The FBI and the Making of the Terrorist Threat

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Historical reflections
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When the administration of George W. Bush proclaimed a war on terror after the 9/11 attacks, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found itself with widened powers. Bush’s FBI operated under a revised legal framework for investigations based on the official goal of “prevent, preempt, and disrupt.” New FBI guidelines, as well as congressional legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act and advanced surveillance technologies, empowered the bureau to conduct political policing on a previously unknown scale. Recently declassified government records are beginning to document how the FBI, using its expanded powers, played a major role in threatening the rights of free speech and assembly after 9/11.

To be sure, the FBI’s role was not new. Through much of its history, the bureau had waged systematic campaigns to chill progressive and radical viewpoints. Even the specific focus on “terrorism” was not completely new, building on more than twenty-five years of threat mongering. While the events of 9/11 elevated and expanded the nature of the threat, prior efforts by the FBI dating to the 1970s already equated many forms of peaceful and legal political activity with violence. Whereas J. Edgar Hoover, who ran the FBI from 1924 to 1972, had framed the domestic threat in terms of “subversion,” his successors at the FBI developed a new paradigm of “terrorism” to characterize most domestic security investigations. The significance of this change proved enormous. It helped demonize dissent by blurring meaningful distinctions between nonviolent and violent political activity. It helped undermine popular social movements by smearing opposition as uncivilized, repugnant, and abnormal. The terrorist became the most feared figure in contemporary society.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the bureau drew on past methods and continued interpreting dissent as terrorism. However, the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI pushed the issue further by developing a so-called preventative approach, which viewed well-nigh all street protest as suspect. The FBI began monitoring public spaces and deployed increasingly sophisticated technological surveillance. For example, intrusive cyberspace surveillance extended to the Internet and e-mail. The extensive use of data mining and watch lists became part of the new goal of “total information awareness.”

The FBI operated as the leading control agency in what scholars and popular writers term the new “surveillance society.” The bureau’s director, Robert S. Mueller III, articulated the surveillance goal in a November 10, 2008, speech: “In the FBI, we have a mantra: ‘Know Your Domain.’ Knowing your domain means understanding every inch of a given community—its geography, its populations, its economy, and its vulnerabilities.”

An event like 9/11, characterized by a large attack on U.S. soil, is unprecedented in the post–World War II period. Perhaps after only ten years it is difficult to determine if the U.S. government’s reaction to the attacks has led us closer to a police state. Yet the policies and practices carried out by the FBI with apparent sanction from the executive branch certainly raise troubling questions about the evolution of democratic society. It seems well to recall the comments of the retired Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O’Connor from a 2006 speech about partisan attacks on an independent judiciary: “It takes a lot of degeneration before a country falls into dictatorship, but we should avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings.”

The “Urban Guerrilla”

The FBI category of subversion had denoted radical efforts by political actors to undermine or transform the government. But it did not imply violent methods to achieve these goals. During the early 1970s, domestic terrorism emerged as a major public policy and law enforcement issue for the first time since the Palmer Raids
The bureau believed violence had become part of a generalized challenge to constituted legal and political authorities. In public speeches and private communications, FBI leaders purported that the country faced the beginnings of a domestic revolution led by “urban guerrillas” such as the Black Liberation Army (BLA) and the Weather Underground Organization (WUO). On November 22, 1972, L. Patrick Gray III, the recent successor to Hoover as the bureau’s director, defined his policy in a secret memo to all agents and supervisors.

These are not normal times. We are in an age of terrorism. The tactic of the urban guerrilla, often used in Latin America, Algeria, the Middle East and elsewhere in the world, was introduced into the U.S. about five years ago and we have seen ample evidence of it in the form of ambushed police officers and terrorist bombings which have included the U.S. Capitol and the Pentagon. We now accept the existence of urban guerrilla terrorism and the fact that the urban guerrilla’s philosophy of terrorism has made it necessary for law enforcement to adopt new standards and adapt to the constant threat of terrorist attack.5

About a year later, a new director, Clarence M. Kelley, told the International Association of Police Chiefs: “Ten or fifteen years ago urban guerrillas and violence-prone extremists were peripheral in law enforcement concern. This is no longer true. Riots, demonstrations, mass rallies, the general unrest of recent years suddenly deposited this new born baby, so to speak, on our doorstep.” Of course, Kelley could not acknowledge that in many cases revolutionary groups formed in response to the official repression of political activity, which prompted radicals to turn to violence.7

