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Political Globalisation and Citizenship: New Sources of Security Threats in Africa

Shola J. Omotola

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J Shola Omotola*

Abstract

This article analyses the interface between political globalization, citizenship and security threats in Africa. Political globalization is assumed to be capable of engendering inclusive citizenship; in the same way, citizenship is considered to be central to the national question in Africa. It is around citizenship that most issues of human rights revolve, both at individual and group levels. The article argues that political globalization in Africa tends to limit the meaning, essence and substance of citizenship, even if the latter is defined from a minimalist perspective of duties-rights relationships. The marginalization and/or exclusionary politics engendered by political globalization, especially for vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, women and youth on all fronts - political, economic and socio-cultural, amount to a gross violation of individual and group rights. Consequently, rather than engender inclusive citizenship predicated upon fairness, equality and social justice, the political globalization processes seem to have done otherwise, thereby perverting democratization and citizenship to become sources of security threats in Africa.

INTRODUCTION

This article is primarily concerned with political globalization, that is, all attempts at political reforms engendered by the globalization of democratic values, as well as the citizenship question vis-à-vis Africa’s security dilemmas. Although discourses on and about globalization have been

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* Currently a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria; teaches political science at Redeemer’s University, Redemption City, Mowe, Ogun State, Nigeria. His recent publications have appeared in Africa Today, Representation, African and Asian Studies, African Study Monographs, International Journal of Regional and Local Studies and Africa Insight, among others. His research interests are in comparative African democratization, oil and environmental politics, peace and conflict studies, and identity issues, including gender and ethnic minorities. He is the author of the widely circulated monograph The Next Gulf? Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalypse and Rising Tension in the Niger Delta (2006, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, South Africa). The first draft of this article was presented at the Joint International Conference on Globalization: Migration, Citizenship and Identity, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 6–9 November 2007; the author thanks the organizers for providing the platform to test the ideas expressed in this article; he also thanks participants for their useful comments. The author is, however, solely responsible for the views expressed in the article. E-mail: sholaomotola@yahoo.com.
pervasive, they appear to have been “dominated by its economic dimensions”\(^1\) which manifest themselves through liberalization of trade, finance and the unprecedented attempts to remove obstacles to the free movement of investible capital. This is not to suggest that the political dimensions of globalization, particularly with respect to political liberalization through the institutionalization of multiparty elections, rule of law and political accountability, have been totally neglected. There have been excellent scholarly outputs regarding political globalization as captured by the flourishing body of knowledge on democratization in Africa.\(^2\) These studies, to varying degrees, examine different dimensions of the political globalization process, such as electoral governance, rule of law and civil-military relations. However, these studies did not focus on the security implications of political globalization. The political globalization-security nexus is rooted in the capacity of political globalization to impact seriously on the distributive and redistributive systems of the state. This failure of the studies to consider this dimension may have resulted from a misleading assumption that political globalization is a smooth process. However, this is only so on the surface. The challenges of political globalization are daunting at all stages, including the transitional contexts, the contents of the transition and the question of consolidation in the post-transition stage. The form and character of the political globalization process at each of these stages have enormous security implications. Bayo Adekanye, a leading Nigerian expert on civil-military relations captures these complexities well when he writes:

“While the majority can agree about the horrible nature of the conditions prevailing within that initial stage of things and from which society is to transit ... and about the desirability of transiting, the question of who presides over that transition process and what methods to employ for achieving it can provoke considerable disagreements. Also, the issue of defining the \textit{terminus ad quem}, including what contents to add to get the set goal as well as its objectives, may prove difficult, and can generate its own disagreements among the relevant political actors or parties. Nor is the


post-transition stage free of such. In fact, the disagreements here can be much sharper and more intense; the issues raised here can be fundamental tending as they do to cast doubt on the wisdom of the earlier decision to be part of the process, if not also about its continuity. I am talking about issues like, ‘who bore the brunt of the struggle leading to the transition, and who came to ‘own’ the transition process and product as such?’ Or better: ‘whose transition, organized by what groups or parties, towards which ends and in whose interests?’”

