Picketing in the New Economy

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The rise of the contingent and gig economies and of outsourced and subcontracted work has left many workers with insufficient bargaining power to successfully negotiate collective bargaining agreements with their direct employers. This problem is exacerbated by a statutory ban on worker picketing and boycotts of non-employers, or “secondaries,” even where those employers collude with direct employers on wage-fixing or the suppression of union activity; have monopsony power over direct employers; or have substantial indirect control over worker wages through contractual arrangements.

This Article is a crucial intervention in modernizing the labor law on worker picketing in the New Economy. It first outlines the current distinction between direct and “secondary” employers under the National Labor Relation Act’s secondary picketing ban. It then provides an overview of New Economy work arrangements and developments in economic theory necessary for updating the law on this distinction and for developing the economic expertise of judicial and administrative labor regulation. The Article then proposes unified principles for measuring labor law’s success under New Economy work structures. These principles align expressive and associational values with achieving economically efficient and distributional outcomes for labor and capital.

On this foundation, the Article assesses current law on the primary-secondary distinction and finds it deficient under these principles. It puts forward instead, an economic effects-based standard that would make a defense to secondary picketing available where employees can demonstrate, through economic evidence, that a secondary target—whether through contractual agreements with a direct employer, monopsony power, or oligopsonistic collusion—has sufficient market power to determine the wages or working conditions of picketing workers. The rule would dramatically benefit employees in the “fissured” workplace by providing a tool to correct for unequal bargaining power between workers and their employers. Remedying this imbalance can enhance protections for the expressive activity and

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self-determination critical for democratic and civil society values, and reverse the adverse microeconomic wage effects and distributive consequences of the current law.

INTRODUCTION

When food industry leaders like Yum! Brands and Tropicana were questioned about the existence of enslaved farmworkers in their supply chains, their responses, like many companies criticized for supply chain
abuses, disclaimed responsibility: “We don’t believe it’s our place to get involved in another company’s labor dispute involving its employees.”

Unlike other companies, however, Yum! Brands and Tropicana were ultimately forced to accept responsibility for those farmworkers—thousands of chronically underpaid tomato and citrus harvesters in Immokalee, Florida—after an organization known as the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) organized a “secondary” boycott against them. In bypassing their direct, or “primary,” employers—labor contractors and growers—the CIW were able to secure better wages, working conditions, and a participatory role in the workplace by picketing those who dealt with those employers, employers known as “secondaries” under the labor law.

Before the CIW’s supply-chain campaign, the farmworkers’ average annual income was just over $6500, earned for long hours of backbreaking work, without rest or water breaks, often in ninety-five degree heat, suffering harsh environmental conditions, pesticide inhalation, and sexual harassment. The CIW initially organized strikes against Florida growers to increase wage rates stagnant from the 1970s, but they were unsuccessful in even compelling them to come to the negotiating table. Like many U.S. industries, agricultural production and distribution in Florida is increasingly concentrated: two or three major firms supply millions of pounds of tomatoes, directly or indirectly, to supermarkets and fast food chains. In the citrus industry, two companies own tens of thousands of acres in Florida alone and sell to three ultimate buyers.


5 Those buyers are Cargill, Tropicana (owned by PepsiCo), and Minute Maid (owned by
The CIW determined that market power concentration of buyers in the supply chain created tremendous downward pressure on suppliers’ (the growers’) prices. They thus developed a “boomerang” strategy to target those large corporate buyers through a combination of nationwide secondary picketing and consumer boycotts. Their goal was to pressure top brands to boycott growers unless those growers improved farmworker wages and working conditions.

The CIW’s secondary pickets were an unparalleled success: in under ten years, they succeeded in establishing an award-winning “Fair Food Program” where buyers at the top of the agricultural supply chain pledged to purchase only from suppliers that: (1) paid a “penny-per-pound” more per bucket of tomatoes picked; and (2) followed the Program’s requirements for improved working conditions. The Program has been heralded as a model for improving agricultural working conditions around the world. The penny-per-pound premium lifted worker wages an extra sixty to eighty dollars per week, a twenty to thirty-five percent weekly pay increase. Its supply-chain monitoring has dramatically improved working conditions while effectively sanctioning suppliers that do not comply; results that have rarely been matched in international supply-chain monitoring schemes.

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7 Leary, supra note 6.


9 Greenhouse, supra note 2. The CIW’s Fair Food Program has received a number of awards, including the 2015 Presidential Medal for Extraordinary Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking. See About CIW, COALITION OF IMMOKALEE WORKERS, http://www.ciw-online.org/about (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).

10 Greenhouse, supra note 2.

Without the ability to engage in a secondary boycott, it is highly unlikely that the CIW would have been able to achieve this success. And yet the CIW were only able to execute their secondary boycott campaign because farmworkers are not classified as “employees” under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 12 Although this meant they were not entitled to NLRA’s protections, it also meant that they were exempt from its punishing ban on secondary activity. At its simplest, secondary activity is “a combination to influence A by exerting some sort of economic or social pressure against persons who deal with A . . . .”13

The ban on secondary activity was intended, according to its co-sponsor Senator Robert A. Taft, to “make[] it unlawful to . . . injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees.”14 But it is no accident that judges, legislators, and scholars have identified the secondary activity ban, and specifically the way in which it has artificially separated primary from secondary employers, as alternately: “draw[ing] no lines more arbitrary, tenuous, and shifting [under the labor law]”; “gradual[ly] sapping . . . union strength”; giving employers a “special legal advantage”; and “fit[ting] very uncomfortably with a regime of free collective bargaining.”15 Richard Trumka, the current president of the AFL-CIO, advocated the abolition of the entire NLRA to in part rid the labor movement of the “secondary boycott provisions that hamstring labor at every turn.”16 This is because the CIW’s story is not unique in illustrating the impact of corporate structures on workers’ wages and terms and conditions of work, and the importance of workers’ access to secondary activity protections.

The NLRA’s overbroad definition of “secondaries” has adverse effects on workers’ expressive and associational rights but also impacts workers’ ability to negotiate an efficient wage, increase union density, and enlarge their share of the pie in the context of deep income


12 Farmworkers are exempt from the National Labor Relations Act under Section 2(3). See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).


inequality. Before the statutory ban, secondary boycotts were strategically used in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to solidify unionized workers’ gains against non-unionized employers. Courts began widely enjoining secondary strikes in the 1920s and 1930s, with dramatic impacts on union strength. Congress then formally amended the NLRA to ban secondary boycott bans in the 1940s and 1950s, constructing a legal regime that oversaw the steady decline of union density in the private sector from a high of 35.7% after the Korean War to its current 6.5% today. This tracks a corresponding decline in non-union worker wages and an increase in income inequality. Absolute income mobility trends since 1940, or the fraction of children who earn more than their parents, has fallen from approximately ninety percent for children born in 1940 to fifty percent for children born in the 1980s.


The consequences of the ban are all the more acute in the New Economy where worker leverage over indirect employers’ power over wages is paltry—a dramatically understudied source of the rise and persistence of economic inequality. The increasing fragmentation of work arrangements—replacing vertically integrated firms with the transactional economies of subcontracting, outsourcing, franchising, and supply chain disintegration—accompanied by the rise of contingent work and growing evidence of employer purchasing power, has fundamentally decentralized employment. Instead of confronting a single employer, workers contend with a number of entities that determine or control their wages, work arrangements, and terms and conditions of work. Yet the NLRA limits workers to just one option when they picket for higher wages—a narrowly defined direct employer. This creates a perverse incentive for employers to avoid labor and employment law liability merely by restructuring. Picketing employers who fall outside the circumscribed definition can result in the imposition of labor law’s harshest penalties: injunctions against picketing, statutory damages plus the costs of suit, and even treble damages if the picketing is found to violate antitrust laws. These high stakes have all but eliminated from labor’s tool kit a key source of economic pressure, which has in turn resulted in the erosion of workers’ bargaining power and arbitrary foreclosure of their ability to picket employers that have more impact on wage determinations than their direct employers.

Current scholarship has failed to fully address these effects of the current law or provide comprehensive proposals for reform. First, scholars have failed to take an integrated approach to analyzing the problems with the ban on secondary activity. For example, scholars have examined the impact of the ban on workers’ constitutional right to free expression without examining the ban’s adverse welfare and fairness.

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23 See WEIL, supra note 11, at 28–42.

24 While the NLRA does not expressly define “employers,” “[t]he term ‘employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012). The Board and the courts have until recently interpreted the term narrowly. See WEIL, supra note 11, at 185–208; see also infra text accompanying note 75.

25 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (granting the Board power to seek injunctive relief from the district court pending resolution of secondary boycott claim); § 187 (granting employers statutory damages for unlawful secondary activity); 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012) (stating that private plaintiffs in antitrust actions “shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”).

