Unpublished Paper
Regulating Spillovers in Teamwork
Working Paper
(2024)
Abstract
We study team incentives with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public
credit for individual contributions to collective success. Compared to ex-ante optimal credit
allocation, higher-ability or lower-cost agents are over-credited ex-post and, thus, overmotivated
for team success when the spillover rate is too low and under-credited/undermotivated
when it is too high. Therefore, organizations may limit communication and
transparency between team members to induce optimal effort. Alternatively, they may
carefully select team members to diffuse credit-sharing concerns. These concerns also make
lower-ability agents less likely to invite collaborators or choose the most capable one for
their projects.
Keywords
- Teamwork,
- Spillovers,
- Credit Attribution
Disciplines
Publication Date
May 30, 2024
Citation Information
Saltuk Ozerturk and Huseyin Yildirim. "Regulating Spillovers in Teamwork" Working Paper (2024) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/huseyin_yildirim/41/