Recovery Of Interest On A tax Underpayment Caused By A Tax Advisor's Negligence

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RECOVERY OF INTEREST
ON A TAX UNDERPAYMENT
CAUSED BY A TAX ADVISOR’S NEGLIGENCE
by
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When a tax advisor renders incorrect advice due to negligence and a plaintiff establishes all the requisite elements of a malpractice cause of action, the most frequently encountered direct damages consist of four elements: additional taxes caused by the negligence, interest on underpaid taxes, penalties and corrective costs incurred in attempting to eliminate or mitigate all or some of the foregoing damages.¹ In this article I wish to focus on the recoverability of interest incurred by a plaintiff on a tax underpayment caused by the tax advisor’s negligence. Such interest payment is present in many, if not most, tax malpractice situations because both federal² and state³ law impose an interest charge on the underpayment of a tax liability. While other types of interest payments incurred by a plaintiff also may be recoverable as consequential damages, such other interest payments will not be addressed in this article.⁴

There are several reasons why I wish to focus on this area. First, and foremost, to update the analysis I presented in a recent article⁵ in light of new developments, especially in light of Frank v. Lockwood,⁶ which, I believe, finally got the issues right and in which the majority and the dissent disagree about appropriate matters. The second reason I wish to revisit this area is because certain courts appear not to appreciate the seriousness of the issues involved, and/or the existence of divergent views. Instead, they

¹ See generally, Jacob L. Todres, Tax Malpractice Damages: A Comprehensive Review of the Elements and the Issues, 61 Tax Law. 705, 712 (2008) (hereinafter “Tax Malpractice Damages”). It should be noted, that additional consequential damages are also recoverable in appropriate circumstances. Id. at 736 et. seq.
² See, e.g. I.R.C. §§ 6621-22.
³ See, e.g. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 19101 (West 2001); N.Y. TAX LAW § 684 (McKinney 2004); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.01 (Vernon 1998).
⁴ An example of such other type of interest might be where a plaintiff who incurred avoidable taxes due to a tax advisor’s negligence paid such taxes with borrowed funds and incurred interest on such borrowing. Wynn v. Estate of Holmes 815 P.2d 1231, 1235-36 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999), overruled on another issue, Stroud v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 37 P.3d 783 (Okla. 2001). Similarly, if a tax advisor’s negligence prevents a plaintiff from obtaining low-cost, tax exempt financing, thereby forcing the plaintiff to incur higher, conventional market rate financing, the additional interest incurred might be recoverable. Billings Clinic v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 797 P.2d 899, 913 (Mont. 1990).
⁵ Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1, 61 Tax Law. at 723.
⁶ 749 N.W. 2d 443 (Neb. 2008).
simply assume the question of the recoverability of such interest is a routine matter to be dealt with summarily.\(^7\) Finally, other courts, inexplicably, persist in perpetuating erroneous statements about this area of law.\(^8\)

In my view, this area is relatively straightforward. There are three views that have developed. Once the views are apprehended, it should be relatively easy for a court to choose which view to follow. I hope that by presenting and analyzing the three views this area will be appropriately elucidated and subsequently given the thoughtful attention it warrants.

In Part II I will focus upon each of the three views and explore the rationale for each view. In Part III I will trace the development of each of the views, especially the minority and more modern, intermediate views. The goal of this discussion is to arrive at a tally of the jurisdictions following each view, fully cognizant that such tallies are, at best, subject to dispute and also quite transient. My reflections on each of the three views and their approaches will be presented in Part IV. My conclusion is that the minority

\(^7\) See e.g., Amato v. KPMG LLP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 (2006) in which the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of an earlier motion in which the issue of the recoverability of such interest was entirely dealt with in two footnotes. The court acknowledged, “[a] thorough review of our … [earlier order], submissions made by the parties, and applicable case law reveal that we glossed over what should have been a significant inquiry concerning the recoverability of interest as a proper measure of damages to Plaintiffs’ claims. It is entirely appropriate for us to take this opportunity to comprehensively address the circuit split concerning this issue and to reconsider our prior erroneous determination that Plaintiffs’ claims for the recoupment of interest paid to the IRS ought to be dismissed at the pleadings stage …” Id. at *8.

\(^8\) See e.g. Malone v. Clark Nuber, P.S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461 at *50 (W.D. Wash. 2008) in which the court’s entire discussion of the recoverability of interest is the following: “Similarly, Washington follows ‘the majority of jurisdictions holding that interest owed to the IRS is not recoverable’ from defendants. Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse, 81 Wn. App. 762, 768, 916 P.2d 449 (1996).” The only problems with this sentence are first, that in 2008 it is very clear that the no interest recovery view is not the majority view but very distinctly a minority view. See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1, 61 Tax Law at 723 n. 109. In addition, the view was also the minority view in 1996 when Leendertsen was decided. See Caroline Rule, What and When Can a Taxpayer Recover from a Negligent Tax Advisor?, 92 J. Tax’n 176, 177-78 (2000), who, in an article published in March 2000 listed four states in the no interest recovery view and fourteen states allowing interest recovery. Most of the authorities cited for the fourteen majority view states predated Leendertsen which was decided in 1996. See Part III, infra, in which I present a current tally of states following each of the three views.
view, while having made an important contribution to the development of the law in this area, should give way to the modern, intermediate view and that the few states that continue to follow it should change and adopt the modern view. A brief conclusion will follow in Part V.

PART II: RECOVERABILITY OF INTEREST ON A TAX UNDERPAYMENT – THREE VIEWS

Three views have developed with respect to the recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment. According to the more established, traditional view that is the majority view,10 such interest is recoverable from a defendant just like any other damages proximately caused.11 A second view, diametrically opposite, and the minority view, absolutely prohibits the recovery of such interest.12 This view developed from approximately 1986 to 1996. A third view, a middle view followed in a number of states, permits the recovery of such interest, but only to the extent it exceeds the interest actually

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9 This portion of the article is primarily adapted from Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1, 723-31.
10 Part III of this article will focus on how many states follow each approach.
earned by the plaintiff on the underpaid taxes.\textsuperscript{13} This last view initially started in 1999 and seems to be the preferred view of most recent cases.\textsuperscript{14}

The starting point in this inquiry is the traditional view that since the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff to incur the interest expense, the interest is recoverable under the normal theory of damages for negligence, which is to make the plaintiff whole. Thus, many cases simply include the interest as an element of recoverable damages.\textsuperscript{15}

The basic reason for the opposite view denying recovery of the interest is that to permit a recovery would result in a windfall for the plaintiff. The plaintiff would have both the use of the tax money as well as a recovery of the interest paid for the use of that money.\textsuperscript{16} According to this view, the interest charged for a tax underpayment is not a penalty imposed upon the taxpayer. Rather, it is merely a charge for the use of money that really belonged to the government rather than the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{17} To put it differently, allowing the plaintiff both use of the tax money and a recovery of the interest from the defendant results in an interest-free loan to the plaintiff “for the period during which the tax[es] were unpaid.”\textsuperscript{18} This view follows the approach of federal securities law for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} See Part III, infra.
\item \textsuperscript{16} See cases cited supra note 12.
\item \textsuperscript{17} See, e.g., O’Bryan, 717 N.W.2d at 636-37 (S.D. 2006).
\item \textsuperscript{18} Caroline Rule, What and When Can a Taxpayer Recover from a Negligent Tax Advisor?, 92 J. Tax’n 176, 177 (2000) (citing the reasoning used by jurisdictions in Alaska, California, New York, and Washington).
\end{itemize}
securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5, under which such interest also is not recoverable.  

_Leendertsen v. Price Waterhouse_, which adopted the no-interest-recovery view in Washington state, suggested two additional justifications for this result. First, a defendant may not be held responsible for such damages since there is no proximate causation, because the rate of return earned by a plaintiff on such funds is due to the plaintiff’s exercise of independent “judgment as to where to invest the money.” The court seemed to be concerned that “damages from poor investing are too speculative to blame [on] defendants.” Second, the court was concerned with the “difficulty of proving where the money was invested.”

_In McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LL.P._, the Court of Appeals of Oregon gave short shrift to these concerns. Here too the court, as a matter of first impression, was faced with the decision of whether interest paid on a tax underpayment is recoverable as damages. In deciding, contrary to _Leendertsen_, that such interest is recoverable, the court simply held that similar issues were dealt with satisfactorily under Oregon law either by the jury, where enough evidence to get to a jury was introduced by the plaintiff, or, if there was inadequate evidence to get to a jury, by the court directing a verdict. In other words, such issues were properly to be determined by the trier of fact.