This passage raises fundamental questions the answers to which are central to the direction of political globalization, whether as a positive or negative reinforcement of security. Yet, the idea that political globalization would engender inclusive citizenship in Africa is widespread. Certainly, there is no denying the centrality of citizenship to the national question in Africa, which relates to how to engineer a sustainable regime of peace and stability, democracy and development across the continent. The citizenship connection is understandable because it is around it that most issues of human rights, both at individual and group levels, revolve. This is, in turn, at the heart of conflict in Africa. According to Said Adejumobi, a leading Nigerian expert in comparative politics, the construction and nature of the state in Africa “tend toward the institutionalization of ethnic entitlements, rights and privileges, which create differentiated and unequal status of citizenship.” The result, according to him, is the tendency to de-individualize citizenship and make it more of a group phenomenon. This incapacitates the state from providing a common bond for the people through the tie of citizenship, with equal rights, privileges, and obligations in both theory and practice. As a consequence, people’s loyalties are bifurcated, leading to rising tensions and conflict. While these have been long-standing features of the state in Africa, as they are rooted in the colonial pedigree, the political globalization process, due largely to perversions as a result of its privatization and criminalization, would appear to have added new twists and turns to the problem, as this article will demonstrate.

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3 JB Adekanye From Violence to Politics: Key Issues Internationally (2001, INOORE, University of Ulster and CEPACS) at 8–9.

4 S Adejumobi “Citizenship, rights and the problem of conflicts and civil wars in Africa” (2001) 21/1 Human Rights Quarterly 148 at 148.

5 M Mamdani Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (1996 David Phillip and Princeton University Press); M Mamdani “When does a settler become a native? Reflections of the colonial roots of citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa” (text of inaugural lecture given as AC Jordan, professor of African studies, University of Cape Town, Lecture Theatre 1, Education Building Middle Campus, 13 May 1998); M Mamdani “Beyond settler and native as political identities: Overcoming the political legacy of colonialism” (paper presented at the First Conference of Intellectuals from Africa and Diaspora, Dakar, 6–9 October 2004); JS Omotola “Explaining succession and legitimacy crisis in Africa: Colonialism revisited” (2004) 20/2 Research for Development 67.
This article argues that political globalization in Africa, delineated by multipartyism, periodic and competitive elections, popular participation and representation, political rights and civil liberties, constitutionalism, etc, tends to limit the meaning, essence and substance of citizenship, even if the latter is defined from a minimalist perspective of duties-rights relationships. The marginalization, and in some cases exclusionary politics, engendered by political globalization, especially for vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, women and youth on all fronts (political, economic and socio-cultural) amount to a gross violation of individual and group rights. This largely accounts for most of the conflicts across the continent, which are most pronounced during succession. The inability of the democratization process to stop these conflicts from escalating complicates the matter. Rather than engender inclusive citizenship predicated upon fairness, equity and justice, the political globalization process seems to have done otherwise, thereby perverting democratization and citizenship to become sources of security threats in Africa.

Is the problem about political globalization itself? How do these perversions manifest themselves in Africa? What are the implications for citizenship and by extension sustainable peace, democracy and development in Africa? What can be done to remedy the situation? These are the main questions in which this article engages. It illustrates the arguments with evidence from across the continent, with its mixed basket of contradictory realities. In doing this, we treat the problem as an historical construct, rather than an “episode” in Africa’s transition.

THE CITIZENSHIP QUESTION IN AFRICA

The concept of citizenship generally connotes the condition of being a citizen, a member of a political community with prescribed rights and duties. From a sociological point of view, TH Marshall defines it as “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”

Citizenship, therefore, underlines the direction and patterns of relationships between the citizen and the political entity. These relationships, which ideally should be symbiotic, are defined in constitutional terms and are, according to Marshall, located in the political, civil, economic and social domains. The civil element comprises the rights of individual

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freedom to justice, including the right to defend and assert one's rights equally with others and by due process of law. The political element, however, deals with the right to participate in the exercise of political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The social dimension relates to the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, and to the right to share to the full in the social heritage of the society. This shows that citizenship is multidimensional, with an emphasis on the equality of individuals in terms of rights and duties.10

