A US$35 Million 'Hole in the Ground': Metropolitan Fragmentation and Cleveland's Unbuilt Downtown Subway

J. Mark Souther
A US$35 Million “Hole in the Ground”: Metropolitan Fragmentation and Cleveland’s Unbuilt Downtown Subway

J. Mark Souther

Abstract
In the 1940s–1950s, Cleveland, Ohio, transit officials and a varied coalition of allies sought to construct a subway to distribute riders throughout downtown. Through two unsuccessful campaigns in the 1950s, the subway planning debate highlights the gradual erosion of downtown’s preeminence and corresponding rise of suburbia. It also sheds light on interest-based rifts within the downtown business establishment and across the social landscape of metropolitan Cleveland. More than transit history, the author argues, the mid-century Cleveland subway battles afford a close look at friction between influential leaders and ordinary citizens as well as competing place-based visions of the metropolitan future.

Keywords
Cleveland, decentralization, downtown, class politics, rapid transit, suburbs, subways

Eight days before Christmas, 1959, Cleveland Development Foundation (CDF) president Upshur Evans admitted he was “in a very un-Christmas mood.” In a letter to real estate executive and Cleveland City Planning Commission member Horton Hampton at his Florida winter home, Evans lamented the state of downtown Cleveland. A protracted debate over the feasibility of constructing a downtown subway had just drawn to a close, leaving the plan’s fate in the hands of three county commissioners. As Evans confided to Hampton, he believed the subway stood little chance because of “deliberate lies” by County Engineer Albert S. (Bert) Porter and “fratricidal” warring between competing downtown merchants. The subway fight had split CDF’s board of directors “right down the middle,” leading it to withhold endorsement of the plan. Worse, the subway issue was coming to a head soon after two other setbacks for the city’s business establishment: voters’ defeat of a subsidy for a planned 1,000-room convention hotel and a charter amendment to lay the foundation for metropolitan government. These setbacks, Evans wrote, had forced him to talk a dispirited Chamber of Commerce president Curtis Lee Smith and CDF chairman Thomas F. Patton out of resigning their respective posts.

1 Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA

Corresponding Author:
J. Mark Souther, 2121 Euclid Avenue, RT 1310, Cleveland, OH 44115, USA.
Email: m.souther@csuohio.edu
Evans’s letter reflected his frustration after watching seven years of acrimonious debate over a transit project intended to ward off downtown decline and promote orderly metropolitan growth. Approved by Cuyahoga County voters by a two-to-one margin in 1953, the subway plan subsequently endured relentless attacks by the county engineer, a man whose strong preference for freeways led at least one observer to liken him to Robert Moses. Although subway proponents attempted to cast him as the sole source of opposition, Porter tapped a well of metropolitan rifts between downtown and outlying neighborhoods and suburbs, and within the downtown business establishment. Scholars have scarcely examined the 1950s downtown Cleveland subway fights and have seldom traced the role of mass transit planning as a component of campaigns to bolster American downtowns. Moreover, few historians have explored the contours of postwar urban mass transit in the context of metropolitan fragmentation. This article argues that Cleveland’s subway fight was that city’s first major response to the impact of decentralization on downtown and that it provides a prism through which one can see the clash of competing visions of the metropolitan future.

**Transit Modernization Planning, 1905–1955**

The idea of a subway in Cleveland dates at least to 1905, when a citizens committee appointed by Mayor Tom L. Johnson studied a subway proposal. One year after New York’s subway system opened, the committee ruled that Cleveland did not need a similar system. A second attempt in 1919–1920 failed when put to a municipal vote because many Clevelanders viewed a transit system as a giveaway to suburbanites, the beginning of a rift that would widen later. When Cleveland railroad barons Mantis J. and Oris P. Van Sweringen financed the mammoth Cleveland Union Terminal in the 1920s, they envisioned a system of rapid-rail spokes radiating from the central hub deep into the surrounding borderlands (see Figure 1). After their early success in establishing a dedicated surface rail line between the Terminal and their nationally renowned planned suburb of Shaker Heights, however, the brothers fell into financial straits in the 1930s, leaving their metropolitan vision on the drawing board.

Subway planning resumed in the early 1940s. In 1942, the City of Cleveland purchased the Cleveland Railway Company, which operated all surface transit lines in the city. To administer the system, the city government formed the Cleveland Transit System (CTS). Its formation paralleled the institution of both municipal and metropolitan planning bodies. Cleveland leaders, like their counterparts in other cities, undertook postwar planning to try to ensure orderly growth, preserve downtown as the metropolitan hub, and arrest the spread of blight. In 1942, the City Planning Commission replaced the Progressive-era City Plan Commission, gaining expanded powers and a professional staff charged with producing Cleveland’s first comprehensive plan. The following year, Mayor Frank J. Lausche also appointed a twenty-seven-member executive committee to set up the Postwar Planning Council of Greater Cleveland. Unfortunately, the former had no authority to plan beyond the city limits, while the latter had no policy-making mandate. Likewise, although transportation was a metropolitan issue, it would labor under a transit agency with no powers beyond Cleveland proper. In 1943, Walter J. McCarter, the first general manager of CTS, drafted a postwar transit modernization program that proposed using existing railroad rights of way to eliminate surface streetcars inside the city limits. The centerpiece and costliest aspect of McCarter’s plan was a downtown subway loop to distribute rapid transit passengers beyond the single Terminal station. It reflected a time when transit ridership was reaching its peak as a result of wartime rationing and peak industrial employment, enabling farebox collections to keep CTS’s bonded debt remarkably low—favorable circumstances for expansion.

The so-called McCarter Loop was only a starting point. Impressed with its plans for a US$51 million subway and rapid transit system in Toronto, CTS officials retained Charles E. DeLeuwen’s Chicago planning firm DeLeuwen, Cather and Company in 1945 to study Cleveland’s transportation
needs. Citing his fear that the resumption of the automobile’s ascent portended a closing window of opportunity to advance rapid transit, DeLeuw recommended moving forward expeditiously with a single US$22.5 million rapid transit line using the Nickel Plate Railroad right of way from West 110th Street through the Cleveland Union Terminal to Windermere Street in East Cleveland. Rather than a loop, DeLeuw proposed a hook-like subway that passed beneath Huron Road and East 14th Street before continuing on the Nickel Plate tracks, nearly halving the cost of the McCarter plan.10 The DeLeuw-Cather Hook won the support of the CTS’s transit advisory committee in an 11-2 vote. Reflecting a concern that would later prove a driving force behind building a downtown subway, the motion to approve the plan came from Jay Iglauer, vice president of Halle Brothers Company (Halle’s) department store, located on Euclid Avenue one half mile east of the Terminal. Iglauer, whose store stood to benefit from the distribution of riders, issued the motion “in confidence that the City Council will carry out the entire program, including the subway.”11

Not everyone was sold on transit modernization. Reacting to the McCarter plan in 1945, Ward 5 councilman Henry W. Speeth of the westside neighborhood of Clark-Fulton told members of the transportation panel of the Metropolitan Cleveland Development Council (formerly the Postwar Planning Council of Greater Cleveland) that he was “frightened” about spending so much for “a hole in the ground.”12 After registering a dissenting vote in the 11-2 approval of the DeLeuw plan,
City Council President Michael M. Lucak of Ward 28 frowned upon DeLeuw’s neglect of a south-east rapid line and declared himself against the downtown subway, an early glimpse of a position that became a major obstacle to a subway. A few months later, American Federation of Labor (AFL) Teamsters District Council Vice President John Rohrich, who shared Lucak’s preference for prioritizing improved transit service to Cleveland’s outlying working-class ethnic neighborhoods over the luxury of a downtown subway, castigated the DeLeuw plan as “class legislation” because it would run transit on the Nickel Plate, which passed through the sparsely populated floodplains of the Cuyahoga River and its tributary, Kingsbury Run. Suggesting that the system favored suburbanites bound for downtown, Rohrich said it ignored the needs of “the 480,000 industrial workers of Cleveland bound from their homes to factories.” A *Plain Dealer* editorial disagreed, pointing out that more than half of the metropolitan area’s workforce were factory workers and arguing that rapid transit would not only facilitate downtown access but also save people throughout Greater Cleveland from the burdens of traffic congestion and funding costly freeways with their tax dollars. Thus, soon after its conception, postwar transit modernization provoked debate over whether it was an unfair perquisite of downtown interests or an indispensable part of metropolitan progress.