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19 _See, e.g._ Streber, 221 F.3d at 734 (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 90 F.3d 1442, 1449 (9th Cir. 1996); Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1092-93 (6th Cir. 1993); Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985), _vacated on other grounds_, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986), _Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey_, relied on _Freschi_ in denying recovery of such interest. 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (1st Dept. 1990);
21 _Id._ at 451.
22 _Id._ at 452.
23 _Id._
25 _Id._ at 417.
26 _Id._ at 419.
The third view, the modern, intermediate view between the previous two extremes was developed in *Ronson v. Talesnick*\(^{27}\) and *Streber v. Hunter*\(^{28}\). It seems to be a reaction primarily to the harsh results that may occur from a rigid application of the no-interest-recovery view. The logic of the no-interest-recovery view initially seems compelling because when a plaintiff obtains and keeps money she or he is not entitled to, it seems appropriate to impose an interest charge for the use of this money when the money is repaid. If this interest charge were recoverable from the defendant, logic further suggests the plaintiff would enjoy a windfall of having enjoyed the interest-free use of the money. However, simply denying any recovery of such interest is based on the tacit assumption that the theoretical value of the use of the money is always exactly equal to the interest paid to the IRS (or a state) and that these amounts always net out, leaving no net recoverable damages. However, there are several practical problems with this theoretical scenario. As an initial matter, it assumes the plaintiff taxpayer has available money to invest equal to the tax underpayment, the earnings on which offset the interest charged for the underpayment. Frequently, however, a plaintiff will not have any available funds to invest, so that there are no earnings to offset the interest payable to the IRS.\(^{29}\) Additionally, the theoretical scenario assumes the taxpayer can earn a rate of return on his or her investable funds equal to the interest charged by the IRS, which often may not be true. Finally, the no-interest-recovery approach does not take into account the


\(^{28}\) 221 F.3d 701, 734-35 (5th Cir. 2000).


As a theoretical matter, even if the plaintiff does not have financial liquidity and does not have available an amount of funds to invest, the financial benefit of having had the government’s funds still has occurred. In the absence of the tax underpayment, the plaintiff may have had to either do without certain expenditures or else borrow a similar amount to meet his or her needs, thereby benefiting by the amount of interest not incurred.
hardship to a plaintiff who has to make an unexpected payment which may not have been budgeted.  

In Ronson, the plaintiff taxpayer had invested in tax shelter partnerships from 1980 through 1983 and claimed losses from the partnerships on his tax returns. Subsequently, the IRS began questioning the deductibility of these losses. In mid-1986, the taxpayer sought advice from the defendant accountant on how to stop the accrual of interest on the amount that would be owed if these losses were ultimately disallowed. The accountant advised the taxpayer to send the IRS a cash bond for $91,300, which the taxpayer did in June, 1986. In 1996 the IRS audited the taxpayer and determined the cash bond was too low and interest of approximately $235,000 was still owed. The taxpayer then filed suit, seeking recovery from the accountant of the additional interest owed by the taxpayer.

The only damages sought by the plaintiff in Ronson were the interest payments owed the IRS. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that interest is never recoverable as damages and that the suit therefore must be dismissed since an essential element of the cause of action, i.e., damages, was absent. The federal district court determined that New Jersey law applied and that New Jersey had no law on point. The court therefore had to determine how the New Jersey Supreme Court would rule on this issue.

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30 See Caroline Rule, supra note 18, at 177.
32 Id. at 350.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 351.
35 Id. at 351-52.
In deciding the issue, the court in *Ronson* initially recognized the split between the no-interest-recovery and the interest-recovery views. Based on New Jersey’s public policy that a tortfeasor should not benefit from the ingenuity of a harmed plaintiff, the court decided that New Jersey would permit the recovery of interest.\(^\text{36}\) According to the court, prohibiting the recovery of interest from a negligent accountant:

permits the tortfeasor to benefit from the presumption that a harmed taxpayer has been or should have been ingenious enough to (1) maintain a sum of money that he would have otherwise had to pay over to the IRS and (2) invest that money in a manner in which he earned interest in an amount comparable to the interest rate charged by the IRS.\(^\text{37}\)

*Ronson*, however, did not hold that New Jersey simply would adopt the view allowing recovery of the interest. *Ronson* held that New Jersey law is more circumscribed. It found that New Jersey follows a benefits rule that “where a wrong creates a benefit that would not have existed but for the wrong, the damages flowing from the wrong are offset to the extent of the benefit received.”\(^\text{38}\)

Under this rule, a defendant could introduce “evidence of [a] benefit from the malpractice that could reduce . . . a plaintiff’s recovery.”\(^\text{39}\) Thus, where a plaintiff earned some interest on the tax underpayment, but less than the amount paid to the IRS, the interest recovery would be limited to the difference.

In *Streber* the Fifth Circuit affirmed a damage award of exactly the same amount, which the court referred to as the “interest differential,” that is, the difference between the interest earned by the plaintiff while she had the tax underpayment and the interest

\(^{36}\) *Id.* at 355. The court surmised that this was the New Jersey public policy underlying its collateral source rule. *Id.*

\(^{37}\) *Id.*

\(^{38}\) *Id.* at 354.

\(^{39}\) *Id.* at 355.
charged by the IRS. Streber involved a combination of bad advice by the defendant attorney about how to report a transaction for tax purposes as well as subsequent bad advice not to settle the controversy on favorable terms. At the jury trial below, the most significant element of damages awarded was for the interest differential. On appeal, the defendants argued that such interest was not recoverable.

At the commencement of its analysis, the Fifth Circuit noted that the issue was one of first impression in that court as well as in any court. The court recognized the split between the no-interest-recovery and the interest-recovery views and also recognized that no interest recovery was permitted for federal securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5. The Fifth Circuit then held that the interest differential was recoverable, since by awarding only the interest differential there was no double recovery as would occur if the plaintiff could recover all the interest paid to the IRS. Additionally, an award of the interest differential would prevent a plaintiff from being penalized for conservative investing. The Fifth Circuit held that the result was correct under the applicable Texas law, which required damages adequate to make a plaintiff whole.

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40 Streber, 221 F.3d 701, 734, 740 (5th Cir. 2000).
41 Id. at 734.
42 Id. Strangely, the court cited the Ronson case at the end of the very paragraph in which it made this statement, apparently without realizing that Ronson had addressed the same issue. Id. see also Ronson, 33 F. Supp 2d at 351, 354-55. The Fifth Circuit simply cited Ronson as one of the accountant malpractice cases allowing the recovery of interest. Perhaps the Fifth Circuit intended its observation to be directed at attorney tax malpractice rather than accountant tax malpractice. However, Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey that was cited by the court as one of the accountant malpractice cases involved attorneys as defendants. See 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 313 (1st Dept. 1990). Jobe v. International Insurance Co. similarly involved tax malpractice by an attorney though the case was brought by an insured law firm against its malpractice insurer. See 933 F. Supp. 844, 849 (D. Ariz. 1995), order withdrawn pursuant to settlement, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1403 (D. Ariz. 1997).
43 Streber, 221 F.3d at 734. The Fifth Circuit referred to this split as involving accounting malpractice claims, though two of the five cases cited by the court involved attorneys (Alpert and Jobe). Jobe involved a suit between an insured law firm and its malpractice insurer. 933 F.Supp. 2d at 849; see also Alpert, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
44 Streber, 221 F.3d at 734.
45 Id. at 734-35.
46 Id at 735.
Likewise, the Texas law’s requirements that consequential damages be “foreseeable” and proven with “reasonable certainty” were complied with, since the evidence established that the defendant knew the plaintiffs intended to invest conservatively. Also, there was abundant evidence establishing exactly how much the plaintiffs earned from the tax underpayment and how much interest the IRS charged.\footnote{Id.}

While Streber seemed to uphold an award of exactly the same amount as contemplated in Ronson, there is a very important procedural difference between the two approaches. In Ronson, the court awarded the plaintiff the full interest paid to the IRS, subject to the defendant being able to prove the existence of a benefit (\textit{i.e.}, earnings) received by the plaintiff that should reduce the plaintiff’s recovery.\footnote{33 F. Supp. 2d 347, 355 (D.N.J. 1999).} In Streber, on the other hand, the plaintiff had the burden of proving the interest differential with “reasonable certainty.”\footnote{221 F.3d at 735.}

In \textit{O’Bryan v. Ashland}, the Supreme Court of South Dakota was called upon to decide the issue of whether interest on a tax underpayment is recoverable.\footnote{717 N.W.2d 632, 634-36 (S.D. 2006).} Here, the case involved an error by the defendant accountant concerning the incorporation of plaintiff’s business and the change from the cash method of accounting to the accrual method of accounting.\footnote{Id at 633-34.} The accountant’s error resulted in a substantial underpayment of tax that the IRS later discovered and for which the IRS imposed an interest change on the plaintiff. At trial, the defendant accountant conceded his negligence and the only issue

\footnote{For a very brief overview of tax accounting methods, see \textsc{John E. Davidian} \& \textsc{Jacob L. Todres}, \textsc{Reducing Personal Income Taxes: A Guide to Deductions and Credits}, § 1.06 (Law Journal Seminars Press 1998).}
was the damages recoverable.\footnote{O’Bryan, 717 N.W.2d at 634.} Both parties argued extensively before the jury as to whether interest was recoverable, and the jury ultimately awarded the plaintiff the interest charged by the IRS, which was calculated to be around $39,000.\footnote{Id at 636.} On appeal, the issue was whether such interest may be recovered as damages under South Dakota law.

