible with the secular message of the PPP, however they were prone to adopting violent tactics to reach their political aims, which landed them on the radar of western nations as a potential terrorist organization by the early 1990’s.\(^{102}\) Bhutto’s government emphasized Pakistani national identity in the hope of uniting Pakistani’s around a new regime, marking a stark departure from the Islam fueled rhetoric of general Zia who sought to radicalize Pakistani society for his own purposes.

At a time when military rule appeared to be over, and a civilian government void of corruption seemed plausible for the first time in decades, if not ever, those who were aware of the inner workings of Pakistani institutions such as the ISI and the military were sure this was not a new era, but a continuum in a new form. To this effect, the military, under leadership of the former head of the ISI (under Zia), General Hamid Gul continued to promote a pan-Islamist agenda, one which included continuing the support for the war in Afghanistan, and in J&K, but also attempting to rid Pakistan of western influence.\(^{103}\) General Gul had assumed control of the ISI in 1987 from General Akhtar Rahman a man loyal to Zia,

---

\(^{100}\) Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 139  
\(^{103}\) Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 144
and a fellow pan-Islamist. Under Gul the ISI aligned itself further with the Mujahideen, particularly with a faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hezb-e-Islami. To this effect, Gul attempted to install a fundamentalist government in Jalalabad with Hekmatyar as foreign minister, and another powerful member of the Mujahideen, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a radical Islamist, as prime minister.\textsuperscript{104}

General Gul also had a strong presence in the 1988 elections, when he and the military helped to organize all right wing political organizations under the banner of the IDA (Islamic Democratic Alliance), also known as the IJI (Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad) with its political arm headed by Nawaz Sharif, to balance against what the military perceived to be the threat of a PPP civilian government led by Benazir Bhutto.\textsuperscript{105} General Beg and Gul publically defended this move to balance against Bhutto by claiming that an opposition was necessary for a truly functional democratic government. In truth, the IJI represented the fears of the military and intelligence community that with the death of General Zia came the end of their control. The result of the formation of the IJI was that Bhutto did not receive an absolute mandate in the ’88 elections, winning every province in a landslide except for Punjab, where the army made its stand, preventing Bhutto from installing a government in the region claiming that Nawaz Sharif (with the help of the ISI) had garnered a significant enough portion of the vote to claim leadership rights over the province.\textsuperscript{106}

During the early stages of the Bhutto government, it became clear that although the authoritarian general Zia had died, the power structure he had left behind still remained. Having delegated enormous power to the president, in an attempt to preemptively ensure

\textsuperscript{104} Haqqani, Hussain. \textit{Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military}. 214.
\textsuperscript{105} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 134.
\textsuperscript{106} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 137
he would retain power after stepping down as military leader, and ending martial law, the
president under Bhutto, Ghulam Ishaq Khan stood to wield the most power after the 1988
elections. Khan, an ally of General Gul carried out the agenda of the military under the
guise of a civilian leader who simply represented the opposition to the Bhutto government,
not a pawn of the military who served to create dissension in Pakistani society. Because of
the lengths through which highly influential figures went, in order to undermine the Bhutto
government, its very legitimacy came into question. The military continued to be the de
facto leadership of Pakistan, while the ISI maintained and dictated Pakistani foreign policy
having cultivated relationships with key figures at both the Af-Pak frontier, and Indo-Paki
Kashmiri fronts.  

In many ways Benazir Bhutto was rendered impotent from the start of her
administration in 1988. The unwillingness to work with or empower the Bhutto
government, on the part of the ISI and the military was compounded by the fact that Nawaz
Sharif, as leader of the Punjab province, and friend of both President Khan, and General Beg
often was granted more power than Bhutto was as prime minister. These circumstances
perpetuated an environment of disrespect, and contempt, which once held for her father,
was now being projected in full force onto her by the Pakistani military, and intelligence
complex. 

In 1989, the Soviet Union was driven out of Afghanistan by NATO forces, and
Afghanistan delved into civil war. The Pakistani ISI was working at full capacity to do all

---

107 Ibid. 142.
108 Ibid. 143.
110 Ibid. 134.
it could to install the Mujahideen leaders it had funded into a position that would allow them to regain control over the war torn nation. Having rid themselves of the Soviets in February of 1989, it now came to General Gul to ensure that the Afghan Interim Government would be comprised of Mujahideen with a favorable attitude towards Pakistan. However without winning a significant victory by taking an Afghan city, those supported by Pakistan had no chance of being seen as legitimate. Gul set his sights on Jalalabad, organizing Afghan forces under Hekmatyar to take it in order to solidify his standing as a prominent member of the Afghan resistance. The ISI and the military however had seen only what they wanted to in their favored Mujahideen forces, and overlooked the fact that they were not prepared for such an undertaking. The siege failed, leaving General Gul demoralized, and empowering the Soviet-backed president of Afghanistan Mohammed Najibullah further by demonstrating his ability to squash potential attempts to undermine his regime. The attempt was doomed to fail from the beginning, but their could have been no better man for the job than General Gul, who was no newcomer in the world of formulating insurgencies. In the past as ISI chief he had actively supported Khalistani national groups who fought against Indian forces in Kashmir, claiming that it provided Pakistan with a low cost solution to fighting India in J&K.

An inexperienced politician, Bhutto found herself abused by the propaganda mechanism of the ISI, by which they used accusations of corruption, levied by the ISI against her husband to tarnish her own credibility. The fear felt by the ISI was palpable, as the daughter the once powerful Bhutto family tried to regain power. General Gul maintained open ties with the IDA, while General Beg did all he could to discourage any

112 Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 140
113 Ibid.
form of participation by Bhutto in military affairs, only allowing her to attend staff meetings as, “an observer, not a participant”.\textsuperscript{114} By 1990, in light of the failed attempt by the ISI under his leadership to take Jalalabad and install Hekmatyar as foreign minister, Bhutto sacked General Gul as head of the ISI, replacing him with Shamsur Rahman Kallu a reserved man who did not try and take steps to further engrain Pakistan in the Afghan civil war. By November of 1990, Bhutto had gone from an inexperienced politician to one who was able to influence Pakistani politics, having undermined Ishaq Khan’s administration through using the leverage she held in parliament to move Pakistan towards a parliamentary democracy, which would imbue the prime minister with further reaching powers than the president. To these attempts, Ishaq Khan utilized the 8\textsuperscript{th} amendment to dismiss the Bhutto government in November of 1990 on hundreds of charges of nepotism, corruption, and despotism.\textsuperscript{115}

A month later, the Election committee of Pakistan called for new parliamentary election. Nawaz Sharif’s conservative IDF bloc took parliament, and Sharif was installed as the new Prime Minister. As prime minister, Nawaz Sharif removed all semblance of plurality that had existed under PM Benazir Bhutto. Without the PPP, the IDF, which had been created entirely out of ISI funding, worked openly with the ISI and the military to pursue the ISI foreign policy agenda.\textsuperscript{116} This manifested itself in the theaters of the Afghan civil war and the ongoing dispute in Jammu & Kashmir. The year Sharif was elected, the IDF dissolved, renamed as the Pakistani Muslim League (PML-Nawaz). Entering into office, the PML-N faced resistance from the PPP as well as the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM),

\textsuperscript{114} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 138.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. 142
\textsuperscript{116} Federation of American Scientists. Intelligence Resource Program. Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
both of which were more liberal than the conservatism that Sharif intended to implement.\textsuperscript{117} Sharif’s interests lied within Pakistan, understanding that the nation had little to no infrastructure at all, an increasingly high level of unemployment, and an energy shortage. This was in addition to the worsening state of affairs in Kashmir, where direct meddling in Kashmiri politics by India in the years prior to Sharif’s election had reached a tipping point by 1990.

In order to address domestic issues, Sharif introduced the National Reconstruction Program, which introduced capitalist reforms to the stagnant Pakistani economy. This included the privatization of several industries and services formerly controlled by the government, several of which had fallen into complete disrepair. Under Sharif, the shipping, power, airlines, telecom, and oil industries were all opened to privatization for the first time in state history.\textsuperscript{118} The first Sharif administration was marked by shady dealings across the board. Although he dedicated far more time to the administration of Punjab, a black eye for his administration came early on with the collapse of cooperative banks in Punjab in 1991, many of which were owned by members of Sharif’s party, and were not prosecuted.\textsuperscript{119}

Sharif lent himself both to western conceptions of development, but also greatly to the Islamization policies of General Zia’s regime, which he hoped to use to promote conservative Islam, and unite Muslims behind his PML-N. This turned out to yield little efficacy when coupled with his seemingly pro-western stance, which included privatization, and alignment with the US over the issue of Kuwait (operation desert storm)

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Abdus, Samad. \textit{Economic Policies of the First Nawaz Sharif Government 1990-93.}
\textsuperscript{119} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism.} 146.
in 1991.\textsuperscript{120} Skepticism for his regime rose domestically as he yielded control of the Sindh region, dominated by the PPP, to the leader of the MQM, Jam Sadiq Ali. Sadiq was given control after he promised Sharif and president Ishaq he would help eradicate the PPP’s presence in Sindh. This soon devolved into anarchy as the violence prone MQM launched an ineffective campaign against the PPP, which resulted in a loss of control by both parties.\textsuperscript{121} By May of 1992 the army entered into Sindh in order to restore order to the region. Working with the ISI, the army combated non-political entities, which were looting, murdering, and overall terrorizing the citizens of Sindh. This was a two-step process in which the second step was to fragment the MQM, which had grown beyond the point where it could be contained. This was accomplished by exacerbating the tensions between different leaders within the MQM, with the ISI protecting those who did not support Altaf Hussein.

An allied organization with PML-N, the partnership with the MQM reflected poorly on Sharif, causing him to fall out of favor with the military and intelligence community following the enlargement of the MQM’s activities. Furthermore, during 1992, the relationship between Sharif, and president Ishaq Khan began to devolve. In March 1992, then director of the ISI, Javid Nasir, a devoutly religious man who wholly perceived Pakistan as an Islamic state turned the tide as to Pakistan’s international standing with his policy of providing assistance to Muslim causes across the world. Director Nasir spearheaded efforts to aid Muslims in Bosnia, Xinjiang province in China, the Philippines, and throughout central Asia.\textsuperscript{122} These activities were troubling to the United States and

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. 148.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. 147.
\textsuperscript{122} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 149
many western nations, who as a response to this, in April 1993 called for the removal of Javid Nasir as director if the ISI, threatening that Pakistan would be put on the State departments terror watch-list if Sharif did not comply. To this request he responded quickly, removing Nasir, and reaffirming his alignment with the US over Kuwait and its concerns in the Middle East.¹²³

A few months after this, president Ishaq Khan concerned with Sharif’s pro-western stance, and his relations with the military particularly in his actions to undermine the current structure (through direct talks between Sharif and senior members of the military in an attempt to bring the military under his control by placing those who would work with him in power) utilized his relationship with the military to once again remove an acting Prime minister, and in late April of 1993 after Sharif attempted to publically campaign against the president, president Ishaq Khan, backed by the military used the 8th amendment of the Pakistani constitution to dissolve the national assembly and remove Nawaz Sharif as prime minister.¹²⁴ However, a month later, the Pakistani Supreme Court ruled that Khan did not have the grounds to dismiss the Sharif government, and reinstated Sharif in June. In July, amidst fighting between Sharif and Khan, the head of the army, General Waheed Kakar stepped in and persuaded both the prime minister and the president to step down. From July ’93 until October ’93, Moeen Qureshi, a retired world bank vice president, was implemented, as per an agreement between Sharif and Bhutto, as the interim prime minister until fresh elections could be held.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Maitra, Ramtanu. *Ishaq Khan Seizes Control in Pakistan*. April 1993
¹²⁵ Abbas, Hussein. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 150.
Having actively been pushing for her return to politics, and seizing on the convoluted environment, which president Ishaq and prime minister Sharif had cultivated in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto returned to power, taking office, in an interesting turn of events, with the help of the head of the military, General Kakar, in October of 1993. As head of the PPP, which had become one of the most solidified political parties, Bhutto was able to assert her regime in many parts of Pakistan, allowing her to elect a high ranking PPP leader, Sardar Farooq Khan Leghari as her president, replacing the interim president Sajjid, and giving her party mandate on executive powers.

By September of 1994, Military Intelligence uncovered a conspiracy between several high, and mid-ranking members of the army including a general (Gen. Zaheer Abbassi), who were planning a coup to overtake the government and declare it a Sunni nation. Their plan was to massacre their fellow army elite’s during a board meeting, assuming control over the army, which was to culminate in a takeover of the state. The plan never took off, due in part to the inability of Gen. Abbassi, who had little to no following, nor troops under his direct control, to persuade a significant amount of army members to follow suit. It became commonly accepted that the general had the support of General Waheed Kakar’s second in command, General Ghulam Malik, a general with an established religious streak. Kakar never ousted Gen. Malik due in part to his wide knowledge of state secrets, and of the nuclear program, however the civilian government following this episode did not trust Malik.

While Kakar did not fully address the attempt to gut the army by religious extremists within the army, he did try to address the issue of radical Islamists within the

---

127 Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism.* 153
ISI. Kakar sacked the director general of the ISI, Javed Nasir, and lieutenant general Asad Durrani for violating the chain of command, and instituted his own man for the job, General Javed Qazi, with the instructions to cleanse the ISI of Islamists, which he did to the best of his capacity.\footnote{Ibid. 153.} The most direct result of this was a purge of Islamists who soon went on to work at consulting positions for different religious extremist groups once they were removed from their posts.

By November of 1996, the Bhutto administration had become increasingly corrupt. Politically motivated killings became a regular occurrence, and a shortfall in Pakistan's foreign reserves of about 50%, some $300 million, discovered by Leghari, culminated in grounds for her dismissal.\footnote{Nawaz, Shuja. *Crossed Swords*. 486.} As a result, her handpicked president, Farooq Leghari a Baloch national, and member of her own party, the PPP, utilized the 8th amendment of the Pakistani constitution to dissolve the Bhutto government, and dismiss her as Prime minister on grounds of corruption. Bhutto had done immense damage to not only her own credibility, but also undermined the PPP as a party that could be trusted to govern the state fairly and ethically. In her place, President Leghari appointed Malik Meraj Khalid interim prime minister. Khalid first emerged in political life under Benazir's father, the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto in the early 1970's as minister of food and agriculture. As a favorite of Zulfikar, the father of the PPP, the decision to elect Khalid by fellow PPP member Leghari was symbolic of the type of image Leghari wished to return to the PPP, away from the corruption of Benazir Bhutto's government.

Entering into an environment of corruption, worsening economic conditions, and an increasingly strong military, Nawaz Sharif reentered the political arena in 1997,
Benazir Bhutto in the parliamentary elections by a landslide. As a result, Sharif’s PML-N assumed power in the parliament from Benazir Bhutto’s PPP, and Sharif was elected prime minister.\textsuperscript{130} Former interim president Wasim Sajjad, who had served as president in 1993, was elected president once again to hold office for the two-month period from December 1997 to January 1998 while Prime Minister Sharif could choose a new president.

