![](https://d3ilqtpdwi981i.cloudfront.net/6er5Mv3arFvSZLPLcM16quFrndM=/425x550/smart/https://bepress-attached-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/63/a3/75/63a375d5-b7e0-46ec-b893-fde855ea10b7/thumbnail_08f2d261-8ee1-4ac1-b49a-cffffef0da93.jpg)
Article
The Meaning of Capacity and Consent in Sexual Assault: R. v. G.F.
Criminal Law Quarterly
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2022
Subjects
- sexual assault,
- consent,
- capacity,
- sufficiency of reasons,
- appellate intervention,
- Criminal Code 273.1(2) and s. 265(3)
Disciplines
- Criminal Law and
- Law
Abstract
The Criminal Code provisions dealing with sexual assault have been amended in a piecemeal fashion several times since the major reforms of 1982, which replaced the offences of rape and indecent assault with a three-tiered sexual assault offence. Many of these reforms were brought forward in response to particular judicial decisions that provoked controversy and concern. In most cases, new provisions were added without removing or amending related provisions already in place. What remains is a set of provisions that do not work together as a coherent whole.
Citation Information
Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, "The Meaning of Capacity and Consent in Sexual Assault: R. v. G.F." (2022) 70:1 CLQ 78.