After recognizing the existing split between the no-interest-recovery and interest-recovery views and examining each view, the South Dakota Supreme Court placed itself firmly with those states which refuse to adopt a blanket no-interest-recovery rule. The court did this in conformity with its own precedent requiring the injured party be made whole.\footnote{Id. at 639 (quoting Hulstein v. Meilman Food Indus., Inc., 293 N.W.2d 889, 891 (S.D. 1980)).} After concluding that such interest may be recoverable, the court affirmed the jury award of interest as being supported by the evidence. The court then went on to seemingly endorse the approach taken by \textit{Ronson} to allow a defendant to come forward with evidence of a benefit received by the plaintiff from the malpractice that would reduce the plaintiff’s recovery.\footnote{Id. at 639-40.} According to the court, such an approach would cut a pragmatic course between the two rigid, extreme views.\footnote{Id. at 640.} However, the court stopped short of adopting the \textit{Ronson} approach and left that for a future case.\footnote{Id.}

What is notably absent from \textit{O’Bryan}’s analysis is any discussion of, or even reference to, the \textit{Streber} case, which essentially follows \textit{Ronson} and, together with \textit{Ronson}, seems to anchor the intermediate view on this issue.

In \textit{Amato v. KPMG L.L.P.}, the federal district court in Pennsylvania followed \textit{O’Bryan}, after agreeing that it “provides an excellent template for surveying the legal
debate about recovery of interest paid to the IRS.”58 In Amato, the federal district court was applying Pennsylvania law. After noting that Pennsylvania had no law on point and after analyzing the split in authority, the court held:

the better practice is to reject a blanket rule forbidding interest recovery in professional malpractice actions. Instead, we align ourselves with those jurisdictions that leave the issue as to whether a taxpayer has been damaged to the trier of fact, with the burden of proof upon the taxpayer. Therefore, we conclude that interest paid to the IRS may be a recoverable element of damages, depending upon the facts of the case.59

Frank v. Lockwood60 is the most recent case to focus on the recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment. While firmly placing itself within the newer, third view, the case contains extensive analysis of the relevant issues. This is probably due to the fact that the procedural difference noted above between the Ronson approach and Streber’s interest differential approach61 is exactly the bone of contention between the majority and the dissent.

In Frank the ultimate issue before the Supreme Court of Nebraska was the recoverability of federal and Nebraska interest and penalties incurred by the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Frank, on the late payment of their taxes and the late filing of their tax returns for 2001.62 There was evidence that their accountant, defendant Fred Lockwood,
failed to advise them to pay estimated taxes for 2001 when, on April 15, 2002, he advised
them to file for an extension of time to file their 2001 federal and Nebraska income tax
returns. After trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs the full amount of interest and
penalties paid to the IRS and Nebraska. The trial judge denied several motions by the
defendant for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On
appeal the issue before the Supreme Court of Nebraska was whether the defendant
suffered recoverable damages.

With respect to the recoverability of interest incurred by the plaintiffs on the late
payment of their taxes, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated several times that it
rejected a blanket rule that precluded the recoverability of interest on taxes as an item of
damages. It also stated the converse proposition several times, that it was adopting a
rule that such interest is available as an item of damages. However, the court made it
very clear that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to specifically establish the
existence of such damages. Since the plaintiff in Frank did not satisfy this burden of
proof, interest was not recoverable.

The burden of proof placed upon plaintiffs by the court seems to be a very heavy
one. The court, though ultimately not adopting the minority, no-interest-recovery view,
seemed in basic agreement with this view’s approach:

As noted above, we generally agree with the reasoning of other courts that interest paid to the IRS represents a
payment for use of money and that therefore, a person who has use of the money is not generally damaged by

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63 Id. at 448.
64 Id. at 448-49.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 451-53.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 453.
the payment of interest. We recognize that there may be circumstances under which a plaintiff actually is damaged, but the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove that such circumstances exist.

* * *

‘[T]o the extent that the I.R.S. charges the market rate, interest is not a proper element of damages’ . . . [citation omitted] To the extent that interest charged by the IRS is above the market rate or does not reflect the value of the use of the money, we think it is the plaintiff’s duty to so prove . . .

Previously, the court indicated that a plaintiff might incur damages from the payment of such interest if he or she could show either that he or she could have borrowed money at the relevant time at a rate below that imposed by the taxing authorities or if he or she had enough money to pay the taxes but the value of the use of such money during the relevant period was less than the interest rate charged by the taxing authorities. 70 Though the court never explained the second situation, presumably, it would exist where the plaintiff could not earn as high a rate of return on their funds, as the interest charged by the taxing authorities. 71

The approach of the majority in Frank was to create a presumption that normally the payment of interest does not represent damages and that a plaintiff has the burden of proving the contrary. 72 The dissent, which disagreed only with the majority’s approach to the recovery of interest issue, disagreed with this presumption. The dissent’s approach is the diametrical opposite of the majority’s. In the dissent’s view, the plaintiffs would not have incurred any interest payment but for the defendant’s negligence. As such, the dissent’s position is that the recovery of the interest payment does not place the plaintiffs

70 Id. at 452.
71 See the court’s discussion of the interest differential approach where it seems to acknowledge that an interest differential, if proven, might be recoverable. Id. at 454.
72 Id. at 453.
in a better position. The dissent then concedes that the harm caused by the defendant’s negligence might be offset by the benefit of plaintiffs’ having had use of the money, but that the burden of proving this “special benefit” belongs on the defendant. 73

The disagreement between the majority and the dissent seems to be the same as the disagreement between the Ronson and the Streber approaches to the new, third view. 74 All agree that the previous approaches of either always permitting the recovery of all interest incurred on a tax underpayment, or never permitting the recovery of any such interest are incorrect. The issue seems to ultimately devolve into a burden of proof question, but which in actuality seems to depend on one’s starting point. If the starting point is that the payment of interest to a taxing authority is not really damages, (i.e., per the no-interest-recovery view) then the burden of proving an exception to the rule belongs on the plaintiff –as the majority in Frank and the Streber interest differential approach hold. If the starting presumption is that the payment of interest to a taxing authority does constitute damages (i.e., per the traditional, recovery-of-interest view) then the burden of proving a “special benefit” to the plaintiff belongs on the defendant – as the dissent in Frank, and Ronson hold.

The dissent in Frank specifically adopts the Ronson approach 75 and the majority in Frank specifically rejects the Ronson approach. 76 Interestingly, however, the majority in Frank, instead of adopting Streber’s interest differential approach, explicitly refuses to

73 Id. at 457.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
75 749 N.W.2d at 458-59.
76 Id. at 453-54.
do so.\textsuperscript{77} It does go out of its way, however, not to reject this approach, but to leave this for another day.\textsuperscript{78}

We do not reject the interest differential approach as a possible measure of damages, and we think that it could be one of the circumstances referred to above in which a plaintiff could prove damages from the payment of interest to the IRS. . . . Because the Franks’ evidence regarding interest differential was inadequate, we need not decide in this case whether we would adopt the interest differential approach.

With respect to the difference between the \textit{Ronson} and \textit{Streber} approaches, it should be noted that in \textit{O’Bryan v. Ashland},\textsuperscript{79} the Supreme Court of South Dakota, while stopping short of adopting the \textit{Ronson} approach, seemed to be inclined towards that approach.\textsuperscript{80} In fact, it never even mentioned \textit{Streber}.\textsuperscript{81} Contrariwise, in \textit{Amato v. KPMG L.L.P.}\textsuperscript{82} the federal district court in Pennsylvania followed the \textit{Streber} approach and placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show damages.\textsuperscript{83} Similarly, Massachusetts also seems to follow the \textit{Streber} approach.\textsuperscript{84}

In connection with the third view, \textit{McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LL.P.},\textsuperscript{85} merits brief discussion. \textit{McCulloch} was decided about seven weeks before \textit{Ronson} and probably follows the traditional view that interest may be recovered as damages. However, in refusing to follow the no-interest-recovery view, the opinion contains some language

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Id.} at 454.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{79} 717 N.W.2d 632 (S.D. 2006).
\textsuperscript{80} See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{82} No. 06 cv 39, 2006 WL 2376245 at *5 (M.D. Pa., 2006).
\textsuperscript{83} See supra text accompanying note 59.
\textsuperscript{84} See Miller v. Volk, 825 N.E.2d 579 (2005). The court’s entire discussion of the recoverability of interest consists of the following: “no proof was offered that the interest paid to the IRS on the deficiency exceeded the value to the plaintiffs of having use of the money in the meantime. There was, in other words, no proof of actionable damages.” \textit{Id.} at 582.
\textsuperscript{85} 971 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
reminiscent of Ronson’s approach. In McCulloch, in response to an argument based on Leendertsen that interest damages on tax underpayments are speculative and therefore ought not be recoverable, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that a plaintiff retains the burden of proof of the causation and the amount of each claim for damages and that, to the extent a defendant chooses to contend that the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages, discovery is available to augment such an allegation.\(^86\) If the reference to mitigation of damages could be deemed to allow a defendant to reduce recoverable damages by the earnings received by the plaintiff on the tax underpayment, this would be almost identical with the recovery permitted in Ronson. The only difference would be one of nomenclature. Ronson refers to the reduction of recoverable damages as coming under New Jersey’s benefit rule, which McCulloch refers to the reduction instead as being by reason of mitigation. Alternatively, this might simply be a reference to the universally recognized obligation imposed upon plaintiffs to mitigate avoidable damages and nothing more.\(^87\)

It should be noted that in King v. Deutsche Bank AG,\(^88\) the federal district court for the district of Oregon adopted the Streber interest differential approach.\(^89\) However, there is no indication in the opinion that the court was declaring Oregon law. Indeed, in this small segment of the opinion in which only five cases are cited none are from Oregon.\(^90\) If the court were declaring Oregon law, its failure to discuss or even cite McCulloch would be inexplicable.