26 KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 199–200 (2004) (surveying literature on the rise of employer bargaining power vis-à-vis unions since 1980s); see PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: HOW IT HAS CHANGED AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 5 (1999) (arguing that employer power in the workplace increased since the 1990s).
effects. Alternatively, scholars have assessed the impact of secondary boycotts on consumer welfare, with debates centering on how best to police labor’s exemption from antitrust laws, without assessing the impact of such activity on wages and distribution. Others have devised alternative tests to clarify the primary-secondary distinction or bring coherence to secondary activity doctrine without either incorporating contemporary developments in labor economics and antitrust policy or detailing what kind of economic evidence should be relevant for any new rules. A number of articles have more broadly extended economic analysis to the policy goals of the labor laws, but, with one exception, have not applied that analysis to conduct specifically regulated as secondary activity.


This Article decisively restructures and advances these debates by integrating developments in the New Economy and economic theory into the analysis of secondary activity. It presents unified principles for the labor law’s success based on those developments, proposing a novel test that furthers the expressive, efficiency, and equitable goals of labor regulation. It is an attempt to move beyond the “ossification of the labor law” by reviving and adapting its purposes to contemporary workplace arrangements, and particularly, its designation of lawful targets of picketing. After outlining the current state of the law on the primary-secondary distinction in secondary boycott doctrine, the Article takes a step back to elaborate, as a preliminary matter, key developments in workplace arrangements as well as in economic theory in the areas of labor economics, theories of the firm, and contemporary antitrust policy and analysis. For decades, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board), its enforcement officers, and courts interpreting the NLRA, have failed to apply economic analysis to or empirically assess the targets of workers’ secondary activity. The NLRA’s ban on Board hiring of economists and its failure to solicit the expertise of social scientists as amici in its highly doctrinal adjudication have hindered the integration of contemporary advances in economic analysis into the labor law. As a key theoretical contribution, the Article provides an overview of these developments and demonstrates how they are applicable to secondary boycott law’s primary-secondary distinction.

The Article then develops unified principles for evaluating the labor law’s success in the context of these critical developments. While the literature has traditionally opposed the socially valuable goals of achieving economically efficient outcomes for labor and capital on the
one hand, with achieving equitable distributional outcomes and protecting workers’ First Amendment expressive and associational rights on the other, it argues that these interests need not be opposed. Where labor regulation can achieve all three, it should be broadly embraced as normatively ideal. The Article then evaluates the current standard for distinguishing primary and secondary employers under these updated principles and is the first to review its deficiencies on expressive, microeconomic, and macroeconomic grounds.36

Finally, the Article puts forward a principled, economic effects–based standard that satisfies the principles for labor law’s success: the market power rule.37 Under the rule, indirect employers with sufficient market power—whether through contractual agreements with a direct employer, monopsony power, or oligopsonistic collusion—in the direct employer’s labor input or product market to determine workers’ wages and/or their terms and conditions of work would be deemed “transactional primaries” rather than prohibited “secondary” picketing targets. The picketing of transactional primaries would be entitled to the same protections as the picketing of primary employers. The rule would have three key benefits. First, in addition to better protecting First Amendment expressive and associational rights, the rule would also increase worker bargaining power, with concomitant micro- and macroeconomic effects, without frustrating the purposes of the statutory ban. Second, the rule would protect workers against indirect employers’ evasion of their labor and employment law obligations. And third, the rule would develop the economic expertise of the Board and the courts, enhancing labor law’s ability to more closely track labor market conditions in the New Economy. The market power rule could be implemented through adjudication as a defense available to picketing employees or through either Board rulemaking or legislative amendment.38

I. THE LAW OF SECONDARY PICKETING

A. The NLRA’s Evolving and Competing Purposes

Properly delineating lawful from unlawful targets of picketing requires first parsing the purposes of the labor law that inform the regulation of picketing generally and the secondary boycott ban in particular. The preamble of the NLRA lists multiple “Findings and

36 See infra Section III.B.
37 See infra Section IV.A–B.
38 See infra Section IV.A–B.
Declaration of Policy” for the federal law:

to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions . . . by encouraging . . . collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.39

There is extensive literature on the relationship between and priorities among the NLRA’s purposes. Unpacking this relationship, and these priorities, is no easy matter, given the obvious tensions between the Wagner Act of 1935—which set out the basic framework of the modern NLRA—and later amendments to the Act by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Amendment or LMRA) and Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Amendment).40

The cooperationist vision of the Wagner Act set out two interdependent goals for the new national labor policy: labor peace; and equal bargaining power between “labor” and “capital.”41 Framed as a response to the rise of large-scale industry and the severe economic effects of the Depression on workers, the statute’s associational protections and collective bargaining scheme were a direct attempt to increase both individual worker bargaining power and workers’ mass purchasing power, with the larger aim of stabilizing the economy and encouraging macroeconomic growth.42 As stated in the Act’s Preamble:

The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate . . . association

40 For debates about the NLRA’s purposes, see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960 318 (1985) (arguing that Wagner Act proponents saw the right of self-organization as only a means to labor peace); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 295–96 (1987) (arguing that proto-Keynesian policy was the Act’s primary purpose); James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law Making, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 7, 10–13 (1985) (arguing that “advancement of economic and social justice, rather than the reduction of industrial strife” was the Wagner Act’s primary objective); Stewart J. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 254–56 (1987) (equating Congress’s primary goal of industrial peace with allocative efficiency).
41 Wachter, supra note 20, at 429–31 (discussing twin purposes of promoting bargaining equity and industrial peace); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 30, at 461.
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to
aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working
conditions within and between industries.

Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife
and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees.43

For the Act’s chief architect, Senator Robert Wagner, equal
bargaining power was essential for the Act’s success. He believed
cooperation was “given only to equals,” and “[t]o match the huge
aggregate of modern capital[,] the wage-earner must be
organized . . . .”44 In congressional debates, he claimed it “simply
absurd to say that an individual, one of 10,000 workers, is on an
equality with his employer in bargaining for his wages. . . . When 10,000
come together and collectively bargain with the employer, then there is
equality of bargaining power.”45 He and others emphasized collective
bargaining as a means of ridding individual workers’ employment
contracts with large-scale employers from duress.46 When the Supreme
Court upheld the NLRA’s constitutionality, it did so on the basis of the
government’s interest in promoting economic growth by facilitating
equal bargaining power between employers and employees.47

The Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
Wagner Act had different goals. Justified as necessary to restrain the
purported abuses and excesses enabled by the Wagner Act, the Taft-

43 29 U.S.C. § 151. For discussion of the Wagner Act’s cooperationist vision, see Barenberg,
supra note 39, at 1427–30.
44 Barenberg, supra note 39, at 1467, 1467 n.377 (citing Robert Wagner, The New
Responsibilities of Organized Labor, Address at the Convention of the New York State
Federation of Labor (Aug. 28, 1928)).
45 To Create a National Labor Board: Hearing on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on Educ.
& Labor, 73d Cong. 17 (1934) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
1 LEGIS. Hist.].
46 See 78 CONG. REC. 3678–79 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 LEGIS.
Hist., supra note 45, at 20 (“The primary requirement for cooperation is that employers and
employees should possess equality of bargaining power.”); see also 79 CONG. REC. 6183–84
(1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
1935, at 2283 (1985) [hereinafter 2 LEGIS. Hist.]; S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 2 (1934), reprinted in 1
LEGIS. Hist., supra note 45, at 1 (identifying centralized economic activity as negating genuine
liberty of contract).
Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments emphasized individualistic and employer-friendly policy goals not emphasized by the earlier statute. These included protecting individual workers’ autonomy to reject collective bargaining and restraining unions’ ability to obstruct commerce. By challenging unions’ ability to present a unified front against employers and weakening the economic weapons unions had available, the Amendments were in tension with the Wagner Act’s focus on bilateral labor-management cooperation reliant on establishing equal bargaining power between the two to ensure labor peace.

Over time, the NLRB and the courts reconciled the collectivist aims of the Wagner Act with the more individualist concerns of the later Amendments by reconceiving the primary purposes of the NLRA as the promotion of “industrial peace” and the “free flow of commerce.” That reconciliation has contributed to an emphasis on continued production over the competitive wage and distributional goals of the labor law, regardless of the broader state of the economy and any resulting economic effects.