By 1975, the FBI had gathered about ninety thousand pages on the WUO, and Kelley felt certain that “the gospel of violent revolution and insurrection had to be halted.”8 The urgency to protect the government from radical challenges included safeguarding the police. “Officers are today, as never before, targets of terrorist groups which deliberately seek to ambush patrol cars, to bomb precinct stations, to kill our personnel. They chatter a constant stream of abuse against law enforcement. They encourage others to disobey the law and hurl epithets against the men in blue. Who are these terrorists?” The FBI had begun to misapply the terrorist label. For example, when the U.S. Senate Church Committee hearings provided details of COINTELPRO (Counter Intelligence Program), which led to a public outcry against civil liberty violations, FBI leaders falsely justified the program in terms of the fight against terrorism. In fact, COINTELPRO had begun in 1956 to combat the U.S. Communist Party and investigated tens of thousands of people who had no ties to political violence. As in later years, touting the threat of violence served as a public justification for monitoring progressive opposition.10

In 1976, the U.S. Justice Department imposed a new terrorism framework for FBI investigations in what was conceived, ironically, as an effort to limit secret
surveillance. The first Attorney General Guidelines for the FBI, known as the Levi Guidelines, limited FBI investigations to violations of the law and direct threats of political violence to end a long history of political policing by the government. Under the Ford (1974–77) and Carter (1977–81) administrations, the FBI dramatically reduced the number of security investigations, describing its new approach as one that stressed “quality over quantity.” Compared to 21,414 active investigations in 1973, the FBI allegedly conducted only 4,868 investigations in 1976, a decline of more than 400 percent. By 1978, the FBI claimed that only 102 investigations were conducted nationwide and conservatives decried the success of the “anti-intelligence lobby.” For the first time in its history, the FBI rejected congressional attempts to increase its budget for spying.

But robust FBI spying soon reemerged under President Ronald Reagan within a revitalized terrorism framework. Reagan cited an alleged global Soviet terror conspiracy to justify spying on Americans, and he began to expand the meaning of what constituted a terrorist act. The FBI director William Webster told the new U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism in 1982: “The question is whether words, unaccompanied by conduct, can be the subject of an investigation. We must be careful, of course, to preserve the right of free speech and to insure that investigations are not used in a way that would inhibit statements that present no serious threat to society. That is not to say that statements alone, particularly statements that advocate criminal violence, or indicate an apparent intent or ability to engage in violence, are protected against investigation.”

In 1983, new FBI guidelines incorporated the violent words and speech criteria to justify investigations. As a result, without sound evidence, the FBI claimed a broad range of individuals and groups advocated violence and supported terrorism, including critics of U.S. policy in Central America, environmental activists, the anti-nuclear and peace movement surrounding the nuclear freeze, animal rights advocates, gay organizations, anti-apartheid groups, and Arab Americans. Peaceful street protests could activate surveillance. One of the largest investigations targeted the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), with surveillance in twenty-two cities. The CISPES file totals about 142,500 pages. A Senate committee concluded that the probe resulted “in the investigation of domestic political activities that should not have come under governmental scrutiny.” By the end of the 1980s, the FBI had come to apply the terrorist label so loosely that a Senate Intelligence Committee report concluded that spying on peaceful protests, including the use of undercover informers, had become a “fairly routine practice.”

With the end of the Cold War, a “peace dividend” might have decreased FBI spying. Instead, the Clinton administration responded to the first World Trade Center bombing (1993) and the Oklahoma City bombing (1995) with one of the largest expansions of the FBI in U.S. history. The terrorist threat grew in magnitude. In addition to nearly doubling the FBI budget during the 1990s, the president also set
The bureau also spoke of the threat of cyberterrorism for the first time, viewing a nonlethal threat, largely unconnected to protest movements, through a prism of political violence. Moreover, city police worked in conjunction with the FBI in new Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The Red Squads of the past were reorganized and renamed utilizing the new keyword—terrorism. Meanwhile, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996), continuing the trend of treating nonviolent activity as subject to discipline if it could be linked to terrorism. It focused on immigrants, whose membership in alleged terrorist groups became the basis for exclusion and deportation and included a broader provision making it a federal crime to provide “material support” (including financial contributions) to a group designated as terrorist by the government.\(^{22}\) As one example of a major political policing initiative, Clinton’s FBI placed antiglobalization protests under its terrorist rubric even though no acts of violence were linked to the movement apart from select petty street vandalism.\(^{23}\)