The African citizenship dilemma seems to be a product of the bifurcation of citizenship between individuals and groups, on the one hand, and the contradictions in the relationship between it and the state. In this connection, Mamdani makes an important distinction between what he called civic and ethnic citizenship in Africa.11 The former, according to him, is a consequence of membership of the central state and it carries mainly individual rights located in the political and civil domains. The later, however, is a result of membership in the native authority and serves as the source of a different category of rights, mainly social and economic. One of the salient features of ethnic citizenship is that the body of rights it embodies is not accessed individually but by virtue of group membership, the group being the ethnic community. The situation would appear to have been complicated in recent times by the expansion of the circumference of group rights beyond social and economic spheres to include political representation in public offices.12 Mamdani also alludes to this with respect to the Nigerian experience when he asserts that, “the effective elements of the Nigerian federation are neither territorial units called states, nor ethnic groups, but those ethnic groups that have their own states.”13 Consequently, there is often confusion in determining what should be the actual currency of citizenship for the purpose of the distribution and allocation of rights: the individual or group? Moreover, there are notable contradictions in the relationship between citizenship, be it civic or ethnic, and the state in most parts of Africa. The most notable relates to the tendency to elevate the rights components over and above duties. As such, the central political community is largely seen as an arena of rights where individuals and groups seek to benefit without necessarily contributing, if and where possible.14 The implication has

10 JS Omotola “Citizenship, group violence and governmental response: The declaration of state of emergency in Plateau state, Nigeria” in O Akinwumi, O Okpeh and J Gwanna (eds) Inter-Group Relations in Nigeria During the 19th and 20th Centuries (2006, Aboki) 749 at 751.
12 Omotola “Democratization and citizenship”, above at note 8 at 3.
13 Mamdani “Beyond settler and native as political identities”, above at note 5 at 12.
most often been negative, such that the state is overloaded with all sorts of demands and pressures without a commensurate increase in state capabilities. The inability to meet these demands, and even in some instances belated responses, explains in part the prevalence of conflicts across Africa.

The distribution of citizenship, defined as its degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness, is particularly relevant to the understanding of Africa’s citizenship dilemmas. In most parts of Africa, as in Nigeria, Liberia, South Africa, Mali, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, etc, the distribution of citizenship has tended toward the direction of exclusionary politics where vulnerable groups are treated largely as onlookers. This tendency reinforces the negative conception of citizenship as “a condition establishing formal equality or a formal recognition of inequality”\(^\text{15}\). Wherever this happens, as in most African countries, Bobson and Clarke argue, the allocation of citizenship only serves to acknowledge, legitimize and consolidate inequalities, “though in ways which yield them to the public wheel.”\(^\text{16}\) This pattern of distribution has been a major source of contradictions in the citizenship question in Africa. While studies have long recognized this trend, it has largely been interpreted mainly in ethnic terms, notably the ethnic minority question and the native-settler dichotomy. Whereas, as argued elsewhere, “a related dimension of the problem, albeit much more pronounced and profound, relates to gender identity where women have been largely marginalized in the power game of politics and decision making”.\(^\text{17}\) Yet, youth constitutes another otherwise strong constituency that suffers serious marginalization in power and politics, possibly as a result of its ascribed location on the citizenship scale, which seems to have been graduated and assumed a pyramidal structure.

Historically, the deepening contradictions of citizenship in Africa are rooted in the colonial pedigree. This is true to the extent that the contemporary African state, in its modern sense, is a colonial creation.\(^\text{18}\) Unfortunately, the creation of the colonial state was built on the bifurcation of citizenship through the creation and/or transformation of various forms of identities: economic, cultural and political. As Mamdani argues, “political identities need to be understood as a consequence of the history of state formation”.\(^\text{19}\) The bifurcation of the public/civic sphere marked the roots of the native-settler dichotomy, where the latter was without an ethnic home. Settlers were, according to Mamdani, “rootless, foot-loose, not tied to any specific territory, always trekking.”\(^\text{20}\) To make matters worse, this appellation did not only apply to “foreigners” such as the colonialist, but also to “natives” who were away from their original home, who migrated elsewhere for whatever reasons and became what