**B. The NLRA’s Secondary Picketing Ban**

The secondary activity ban, enacted as part of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the NLRA, was a critical component of the shift away from the Act’s distributist goals in favor of prioritizing continued production. Under the amended provisions, it is an unfair labor practice for workers in a labor dispute with a direct employer to “threaten, coerce, or restrain” other “secondary” or “neutral” employers to join forces with them in boycotting or refusing to deal with their immediate employer (section 8(b)(4)). It is also an unfair labor practice to induce or encourage employees of another employer to “strike or . . . refus[e] in the course of his employment” to

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48 Gross, supra note 40, at 12–16.
49 For emphasis on industrial peace in the legislative history, see S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 1 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 46, at 2300 (“The first objective of the bill is to promote industrial peace.”). For case law emphasizing the purposes of industrial peace and the free flow of commerce, see, e.g., NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Emps. of Am., 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986) (stating that the Act’s basic purpose “is to preserve industrial peace”); First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) (stating the Act’s fundamental aim as “the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate commerce”).
50 See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 111 (1983) (“The most commonly expressed goal of the Wagner Act was the achievement of industrial peace.”); Donald A. Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 590, 594 (1985) (“Since [the Great Depression], ‘industrial harmony’ has replaced ‘equality of bargaining power’ as the primary justification of our labor law.”); Schwab, supra note 40, at 252–53 (discussing the labor law’s purpose of industrial peace and equating it with economic efficiency).
deal with or handle a direct employer’s goods or services.52

Prior to the Wagner Act, secondary activity was prohibited under a number of legal theories, from criminal and antitrust conspiracy to the torts of trespass and disturbing the peace.53 While the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 arguably legalized peaceful secondary pressure, the Supreme Court in *Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering* stripped workers of virtually all secondary activity protections granted under that Act.54 After significant pressure from organized labor and progressives, Congress revived protections for peaceful union secondary conduct in the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932.55 However, the legality of secondary activity remained controversial, and in 1947, over a presidential veto, section 8(b)(4) was amended to the Act.56 Taft-Hartley passed in the context of increased anti-union sentiment following worker strikes protesting post-World War II layoffs and price increases.57

The purposes of the proscription on secondary activity were multifold. First, it was intended to protect employers neutral to a labor dispute from union pressure that would force them to cease dealing with a struck employer.58 The concern was that of enmeshing those with only indirect power to resolve a labor dispute in the adverse economic consequences of a strike.59 Second, the prohibition was intended to prevent unions from colluding with employers to reduce competition by

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52 Id.
59 1947 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 58, at 1106.
targeting an employer’s competitors. Finally, Congress was concerned about unions coercing non-unionized workers of other employers to compel them to accept union representation through a form of “top-down organizing.”

The Board enforces these goals by distinguishing between “primary” and “secondary” employers. While the Board has recently begun to extend statutory “employer” status to franchisors and hiring firms in the franchising and temporary employment contexts under common law agency tests, it defines “primary” and “secondary” employers under section 8(b)(4) quite differently. Employers not in a direct employment relationship with picketing statutory employees are deemed “secondaries” with two narrow exceptions. First, under the “ally doctrine,” otherwise neutral employers who perform struck work farmed out by a primary employer forfeit their neutral status. Second, under the “single employer” doctrine, an employer forfeits neutral status if it functions as a single employer with a direct employer under a demanding four-factor test: (1) common ownership; (2) common

60 93 CONG. REC. 270 (1947) (citing Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd.of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 798–800 (1945)); Fred W. Jones, The “Secondary Boycott” Provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 9 LA. L. REV. 282, 285 (1949); see also Campbell, supra note 28, at 1022–39 (discussing adverse effects of extending labor’s monopoly on inputs to firm outputs through secondary activity); Leslie, Principles, supra note 28, at 1224–33 (proposing antitrust regulation of certain union-management schemes to regulate product markets by controlling prices, outputs, or market allocation); Meltzer, supra note 28, at 710 (discussing unions’ ability to collude with employers); Winter, Jr., supra note 28, at 16 (discussing anticompetitive incentives in both labor and management where collecting bargaining is based on employee organization along product market lines).


62 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 186, 2, 15–16, 18–21 (2015) (expanding joint-employer standard to include the indirect right to control the “means or manner of employees’ work and terms of employment”); id. at 16 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958)’s common-law agency test to define a “servant”); McDonald’s USA, L.L.C., 362 N.L.R.B. 168, 2 n.1 (2015) (applying Browning-Ferris’s joint-employer test to franchising); see also Retro Envtl., Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. 70, 4 n.4 (2016) (applying Browning-Ferris’s joint-employer test to temporary staffing agency and construction company). As of this writing, the status of Browning-Ferris’s joint-employer test is uncertain and remains on appeal before the D.C. Circuit. See Motion of the National Labor Relations Board for Remand of the Case to the Board for Reconsideration in Light of New Board Precedent, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 16-1028, 16-1063, 16-1064 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 19, 2017); Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 3991 (2018) (Nos. 16-1028, 16-1063, 16-1064).

63 See sources cited supra note 24 and accompanying text.

64 See, e.g., Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627 (1967) (describing “ally doctrine” exception to secondary boycott rule); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 776, 313 N.L.R.B. 1148, 1164 n.57 (1994) (defining the Board’s interpretation of “single employer”); see also DERESHINSKY ET AL., supra note 29, at 121–89 (summarizing case law).

management; (3) interrelation of operations; and (4) common or centralized control of labor relations. Union penalties for picketing secondary employers are severe: employers can request injunctive relief from the NLRB’s Solicitor General and can directly seek statutory damages under section 303 of the LMRA as well as potential treble damages under the antitrust laws. Union violations of section 8(b)(4) are the only unfair labor practices that can result in statutory damages available to employers under the NLRA.

Although the ban serves important purposes, the very broad definition of secondary employers that the Board employs creates serious problems for worker bargaining power in New Economy workplace structures—as the next Part explores.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEW ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC THEORY

The secondary boycott ban and its exceptions fail to take account of or integrate the dramatic changes in workplace arrangements that have come to characterize the New Economy. Nor do they consider key contemporary developments in labor economics, the theory of the firm, and antitrust policy, either in assessing which economic actors impact labor conditions or in determining, on a more theoretical level, how corporate restructuring and contractual relationships have shifted bargaining power away from labor in favor of both direct and indirect employers. These developments provide useful analytical frameworks for assessing labor market dynamics and pricing structures, offering critical interventions and guiding principles for identifying which entities determine workers’ wages and working conditions and which are “wholly unconcerned” with those determinations. By doing so, they can aid in identifying exactly where the current primary-secondary distinction fails to track the statute’s purposes and offer insights for revising that distinction to better further them.

A. New Economy Work Structures

Dramatic changes in the structure and valuation of work present significant challenges to labor law’s outdated regulatory infrastructure. A growing number of workers are in work arrangements where direct as

68 See supra notes 39–40.
well as indirect employers determine their wages. Economists estimate that workers engaged in alternative work arrangements—temporary, on-call, or contract workers, as well as independent contractors or freelancers—rose from 10.7%, or around 15 million workers, in 2005 to 15.8%, or 23.6 million workers, in late 2015. Some predict that as much as 40% of the American workforce will be contingent workers or independent contractors by 2020. While comprehensive numbers have not yet been collected, there are an estimated 3.3 million workers in fast-food franchises and 940,000 in outsourced janitorial services. Over 80% of hotel properties alternate company-operated hotels with franchising and subcontracting arrangements, and the hotel industry overall employs 1.86 million workers. There are also countless workers laboring in vertically disintegrated supply chains—manufacturing and supplying parts, handling distribution, providing contracted-for services, all spun off from previously vertically integrated companies—including in the fastest-growing U.S. industries.

Restructuring work arrangements are a key way employers in the New Economy evade compliance with labor and employment law. New Economy employment blurs firm responsibility for the terms and conditions of work and creates an imbalance in worker bargaining power relative to indirect employers. By shifting from setting wages to

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72 Id. at 146, 154–55.

73 Id. at 154.


75 Weil, *supra* note 11, at 185–208 (detailing how competing definitions of “employee” and “employer” in labor and employment law fail to track New Economy employment).

setting prices for contracted-out, primarily non-union work, employers operating within disintegrated supply chains, franchisor-franchisee relationships, and complex production-and-distribution networks can capture the difference between contracted-out wages (at the marginal revenue product of labor) and prevailing wage rates in the vertical integration era that were set through collective bargaining or internal labor markets while shedding the costs of legal liability as statutory “employers.” Yet, employers within these disintegrated networks have detailed contractual provisions with direct employers that set standards, quality controls, and monitoring requirements on production and service. The contractual delineations of responsibility for employment conditions between employers disrupt the traditional principal-agent model of employment adopted under the NLRA. And these arrangements place many obstacles in workers’ way as they attempt to improve their plight through collective action with others. The fragmentation of protections even within a given workplace—between ill-defined direct employees and independent contractors, temporary and permanent workers, and direct and outsourced workers—increases workers’ coordination costs and impedes the building of solidarity and cohesion necessary to build a union.

Employees that do have labor law protections face a series of legal obstacles in organizing and bargaining with multiple employers,
including the fact that the post-industrial, service sector–oriented economy has made single-firm careers itinerant and flexible.82 Core features of the labor law designed to improve working conditions on the timescale of a worker’s productive life—emphasizing seniority systems and narrow bargaining units for workers trained to specialize in circumscribed and firm-specific job skills—are not compatible with, say, on-call employment at Uber, temp work, or the transient, project- and team-oriented job descriptions through which workers migrate in a single job.83 Finally, workers’ access to NLRB remedies is so protracted that there is little incentive in the fast-paced economy to utilize or rely on enforcement mechanisms for labor rights protections.84

Labor law’s ability to successfully adapt will determine its relevance as a regulatory mechanism capable of achieving its policy goals.85 The failures of current law provide ammunition for questioning the value of labor regulation altogether and invite calls for its dismantling.86 A critical political and scholarly project justifying the NLRA’s regulatory regime must connect its stated policy goals with a goal long argued to be in opposition to them: maximizing social welfare.87 In fact, efficiency goals are not antithetical to the purposes of the labor law. With the Board’s recent decisions and rulemaking on the chopping block, it is crucial to revive and adapt the NLRA’s purposes by integrating current developments in economic theory that inform the labor law’s ability to achieve both welfare and fairness benefits. These developments explain the effects of workplace arrangements on worker bargaining power and offer tools to correct for existing regulations’ lagging behind. The following Sections provide an overview of these developments, concentrating on how they are relevant for secondary boycott law’s primary-secondary distinction specifically.