**The Politics of Fear**

The 9/11 attacks initially brought attention to the FBI’s intelligence failure prior to September 11. The revelation of an internal FBI memo from early August 2001, “Bin Laden Determined to Attack in the United States,” embarrassed the bureau as did other pre-attack indicators: a July 2001 FBI report of potential terrorist interest in aircraft training in Arizona and the August 2001 arrest and release of the plotter Zacarias Moussaoui while he attended a flight school in Minnesota.\(^{24}\) Many critics believed the bureau had enough prior warning to stop the attacks. Yet the Bush administration, promoting an aggressive “wartime” posture, gave the FBI even greater secret spying capabilities. The popular refrain, “nothing will ever be the same,” seemed to give new legitimacy to government efforts to sacrifice rights under the banner of national security. The so-called war on terror necessitated a reduction in civil liberties not only for select high-profile targets but also for the general domestic population whose e-mail, phone calls, and other communications were data-mined and collected. Bush and his vice president, Dick Cheney, engaged in exaggerated rhetoric, looked for scapegoats, and demonized opponents.\(^{25}\) Dissenting voices were accused of disloyalty. When the presidential candidate Senator John Kerry said he hoped to reduce the threat of terrorism to a “nuisance,” similar to gambling and prostitution, Cheney charged that Kerry’s comments were “naïve and dangerous, as was Senator Kerry’s reluctance earlier this year to call the war on terror an actual war.” Cheney went on to predict a national catastrophe if Kerry won: “The terrorists will escalate their attacks, both at home and overseas, and the likelihood will increase that they will acquire weapons of mass destruction to use against us.”\(^{26}\) The invocation of a terrorist threat dominated almost every speech at the 2004
Republican Convention, and as Tom Ridge, the former head of the Department of Homeland Security, recalled, Bush tried to manipulate terror alerts before the 2004 election to enhance his chances of victory. In many respects, an uncritical mass media left unchallenged state propaganda promoting the administration’s construction of the universal threat of terror.

Both Bush and Congress expanded the legal framework for FBI investigations. When the president signed the Patriot Act six weeks after 9/11, what once had been the executive branch’s loose and broad view of terrorism now received sanction throughout the government. Section 802 of the act created the federal crime of “domestic terrorism” to cover “acts dangerous to human life that are in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State.” A terrorist act consisted of any effort “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population” or “to influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion.” What is intimidation? What is coercion? Demonstrators who disobey a police officer might be viewed as engaging in terrorist activity. Indeed, the government equated most peaceful civil disobedience with terrorism. Acts of disorderly conduct, once considered violations of local law, were transformed into transgressions of federal statutes.

Moreover, gathering vast amounts of information on Americans became a top priority. The Patriot Act lowered the standard for obtaining third-party records (medical, financial, educational) without a warrant by expanding the use of special National Security Letters (NSLs). The further loosening of restrictions on spying occurred with the imposition of new Attorney General Guidelines for the bureau. In a major change, the guidelines, issued on May 30, 2002, empowered the FBI to monitor public spaces (lectures, religious meetings, college classes, or the Internet) independent of any ongoing investigation. The Justice Department reported: “Under the old guidelines, FBI field agents were inhibited from visiting public places, which are open to all other citizens. Agents avoided them not because they were barred by the Constitution, or any federal statute, but because of the lack of clear authority under administrative guidelines issued decades ago. . . . The new guidelines clarify that FBI field agents may enter any public space that is open to other citizens.” By 2003, almost all civil liberty and human rights groups in the United States criticized the changes in the law. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Lawyers Guild (NLG), and Amnesty International issued reports decrying human rights violations under the terror scare. Moreover, some observers noted serious problems with the “war” metaphor itself. When does it end? The amorphous nature of the enemy did not lend itself to an easy resolution.