Upon his election, Sharif made monumental changes to the Constitution of Pakistan by removing the 8\textsuperscript{th} amendment, which had previously given the president the ability to dissolve parliament, and remove acting prime ministers. This, coupled with several personal differences with Sharif resulted in the resignation of president Leghari in December of 1997.\textsuperscript{131} Sharif’s second term as prime minister was marked by an aggressive nuclear build up, including several nuclear tests on May 18\textsuperscript{th} of 1998, which came in response to similar tests done by just a week earlier on May 11\textsuperscript{th}. The United States had already expressed discomfort over a nuclear South Asia in the form of condemnation of the Indian tests. These tests, while alarming, and subsequently publically condemned by the United States, sent a much more vivid signal to India that Pakistan would not be intimidated by a nuclear India, and had every intention of developing its own nuclear program. Furthermore, the decision showed the lack of faith, which Pakistan had in the US to provide them with deterrence support in light of the Indian tests, prompting them to flex their own nuclear muscle.\textsuperscript{132}

In early 1999 a plan which had arisen repeatedly throughout the history of Pakistan, dating back to its first appearance under General Zia over 20 years prior, came to the

\textsuperscript{130} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan's Drift into Extremism}. 160
\textsuperscript{131} Nawaz, Shuja. \textit{Crossed Swords}. 487.
\textsuperscript{132} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan's Drift into Extremism}. 162.
forefront of Pakistani policy, and this time, with some level of support. This plan concerned an Indian outpost in the Kargil mountain range, which was key to securing trade routes through Pakistani controlled Jammu and Kashmir, into India. During the winter months, Indian troops would abandon their post due to snowfall and overall harsh weather conditions, and the post would be retaken in the spring. This had become a yearly routine, and had been long recognized as a strategic opportunity for Pakistan by shortsighted generals and political strategists alike. The plan was shot down in the late 1970’s by General Zia who foresaw the blowback that would ensue if Pakistani forces took, and held the Kargil outpost, and thus the plan was scrapped at Zia’s request.\textsuperscript{133} Under Nawaz Sharif however, the negotiations over Kashmir were undermined when a plan to take the Kargil outpost was certified, and put into action sometime around October of 1998.\textsuperscript{134} The result of this was Sharif allowed the military to send its own troops, posing as militants into the Indian controlled Kashmiri territories during 1998, and into 1999. This was known as “operation Badr”, and was intended to give Pakistan leverage in coaxing India into talks for negotiating the Kashmir dispute in the face of what appeared to be increasing sectarian violence, but was actually an organized military buildup by the Pakistani military. The operation in Kashmir was in part imagined and carried out by Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz Khan, himself a Kashmiri who saw Kargil as the crux of what it would take to turn the Kashmir debate in favor of Pakistan. The Kargil operations were spearheaded by General Mahmood Ahmad, the general in charge of Kargil for the Pakistani military, and General Javed Hassan who led the Northern forces of the military, and was responsible for the operational logistics of the taking of the Kargil outpost. The two worked to convince

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid. 170.
\textsuperscript{134} Jones, Owen Bennett. \textit{Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm}. 92.
Prime Minister Sharif of the advantages of conducting such an operation, to which he responded positively, although it already was in full swing by the time the PM was presented with it in late March of 1999.\textsuperscript{135}

Sharif would vehemently deny any prior knowledge of the Kargil plan, claiming it had been entirely undertaken unilaterally by the army, and although this is unlikely, he still would have been unable to stop it given the strengthening of the military that had taken place over the 1990’s.\textsuperscript{136} Although Sharif ostensibly knew about the Kargil plan by the end of March, the operation began several months earlier in late 1998 without not only the blessing of the prime minister, but also the involvement of all branches of the military. The operation was carried out in its early stages by regional generals, working with Kashmiri militants. By early May India had identified a significant build-up of Pakistani forces in Kargil, including several helipads.\textsuperscript{137} On May 5\textsuperscript{th} the Indian army sent a five-man patrol to check on the post. The five men were subsequently tortured and killed by the occupying forces, marking the start of the Kargil conflict.

Throughout the course of May and June, it became increasingly clear that the Pakistani military was behind these operations as the Indian offensive ramped up, sending the Indian Air Force into combat with Kashmiri/Pakistani militants. The security paradigm of South Asia was playing out in real time as Pakistan and India, both newly nuclear powers came face to face as the world watched. Now without the Soviets and Americans to sway the balance of power within the sub-continent, post-soviet Pakistan found itself without an ally in the United States, which grew increasingly concerned with the actions taken by the

\textsuperscript{135} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 171.  
\textsuperscript{136} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 174.  
\textsuperscript{137} Jones, Owen Bennett. \textit{Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm}. 94
Pakistani military to usurp Kashmir from India. In Mid-June, US president Bill Clinton called Nawaz Sharif and instructed him to pull out of Kargil with the threat of international condemnation. From then on, the operation began to fall apart. India began to repel Pakistani forces, cutoff supply routes and ports, specifically in Karachi, and re-established control of its outpost in Kargil. The events that transpired from March on were complicated by the fact that Nawaz Sharif had invited Indian prime minister Atal Vajpayee to attend bilateral talks on restoring diplomacy, and normalizing nuclear relations between Pakistan and India, adding another dimension to the already complex relationship that these two nations had with one another. With the possibility of severe consequences looming in the event of failure, these talks were followed carefully all across the world. The efforts between them culminated in the signing of the Lahore Declaration on February 21st 1999. The declaration outlined nuclear proliferation in South Asia and called for restraint to be employed in disagreements between the two nations in the future. The talks were highly constructive, and both parties walked away publically announcing they were pleased with the outcome and highly optimistic. Any good that had been done by these negotiations quickly dissipated as the talks reached their climax just days before the ongoing operation in Kargil became evident.

Although Pervez Musharraf had initially been appointed head of the army staff by Nawaz Sharif in the events following the removal of general Jehangir Karamat in 1998, this did little to improve Sharif’s standing with the military. As 1999 went on, tensions between the military, led by Musharraf, and the civilian government, led by Nawaz Sharif, began to reach critical levels.\textsuperscript{138} The operation in Kargil had further revealed a severe rift within the

\textsuperscript{138} Nawaz, Shuja. \textit{Crossed Swords}. 500.
army staff. This signaled to Sharif, whom had been waiting for an opportunity to legitimize his position as Prime Minister for almost a decade, with the backing of the military that the time was right to try and gain control of the army, Sharif tried to accomplish this through the fateful decision to implement Musharraf as the head of the army staff, something Musharraf was fully aware of upon assuming the position.¹³⁹

Chapter 3: A Return To Military Governance

Throughout 1999, the relationship between the executive and the military further deteriorated, when in September On October 12th 1999, while Musharraf was en route to Sri Lanka, Nawaz Sharif relieved Pervez Musharraf from his post, and installing then ISI chief Khawaja Ziauddin as the new head of the army staff.¹⁴⁰ Before the announcement could be made public, the military seized control of the state news station, and set up a perimeter around Nawaz Sharif’s home. When Sharif declined to reinstate Musharraf, the military placed him under arrest, and upon his arrival in Islamabad, General Musharraf became the new leader of the Pakistani army, as well as the state, becoming the first military leader of Pakistan since General Zia.¹⁴¹ The 1999 coup, which ousted Nawaz Sharif, marked the end of Pakistan’s first experiment with democracy. However, this was indicative not just of a shift in military power, but more importantly it showed a sharp decline in the ability of democratic processes to be a guarantor of foreign aid, and thus a

¹³⁹ Ibid. 501.
¹⁴⁰ Jones, Owen Bennett. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. 42.
¹⁴¹ Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. 177.
worthwhile endeavor for the Pakistani military. When Musharraf’s generals moved to quarantine Prime Minister Sharif, the decades old power structure, which had been swept under the rug throughout the 1990’s returned to the forefront of Pakistan’s political scene.\textsuperscript{142} Up until this moment, the military had remained in power but taken the role of a silent partner in running Pakistani foreign policy but remaining clear of the public eye. The decision to formally quarantine and detain the prime minister removed any doubt that had existed in the minds of the Pakistani people to the power of the military to take an authoritative role in politics if they saw fit. Although the regime had changed in the form of the Bhutto and Sharif governments, the power structure of the state had remained the same since Zia had imbued the military with the power to define the identity of the state as a Muslim nation. Using a professional military and employing Islamic militants to carry out the goals of a state outlined in such a fashion, enabled the military to gain relative autonomy from the electorate, and supersede elected government.

This indicated not only a shift in domestic politics, but also global politics. The strength of the army had not dissipated since the death of General Zia in 1988, but it had allowed itself to take a backseat (if only in appearance) to elected government in order to achieve what it saw as the best organization of Pakistani politics that would allow the military to achieve the aims of the state. This meant securing a good standing in the international arena, which in the 1990’s meant allowing democratic governance to emerge.\textsuperscript{143} At a time when even the Soviet Union had given in to the norm of democratic elections following the implosion of the USSR, Pakistan as a nation slowly losing the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid. 178.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Ibrahim, Amina. \textit{Guarding the State or Protecting the Economy? The Economic Factors of Pakistan’s Military Coups}. 13.
\end{itemize}
prominence it once enjoyed as a state with great strategic importance during the Cold War era, followed suite. However, the elections of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were not enough to reverse the regional trend towards Indian hegemony in the Asian sub-continent. Instead, corruption marked these democratic regimes, and the military enjoyed complete autonomy from the decisions of the civilian government, indicating that it was business as usual in Pakistan.\footnote{Nawaz, Shuja. \textit{Crossed Swords.} 530.}

1999 marked a dramatic shift not only the popular opinion of Pakistani citizens, but also in the clout of the military. Nawaz Sharif brought these tensions to light by taking the unprecedented step in attempting to depose a popular military general, Pervez Musharraf. With Pakistani citizens still strongly believing in the importance of a strong military, a move such as the one taken by Sharif would never have been made had the relationship between the prime minister and the military gotten so desperate. Sharif had become somewhat of a pariah by the end of his second tenure as prime minister, due in part to his close relationship with the US, and president Bill Clinton, but more so because of the culture of corruption which flourished under his regime, most pronounced in his favoritism towards his native Punjab Province. This disenchantment made the emergence of a military leader that much easier for Musharraf when a civilian leader whom most distrusted to run the state attempted to seize power over the military, the entity most closely associated with carrying out the goals of the state.\footnote{Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism.} 180.}

The triumph of the military indicated a change in the forces compelling domestic politics, as the US, which had demonstrated full support for any democratically elected leader, failed to help prevent the October 1999 coup. The military had evolved from the
Cold War era paradigm of international relations, where success depended on siding with either the US or the USSR. The primary concern among army staff had shifted from western appeasement (democratic governance) to a policy of realism whereby the military understood its role as main guarantor of a thriving Pakistan, depended on its autonomy, something that had been compromised by the democratic elections of the 1990’s. Opposition from civilian leaders over the goals of the state, and state identity had complicated military operations for almost a decade, and while India’s economy had developed rapidly, Pakistan had began to feel the effects of economic stagnation. Other than liberalization of media outlets, the tangible improvements that could be attributed to democratic governance were few and far between. A return to military rule was met with little domestic opposition as many Pakistani’s saw an opportunity for improvement in a change in regime type.146

The 1999 coup however, was far different from the one which twenty years earlier had placed general Zia-ul-Haq in power in 1977, replacing Zulfikar Bhutto, the first democratic leader in Pakistan. General Zia had been a vocal proponent of the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state, and had helped to solidify the army’s position as the entity at the head of the state’s affairs. Zia’s policies led to the first wave of radicalization in Pakistan, and his handling of the first Afghan war created a far more tenuous relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan than had ever existed previously.147 Musharraf on the other hand, was a public proponent of democratic governance, and who rose to power not because of his charisma (as did general Zia), but because of his innocuous moderate positions on most issues. He was elected to chief of the army staff under Benazir Bhutto in

---

146 Bokhari, Farhan. *After a calm coup, Pakistani’s Celebrate*. October 14th 1999.
147 Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 112.
her second term in office, and was seen as a way to steer the military away from radicalization, and towards a normalization of military-civilian relations.\textsuperscript{148} The coup itself was remarkably different from the one that had deposed Zulfikar Bhutto, in that the breaking point came with civilian aggression against the military staff, while the 1977 coup saw the exact opposite dynamic. General Zia had initially found his niche by leading a campaign against Bhutto on grounds of corruption, placing him on trial, and subsequently assuming control of the government as a military leader. In the case of general Zia, his coup had been backed by the US government, and ensured by the fact that Zia had more powerful connections that would back his regime than Bhutto did. With Musharraf, Sharif surely had more powerful diplomatic ties than his army counterparts, although they proved to be of no use in preventing a military takeover.\textsuperscript{149}

Musharraf faced a delicate situation entering into his leadership position in October of 1999. It was vital for him to differentiate himself from past military leaders, and to this effect, he did not declare martial law, and named himself “chief executive” instead of chief martial law administrator. Three days after the coup, on October 15\textsuperscript{th}, Musharraf declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, and purged the government of political enemies, most notably Khwaja Ziauddin, the former ISI chief, whom Nawaz Sharif had appointed preemptively to replace Musharraf. Additionally he laid out a multi-faceted liberalizing agenda designed to rid the state of corruption through transparency and decentralization, to create cohesion between the factionalized Pakistani regions, and a plan for reviving the economy by opening it up to foreign investment. These were all promises made several times before to the Pakistani people, restated by almost every incoming

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid. 179.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid. 176.
leader, and few truly believed that Musharraf would, or could make good on what he promised.  

150 By the end of October, Musharraf had assumed control over the country, installing four hand picked individuals as provincial administrators, created a seven member military-civilian council to govern the nation, and deposed the staff and the office of Nawaz Sharif, placing him under house arrest. Working with President Rafiq Tarar, Musharraf installed several new members to the military staff, many of whom Musharraf had a personal relationship with. Additionally he filled his cabinet with technocrats such as Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank executive whom Musharraf named finance minister, and Abdul Sattar as his foreign minister. 151 On November 10th, Nawaz Sharif was formally indicted on corruption, kidnapping (diversion of Musharraf’s flight), and treason. 152 The first step in carrying out the reforms that Musharraf had promised, was the creation of an anti-corruption unit, called the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in late October. 153 The NAB was stocked with respected military officers who had gained a reputation for their integrity. Headed by Lt. Gen. Syed Mohammed Amjad, the creation of the bureau was met with widespread optimism, and on November 17th, the first round of arrests on grounds of corruption were made. 154 The public responded with overwhelming positivity, and the NAB became synonymous with the efforts of Musharraf to “clean up” Pakistani government, its failure meant his failure as well. Those who could be held accountable for

---

151 Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords. 529.
153 Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism. 184.
154 Ibid. 185.
their corruption were mostly low, and mid-level offenders, while high-ranking officials responsible for the bulk of corruption were beyond the reach of the NAB.