\(^86\) Id. at 419.
\(^87\) See generally 3 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §21:10 (2009 ed.). Concomitantly, the mitigation costs become an element of recoverable damages. See Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1, at 733.
\(^89\) Id. at *110.
\(^90\) Id. at *108-10.
PART III – THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF THE THREE VIEWS

In this portion of the article I will briefly explore the development of each of these views on the recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment. The goal is to then present a tally of the jurisdiction following each view. The tally is intended as a rough guide, not as being final or even very definitive. As an initial matter it should be emphasized that while I have done research to discover recent cases that have addressed the issue, I have not attempted to systematically research the law in each of the fifty states. Instead, my tally is based in part on an earlier tally presented in a 2000 article,91 supplemented by the cases I have encountered in writing in this area92 and by current research. There is always the possibility, or even the likelihood, that some cases will have eluded me.

The second caveat in attempting to prepare a tally is that tallies are inherently imprecise and there is often much room for differing interpretations of the underlying cases. It is not always clear what the view of any state is, nor, sometimes, even how to interpret any given case. For instance, Alaska is usually cited as a state following the no-interest-recovery view,93 based on the 1986 case of Orsini v. Bratten.94 Nevertheless, a 1991 Illinois case listed Alaska as permitting the recovery of such interest95 based on the later Alaska case of Thomas v. Cleary.96

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91 Caroline Rule, supra note 18, 92 J. Tax’n at 177-78.
92 See e.g., Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice and the Tax Practitioner: An Analysis of the Areas in Which Malpractice Occurs, 48 Emory L. J. 547 (1999); Jacob L. Todres, Malpractice: Areas in Which It Occurs and the Measure of Damages – An Update, 78 St. John’s L. Rev. 1001 (2004); Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1.
93 See e.g., Frank, supra, 749 N.W.2d at 451.
96 768 P.2d 1090, 1094 n.10 (Alaska 1989).
A second example of the difficulty of characterizing even what any given case stands for is illustrated by *O’Bryan v. Ashland*. In *O’Bryan* the South Dakota Supreme Court directly faced the issue of whether interest paid on a tax underpayment may be recoverable as damages from a negligent tax advisor. At the beginning of the opinion the court indicated that this issue was “never before decided in South Dakota.” Nevertheless, in *Ronson v. Talesnick*, the New Jersey federal district court listed South Dakota among the jurisdictions permitting the recovery of interest based on the earlier case of *Lien v. McGladrey & Pullen*. While acknowledging what *Ronson* had done, and agreeing with the principle of law *Ronson* had gleaned from *Lien*, the South Dakota Supreme Court nevertheless emphatically stated that *Lien* never decided the issue, but that the court was doing so only in *O’Bryan*.

Before proceeding to review the development of each view and my tally of states following the views I wish to emphasize that when I refer to the view permitting the recovery of interest, I intend to refer to the situation where interest on the tax underpayment is recoverable as damages without qualification. Similarly, when referring to the no-interest-recovery view, I contemplate a view that absolutely refuses to permit the recovery of such interest, with no exceptions. The third or intermediate view refers to all views that are not absolute, but which sometimes permit the recovery of interest depending upon the facts and circumstances. For the tally it is irrelevant whether

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*717 N.W.2d 632, (S.D. 2006).*
*Id.* at 633.
*Id.*
*33 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.N.J. 1999).*
*Id.* at 352.
*509 N.W.2d 421, 426 (S.D. 1994).*
*O’Bryan*, 717 N.W.2d at 638 n.9.
*The general duty on a plaintiff to mitigate damages is ignored, since it pertains to all damages and not particularly to interest incurred on a tax underpayment.*
the burden is initially placed upon the plaintiff to prove some interest differential or if the defendant is given the burden of proving some special benefit to the plaintiff. So long as there is not an absolute rule either permitting or denying the recovery of such interest, such position is placed in the third, intermediate view.

Traditional View – Permitting Interest Recovery

Under traditional tort damages doctrine, all damages directly flowing from a defendant’s negligence are recoverable. Accordingly, interest incurred on a tax underpayment is recoverable according to this view, since it was caused by the tax advisor’s negligence. Today, the following thirteen states seem to follow this view: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In a

106 Id. See also Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1, 61 Tax Law. at 724-25.
number of these states the courts simply awarded interest without discussing the issue.\textsuperscript{120} In two of the states the law was declared by a federal court rather than a state court.\textsuperscript{121}

Oregon probably also belongs with these thirteen states,\textsuperscript{122} though there may be some uncertainty about this. I included it in this group in my recent \textit{Tax Malpractice Damages} article,\textsuperscript{123} as did another author in an earlier article.\textsuperscript{124} Also Oregon’s \textit{McCulloch} case was cited several times as standing for this proposition.\textsuperscript{125} There is, however, reason to possibly place Oregon in the third view.

Oregon’s position was declared in \textit{McCulloch v. Price Waterhouse LLP},\textsuperscript{126} which involved a suit against an accountant and his firm for a deficient estate tax return. At trial the plaintiff recovered damages that included interest paid to the IRS. One of the issues on appeal was the trial judge’s refusal to rule that the recovery of damages for such interest is precluded as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{127} In addressing this issue the court noted that the issue was one of first impression in Oregon.\textsuperscript{128} The court extensively analyzed the no-interest-recovery view,\textsuperscript{129} very clearly declined to adopt it, and held the plaintiff could recover such interest as damages.\textsuperscript{130} What is not very clear is whether the court was simply adopting the traditional view which absolutely permits the recovery of interest or if it was really more circumscribed and was adopting a position that today would be characterized as fitting, within the middle, third view. \textit{McCulloch} itself must have

\textsuperscript{120} See e.g., Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Wisconsin and Wyoming, \textit{supra} notes 107-10, 113-16 and 118-19, respectively.
\textsuperscript{121} Arizona and Florida, \textit{supra} notes 108-09.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Supra} note 1, 61 Tax. Law. at 724 n.110.
\textsuperscript{124} Caroline Rule, \textit{supra} note 18, 92 J. Tax’n at 178.
\textsuperscript{125} See e.g., \textit{Frank}, \textit{supra} 749 N.W.2d at 457 n.1 (dissent); \textit{King v. Neal}, \textit{supra} 19 P.3d at 902. \textit{But see O’Bryan, supra, 717 N.W.2d at 637.}
\textsuperscript{126} 971 P.2d 414 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). \textit{See also supra} text accompanying notes 24-26 and 85-87.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Id.} at 415.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.} at 417.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Id.} at 417-19.
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Id.} at 419.
assumed it was adopting the traditional view, since there was then no third view yet.\textsuperscript{131} If it was intending to establish a novel, new view, it would have needed to do so much more explicitly than the ambiguous, circumscribed language it used.

In refusing to accept the defendant’s argument, based on \textit{Leendertsen}, that interest damages are too speculative to be recoverable \textit{McCulloch} stated:\textsuperscript{132}

[\textit{w}e note that plaintiffs retain the burden of proof of the causation and amount of each claim of damage by a preponderance of the evidence and that, to the extent that defendants choose to contend that plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damage, discovery is available. \ldots{} to augment their allegations. Accordingly, we decline to adopt the rule that defendants propose. We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff is not barred as a matter of law from seeking damages based on the interest obligation that he owes to the IRS. (footnote omitted).]

If the court is simply referring to the generally recognized obligation imposed on all plaintiffs to prove their damages and also to mitigate damages, \textit{McCulloch} is simply following the traditional view allowing the recovery of interest. Its use of the qualifying clause, “under the circumstances of this case” in the last sentence in the above quote would simply be the general caution of careful jurists to decide a case as narrowly as possible. Alternatively, if the reference to mitigation of damages could be deemed to allow a defendant to reduce recoverable interest damages by any earnings received by the plaintiff on the tax underpayment, then this is very similar to the type of recovery obtained in \textit{Ronson} or by \textit{Streber’s} interest differential

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{McCulloch} was decided about seven weeks before \textit{Ronson}. Also none of the subsequent cases treat \textit{McCulloch} as belonging to the third view.

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{McCulloch}, 971 P.2d at 419.
approach.\textsuperscript{133} Since there was no third view extant yet, this second alternative seems remote. So, I assume, ultimately, \textit{McCulloch} probably is simply another case following the traditional view, though, perhaps, a precursor of the third view to come. However, because of the possibility that \textit{McCulloch} is not simply adopting the traditional view, I have not directly added Oregon to the list of majority view jurisdictions.