By 2003, the FBI also had begun to take action against street demonstrations. In what has been referred to as the “Miami model,” the bureau and local police organized preemptive, suppressive tactics to curtail public expressions of political activity. When in November 2003 trade ministers from the western hemisphere met in Miami for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) meetings, police in riot
gear violently attacked groups of demonstrators by firing rubber bullets, tear gas, and pepper spray, as well as wielding batons and electronic shields. Legal observers described this “indiscriminate, excessive force” as inhibiting the right of hundreds of people to engage in assembly and free speech. Law enforcement unlawfully detained, searched, and falsely arrested protestors to curtail activism. From the police perspective, convictions were less important than clearing the streets from opposition during the FTAA meetings. Notably, only 4 of the 219 people arrested by the Miami police were convicted of crimes.³⁴

Similar heavy-handed methods of protest suppression also regularly occurred elsewhere. Backed by FBI intelligence, city police engaged in nonlethal violent attacks against protestors who posed no threat to public safety. The law professors David Cole and Jules Lobel noted the new development of a “very troubling form of anticipatory state violence — undertaken before any wrongdoing has actually occurred and often without good evidence for believing that any wrongdoing will in fact occur. Such preventive coercion places tremendous stress on the rule of law.”³⁵ The public space for free speech seemed to shrink. In large cities like Boston or New York, police developed free speech ghettoes resembling prisons, restricting rallies and demonstrations to highly regulated spaces — “militarized spaces,” Timothy Zick calls them — and courts upheld their imposition in the name of “security.”³⁶

A case study of surveillance in Denver, Colorado, illustrates the practices of a JTTF. The ACLU had sued the Denver police department and uncovered broad First Amendment monitoring by the bureau of the activities of peaceful protestors who had no connection to terrorism or any other criminal activity. In 2002, the JTTF’s “active case” list included the American Friends Service Committee, Colorado Campaign for Middle East Peace, Denver Justice and Peace Committee, Colorado Native American Indian Movement, Rocky Mountain Independent Media Center, and the Human Bean Company, which imported coffee from indigenous people in Mexico. Again, monitoring street demonstrations became a high priority. The JTTF trained the Denver police on the alleged “criminal tactics of protest extremists.” On one occasion, the JTTF recorded the names and license plate numbers of environmental and conservation activists at a peaceful demonstration against the lumber industry’s threats to endangered old-growth forests. It monitored a person who distributed leaflets promoting a documentary film critical of the FBI. The JTTF intercepted e-mail from several local organizations, which provided intelligence on an upcoming protest by animal rights activists, on a pro-Palestine rally, on plans for a Transform Columbus Day rally, and on a several-day festival billed by local activists as the “Flying Circus.”³⁷

As in earlier decades, civil disobedience sent the FBI into a monitoring mode.³⁸ In 2004, the JTTF conducted surveillance against Food Not Bombs (FNB), a group described as embracing anarchist politics. The anarchists liked to ride bicycles, so the FBI surveyed the Derailer Bicycle Collective, which some FNB members had joined. Neither FNB nor the Derailer Bicycle Collective organized street
protest. FNB became known for distributing free vegetarian food to the homeless in public parks and the collective fixed old bikes that it then donated to the poor. One young activist, Sarah Bardwell, was put under twenty-four-hour surveillance. She recalled a visit by FBI agents to her home, where she refused to answer their questions. “They did say that since we weren’t giving them the information that they wanted, they were taking that as non-cooperation and they were going to have to therefore take more intrusive effort in the future to find out what they needed to know, but they wouldn’t specify what they needed to know specifically or what those more intrusive efforts were, she said.”

More than 150 FNB chapters exist in the United States. Elsewhere, the FBI closely watched a small number of individuals and groups described as anarchist. From 2002 to 2004, the alleged anarchist threat surfaced in several FBI reports, including during protests at the Republican Convention in New York City. But no criminal charges for violence resulted from any of these investigations.