In December, the link between the success of the NAB and the credibility of the Musharraf administration became increasingly clear. At the behest of Musharraf himself, this lead to an increase in the robustness of the Bureau, as well as expediting many of the pending cases by prosecuting based more on hearsay and the reputation of the individual in question, than on facts and evidence. The NAB chairman, Gen. Amjad however, became far more interested in industrialists, and businessmen who had utilized corrupt practices to gain an upper hand in setting up their businesses in Pakistan, than in government officials.\textsuperscript{155} This was risky, and mostly due to the immense amount of money that had changed hands through corrupt deals, the NAB was prevented from prosecuting cases that had been built up against these foreign corporations by Musharraf himself, along with his finance minister, former Citibank executive Shaukat Aziz.\textsuperscript{156} Criticism of the NAB has been primarily concerned with the fact that the NAB utilizes closed courts for its proceedings. Lacking in any oversight, the NAB was able to prosecute whomever they wanted, guilty of corruption, or not. This created a culture of fear amongst politicians who were constantly at risk of prosecution merely for failing to cooperate with the federal government, or voicing an unpopular opinion.\textsuperscript{157}

In March of 2000, US president Clinton wrapped up a trip to South Asia, after 5 days in India, by flying into Islamabad, and spending just 5 hours in Pakistan on March 25\textsuperscript{th}. While there, he met with Musharraf to discuss the Kashmir issue, and concerns over the

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid. 187.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid. 187.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid. 186.
status of the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Understanding that it was with support from Pakistan that the Taliban and Bin Laden were able to thrive, Clinton pushed Musharraf to back down on the traditional policy of the Pakistani military towards Afghanistan. Musharraf agreed to try and negotiate personally with the Taliban leadership, but did not back down on the Kashmir issue. This meeting, it would turn out, set the precedent for Musharraf’s policies relative to Afghanistan throughout his tenure.\footnote{Ibid. 190.}

Islamic extremism had reached a critical point in South Asia, entering into the new millennium and required decisive action to reverse the growing threat of extremist groups. In April of 2000 Musharraf attempted to end the controversial blasphemy laws, but failed to do so in the face of widespread public backlash.\footnote{Jones, Owen Bennett. \emph{Pakistan: Eye of the Storm}. 20.} The failure of Musharraf to end these laws gives a very important insight into the contentious social environment of Pakistan at the time. In May, after several steps taken by Musharraf to consolidate his power, most noticeably by banning political rallies, the Supreme Court formally requested that he hold national elections by October of 2002. Musharraf agreed, driven by his desire to retain at the very least, the façade of democracy.\footnote{Abbas, Hassan. \emph{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 191.} Having gained the powers of the prime minister in the coup, Musharraf remained “chief executive” for almost half of a year, calling into question his devotion to democracy. Agreeing to the elections allowed Musharraf to feign interest in democratic processes, and enabled him to continue espousing democratic ideals, while presenting himself as a non-authoritarian military leader. In September of 2000, Gen. Amjad, the head of the NAB was relieved from his duties. As the face of the NAB, and a symbol of anti-corruption, this was a devastating blow to the organization, and the

\footnote{158 Ibid. 190.} 
\footnote{159 Jones, Owen Bennett. \emph{Pakistan: Eye of the Storm}. 20.} 
\footnote{160 Abbas, Hassan. \emph{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 191.}
remaining original members of the NAB whom had been chosen for their integrity, were soon relieved from their posts as well. This reorganization, carried out by the Musharraf government, effectively ended the NAB as it was initially conceived.\footnote{Ibid. 189.} In December, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s trial, which began in March, came to a close. Sharif was convicted of all charges, in what was widely regarded as a sham trial. Immediately following the trial, Sharif and his family were exiled to Saudi Arabia.\footnote{Rashid, Ahmed. \textit{Pakistani fury as army lets Sharif fly into exile}. December 11th 2000.}

In June of 2001, president Rafiq Tarar resigned, and Musharraf assumed the presidency. His ascendance to the presidency prompted him to institute several social reforms including a total overhaul of the cultural policies of Nawaz Sharif, adopting many reforms from Benazir Bhutto’s tenure including liberalization of the media, and encouraging development of the arts, and complimentary institutions such as movie theaters, play houses, and even allowing for public concerts.\footnote{Waldman, Amy. \textit{Pakistan TV: A New Look at the News}. January 25th 2004.} In July, a meeting between Pakistani President Musharraf, and Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee was organized as a follow-up to the Lahore talks of 1999, which although successful, had been undermined by the revelation that Pakistan had crossed the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir, and taken the Indian outpost at Kargil while the talks were occurring. This led to a period of unprecedented tension between the two nations, at a time when both nations emerged with functioning offensive nuclear programs. These talks, known as the Agra Summit took place from July 14th to 16th in New Delhi between the Indian and Pakistani leaders. The talks revisited nuclear proliferation in South Asia, and delved into discussions over governance of Kashmir. The talks came about at the behest of UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan, who recognized the importance of remediating diplomacy between the two nations.\textsuperscript{164} 

The Agra treaty however, never came into fruition, and neither party signed on as talks collapsed under the weight of mistrust between the new Pakistani President, and a veteran Indian prime minister.\textsuperscript{165} Both sides claimed their own reasons for the failure of the talks, but it was at its root, the result of a long history of subversion by the Pakistani military and its intelligence bureau that doomed these talks.\textsuperscript{166} Musharraf from the Indian perspective represented the Pakistani military complex, and his current position as president, attempting to negotiate peace was not something that Prime Minister Vajpayee could remediate against his career as a military general, partaking in operations such as Kargil, and the ongoing violence in Kashmir.

At the beginning of September, Pakistan appeared to be on a trajectory towards institutionalized military governance, with Pervez Musharraf at the head. A self-styled military commander turned technocratic leader, Musharraf had diverged very little from the traditional military position of continuing the Kashmiri war of attrition, publically denying involvement, but privately allowing Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed, to operate within Pakistan, sometimes with direct funding from the government.\textsuperscript{167} In March of the year before, Musharraf had pledged to US president Clinton that he would attempt to rein in the Taliban, and control the operations of Osama bin Laden and his affiliates. There is little evidence that indicates Musharraf took any steps towards dismantling the Taliban

\textsuperscript{164} BBC. \textit{Agra Summit at a Glance.} July 17\textsuperscript{th} 2001.
\textsuperscript{165} Press Trust of India. \textit{Mush’ Responsible for Agra Summit Failure.} September 26\textsuperscript{th} 2006.
\textsuperscript{166} Express News Service. \textit{Atal Rejects Musharraf’s Claims on Agra Summit.} September 27\textsuperscript{th} 2006.
\textsuperscript{167} Jones, Owen Bennett. \textit{Pakistan: Eye of the Storm.} 83.
at the time, or that he even could. Furthermore, Musharraf had indicated that he saw the Taliban as a group, which represented the interests of the Punjabi people, and as such has legitimacy as an organized form of representative government.\textsuperscript{168} By late 2001 Pakistan was allowing the Taliban to operate freely within the border regions of Pakistan, and substantively it appeared nothing had changed in Islamabad with regards to Afghanistan since the late 80's, that was, until September 11\textsuperscript{th} of 2001.\textsuperscript{169}

On the morning of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, two commercial jet planes flew into the World Trade Center in New York City. An hour later, another plane hit the Pentagon, the United States military intelligence headquarters, located in Arlington Virginia. An hour after that it was reported a fourth plane, also headed towards Washington D.C. had crashed in Pennsylvania. Within hours, it was revealed that 19 men, 15 of which were citizens of Saudi Arabia, two from the UAE, one from Egypt, and another from Lebanon, had hijacked four planes and used them as projectiles to take out 4 designated targets within the United States.\textsuperscript{170} Three of the planes hit their targets and a fourth one went down before the hijackers could reach their destination. The men were members of an Islamic Mujahid organization born out of the Afghan war known as Al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{171} Founded by Osama Bin Laden, the son of a construction magnate from Saudi Arabia, himself a former soviet mujahideen fighter/ fundraiser in late 1988, the organization emerged as a spin-off from the Maktab Al-Khidamat (MAK) organization, a recruitment center, and funding operation for mujahideen founded by Bin Laden, and his mentor, an Egyptian by the name of

\textsuperscript{168} Rashid, Ahmed. \textit{Pakistan’s Explicit Pro-Pashtun Policy and Pro-Taliban Support}. June 6\textsuperscript{th} 2000.
\textsuperscript{169} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 220.
\textsuperscript{170} Nawaz, Shuja. \textit{Crossed Swords}. 538.
\textsuperscript{171} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 217.
Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (commonly referred to as the blind Sheikh) four years earlier in 1984. Relying on Saudi funding acquired both by Bin Laden himself, and given by the Saudi government, MAK provided well over a billion USD to the anti-soviet movement in Afghanistan throughout its duration. There was however, no evidence linking Bin Laden himself to the attacks, and he explicitly denied responsibility on several occasions, openly praising those who carried them out. The next day, Al Qaeda began to frame themselves as the group that had spearheaded the attacks, promising similar attacks in the future, and calling young people to arms in the name of jihad to join in the fight against America.

The funding provided by MAK and Saudi Arabia for the mujahideen however, only tells part of the story. The bulk of the funding for anti-Soviet fighters came from the US by way of the CIA, which handed tens of millions over to the Pakistani intelligence service, the ISI. It was the ISI that was responsible for providing the material support that armed and trained mujahideen fighters in the 1980’s, but also funded right wing Islamic schools, and propagated violence all for the purpose of providing a cheap and effective way for the Pakistani military to manufacture soldiers. In 2001, this funding came full circle, and US foreign policy strategists saw first hand what their funding had yielded, a decade of policy encapsulated by the 9/11 attacks. Although the men who hijacked the planes were not Afghan mujahideen, nor were most old enough to fight, with some not even alive during the Afghan war, they had all been educated in the cause of pan-Islamism, studied Wahhabism

---

and Salafism and trained under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda. These men were a new
generation of jihadis, and of the 19 men, only 4 were over the age of 30, and not one was
older than 35, several of the men were only 20. The oldest of them were barely old enough
to fight in the Afghan war, and not a single one did. They were all radicalized in various
parts of the world, and came together to plot the 9/11 attacks in Hamburg, Germany.

These were a loosely affiliated group of individuals, all with radical conservative Islamic
values, who found an identity in Al-Qaeda, and with its leader Osama Bin Laden. Bin Laden
had issued a Fatwa (a ruling Islamic law) against the United States in 1996, and again in
1998 against “Jews and Crusaders”. These rulings served to propagate hatred towards the
west with the hope of inspiring a new generation of jihadis to carry on what many saw as
the legacy of the Afghan mujahideen in ridding the Middle East of westerners who would
implement their own despotic leaders, undermining the goal of installing a pan-Islamic
caliph as per the teachings of radical Islamic sects.

The events of 9/11 certainly had a profound impact on Americans, however the real
effect of these attacks was to be felt in South Asia in the coming months, in the invasion of
Afghanistan and in the Middle East with the 2003 war in Iraq. The U.S. intelligence
community had long known about Al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attacks, and understood very
well that Afghanistan had become a haven for Islamic holy warriors following the end of
the Afghan war. Furthermore, the U.S. knew that without Pakistani efforts, these radical
groups which operated both entirely in Afghanistan, and the majority which operated

---

179 Nawaz, Shuja. *Crossed Swords*. 538
freely across the Durand line, could never have become as prolific as they had become by 2001. A decade of neglect in diplomacy and intelligence estimates left the US with only a surface level understanding of the state of affairs in Afghanistan. To truly combat the organization that the US understood to have carried out the attacks, the US knew it would have to work with Pakistan, a nation that had drifted beyond the control of the United States, but could provide the same strategic depth to a US operation in Afghanistan as the ISI did to the CIA in the 1980’s.180

On the day of September 11th, the head of the ISI, Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed was in Washington D.C. visiting the CIA, with instructions from Musharraf to try and persuade the US to stop pressuring Pakistan to destabilize the Taliban. This mission was ill fated, and within hours of the attack Ahmed was called to the State Department to meet with the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.181 It was at this meeting that Gen. Ahmed received an ultimatum on the operation that the US would carry out in response to the 9/11 attacks, to be relayed to Musharraf himself. The message from the U.S. was clear: either you are with us or you’re against us. Armitage laid out seven points of cooperation for Pakistan to comply with, in aiding the US in the capture of Osama Bin Laden, clear as day, requiring almost unlimited access to Pakistani intelligence, air space, and military personnel.182 With that meeting, the foreign policy Pakistan had held with regard to Afghanistan for almost 20 years abruptly changed. The Pakistani ambassador to the US issued a statement saying that Pakistan would urge the Taliban to meet the demands of the international community, and give up Osama Bin Laden. On October 7th 2001 Gen. Ahmed

181 Abbas, Hassan. *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*. 217
182 Ibid. 218.
was removed as head of the ISI, becoming a vocal opponent of the US led war in Afghanistan.  

In many ways, the re-entrance into Afghanistan by the US was quite possibly the best thing that could have happened to Pakistan, a nation falling behind India, and struggling to find its place in the international arena. Nobody knew this better than Pervez Musharraf who had found a resurgent partner in the US as an ally on the war on terror. With the promise to assist the US in any way it could in capturing Osama Bin Laden, Musharraf secured immense amounts of foreign aid from the US government, money that Pakistan, a nation in economic turmoil desperately needed. In the months following the announcement of the US invasion, Pakistan pulled thousands of military officers, and commandoes from Afghanistan who had been assisting and advising the Taliban, thus dissipating the ability of the Taliban to operate, and eventually causing it to collapse entirely, lacking its most immediate source of assistance. This partnership however came with a price. Musharraf almost instantly became a pariah within the Muslim community, and a target of extremists, in response to his decision to grant the US vast access to Pakistani resources, vital to allowing the US to carry out their operation in the Afghan mountains of Tora Bora in December of 2001, barely 10 miles from the Pakistani border.

Musharraf held that this realignment was something he did as a calculative measure to balance against India. India had already offered its bases to the US according to

---

183 Ibid. 222.
185 Ibid. 49.
Musharraf, and Pakistan risked further alienation by failing to support the US, who would proceed with their military operations with or without Pakistan. This support came in the form of access to Pakistan’s military bases and airfields, but it also included information sharing with the Pakistani intelligence community, something far more vital to US strategists.\textsuperscript{188} Directly following the bombing of Tora Bora, much of the leadership and constituency of the Afghan Taliban relocated to the Pakistani city of Quetta, where the Quetta Shura militant organization was formed under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar, spiritual leader of the Taliban, and known associate of Bin Laden.\textsuperscript{189} The lack of effort by the Pakistani leadership in quelling the flow of Taliban leadership and Afghan militants into Pakistan following the Tora Bora bombings is indicative of the fact that the long held interests of the Pakistani military complex were being undermined by the US operation in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{190} In addition to allowing free flow of refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan, Musharraf allowed the Deobandi network of religious schools, responsible for training millions of young people in the cause of jihad to remain open, instructing them to provide science and math education, but doing little to change the leadership of the network.\textsuperscript{191} Although Musharraf was a vocal opponent of extremism, banning several known terrorist organizations within Pakistan, very little changed, and his rhetoric often overshadowed any efforts to strike against militants, which were often meager, and for show.\textsuperscript{192}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{188} Hussain, Zahid. \textit{Frontline Pakistan}. 46.
\textsuperscript{189} Rashid, Ahmed. \textit{Pakistan on the Brink}. 51.
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid. 31.
\textsuperscript{191} Jones, Owen Bennett. \textit{Pakistan: Eye of the Storm}. 32.
\textsuperscript{192} Abbas, Hassan. \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}. 224.
\end{flushright}
Chapter 4: Musharraf and the War on Extremism

On December 13th 2001, the argument for foreign intervention in Pakistan gained traction, coming in the form of a terrorist attack launched on the Indian Parliament, further straining Indo-Paki relations, and calling into question the ability of the Musharraf government to combat terrorism at any level. Immediately, Indian officials came out publically claiming Pakistani militants were responsible for the attack.\textsuperscript{193} The failure of Musharraf to contain Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed stood in strong contrast with the rhetoric he had become known for that denounced radical Islam and promised to crack down on organizations that promoted violence. This all appeared meaningless when these groups were able to orchestrate an attack targeting top Indian politicians in New Delhi. These attacks led to the most severe point in Indo-Paki relations since the Kargil war in 1999. The attack on Parliament led to what was known as the 2001-02 standoff between the Pakistani and Indian army, whereby both sides began unprecedented military buildup on either side of the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{194}

In the months after 9/11 the rhetoric coming from Musharraf appeared to match his actions as he publically banned several known extremist Islamic organizations in a speech against extremism on January 12\textsuperscript{th} 2002. This included three of the most prolific extremist

\textsuperscript{193} Dugger, Celia W. \textit{India Blames Pakistani Group for Parliament Attack}. December 14\textsuperscript{th} 2001.
\textsuperscript{194} Stolar, Alex. \textit{To the Brink: Indian decision making and the 2001-2002 standoff}. 7.
organizations operating in South Asia at the time, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Al Badr, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). In the speech Musharraf addressed the misappropriation of Islam and its accompanying institutions such as Mosques and Madrassa’s for violent activities that went against the central tenants of not only Islam, but Pakistan as well.\textsuperscript{195} The expansive madrassa network that had developed since the Afghan war in Pakistan, known as the Deobandi school had become a prolific source of radicalization for young Sunni men, serving almost half a million students per year, with very little oversight from the federal government, which often was the target of rhetoric that incited violence propagated by these schools.\textsuperscript{196} Although this was met with widespread positivity amongst more secular Pakistani’s who were tired of dealing with the ravaging effects of holy war and extremist infighting, this was not as true among the right wing conservative Islamic community. For those who felt sympathy towards these groups, the message was not received the same way. After this speech, Musharraf became a top target for assassination among several extremist organizations.