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15 Bobson and Clarke “Citizenship”, above at note 6 at 55 (emphasis added).
16 Ibid.
17 Omotola “Democratization and citizenship”, above at note 8 at 4.
19 Mamdani “Beyond settler and native as political identities”, above at note 5 at 15.
20 Mamdani “When does a settler become a native?”, above at note 5 at 2.
Mamdani called “native settlers.” As such, the distinction between the indigenous and non-indigenous ceased to be a racial issue and became ethicized. This marked the genesis of the problem. Through consistent practice over the years, it became legitimated, almost impossible for a settler to become a native. Mahmood Mamdani engaged in this critical question of when a settler becomes a native and came to the conclusion:

“There is no single answer to this question, for the answer depends on whether your vantage point is the civic or the ethnic. From the point of view of civic citizenship, it is merely a matter of time. That time period comes up for discussion every time citizenship is debated. And that time period is specified in citizenship clauses in most constitutions ... from the point of view of ethnic citizenship, however, the answer is NEVER. So long as the distinction between settler and native is written into the structure of the state, the settler becomes a citizen, but not a native. To say that is to say that the settler can be a member of the civic space, now deracialized, but not the customary space, still ethicized.”

Unfortunately, the distinction between the settler and native has been ingrained in the structure of the state in Africa and reinforced by political practices. The post-independence elites of power did not only fail to exploit the opportunities of political independence to dismantle the vestiges of colonialism, but also helped to consolidate them. This is partly what Mamdani meant when he talked about the “postcolonial dilemmas” in Africa. These include the growing tendency for indigeneity to become the litmus test for citizenship and rights in the postcolonial state, thereby turning the colonial legacy on its head but without transforming it. The second dilemma relates to the practice of the post-colonial African state to build upon this foundation and turn indigeneity into a test for justice and entitlement. The third dilemma has to do with the tendency to identify a colonially constructed regime of customary law with Africa’s authentic tradition. The bifurcation of citizenship and attendant politicization of indigeneity, therefore, remain critical issues in the outbreak, intensification and prolongation of conflicts in Africa.

Several examples abound in Africa. Nigeria offers a good laboratory for a failed experiment in citizenship and the indigeneity problem. The protracted communal conflict between the Ife and Modakeke people of south-western Nigeria is good case study. Here there have been intermittent violent escalations over the question of indigeneity in terms of ownership and control of land and the allocation of values, which have taken several lives and destroyed properties worth millions of naira. Across the whole country, native-settler controversies have repeatedly led to outbreaks of violence, as was the case between the Yoruba natives and Hausa settlers of

21 Id at 3.
22 Mamdani “Beyond settler and native as political identities”, above at note 5 at 9.
western Nigeria in Ibadan, Lagos and Shagamu. The situation is no different in the middle belt, particularly between the Tiv and Jukun of Benue state and between the Berom natives and Hausa settlers in Jos, Plateau state. In the core north, native-settler conflict has been a constant feature of inter-group relations with outbreaks of violence in Kano and Kaduna over religious and economic issues that relate to the citizenship question particularly human rights. Across the whole continent (Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, Congo, Uganda) the citizenship question had threatened to tear the state apart. The Casamance separatist conflict in southern Senegal has continued for about 25 years, with little prospect of settlement. The dichotomy between “northerners” and “southerners”, Muslim and non-Muslims, “true Ivorians” and “circumstantial Ivorians”, representing different dimensions of identity politics, has also been identified as central to the Ivorian conflict. There are also issues of political identity in the protracted conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan between the “African” and “Arab”, the Janjawid. The Rwandan-Burundian episode between the Hutus and Tutsi was another dreadful example of an identity-based conflict rooted in citizenship. The situation became so shocking that notable Africanists began to talk about state collapse in Africa. This is a thesis that has been very controversial and treated with much caution by African scholars but can hardly be discredited. The only exemption may be that the collapsing structures and institutions of the state in Africa are “the institutional legacy of colonial rule particularly the political institutions of colonial rule”, such as the native-settler dichotomy that lies at the root of most African conflicts.