In 1947, the Metropolitan Cleveland Development Council dissolved, leaving behind only its transportation panel, which affiliated with the Cleveland Automobile Club and continued its push for transit modernization. In 1949, a charter amendment for the DeLeuw plan for a rapid line on railroad rights of way appeared on the October 4 primary ballot. Prior to the election, advertising executive and Public Square Association spokesman William Ganson Rose told a group of business and civic leaders that “[t]he proposed rapid transit . . . would prevent Cleveland from rotting at the core.” Yet, not all downtown leaders were convinced. CTS’s plan to eliminate approximately 700 daily bus trips on express routes from downtown to funnel more riders onto its planned rapid transit line alarmed the Euclid Avenue Association, which represented Playhouse Square interests. Located three-fourths of a mile from the Cleveland Union Terminal, the district’s several theaters and large department stores would face a disadvantage if eastside suburban transit traffic bypassed Euclid Avenue on the Nickel Plate to the south. To secure a united front of support among downtown leaders, the Public Square Association persuaded a reluctant Euclid Avenue Association to back the rapid in 1949 by promising its support for a subway in the future. Regardless of how downtown leaders felt, just days before the vote, promoters made clear that the rapid was “only the first step” and that a subway would come in the future. About 54 percent of Cleveland voters approved the amendment.

Having secured funds to build the east–west rapid line, by 1952 CTS revisited the need for a subway to distribute passengers throughout downtown. It argued that, by improving access to downtown, a subway would reduce traffic congestion, enable downtown growth, and augment the tax duplicate. CTS also maintained that it was the necessary hub to support suburban rapid extensions. Unable to fund a subway out of the farebox and fearful of pitching a bond issue to city voters, who had stymied the 1919 plan, the transit service worked with Robert J. Shoup, former CTS general counsel and head of the Cleveland Automobile Club’s transportation subcommittee, to draft a bill to allow Ohio counties to operate transportation systems. Both houses of the Ohio General Assembly voted unanimously for the measure, making possible a bond referendum.

In the summer of 1953, Bert Porter set forth his objections to a downtown subway. He claimed it would destabilize the watery sand beneath downtown buildings. If it did not wreck downtown, it would surely prove more expensive than anticipated. Beyond the infeasibility of the subway, Porter insisted it would be an unfair subsidy by taxpayers for a service few would use. Nonetheless, the subway plan garnered endorsements from a wide range of opinion shapers, including all three major daily newspapers, Mayor Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Chamber of Commerce, Regional Planning Commission, Citizens League of Greater Cleveland, Cleveland League of Women Voters, and Halle’s department store. *Cleveland News* reporter Harry Christiansen called the subway
Cleveland’s version of the “Chicago Loop” and implied that, in enabling far more people to go downtown without driving, it would cause home values to soar countywide. On the eve of the election, Halle’s used its usual second-page Plain Dealer fashion ad to urge support of the bond issue. Aiming at “Cleveland homemakers,” Halle’s noted the subway’s benefit for women shoppers and connected it to increasing home values and “a prosperous, progressive community.”

In November 1953, 65 percent of Cuyahoga County voters approved the US$35 million downtown subway bond issue. All three daily newspapers lent editorial support before and after the referendum and portrayed the subway as a progressive solution to the problems of access to downtown and circulation within it. Yet, the aggregate vote hid the fact that certain areas strongly supported the subway, while others were more divided or even against it. Unlike in Toronto, whose newly opened Yonge Street Subway was financed entirely from fare-box revenues, the Cleveland subway would rely on Cuyahoga County taxpayers. The Cleveland Press reported that Ward 14 in southeastern Cleveland, “which consistently opposes bond issues and levies,” was the lone ward among thirty-three to reject the bond issue—by a single percentage point. The Press did not report that Ward 14 comprised the heavily working-class Polish and Czech neighborhoods of Warszawa and Karlin with their above-average proportion of homeowners. Position statements by some city councilmen suggested that many residents of other so-called cosmopolitan wards or nationality wards felt little enthusiasm for the subway. In contrast, in the majority–African American neighborhoods of Cleveland’s east side, there is no evidence of particular opposition. It may be that these neighborhoods, which included most of the city’s highest proportions of renters, saw little threat in supporting a project whose debt service would not saddle them with property tax increases.

In the suburbs, support for the subway appears to have been correlated with the affluence of residents. Shaker Heights, the toniest of Cleveland suburbs, which anticipated direct benefits from the subway due to its large number of apartments and existing transit connection to the Terminal, registered a remarkable 75 percent in favor. Similarly, in the eastern suburb of Cleveland Heights and western suburb of Lakewood, large contingents of affluent homeowners and renters probably explain respective votes of 71 and 72 percent for the subway. Dotted with the more modest, owner-occupied homes of working-class voters, the northeastern suburb of Euclid and southwestern suburb of Parma recorded less impressive victories of 52 and 59 percent. Similarly, the bond issue failed with only 48 and 47 percent of the vote in the southeastern suburbs of Garfield Heights and Maple Heights, both working-class communities whose access to the subway, like that of Euclid and Parma, depended on future extensions of CTS service.

The affirmative vote never guaranteed the subway’s construction. Rather, it approved the issuance of bonds provided that responsible authorities deemed the project feasible. In the meantime, the Ohio Supreme Court spent much of 1954 and 1955 deliberating the legality of allowing the county to fund a subway that a municipal entity would have to operate. Once the court ruled in favor of the subway, the county board of commissioners hired three firms—Praeger-Kavanagh of New York, Richard Hawley Cutting & Associates of Cleveland, and Charles E. DeLeuw of Chicago—to study the subway’s feasibility. While the consultants were preparing their report, the thirteen-mile east–west rapid transit made its first complete run between West 117th Street and Windermere on August 15, 1955.

The First Subway Battle, 1956–1957

The Praeger–Cutting–DeLeuw report, delivered to Porter early in 1956, drew upon Federal Reserve Board data that found that downtown department store sales volume in 1954 remained at 103 percent of the volume in 1949, suggesting that Cleveland’s core was still strong. It projected that the McCarter low-level route, which would tunnel through bedrock as much as sixty feet beneath downtown, would cost nearly US$50 million. Instead, the report recommended the Superior–East 13th–Huron
Subway, a high-level loop that it claimed could be built for just over US$30 million, comfortably within budget (see Figures 2 and 3). In Porter’s response, he used keen debating skill and engineering knowledge to establish himself as an unimpeachable expert who knew best what transportation policy was right for Cleveland. In doing so, he cleverly employed a populist rhetoric that appealed to the tax-averse, individualist mentality of Cleveland’s large contingent of white ethnic working-class homeowners in both its outlying neighborhoods and inner-ring suburbs.

In Porter’s forty-nine-page report to the county commissioners in March 1957, he attempted to dismantle proponents’ arguments for a downtown subway. Porter dismissed the subway as a “hole in the ground,” echoing a statement more than a decade earlier by Henry W. Speeth, who was now one of the three county commissioners who would have to render final judgment on the subway bonds. Porter painted the subway as too expensive, disruptive, and ineffective. He questioned the consultants’ price tag for the high-level subway and set forth his own estimate of US$38,107,000, considerably more than the bond issue. He claimed that the so-called cut-and-cover method of building high-level subways would require not only great expense but also the cessation of utility service, which he said might force many downtown merchants out of business (see Figure 4). He raised the specter of exhausting funds while the streets were uncovered, forcing the county to beg more money from taxpayers. More fundamentally, Porter characterized mass transit as a relic ill suited to modern transportation needs. He pointed to first-year rapid transit ridership that fell well