As the US sent more and more troops to Afghanistan at the end of 2001, Musharraf attempted to make good on his promises to detain known members of extremist groups, which he did, if only briefly. By the end of 2001, hundreds of suspected militants had been rounded up, and subsequently released by early 2002.\textsuperscript{197} For Musharraf, this was a way to remediate his own pro-US policies against the growing distain among Pakistani’s, concerning the US presence in South Asia. These half steps however were the source of

\textsuperscript{195} Musharraf, Pervez. \textit{In Musharraf’s Words: ‘A Day of Reckoning’}. January 12\textsuperscript{th} 2002.
\textsuperscript{196} Cohen, Stephen P. \textit{The Idea of Pakistan}. 182.
\textsuperscript{197} Balduf, Scott. \textit{Pakistan’s release of Islamic militants rattles India}. December 16\textsuperscript{th} 2002.
further violence, and even led to attempts against Musharraf’s own life.\textsuperscript{198} Release of these prisoners often incited further violence against the government and the people, and fomented anger towards Musharraf who was the target of a car bombing in April of 2002. Musharraf was unharmed in this attack, however 14 civilians were killed as a result of the bombing.\textsuperscript{199}

In late April 2002, two years after the Pakistani Parliament had requested he hold elections, the Musharraf government held a referendum to extend the General’s presidency for another 5 years. The referendum was held on April 30\textsuperscript{th}, with a reported 56\% voter turnout, later revealed to be actually closer to 5 or 6\%. The referendum held little legitimacy for those within Pakistan, as well as the international community at large, with Musharraf claiming to have won 97\% of the vote. Musharraf ran almost unopposed, with the majority of opposition groups in Pakistan boycotting the elections. As a result, the 2002 election did little to legitimate his position within Pakistan, and served as little more than a gesture towards the US and western nations to signify his willingness to cooperate with the west and participate in democratic governance, if only in appearance.\textsuperscript{200} In direct contradiction with the decision to hold elections, Musharraf passes a Legal Framework Order (LFO) just before the 2002 elections, whereby he restructured the constitution of Pakistan to favor the powers of the President over the Prime minister, solidifying his power upon his reelection as president.\textsuperscript{201} From here on out, it is important to keep in mind that

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{198} Jehl, Douglas.  \textit{A Nation Challenged: Pakistani Militants; Groups Banned by Musharraf Join Forces for Attacks, Officials Say.} March 1\textsuperscript{st} 2002.

\textsuperscript{199} BBC News.  \textit{Near miss for Musharraf convoy.} December 14\textsuperscript{th} 2003.

\textsuperscript{200} Associated Press.  \textit{Musharraf Winning Five More Years as Pakistan President, Turnout Low.} April 30\textsuperscript{th} 2002.

\textsuperscript{201} Abbas, Hassan.  \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism.} 228.
\end{flushleft}
the Prime Minister took a backseat to the President in the newly established power structure.

In October of 2002, it became clear that the Musharraf government had become inept at handling electoral matters, when in the general election, what had been expected to be a clean sweep by the newly created pro-Musharraf Pakistani Muslim League, Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) turned out to be a four way split between the Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP), Pakistani Muslim League, Nawaz (PML-N) and a coalition of Islamic political parties known as Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (MMA). Of these four, the MMA was the only surprise. The surprise was a big one to those who had worked within Pakistani state institutions under the Musharraf government. The majority of effort surrounding this election had come in the form of trying to prevent the PPP and PML-N led by Benazir Bhutto, and Nawaz Sharif respectively, from gaining any control in the 2002 election. Although they succeeded, limiting Sharif’s gains to about 12% of the vote, the PPP gained about a quarter of the vote with just under 26%, and the MMA gained an unprecedented 12%. The Musharraf government, while proving effective at limiting the Bhutto and Sharif coalitions to a marginal percentage of the parliamentary votes, made a drastic oversight in allowing the newly formed coalition of the Northwestern Tribal regions Islamic parties to take an unprecedented 56 seats of the 277 in the parliament.202 Although the PML-Q backed by Pervez Musharraf, and led by Zafarullah Khan Jamali was able to take 118 seats in

---

parliament and establish a majority, the election was seen widely as an embarrassment for the Musharraf administration.203

Zafarullah Jamali was elected Prime Minister in November of 2002, following the results of the October election that put the PML-Q in power.204 Although the PML-Q had established control over Pakistan on paper, the nation remained highly factionalized, with the PML-N in control in Punjab, the National Alliance and MQM dominant in the Sindh region, Jamhoori Wattan Party (JWP) in Balochistan, and MMA in the FATA. For Musharraf, he had succeeded in doing little more than win an election, through his 2002 victories in establishing himself as president in April, and his hand picked prime minister in October. The extremism that Musharraf had vowed to fight upon his ascendance to the presidency after the 1999 coup, emerged in 2003 as not only a resurgent power, but an institutionalized one, finding almost 60 seats of parliament occupied by a coalition that included several Islamic political parties banned by Musharraf himself not a year earlier.205

Jamali was an interesting choice for Prime Minister on the part of Musharraf for several reasons. For one, Jamali was an Islamabad insider, having been a prolific supporter of the PPP in the late 1970’s, a member of the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) throughout the 1980’s, and a member of the Sharif government, and of the PML-N throughout the 1990’s. Furthermore, Jamali differed from most prime ministers of the past who hailed from either the Sindh or Punjab regions, as being of Baloch descent. He served as chief minister of Balochistan from 1996-97 where he gained national attention as a vocal critic of the Pakistani Nuclear tests. As Prime Minister, Jamali was most noted for his

203 The Economist. Oh, what a lovely ally; an anti-American grouping makes important gains that are likely to embarrass President Musharraf. October 17th 2002.
economic policies, which were centered on privatization and free market economics. His policies were in large part derived from those of his finance minster Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank executive and prominent Pakistani economist. Jamali’s policies sought to achieve a lessening of Pakistan’s financial obligations through privatization of state entities, and raising private equity through opening up Pakistan’s markets, to be used for debt alleviation.\textsuperscript{206} The privatization program was entirely overseen by Jamali’s finance minster, Shaukat Aziz, who had primary control over this delicate process.

In October of 2003, Jamali met with US president Bush at Camp David to discuss the War on Terror, and reaffirmed Pakistan’s support for the US in pursuit of terrorist suspects and combating Islamic extremism throughout the region. In January of 2004 the largest breakthrough in Pakistan foreign relations came with an unexpected visit to Afghanistan by Jamali, the first of its kind in 34 years. During the visit, Jamali pledged his support for Hamid Karzai in the Afghan elections set to happen in October, and announced a substantive aid program to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{207}

The efforts on the part of President Jamali to reaffirm the position of Pakistan in relation to the international community certainly played an important role in helping with Pakistan’s PR, but it was his economic policies, via Shaukat Aziz that substantively changed Pakistan’s pre-2001 trajectory. Jamali was largely ineffective, and owed much of his own success to the funding that came with the US War on Terror, as Musharraf handed over hundreds of militants including Khalid Shaykh Muhammed (KSM) who was believed to

\textsuperscript{206} Amer, Shaukat. \textit{Privatization for Economics Prosperity of Poverty- A Case of Pakistan}. 2.
\textsuperscript{207} Gall, Carlotta. \textit{Karzai Announces Pakistani Pledge to Stop Cross-Border Attacks}. April 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2003.
have been the mastermind behind 9/11, caught in March of 2003.\textsuperscript{208} It was with these small, but for the US, significant captures, throughout 2002 and 2003 that garnered Pakistan some leeway from the US, and also revealed the migration that had been occurring of Afghan militants into Pakistan. Of these hundreds of Al-Qaeda operatives that Musharraf claimed to have captured, almost all of them had been found at the safe houses of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and comparable extremist organizations that formerly had enjoyed protection from the state.\textsuperscript{209}

In June 2004, after failing to prove himself as Prime Minister, and creating a tenuous situation between the business elite and the Pakistani state due to his opening of markets formerly controlled by Pakistani business magnates, Jamali announced his resignation on June 26\textsuperscript{th}. His resignation came after a meeting between himself and Musharraf where it is widely believed that Musharraf dismissed Jamali due to his failure to carry out some of Musharraf’s policies and divergent opinions on the role of the military in governance.\textsuperscript{210} Accordingly, an interim prime minister, Chaudhry Shujat Hussain the current president of the PML-Q was selected by Jamali to succeed him. It was later revealed that a contentious relationship between Hussain and Jamali was what ultimately led to Jamali’s decision to resign. Hussain held the position of Prime Minister for two months, from June until August of 2004. Hussain oversaw the handover of power from himself to former finance minister Shaukat Aziz in August, at which point Hussain returned to his position as president of the PML-Q.\textsuperscript{211}

\textsuperscript{208} CNN. \textit{Top al Qaeda operative caught in Pakistan}. March 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2003.
\textsuperscript{210} Masood, Salman. \textit{Pakistan Premier Resigns, Replaced by General’s Ally}. June 27\textsuperscript{th} 2004.
\textsuperscript{211} Gauhar, Mashaal. \textit{Chaudhry Shujat Hussain: ‘We are a resilient nation’}. June 4\textsuperscript{th} 2013.
The tenure of Shaukat Aziz was an interesting one. His policies have a contested legacy in Pakistan, but some assert that his expansive policy of privatization may have been the only hope Pakistan had for survival. Appointed finance minister by Musharraf in 1999 following the coup, Aziz oversaw much of the plan for the privatization of state owned entities (SOE’s), a process which began in 1991. Although privatization began in 1991, it became far more robust under Musharraf, and even more so once Aziz was selected as Prime Minister in 2004. Aziz had been a high profile individual in Pakistan long before becoming Prime Minister. He was the target of an assassination attempt while campaigning just a month before he was elected in July of 2004 in the Attock district in the northwest tribal regions. A suicide bomber detonated a device in the car next to Aziz’s killing 9 others, but leaving the finance minister unharmed. Soon after, members of Al-Qaeda located in Egypt claimed responsibility for the attack. In August 2004 ten men who were charged with the attack were extradited to Pakistan and tried for their responsibility in the assassination attempt.\(^{212}\)

Under Prime Minister Aziz, Pakistani society became further radicalized as corruption increased with privatization. The work that the NAB had sought to do at the beginning of Musharraf’s tenure came undone by the end of 2004. The amount of business dealings with foreign entities became too numerous for anti-corruption advocates to keep track of, and soon became an uninhibited process that was perpetuated throughout Aziz’s tenure. Under Aziz, 80% of the banking industry was privatized.\(^{213}\) In June of 2005, workers at the main telecommunications company (Pakistan Telecommunication Company

\(^{212}\) Vries, Lloyd. *Pakistan PM-To-Be Survives Blast*. July 31\(^{st}\) 2004
Limited, PTCL) staged a protest to the privatization of their company, it was met with a stern warning from the government that it would use force if necessary to disperse the workers, and the protest soon subsided. The privatization went ahead as planned and almost 60,000 PTCL workers lost their jobs. This unfortunately was the typical fate of those in Pakistan who worked for SOE’s under Shaukat Aziz.\textsuperscript{214}

In 2004, the first year Aziz was in office, Pakistan experienced 8.5\% growth in GDP, far more than any growth rate in the past 10 years. The manufacturing industry grew almost 20\% in 2004, the Pakistani stock market boomed, and Pakistan received widespread accolades for its economic turn around from individuals at all of the supranational banking institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.\textsuperscript{215} Praise for opening Pakistan’s markets was almost limitless from sources outside of Pakistan, however within Pakistan, much of the reforms were having a visible negative impact on average Pakistani’s, while wealthy individuals and foreigners were making money hand over fist with the new opportunities for profiteering off of newly privatized industries. As a result, the wealth gap grew visibly under Shaukat Aziz’s tenure, paving the way for resurgence in Islamic radicalism across Pakistan.\textsuperscript{216} In March 2004, Pakistan engaged in fighting members of Al-Qaeda and other militants in the mountains of Waziristan in Northwest Pakistan, bordering with Afghanistan. After a week of intense bombing and fighting, Pakistan captured a reported 400 members of Al-Qaeda, but failed to kill any high profile targets. The vast majority of fighters were from Central Asia, coming from Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite initial reports that top Al-Qaeda leadership was located in the region it

\textsuperscript{214} Dawn. \textit{Karachi: PTCL workers on strike against privatization}. May 25\textsuperscript{th} 2005.
\textsuperscript{216} Waqas, Muhammad. \textit{The bitter pill of privatization for Pakistan}. October 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2013.
is doubtful if that was ever the case, and the primary target Ayman al-Zawahiri was never captured.\textsuperscript{217}

Additionally, fighting in Kashmir took on a new aspect with the official severing of ties with former government sponsored militant organizations and the Pakistani government. This came partly in response to the two attempts on General Musharraf’s life between 2000, and 2003 by Kashmiri militant organizations including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Harkut-ul-Jihad al-Islami.\textsuperscript{218} Although 2004 was a particularly treacherous year for Kashmiri infighting, 2005 was devastating to the region in another sense. In October of 2005 a 7.6 magnitude earthquake hit Kashmir, and shook the Northwest Tribal regions, leveling villages, killing tens of thousands, and displacing millions. It was the largest natural disaster to hit South Asia since the 1970 Bhola cyclone which killed almost half a million people in India and what was than East Pakistan.\textsuperscript{219} The earthquake however yielded an influx in foreign aid to the region from all across the world, placing almost $6.5 billion dollars in the hands of the Pakistani government for relief to its desperately poor victims in Kashmir and the Northwest, with about $200 million coming from the United States alone.\textsuperscript{220}

For Kashmir, 2005 seemed like a promising year. In November of 2004 Gen. Musharraf outlined a plan for negotiating control over Pakistan whereby the remaining disputed territory would be governed by a joint administration comprised of both Pakistani and Indian officials. By April of 2005 this seemed like a viable reality with bus

\textsuperscript{217} Sly, Liz. \textit{Fighting intensifies in hunt for trapped al-Qaida aide}. March 20\textsuperscript{th} 2004.
\textsuperscript{218} Masood, Salman. \textit{Pakistani Leader Escapes Attempt at Assassination}. December 26\textsuperscript{th} 2003.
\textsuperscript{219} Walsh, Declan. \textit{Pakistan Earthquake Toll Reaches 79,000}. October 19\textsuperscript{th} 2005.
\textsuperscript{220} Associated Press. \textit{Study finds that foreign aid after 2005 earthquake built trust in Pakistan}. September 7\textsuperscript{th} 2010.
service and other services resuming between Indian controlled and Pakistani controlled Kashmir, marking the first time in almost 30 years that the two nations were able to agree to begin building infrastructure in a region who’s inhabitants had paid the price for a dispute between two nations to which they did not truly belong.\textsuperscript{221} It was an unprecedented moment of diplomacy between the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and the Pakistani military leader Pervez Musharraf. The year was marked however by an increase in activity by the US on the Pakistani/ Afghani border, and violence in the Northwest was widespread, trickling into Islamabad in May when 20 Shia’s were killed at the shrine of Bari Imam in the nations capital.\textsuperscript{222} Four days later, on May 31\textsuperscript{st}, an attack on a Shia mosque killing 6 in Karachi further incited sectarian violence between Shiite and Shia. From September to December 2005 five more attacks took place, with two in Waziristan, one in Lahore, and another in Punjab.\textsuperscript{223} The earthquake in October brought Kashmir to a standstill as violent conflict became unsustainable at the level it had been at, and bilateral rebuilding took priority somewhat alleviating the tension that had been building since Musharraf took office. The Kashmir issue had exacerbated already high tensions with India, and the nature of the conflict continued to characterize much of the relationship between Pakistan and India entering into and throughout 2005. The earthquake provided a correction to the unabated escalation in violence, but greatly worsened the lives of those who lived within Kashmir.