THE DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION

How do we appropriately evaluate political globalization? There is no straight-forward answer to this question. It depends on our usage of the concept. Political globalization in this context is coterminous with all efforts geared towards political liberalization of the public sphere. It is
therefore the political dimensions of globalization that have come to be commonly regarded as democratization. From this conceptual standing, political globalization can be measured with reference to at least three core elements. These are the structural, behavioural and attitudinal foundations of democratization. These three elements, according to Andreas Schedler, underline the deepening of democracy provided they are well institutionalized. The structural foundations emphasize issues of socio-economic prosperity where poverty is kept to the barest minimum and institutional parameters such as periodic, competitive, free and fair elections, a multi-party system and the rule of law. The behavioural foundations are embedded in the proven capacity of “democrats” to roll back anti-democratic challenges. This is because “unless, no major political actors violate basic democratic rules anymore”, such as the use of violence, the rejection of elections and the transgression of authority, democracy will be at risk. The attitudinal foundations, however, encompass the basic normative, strategic and cognitive elements required to sustain democracy. The normative elements include democratic legitimacy, defined as the genuine, non-instrumental, intrinsic support for democracy by political elites as well as citizens. The strategic elements entail the ability to mediate in and transform the usually conflicting relationship between democrats and anti-democrats in a consensual way, all working in the interests of the democracy project.

Assessed against this background, the political globalization process in Africa is still very far off the mark. The structural, behavioural and attitudinal foundations of democracy are in a delicate state. Poverty is still largely a continent-wide problem, with very few exceptions. This makes the people easily susceptible to manipulation, especially during electoral engineering. While elections are now being held periodically, they are hardly competitive, free and fair, Nigeria since 1999 being a case in point. As such, elections are usually boycotted and, where they are not boycotted, the results can be rejected outright by opposition elements. Either or both of these situations have arisen in Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Senegal at different times. This creates a deep democratic legitimacy crisis for the government, thereby casting doubts on the possibility of consolidation. Worse still, major political actors hardly operate within the limits of constitutional provisions, as they employ extra-constitutional mechanisms to pursue their selfish interests. These include the abuse of power of incumbency by taking undue advantage of the apparatus of the state, including security agencies, the electoral management body and the mass media, to frustrate the opposition.

The Nigerian experience between 1999 and 2007 illustrates these tendencies in the political globalization process in Africa. The democratiza-

31 Id at 68.
The democratization process in Nigeria since 1999 has largely been in the direction of the disempowerment of popular forces. While this is all encompassing, involving every facet of the democratization process, the third term agenda and the conduct of the April 2007 general elections remain the most recent and notable in the series of anti-democratic behaviour and attitude of the political actors. The third term agenda was a deliberately schematized design by ex-President Obasanjo and his political opportunist class to force the extension of tenure beyond the two statutory terms of four years each. In his desperation, he deployed all the apparatus of the state, including top government functionaries in the executive and legislative arms, financial resources and the mass media in pursuit of his agenda. Thanks to the virility and vigilance of the civil society and opposition elements, they for once rose above their divisive tendencies to challenge the agenda and its promoters head-on. Although, the agenda was eventually defeated on the floor of the National Assembly, it was a victory at a rather too high a cost.

For one thing, the country was at boiling point while the agenda lasted, as the language of politics was highly laced with violence. Ex-President Obasanjo and his People's Democratic Party (PDP) particularly through its national chairman, Colonel Ahmadu Ali (rtd) employed offensive and foul language to threaten all PDP members in the National Assembly who failed to support the agenda, including the threat of expulsion from the party and the denial of rightful entitlements. The shocking defeat of the agenda, against the expectations of its promoters, given the huge financial investment they had put into it, may have accounted for the convoluted form of succession politics that underlined the agenda in the first instance. Recent revelations by some ex-governors standing trial before the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), one of the country's anti-corruption agencies, which was politically instrumentalized by the Obasanjo regime, have shown that the agenda had very huge financial costs. For instance, Alhaji Saminu Turaki, the immediate ex-governor of Jigawa state, who is currently standing trial before the EFCC for alleged corruption, claimed that “he was compelled to finance the Third Term project to the tune of $10 million.” Alhaji Ibrahim Mantu, the then deputy senate president, who was mandated to ensure the success of the agenda by pushing for constitutional amendments in the National Assembly to that effect, reportedly received ₦500 million (about $4 million)