---

**Figure 2.** The Superior–East 13th–Huron Subway, patterned after the McCarter wartime subway plan, would have run westside trains through the Terminal and thence counterclockwise around the loop and back to their western origin. Eastside trains would have entered the Terminal and then proceeded clockwise around the loop before returning to their eastern origin. Passengers wishing to change directions would have done so at the Euclid–East 13th Station, where double-decked tubes facilitated pedestrian transfers. The Terminal itself would have served only the Shaker Rapid, with its low-platform cars, which would have been incompatible with the subway’s high-level platforms. *Source:* Praeger-Kavanagh, Richard Hawley Cutting & Associates, and Charles E. DeLeuw, *Cleveland Subway, Operating and Engineering Feasibility* (Cleveland: Board of County Commissioners, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1955), 17.
short of projections, noting that DeLeuw’s prediction that suburban bus lines would cease operation or become feeder lines to outlying rapid stations had failed to materialize. The rapid, he claimed, was a failure, just as subways and rapid transit systems in many other places had failed. Porter’s anti-subway report anticipated the accelerated tilt of population, industry, and commerce to the suburbs in the 1960s and 1970s. In one of his most revealing moments of pandering to residents of outlying neighborhoods and suburbs, he averred that downtown Cleveland was destined to become just another business district, “a local service center for adjacent residential areas such as St. Clair, Superior, Wade Park and Hough and Cedar, Central, Scovill, Woodland, etc. from East 30th Street to East 105th Street,” one that Porter implied would become a place of necessity for an impoverished and largely black inner-city population rather than a destination of choice.31

It is tempting to tell the story of the subway fight as a one-man crusade by the Robert Moses of Cleveland to deliver Clevelanders from the yoke of mass transit to a promised land traversed by freeways. Indeed, Porter cast himself as the spokesman for an anti-subway Silent Majority, and the staunchly pro-subway Cleveland Press devoted scores of articles and editorials to vilifying Porter. Yet, such a narrative obscures the influence of those who shared and amplified Porter’s message and denies the ability of citizens to weigh the pros and cons of the subway as they came to possess additional information. It also confines the subway debate to the annals of transit history when, in fact, it is also a lens that draws a number of metropolitan agendas into sharper focus. The subway debate revealed clear class rifts in Greater Cleveland and intramural feuds within the downtown establishment. Sometimes these divisions also had a clear spatial dimension.

Figure 3. Platform Level, East 9th–Superior Station. Praeger–Cutting–DeLeuw recommended 400-foot-long subway platforms to accommodate eight-car CTS trains. The consultants called for escalators to a mezzanine level, at which they hoped downtown stores would open new subterranean entrances for shoppers. Source: Praeger-Kavanagh, Richard Hawley Cutting & Associates, and Charles E. DeLeuw, Cleveland Subway, Operating and Engineering Feasibility (Cleveland: Board of County Commissioners, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1955), 40.
Porter benefited from favorable articles by Wilson Hirschfeld, a Plain Dealer reporter assigned to follow the subway story soon after the passage of the bond issue. As early as 1955, Hirschfeld began to evince a personal bias against the subway, which led at least one perturbed reader to decry his “non-stop vendetta against rapid transit in general and CTS in particular.” Hirschfeld missed no opportunity to expose CTS’s shortcomings and transit failures in other cities and to discredit the Praeger–Cutting–DeLeuw report. Scarcely a week after his April 1957 article headlined “Porter Slaps CTS Bosses on Blunders,” Hirschfeld leaked an anti-subway letter written by the one of the city’s most influential men. George Gund, chairman of the Cleveland Trust Company, Cleveland’s largest bank, wrote the county commissioners on April 5 to warn against the subway, repeating Porter’s concerns about cost overruns and disruption to downtown streets and urging better accommodation of automobiles. Hirschfeld’s article about Gund, printed on April 9, came just three days after Porter ripped CTS general manager Donald C. (Don) Hyde’s support for the subway at a debate in the City Club Forum. The pro-subway Cleveland Press relegated the story of Gund’s letter to a two-inch column buried deep inside the paper next to the death notices, but Gund’s detailed and well-timed appearance on the front page of the Plain Dealer propelled his words—virtually a proxy for Porter’s argument—to hundreds of thousands of Clevelanders.
The question of whether the rapid transit system could expand throughout the metropolitan area without a downtown subway to distribute the expected increase in passengers assumed clear class dimensions as the debate heated up. Originally billed as the hub of metropolitan transit, the subway took on a life of its own in the wake of the poor initial performance of the east–west rapid. In a special report to CTS in 1956, Charles DeLeuw recommended that no major new rapid extensions be built in the near term. The main extensions, if built, would have expanded rapid transit service to the largely working-class suburbs of Brooklyn and Parma to the southwest, Garfield Heights and Maple Heights to the southeast, and Euclid to the northeast, all of which ultimately opposed a subway-first approach to transit modernization (see Figure 5).

As previously noted, Porter used class as an effective wedge in his opposition to the subway. Exploiting the insecurities of the aspiring middle class, he claimed to represent their best interests. In a speech to the Greater Cleveland Young Republican Club in April 1957, Porter discredited the subway as an expensive gamble for “a little merry-go-round of eight to 10 blocks downtown.” Implying that taxpayers would foot the bill for misguided downtown merchants who “would cut their own throats if they had [a subway],” he conjured a nightmare scenario: “There will be pile-drivers. There will be jackhammers. There will be bulldozers. They’ll take the gas lines and the water lines and the sewer lines and string ‘em in the air and on the sidewalks. They’ll cut off the telephones and the gas and the light and the water in the office buildings. Then you try to get to work. That’ll go on for three years.” Amid erupting applause, Porter exclaimed that in his fight against the
“three daily newspapers, downtown business interests, the Cleveland Transit System and City Hall,” “[t]here is no one on my side except one kind of guy, the man in the street, Joe Doakes, the guy who pays the bill.”

Porter argued that voters had no reliable information about the subway when they approved the 1953 bond issue. Armed with Porter’s litany of warnings and the knowledge that the initial rapid transit line was not meeting CTS’s projections, many Clevelanders became skeptical. Although two-thirds of Cuyahoga County voters had approved the bond issue, by April 1957, a newspaper poll conducted by a local radio station revealed that 87 percent of some 3,000 respondents now opposed the subway.

In the two months before the county commissioners’ decision on the subway issue in May 1957, Cleveland’s metropolitan fault lines were on display. Since downtown revitalization was a pillar of supporters’ argument for building a subway, the state of the central business district became highly politicized. Like many American cities, Cleveland saw downtown’s dominance as a retail center erode as suburban shopping centers capitalized on cheaper land, lower taxes, and the ability to offer ample parking—all at downtown’s expense. Yet, the question remained: Was decline inevitable? After Porter argued that automobile-friendly suburbanization meant that downtown would have to rely in the future on less mobile inner-city populations to sustain its retail trade, subway supporters tried to shift the discourse from one that focused on downtown decline to one that emphasized downtown’s residual strength and untapped potential. Don Hyde countered Porter’s dismal prediction by citing more than US$54 million in downtown projects planned or under construction. He asked why freeways and additional downtown parking should be built if downtown was truly “falling apart.”

In a statement to the county commissioners, Praeger–Cutting–DeLeuw also dismissed Porter’s claims and compared downtown Cleveland, “with its modern railroad terminal and principal adjacent streets,” to the area around Grand Central Terminal in Manhattan, where rail transit continued to support new development—fifteen skyscrapers since 1950. The consultants added that the subway’s main function was not to bring more people downtown, which would continue to grow because “Cleveland is a vigorous and growing metropolitan area.”

The debate over whether the subway would help or hurt downtown heightened a long-standing rivalry between business interests, between Public Square and East 9th, and those east of East 9th. The Euclid Avenue Association underscored its support in a unanimous vote of its trustees in advance of public hearings on the subway. Appearing on local television, Paul J. Hoover, vice president of Halle’s and a leader in the Association, insisted that downtown still merited a subway. He pointed out that, in the absence of a subway, Halle’s had offered a free express bus service to carry 750,000 shoppers between the Terminal and its store in 1956, adding that downtown stores had spent millions of dollars in improvements in recent years.