The October Plan
The FBI invoked the 9/11 attacks during the 2004 presidential election campaign to justify surveillance. Six weeks before voting, the FBI announced the so-called October Plan that included “aggressive — even obvious — surveillance” to fight potential terrorism before Election Day. In a recently declassified memo, an agent in Charlotte, North Carolina, explained the historical reasoning used by the bureau to monitor Arabs and Muslims in America: “According to the Islamic Lunar calendar, November 2, 2004 is the anniversary of the Battle of Badar [sic]. This battle was the first battle fought in the name of Islam. It was fought against the enemies of Allah. Mohammed, the prophet and his forces, battled in the holy city of Mecca. Of course, November 2, 2004 is the U.S. election day.”

A special FBI 04 Threat Task Force indicated no advance intelligence on any plot, but CNN reported, “The FBI is putting together an aggressive plan that includes rousting people suspected of supporting violent extremists. Federal lawmen may jail some who have committed minor crimes or immigration violations and question or tail others if only to let them know the government can find them.” The Islamic Center of San Francisco (ICSF) was among the organizations targeted by the bureau. The FBI tried to interview its leadership but reported resistance.

On 10/21/2004, [text redacted], DOB [text redacted], telephone number [text redacted], contacted SA [text redacted]. [text redacted] is a [text redacted] of the ICSF. [text redacted] advised that the board members at ICSF are worried about the FBI’s interest in talking to them. They believe the interviews are really interrogations, and that an interview with the FBI could lead to further investigation and ultimately deportation from the United States. They have been advised by the ACLU not to talk to the FBI.
This declassified FBI document details efforts to interview the leaders of the Islamic Center of San Francisco. It was obtained from the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act after filing an administrative appeal with the Office of Information at the U.S. Justice Department.

Source: October Plan FBI document, in the author's possession.
The October Plan continued into November after the Bush victory. On November 4, the president opened his first postelection press conference with a prepared statement: “We are fighting a continuing war on terrorism.” Bush intensified efforts against the terrorist threat during his second term. On November 18, 2004, he issued three separate presidential directives giving even greater power to the CIA and the FBI. The FBI’s power would increase with the goal to “strengthen further the FBI’s ability to prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist threats to and attacks against the United States.” At last, we had the new keywords for the FBI role after 9/11 — “prevent, preempt and disrupt” — which reappeared in a Bush memorandum to the attorney general on November 23, 2004 (“Further Strengthening Federal Bureau of Investigation Capabilities”). Who were the targets? The FBI investigated under the terrorism framework groups such as the Thomas Merton Center, Greenpeace USA, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Code Pink, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the antiwar coalition United for Peace and Justice, the Raging Grannies, and the ACLU.

From July 2004 through November 2007, the FBI investigated almost 108,000 potential terrorism-related threats, as well “reports of suspicious incidents.” The FBI began to equate “suspicious activity” with the threat of political violence. The bureau’s definition of suspicious remains unclear. But fighting the threat included the recruitment of private companies into so-called Watch programs. As one example, boat fishermen were called on to function as the FBI’s “eyes on the water” and to report “unusual behavior when you see it.” Truck drivers also were recruited as part of highway Watch efforts to serve as a “potential army of eyes and ears to monitor for security threats.” In some cities, the police trained real estate agents and residential building doormen to report to the authorities. In Florida, police trained emergency personnel and cable and utility workers to report anything out of the ordinary as they visited private homes. Members of the U.S. Air Force, in the Eagle Eyes program, were enlisted to report to police if they noticed “people who don’t seem to belong in the workplace, neighborhood, business establishment or anywhere else. . . . If a person just doesn’t seem like he or she belongs, there’s probably a reason for that.”