Just to confuse things a bit further, in \textit{King v. Deutsche Bank AG},\textsuperscript{134} the federal district court for the district of Oregon simply adopted the \textit{Streber} interest differential, third view.\textsuperscript{135} There is no indication in the case, however, that the court was declaring Oregon law. \textit{McCulloch} is not even cited in the opinion and none of the five cases cited by the court in this small portion of the opinion is from Oregon.\textsuperscript{136} I, therefore, believe the court in \textit{King} adopted the \textit{Streber} approach as its rule of law and was not addressing Oregon’s position.

Before leaving the traditional view discussion, a brief caveat about Florida and North Carolina. Both of these were included among the states following the traditional view based on the cases cited above. There is some language in \textit{Loftin v. KPMG LLP},\textsuperscript{137} which might suggest the court viewed these states as belonging in the no-interest view. This conclusion seems remote, though, and would be inconsistent

\textsuperscript{133} In \textit{O’Bryan}, supra the Supreme Court of South Dakota’s discussion of \textit{McCulloch} is ambiguous, and could almost be read to mean that \textit{McCulloch} belongs in the newer third view. \textit{Id.} 717 N.W. 2d at 637-38. However, the court in one string cite includes with \textit{McCulloch} a reference to \textit{Ronson}, clearly belonging in the third, intermediate view, but also references to Jobe v. International Ins. Co., 933 F. Supp. 844 (D. Ariz. 1995), Dail v. Adamson, 570 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991), and Wynn v. Estate of Holmes, 815 P. 2d 1231 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991) the latter three belonging to the traditional view allowing interest. \textit{Id.} at 637. Amato v. KPMG LLP cites this discussion in \textit{O’Bryan} with seeming approval. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 at *16-17 (M.D. Pa. 2006).

\textsuperscript{134} 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11317 (D. Or. 2005).

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id.} at *110.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Id.} at *108-10.

\textsuperscript{137} 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
with the cases noted above. I, therefore, believe it is appropriate to include Florida and North Carolina among the states as following the traditional view.

*Loftin* involved a plaintiff who was put into two ineffective tax shelters. His return for the earlier year was audited and the primary defendant, KPMG, encouraged him to settle. While pursuing a settlement agreement with IRS, the plaintiff sued the defendants for damages based on various causes of action including fraud and malpractice.\(^{138}\) In this case the court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss since there were no damages yet and the case was therefore premature.\(^{139}\) The state law claims involved were governed by either Florida or North Carolina law. The court did not decide which law governed since it held both laws were the same with respect to the issues involved.\(^{140}\) After holding the plaintiffs’ claim for fraud and negligent misrepresentation were premature, the court added “[i]n deed if Loftin’s settlement payments amount to nothing more than payment for . . . interest, he will not have suffered an injury.”\(^{141}\) Later, with regard to one of plaintiff’s malpractice claims, the court held it was premature “for the same reasons the rest of his state law claims are premature.”\(^{142}\) If this latter quote can be deemed to also incorporate by reference the court’s earlier observation that simply paying interest is not damages to the plaintiff, the court is putting Florida and North Carolina in the no-interest view. However, this would seem to be reading too much into a general reference that the malpractice claim is also premature. Accordingly, I have ignored this possibility, and counted both states among traditional states allowing the recovery of interest.

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\(^{138}\) *Id.* at *3-9.

\(^{139}\) *Id.* at *29.

\(^{140}\) *Id.* at *22 n.4.

\(^{141}\) *Id.* at *24.

\(^{142}\) *Id.* at *29.
**No Interest View**

The no interest view developed between 1986 and 1996 in four states—Alaska, California, New York and Washington. In California the law was declared by a federal district court. While it briefly appeared this view may have picked up two new adherents—Massachusetts and Nebraska-- this turned out not to be the case. Currently, these four states, and the original cases in which they adopted the view, are still cited as the only followers of this view.

Except for New York, there have not been any notable developments in the other three states following this view. In Alaska, the no-interest view was promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1986 in *Orsini v. Bratten*. There was some language in *Thomas v. Cleary*, a 1989 decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, which was read by some out-of-state courts as being consistent with the traditional view allowing the recovery of interest. However, several years later, in a case

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147 As was noted in the text, supra text accompanying notes 137-142, Loftin v. KPMG LLP, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26909 (S. D. Fla. 2003) might possibly be read to state that Florida and North Carolina also follow this view. However, this is ignored herein because such an interpretation seems quite strained and there are cases in each state putting them in the traditional view allowing the recovery of interest. See e.g., *Jones v. Childers*, No. 88-85-CIV-T-22C, 1992 WL 300845 at *12 (M.D. Fla. 1992), aff’d and rev’d on other grounds, 18 F.3d 899 (11th Cir. 1994); Estate of Smith v. Underwood, 487 S.E.2d 807, 817 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
149 See infra text accompany notes 178-188.
150 See e.g., *Frank*, supra, 749 N.W.2d at 451; *Amato*, supra, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15-16; O’Bryan, supra*, 717 N.W.2d at 636-37.
151 *Supra* note 143.
152 768 P.2d 1090, 1094 n.10 (Alaska 1989).
involving a breach of fiduciary claim against an estate’s personal representative,\textsuperscript{154} the Alaska Supreme Court held interest was not recoverable, based on \textit{Orsini}. \textit{Thomas} was never even cited in the court’s brief focus on this issue.\textsuperscript{155}

In both California and Washington, recent cases reaffirmed adherence to the no-interest view based on \textit{stare decisis}, and without any reexamination of the issues and without any reference to the recent emergence of the intermediate, third view.\textsuperscript{156} Both \textit{Fallon} and \textit{Malone} were decided in federal district courts, not in state courts. In Washington, \textit{Malone} simply followed \textit{Leendertsen}, even to the extent of repeating its erroneous statement that the no-interest view is the majority view.\textsuperscript{157}

New York adopted the no-interest view in \textit{Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko & Casey}.\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Alpert} is still recognized as the New York position both inside\textsuperscript{159} and outside\textsuperscript{160} of New York. The reasoning of \textit{Alpert} is that the payment of interest is not damages but simply a payment for the use of money during a period of time the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and further, if interest were awarded as damages the plaintiff would have a windfall of having both the use of the money and recovering the interest thereon.\textsuperscript{161} Approximately two years after \textit{Alpert} another panel of the

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.} at 856.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Malone}, \textit{id.} 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461 at *50.
\textsuperscript{158} 559 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (1st Dept 1990).
\textsuperscript{161} 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
same First Department that decided *Alpert* decided *Jaimie Towers Housing Co. v. Lucas*\(^{162}\) which seems fundamentally inconsistent with *Alpert*.

In *Jaimie Towers* the plaintiff, a residential housing cooperative, incurred over $470,000 in interest when its managing agent failed to timely pay real estate taxes for the 1991/1992 tax year. In this suit the plaintiff was seeking to recover the interest from its former managing agent and its former accountant. The lower court dismissed the complaint on defendants’ summary judgment motion based upon *Alpert*.\(^{163}\) The First Department reversed, holding *Alpert* inapposite. The First Department’s analysis, in its entirety follows:\(^{164}\)

> Here, however, plaintiff, allegedly through no fault of its own, was unnecessarily caused to pay $472,043 in interest to the City due to its managing agent’s failure to timely pay certain real estate taxes for the 1991/1992 tax year. As such, the recovery of such interest as an element of its damages would not constitute an impermissible windfall or put plaintiff in a “better position” than it was in prior to its managing agent’s alleged misfeasance . . . and it should be entitled to prove such damages, if any. Those would ordinarily be measured not by the difference in interest rates charged by the City and the IRS, but by the actual amount of interest and late charges paid to the City due to the alleged misfeasance, subject to any offset of the actual income derived from the funds in question during the relevant period of time. (citation omitted).

It is very difficult to understand why *Alpert* is distinguishable. In both situations the plaintiff ended up retaining possession of money it was not entitled to. In *Jaimie Towers* it was due to the error of the managing agent in not paying real estate taxes.

\(^{162}\) 745 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1st Dept. 2002).
\(^{163}\) *Id.* at 533.
\(^{164}\) *Id.* at 533-34.
taxes. In *Alpert* it was due to the error of the tax advisor in advising the plaintiff that he had legitimate tax reductions. In both situations the plaintiff had use of the money until the error was discovered and the money repaid. Yet in *Jaimie Towers* the First Department held the recovery of interest was not an *impermissible* windfall, while in *Alpert* it held it would be.\textsuperscript{165} The cases may differ since in *Alpert* the plaintiff intentionally sought the tax shelter and intentionally utilized it and paid less taxes than otherwise would have been payable, while in *Jaimie Towers* the underpayment arose inadvertently due to an error. Also, *Alpert* involved underpayment of income taxes while *Jaimie Towers* involved underpayment of city real estate taxes. However, these seem to be distinctions without differences, since in both instances the end result is the same: the plaintiff had use of a sum of money to which he or it was not entitled.