82 STONE, supra note 26, at 87–99 (describing the rise of the post-industrial “new employment relationship”).

83 See id. at 125, 203–09 (pointing to features of American unionism as “antithetical to boundaryless careers”).


85 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); Barenberg, supra note 39, at 1390 n.31 (discussing the Wagner Act’s purposes).


87 See, e.g., Epstein, Labor Unions, supra note 30, at 33 (“At one time, unions offered attractive benefits to their members, but always at the cost of overall social welfare.”); Epstein, Common Law, supra note 30, at 1402–03 (arguing that American labor law “shrinks the pie” for certain workers’ benefit over other workers and employers).
B. Developments in Labor Economics on Wage Determination

The primary-secondary distinction and its common law carve-outs for “allies” and “single employers” fail to take into account how current labor markets work, particularly in the area of wage determination. The Wagner Act envisioned collective bargaining as the exclusive vehicle for wage setting, isolated from what John R. Commons described as the “cutthroat competition” of external market wage-setting that the “cheapest laborer” would accept. The Act’s success turned on the fact that a single “employer” had the power to lift its employees’ wages outside those competitive determinations. Once suspended, workers and employers could bargain for a neat division of firm revenues from sales in a final product market.

In fact, the economic arrangement in contemporary workplaces is often far more complex. Many firms have developed what economists call “internal labor markets” (ILMs). ILMs are administrative units “within which the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” within a firm that establish methods of compensation, benefit packages, and job ladders for in-house promotional hiring. The impact of internal labor market structures on workplace organization has been profound. Employers

90 Wachter, supra note 20, at 440–42; see also BARENBERG, supra note 39, at 1421.
91 Wachter, supra note 20, at 440–42.
94 Oded Stark & Walter Hyll, On the Economic Architecture of the Workplace: Repercussions of Social Comparisons Among Heterogeneous Workers, 29 J. LAB. ECON. 349 (2011) (modeling how wage sharing and fairness concerns impact compensation policy and worker productivity). Labor scholars debate the impact of unionization in the creation of internal labor markets through the establishment of seniority arrangements and other protections for job security. For example, Clark Kerr and Paul Osterman argue that internal labor market policies are a result of
benefit from establishing internal structures as a means of capturing the complexity of labor as a dynamic input of production: fixed compensation structures allowed employers to recover recruitment and training costs by incentivizing longer-term attachments through higher wage premiums and turnover reduction. ILMs are also a means by which firms overcome holdup problems, reduce monitoring costs, and prevent either workers or employers from cheating the other in the face of incomplete employment contracts. A dominant trend of ILMs is the establishment of horizontal and vertical pay equity structures to maintain “[i]nternal harmony and morale” by setting standard pay across and between comparable positions within a firm, even if individual performance varies.

While ILM schemes were prevalent and remain common, the growth of contingent employment has impacted workers’ ability to access and benefit from them. Because contingent work is priced on the external market, employers can avoid the downward rigidity of wages and loss aversion of existing employees. Evasion of direct union pressure on employers. Kerr, supra note 92, at 29; Paul Osterman, Introduction: The Nature and Importance of Internal Labor Markets, in INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 1, 9 (Paul Osterman ed., 1984); see also Weiler, supra note 15, at 8–9. On the other hand, Katherine Stone contends that, as a historical matter, internal labor market structures were established by employers in a period that “predated unions, often by several decades,” and that such structures are frequently found in nonunion firms. Stone, supra note 26, at 60–61.


97 TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION 79, 81 (1999) (explaining the existence of pay equity structures and nominal wage rigidity on fairness grounds); see also Weil, supra note 11, at 83–85 (discussing evolution of internal equity schemes); David Card et al., Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 2981 (2012).


99 Stone, supra note 26, at 67–86 (describing the shift from permanent to contingent employment).

100 Bewley, supra note 97, at 18–19 (“The greater flexibility of hiring pay [for secondary workers] derived from the lesser importance of internal pay equity.”).
employer liability under labor and employment laws also lowers the hiring and labor costs of contingent workers and/or the costs of doing business with those who rely on contingent work.101 Employers have thus increasingly moved towards the benefits of “fissured” workplace structures without wanting to relinquish the benefits of relational contracting for labor inputs, characterized by repeat play, extensive monitoring, and reliance on workers’ development of firm-specific skills.102Ordinarily, but for a contract between direct employers and labor providers, such work would be less “market-oriented,” more determined by firm-specific value-added, and wages would be set by the level of competition within an ILM rather than based on external market rates. Instead, by switching from wage-setting to pricing, firms are able to wage-discriminate and capture wage differential rents through contract.103 As David Weil describes it, “[s]hifting work outward allows redistribution of gains upward.”104

C. Developments in Economic Theories of the Firm

The theory of the firm is another significant area of study in the economics literature not incorporated into the analysis of the primary-secondary distinction. Neither the Wagner Act nor its subsequent amendments explicitly proffer a theory of the firm in which labor disputes are resolved.105 And neither Board nor court decisions have developed one or applied one to their analysis of who should count as a “primary” or a “secondary” under section 8(b)(4). By failing to do so, they have failed to integrate into their analysis of the primary-secondary distinction, the effects of employer control over asset usage on contracting employers’ relative bargaining power with each other ex ante and ex post. They also fail to consider how a “secondary” employer’s bargaining power over the wages and terms and conditions

102 Weil, supra note 11, at 60–72 (discussing detailed, firm-specific work provided by contracted entities with lead firms as well as extensive, low-cost monitoring networks enabling quality control).
103 Id. at 20, 87–91.
104 Id. at 90.
105 The Board applies a narrowly rebuttable presumption in favor of initial bargaining units being limited to a single facility of a single employer, allowing multi-employer bargaining units only under certain circumstances. See, e.g., J&L Plate, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 429, 429 (1993).
of work of a primary employer, or on how the division of ex post surplus in the network of relationships between primary employers, their workers, and contracting parties, affects who should count as a “primary” rather than a “secondary.” Incorporating a nuanced theory of the firm into the analysis of the primary-secondary distinction is crucial not only for understanding firm incentives within the “fissured” workplace, but also for discerning the effects of decisions about corporate structure, contracting, and ownership rights on employer control and employee bargaining power.

Under a neoclassical conception of the firm, assuming no agency costs, a firm’s production choices are focused on maximizing the owner’s welfare, and the firm functions as a set of production plans capitalized upon by managers buying and selling inputs and outputs to achieve that goal. The revisions of Coasean transaction-cost economics introduced the impact of planning and contracting costs on the structure of the firm. Specifically, Coasean theory marked the firm’s boundaries where marginal cost savings from transacting within the firm are the same as the costs of any errors resulting from concentrating decision-making in a single managerial authority plus any associated administrative rigidity costs.

Three main criticisms of Coasean theory of the firm complicated his account and contribute to the explanation of both workplace fissuring and its effects on direct and indirect employer control over employees. First, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz challenged Coase’s dichotomy between an isolated, dominant internal authority within the firm on the one hand, and the authority of competitively determined market valuations on the other, arguing that a firm’s authority to dictate obedience from an employee is determined less by authority relations and more by the employee’s opportunity costs on the market. Second, they highlighted the importance of sunk costs and lock-in effects like firm- and relationship-specific worker training on the boundaries of the firm, introducing ways in which external markets fail to guide employers’ and employees’ opportunity costs after such

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106 For accounts of neoclassical theory of the firm, see JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 64–134 (3d ed. 1980); HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6–78 (2d ed. 1984). Principal-agent theory complicated this account by identifying conflicts of interest between different economic actors, observability problems, and asymmetries of information within the firm. See, e.g., Bengt Hōlmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. 74 (1979); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 Bell J. Econ. 55 (1979).


investments. Finally, economists broke down distinctions between internal and external markets to view the firm as a nexus of contracts with one instituting and governing “standard form” contract establishing the business entity and allowing a proliferation of contractual relationships with employees, customers, and others.