The rest of Aziz’s tenure was marked by his privatization policy; whereby he continued to open up Pakistani markets in an attempt to both make Pakistan attractive to

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{221} United Press International. \textit{India, Pakistan resume bus service}. December 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2005. \\
\textsuperscript{222} Asghar, Mohammad. \textit{Suicide blast at shrine; 20 killed}. May 27\textsuperscript{th} 2005. \\
\textsuperscript{223} Peters, Gretchen. \textit{Violence grows in Pakistan’s tribal zone, despite army presence}. December 12\textsuperscript{th} 2005.
\end{flushright}
foreign investment, and also for personal gain. Under Shaukat Aziz, it is suspected that almost $23 billion was misappropriated; lost or stolen in the process of privatization that saw very little government oversight, and was carried out almost unilaterally by Aziz, with many of his policies being implemented without the need for approval from anyone including Musharraf himself.\footnote{Hasan, Saad. *Pakistan Steel privatization looks even more difficult than last attempt.* November 11th 2013} Above all else, the faith that Musharraf put in Aziz to reform the Pakistani economy was one of, if not the most remarkable part of his time as prime minister. As well as his economic reforms, 2005 and 2006 were years of infrastructure building for Aziz who pursued policies set forth initially by Nawaz Sharif in the 1990’s in the form of the *Khushal Pakistan*, a plan to bring and power to all residents of Pakistan through a $5 billion dollar pipeline.\footnote{Dawn. *Khushal Pakistan Fund Launched.* March 17th 2006.} Furthermore, Aziz invested himself into developing the robustness of regional governance and regional institutions under the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). The NRB worked to promote self-reliance and accountability of regional police and government institutions to regional committees that placed power within the regions of Pakistan and reduced the power of the central government, outlined in a plan known as the Aberdeen Agenda.\footnote{Commonwealth Local Government Forum. *Symposium on Strengthening Decentralization In Pakistan and In the Commonwealth, Islamabad.* July 25th 2006}

The investment into the NRB however came at a time when three regions of Pakistan were pulling apart. The northwest territories, Balochistan, and Kashmir were all experiencing growing pains in late 2005, early 2006, and with central governance primarily concerned with the US operation in Afghanistan, and retaining control of its borders, the efforts of the NRB to place regional governance in the hands of regional overseers soon
became all but impossible. There are many reasons however that Aziz was successful as a prime minister, namely his ability to work with, and not against the military. He, unlike his predecessors, was given autonomy to reform the economy, and in return he refrained from questioning the goals of the state as outlined by Musharraf and the military. Positioning himself as a proponent of Pakistan’s nuclear program gained him favorable standing with the military, as he actively defended Abdul Qadeer Khan, the nuclear scientist who had gained international attention for his activities not only with helping to create the Pakistani nuclear program, but violating international nuclear proliferation by trading designs for centrifuges and other components to nations such as Syria, North Korea, and China. In particular, Aziz worked to strengthen ties with China, something that many Pakistani’s hoped would enable Pakistan to balance against India. A growing concern for both nations as the US began to align itself even more with India.  

In November 2006, Aziz oversaw the successful launch of the Shaheen II missile, something seen as a huge step in developing the strategic depth of the Pakistani defense program. In August, Aziz took an official trip to China to meet with the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. The two released a statement concerning the future relationship between Pakistan and China, asserting that they would work to further develop their strategic partnership, both economically and militarily. In late August, the military operation in Balochistan came to a head when the chief of the Baloch rebellion, Akbar Bugti was killed in an air strike by the Pakistani air force. The fighting in Balochistan between the central

---

government and Baloch nationalists had been raging with low intensity for almost three
years prior to the killing of Bugti, but it was with his assassination that the Musharraf
government came under fire for their handling of what was perceived to be a legitimate
separatist movement, with Bugti at the head.\textsuperscript{230} Additionally, Bugti had engaged with
Islamabad in a dialogue over the fate of Balochistan for several years, speaking directly
with past prime ministers, and had been regarded as a legitimate voice of the movement
across Pakistani political circles, as he had been the chief minister of Balochistan for some
time. His killing was so clearly politically motivated that it incited a new wave of young
people seeking to fight for the cause of ethno-nationalism to be drawn, en mass to fight
against the central government in Balochistan province. For the most part, the Baloch
resistance had always been unable to truly challenge Islamabad, and in the months leading
up to Bugti’s assassination, the movement’s key figures had been forced into hiding in the
mountains. It was with Bugti’s death that the Baloch movement experienced yet another
crippling blow to its viability as a movement that would herald in the creation of a new
Baloch state.\textsuperscript{231} The Baloch conflict served to further envelope the Pakistani army in
attempting to quell the separatist movement, raising the military presence close to the
Indo- Paki border and heighten tensions with India.

The importance of the Baloch conflict dwindled significantly after the re-entrance
into Afghanistan by the US in 2001. In pre-2001 Pakistan, the Baloch conflict was regarded
as highly important in regards to the relationship between Pakistan and India, which is
often seen as the catalyst for continued insurgency in Balochistan. After 2001 the focus of

\textsuperscript{230}Shahid, Saleem. \textit{Bugti killed in operation: Six officers among 21 security personnel dead.} August 26\textsuperscript{th} 2006.
\textsuperscript{231} Gall, Carlotta. \textit{Tribal Leader’s Killing Incites Riots in Pakistan}. August 28\textsuperscript{th} 2006.
Pakistani foreign policy again became Afghanistan. With respect to the Afghan-Pakistani border this drew focus to the Pashtun ethno-nationalist movement, one that was comprised almost 20 million Pakistani’s, and more than 30 million Afghani’s.\textsuperscript{232} It was this movement, one that rejects the legitimacy of the Durand Line (which separates Pakistan and Afghanistan) that has been at the crux of the free flow of Afghani refugee’s, former Taliban leadership, and extremists from Afghanistan into Pakistan.\textsuperscript{233} Unlike the Baloch separatist movement that ostensibly stands to harm Pakistan relative to its neighbor India in the case the movement was successful; the Pashtun movement has historically served the purposes of the Pakistani state quite well. For several years after 2001, Pakistan allowed the flow of people back and forth past the Durand Line in a passive effort to allow Taliban leadership and supporters to seek refuge from the US bombing campaign in Afghanistan and the northwestern tribal provinces in Pakistan. In 2005, this became an issue on which US officials pressed Pervez Musharraf, once it became clear that the majority of Taliban leadership, and Al-Qaeda members, were captured inside of Pakistan right across the Af-Pak border.\textsuperscript{234} The impact however, of failing to secure its own borders had far more of a detrimental impact on Pakistan itself than it did on the US operation to combat terrorism and dismantle the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. From 2003-2007, the number of people killed from terrorist attacks in Pakistan skyrocketed over 2000% from 183 deaths in 2003, to over 3500 in 2007.\textsuperscript{235} These figures are indicative an increase not only in extremism against the US, but against the Pakistani people, and the state which is perceived

\textsuperscript{232} Ahmed, Bilal. \textit{Neglect from Islamabad Bolsters Taliban in Balochistan}. July 13\textsuperscript{th} 2012.
\textsuperscript{233} Bajoria, Jayshree. \textit{The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border}. March 20\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\textsuperscript{234} The Washington Times. \textit{Cheney presses Musharraf over border control}. February 26\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
\textsuperscript{235} South Asia Terrorism Portal. \textit{Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2014}. April 13\textsuperscript{th} 2014.
to be aligned with the US in its goal of eradicating the Taliban. Pashtunism has in large part played a role in allowing this escalation of violence to take place. The emphasis placed on Pashtun nationalism in the Northwestern provinces has created an environment that does not regard the Pakistani government as wielding any authority in the FATA, and as a result, provides a space for those who would attack the state and its allies such as the US troops and Pakistani citizens.

The year 2006 marked the beginning of the decline of Musharraf’s stronghold on power. The election 2 years earlier had undermined his position as controlling domestic politics, and the resurgent power of the MMA which took almost 15% of the vote was indicative of the increasing radicalism that had emerged in response to the closeness of Musharraf with the US. Furthermore, the entrance of the US into Iraq in 2003, giving rise to further concern from conservative Islamists as to the goals of the US not only in South Asia but throughout the Middle East.236 The August killing of Akbar Bugti sent a strong signal as to the growing concern in Islamabad over separatist movements, and further lent itself to the trend in 2006 of a re-solidification of dissident voices in Pakistani politics, something Musharraf found deeply troubling.237

By January of 2007, Musharraf found himself embattled with the judiciary of Pakistan.238 Attempting to retain the façade of democracy while trying to maintain an authoritarian hold on Pakistani political life had become impossible as US influence on Pakistan began to fade from the post 2001 fervor, and regional political relationships began

to return to normal. Normalcy however did not equate with peace, as suicide bombings against civilians and government officials ramped up. In the last week of January alone almost 30 people died in 4 separate terrorist attacks throughout Pakistan. Leading into February, violent attacks became more prevalent, becoming especially pronounced in the NWFP. The increase in violence was in large part due to an increase in the offensive efforts of US and UK coalition troops in Afghanistan near the Northwest border, causing an influx of militants and exacerbating ethnic tensions in the region. The fighting throughout February was compounded by a concerted effort, by the Pakistani military to limit movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as per a request by the US to Pakistan in 2006 to secure its borders. This yielded some of the first firefights between Pakistani military and Afghan militants since the US occupation in Afghanistan began.

On March 9th 2007, Musharraf made his most heinous mistake in dismissing a popular Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. He did so in response to the Chief Justice’s vocal opposition to many of Musharraf’s policies including privatization and illegal detention of citizens. The removal of Chaudhry brought about one of the largest civil society responses in Pakistani history, with the emergence of the “Lawyers Movement”. The removal of a Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court was the most clearly dictatorial action taken by the Musharraf government taken since he came to power in 1999, and was for many Pakistani’s truly astonishing. The Lawyer’s Movement was an organized effort by the lawyers of Pakistan to challenge

---

239 BBC. ‘Suicide blast’ at Pakistan hotel. January 26th 2007
242 Walsh, Declan. Lawyers clash with riot police over Musharraf’s removal of chief justice. March 12th 2007
Musharraf’s decision on both legal grounds, and publically, in the form of mass protests against the government. The removal of the judge had been unconstitutional, and was not recognized by the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan, which declared the suspension of a chief justice an “assault on independent judiciary”. On March 12th, protests against the removal of Chief Justice Chaudhry took place throughout Pakistan, in Lahore, Karachi, Quetta, and Islamabad. Thousands of lawyers dressed in black suits protested Chaudhry’s removal, and sent Pakistan into frenzy. Protests continued throughout April and into May, eventually leading Musharraf to reinstate Chaudhry in June. By June however, the damage had been done, and Musharraf had undermined himself as president, irreparably harming his image and standing in Pakistan.

In July of 2007, the issues surrounding extremism propagated throughout the madrassa system against not only the US, but also the Pakistani state, came to a head at two religious schools located in the capital city of Islamabad. Two schools, Lal Masjid, and the Jaima Hafsa complex had been under investigation for promoting violence against the state. Both schools were lead by well known militants, brothers by the name of Maulana Abdul Aziz, and Abdul Rashid Ghazi. Violent actions taken by students of these two institutions, over the past two years had led to a confrontation between the state and the schools in mid-2007. Known as the Siege of Lal Masjid, the confrontation began on July 3rd of 2007 when students from Jaima Hafsa stole weapons from a nearby military outpost. Pakistani military responded by firing tear gas to incapacitate the students. This was ineffective, and about 150 students attacked the Ministry of Environment building killing 6 and wounding 150. The next day Islamabad went into lockdown as military received orders to shoot

anyone exiting either school that appeared armed.\textsuperscript{244} Between the two schools around 1000 students waited inside in a standoff with the military that lasted 4 days until the final offensive on July 10\textsuperscript{th}. After four days of a standoff and sporadic firefights, the Pakistani military stormed Lal Masjid, and within hours had cleared the complex, moving onto the Jaima Hafsa complex where they did the same. When all was said and done by the evening of July 11\textsuperscript{th} upwards of 73 were dead with another 300 injured. The incident brought to light the conflict between a state trying to retain its autonomy from a religious system that it had propagated and helped to flourish for its own purposes. The Lal Masjid siege brought 40 years of military policy to a head, making it clear to many members of the government that Islam could no longer be used to further the goals of the Pakistani state.\textsuperscript{245} With the reentrance of the US into Afghanistan, and the subsequent alliance of Pakistan with the US, an intangible awakening had occurred within the Islamic community that pinned conservative Islam in direct conflict with the Pakistani state.

Throughout May, riots raged across Pakistan over the decision to remove Muhammed Chaudhry as a Chief Justice in the Pakistani Supreme Court. On May 6\textsuperscript{th} Chaudhry spoke in Lahore in front of thousands of protestors, saying that dictatorships will inevitably be destroyed, a clear allusion to the Musharraf regime.\textsuperscript{246} On May 12\textsuperscript{th}, Riots in Karachi turned violent, and 42 people were killed with over 140 injured. Two days later, a good friend of Iftikhar Chaudhry, and fellow Supreme Court Judge, Syed Hammad Raza was killed in his home in Islamabad. Two months later on July 17\textsuperscript{th}, during a rally for Chaudhry

\textsuperscript{244} Hasan, Syed Shoaib. \textit{Profile: Islamabad’s Red Mosque.} July 27\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
\textsuperscript{245} Wilkinson, Isambard. \textit{Al-Qa’eda targets Musharraf after bloody siege.} July 12\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
\textsuperscript{246} Cameron-Moore, Simon. \textit{Suspended Pakistani Judge warns against dictatorship.} May 6\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
in Islamabad a bomb was detonated among the crowd, and 15 people were killed. The government quickly issued a statement saying that the attack was due to a suicide bomber, something that has been vehemently denied by Chaudhry’s supporters who claim that the ISI may have played a role in the bombing. Three days later, the Supreme Court reinstated Chaudhry on June 20th, and was allowed to resume work on the 23rd.

