Strategic R&D cooperativesResearch in Economics (2000)
Although firms have many reasons for investing in R&D, still market forces are believed to be inadequate for directing an optimal amount of funds towards R&D investments. An important tool for diminishing this failure on markets for R&D is to sustain R&D co-operatives, a policy instrument recently (re)discovered by public authorities. For quite some time the formal economics literature did not pay substantial attention to this policy, but with the appearance of the seminal analysis of d’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) this silence was abruptly disturbed.
The objective of the present paper is to develop a general version of the d’Aspremont & Jacquemin (1988) model which still allows for the calculation of explicit equilibria and therefore enables a comparison between co-operative and non-co-operative R&D. While pursuing this objective an analysis is presented which encompasses several recent contributions to the literature.
Having established this general characterization of a market with possible strategic R&D co-operatives the arguments against and in favour of this industrial policy are evaluated. It appears that there are circumstances when these strategic alliances could indeed be socially beneficial. However there remains always the threat of firms increasing their market power by extending the co-operative agreement to the product market.
- Differentiated oligopoly,
- Cournot competition,
- Bertrand competition,
Citation InformationJeroen Hinloopen. "Strategic R&D cooperatives" Research in Economics Vol. 54 Iss. 2 (2000) p. 153 - 185 ISSN: 1090-9443
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/hinloopen/32/