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37 (26 August 2007) Sunday Sun at 11.
as a mobilization fee. The agenda also reportedly cost Peter Odili, the ex-governor of Rivers state, the sum of N9 billion (about $72 million). This is in addition to the contributions from other governors and corporate bodies, as well as captains of industry and other financiers, the details of which are not known. Yet no-one, except its principal actors, can say categorically how much the agenda cost the federal government (Obasanjo and PDP) out of the Petroleum Development Trust Fund (PDTF). The PDTF was a special account in which the federal government’s share of oil windfalls was held for special projects under the control of the office of the vice president, Atiku Abubakar. It was from this fund that most of the money deployed for the third term agenda was reportedly drawn, to the extent that it later became a source of accusation and counter-accusation between ex-president Obasanjo and Atiku.

True to expectations, the third term agenda became a central issue in the 2007 general elections. Possibly for the leading role played by Alhaji Abubakar Atiku, the ex-vice president, in mobilizing popular forces against the agenda, the presidency moved swiftly to halt his presidential ambition. Through the EFCC, he was accused of corruption with particular reference to the PDTF. This having been exposed, an administrative panel of inquiry was set-up to investigate the matter. Within a few days, the panel concluded its assignment, found Atiku guilty of the allegation and recommended that the report be gazetted and Atiku disqualified from contesting the election. The presidency upheld the report, gazetted it and insisted on not allowing Atiku to contest. It was therefore not surprising to see the Independent National Electoral Commission, which had been acting like a mere appendage of the presidency, disqualify Atiku on the basis of the indictment. This was despite ongoing litigation on the matter. This and several other controversial issues, most notably the PDP’s declaration that Atiku was no longer the vice president, following the latter’s defection to Action Congress (a leading opposition party) to realise his presidential ambition and Obasanjo’s infamous declaration that, for him and the PDP, the 2007 election was “a do or die affair”, served to overheat the situation. As it turned out, the elections really were a do or die affair, characterized by monumental violence, manipulation and falsification of results, and have since been the subject of litigation at the Election Petition Tribunals. The result has been a deep vacuum of democratic legitimacy for the new government from the start, setting it up for serious threats to political stability and the prospects of consolidation.

The Nigerian experience is just one of several cases across Africa. In Uganda, Yoweri Musoveni succeeded in engineering constitutional amendments to enable him run for a third term. In Zimbabwe, Togo, Kenya and many other countries, elections are mere fading shadows of democracy. The recent electoral and political imbroglios in Kenya and Zimbabwe, where power of incumbency was used not only to frustrate opposition forces but...
also to intimidate them into submission, are emphatic testaments to this. For these and related reasons, the process of political globalization has tended to marginalize still further historically marginal groups such as ethnic minorities, women and youth. The current situation would appear to have expanded the spectre of the marginalized, as the people, the supposed core stakeholders in the process, have been reduced to mere spectators, clients and/or consumers.

This development reinforces the long-standing bases of popular organization and mobilization, particularly political identities who have been less agitating and visible in the political space and who now crave more space in the public arena. Consequently, the political landscape in Africa has been experiencing the emergence and crystallization of new identities as a result of the distribution of citizenship, which tends toward exclusion rather than inclusion. Third layer identities, such as minorities within a hitherto “minor” minority, have suddenly crystallized into a position of distinct political identity, craving for recognition and accommodation in the power matrix of the state. A typical example from the grassroots of Nigeria is the case of the Okun ethnic group of Kogi state. Itself a minority within the Yoruba ethnic stock, several sub-group identities such as the Ijumu, Owe, Bunu and Yagba and sub-sub-groups such as the Ijumu Arin, Ijumu Oke and Gbedde have begun to crystallize since the democratization process in 1999. This development has been at the root of rising ethnic tensions in the state, leading to the ascendency of intra-group conflicts on the one hand and inter-group conflicts on the other.39