Despite the fact that *Jaimie Towers* seems to be fundamentally inconsistent with *Alpert*, many later cases simply cite *Alpert* for the no-recovery-of interest proposition and never even bother to cite *Jaimie Towers*.\textsuperscript{166} While some cases do address the existence of *Jaimie Towers*,\textsuperscript{167} and attempt to distinguish it, their reasons for distinguishing it do not seem compelling. For instance, in *Thies v. Bryan Cave LLP*,\textsuperscript{168} a case involving a suit against two law firms that gave opinions with respect to investments in an ineffective tax shelter, the court distinguished *Jaimie Towers* because

\textsuperscript{165} In *Jaimie Towers* the measure of damages adopted by the court was that of the intermediate, third view, \textit{i.e.}, the difference between the interest paid reduced by the actual income derived from the money during the relevant time. \textit{Id.} at 534.


\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Id.}
in *Thies* the plaintiffs intentionally decided not to pay the taxes in question.\(^{169}\) I fail to comprehend any difference in final result if the retained funds were obtained due to an oversight – forgetting to pay real estate taxes—or to intentionally, and in good faith, relying on an attorney’s advice that a tax reduction was valid.

Similarly, in *Shalam v. KPMG LLP*,\(^{170}\) which also involved a suit against a tax advisor for advice to invest in a bad tax shelter, the First Department held interest was not recoverable per *Alpert*. The court held that *Jaimie Towers* (and also *Ronson*) were distinguishable because they involved “negligence by an accountant or other agent resulting in exposure to liability that would not have been incurred, ‘but for their accountant’s negligence.’”\(^{171}\) Again, if paying interest for the use of funds one is not entitled to does not constitute damages, why does the circumstance of how the funds were obtained matter? Also, the lower court in *Shalam* seems to have decided that *Alpert* governed rather *Jaimie Towers* because the facts of *Shalam* and *Alpert* were more analogous, because each involved a bad tax shelter.\(^{172}\)

In *Apple Bank for Savings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP*,\(^{173}\) a trial court within the First Department followed *Jaimie Towers* and had a very original and novel interpretation of what *Alpert* stood for. In *Apple Bank* the issue before the court involved whether the defendant accounting firm gave the plaintiff bank incorrect advice concerning the tax consequences of how the bank redeemed stock from the estate of its sole shareholder. The case arose on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

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\(^{169}\) *Id.* at *5*.

\(^{170}\) 843 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dept. 2007).

\(^{171}\) *Id.* at 19.

\(^{172}\) 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2380 at *40-41* (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2006).

One of the grounds asserted for dismissal was that under *Alpert* any interest incurred by the bank was not recoverable. The court, however, denied the motion for summary judgment and read *Alpert* very narrowly to prevent the recovery of interest only where the plaintiff inevitably would have incurred the tax liability even if the plaintiff had not relied on the faulty tax advice. “However, if the tax liability would have been avoided but for the erroneous advice, it appears that . . . interest would be recoverable in order to make the plaintiff whole.” As authority for this proposition the court cited *Jaimie Towers* and *Penner v. Hoffberg Oberfest Burger & Berger*. *Penner*, however, is a very short opinion in which the court’s entire focus on the recovery of interest (and back taxes) was to uphold the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action “since plaintiff’s tax liability was not attributable, to an act or omission on defendants’ part.” This hardly seems an adequate basis for such a dramatic narrowing of *Alpert* from simply holding there is never any recovery of interest in such situations.

While *Apple Bank* is the most recent exposition of *Alpert*, (a) it is a lower court holding, (b) *Penner* seems to be very weak, if any, authority, and (c) in light of the history of invisibility of *Jaimie Towers*, it is unclear how strong the *Jaimie Towers* precedent is. Accordingly, it is impossible to assess the strength of *Apple Bank*. Only time will tell if *Apple Bank* has successfully narrowed the scope of *Alpert*.

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174 *Id.* at *1-3.
175 *Id.* at *18-19. The court’s holding also applied to the recoverability of additional taxes caused by the defendant’s negligent advice.
176 *Id.* The court actually cited *Penner* first as a parenthetical.
177 *Supra*, 755 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
Before concluding the discussion of the no interest view, brief focus should be given to the fact that at some point in time it appeared as if both Nebraska and Massachusetts might have adopted the minority view, but in both instances this, at best, was transient. In *J.D. Warehouse v. Lutz & Co.*\(^{178}\) the Nebraska Supreme Court indicated that the district court below had expressly held that interest paid to the IRS was not a proper element of damages for reasons that paralleled those of the minority view.\(^{179}\) The Supreme Court of Nebraska, however, never focused on this part of the lower court’s opinion. What, if anything, could be made of this is now moot, since in *Frank v. Lockwood*, \(^{180}\) the Nebraska Supreme Court placed Nebraska squarely in the intermediate, third view.\(^{181}\)

The situation in Massachusetts is somewhat analogous to that of Nebraska, though the court that seemingly adopted the minority view was the local federal district court rather than a state court. Also, the portion of the opinion addressing this issue is so internally inconsistent and erroneous that its validity is questionable. *Sorenson v. H&R Block, Inc.*, \(^{182}\) involved an accusation by plaintiff that one of the defendant’s employees reported his suspicions to the IRS that the plaintiff planned to file fraudulent 1993 income tax returns before the returns were actually filed.\(^{183}\) Virtually all of plaintiff’s claims for damages were dismissed except for a limited breach of contract claim that H&R Block did not keep his tax information confidential and a rather technical violation of the Massachusetts False and Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

\(^{178}\) 639 N.W.2d 88 (Neb. 2002).
\(^{179}\) *Id.* at 92.
\(^{180}\) 749 N.W.2d 443 (2008).
\(^{181}\) See *supra* text accompanying notes 60-78.

\(^{183}\) *Id.* at *2-3.
Total damages of only $630 were awarded. Any statements by the court concerning tort damages recoverable were probably, therefore, dicta, at best.

In Sorenson, the federal district court combined its discussion of the possibility of recovering additional taxes, interest and penalties. As to interest and penalties, the court stated that the Massachusetts courts had not addressed the issue and that the weight of authority followed the no interest recovery rule of Alpert. The court then stated that Eckert Cold Storage, Inc. v. Behl reached the opposite conclusion based on California law, but Eckert nevertheless acknowledged that Alpert represented the majority view. While Eckert and Alpert reached different results as to the recovery of additional taxes caused by the negligence of a tax advisor, both follow the no-interest view and the court was simply wrong when it stated they differed with respect to the recoverability of interest. Also, the recovery of penalties caused by a negligent tax advisor is very different from the treatment of interest on a tax underpayment. With regard to penalties, there is no issue of plaintiff having had use of the money or any windfall type of concern. Any penalties incurred are out-of-pocket damages and clearly recoverable.

Without belaboring any further the authoritativeness of Sorenson on this issue, it should be noted that in Miller v. Volk the Massachusetts Appeals Court adopted the intermediate third view, thus removing Massachusetts from the no interest camp, even assuming Sorenson placed Massachusetts there to begin with.

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185 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18689 at *45-46.
186 See e.g. Frank, supra, 749 N.W.2d at 454-55; Blumberg v. Altman, supra, 841 N.Y.S.2d at 818. See generally, Tax Malpractice Damages, supra note 1, 61 Tax Law. at 731.
188 Id. at 582.
Intermediate Third View

Most of the cases following the intermediate, third view have been discussed previously in Part II of this article. Thus, New Jersey, Texas, South Dakota, Pennsylvania and Nebraska adhere to this view, as pronounced in Ronson, Streber, O’Bryan, Amato and Frank, respectively. Ronson and Amato were decided by the local federal district courts. Streber was decided by the Fifth Circuit, while O’Bryan and Frank were decided by the Supreme Courts of South Dakota and Nebraska, respectively. While South Dakota seemed favorably inclined towards Ronson’s approach of awarding the plaintiff interest and imposing the burden on the defendant to show special benefits to the plaintiff, in O’Bryan the South Dakota Supreme Court declined to adopt the Ronson approach but left that issue for a later day. O’Bryan, supra 717 N.W.2d at 640.

While both Amato and the majority in Frank placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish any interest damages, neither adopted the Streber interest differential approach. Amato did this by silence, while Frank, explicitly left this for another day.

In Miller v. Volk the Appeals Court of Massachusetts seems to have summarily adopted the intermediate view without any express focus on the issues. In holding that no proof of actionable damages existed as a result of claimed negligent tax advice, the court pointed to the fact that “no proof was offered that the interest paid to the IRS on the deficiency exceeded the value to the plaintiffs of having use of the

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189 See supra text accompanying notes 27-84.
190 Ronson’s articulation of New Jersey law was followed by Carroll v. LeBouef, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P. 392 F. Supp. 2d 621, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
191 O’Bryan, supra 717 N.W.2d at 640.
192 Amato, supra, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57091 at *18. Amato did place the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show damages but it never referred to Streber. Id.
193 Frank, supra, 749 N.W.2d at 454.
money in the meantime.” The court, thus, appears to also place the burden of proof on the plaintiff.

