Skip to main content
Article
The Informational Value of Incumbency
Journal of Public Economic Theory (2009)
  • Humberto Llavador, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
  • Carmen Bevia, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Abstract
This paper exploits the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. We propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage, ideological bias and terms in office. Our argument emphasizes that incumbency affects candidates' chances of winning even if they had no opportunity to strategically utilize policies.
Keywords
  • Incumbency,
  • information,
  • candidate quality,
  • tenure,
  • ideology.
Disciplines
Publication Date
2009
Citation Information
Humberto Llavador and Carmen Bevia. "The Informational Value of Incumbency" Journal of Public Economic Theory Vol. 11 Iss. 5 (2009)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/humberto_llavador/2/