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Article
Regulatory Managerialism Inaction: A Case Study of Bank Regulation and Climate Change
Journal of Law & Contemporary Problems (forthcoming)
  • Hilary J Allen, American University Washington College of Law
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-20-2023
Journal

Journal of Law & Contemporary Problems (forthcoming)

Abstract

In November of 2029, Hurricane Penelope struck New York City as a category two storm. Work had started on a wall to protect Manhattan from rising sea levels and storm surges, but the work was incomplete, and significant damage to Manhattan real estate was sustained. While almost all that real estate was insured, insurance companies were compromised by the sheer magnitude of the losses. Even with significant federal subsidies, they were unable to meet their full commitments on insurance policies. Some commercial real estate firms, who had never really recovered from the shift to remote working during the Covid pandemic, decided to cut their losses and file for bankruptcy. Banks with outstanding loans to these firms were left to foreclose upon the damaged properties. At the same time, given their own difficulties, many insurance companies were drawing down revolving lines of credit from their banks. Many of these insurance companies also refused to renew policies, undercutting the value of the foreclosed properties.

Citation Information
Hilary J Allen. "Regulatory Managerialism Inaction: A Case Study of Bank Regulation and Climate Change" Journal of Law & Contemporary Problems (forthcoming) (2023)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/hilary-allen/127/