It is a combination of the foregoing that Schmitter referred to as the “dangers and dilemmas” of democracy.40 His taxonomy of democratic dilemmas includes intrinsic and extrinsic problems. The extrinsic dilemmas relate to what he referred to as boundaries and identities expressed in terms of nationality. Unfortunately, the boundaries of nationality are not always clearly delineated before, during or even after democratization. While common ancestry, language, symbols and historical memories have been seen as critical elements in defining a nation, they are not usually constant, as they are subject to transition and transformation. As Schmitter put it:

“All one can say for sure is that the sentiment of national identity and boundaries is the outcome of arcane and complex historical processes that are, nevertheless, subject to manipulation. Democratization itself may encourage actors to attempt such manipulations in order to create constituencies favourable to their respective purposes, but it does not and


cannot resolve the issue. There is simply no democratic way of deciding what a nation and its corresponding political unit should be."  

These are pertinent issues that concern the necessity of political globalization in the first place, the contents of the transition, and the most fundamental challenge of who bore the cost of the struggle leading to the transition vis-à-vis the eventual “owner” of the transition process and outcome. In the African context, particularly under the third wave, the political globalization process is a product of both internal and external forces. In either case, it is the masses through pro-democracy movements and civil society that bore the brunt of the democratization process. In several capital cities, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Africans have endured the anguish and pain of civil and violent protests against authoritarian rule and deepening economic woes, to demand political and economic reforms. In the process, the people were harassed, assaulted, maimed, killed, tortured and their basic human rights violated with reckless abandon. The victory of the democratic forces in Africa over those of authoritarianism was, therefore, at a very high cost. Unfortunately, the opening of democratic political space has not amounted to a significant improvement in the political rights and civil liberties of the people. The process was completely hijacked by old authoritarian political actors to rig democracy against the people. By implication, the democracy project in much of Africa is owned and driven by the powerful elite, not the people. The exclusion of the masses as “shareholders” in the political globalization process, in the form of the absence of democratic dividends such as better delivery of social services, a reduction in the widening gap between the rich and the poor, popular participation and representation, security of life and property, and a general improvement in people’s well-being, as well as limited involvement in the democratic process as a result of undue criminalization and corruption, underlie most violent conflicts in Africa. While such conflicts assume different dimensions, they are most often closely interlinked with the citizenship question, where other political units of identity, particularly ethnicity and religion, offer palliative relief from the stresses and strains of exclusionary politics.

POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION, CITIZENSHIP AND SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA: THE INTERFACE

The preceding analysis creates the picture of a very close linkage between political globalization, citizenship and security threats in Africa. The people, whether as individuals or an ethnic community, are objects of rights and duties under political globalization and citizenship. Either way, peace and stability can only be attained if the process and outcome are

41 Ibid.
42 Adekanye From Violence to Politics, above at note 3.
43 Bratton and van de Walle Democratic Experiments in Africa, above at note 2.
sufficiently inclusive to accommodate every segment of society in a fair, equitable and just political and social order. This is the only option that allows for the full expression of rights, be they individual or group. Under such conditions, political globalization and citizenship become mutually reinforcing which results in enhanced security. Security in this context connotes freedom from fear, real or imagined, and from political, economic and socio-cultural inequalities, marginalization and/or repression.

On the other hand, when the distribution of citizenship tends more towards exclusion, so that a particular group, the powerful elite for example, establishes a dominant influence over others, the balance of citizenship is lost. When this happens, and is not checked over time, it has the potential to alter and pervert the scope for democratization. In these circumstances, democratization may be disproportionately configured in such a way that promotes the interests of the dominant groups at the expense of the majority of the people. By implication, the basic rights of the people to democratic participation, representation and development are easily compromised. The struggle for people to mobilize and reorganize themselves under a different umbrella, separate from the state, reinforces hitherto dormant political identities, which crystallize to demand space in the public arena for their “own” expression. If this continues unmitigated, it poses serious security threats to the democratic system in the form of rising political tensions, ethnic conflict and separatist agitations and movements.