Later economic theorists developed a property-rights approach to the theory of the firm, viewing the firm as the owner of residual rights of control over nonhuman assets in contractual relationships. Ownership rights structure the contracting parties’ incentives: “[W]hen contracts are incomplete, the boundaries of firms . . . determine who owns and controls which assets.” The choice between contracting with an outside firm and merging or integrating with it, affects workers’ incentives depending on whether any training or investment in skills benefits a direct employer only, the contractual arrangement between a direct employer and another firm, or the outside firm. A supplier-purchaser relationship between General Motors (GM) and Fisher Body, an entity that supplies GM with car bodies, illustrates this point. If GM and Fisher are separate companies, a Fisher employee’s incentives to invest in improvements specific to Fisher or GM will depend on which company owns the assets. For example, if Fisher owns the assets, he could invest in improving the quality of Fisher’s output by learning some aspect of Fisher’s production process better. If, of all of Fisher’s customers, only GM cares about the improvement, that employee could increase his value to the Fisher-GM venture by investing in the improvement and possibly extracting its benefits with a higher wage or promotion. Since the improvement is GM-specific, the employee incurs lower costs negotiating directly with GM both because GM is the party that benefits from the employee’s increased skill and because negotiating with Fisher would require Fisher, in turn, to bargain with GM. And the employee would capture a lower share of the surplus

111 Hart, supra note 107, at 1764–65.
113 Hart, supra note 107, at 1766.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1767–78.
116 Id. at 1768.
Fisher decides to parlay, reducing the employee’s overall incentive to make the improvement.\footnote{117 Id. at 1768–69.}

The employee benefits, and thus his incentives to make the investment increase, and the lower the number of possible hold-ups: if Fisher owns the assets, two hold-ups—Fisher’s denial of the employee’s access to the assets, and GM’s declining to pay more for the improved product—make it likely that the employee, at best, receives a third of his increased marginal product. With GM’s management controlling the assets, there is only one hold-up: GM’s power to deny the employee his increased marginal product rests solely in one agent’s hands, making it likely that the employee, at best, receives half of his increased marginal product.

However, if the improvement is not GM-specific and reduces Fisher’s costs of production, regardless of Fisher’s final customer, we reach the opposite conclusion: the hold-ups are reduced by giving Fisher control and are increased if GM, the indirect recipient, were given control.\footnote{118 Id. at 1769.} An employee’s incentives to make improvements specific to either company are also low where the assets are jointly owned because the number of parties with hold-up power will always be two.\footnote{119 Id. at 1770.} This illustration demonstrates how property rights over physical assets can affect control over human assets. The owner of the physical assets has more leverage over the worker: it can deprive the employee of the assets he works with and hire others to work with them.\footnote{120 Id. at 1770–71.}

These developments in the theory of the firm literature introduce critical insights for secondary activity analysis. First, it makes clear that wages and terms and conditions of work are not exclusively determined by who directly controls the employee, but by a broader set of factors: the transaction costs of contracting inside the firm and in the external market (including agency and monitoring costs); the nexus of contracts within which workers provide services; and the ownership and property rights of direct employers and their contracting parties. Second, these developments highlight the ways in which firm decisions, whether internal or in the marketplace, impact worker bargaining power relative to employers regarding the division of ex post surplus not only in their direct relationships, but through employer bargains with contracting parties.
Finally, the NLRB and the courts have ignored the effect of indirect employer monopsony power and monopsonistic competition in markets with multiple employers on employee wages when distinguishing “primaries” from “secondaries.” This is an area of growing study and concern in both the economic and antitrust literature.\textsuperscript{121} Monopsony power is the inverse of monopoly power, or the ability to charge higher prices for a product.\textsuperscript{122} Firms with monopsony power have the ability to pay lower prices for inputs without losing sellers to competition from other firms buying the same or similar product.\textsuperscript{123} In the labor market, monopsonistic employers can pay lower wages to workers than would otherwise prevail in a competitive market without losing those workers to competing employers. As with monopoly, monopsony power can lead to economic inefficiencies, and in the labor market, to redistribution from workers to employers.\textsuperscript{124} This is because, in an otherwise competitive labor market, firms would bid wages up to recruit workers from other firms as long as the revenue they could earn by hiring another worker exceeds the wage it must pay, tracking as closely as possible wages and worker productivity, or the worker’s value-added. If a firm bids too low for a worker’s wages in a perfectly competitive market the worker would find alternative employment, so competitive firms would all need to pay market wages and compensation would equalize across similarly productive workers for similar types of jobs.\textsuperscript{125} However, when there is

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\item[123] \textit{Areeda \& Hovenkamp, supra} note \textbf{122}, at \textbf{575}.
\item[125] \textit{Id.; Manning, supra} note \textbf{88}, at \textbf{29}–\textbf{32}.
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imperfect competition, firms with monopsony power are incentivized to employ fewer workers at a lower wage than they would in a competitive labor market because what they lose in reduced output and revenue they can make up for in reduced labor costs by paying lower wages.126 Monopsonistic employers can thus recoup labor and recruitment costs, shifting the benefits of production from wages to profits.127 Economists and policymakers increasingly recognize the existence of employer monopsony power in labor markets based on direct evidence of collusion between employers and non-compete agreements, as well as indirect evidence of minimum wage impacts on employment, wage-setting, and wage discrimination.128 The U.S. Department of Justice and class action litigants have brought suit against major Silicon Valley employers, hospitals, and sports associations for artificially suppressing the wages of high-tech employees, nurses, mixed martial arts fighters, and others, through no-poaching agreements, collusive wage-setting, and unlawful monopsony acquisition and maintenance.129 An estimated eighteen percent of the U.S. labor force is covered by non-compete agreements based on recent survey evidence.130 Indirect evidence of monopsonistic wage-setting is also strong. Beginning in the 1990s, economists began finding that minimum wage increases were not

126 CEA I, supra note 124, at 2.
127 Id.
accompanied by job loss, indicating that wages have not been bid up to the marginal value of labor. Empirical evidence also indicates that workers' quit rates are less responsive to wage changes than would be expected if labor markets were competitive, suggesting that employers can set wages significantly below what would prevail in a competitive market without losing their workforce. Employment restructuring is a critical component of firms' abilities to engage in wage discrimination by outsourcing and subcontracting away from internal equity constraints.

There is also evidence that employer discretion over workers' wages may be rising due to rising market concentration, declining labor market dynamism, and the decline of unions and the federal minimum wage. Between 1997 and 2012 there has been a steady increase of product market concentration in the U.S. economy, where the majority of industries have seen increases in revenue share by the fifty largest firms. Rising concentration can impact labor markets by expanding each individual firm's monopsony power, facilitating collusion, and increasing barriers to entry. Labor market dynamism, or the frequency of changes in who is working for whom, has also been in a pattern of long-term decline, suggesting that incumbents are shielded from competitive upward pressure on wages and an increase in job-switching costs for non-contingent workers. Finally, with union density in the private sector at a historic low, and the real value of the federal minimum wage declining twenty-four percent since its peak of $9.55 (in 2015 dollars) in 1968, there are reduced checks to employer wage-setting power.

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134 CEA I, supra note 124, at 2–4.

135 CEA, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 4 & tbl. 1.


138 CEA I, supra note 124, at 12–13; BLS, Union Members—2016, supra note 20.
Integrating the distorting effects of monopsony power and oligopsonistic collusion on wage suppression is necessary for evaluating labor market impacts on worker bargaining power and any resulting efficiency and distributional effects.139 Without assessing which firms in fact have the power to determine wages, the purpose, function, and success of a collective bargaining framework for negotiating wages becomes shadow puppetry. Antitrust scholars, economists, and the courts have developed a range of mechanisms for measuring harm resulting from an employer’s monopsony power or monopsonistic competition, whether through unilateral conduct or through agreement, providing economic modeling that can be used in adjudication to determine whether workers suffer lower wages due to monopsony power or monopsonistic competition in the labor market.140

Monopsony power by an indirect employer can be directly shown with evidence that that employer can depress wages below the competitive level by withholding the purchase of labor inputs and not losing the sellers of those inputs to other purchasers or employers.141 Monopsony power can also be shown indirectly with evidence of an indirect employer’s market share in a relevant geographic market for labor inputs protected by entry barriers.142 Courts have found a twenty percent market share to be sufficient to infer buyer market power over sellers of labor inputs.143 But even buyers with low market shares can exert significant market power over sellers to the extent that sellers are more dependent on buyers than the inverse.144 For example, high-volume retailers have tremendous leverage over suppliers, especially where the market for particular products is relatively small but benefits from resale in high-distribution, nationally scaled businesses like Amazon.com or Wal-Mart are significant.145 There is a strong consensus

139 See Exec. Order No. 13,725, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,417 (Apr. 15, 2016); CEA I, supra note 124, at 4–5; see also Renata Hesse, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., And Never the Twain Shall Meet? Connecting Popular and Professional Visions for Antitrust Enforcement, Presentation at the Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 20, 2016) (emphasizing that antitrust enforcement “benefit[s] workers, whose wages won’t be driven down by dominant employers with the power to dictate terms of employment”).
140 See infra Section IV.B.
143 Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000).
145 Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 776–77 (6th Cir. 2002); Stucke, supra
that market share thresholds alone are insufficient to find monopsony power, and courts should thus consider interrelated factors such as “upward sloping or somewhat inelastic supply curve[s] in the input market” and “an inability or unwillingness for new purchasers to enter the market or current purchasers to expand the amount of their purchases in the market.” An employer’s market share can be determined as the percentage of its share in either dollars or units of its labor input purchases; the elasticity of fringe demand can be the capacity of alternative buyers to purchase the labor inputs “without undue delay, risk, or cost” (including barriers to entry); and the elasticity of supply can be determined by the workers’ ability and incentive to switch to selling other services. Where employees are less responsive to wage changes than would be expected in a competitive labor market, economists infer evidence of monopsony power. Further, evidence of worker search costs, labor market frictions, “job lock,” information asymmetries, and barriers to market price discovery, immobile benefits, and regulatory or other barriers to worker mobility, can support a finding of monopsony power.