By the end of July, it had become increasingly clear that the government had become entirely authoritarian in structure, with many of the bills proposed by the parliament either ignored or immediately shot down by Musharraf. The prominence of the PML-Q headed by Shaukat Aziz had become unprecedented, leaving little room for other parties to actualize their expressed goals. As a result, Qazi Hussaid Ahmed, President of the Muttahida Majalis Amal (MMA) resigned in late July of 2007, citing the reforms passed by Musharraf, which favored presidential powers over those of the prime minister as a root cause of what had devolved into total presidential control. The domestic challenges that Musharraf now faced caused him to explore further options for consolidating power including reviving the opposition through a power sharing deal with Benazir Bhutto.

In late July 2007, Benazir Bhutto met with Pervez Musharraf where they discussed the possibility of allowing Bhutto to return to Pakistan in order to run for office in the 2008 elections. The power sharing deal would have Bhutto sitting as Prime minister, and allowing Musharraf to continue on as President, something conditional on Musharraf retiring as Chief of the Army Staff. This power sharing deal served Bhutto with a way to

---

reenter into Pakistani politics, and return from exile, something she wanted regardless of the cost. Throughout August and September, opposition groups banded together to try and disqualify Musharraf from participating in the 2007 elections, but to no avail. In September, Nawaz Sharif attempted to return from exile, but he was subsequently arrested and detained at the airport; Sharif was sent back to Saudi Arabia the same day. On September 29th, election officials approved Musharraf’s nomination for reelection. The election held on October 6th 2007 ended quite predictably, and Musharraf swept the election with 671 of the 684 total electoral votes. Although he won the election, 80 members of parliament had resigned as a pre-emptive move to invalidate the General’s sham electoral victory. The Pakistan Peoples Party however did not withdraw but abstained, providing Musharraf with the bare minimum needed to claim that his win was legitimate.

On November 3rd, less than a month after his re-election, Musharraf instituted Martial Law, declaring “Emergency Rule” across Pakistan. He suspended the constitution, and cleaned house in the Supreme Court, re-firing Chief Justice Chaudhry, and all other sitting justices. The emergency rule came in response to the fear that the Supreme Court would overturn the ruling, which allowed Musharraf to run in the 2007 elections on the grounds that he also controlled the army. His opponent, retired Justice Wajihuddin Ahmed challenged the ruling, and Musharraf, who clearly thought their was a chance his opponent

---

would receive a favorable outcome through his appeal, declared martial law just two days before the court was set to rule.\textsuperscript{256}

On November 15\textsuperscript{th} 2007, Pakistan’s first Prime Minister to serve a full term, Shaukat Aziz left office, having executed rampant privatization, and left a mixed legacy that made some within Pakistan very wealthy, and kept countless others, quite poor. His reforms had irreparably changed the course of Pakistani history, and throughout his 8 years as finance minister he had brought growth to what had been a stagnant economy.

All that Aziz’s privatization may have accomplished to revive and modernize the Pakistani economy was subsequently undone with the declaration of a state of emergency. On the first day alone the Karachi Stock Exchange fell almost 5\%, and over $235 million in foreign capital left the country over the course of the emergency.\textsuperscript{257} Additionally, development aid ceased, and Pakistan’s credit rating dropped. Among the measures taken by Musharraf, included an almost complete media blackout, as well as widespread arrests, and detaining of political enemies throughout Pakistan.\textsuperscript{258} With this move it became clear that Musharraf had carefully solidified his power over the years to allow for such an occurrence. Those who had deluded themselves into believing Musharraf was a liberal, or a proponent of democracy soon found themselves in shock, and those who knew Pakistan’s history expounded on how they saw this coming. On November 28\textsuperscript{th}, 25 days into the emergency, Musharraf resigned as army chief, handing over power to one of his long time generals, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who left his post as head of the ISI to assume his role as

\textsuperscript{256} Latif, Aamir. \textit{The Revolt of the Lawyers: Why judges too, are joining the challenge to General Musharraf}. November 16\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
\textsuperscript{257} Akbar, Shaan. \textit{Day 6 of Emergency Rule: Of America, the Army, and Arrests}. November 9\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
\textsuperscript{258} CNN. \textit{Bhutto blocked from visiting chief justice}. November 11\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
head of the army staff. The divorce of Musharraf from the military however was only at the surface, as the military continued to act on behalf of Musharraf even after he resigned as chief of the army staff.\textsuperscript{259}

Perhaps the most significant moment of the emergency came on November 3\textsuperscript{rd}, the day it occurred, when Benazir Bhutto who had been scheduled to return at a later date, returned to Pakistan in order to ride the political wave created by Musharraf's declaration of a state of emergency, leaving a family vacation in Dubai. Bhutto was met at the airport by hundreds of supporters both of her Pakistani People’s Party (PPP), and a variety of other opposition movement supporters. Just 5 days later on November 8\textsuperscript{th}, Bhutto was placed under house arrest in her house in Lahore. Although the house arrest was withdrawn the next day, all other opposition leaders remained on house arrest, and Bhutto’s activities were highly limited over the duration of the emergency.\textsuperscript{260} On November 16\textsuperscript{th}, following the end of Shaukat Aziz’s term as Prime Minister a day earlier, Muhammad Mian Soomro, former governor of the Sindh state, and a well known banker, was sworn in as caretaker prime minister by president Musharraf.\textsuperscript{261} On November 24\textsuperscript{th}, Bhutto filed for nomination for the January 2008 elections, formally announcing her candidacy in the upcoming elections. On November 30\textsuperscript{th} Musharraf was sworn in as President, announcing he would lift the state of emergency on December 16\textsuperscript{th}. This was met with widespread optimism that the 2008 elections would still be held without any delay, and opposition leaders began to outline their positions as the elections drew closer.\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{259} BBC. Musharraf gives up army uniform. November 28\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
\textsuperscript{261} Subramanian, Nirupama. Soomro sworn in caretaker PM. November 17\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
\textsuperscript{262} Walsh, Declan. Musharraf to end emergency rule before elections. November 29\textsuperscript{th} 2007.
On November 25th, Nawaz Sharif returned to Pakistan, this time successfully. He arrived in Lahore where he then traveled to a mosque, and spoke against Musharraf’s government, and the state of emergency that Pakistan currently was in. With one day to go, Sharif registered for the 2008 elections, and with that, both himself and his long time opponent Benazir Bhutto were back on the Pakistani political scene, something most Pakistani’s thought they would never see again. The return of these two political icons came at what was perhaps the most contentious time in Pakistani history, nothing but a state of emergency signaling a weakening in Musharraf’s government could have brought Sharif and Bhutto back to Pakistan, and it was just this that brought them together to demand Musharraf restore order as he had promised. Bhutto, aware of the danger posed by her return, was a target as soon as she stepped off the plane in Islamabad.

In late December, Bhutto found herself in the thick of campaigning for her bid for the Prime Minister position in the 2008 elections to be held in January. After giving a speech in Rawalpindi, in the Punjab province on December 27th 2007 to a crowd of PPP supporters, Bhutto left the stage and got into her car. Just seconds after, as Bhutto pulled away and was waving to the crowd through the sunroof, militants opened fire on Bhutto’s car, spraying her with bullets as she slumped back through the sunroof, and fell back into her SUV. Seconds after the gunman opened fire, a bomb detonated next to her car killing 24 civilians and Bhutto. A nation under emergency rule, welcoming home its own daughter had seen her killed no sooner than she had returned. Instantly, riots broke out all across

265 Walsh, Declan. Bhutto Assassinated; shot twice then bomb exploded; riots across country; fears over election. December 27th 2007.
Pakistan with heightened security in Sindh, Karachi, Peshawar, and Multan where people were burning buildings breaking windows and destroying whatever they could. Pakistan had truly descended into chaos, a dark moment for the nation. The looting and rioting went on for about 24 hours, deteriorating as police were given shoot-on-sight orders for anyone partaking in the riots. On December 30th Bhutto’s son, Bilawal Zardari read a prepared speech on the future of the PPP, and as per her wishes, the young Zardari was appointed Chairman of the PPP.\footnote{Dawn. \textit{Bilawal declares war against Taliban at start of political career.} December 28th 2007.}

With Bhutto’s assassination coming so close to the election, Pakistan’s election commission decided to postpone the elections until late February. Additionally the assassination had a profound impact on the economy, with the KSE falling almost 5%, Karachi experiencing almost $1 billion in damages, and Pakistan Railways experiencing almost $100 million in damages.\footnote{Dawn. \textit{2008: Pakistan lost $2bn in violence following Benazir’s death.} June 10th 2011.} On December 27th Al-Qaeda member Mustafa Abu al-Yazid claimed responsibility for killing Bhutto, claiming that Ayman al-Zawahiri ordered the killing in 2007 due to Bhutto’s relationship with the west. This however is contended by Bhutto supporters who believe that government responsibility for her death is far more likely than that of Al-Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, due in part to Bhutto’s own extensive list of officials who she believed might be trying to assassinate her.\footnote{Shah, Saeed. \textit{I was warned that bombers would target me, says Bhutto.} October 2007.} One thing is for certain, that she was not given the proper security consideration to prevent such an attack, and that with cooperation from the Musharraf government she may have lived to run in the 2008 election.
The elections themselves took place on February 18th 2008, with the Pakistani People’s Party taking 30.8% of the vote, the PML-Q headed by Musharraf taking 23%, and the PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif taking 19.7%. Accordingly the PPP candidate, Yousaf Raza Gillani was elected Prime Minister on March 26th. With the PML-Q candidate out of office, Musharraf accepted the results of the election, and pledged that he would work with the newly elected Prime Minister, and parliament. Additionally, upon the announcement of the results the PPP and the PML-N announced they would be working together to form a coalition government with the much smaller Awami National Party (ANP). With Gillani at the head of the coalition government, all opposition parties vowed to work against Musharraf to depose him, and end his decade in power.

The year 2008 was the last year Musharraf was in power, and one of the most deadly years in Pakistani history. The deadliest since the US entered into Afghanistan, with over 6700 terrorism related deaths, compared to 3500 in 2007. The increase in violence was due in part to the consolidation of several militant organizations under the umbrella of Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, led by Baitullah Mehsud, the individual who is widely suspected of being behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The affiliated organizations behind TTP included Al Qaeda, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. All these organizations coalesced around Mehsud who’s war against the Pakistani state began when Mullah Omar, the famed Taliban leader appointed Baitullah governor of

---

the Mehsud area in South Waziristan in December of 2007.272 With this, Mullah Omar handed over the tribal regions in Pakistan to Baitullah giving him de facto control over the militant groups in the FATA, and enabling him to found the Pakistani Taliban. In February of 2008 the Pakistani military announced a ceasefire had been arranged with the TTP, as the new government attempted to address the question of extremism and militancy within Pakistan.273 The efforts seem to have been in vein as violence in the FATA reached astronomical levels early on in 2008, and worsened as the year went on. On June 25th, Baitullah executed 28 members of a tribal peace group that had been negotiating with the TTP in the FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.274

Chapter 5: The end of Military Rule, and a Return to Civilian Governance

On August 18th 2008, following months of widespread violence, and a concerted effort on the part of the new coalition government headed by Yousaf Gillani to impeach Musharraf, the longtime general stepped down as president, effectively ending his 9-year military rule.275 In a televised address, Musharraf defended his tenure as leader of Pakistan, and left Pakistan on November 23rd when he flew to London. On September 6th, just three weeks after Musharraf announced his resignation, the coalition government headed by the PPP held presidential elections. Three candidates emerged, each from one of the three most

---

prominent political parties, the PPP, the PML-N, and PML-Q. As the dominant party, the PPP garnered most of the electoral votes throughout the various regions of Pakistan. The PPP candidate, husband of the late Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari emerged as the victor, being elected president of Pakistan after receiving almost total support from the coalition government before elections were held. The election was widely seen as one of the cleanest in recent history, and most parties were pleased with the proceedings of the election and with the results.\textsuperscript{276}

Zardari had not only won the presidency, but he had done so with an alliance that included political groups from all across Pakistan, including the Awami National Party, a Pashtun organization, the Muttahida Quami Movement, based in the Sindh, and several Baloch national groups. The PPP, headed by Zardari had led the fight to oust Musharraf, and as a result, the popularity of the party ushered Zardari into office. Although Zardari, like his current Prime Minister Gillani had been convicted of corruption in 1996 following his wife’s removal as prime minister, this weighed very little on the minds of Pakistani’s eager to begin a new chapter in their nations history. For most, Zardari represented the Bhutto’s and the democratic system that they had worked to implement in Pakistan. With his wife’s life so suddenly cut short, Zardari embodied the gleaming ray of hope, which democracy promised to the people of a war torn nation.\textsuperscript{277}

Democracy in Pakistan however, was not simply a matter of an election, and although Zardari had won the presidency, he could not possibly end the civil war in the tribal territories through rhetoric alone. By 2008 almost 1.5 million people had been displaced from the FATA, an area that had remained entirely neglected by Musharraf who

\textsuperscript{276} CNN. \textit{Bhutto widower Zardari elected Pakistan’s new president.} September 7\textsuperscript{th} 2008.
\textsuperscript{277} Birsel, Robert. \textit{Zardari wins Pakistan Election}. September 6\textsuperscript{th} 2008.
failed to build infrastructure despite receiving massive amounts of foreign aid to do just that.\textsuperscript{278} The residents of FATA fell under the day-to-day jurisdiction of warlords or militant leaders who fell under the umbrella of the TTP, which now provided a safe haven for both its own operations, and Al Qaeda. To combat the growing threat of a group that was poised to become a serious contender for control over Pakistan, Zardari employed the military, effectively handing over the administration of the tribal regions to the army, in lieu of any plausible diplomatic option.\textsuperscript{279}

This placed tremendous faith in the skills of the newly appointed Chief of the Army Staff, Ashfaq Kayani, former director of the ISI, and longtime member of the military complex. By most accounts, Kayani was early on interested in de-politicizing the army, undoing the treacherous marriage that had been fabricated by Musharraf that had led to a damaging of both the president’s, and the military’s credibility. In February, before Musharraf had even left office, Kayani ordered the military out of civilian government agencies and public spaces.\textsuperscript{280} The decision however to hand over operations in the tribal regions to Kayani was highly calculative. Zardari knew that as ISI director Kayani had gained a very deep knowledge about the tribal area’s and the inner working of the various militant groups and religious leaders who controlled the area. With the Pakistani ambassador having already been abducted in February en route to his home in Peshawar, an embarrassing episode for Pakistan, it was of vital importance to regain some semblance of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{278} Ali, Zulfiqar. \textit{Political administration not prepared to replace army in Fata.} December 16\textsuperscript{th} 2013.
\textsuperscript{279} Pakistani Press International. \textit{PAF conducted 5,500 bombing runs in Fata since 2008.} November 14\textsuperscript{th} 2011.
\textsuperscript{280} Masood, Salman. \textit{New Pakistan Army Chief Orders Military Out of Civilian Government Agencies, Reversing Musharraf Policy.} February 13\textsuperscript{th} 2008.
\end{flushleft}
order around the tribal areas, as it began to spread into metropolitan areas, and the TTP began to gain in strength.\(^{281}\)

On the diplomatic front, Zardari invited Afghan president Hamid Karzai to attend his inaugural on September 9\(^{th}\) in an attempt to restore relations between the two, and promote an environment of solidarity between Afghanistan and Pakistan.\(^{282}\) On September 20\(^{th}\), Zardari experienced his first major terrorist attack as president when a dump truck filled with explosives plowed into the Marriott hotel in Islamabad killing 54 people, and injuring almost 250.\(^{283}\) The attack came just hours after Zardari made his first speech to parliament. The attack sent shockwaves through Pakistani political circles, with most officials reaffirming their dedication to combating terrorism. Ultimately it was revealed that a Kenyan terrorist, and member of Al Qaeda, who served as the chief of operations in Pakistan, was responsible for the bombing. A man by the name of Fahid Msalam, he had been on the United States terror watch list since 1998 due to his involvement in the United States Embassy bombings in both Kenya and Tanzania. After the bombings in Africa, Msalam fled to Karachi where he lived until being killed in a drone attack in 2009.\(^{284}\)

