Skip to main content
Article
Probabilistic public key encryption for controlled equijoin in relational databases
Computer Journal
  • Yujue WANG, Singapore Management University
  • Hwee Hwa PANG, Singapore Management University
Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
3-2017
Abstract

We present a public key encryption scheme for relational databases (PKDE) that allows the owner to control the execution of cross-relation joins on an outsourced server. The scheme allows anyone to deposit encrypted records in a database on the server. Thereafter, the database owner may authorize the server to join any two relations to identify matching records across them, while preventing self-joins that would reveal information on records that are unmatched in the join. The security of our construction is formally proved in the random oracle model based on the computational bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Specifically, before a relation is joined, its encrypted records enjoy IND-CCA2 security; after a join, our scheme offers One-Way CCA2 security protection on the records. Our PKDE construction is shown to outperform the only existing

Keywords
  • Database security,
  • Data encryption,
  • Controlled join,
  • Equality test,
  • Private set intersection,
  • Data outsourcing
Identifier
10.1093/comjnl/bxw083
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy A - Oxford Open Option A
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/bxw083
Citation Information
Yujue WANG and Hwee Hwa PANG. "Probabilistic public key encryption for controlled equijoin in relational databases" Computer Journal Vol. 60 Iss. 4 (2017) p. 600 - 612 ISSN: 0010-4620
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/hweehwa-pang/63/