Where multiple employers collude on wages and agree to fix wages, employer conduct is per se unlawful and litigants need not establish that anticompetitive harms outweigh any procompetitive benefits from agreements. Where agreements are not directly evidenced, they can be inferred through circumstantial evidence of market concentration, industry structures, firm histories, employer collusion (such as through no-poaching agreements and coordinating wage offers), and market environments that are conducive to and/or facilitate collusion.

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\[\text{146 FTC & DOJ, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition 15, 17 (July 2004) [hereinafter DOJ & FTC, Improving Health Care]; see also Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 308, 324 (D.D.C. 2011); Blair & Harrison, supra note 122, at 58.}
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\[\text{149 CEA I, supra note 124, at 5–10; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 Am. Econ. Rev. 460, 461 (2002).}
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“plus factors” indicating agreement include: actions contrary to an employer’s self-interest; evidence of employers’ regular communication; industry performance data suggesting successful coordination; and the absence of a plausible business rationale for suspicious conduct.152 The core evidence of harm to workers from employer monopsony power is artificially suppressed wages.153 Evidence of artificially suppressed wages can be determined through econometric regressions comparing existing wage conditions to a “but-for” world where wages would be competitive within the same labor market.154 Economists usually utilize a benchmark or yardstick approach comparing existing wages to those before the anticompetitive conduct occurred (say, prior to the merger of two defendant firms), or in comparison to a similar industry with similar labor market conditions to ascertain the marginal revenue product (MRP), the value that an employee creates for his employer in competitive conditions.155 For example, in a case alleging that hospitals in the Albany area colluded to suppress registered nurses’ wages, economic expert testimony was offered to show that wages of agency nurses in the same geographic market—argued to be interchangeable with registered nurses they worked alongside performing the same tasks on the same days—was the appropriate benchmark for comparing registered nurses’ wages, and agency nurses’ wages exceeded the registered nurses’ wages.156

Developments in labor economics and antitrust policy have significantly advanced both theoretical and empirical tools for assessing when indirect employers have sufficient power to artificially suppress indirect employees’ wages. Labor law could dramatically benefit from utilizing these tools in determining employers’ market power for the purposes of distinguishing between primaries and secondaries, and more broadly, to ensure that workers have protections to effectuate the purposes of the labor law.

153 BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 122, at 48–49 (discussing economic harms resulting from monopsony).
155 Id. at 256–57 (discussing the Lerner Index of measuring market power); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust Damages, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 154, at 378, 380–81 (describing benchmark and yardstick approaches).
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY

Integrating developments in the New Economy and economic theory into evaluations of existing labor regulation can provide a clearer view of when those regulations are not achieving the labor law’s purposes and when reforms are needed. Further, perhaps more surprisingly, it can offer a way out of viewing the labor law’s expressive, microeconomic, and macroeconomic goals as necessarily conflicting. Instead, economic theory suggests that the regulation of secondary activity can be recalibrated to achieve all of these purposes. This Part elaborates those principles and applying the insights from the prior Part, explains how current law on the primary-secondary distinction fails under them.

A. Unified Principles for Evaluating Labor Law Rules

Judge Richard Posner is not the first to view labor law as “founded on a policy that is the opposite of the policies of competition and economic efficiency that most economists support....” But labor regulation is not inherently inefficient. Rather, it is best conceived as achieving three socially beneficial outcomes on a sliding scale: (1) enhancing expressive and associational rights at work (First Amendment protections); (2) minimizing inefficient resource allocations to ensure the stabilization of competitive wages (microeconomic policy); and (3) achieving the distributional goals of enhancing mass purchasing power (macroeconomic policy).

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First, since its inception, labor law has been committed to promoting workers’ expressive and associational rights. These rights operate as an “analogue[] to the First Amendment and the ‘Republican Form of Government’ clause . . . .” There are strong normative reasons to promote this foundational concern of the labor law as not only fundamental to self-expression and self-determination, but also to social and political well-being. Worker voice can have positive effects on worker productivity and the social welfare by “articulating the preferences and internal trade-offs of workers; improving communications between workers and management; fostering due process and restricting the capricious actions of managers; reducing

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159 CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 135 (2003) (analogizing the animating vision of the Wagner Act to a “basic charter of civil liberties . . . and a form of workplace democracy available at the option of a majority of the workforce”).

.quit; and ‘shocking’ management into more efficient work practices.”\textsuperscript{161} Worker voice benefits employers by “improving morale, enhancing loyalty and commitment, reducing costly turnover, ensuring the receipt of deferred compensation, and providing information to employers.”\textsuperscript{162}

Second, the NLRA was intended to “stabiliz[e] . . . competitive wage rates[,]”\textsuperscript{163} and failing to evaluate the microeconomic effects of labor regulation neglects that key purpose by ignoring regulatory impacts on inefficient resource allocation and labor market failures. For example, where labor regulation results in enhanced employer monopsony power, which in turn can result in artificially suppressed wages, it can result in reduced output, the exit or failure of entry of the most productive workers, a weakened link between labor productivity and wages, and other adverse effects on firm-specific institutions (for example, on grievance procedures and incentive structures that keep firm-specific skills in the firm).\textsuperscript{164} Efficient bargains in the workplace can also reduce labor unrest.\textsuperscript{165} Insights from the behavioral economics literature highlight the significance of workers’ perceptions of wage fairness, not only with respect to their own wage but with respect and relative to others’ wages, on productivity and high-quality job performance.\textsuperscript{166}

Third, distributional goals of increasing wage earners’ purchasing power in the context of depressed wage rates was an essential macroeconomic policy goal of the NLRA.\textsuperscript{167} This purpose is all the more relevant in light of the dramatic rise in inequality following the Reagan administration’s deregulation of labor markets.\textsuperscript{168} Two critical restructurings within human resource management practices have contributed to American income inequality: the “financialization” of the

\textsuperscript{161} Morley Gunderson, Two Faces of Union Voice in the Public Sector, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO?: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 401, 401 (James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007).

\textsuperscript{162} Id.

\textsuperscript{163} 29 U.S.C. § 151.

\textsuperscript{164} For a full discussion of the adverse microeconomic effects of employer monopsony power, see infra Section III.B.2.


\textsuperscript{166} See WEIL, supra note 15, at 81–83 (summarizing behavioral economics literature); see also BEWLEY, supra note 97, at 81 (explaining the existence of pay equity structures and nominal wage rigidity on fairness grounds); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 739–40 (1986) (finding that fairness constraints apply to wage-setting).

\textsuperscript{167} See supra Section I.A.

\textsuperscript{168} WEILER, supra note 15, at 18–22 (discussing the distributional effects of Reagan administration’s deregulatory policies).
firm and the “fissuring” of the American workplace. First, the transformation of the American firm to prioritize maximizing shareholder returns has deeply altered the firm’s relationship with its employees, incentivizing the systematic deployment of labor-cost minimization to satisfy profitability constraints while making flexible temporary work arrangements more attractive. This shift in human resource management has corresponded with a continuous rise in labor productivity, wage stagnation, and increased returns to shareholders. While worker productivity is estimated to have grown 64.9% between 1979 and 2013, hourly compensation has only increased by 8.2%.

Second, the vertical disintegration and fissuring of lead company production, distribution, and employment, including how firms hire, evaluate, pay, supervise, train, and coordinate labor inputs, has become a mainstream means of shedding wage-setting costs for employment. Gains to firms from both restructurings have disproportionately benefited executives and their investors at the expense of workers’ wages. In fact, in his seminal account of the rise of income inequality, Thomas Piketty explains the forty-five to fifty percent increase in the top decile’s share of U.S. national income as resulting from “a veritable separation of the top managers of large firms from the rest of the population,” those who have high bargaining power to set their own remuneration and those who do not. The share of corporate-sector

169 See generally Michel Aglietta & Antoine Rebérioux, Corporate Governance Adrift: A Critique of Shareholder Value 1–20 (2005); Weil, supra note 11, at 281–82.
173 Weil, supra note 11, at 1–26, 281–82; see supra Section II.A.
175 Piketty, supra note 17, at 23–24, 294–96, 314–15.
income going to labor compensation rather than corporate profits since 2000 is at historic lows, estimated at $535 billion less for workers. In addition to these restructurings, declining union density has removed a critical counter-mechanism of achieving more equitable wealth distribution through asserting real bargaining leverage against employers. Declining unionization is estimated to account for between a fifth and a third of the increase in inequality since the 1970s. This adverse macroeconomic distribution can result in underconsumption, persistent unemployment, and deflation. Measuring the impact of labor regulation on workers’ diminished share of the pie can be a crucial means for servicing the needs of macroeconomic policy.