Zardari spent October 2008 on a worldwide tour where US, China, Saudi Arabia, and England trying to both restore Pakistan’s tarnished global image, and make a case for new IMF funding that Pakistan desperately needed to revive its stagnating economy. It soon became clear that the economic reforms implemented under Shaukat Aziz had a limited effect, and boosted the economy only while he was in office, the reforms soon proved

\(^{281}\) Wilkenson, Isambard. *Pakistani ambassador to Kabul is kidnapped*. February 12\(^{th}\) 2008.
\(^{283}\) Gall, Carlotta. *Bombing at Hotel in Pakistan Kills at Least 40*. September 20\(^{th}\) 2008.
\(^{284}\) Roggio, Bill. *Al Qaeda’s operations chief in Pakistan killed in New Year’s Strike*. January 8\(^{th}\) 2009.
ineffective, and by late 2008 the economy had stagnated again with growth for the year at around 6% with foreign exchange reserves staring to dwindle.\textsuperscript{285} It was with this in mind that Zardari requested an $11.3 billion dollar multi-year loan from the IMF in November 2008, contingent on an overhaul of Pakistan’s economic policies. This loan was never realized, but instead was supplemented by a $7.5 billion dollar package from the US to be disbursed at a rate of $1.5 billion over 5 years, called the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill. The bill however came with a caveat from the American government that the money would be contingent on both remaining a democracy, and helping the United States in its war on extremism.\textsuperscript{286} Kayani and his corps commanders deemed the bill unacceptable and at first did not accept the aid package. For the new US diplomat Richard Holbrooke this was devastating, as he had closely advised the US president on the importance of such an aid package in tightening relations with Islamabad.\textsuperscript{287}

The year 2008 was revolutionizing in the global political scene, as both the US and Pakistan emerged with distinctly new leadership. In the US, the Bush regime, which had been responsible for the re-entrance of the US into Afghanistan left office, and Barack Obama, a liberal took office. Although his policies were similar to his predecessors, new management, and new special envoys meant a fresh start for US-Paki relations. In January 2009, an American diplomat, Richard Holbrooke was appointed by president Obama as the special envoy to the Af-Pak region.\textsuperscript{288} Additionally, the emergence of a democratic regime

\textsuperscript{286} Kugelman, Michael. \textit{Four Myths about Kerry-Lugar-Berman}. December 9\textsuperscript{th} 2011.
\textsuperscript{287} Rashid, Ahmed. \textit{Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan}. 146
\textsuperscript{288} Richter, Paul. \textit{Richard Holbrooke appointment met with applause in U.S wariness in South Asia}. February 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2009.
in Pakistan meant that the US could make more meaningful ties with Pakistan, working
closer with its leaders to combat terrorism, and provide support to the nation that had bore
the brunt of the war on terror. While USAID certainly had been doled out to the Musharraf
government, it had been done under auspicious conditions, whereby neither the US or
Pakistan had kept track of where the money was spent, as their had been no substantive
discussion as to where it should go. This had been a source of controversy as to the Bush administration's handling of its relationship with Pakistan, and had resulted in a
congressional request to cut off funding to Pakistan just a year earlier.\textsuperscript{289}

With the tenure of Ashfaq Kayani, began a total overhaul of not only the military, but
the intelligence services as well. Kayani gutted the ISI and the military, ridding the army
staff of Musharraf loyalists, and replacing the ISI head, Nadeem Taj, with a former general
whom Kayani worked with closely and respected highly; Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha in late
September 2008.\textsuperscript{290} This appointment sent a strong signal to the US that the new general
might not be to keen on directly attacking the TTP and Al Qaeda leadership in the frontier
provinces, given Pasha's record of doing as little as possible to disrupt the status quo, while
appeasing US lawmakers and officials. In November 2008, after coming under fire for
rhetoric that framed Indian fighters in Kashmir as terrorists, Zardari attempted to mend
relations between India and Pakistan as he hinted that Pakistan would adopt a no-first-use
nuclear policy. Zardari's initial efforts were minimal at best, and in late November, on the
26\textsuperscript{th}, members of the Pakistani militant organization Lashkar-e-Taiba launched an all out
offensive in Mumbai, India that lasted for 4 days until the 29\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{291}

\textsuperscript{289} Shiner, Meredith. \textit{Frank Lautenberg: Suspend aid to Pakistan}. May 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2011.
\textsuperscript{290} Perlez, Jane. \textit{Pakistani Military Names Spy Agency Chief}. September 30\textsuperscript{th} 2008.
\textsuperscript{291} Sengupta, Somini. \textit{At Least 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks}. November 26\textsuperscript{th} 2008.
The offensive was comprised of 12 attacks throughout Mumbai, where a total of 164 people were killed, with over 600 injured. The attack was a watershed moment in Pakistani-Indian relations, and for the first few days Pakistan denied that any of the attackers were even Pakistani. With the capture of Ajmal Kasab, the sole surviving attacker, Pakistani officials admitted that Pakistani nationals within Pakistan had indeed planned the attack. Upon the attack Indian officials announced plans to mobilize their air force to carry out air strikes on suspected militant bases within Pakistan, and in response the Pakistani military mobilized to the Indo-Paki border pre-empting any attempts by India to cross into Pakistani airspace. Although India did not hold Zardari’s government responsible for the attack it ramped up tensions between the two nations, creating a sense of urgency within Pakistan that the militant elements of Pakistani society must be combated quickly and effectively or risk further embarrassment.

While the president was concerned with improving relations with its neighbors and allies around the world, the new Prime Minister Gillani worked to reform the economy with few results. By the end of 2008 the global markets had begun to crumble as the housing market collapsed in the United States and global banking practices threatened markets in Europe and Asia. Initially Gillani had attempted to continue to privatization pursued by Shaukat Aziz, but this soon fell apart as the global economy slowed. With the gutting of the NAB, which had prosecuted corruption, few if any institutions existed that would oversee the unprecedented amount of foreign aid that was funneled into Pakistan. With the departure of US president Bush, policy towards Pakistan shifted from providing

strictly military aid to providing conditional aid that relied on specific designations for funding in nation building and infrastructure projects throughout Pakistan. This was met with resistance from the Pakistani army, which objected to many of the contingencies attached to the aid. Ultimately the army reversed its position on the USAID, but the ability of the army to block funding for the civilian government stood as a testament to how little things had actually changed in the wake of Musharraf’s departure from politics. While governance in both the US and Pakistan had changed, the US geo-strategic interests in the region remained the same, an arrangement that would continue to benefit the Pakistani military as long as US troops remained in Afghanistan.

In February 2009 Zardari attempted to block Nawaz Sharif, his primary political rival from running in elections. He did so utilizing the stacked court that Musharraf had placed in his power to unanimously ban Sharif and his brother from politics. In an effort to consolidate power, Zardari dismissed the Punjab provincial government, targeting Sharif’s brother, Shahbaz who had been the head of the Punjab government. Additionally, Zardari refused to reinstate about half of the judges that were deposed under Musharraf. In response to this, Sharif joined his PML-N with the “Lawyers Movement”, which emerged after the deposition of chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, to demand a reduction in the powers of the president. On March 15th Zardari attempted to place Sharif under house arrest, but police quickly dispersed as a crowd began to amass around Sharif’s home in Punjab.

---

294 Korb, Lawrence J. Reassessing Foreign Assistance to Pakistan; Recommendations for U.S. Engagement. April 2nd 2009.
next day, in fear of inciting unrest, Yousaf Gillani restored the status of the judges deposed under Musharraf including chief justice Chaudhry.\textsuperscript{299} On March 30\textsuperscript{th} an attack on the Manawan Police Academy by the TTP in Lahore shook Pakistan when 19 people were killed, and 95 injured. By the end of March, Zardari had restored control of Punjab to its provincial government.\textsuperscript{300} In April, due to rising pressure from the FATA government in the regional assembly’s attempt to reach a ceasefire amongst the Pashtun tribes, Zardari signed the ceasefire bill, formally implementing Islamic sharia law in the region.\textsuperscript{301}

In May of 2009 public opinion began to shift against the extremists, as the army began a campaign against militants in Swat, the third of its kind, in which the military sought to restore governance to the region, and remove the ruling mullah’s. The previous two campaigns had failed, and were at best half-hearted attempts at rooting out extremism, and as a result few were optimistic about the spring 2009 offensive in Swat. The result however was unlike the previous two, and by July, the military had restored control of the territory, and those who had left to escape the violence returned to their homes.\textsuperscript{302} In late August, the head of the Pakistani Taliban, the TTP, Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a US drone strike, leaving Hakimullah Mehsud (no relation), whom Baitullah had wrestled with for power of the TTP, in charge of the extremist network.\textsuperscript{303}

In November, Zardari transferred power over the Pakistani nuclear program to Prime Minister Gillani in what was the first of several good faith measures to reduce the

\textsuperscript{299} BBC. Pakistan ex-PM ignores ‘arrest’. March 19\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\textsuperscript{300} Shah, Saeed. Pakistani Taliban claim responsibility for Lahore police academy attack; Warlord Baitullah Mehsud threatens future strikes similar to deadly attack on police training academy. March 31\textsuperscript{st} 2009.
\textsuperscript{301} Associated Press. Pakistan puts area under Islamic law. April 13\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\textsuperscript{302} Fair, Christine C., Pakistan in 2010. 104.
\textsuperscript{303} Fair, Christine. Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the “War on Terror”. 107.
powers of the president and restore balance to the executive.\textsuperscript{304} In December the Supreme Court ruled that the National Reconciliation Ordinance, issued by Pervez Musharraf in 2007, which had granted Zardari along with many other politicians amnesty for corruption charges, was unconstitutional. This yielded a brief period in early 2010 where through a series of legal discussions, it became clear that Zardari could not be prosecuted due to his presidential immunity, as described by international law.\textsuperscript{305} In April 2010, parliament passed the 18\textsuperscript{th} amendment, removing the ability of the president to dissolve parliament, dismiss the prime minister, or appoint military chiefs. This reduced Asif Zardari to a figurehead, empowering Yousaf Gillani, and yielding the way for Nawaz Sharif to make a return to politics, as the amendment also lifted the two term limit on prime ministers, allowing Sharif to seek a third term.\textsuperscript{306}

In July 2010 floods from the Indus River Basin spilled over into Pakistan, covering almost 1/5\textsuperscript{th} of its total area. The flood affected almost 20 million people, killing almost 2,000, and destroying over 2 million homes.\textsuperscript{307} Paired with the global recession, the flood, which caused damages in excess of $9.7 billion, dealt a crippling blow to the already fragile Pakistani economy.\textsuperscript{308} GDP growth in 2009 had decreased from a stagnant 6.0% as it had for three consecutive years, to about 2.0% growth at the end of FY2009. Images of Zardari surfaced in August of him vacationing in his chateau in Normandy outraged Pakistani’s and painted a poignant picture of the ineptitude of the civilian government in handling matters

\textsuperscript{304} Rodriguez, Alex. \textit{Pakistan’s president gives up control of nuclear weapons}. November 29\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\textsuperscript{305} Rodriguez, Alex. \textit{Pakistan declares amnesty law unconstitutional}. December 17\textsuperscript{th} 2009.
\textsuperscript{306} Asif Ali Zardari. \textit{18\textsuperscript{th} Amendment Bill, Pakistan}. April 19\textsuperscript{th} 2010.
\textsuperscript{307} Witte, Griff. \textit{Pakistan floods affecting 20 million; cholera outbreak feared}. August 15\textsuperscript{th} 2010.
\textsuperscript{308} Fair, Christine C., \textit{Pakistan in 2010}. 98.
important to average Pakistani’s.\textsuperscript{309} It was among other things, a failure to control his public image that resulted in US diplomats promising to provide only $\frac{1}{4}$ of the necessary money to aid Pakistan after the floods. The image of both Zardari and Gillani as playing fast and loose with billions in foreign aid money did not translate well as they both petitioned the world for emergency money to help the tens of millions of people impacted by the flood. The world would provide a quarter of the money, and the rest was left up to Pakistan to raise itself.\textsuperscript{310}

On July 22\textsuperscript{nd}, a reaffirming of the military and intelligence leadership came when Prime Minister Gillani extended Gen. Kayani’s term as army chief for three more years until 2013. This came three months after Gillani extended the tenure of Lt. Gen. Pasha as head of the ISI, a move that surprised many within Pakistan, and abroad. By August 2010, due to a failure of the parliament to reform the tax code the IMF delayed the sixth installment of the aid from the IMF’s 2008 standby agreement with Pakistan that demanded lawmakers improve the collection of income tax throughout the country.\textsuperscript{311} As of 2010 about 2\% of the 180 million total Pakistani’s were recorded as having reported their income tax, indicative how little faith remained in government institutions.\textsuperscript{312} September was a particularly deadly month with two high casualty attacks coming within the first three days of the month. On September 1\textsuperscript{st}, three bombs exploded in Lahore killing 25 and injuring 170. Two days later on September 3\textsuperscript{rd} another bombing in Quetta killed 50 people and injuring 80.

The increase in violence came as the TTP launched an offensive following the July flooding,

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{309} Waraich, Omar. \textit{Interview: Pakistan’s President on Flood Recovery}. August 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2010.
\textsuperscript{311} Fair, Christine. \textit{Pakistan in 2010}. 108.
\textsuperscript{312} Tavernise, Sabrina. \textit{Pakistan’s Elite Pay Few Taxes, Widening Gap}. July 18\textsuperscript{th} 2010.
\end{flushright}
which left the civilian government and the army spread thin, prompting an increase in US
drone strikes on suspected TTP sites.\footnote{Mazzetti, Mark. \textit{C.I.A. Steps Up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan}. September 27\textsuperscript{th} 2010.}

On September 10\textsuperscript{th}, Musharraf announced from exile in London that he would return
to Pakistan to form a new political party, and participate in the 2013 elections. On October
1\textsuperscript{st} he announced the formation of the All Pakistan Muslim League.\footnote{Burns, John F. \textit{Musharraf, Vowing Return, Announces New Party}. October 1\textsuperscript{st} 2010.} Throughout
September and October the US drone campaign ramped up in Northwest Pakistan,
drastically increasing the number of casualties within Pakistan, and greatly straining US-
Pakistani relations. Although drone strikes had become routine, following the departure of
Musharraf, it had become a serious source of concern for Pakistani’s who were not being
protected by their own government.