Seippel v. Jenkens & Gilchrist involved a suit by an investor in a bad tax shelter to recover various damages incurred. With respect to interest the federal district court for the Southern District of New York held that Virginia law governed. The court further held that Virginia courts had not directly addressed this issue. Based on Virginia’s approach to the “benefits rule,” the court held Virginia would award interest paid by the plaintiff as damages, but permit the defendant to establish that a special benefit has been conferred upon the plaintiff that ought to be considered in mitigation. In short, that Virginia would follow the same approach as New Jersey, as articulated in Ronson.

In King v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Oregon federal district court adopted the Streber interest differential approach. While the court did take note of the arguments of the parties and cited various cases on point, the court rather summarily adopted the Streber approach. This is troubling since the court did not indicate if it was simply adopting this view for itself, or if this somehow was meant to reflect the law in Oregon. It seems almost impossible to assume this was intended as a statement of Oregon law, since (a) the court never indicated it was so intended, and (b) the court never even cited the McCulloch opinion of the Oregon Court of Appeals that contained a very thoughtful and careful analysis of the issues. In light of this, it seems that King should be read

195 Id. at 582.
197 Id. at 384-85.
199 Id. at *110.
200 Id. at *108-10.
201 See supra, text accompanying notes 126-133.
as adopting the *Streber* approach only for the federal district court for Oregon and nothing more.
**Conclusion and Tally**

The following table summarizes the conclusions reached in this part.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>States Following:</th>
<th>Traditional View</th>
<th>No-Interest Recovery View</th>
<th>Intermediate View-Depends on Facts and Circumstances</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
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This table is intended solely as a current snapshot\(^{202}\) and only as a very general guide. Cases may lend themselves to different interpretations and changes may always occur. The only thing that seems reasonably certain is that the traditional view allowing the recovery of interest is, and probably always was, the majority view.\(^{203}\) The no interest view is clearly a minority view – even if the two transient adherents\(^{204}\) are taken into account. Any statement in certain cases that this view is, or ever was, the

\(^{202}\) As of late June, 2009.

\(^{203}\) Although there was no intermediate, third view recognized yet and although the list of specific states following the traditional view is a bit different, an authority in 2000 counted fourteen states, (actually thirteen if a state counted twice is eliminated) as allowing a recovery of interest and the same four states as not allowing the recovery of interest. Caroline Rule, *supra* note 18, 92 J. Tax’n at 177-78.

\(^{204}\) See the discussion of Nebraska and Massachusetts, *supra* text accompanying notes 178-88.
majority view seems incorrect. The intermediate, third view seems to be growing and today has more adherents than the minority, no interest view.

PART IV: REFLECTIONS ON THE THREE VIEWS

The development of the law on the recoverability of interest on a tax underpayment as damages is a wonderful case study of how law evolves. First came the traditional, majority view that such interest is recoverable as a simple application of traditional tort damage principles. Since the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff to incur such interest costs, the costs were recoverable as damages under traditional doctrine. Over time, the injustice, or potential injustice, that such an absolute rule could create, became apparent. The spectre of awarding interest damages to a plaintiff who had use of the unpaid tax money caused the no-interest-recovery view to be born. This view dealt with the problem by adopting the exact opposite of the traditional approach and absolutely prohibited the recovery of such interest. While this certainly remedied the problem of possible unjust enrichment of a plaintiff who had both the use of the tax underpayment and who also recovered the interest paid for the use of such money, it created a different type of injustice – i.e., what about the plaintiff who did not earn as much on the money in his possession as the interest charged by the government? These concerns, in turn, spurred the development of the modern, intermediate third view that eschewed absolutes and attempted to apply more precise justice by permitting the recovery of interest but only when, and to the extent, appropriate. While this latter view split into two different approaches as to how to cure the perceived problem – either by (1) presuming interest is not generally recoverable
but by permitting a meritorious plaintiff to prove otherwise, or (2) presuming interest is generally recoverable but permitting the defendant to show a special benefit to the plaintiff—both approaches seem to effectively deal with the problems wrought by both predecessor views.

In contemplating the three views, the intermediate, third approach clearly seems to be best. It eschews both extreme, absolute views and permits awarding damages based on the particular circumstances of the particular litigants before the court. This seems to be widely recognized because, as developed in Parts II and III above, since the *Ronson* case in 2000, no court unconstrained by precedent has adopted either the traditional, majority view or the minority view but, instead, has adopted some form of the intermediate, third view.205 It, therefore, clearly deserves the appellation of the “modern” view.

While it might be nice if jurisdictions following the traditional and minority views would change and adopt the modern view, I am not certain if this is necessary for the traditional view jurisdictions. The reason for this is that most jurisdictions – perhaps even all – impose upon plaintiffs a duty to mitigate their damages.206 If these jurisdictions would simply treat any earnings received (or, perhaps, receivable,) by a plaintiff on tax underpayments as mitigating any interest damages otherwise recoverable by plaintiff, the result would be virtually the same as under the modern view. There would be no need to change their jurisprudence. As indicated previously, this might be exactly what Oregon did in *McCulloch*.207

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205 See *supra* text accompanying notes 27-90.
207 See *supra* text accompanying notes 85-87, and 126-33.
With respect to the minority, no-interest view, I believe the situation is different. It certainly should not be adopted by any jurisdiction having no law on point. I also would urge that it should be replaced by the modern view in those four jurisdictions that follow it. My reasons for this are twofold. First, I believe, this view was totally supplanted by the modern view and simply has run out of steam. It originated in 1986 in Alaska in *Orsini*. \(^{208}\) New York adopted it in 1990 in *Alpert* \(^{209}\) and it was adopted in 1996 in California and Washington. \(^{210}\) Although it may have gained two temporary adherents, \(^{211}\) today it is still followed in only these same four states. While recent cases in these jurisdictions continue to follow it based on *stare decisis* principles, \(^{212}\) it has gathered no new adherents since then. In addition, it may be showing signs of beginning to erode in New York based on the recent *Apple Bank* decision that seems to follow *Jaimie Towers* and the modern view. \(^{213}\)

The second reason why I believe the minority view should be replaced is that it is based on a very weak foundation that appears to be flawed. The minority view is based on two legs: a logical argument and some sparse precedent. The basic logical argument of the minority view is that it is unfair to award interest paid on a tax underpayment as damages since the plaintiff had use of the money and, presumably, was able to earn interest on it while holding it. This reason (and no precedent) was articulated first in *Orsini* \(^{214}\) and was repeated by each of the other cases adopting this

\(^{208}\) *Supra*, 713 P.2d 791 (Alaska, 1996).
\(^{209}\) *Supra*, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dept. 1990).
\(^{211}\) See discussion of Nebraska and Massachusetts, *supra* text accompanying notes 178-88.
\(^{212}\) See *supra* text accompanying notes 156-7, and 159.
\(^{213}\) See *supra* text accompanying notes 173-77.
\(^{214}\) *Supra*, 713 P.2d at 794.
view.\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Alpert} also added the windfall articulation of this same argument, \textit{i. e.}, that if interest were awarded, a plaintiff would have a windfall of having had both the use of the money and the interest recovery as well.\textsuperscript{216} Both of these points have been successfully refuted by the modern view which notes that the underlying tacit assumption of the minority view is that the value of the use of the money to the plaintiff is always exactly equal to the interest charged by the government for the tax underpayment. This is belied, according to the modern view, by the fact that a plaintiff may not have any available funds to invest so there are no earnings to offset the interest payment.\textsuperscript{217} Additionally, even if the plaintiff does have funds available, he or she might not be able to earn as high a rate of return as the interest charged by the government. Finally, the minority view also ignores the hardship to a plaintiff who must make an unexpected payment which may not have been budgeted.\textsuperscript{218}

As for the two possible additional reasons for the minority view suggested by \textit{Leendertsen}, \textit{i. e.}, (1) that “damages from poor investing are too speculative to blame upon defendants” and that since plaintiffs decide where to invest, their exercise of this independent judgment somehow breaks the proximate causation link between the negligence and the damages; and (2) the difficulty in proving where the money was invested,\textsuperscript{219} they have not been adopted by any other court.\textsuperscript{220} The reason for this presumably is the same as the reason articulated by the Oregon Court of Appeals in

\textsuperscript{215} See e.g., \textit{Alpert}, supra, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315; \textit{Eckert Cold Storage, Inc.}, supra, 943 F.Supp. at 1235; \textit{Leendertsen}, supra, 916 P.2d at 451.
\textsuperscript{216} Id.
\textsuperscript{217} See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
\textsuperscript{218} Id.
\textsuperscript{219} See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
\textsuperscript{220} In \textit{Malone v. Clark Nuber}, P.S., Case No. C07-2046 RSL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48461 (W.D. Wash. 6/23/08) the court did follow \textit{Leendertsen} as establishing Washington’s position on this issue. \textit{Id.} at *50.
when it gave short shrift to these arguments by noting that these were exactly the types of issues normally left to the finder of fact to resolve. As to the precedent upon which the minority view is based, it is sparse and distinguishable. Orsini, the first case to articulate the minority view did so in only a few lines of text based solely on the use-of-the-money rationale without citing any precedent. Alpert, the second case to adopt the minority view cited only two cases, Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture and Cowart v. Lang. Freschi, involved a defrauded tax shelter investor seeking recovery under the federal securities law and for common law fraud. Freschi, however, based its entire analysis of the issue of the recoverability of interest on the same use-of-the-money rationale as Orsini and Alpert. It never cited any other precedent. When Eckert and Leendertsen adopted the minority view, apart from the use-of-the-money rationale, they relied only upon Orsini, Alpert, two subsequent cases from Alaska and New York that simply followed Orsini and Alpert, and Stone v. Kirk, and In re Securities Group 1980. Both of these latter cases involved securities fraud causes of action and both recognized that Freschi established only that in securities fraud cases and in other fraud cases interest is