This trend has been predominant in Africa. While the citizenship question and the dilemmas of political globalization in Africa are products of a historical process rooted in the colonial origin of the state, the managers of the post-independence state would appear to have accentuated the problem. This is not only because of their failure to deal with the vestiges of colonialism that are inimical to the development of “true” citizenship and democratization, but also through the consolidation of these perverted structures of social and political organization. As Francis Nyamnjoh illustrates, “the elites have created and sustained political institutions not so much to mobilize and conscientize the masses for collective interests, but to curb mass involvement, to control and to strengthen their own omnipotence in national life”.44 The result is the increasing exclusion of the people, and rising poverty and underdevelopment, all critical issues with regard to security threats. As the dividends of democracy wane almost everywhere on the continent with very few exceptions, security is being threatened. The democratization process seems to have exacerbated what began as a citizenship problem on the continent. A good reading of Africa’s citizenship question, particularly in its contemporary manifestation, cannot be understood without also

44 Nyamnjoh “Globalization and popular disenchantment in Africa”, above at note 1 at 71.
analysing political globalization. In fact, political globalization has become a major political instrument through which the citizenship cards in Africa are being played. This has been complicated by the coincidence of political globalization with economic globalization, which has ensured that “out-groups” or, better still, what Mamdani called “native settlers” are not only marginalized politically, but also economically. These tendencies are, obviously, viable sources of security threats and have been so in Africa over the years as illustrated above.

RECLAIMING POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN AFRICA: A CONCLUSION

Citizenship is certainly at the heart of political globalization, which is itself about popular participation and representation, as well as the structural, behavioural and attitudinal frameworks of organization. These entail institutional parameters such as elections, citizenship and the mechanisms through which they are operated. Whether they will be symbiotic or otherwise is largely contingent upon the attitudinal and behavioural dispositions of major political actors. Where those actors are prepared, willing and able to play the game according to established standards and rules, citizenship and political globalization are mutually reinforcing. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case in Africa, where citizenship and political globalization have a faulty colonial origin complicated by the misadventures of the post-independence powerful elite. As such, both have remained a persistent source of security threats in most parts of the continent.

What should be of utmost priority in mitigating security threats is initiating measures aimed at reclaiming citizenship and political globalization. The appropriate starting point should be addressing the colonial roots of the problem. In this way, there is need to tackle head-on the political legacies of colonialism that are related to citizenship. One important area relates to the bifurcation of citizenship into native and settler on the one hand, and the native-native and native-settler dichotomy. As it has turned out, though disappointingly, this dichotomization has become the currency of the distribution of citizenship, allowing for the marginalization/exclusion of a substantial segment of the population from the mainstream of national political and economic affairs. Yet, Africans define citizenship first in terms of rights before any consideration of duties. This is another colonial legacy that constitutes a negation of the original concept of citizenship in Europe, whence it was taken to Africa. For this reason, the state is seen as the source of rights to be distributed to all, even when they do not discharge any duties. This tendency barely finds expression in political theory, where rights are treated as corollaries of duties. The impression must therefore be changed through sustainable social mobilization and political reengineering.

Since the democratization process has become a contentious site of citizenship and identity politics, efforts should also be made to “democra-
tize” the democratization process. In its current form, the political globalization process seems too un-rooted from society, as former autocrats and military dictators now call the shots in civilian roles. There is also the increasing tendency towards popular alienation and disempowerment in the democratization process. All these call for a fundamental change about the ownership of the democratization process in such a way that empowers the masses over the powerful elite. This can help to galvanize a new regime of popular vigilance on the part of the people, demanding accountability from the government. This can be done with the strengthening of civil society and non-governmental organizations, with adequate regulatory and monitoring frameworks. A reformist democratic developmental state in Africa offers some plausible way beyond the crossroads.