Business interests closer to Cleveland Union Terminal, in contrast, saw little to gain from a subway that, if anything, promised to diminish the singular advantage they already enjoyed at the heart of downtown. Vice President Sam Rosenberg of the May Company, a department store located on Euclid Avenue at Public Square, questioned whether better parking facilities like those recently added in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Pittsburgh would not accomplish more than a subway at far less cost. Republic Steel chairman Charles M. White echoed Porter’s call for freeways and better downtown parking. Headquartered in the Terminal, Republic Steel, along with Erie Railroad, Standard Oil Company of Ohio, and Sherwin-Williams, administered the acronymous RESS Realty, which held leases for the Terminal’s office buildings and therefore was averse to any move that might diminish the complex’s dominance. Like Republic Steel, the Higbee Company (Higbee’s) department store enjoyed a location inside the Terminal and benefited directly from its basement entrance from the transit station, which likely underlay vice president George Merrifield’s call for prioritizing rapid extensions over a subway, a move that would funnel even more shoppers into its flagship store.
Perhaps most Clevelanders erroneously assumed that downtown interests generally favored the subway, but they surely perceived the growing chasm between the central city and its outlying neighbors. As the subway debate reached a crescendo in spring 1957, the positions taken by leaders representing mostly working- and middle-class outlying neighborhoods and suburbs suggested that Porter had found a receptive audience for his professed concern about “Joe Citizen.” When the Cleveland City Council voted 27-2 against taking an official stand on the subway issue, the two dissenting councilmen hailed from adjacent wards in the heavily industrialized Collinwood neighborhood along the city’s northeastern border with Euclid, where a planned rapid transit extension now seemed a faint prospect. One of them, Ward 32 councilman John A. Fakult, argued that the council should recognize that “[p]eople are revolting against the high taxes being put on their backs.” Ward 28 councilman Joseph W. Kovach, whose Union-Miles neighborhood waited in vain for the proposed southeast rapid extension, warned of “terrible repercussions” from taxpayers if the subway were to proceed and insisted that extensions did not depend on a subway. The mayor of Solon, a town in the southeastern corner of Cuyahoga County whose voters had rejected the bond issue four years earlier, considered the subway a waste of taxpayers’ money. In Maple Heights, the would-be terminus of the shelved southeast rapid line, the city council even passed an anti-subway resolution.

Although subway supporters stirred conflict both within downtown and between downtown and the rest of the metropolitan area, ultimately they lost the battle as a result of their inability to prove that the subway was critical to the future of downtown, Greater Cleveland, and the region’s transportation needs, or that it could be built for US$35 million. With Commissioner Henry W. Speeth rigidly opposed to the subway from the outset and Commissioner Joseph F. Gorman firmly in favor, the decision rested with the third commissioner, John F. Curry. When, at Porter’s request, local utility companies produced figures on the cost of replacing subterranean infrastructure affected by construction that were nearly twice as much as those estimated in the consultants’ report, Emil H. Praeger admitted that he could not guarantee that the subway could be built for less than US$35 million. Curry told the Cleveland Press that even with a conservative interest rate on the bond, the total cost over twenty-five years would top US$48 million, saddling the average homeowner with a home assessed at US$5,000 with more than US$50 of additional taxes in the same period. Echoing Porter, and with Shaker Heights having opted out of running its separate rapid transit cars through the subway, Curry concluded that the subway, “a CTS subsidy,” would serve less than 5 percent of Cuyahoga County residents. Porter’s brother, Plain Dealer reporter Philip W. Porter, who had refrained from taking a public stance, now felt liberated to express his opinion. He wrote that the subway was not worthy of its name because it “would have been simply an extension of the CTS rapid transit terminal, a small vermiform appendix, about as useless to most car riders as the appendix is to all humans.” He wished for a “more factual, less starry-eyed and promotional, look at proposals to spend public money” and urged that new underground parking, freeways, a convention center, and hotels would be more likely to save downtown.

With the commissioners’ vote looming, leaders in the city’s growth coalition sought to delay the decision. The Chamber of Commerce released a policy statement that reiterated its stance that some form of transit distribution was critical “to preserve the downtown area.” It implored the commissioners to wait until a long-range transportation study could be completed, reminding them that the approved bonds would not expire for several more years. At the urging of the Chamber and the Citizens League of Greater Cleveland, the Metropolitan Services Commission (Metro), which was already preparing recommendations for creating a limited form of metropolitan government, agreed to undertake the study. The Plain Dealer reported that “[t]he worst that Speeth and Curry can do to the subway would be to put it to sleep—and hope no Prince Charming comes along before the spring of 1960.” However, before Metro could undertake its study, the commissioners voted down the subway 2-1 on June 6, 1957.
The Second Subway Battle, 1959

Almost exactly one year after the defeat of the loop subway, Proctor Noyes, director of the largely ineffectual Regional Planning Commission, announced a US$115 million plan for a downtown loop subway, a four-mile subway eastward to University Circle, and five rapid extensions into the suburbs. The plan drew a cold reception. Citizens League director Estal Sparlin said the plan “might be a good one for the year 2050,” when he believed Cuyahoga County would have four to five million residents, many of them apartment dwellers. In contrast, Bert Porter said the plan would be fine for the “Gay Nineties” and threatened to find out who was behind the plan, adding that the Regional Planning Commission, funded largely by the county government, was wasting taxpayers’ money. While they may have disagreed on when Cleveland was more conducive to rapid transit, the pro-freeway county engineer surely concurred with Sparlin’s insistence that government had no business interfering with people’s preference for driving their cars. In fact, however, as historian Christopher W. Wells has argued, federal subsidies—which amounted to enabling state highway departments to spend ten-cent dollars to build freeways—tipped the balance inexorably toward the automobile, making the claims of car fever a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In December 1958, Erie Railroad agreed to investigate the feasibility of making its tracks available to CTS for a southeast rapid line. Two days into the new year, the Plain Dealer declared, “Southeast Rapid to Be No. 1 Topic.” Most readers must have been surprised two months later when the paper reported that its rival, the Cleveland Press, which it did not name, had leaked the story of a new proposed subway that would run under Public Square, Euclid Avenue, and East 14th Street. The Press article was the only public indication that the downtown subway might still be alive, and the Plain Dealer cast aspersions on its rival’s revelation by quoting several CTS and city officials as having no knowledge of such a plan. CTS may well have had no knowledge because, in contrast to the 1953 plan, the 1959 subway plan originated not with transit planners concerned with reshaping metropolitan transportation patterns but instead with downtown businessmen who were beginning to feel desperate for some kind of action to reverse their declining fortunes.

Amid great uncertainty about downtown’s future, it seemed that too many Clevelanders were indifferent to its plight. The subway defeat in 1957 was only the first in a succession of failed downtown projects. In both 1957 and 1958, bond issues to fund a new convention center failed to draw the necessary 55 percent favorable vote, and now Conrad Hilton’s plan to build a major downtown hotel on the publicly owned Mall was already drawing public opposition. As in other cities in the late 1950s, Cleveland’s downtown was losing its hold on retail trade to emerging suburban shopping centers. Although its six large department stores remained in business through the decade, many smaller stores closed. In their place arose a number of savings and loan associations, airline ticket offices, and discount stores. Playhouse Square interests were particularly concerned. Located well away from the city’s transit hub, they had witnessed greater business erosion than their counterparts nearer Public Square. For decades, the city’s transit operators, at the behest of Public Square department stores, had refused merchants’ pleas to allow westside buses to pass east of what one newsmen dubbed the “Chinese Wall of Public Square.” The diversion of eastside transit riders to the Terminal in 1955 was such a blow that Halle’s had begun operating free buses to shuttle shoppers between the Terminal and its store.

Downtown leaders and transit officials not only felt an urgency to build a subway before the 1953 bond issue expired in 1960, they also saw that the window for building a transit system that could compete with rising automobile use was rapidly closing, if it had not already closed. In stark contrast to a 1953 survey by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company that found that 72 percent of downtown shoppers used public transit, a municipal cordon count in July 1958 revealed that 62 percent of Clevelanders who entered downtown for work or pleasure did so by car. With two sections of the Inner Belt Freeway scheduled to open by decade’s end, it was clear that Cleveland would soon
be connected by superhighways to its suburbs. As downtown withered and suburbs bloomed, the subway fight became even more inseparable from the campaign to bolster downtown.

