The pro-collusive effect of increasing the repose period for price fixing agreementsThe B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy (2007)
Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.
- cartel stability,
- detection probability,
- statue of limitation
Publication DateMarch, 2007
Citation InformationJeroen Hinloopen. "The pro-collusive effect of increasing the repose period for price fixing agreements" The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Vol. 7 Iss. 1 (2007) ISSN: 1935-1682
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/hinloopen/19/