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Article
Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
  • Ion Juvina, Wright State University
  • Muniba Saleem, University of Michigan - Dearborn
  • Jolie M. Martin, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
  • Cleotilde Gonzalez, Carnegie Mellon University
  • Christian Lebiere, Carnegie Mellon University
Date of Original Version
3-1-2013
Type
Article
Abstract or Description

We studied transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. We found that the interpersonal relation between two players during and across two games influence development of reciprocal trust and transfer of learning from one game to another. We show that two types of similarities between the games affect transfer: (1) deep similarities facilitate transfer of an optimal solution across games; (2) surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer depending on whether they lead players toward an optimal or sub-optimal solution in the target game. Learning an optimal solution in a context of interdependence between players is associated with development of reciprocal trust, which in turn mediates transfer of learning across games. The results can be used to inform the design of training exercises to develop strategic interaction skills.

DOI
10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.09.004
Citation Information
Ion Juvina, Muniba Saleem, Jolie M. Martin, Cleotilde Gonzalez, et al.. "Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction" Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Vol. 120 Iss. 2 (2013) p. 206 - 215
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/ion_juvina/50/