Putting these three policy goals together, a unifying set of principles for evaluating labor regulation thus favors rules that: (1) are more protective of worker expression and association in the workplace with little or no constraints on employer expression; (2) are Kaldor-Hicks optimal, effectuating efficient resource allocation and wage-setting; and (3) further macroeconomic distributional policy goals of reducing inequality and increasing mass purchasing power. The advantage of the unified principles is that they establish a framework for evaluating the labor law’s competing purposes in a non-oppositional manner, inviting both information about and evaluation of any and all relevant effects of labor regulations while also allowing for a more informed conversation on how to judge the preferability of certain labor rules over others. The principles provide a framework for assessing how the various dimensions of a law’s effects interact. Further, they avoid a myopic focus on one perspective of the benefits or detriments of labor regulation over others, and by doing so, demand broader evaluation of each of the social values at stake in labor policy.

180 Resolution of a bargain or conflict is “Kaldor-Hicks optimal,” relative to the status quo where a hypothetical, costless redistribution from those who benefit to those who do not would make no one worse off. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 1.2 (9th ed. 2014); see also Robin W. Boadway & Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics 97–99 (1984).
B. Current Secondary Picketing Law Fails Under the Unified Principles

While the coercive potential of secondary activity on employers and non-union employees is a legitimate concern, current regulation of secondary activity is overinclusive in designating employers that have market power to determine wages and terms and conditions of employment as “secondaries” “wholly unconcerned” with the labor dispute. By reducing worker bargaining power as against direct employers and transactional primaries, the current legal standards for distinguishing primaries from “neutrals” or “secondaries” are deficient under the unified principles.

First, the sweeping application of the ban unduly obstructs worker expression and association in the workplace. Second, the overbroad demarcation decreases worker bargaining power, which can result in inefficient wages. Prohibiting lawful targeting and economic pressure on all wage-determining employers prevents workers from countering the adverse effects of employers’ market power on their wage determinations and terms and conditions of work. Finally, current law obstructs the labor law’s macroeconomic goals by favoring distributional gains to employers at the expense of employees. Left unchecked, employers’ externalization of labor costs are borne by society and taxpayers in the form of increased coordination costs, declining consumer purchasing power, increased burdens on the social safety net, and increased health problems and domestic instability associated with poverty wages. Much as the social and political consequences of market concentration are getting a new airing in antitrust policy, the NLRA’s stated purposes of “equality of bargaining power” and “the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working

181 STONE, supra note 26, at 210–12 (arguing that current exceptions to the secondary boycott rule are too narrow); Harper, supra note 29, at 330, 337–38, 348 (rejecting the overbroad exemption of employers reliant on contingent workers from collective bargaining obligations).


183 See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 11, at 18–20; SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., FAST FOOD, POVERTY WAGES: THE PUBLIC COST OF LOW-WAGE JOBS IN THE FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY 1–2, 6–7, 10 (Oct. 15, 2013) (estimating the costs of public assistance for fast-food workers at roughly $7 billion a year).
conditions” deserve a reinvigoration, both theoretically and pragmatically, to ensure that the distributive and macroeconomic objectives of the labor law can be achieved.  

Figure 2. Overlapping Interests in Regulating Secondary Activity

An example from the janitorial services market—a market that typifies the complexities of New Economy workplace structures—clarifies these limitations. Janitors were traditionally employed directly by building owners but are now overwhelmingly: (1) employed (and often misclassified) as independent contractors; (2) employed by independent janitorial firms that contract with building owners; or (3) employed as individual franchisees in larger franchised companies like Jani-King International. Contractual agreements between janitorial firms and building owners or between franchisees and franchisors

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186 Weil, supra note 11, at 132–42 (describing the rise and effects of the shift from direct janitorial employment to franchising).
generally reflect the weaker bargaining power of the former relative to
the latter due to the competitive market for spun-off janitorial services:
pricing is based on price-for-service provisions without reference to
hours worked; janitorial workers, whether as employees of janitorial
firms or as franchisees, do not directly negotiate with building owners
regarding terms and conditions of work; and franchisees are required to
pay initial franchisor fees, purchase cleaning materials from franchisors,
and pay ongoing royalty and management fees that make it so difficult
to break-even that the industry has an annual turnover rate of fifteen
percent. Given the very narrow margins in the industry, it is
unsurprising that violations of labor standards are widespread, with
twenty-two to twenty-six percent of workers reporting minimum wage
violations and sixty-three to seventy-one percent reporting failure to
receive overtime pay. Recognizing the limited bargaining power of
direct employer independent janitorial firms, and unable to negotiate
better wages and terms and conditions from those employers, janitorial
workers have increasingly turned to placing economic pressure on
building owners and franchisors that contract with their direct
employers. In the late 1980s, the Service Employees International
Union’s (SEIU) Justice for Janitors campaign began the first nationwide
effort to organize janitors and extend peaceful picketing beyond direct
employers to building owners and building management companies.
The picketing strategy came under quick-fire as unlawful secondary
activity. For example, the SEIU picketed several Washington, D.C.
building owners and building management companies that had
contracted with two independent janitorial firms. The building
owners, managers, and maintenance contractors then formed a trade
association with the janitorial firms to “formulate strategy to counter
the Union’s efforts[,]” directly supporting and financing the direct
employers’ antiunion campaign through a strike fund invoiced “to

187 Id. at 134–41 (collecting and summarizing franchisor-franchisee agreements and
turnover rates).
188 Id. at 132, 139–42 (discussing violations of labor standards in the janitorial services
sector). See generally Dube & Kaplan, supra note 133, at 287–306 (finding a “wage penalty” of
four percent to seven percent between contracted-for and directly employed janitors).
189 See, e.g., Williams v. Jani-King of Phila., Inc., 837 F.3d 314, 316, 325 (3d Cir. 2016)
(holding that janitors working as Jani-King “franchisees” may pursue misclassification class
action).
190 Lydia Savage, Justice for Janitors: Scales of Organizing and Representing Workers, 38
ANTIPODE 645, 653–54 (2006) (discussing Justice for Janitors campaign); see also STONE, supra
note 26, at 211–12 (discussing the negative impact of the secondary boycott ban on the Justice
for Janitors campaign).
191 See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 525, 329 N.L.R.B. 638, 638–42 (1999); id. at 644–
50 (Member Liebman, W., dissenting).
192 Id. at 639, 641 (majority opinion).
counter the SEIU’s organizational campaign.” When the janitors picketed buildings owned or managed by trade association members, the trade association and its two most active indirect employers sought relief under section 8(b)(4). The majority of the Board found the picketing unlawful because it was “‘tactically calculated to satisfy [the union’s] objectives elsewhere,’ i.e., to organize the primary employers’ employees,” and because the Union failed to establish that the secondaries lost their neutrality under the ally or single employer doctrines.

The next Sections discuss in detail how the ban, illustrated by the above example, decreases worker bargaining power, resulting in adverse effects on workers’ expressive and associational rights, workers’ ability to earn an efficient wage, and the achievement of labor law’s macroeconomic distributional goals.

1. Current Law Decreases Worker Bargaining Power

Labor law, as it has evolved, creates a structural imbalance in bargaining power between employees and employers by granting a broader set of economic tools and self-help protections to employers than employees in labor disputes. Employers can: permanently replace striking workers; prohibit discussion of unionization in a wide range of circumstances; limit union access to employees; refuse to bargain collectively on permissive subjects of bargaining, which include outsourcing and plant closures; discharge workers engaged in concerted activity for insubordination or disloyalty; and enjoin unions to cease striking pending arbitration, to list a few. Employers may also engage in self-help, including lockouts as well as terminating and suspending workers, when employee activity is unprotected. Employees’ right to strike, their ultimate economic weapon, has been sharply curtailed as

193 Id. at 644–45 (Member Liebman, W., dissenting).
194 Id. at 639–40 (majority opinion) (quoting Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644 (1967)).
unprotected in a wide range of contexts. For example, employees cannot: strike in favor of permissive subjects of bargaining; strike to modify collective bargaining agreements; strike when a no-strike clause is present or implied in a collective bargaining agreement; strike as a minority unsanctioned by their union (“wildcat” strikes); engage in a slowdown; refuse to cross picket lines if a no-strike provision bars such refusal; and get food stamps while on strike. The NLRB and the courts have also set default rules of contract interpretation that favor employers over employees, including implying no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements with mandatory arbitration provisions. The decline in union density coupled with declining access to collective resources to conduct the obligatory union business in Right-to-Work states has also lessened union bargaining power in labor disputes. Finally, in practical terms, delays in NLRB rulings on unfair labor practices and its limited exercise of its remedial authority have dramatically reduced employees’ bargaining power at each stage of the recognition and collective bargaining process.