Behind the scenes, the Euclid Avenue Association formed a strategy group of Playhouse Square area interests in the spring of 1959. Anticipating a renewed fight with Bert Porter, the group asked Thomas A. Burke, Cleveland’s mayor between 1945 and 1953, to serve as its legal counsel. Burke already provided legal services to Higbee’s, still a presumed opponent of the subway, so he recommended one of his associates, longtime subway advocate Robert J. Shoup. The group also understood the need to head off the resumption of what it saw as the biased reporting of Wilson Hirschfeld in the Plain Dealer, so it met with the paper’s editorial staff and persuaded it to divert him to other stories until the subway issue had run its course.

On May 21, 1959, some 1,500 civic leaders gathered for the unveiling of Downtown Cleveland—1975, the city’s first comprehensive downtown plan. Developed by the City Planning Commission in consultation with nationally prominent planners like Edmund N. Bacon, Walter H. Blucher, and James C. Downs Jr. with US$100,000 in funding from the Cleveland Foundation, Leonard C. Hanna Fund, Beaumont Foundation, and CDF, the plan proposed a modified version of the old DeLeuw-Cather Hook. Unlike the former model, which veered northward from the main trunk of the rapid to a proposed station at Prospect Avenue and East 9th Street before turning to the southwest beneath Huron Road to enter the Cleveland Union Terminal, the new recommended route took a northward turn to Euclid Avenue with stations under East 14th and East 9th streets and Public Square. Reimagining Euclid Avenue in the rubric of a shopping mall anchored by department stores on each end, the master plan presented the subway, which one city planner later remarked was “the key to the downtown plan,” as “giving cohesion” to Euclid Avenue by “inducing shoppers” to traverse the three-fifths of a mile between Public Square and Playhouse Square—a significant departure from the earlier aim of simply distributing transit riders throughout downtown.

The City Planning Commission’s strong support for the subway, however, was merely a hurdle in a race to approve the subway before the bond issue lapsed. The Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners still held the final say on whether funds could be encumbered. Since the 1957 subway defeat, Commissioner Joseph Gorman had retired and been replaced by Frank M. Gorman (of no relation). Then, following a brief illness, Commissioner John Curry died. With Gorman favoring the subway and Speeth firmly opposed, attention turned to Curry’s successor, William Patrick (Pat) Day, whose vote would likely be decisive.

The 1959 subway battle also resurrected and amplified the same arguments that marked the 1956–1957 battle. Could the subway be built for US$35 million and safely dug in what some called “quicksand?” Would it alleviate traffic congestion, serve transportation needs better than freeways alone, and boost downtown or, in Porter’s words, make Euclid Avenue “look like the Battle of the Marne” for three years? Would it catalyze completion of the rapid transit system or become a bottleneck? And would it ease the tax burden by building up downtown values or prove a millstone around taxpayers’ necks? However, the 1959 battle differed in that many more elected officials took public stances of opposition. The debate, which played out alongside a concurrent effort to move Cuyahoga County toward a metropolitan form of government, offers an ideal opportunity to see why the prospect for metropolitan unity was so dim.

The latest subway plan garnered endorsements from the same organizations that supported the previous plan: the Euclid Avenue Association, Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Realty Interests, Cleveland League of Women Voters, Building Owners and Managers Association, and Cleveland Automobile Club. The Plain Dealer, which had turned against the subway in 1957, now rejoined the ranks of supporters. Among elected officials, only Mayor Celebrezze and his counterparts in Lakewood and Cleveland Heights declared their support. Conversely, at least fourteen of the thirty-three city councilmen and twenty-six of the thirty-one Cuyahoga County mayors revealed their opposition in the local press.
Concerns about downtown found fuller public expression in the 1959 subway fight because observers had watched the central business district’s slippage since the mid-1950s. Even before the opening of the region’s first shopping malls, the ten largest outlying shopping centers together nearly equalled the number of retail stores in downtown, suggesting that the late 1950s were pivotal. Commission Gorman stated “that something must be done for downtown Cleveland before it dies. We can’t just sit around and watch it rot.” Representing the Euclid Avenue Association, Timothy W. (Tim) Grogan, who owned the Hanna Building at Euclid and East 14th and many other downtown properties, argued that property owners faced mounting difficulties in keeping tenants in Playhouse Square because they wanted to be closer to the Terminal or ample free parking in the suburbs. Grogan cited several examples of downtown difficulties: the departure of most physicians’ offices, the replacement of a shoe store next to the Stillman Theatre by a government agency, the conversion of Halle’s Huron Road annex into a parking garage, and the steadily declining revenues of another shoe store in the Euclid Arcade that had led it to demand a reduced rent. He lamented that Euclid Avenue, Cleveland’s “best street,” was “now taking in discount houses in desperation to fill ... vacancies.” Members of the Euclid Avenue Association worked every angle to try to win public favor for the subway. As Grogan and other Playhouse Square leaders testified before the county commissioners, Sterling–Lindner–Davis, in a departure from the lavish Christmas window displays for which Euclid Avenue department stores were widely known, allocated one of its windows to a scale model of the subway with a continuous-loop narration.

Downtown interests so dominated the pro-subway discourse that some subway backers felt the need to try to recenter public attention on the project’s metropolitan virtues. Don Hyde characterized the subway as a leg of a rapid transit system that would encourage further expansion into the suburbs, thereby emphasizing the subway’s metropolitan import over its boon to downtown merchants. Likewise, after a Collinwood resident wrote a letter complaining that the subway would simply go “in a circle like a puppy dog chasing its tail,” the Cleveland Press tried to accentuate the subway as the key to future rapid extensions (see Figure 6). Harry Jacobson, a Euclid Avenue merchant, made an impassioned plea to save retailers but also insisted that if downtown property values (which he said amounted to 22 percent of the city’s tax duplicate and 12 percent of the county’s) were not preserved, the tax burden would increase in outlying areas. Beyond the subway’s transportation and tax benefits, at least one proponent pointed to its potential to combat deindustrialization. Federation of Realty Interests President Henry DuLaurence averred that it was critical to revive downtown, which he called “the showroom of the City of Cleveland.” With industries already beginning to flee the city, having a subway as one more enticement to corporate investors might well pay dividends in the form of industrial expansion.

To an even greater extent than in the mid-1950s, the 1959 subway battle revealed especial hostility in working-class wards. Diverging from the Plain Dealer’s editorial support of the subway—and from his own restraint two years before—reporter Philip Porter dismissed the subway as “no subway like New York’s or Toronto’s” but rather “an extended underground loading zone for the CTS rapid transit” that would serve only five blocks on Euclid Avenue. Like his brother, Porter knew how manipulate the sentiments of Clevelanders who already felt squeezed. Playing the politics of class, he chastised Playhouse Square merchants for “favor[ing] any proposal no matter how nebulous to bring potential customers to their front doors,” especially when “other people would be paying for it.” Allowing that downtown businesses also paid taxes, Porter insisted that most would pay for something that would not serve them: “The homeowners in Parma and Euclid and Rocky River, etc., the industries in Brook Park and Cleveland and Bedford, etc., the apartment owners all over would be paying most of it.”