The misapplication of “terrorism” to protest activity was written into law in the Animal Enterprise Terrorist Act (AETA) of 2006. The FBI now considers animal rights activity a major terrorist threat, even though no deaths have been associated with such activism. The government views property sabotage or vandalism as a form of terrorism, as well as any effort to “physically disrupt” the functioning of a business or research center related to animals. Two groups — the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) — are identified as leading “eco-terrorists” responsible for hundreds of criminal acts.
The FBI in the Surveillance Society
The making of the threat occurred as the information society morphed into the surveillance society. Past practices persisted with the unaccountable imposition of political policing: the amassing of large dossiers on political subjects and the use of counterintelligence disruptive acts. The FBI’s conduct continued to raise the question, how speech and assembly can be considered “protected” when federal law enforcement secretly tracks and fights its practitioners? The attacks of 9/11 prompted the FBI to expand significantly its information collection with vast new databases. For example, the FBI began to rely on biometrics — records of palm prints, scars and tattoos, iris eye patterns, and facial shapes — and also broadly scrutinized financial activity by compelling financial institutions to report to the special U.S. Treasury agency termed FinCen. In 2008, FinCen shared more than 1.2 million “suspicious activity reports” with the bureau. The FBI deployed cyber “worms” or robots, whereby a computer code migrates across the Internet and places itself into the hard disks of computer users without causing any damage, transmitting information back to the bureau. Cell phones not only functioned as tracking devices via their connection to a Global Positioning System (GPS) but were also used as eavesdropping tools remotely activated. Outdoor video surveillance in the form of Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) dramatically expanded in urban areas. Leading critics such as Simson Garfinkel evoked George Orwell’s 1984. “Orwell thought the ultimate threat to privacy would be the bugging of bedrooms and offices. Today, an equally large threat to freedom is the systematic monitoring of public places through microphones, video cameras, surveillance satellites, and other remote sensing devices, combined with information processing technology. Soon it may be impossible to escape the watchful outdoor eye.”

Before Bush left office, the Justice Department issued another set of FBI guidelines expanding spying power. The new guidelines, which took effect on December 1, 2008, lowered the standard to authorize surveillance, prompting civil liberty concerns about profiling based on race, religion, or ethnic background. Bureau agents had begun collecting intelligence on businesses, behaviors, lifestyle characteristics, and cultural traditions in ethnic communities. Moreover, the new guidelines allow agents in local field offices to conduct physical surveillance, recruit informers, and interview friends of subjects without higher approval. The FBI began to investigate people simply to determine if they would make effective informants. The FBI General Counsel stated that the new guidelines “are the culmination of prior efforts to revise the FBI’s operating rules in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.” The FBI will “proactively look for threats within the country . . . moving beyond a reactive model (where agents must wait to receive leads before acting).”

How will “proactive” spying differ from “reactive” spying? The Bush administration asserted that to “connect the dots” and prevent another 9/11, it needed
spying both inside and outside existing laws. While Barack Obama as president has shed the overblown rhetoric of the war on terror, he has not placed any new limits on FBI practices. Rather, he supported the renewal of provisions of the Patriot Act and advocated the collection of Internet use records without warrants. All efforts have been directed at expanding the surveillance state. The widespread misapplication of the terrorist label continues to challenge the very existence of a rights-based democratic society.

Notes
My thanks to Nancy C. Carnevale and Richard Greenwald for comments on an earlier draft. This article is loosely adapted from my book The Dangers of Dissent: The FBI and Civil Liberties since 1965 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010).


5. FBI Director, “Memorandum to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors,” November 22, 1972, L. Patrick Gray III FBI File. The FBI released the Gray file, as well as the file on Clarence M. Kelley, as a result of civil litigation, Greenberg v. FBI (2008).


8. In May 1972, an FBI official summarized the bureau’s WUO efforts. “Our investigation of the revolutionary Weatherman group centers on approximately 280 people throughout the country. Included in that number are the 26 Weatherman fugitives. Also included is a group of about 40 individuals, all non-fugitives, whose whereabouts are unknown and who are believed active in the Weatherman underground.” Francis J. Martin to Paul V. Daly, United States v. Felt, June 8, 1979, Gray FBI file; R. L. Shackelford to Mr. E. S. Miller, “Weatherfug,” May 8, 1972, Gray FBI file; Clarence M. Kelley, “The FBI’s Role in Protecting America,” speech at the University of Kansas, Lawrence, March 28, 1974, Kelley FBI File.


10. The FBI continues to view COINTELPRO in these terms. The bureau recently wrote on its Web site that during the 1960s it “used both traditional investigative techniques and counterintelligence programs (‘Cointelpro’) to counteract domestic terrorism and conduct investigations of individuals and organizations who threatened terrorist violence.” See the FBI Web site, www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/vietnam.htm (accessed April 7, 2010, www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/brief-history).

11. The FBI investigated the U.S. Communist Party under the category of “foreign counterintelligence.”


34. Boykoff, Beyond Bullets, 262–66.