In January 2011 the MQM withdrew from the coalition government, causing the PPP
led government to lose its majority in Parliament. Although a vote of no confidence was not
ever brought to the table, the leader of the opposition PML-N, Nawaz Sharif issued a
statement accusing Zardari of allowing corruption to run rampant within his government, a
tactful move meant to undermine the PPP government while it was weakened.\footnote{Fair, Christine. \textit{Pakistan in 2010}. 110.} Just days
later, on January 4\textsuperscript{th} the governor of Punjab was killed by his own bodyguard after he had
publically advocated repealing the blasphemy law that had been passed to please
extremists who sought to have sharia law implemented in Pakistan. The guard claimed he
had done it because of Tasser’s stance on the law.\footnote{Associated Press. \textit{Punjab Governor Salman Taseer assassinated in Islamabad}. January 4\textsuperscript{th} 2011.} In late January, a CIA contractor,
Raymond Davis murdered two young men in Lahore, prompting riots to erupt once the US
began to demand his extradition, something Pakistani’s felt unacceptable. This brought to light the tenuous relationship between the US and Pakistan that had developed in the decade since the US reentered into Afghanistan, bringing with it not only military operations, but a whole intelligence operation as well. This extended the CIA deeply into the inner workings of Pakistani radical circles, a place where the ISI itself had vested interests. Mixed with the US drone war that had expanded several fold in the last three years, relations between the US and Pakistan had become strained, and in no place was this more felt than between the CIA and the ISI. The Davis affair exacerbated these tensions, and ultimately dragged on for several months before it was resolved when the US agreed to pay blood money to the families of the men David killed.

2011 was marked by an increase in violence across Pakistan. In Karachi alone, almost 1,000 people were killed, and drone strikes, which peaked in 2010, with 831 drone related deaths coming within Pakistan, went down, but remained high in 2011 at 548. In May, relations between the US and Pakistan took a turn for the worse when US Navy Seals were sent in to Abbottabad, a small city in Northwest Pakistan to kill who they suspected was Osama Bin Laden. On May 1st Bin Laden was killed. The operation had been carried out without the knowledge of the Pakistani government who were informed only after US forces had left Pakistani air space and Bin Laden had been killed, the morning of May 2nd. On May 5th the head of the Pakistani army, Ashfaq Kayani issued a statement condemning

---

317 Fair, Christine. *Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the “War on Terror”*. 101.
318 Mazzetti, Mark. *How Raymond Davis Helped Turn Pakistan Against the United States*. April 9th 2013.
319 Fair, Christine. *Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the “War on Terror”*. 101.
the blatant violation of sovereignty that the operation to kill Bin Laden had been. It was a clear attempt at framing the operation, (which revealed the extent to which Pakistan had allowed extremism to flourish during the decade long war on terror) as a failing of US diplomacy, and not the embarrassment for Pakistan that it actually was internationally. The bin Laden raid called into question all that Pakistan had claimed to have been doing to combat terror, and indicated how little the ISI and the military had diverged from their traditional stance of allowing militancy to exist in order to destabilize politics and retain control of the state. 

Additionally, in October Pakistan decided to discontinue the loan package to disburse $11 billion dollars from the IMF, created in 2008. By the time the announcement was made, Pakistan had only received $8 billion of the 11, but decided to go back to the negotiating table at a latter date to reformulate a deal more to Pakistan’s liking. This was in response to several reforms including a general sales tax, and other taxes which the IMF had required Pakistan to implement in order to receive the aid as scheduled. The reforms hurt the poorest Pakistani’s who had no qualms with the finance minister’s decision to discontinue the aid until a more favorable deal could be reached.

In November an air strike by NATO killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, prompting Pakistan to close off all ground routes that were vital to the US operation in Afghanistan, banning the US from the use of several airbases, and launching a parliamentary investigation geared towards reassessing the Pakistani relationship with the US. By the end of the year, tensions between Zardari and the judiciary continued to escalate as many pushed to repeal the National Reconciliation Ordinance that had granted Zardari amnesty for corruption

---

322 Ibid. 9.
324 Fair, Christine. Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the “War on Terror”. 111.
over charges that he had laundered money through Swiss banks. It was his refusal to
prosecute these charges that caused Yousaf Gilani to lose his position as Prime Minister,
being convicted of contempt of court in June of 2012.\footnote{Maqbool, Aleem. \textit{Pakistani PM Gilani guilty of contempt but spared jail.} April 26\textsuperscript{th} 2012.} That same month, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf was sworn in as prime minister succeeding Gilani. Ashraf, had previously served as Minister for Water and Power from 2008-2011, and his family had made their wealth off of agricultural land in the Sindh region. He entered office facing potential corruption charges relating to his dispersal of electricity contracts. In July, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton formally apologized for the NATO operation that resulted in the deaths of two-dozen Pakistani soldiers in November 2011. Accordingly, Pakistan re-opened trade routes leading to Afghanistan, vital for US forces to carry out their operations.\footnote{Associated Press. \textit{Pakistan reopens Nato supply routes after apology from Hillary Clinton.} July 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2012.} In November 2012 the Supreme Court ended its investigation into Ashraf’s affairs as Minister for Water and Power. In 2012, due to the increasing population, and thus dominance of Punjab, its former governor Nawaz Sharif began to build momentum as a highly popular figure in Pakistani politics enjoying a 62% favorability rating.\footnote{Pew Research Center. \textit{Pakistani Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S.} June 27\textsuperscript{th} 2012.}

Since the middle of 2012, the promise of the US to wind down its operation in Afghanistan following the 2011 surge has mostly remained a fantasy. By May of 2012 the number of US soldiers dropped to 88,000, returning to its pre-surge levels, but remaining quite high.\footnote{Bingham, Amy. \textit{Afghanistan War by the Numbers: Lives Lost, Billions Spent.} May 1\textsuperscript{st} 2012.} By February 2013 about 66,000 US troops remained in Afghanistan, as per an agreement between U.S. President Barack Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai who agreed to take over responsibility for Afghan security once US forces leave the country.
arrangement called a “post-2014 bi-lateral security agreement” is supposed to hand over control of Afghanistan entirely to the Afghan army by the end of 2014.\textsuperscript{329}

2013 marked a distinct shift in public opinion over democratically elected leaders. The completion of the first full 5-year term by a civilian government came with the end of Asif Zardari’s term in September of 2013. In March, former military leader Pervez Musharraf returned to Pakistan to run in the 2013 elections. Upon his arrival he was declared ineligible to run, and detained by Pakistani authorities, who placed him on trial for corruption, as well as charges relating to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.\textsuperscript{330} As it was an election year, violence increased in Pakistan, ramping up during the campaign season from March to May, with several attacks resulting in the deaths of 117 people including two candidates, as well as the kidnapping of the PPP candidate, Ali Haider, the son of the former Prime Minister Yousaf Gilani in May.\textsuperscript{331}

On May 11\textsuperscript{th}, the election was held with a massive military presence, and an even higher voter turnout, with most estimates claiming 60\% of the population turned out to vote, something entirely unprecedented relative to the rest of Pakistani history.\textsuperscript{332} The vote heralded in the third term of Nawaz Sharif, and his party the PML-N, which swept the May elections taking 123 seats in parliament. In September Zardari stepped down as President, ending his term, as well as his presidential immunity that had protected him from being prosecuted for charges of corruption brought against him for his activities under the Musharraf regime. As such, an accountability court promptly renewed their efforts to

\textsuperscript{329} Thompson, Mark. \textit{Afghan Troops Numbers: How Low Can the U.S. Go?} January 9th 2013.
\textsuperscript{330} Malik, Anis. \textit{Pakistan in 2013: A Milestone in Democratic Transition}. 178
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid. 179
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid. 179.
prosecute the now former president.\textsuperscript{333} The victory of the PML-N however signified the growing hegemony of Punjab within Pakistan more than it did an equitable new political arrangement in Pakistan with the return of Nawaz Sharif to office.\textsuperscript{334} Especially pronounced was the shift in power from the Baloch backed PPP to the Punjabi backed PML-N. The center of power in Pakistan had been slowly shifting this way since Zardari gave up many of his presidential powers in late 2009.

As prime minister, Sharif faces a slew of challenges, none more daunting than the tough economic decisions that have to be made in order to generate the necessary tax revenue to pay for the vast public projects needed to bring power to the Pakistani people. In September, in light of the stagnating Pakistani economy, and their deals with the IMF requiring Pakistan to pay back $6 billion to international lenders, the IMF approved a $6.7 billion dollar package to aid Pakistan in repaying these loans, contingent on reforms to fiscal and monetary policy as well as continuing privatization of SOE’s (state owned entities) to raise equity.\textsuperscript{335}

**Conclusion- Looking Forward**

In looking at various time periods throughout Pakistani history, and exploring the various factors at work within and surrounding Pakistan, it becomes clear that although similar regimes may emerge, they never do for the same reasons. To return to the question I asked about how regimes emerge at the beginning of this paper, I believe it has been

\textsuperscript{333} Asad, Malik. *Corruption cases against Zardari reopened.* October 12\textsuperscript{th} 2013.
\textsuperscript{334} Malik, Anis. *Pakistan in 2013: A Milestone in Democratic Transition.* 180.
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid. 182.
adequately demonstrated that regime type has been determined, both by regional and global issues that either reinforce the existing power structure or destabilize it. General Zia for example utilized Islam to consolidate power, bringing his regime to prominence, while revolutionizing the conception of Pakistan as a religious nation, united under Islam, but led by him. It follows that after 9/11, as the conception of Pakistan as a nation ravaged by sectarian violence has become the predominant narrative, that Pakistan has attempted to again reinvent itself as a nation diametrically opposed to extremism.

Regimes emerge with the introduction of a destabilizing factor, either economic or political that causes the state to stray from the straight and narrow path. With the end of military rule in 1988, Pakistan found itself reacting to the global trend of democratization with the emergence of civilian government. When the world found itself re-militarized following the entrance of the US into Afghanistan and Iraq, an unlikely military government was able to retain power due to an influx of military aid from the United States. Although the emergence of these regimes in the first place is due to internal and regional factors, what enables them to retain power is often contingent on the larger geo-political environment that allows them to either thrive or die off. Today, Pakistan is seeing a resurgence of democratic governance as the war on terror begins to peter out, with US and NATO forces beginning to withdraw from South Asia.\footnote{Tapper, Jake. *Obama Announces 34,000 troops to come home.* February 13\textsuperscript{th} 2013} The policies of the emergent democratic government since Musharraf resigned in 2008 have in may ways succeeded in restoring balance between the prime minister and president, and although the prime minister wields more power, the office is subject to balance from the parliament, and without the ability to truly control the army, power remains disbursed between the
president, prime minister, COAS (Chief of Army Staff). This power relationship explains in part why there has been no sign that the war in Kashmir is coming to a close. This raises the question of how committed to a diplomatic solution the Pakistani military is, something that remains a concern for any civilian government that hopes to be successful in normalizing relations with India.

Moving forward, Pakistan’s future will depend on not only the ability of civilian government to be transparent and honest, something that would help in assuring foreign investors their returns would be safe, and allow Pakistan’s economy to benefit from foreign direct investment. The business climate of Pakistan since the war on terror began has been highly adversely impacted, and is often viewed as quite unattractive to foreign investors looking for a place to put their money in South Asia. With almost 200 million people, Pakistan has the manpower to become an economic power-house the likes of India or Bangladesh, but without an improvement in education, Pakistan is doomed to be relegated to the back channels in finding investment opportunities, unlike its competitors who enjoy the benefits of good credit ratings which come with timely repayment of IMF loans. Continual reliance on IMF funding to drive the Pakistani economy is unsustainable, and at recent levels, calls into question the ability of Pakistani politicians to retain complete autonomy of Pakistan’s economy relative to the larger international economic system. Any rush to privatize SOE’s in order to repay IMF loans will ultimately result in undervaluing them at catastrophic levels the likes of the telecommunications industry, and the steel mills.

Sharif’s number one goal moving forward needs to be education, something that has already been delegated significant funding from foreign aid sources such as the US, and has
in the past been squandered on military expenditures. As the US slowly exists Afghanistan it must become a priority of the Pakistani civilian government to ensure that they have an equitable relationship with the Afghan government that emerges after Karzai leaves office. It is in both nations interests to work out a bilateral economic agreement that would allow for enhanced trade in the Af-Pak region, standing in stark contrast to the traditional policies Pakistan has held towards its fragmented neighbor. Willingness to work with the government in Pakistan would indicate a departure from the soviet era policies that remain in tact whereby nation building has been undermined by desire to retain dominance over Afghan affairs at the cost of substantive development that would discourage extremism through traditional education as opposed to religious indoctrination. It is with this in mind that Sharif must work to dismantle the Deobandi madrassa network, and target warlords living on the Af-Pak border in Quetta, and in the FATA. Targeting TTP leadership needs to be a priority for Sharif, as their continued existence no longer serves the militaries interest let alone civilian interests. Replacing religious education with traditional education is the most important thing needed to reverse the course of social misdirection that has been fomented by the military in an attempt to control the Pakistani people through religious indoctrination. It is through not just dismantling the Deobandi madrassa’s, but utilizing the existing institution and reforming it, that Pakistani youth can become able to compete in a highly interconnected and competitive world.

With the removal of US troops from Afghanistan, I believe we will see a liberalization of the political scene in Pakistan. Without the military environment that the US operation in Afghanistan brought to the region, military expenditure on the part of the Pakistani army should dwindle as well. Diplomacy between Pakistan and India can be a low
cost, minimally damaging way to remediate Pakistani concerns over Indian economic hegemony with Indian concerns about Pakistani extremism. High levels of income inequality, and low per capita GDP are typically conditions that allow extremism to take root. Targeting these problems, first through supplying basic public needs such as power and running water, is a good first step in combating the allure of warlords and clerics who provide basic amenities for the poor in lieu of government assistance. It is the job of the Pakistani government to provide for its people, and with proper delegation of foreign aid, ensured through strict oversight, it should be relatively easy for the civilian government to accomplish these goals.

Sharif has been a vocal proponent of remediating differences with India, and moving towards bi-lateral trade agreements, but he must also work to publically condemn activities of the military that overstep into civilian life. With the exit of Ashfaq Kayani as head of the army staff in November 2013, longtime general Raheel Sharif has taken control of the Pakistani army; a man who many believe has a good grasp on what the goals of the military should be in order to address issues that substantively impact Pakistan in 2013. The new general has a good working relationship with the prime minister, and is a trusted friend of several former military generals who are now in Nawaz Sharif’s cabinet. Gen. Sharif has openly voiced his desire to combat the TTP, claiming that they are just as, if not a larger threat to the Pakistani state than India.

The policies of the Pakistani military have remained strikingly constant since Zulfikar Bhutto was deposed in 1978, diverging very little from the straight and narrow path paved by the militarization of the state, and subsequent Islamization of the military.

and society that was cultivated under General Zia ul-Haq. It may have taken 35 years for relations between the military and the government to normalize but it appears that the conditions are right for civilian governance to return for good in Pakistan. Just as the military government in the 70's and 80's was backed by a covert operation in Afghanistan made possible by US funding, the military government that Pakistan found itself with in the early 2000's was also given legitimacy by the US military's need for unilateral action while they conducted their operation in Afghanistan against the Taliban. As the U.S. operation begins to wind down, it should follow that so will the demilitarization of Pakistan. While Musharraf may have been necessary for US president Bush to achieve his goals in the region, the goals of the US have shifted to finding an exit from the region, and with that, a new era of civilian leadership unimpeded by foreign intervention will have the leeway it needs to thrive.

Although it remains to be seen whether or not the new head of the army staff, and the new prime minister will continue to get along, the rhetoric from both appears promising, as the anti-extremist position has become somewhat mainstream in Pakistan, indicating a shift from the policy of supporting militants for achieving the goals of a state constantly at war with India, to one which understands the dangers of allowing non-state actors to gain influence within an already fragmented nation. In the three years since the raid in Abbottabad, which killed Osama Bin Laden, US- Pakistani relations have somewhat normalized, as a scaling back of the drone campaign, and a withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan has helped to begin demilitarization of the region, allowing issues impacting Pakistani's to take precedent over the interests of the U.S. and NATO forces.
Sources Cited


Friedman 133