Politicians understood their constituents’ predilections. Mayor Kenneth J. Sims of Euclid, who favored rapid extensions over the subway, argued that the northeastern corner of Cuyahoga County had its own issue: how to move 20,000 people daily in and out of Euclid’s factories. As was true in
the earlier subway battle, the most combative stance toward the subway arose in the working-class neighborhoods and suburbs well to the southwest and southeast of downtown. Speaking at Komensky Hall, a Czech social club in the eastside Mount Pleasant neighborhood, Republican mayoral candidate Tom Ireland promised that his election would “guarantee the subway will be halted at once.” Arguing that the blue-collar taxpayers in Ward 13 already paid too much and could not afford what he was sure would be a huge cost overrun, Councilman Ralph J. Perk, himself the son of a Czech-born garment worker, conjured the specter of spending tens of millions of dollars, only to “be left with nothing but a hole in the ground.” In his appeal to a neighborhood in which most residents were immigrants and their sons and daughters, Perk called instead for extending rapid transit service to southeast Cleveland and the suburbs beyond while resubmitting the subway bond issue to voters. He also vowed to stall the subway in City Council, whose consent would be needed to allow city streets to be excavated. Ward 9 councilman Norbert G. Dennerll Jr. of the Old Brooklyn neighborhood along Cleveland’s southwestern border with Parma also called the subway a “hole in the ground” that would cost steel workers in his ward far more than downtown stores would pay. Dennerll spoke of a Lone Ranger episode in which the protagonist, in order to save Tonto from sinking into quicksand, had to surrender his weapons to bandits to obtain a twig to pull Tonto to safety. The councilman, who also favored southward rapid extensions, likened this situation to the subway fight, in which county taxpayers had to pay CTS to save downtown merchants. Councilman Leonard P. Franks of Ward 14 said many elderly pensioners in his ward were overtaxed and deserved another chance to vote. Anthony Pecyk, Kovach’s successor in Ward 28, called the subway an unnecessary tax burden that would “benefit a small number of people.” He urged rapid extensions to suburban Parma and Solon instead. Not only the city’s working-class wards but also its suburbs staked out negative positions toward the project, with twenty-six of the thirty-one mayors going on record against the subway. By the time of the public hearings, city councils in suburban Solon and three working-class suburbs—Maple Heights, Brooklyn Heights, and Parma—had adopted anti-subway resolutions.
These complaints reflected a growing public rebuke of the subway idea. A woman from the Miles Park neighborhood adjacent to Garfield Heights echoed Councilman Pecyk in a letter to the *Plain Dealer* in which she averred that the subway would not attract her downtown but would burden those who were “already hurting plenty.” To make his point that thousands of Cleveland workers suffered long waits on crosstown bus routes, one subway opponent told of an experiment in which he endured a six-and-a-half-hour-long nighttime round trip of just about three miles on the city’s east side. Unionist John Rohrich, who had detected classist dimensions of CTS’s transit modernization efforts as early as the 1940s, agreed, pointing to the lack of rapid service that forced “thousands of west side people” to drive to Thompson Products in Euclid and “thousands that live out there” to make an equally long trek to their Ford and Chevy jobs in Brook Park. Only days before the hearings, the *Plain Dealer* had reported that more than 95 percent of letters to the editor, most never published, were hostile to the subway.

Just as the very notion of a subway continued to pit outlying areas against downtown, the subway’s route exacerbated intramural feuding within downtown. In the earlier subway fight, the hook route, though less costly, was deemed less attractive than the loop because it would not distribute riders through as much of downtown. Although the hook now appeared preferable because of its lower price tag and direct boost to the city’s main shopping street, its new route worsened the divisions between downtown merchants. Halle’s and other Playhouse Square businesses strongly favored the Euclid Avenue route. The May Company, which had seen little to gain from the loop subway, now favored the 1959 route because it offered a separate central station under Public Square across the street from the department store. Higbee’s, which stood to lose the most if CTS abandoned the Terminal in favor of Public Square, strongly opposed the Euclid Avenue subway. Fearing another crippling defeat in an already battered downtown, Curtis Lee Smith and Upshur Evans tried to engineer a compromise that would enable all downtown department stores to support the subway. They visited Higbee’s president John P. Murphy to ask him to support the earlier DeLeuw-Cather Hook, which would adjust the route from Euclid Avenue to Huron Road and preserve the Terminal as the primary downtown station (see Figure 7). As Smith later recalled, Murphy might have been inclined to compromise, but ultimately, with “30,000 people dumped into his basement, who was he to encourage a change?” Not only did Smith and Evans’s compromise fail, it also angered the May Company, whose legal counsel administered the Beaumont Foundation, one of the sponsors of the downtown plan. Combined with the fact that CDF’s chairman, Republic Steel president Thomas F. Patton, understood the losses RESS Realty would incur if the rapid were rerouted under Public Square, the failed compromise effectively forced CDF to withhold further advocacy for the subway.

The 1959 subway hearings, like those in 1957, exposed deep class fissures across the metropolitan geography of Cuyahoga County, but they also displayed far more clearly that in spite of dire warnings about the fragile state of downtown, the subway also further divided the downtown establishment. After an early round of pro-subway testimonies lined up by the Euclid Avenue Association, anti-subway downtown interests got their opportunity. Thomas J. McDowell, vice president of RESS Realty, recalled when the Cleveland Union Terminal had invited widespread consensus that Cleveland was far ahead of other cities in its transit situation. In what was in part a veil for his company’s own interest in protecting its investments, he then argued that it was nonsensical to call for moving the rapid out of the Terminal and making people walk 500 feet to a new station under Public Square. Likewise, John P. Murphy of Higbee’s stated his belief that a subway was unneeded but if ever built should take advantage of the Van Sweringens’s original underground stub for a subway beneath Huron Road. Downtown decline became less useful to subway supporters than to detractors, who painted the tube as unnecessary in light of what they characterized as an ineluctable drift to the suburbs. Although Tim Grogan insisted that downtown retained a special appeal, particularly for women, because it offered a superior selection of merchandise that no suburban store could match, it
Figure 7. The East 14th–Huron Subway plan, a slightly modified update of the DeLeuw–Cather Hook, was considered on the eve of the first subway fight but abandoned because promoters understood that it would achieve a less robust distribution of riders throughout downtown Cleveland. When the City Planning Commission modified the plan in 1959 to run the subway under Euclid Avenue instead of Huron Road, it threatened to remove Higbee’s department store’s singular advantage—its entrance from the Terminal station—by creating a new station under Public Square. Source: Praeger-Kavanagh, Richard Hawley Cutting & Associates, and Charles E. DeLeuw, Cleveland Subway, Operating and Engineering Feasibility (Cleveland: Board of County Commissioners, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1955), 21.

was difficult to explain why fewer suburban housewives were engaging in the downtown shopping ritual. Questioning downtown merchants’ claim that a subway would reduce street congestion, one downtown attorney argued that, apart from rush hour or the Christmas shopping frenzy, Euclid Avenue was if anything too sparsely populated with cars and pedestrians. “The trouble with Euclid Avenue,” he said, “is that it looks dead. You want people on Euclid Avenue and you are going to hide them down in this little tunnel.” John Rohrich agreed. Speaking of a pro-subway editorial cartoon in the Cleveland Press cartoon showing a snarl of downtown traffic, he said, “There ain’t a person in this room [who] ever saw a jam of cars like they showed in that cartoon. . . . After 6:30 at night, you walk along Euclid, [and] you will hear the echo over in Jewish town [Glenville, a historically Jewish neighborhood five miles away].” A commercial realtor concurred, arguing that the Terminal rapid station was nowhere near its capacity: “I could make up a ballgame in one corner and never hit anybody.”

In the subway hearings, Bert Porter turned in effect from engineer to “prosecutor, judge, and jury” as he cross-examined subway proponents. He deftly turned subway supporters’ own words
against them and exposed their every misstep as he cast the subway as both dangerous gamble and monumental waste of taxpayers’ money. In a revealing exchange with Grogan, Porter furthered his contention that downtown was declining. When Grogan cited eleven store vacancies on Euclid Avenue between Public Square and East 9th, Porter retorted that these were within the 1,200-foot limit that Grogan claimed shoppers were willing to walk. When Grogan pointed out that Halle’s had to operate its own bus service to meet the demand of shoppers going to its store, Porter responded that the existing load on the rapid was 6,000 people per hour, just one-quarter of its capacity of 24,000. When Grogan said the subway would unquestionably “save the decayed downtown,” Porter called it an unfair subsidy of downtown merchants and asked if Grogan would subsidize suburban shopping centers or parking lots for Republic Steel, Ford, Chevrolet, or other factories if they should need them in the future.98

Near the finale of the two-week-long subway hearings, Porter unleashed his most intense questioning upon Charles DeLeuw, who had come to Cleveland to defend the City Planning Commission’s recommendation of a Euclid Avenue subway route. When Porter launched a fusillade of statistics that he had tabulated from DeLeuw’s own report, DeLeuw was not nimble enough to counter his barrage. Porter made DeLeuw appear utterly incompetent. When Porter insinuated that the real reason CTS wanted to abandon the Terminal station was because it hoped to use the space for transit car storage at US$108,000 a year and get a publicly funded station under Public Square, all that a bewildered DeLeuw could say was that he had never thought of that. Commissioner Day’s anger swelled as DeLeuw mistakenly characterized Euclid and Parma, which together counted more than 140,000 residents and had nearly quadrupled in population since World War II, as too inconsequential to warrant rapid transit extensions. In exasperation, Day complained that “we can get no commitments at all as far as extensions are concerned, and yet we are asking these people to pay for a downtown subway.’’99 Then, it became clear that DeLeuw had failed to consider that with the past few years’ dramatic decline in passenger railroad service, the Cleveland Union Terminal now had ample tracks and platforms to accommodate an increase in rapid transit traffic. When DeLeuw admitted that he had never seen the CTS platforms in the Terminal, Commissioner Gorman grew very angry, which, one observer recalled, “blew the whole cap off.”100 On December 21, Day joined Speeth in voting down the subway.101 As far as the public knew, the subway supporters had simply failed to convince Day that the subway was worth his vote. However, behind the scenes, a county Democratic official allegedly worked with Public Square interests to bribe Day to vote against the subway.102 Whether or not Day accepted a bribe, the possible attempt to buy his vote may have added to his resolve not to vote for a project that stirred such visceral opposition.