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221 See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
223 298 N.Y.S. 875 (4th Dept. 1937).
224 767 F.2d at 1046. There was also a claim for legal malpractice for which the jury awarded damages of $440,000. However, the trial judge granted the defendants judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this claim, id., and this was not an issue on appeal. See also id. at 1051.
225 Id. at 1051.
227 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993).
228 124 B.R. 875 (Bkrtcy M.D. Fla. 1991).
not recoverable. The reason being that the only damages recoverable in such situations are either out-of-pocket damages or rescission or rescissory damages which permit only a recovery of the plaintiff’s net actual losses. The following excerpts from Stone v. Kirk illustrate both the nature and limitations of damages for securities fraud violations as well as the reversion to the “use of the money rationale” when holding interest on a tax underpayment is not recoverable: 229

The correct measure of damages in cases arising under §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is generally held to be an “out-of-pocket” measure.

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But in some circumstances, at least, it appears that the plaintiff in a §10(b)/Rule 10b-5 case may elect to obtain rescissory damages in lieu of out-of-pocket damages. . .

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Out-of-pocket damages, the alternative to rescissory damages, are not expectancy damages. “The difference between the value of what [the defrauded investor] got and what it was represented he would be getting” is not the measure; out-of-pocket damages are limited to “the excess of what he paid over the value of what he got. . . .”

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The Stones are not entitled to recover as damages the taxes they had to pay. . . They did not expect to have to pay such taxes, to be sure, but expectancy damages – damages designed to give the plaintiff the benefit of his bargain – are simply not recoverable under the federal securities laws.

Neither are the Stones entitled to recover the interest they had to pay on their back taxes, at least insofar as the IRS charged a market rate of interest. The Stones had the use of the tax money, of course, until the money was belatedly turned over to the IRS. (citations omitted).

None of the foregoing federal securities law cases hold interest is not recoverable as damages in a negligence cause of action. Similarly, Cowart v. Lang was

229 Supra, 8 F.3d at 1092-93.
a fraud case in which the measure of damages was for fraud, not for negligence.\(^{230}\)

Thus, in summary, all of cases adopting the minority view essentially either directly relied on the use-of-the-money rationale, or did so indirectly by relying on *Freschi* (or cases that rely on *Freschi*) or earlier minority view cases which also rely on the same rationale. Also, all of the non-minority view cases cited as precedent involve fraud causes of action in which the measure of damages is very different from the negligence measure of damages. In fraud situations the measure of damages is designed to only recover the net out-of-pocket loss suffered by the plaintiff while in negligence causes of action expectancy or benefit-of-the-bargain damages are typically available.\(^{231}\)

**PART V: CONCLUSION**

Presently, there are three views concerning the recovery of interest on a tax underpayment caused by a tax advisor’s negligence. The traditional view, which is still the majority view, permits the recovery of such interest. A minority view absolutely prohibits the recovery of such interest. The modern, intermediate view permits the recovery of such interest but only when the interest paid the government exceeds the earnings the plaintiff was able to realize from the use of the underpaid taxes. There are two approaches utilized by the modern view to achieve its goal. Some adherents of the modern view impose the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show the earnings on the tax underpayment were less than the interest paid the government. Other adherents permit a recovery of the full interest paid the government, subject to reduction if the

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\(^{230}\) *Supra*, 298 N.Y.S. at 875.

defendant is able to prove the plaintiff received some special benefit, i.e., earnings, on
the tax underpayment.

The development of the three views seems to be a good example of how the
common law evolves. First came the traditional view that simply applied traditional
common law conceptions of damages recoverable on account of negligence to the
recovery of such interest damages. Since the interest would not have been incurred but
for the defendant’s negligence, the interest charges were recoverable according to
traditional principles. The minority view sensed the injustice of the traditional view
since it overcompensated plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, although incurring the interest cost to
the government, did have the use of the money, so, according to the minority view, the
interest payment did not really represent any loss or damages to plaintiffs. The
minority view adopted an approach exactly opposite the traditional view, and
absolutely refused to treat such interest as recoverable damages. In response to the
traditional and minority views, modern cases analyzed the underlying factual situation
more carefully and realized that both extreme views had the potential for injustice – i.e.,
to either overcompensate (i.e., the traditional view) or undercompensate (i.e. the
minority view) plaintiffs – so they adopted a much more precise manner of treating
such interest payments by awarding or not awarding interest as damages depending on
the actual earnings generated by this particular plaintiff with the underpaid tax funds.

Today, the modern view seems most just since it is very precise in awarding
damages, thereby avoiding the problems inherent in the other views. While, ideally,
each of the other views ought to be changed and the modern view adopted, the
traditional view could accomplish this same result without necessarily changing its

232 See *supra* text accompanying notes 105-06.
jurisprudence. This could be accomplished in one of two ways. First, the traditional
view could simply refine its definition of such interest damages by looking to net
interest damages incurred by a plaintiff, i.e., by reducing the gross interest paid to the
government by the earnings realized by the plaintiff on the use of the underpaid taxes,
and only awarding the net amount as damages. The second way would be for the
traditional view to treat any interest earned\textsuperscript{233} by the plaintiff as mitigating the
defendant’s damages, thus arriving at the same net interest award as actually suffered
by each particular plaintiff. This latter approach may in fact be what the \textit{McCulloch}
case did right before the birth of the modern view.\textsuperscript{234}

Unfortunately, in my view, the minority view has no similar means to adapt,
and it should be abrogated and replaced by one of the branches of the modern view.\textsuperscript{235}
Ultimately, the minority view rests its position on the logical argument that such
interest paid to a government is not damages since the plaintiff had the offsetting use of
the funds.\textsuperscript{236} However, the modern view has effectively countered this argument by
noting that the minority’s argument only works where the interest earned by a plaintiff
on the use of the funds exactly equals the interest charged by the government. This
precise equality may occur only very rarely. Similarly the few cases cited by the

\textsuperscript{233} An argument could be made that not only the actual earnings realized by a plaintiff from the tax
underpayment should be taken into account, but also potential earnings. For instance, if a plaintiff takes a
tax underpayment and places it in a non-interest bearing checking account rather than in an interest bearing
account for no apparent reason, perhaps the potential earnings should also reduce or mitigate any
recoverable interest. Calculating such potential earnings, however, may present difficult issues.
\textsuperscript{234} See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 85-87, and 126-33.
\textsuperscript{235} The branch of the modern view that seems closest to the minority view is the one that places the burden
of proving the existence of an interest differential on the plaintiff. This view seems to start from the
proposition that generally interest paid a government is not damages since plaintiff had use of the funds. If
a plaintiff seeks to assert there were damages, the burden of proof is on plaintiff.
\textsuperscript{236} The second rationale often given for the minority view – that if interest were awarded as damages a
plaintiff would have a windfall of having both the use of the money and recovering the interest thereon—is
really the same as the use-of-the-money reason. See \textit{Alpert, supra} 559 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
minority view as authority are either other cases that previously adopted the minority view, cases from minority view states that simply follow the minority view under principles of stare decisis, or federal securities law cases that either directly or indirectly rely upon the same use-of-the-money rationale. Also, almost all cases cited as support for the minority view (other than cases that previously adopted the minority view or simply followed it as stare decisis) are either federal securities fraud cases and one civil fraud case in which the measure of damages is very different from the traditional negligence measure of damages. The measure of damages in these situations is simply rescission or rescissory damages which seek to make good any out-of-pocket losses suffered by the plaintiff. The measure of damages for negligence is broader and includes compensation for expectancy or benefit of the bargain.

The final evidence that the minority view has outlived its usefulness and ought to be replaced by the modern view is that today it is still followed in only the same four states in which it was initially adopted between 1986 and 1996. Although it may have gained temporary adherents in two other states – Nebraska and Massachusetts – it has not developed any following at all. Contrariwise, the modern view is now followed in seven states and the federal district court in Oregon.

Since the development of the modern view in 1999-2000 in Ronson and Streber all jurisdictions outside the four minority view states that have examined the issue have adopted one of the two branches of the minority view. Also, in the jurisdiction with the

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237 See generally, supra Part IV.
238 Id.
239 See generally, supra Part III.
240 Id.
most relevant cases, New York, it may be that cracks are beginning to appear in
adherence to the minority view.\textsuperscript{241}

With due respect to William Shakespeare, it seems that now is the time both to
praise the minority view – for changing continued blind adherence to the traditional
approach of simply treating such interest as damages – and then to bury it in favor of
the modern, more temperate, and more just, view.

\textsuperscript{241} See supra text accompanying notes 158-77.