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Article
The pro-collusive effect of increasing the repose period for price fixing agreements
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2007)
  • Jeroen Hinloopen
Abstract
Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.
Keywords
  • cartel stability,
  • detection probability,
  • statue of limitation
Publication Date
March, 2007
DOI
doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1135
Citation Information
Jeroen Hinloopen. "The pro-collusive effect of increasing the repose period for price fixing agreements" The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Vol. 7 Iss. 1 (2007) ISSN: 1935-1682
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/hinloopen/19/