Conclusion

After two defeats of the subway, downtown promoters took up new and different initiatives to try to revitalize the central business district. Less than one month after Day’s vote killed the subway, CDF unveiled Erieview, billed as the nation’s largest downtown urban renewal project and Cleveland’s answer to Rockefeller Center.103 In the ensuing decades, Cleveland boosters latched onto a succession of downtown plans and large-scale projects, none of which prevented the continued erosion of retailing and, eventually, office building occupancy. True downtown revitalization had to wait several decades until a new, upmarket residential and entertainment orientation reached a critical mass. Bert Porter won the subway fights but failed to create a freeway system on the scale he envisioned. In the most dramatic local freeway revolt, just five years after the last subway defeat, a determined group of well-connected Shaker Heights civic leaders quashed Porter’s planned freeway through the pristine Shaker Lakes in the heart of the nation’s wealthiest incorporated community.104 If much of Porter’s envisioned honeycomb of interconnected freeways never materialized, the completion of a number of superhighways, combined with a leveling off of metropolitan population by
the 1970s, created conditions that rewarded the driving habit across Greater Cleveland. The subway plan stood as a notable counterpoint to a pattern of policy-driven favoritism toward what Christopher Wells calls “car-dependent landscapes,” which had solidified as a combination of actions removed streetcars and funneled development incentives toward auto-oriented development in outlying areas in the 1930s–1950s. The failure of the subway and the regional rapid transit system it was meant to catalyze abetted a preexisting drift of retailers away from downtown and toward the suburbs, reinforced working- and middle-class Clevelanders’ growing affinity for suburban shopping, and exacerbated the spatial mismatch between workers and jobs, with the inner-city poor growing increasingly isolated despite their proximity to the urban core.

The subway idea may have failed, but it did not disappear. Later plans to use rail transit to tie together downtown attempted to blunt local opposition by tapping less immediate sources of funding from the state or federal governments. The Downtown People Mover, a planned monorail loop, fizzled when Cleveland Mayor Dennis Kucinich (who embodied the same class-based critique of downtown favoritism that marked earlier opposition to the subway) declined federal funding for the pilot project in 1977. Then, after delays in the 1980s–1990s, the Dual Hub Corridor, a combined subway and surface rail line intended to link Public Square and University Circle, morphed by the 2000s into a less expensive, federally funded bus rapid transit project dubbed the Healthline after sponsorship by the city’s two leading hospital systems along its route. Likewise, leveraging state funds, in 1996 the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority opened the Waterfront Line as an extension of the Blue and Green lines from Shaker Heights. At a time when downtown backers had all but abandoned notions of a retail-centered city center, the new line aimed to distribute riders to prop up the Flats, Cleveland’s entertainment district whose 1970s–1980s heyday was already fading. In the ongoing absence of true regional planning and metropolitan unity, however, development continued to concentrate in a few central city hot spots and on the suburban fringe as most Cleveland neighborhoods and an increasing number of inner-ring suburbs faltered.

The downtown Cleveland subway fights were a barometer of change in the relationship between cities and suburbs after mid-century. Cleveland did not enjoy the advantages of other cities that undertook new subways in the 1950s–1960s. Toronto was able to build its subway before it became too late to fight decentralization, and San Francisco and Washington, DC, relied on forward-thinking state and federal governmental action and metropolitan cooperation. Much more than a one-man crusade, Albert S. Porter’s campaign against Cleveland’s subway reflected his keen understanding of the social dynamics that accompanied metropolitan expansion and his willingness to shepherd the process rather than fight it. In older industrial cities in the Northeast and Great Lakes regions that were encircled by incorporated suburban municipalities, this relationship became more estranged as more middle-class city dwellers chased the suburban horizon.

Suburbanites dominated the downtown establishment but could not escape the problems that encouraging metropolitan expansion wrought on downtown. Nor could downtown interests summon a unified resolve to combat the results of decentralization as long as they considered their own conflicting interests first. Although it was not what those with a stake in preserving the downtown status quo wished to admit, Porter correctly concluded that sagging downtowns reflected the abandonment of cities to those whose mobility and purchasing power could not support, in Cleveland’s case, six downtown department stores with fifty-four stories of retail space. It may be that a downtown subway—especially in the absence of a robust transit system in its 1959 form—could not have stopped what Porter saw as the natural, inevitable atomization of metropolitan Cleveland, but its failure certainly conveyed a very strong public message that those with eyes turned toward suburbia need not look over their shoulders to see themselves connected to the central city or to contribute to its revitalization. In contrast to Toronto’s concurrent embrace of rapid transit, which certainly contributed to the ongoing vitality of that city’s core, the downtown Cleveland subway fights provide a revealing window into the consequences of acquiescing in metropolitan fragmentation.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes


2. Interview #436 (1960), Maurice Klain Research Papers, MS. 4219 (hereafter MK), WRHS. Klain conducted confidential interviews between 1957 and 1965. To protect confidentiality, WRHS assigned random numbers to these interviews. In cases in which interviewees or their descendants later released an interview, I cite the exact page/pages in the transcription.


4. To be sure, as others have argued, concerns about downtown stagnation predated World War II and even, to some extent, the Great Depression. See, for example, Jon C. Teaford, Rough Road and Cities of the Heartland: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Midwest (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Fogelson, Downtown, 2001; and Alison Isenberg, Downtown America: The Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). In contrast, William D. Jenkins, “Before Downtown: Cleveland, Ohio, and Urban Renewal, 1949-1958,” Journal of Urban History 27, no. 4 (May 2001): 471–96, argues that Cleveland leaders, unlike their counterparts in nearby Pittsburgh, trained their focus first on residential renewal, turning to downtown only in 1960 with the advent of the Erievew urban renewal project. Instead, I focus on the 1950s, when downtown stagnation prompted the first sustained metropolitan conversation over its future.

6. Alvin Silverman, “Ask Citizens to Help Plan Postwar City; Lausche and Civic Leaders Call on ‘Associates’ for Moral Support,” Plain Dealer, July 2, 1943, 1. In calling the new organization to action, Mayor Frank J. Lausche insisted that the “Cleveland metropolitan district must be viewed as one community” and that “the individual views of separate municipalities will have to be subordinated to the good of the whole community.” As I demonstrate in this article, metropolitan unity seldom moved beyond rhetoric.


15. Interview #344 (1961), MK.


17. Praeger-Kavanagh, Richard Hawley Cutting & Associates, and Charles E. DeLeuw, Cleveland Subway, Operating and Engineering Feasibility (Cleveland: Board of County Commissioners, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, 1955), 54; Interview 528 (1961) and Interview 344 (1961), MK.

18. Interview #443 (1960) and Interview #344 (1961), MK. Others claimed no such agreement was ever made. See Interview #534 (1960) and Allen J. Lowe interview, May 12, 1961, transcript p. 14, container 8, folder 399, MK.


28. Ibid.
32. Herbert H. Harwood, Jr., “Letter to the Editor,” Plain Dealer, January 1, 1956, 3-B.
33. Interview #443 (1960) and Interview #344 (1961), MK.
34. George Gund to Hon. John F. Curry, Hon. Joseph F. Gorman, Hon. Henry W. Speeth, April 5, 1957, box 1, folder “Correspondence,” Board of Cuyahoga County Commissioners, Proposed Subway System for Downtown Cleveland, 1953-1960 (hereafter BCCC), Cuyahoga County Archives; “Porter, Hyde Scorching on Subway Issue; County Engineer and CTS General Manager Bitter in Debate Before City Club; Battle Rages Over Transit Versus Freeways,” Plain Dealer, April 7, 1957, 1-A; Wilson Hirschfeld, “Gund Asks Weighing of Subway; Urges County to Consider Porter Objections,” Plain Dealer, April 9, 1957, 1; “Commissioners Silent on Gund’s Subway Views,” Cleveland Press, April 9, 1957, folder “Subways—Cleveland,” CPC.
38. Elizabeth Cohen, “From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community Marketplaces in Postwar America,” American Historical Review 101, no. 4 (October 1996): 1052.
42. "Halle Officer Makes Plea for Subway; Reports 750,000 Carried by Free Bus," Plain Dealer, March 27, 1957, 7.
43. Ibid. Cleveland was unusual in its degree of emphasis on rapid transit as a solution to downtown troubles. As Christopher W. Wells has argued, “plentiful parking topped most wish lists,” followed by freeways. See Wells, Car Country: An Environmental History (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 267.
46. Edwin W. Carter to Board of County Commissioners, April 25, 1957, box 1, folder “Correspondence,” BCCC.
52. Wilson Hirschfeld, “Hits Plan to Extend the Rapid; Citizens League Head Tags It Impracticable,” *Plain Dealer*, June 9, 1958, 1.
56. Murray Seeger, “Future of Civic Center Clouded,” *Plain Dealer*, November 6, 1958, 37; “If Letters to Editor Are Criteria, Then Public Opposes Mall Hotel; Ratio of Replies Has Run, By Actual Tally, Close to 95% Against the Proposal,” *Plain Dealer*, March 1, 1959, 5-B.
57. Analysis of Euclid Avenue between Public Square and East 9th Street, and between East 9th and East 17th streets in Cleveland City Directories, 1950–1958, Cleveland Public Library.
58. Interview #439 (1960), MK; Donald T. Grogan, interview by Laura Brogan, April 12, 2005, Cleveland Regional Oral History Collection, #304023, Cleveland State University.
61. Thomas A. Burke interview, February 5, 1960, transcript p. 251, container 2, folder 67, MK. Another accounts of Burke’s demurral appear in Interview #57 (1960) and Interview #439 (1960), MK. The latter account adds that Burke went to Higbee’s president John P. Murphy, who refused to release him to serve as counsel to the Euclid Avenue Association.
62. Interview #443 (1960), MK. Indeed, after writing dozens of articles about the subway and rapid transit from 1953 to 1958, Hirschfeld did not write a single article on any aspect of rapid transit between January 2 and December 22, 1959.
64. Interview #60 (n.d. [ca. 1960]), MK; “Date Set for Master Plan Parleys,” *Plain Dealer*, September 11, 1959, 7.

68. Paul Lilley, “Council Majority Seen Opposed to Subway,” Cleveland Press, December 15, 1959, folder “Subways—Cleveland,” CPC; Sanford Watzman, “Council Foes of Subway Lose Round,” Plain Dealer, December 15, 1959, 1; Melnick, “County Mayors Oppose Subway,” 1959. Tellingly, Cleveland now has only seventeen wards, barely half of the thirty-three it had in the mid-twentieth century when the municipal population stood near its peak.

69. Howard Whipple Green, A Sheet-A-Week (vol. 27, no. 45 [July 7, 1960], Cleveland State University Special Collections, Cleveland, OH).

70. “County Chiefs Ready for Talks on Subway,” 1959, folder “Subways—Cleveland,” CPC.

71. Grogan interview (2005); “Public Hearing on the Downtown Subway Before the County Commissioners,” November 30, 1959, 62, 68–71, box 1, BCCC.


75. “Public Hearing on the Downtown Subway Before the County Commissioners,” December 1, 1959, 132, box 1, BCCC.

76. Ibid., 115–16.


78. “Downtown Subway Public Hearing before the Cuyahoga County Commissioners,” December 8, 1959, 802–4, box 2, BCCC.

79. “No Subway if I’m Elected, Ireland Says,” Plain Dealer, October 10, 1959, 11.


81. “Downtown Subway Public Hearing before the Cuyahoga County Commissioners,” December 8, 1959, 759–61, 765, 768, box 2, BCCC.

82. Ibid., 789–90.


87. “Downtown Subway Public Hearing before the Cuyahoga County Commissioners,” 1959, 795–96, box 2, BCCC.


89. Curtis Lee Smith interview, August 8, 1961, transcript 32–35, 54, container 12, folders 602–3, MK; Seth Taft interview, November 21, 1959, transcript 155, container 12, folder 643, MK. Other accounts of the Smith-Evans compromise appear in Interview #396 (1962), Interview #519 (1960), and Interview #439 (1960), MK.

90. Taft interview, 156.

91. “Downtown Subway Public Hearing before the Cuyahoga County Commissioners,” December 10, 1959, 1095–96, box 2, BCCC.

92. “Downtown Subway Public Hearing before the Cuyahoga County Commissioners,” December 14, 1959, 1168–70, box 2, BCCC.

93. “Downtown Subway Public Hearing before the Cuyahoga County Commissioners,” November 30, 1959, 91–92, box 1, BCCC.
94. “Downtown Subway Public Hearing before the Cuyahoga County Commissioners,” December 9, 1959, 877–78, box 2, BCCC.
95. Ibid., 899–901.
96. Ibid., 975–76.
97. Smith interview, transcript p. 61.
98. “Public Hearing on the Downtown Subway before the County Commissioners,” November 30, 1959, 69, 83, 90, 100–102, box 1, BCCC.
100. Interview #38 (1962), MK.
102. Interview #519 (1960), Interview #129 (1962), and Interview #57 (1960), MK.
106. Joseph Rice, “Cleveland Mayor Rides Waves of Controversy,” Christian Science Monitor, January 25, 1978, 17, container 2, folder 59, Daniel J. Marshall Papers, MS. 4561, WRHS; Thomas S. Andrzejewski, “Public Transit Should Serve Neighborhoods,” Plain Dealer, June 25, 1983, 15-A; Steven Litt, “Euclid Corridor Project Helps Drive $4 Billion in Cleveland Development,” Plain Dealer, February 10, 2008, A1. The BRT system connects the Terminal (now known as Tower City Center) with Playhouse Square, Cleveland State University, Cleveland Clinic, University Hospitals, and Case Western Reserve University. Cleveland State University, which opened in 1964, might have offered a greater impetus to augment downtown rapid transit distribution, but its original design, like that of the University of Illinois Chicago Circle campus, availed itself of interstate ramps that created a seamless connection between students’ home garages and university parking lots.
107. Metropolitan Cleveland experienced a net growth of more than 500,000 people between 1950 and 1970, but the city of Cleveland declined by nearly 165,000 people in the same period. More recently, downtown living has finally started to match the levels of demand that many prognosticators too optimistically forecast for Cleveland in the 1960s, when Erieview was supposed to include 6,000 new apartment units. Indeed, downtown Cleveland experienced a 96 percent population increase between 1990 and 2010, according to a census study conducted by the Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development at Case Western Reserve University. See Richey Piiparinen, “Not Dead Yet: The Infill of Cleveland’s Urban Core,” MetroTrends, March 2012, accessed October 22, 2013, http://www.metrotrends.org/spotlight/index.cfm. Alan Ehrenhalt describes older suburbs like Cleveland Heights as lying “in the uncomfortable center of demographic inversion.” See Ehrenhalt, The Great Inversion and the Future of the American City (New York: Knopf, 2012), chap. 5.

Author Biography

J. Mark Souther is an associate professor of history at Cleveland State University. He is the author of New Orleans on Parade: Tourism and the Transformation of the Crescent City (LSU Press), as well as several articles, and is writing a book on perceptions of decline in postwar Cleveland.