The secondary activity ban takes on particular salience in the context of these background rules impacting worker bargaining power. At the most general level, it creates a blatant formal inequality in the law by allowing employer self-help during worker strikes that are not equally offered to employees, decreasing the potency of those strikes and allowing employers a broader set of resources to ride them out. The

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197 See, e.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, 485 U.S. 360, 363–64 (1988) (holding a statute denying food stamp eligibility to striking workers constitutional); Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 60–70 (1975) (holding that wildcat strikes are unprotected); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 284–89 (1956) (holding that strikes to modify collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike clause are unprotected); NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80–81 (1953) (holding that an employer’s discharge of a union member/employee for refusing to cross the picket line of another union was not an unfair labor practice when the collective labor contract contained a no-strike provision); Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. 601 (1984) (holding that if a mandatory term is not clearly in the collective bargaining agreement and an employer bargained to an impasse, the employer can unilaterally act without getting union consent); In re Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337–38 (1950) (holding that slowdowns are unprotected).

198 Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104–06 (1962) (holding that a no-strike clause was implied in the union-management arbitration agreement).

199 For decline in union density, see sources cited supra note 20 and accompanying text. As of this writing, twenty-six states have adopted right-to-work laws, with Kentucky, Missouri, and New Hampshire poised to become the next three. See Rhonda Smith & Chris Brown, Right-to-Work Bills Move Forward in Missouri, New Hampshire, 71 UNION LAB. REP. (BNA) (Jan. 27, 2017); Steve Bittenbender, Kentucky Lawmakers Pass ‘Right-to-Work’ Legislation, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2017, 7:04 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kentucky-unions-idUSKBN14R08BN. Whether non-members of public employee unions must pay dues to cover union administration costs will likely be relitigated before a full Roberts Court after the Court’s 4-4 tie in Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam).

200 See sources cited supra note 80 and accompanying text.

prohibition restricts unions’ outreach to all non-direct employers and their employees, while employers can exercise extensive control over "neutrals" or third parties by incorporating into contractual agreements with those parties provisions that ensure their immunity from harm in the event of strikes.\textsuperscript{202} Employers thus have more alternatives outside the bargaining relationship with their employees while employees have none, dramatically circumscribing employees’ “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) relative to employers.\textsuperscript{203}

Further, only allowing workers to economically pressure a single employer when two or more employers in fact impact wage determinations, reduces worker bargaining power by forbidding use of their strongest economic weapon as against those indirect employers. Lesser bargaining power means lower wages and less control over the terms and conditions of work, including the ability to negotiate better workplace protections and have collective representation, flexible scheduling, more stable employment, access to equitable grievance procedures, paid leave policies, and more. It also means that workers’ ability to gain union recognition and better terms through collective bargaining as well as to impact their employers’ decision-making through concerted activity is weaker because workers can neither picket nor join with indirect employers or their employees.

It is for this reason that, of all the asymmetries in the labor law between employers and employees, the ban on secondary picketing has the largest impact on union density across industries. This is likely the main motivation behind Richard Trumka’s quip that he would abolish all of the labor law to be relieved of its secondary boycott ban.\textsuperscript{204} The categorical ban prohibits workers in the New Economy from pressuring indirect employers and achieving sufficient union density to collectively challenge wage standards in industries with fragmented employment. This creates a structural inability for workers to gain equal bargaining power in a range of New Economy work structures: (1) indirect employer outsourcing or subcontracting with direct employers; (2) the franchisor-franchisee relationship; (3) contractors with monopsony power over direct employers within a supply chain or other corporate arrangement; and (4) horizontal wage-fixing or tacit collusion on wages employers and employees).


\textsuperscript{203} Weiler, \textit{Striking New Balance}, \textit{supra} note 15, at 415 (arguing that current labor law unfairly allows employers “to continue . . . business relations with cooperative outsiders” while employees are only permitted “to request the help of sympathetic union members elsewhere”). For a discussion regarding BATNA, see ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, \textit{GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN} 97–106 (Bruce Patton ed., 3d ed. 2011).

\textsuperscript{204} Trumka, \textit{supra} note 16, at 881.
in oligopsonistic industries.

a. Outsourcing, Subcontracting, and Temporary Employment

The rise of outsourcing and subcontracting has impacted worker bargaining power in a number of ways. First, it has limited workers’ ability to compel compliance from employers that, prior to outsourcing and subcontracting, would have been subject to labor and employment law.\(^{205}\) To cite the janitorial contracting example, building owners have avoided legal sanctions for wage-and-hour law violations while also benefiting from fragmenting the labor force of janitorial service providers that dramatically increases worker coordination costs for unionization.\(^{206}\) Further, building owners rely on the creation and persistence of a competitive market of sellers of janitorial services that cannot coordinate to increase prices for their contracted-for services under the antitrust laws and have been driven to race-to-the-bottom wages for their direct employees.\(^{207}\)

![Figure 3. Outsourcing and Subcontracting Arrangements](image)

Workers that find themselves in these arrangements have limited options if they seek to negotiate higher wages from their direct

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205 See Weil, supra note 11, at 93–178 (discussing the compliance effects of business restructuring).

206 Id. at 136–42.

207 The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce[,]” including price-fixing agreements and group boycotts. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421, 425 (1990) (holding that a boycott for compensation increase is unlawful as an agreement among competitors); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213–14 (1959) (holding that concerted refusals to deal in a group boycott are unlawful); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (holding that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se).
employers. First, an individual set of workers (say, W1) could strike their direct employer (B1) to seek recognition as a union, or if they are already unionized, to negotiate higher wages in a collective bargaining agreement. They would likely be unsuccessful at increasing their wage where B1 has a cost-plus contract with A because B1 cannot remain competitive with B2, B3, and B4 to the extent they have lower labor costs. Thus, if B1 demanded to renegotiate its contract with A, A would be more incentivized to assign B1’s contracted services to B2, B3, or B4 to avoid paying higher prices to B1. If B1 nevertheless agreed to pay higher wages to W1, it could go out of business.

Second, to the extent the workers (W1, W2, W3, and W4) could overcome coordination costs to collectively organize rather than compete with one another, they could use the protections of the labor law to engage in concerted activity against all of their direct employers, the Bs.208 The advantage of striking all of the Bs is that the Bs could then confront A as a united front to boycott A unless A offers them better terms for the provision of janitorial services. However, a range of obstacles would challenge the success of that strategy. First, as in the SEIU case discussed above, A could collude with the Bs in an anti-union campaign since it is in neither of their interests to pay the Ws higher wages.209 Second, A could wait out the pressures of cartel maintenance among the Bs or refuse to renegotiate contracts with any of the Bs. This could be relatively easy for A, given the very low barriers to entry in the independent janitorial firms market that currently exist.210 Third, if the Ws rely on the Bs to agree on a plan to pressure A, they would have to hope the Bs could overcome high coordination costs to do so, and even then, the Bs’ conduct could violate antitrust laws.

The workers’ final option would be to directly exert economic pressure on the building owner, A, by picketing its headquarters and the buildings it owns. This would increase their bargaining power with the Bs because it would create a picket line pressuring all janitorial service providers from providing services to A. Directly picketing A would override any coordination problems between the Bs in pressuring A and would also overcome the low barrier-to-entry problem in the market for Bs by blocking new Bs from providing their services to A. Secondarily, picketing A may bring reputational harm to A and any tenants or customers of A may refuse to cross the Ws’ picket lines. That workers are banned from directly picketing A even if, as an economic matter, A is setting a cap on their wages, thus decreases their bargaining power in negotiating their wage.

209 See cases cited supra note 191 and accompanying text.
210 Weil, supra note 11, at 136–39.
b. Franchising and Independent Contracting

Workers employed by franchisors face many of the same problems as those employed by subcontractors. This is because, although franchisors differ from subcontractors in various respects, like subcontractors, they lack sufficient bargaining power to improve employment terms. In franchising, the lead franchising firm contracts with franchisees to carry out its core activities while retaining overall control of brand management. The secondary activity ban decreases worker bargaining power in the franchising context in either one of two ways. First, for workers working directly for franchisees, their bargaining power is decreased for the same reasons it is decreased in the outsourcing or subcontracting arrangement: their direct employers lack sufficient bargaining power to improve employment terms, and workers are unable to bargain over those terms directly with transactional primaries, the franchisors.

Workers in franchising arrangement may also confront a Catch-22. Instead of franchisors classifying them as “employees” protected by labor and employment law, they may classify them as independent contractor “franchisees” to which they owe no obligations under that law. In that circumstance, workers would have to choose to either forfeit the protections of the NLRA and other employment laws by maintaining a “misclassified” status, which would allow them to engage in a range of secondary activity much like the CIW workers did, or litigate their misclassified status and thereby opt into the NLRA’s secondary picketing ban. That they are prohibited from directly picketing building owners in the franchising context has the same effect on their bargaining power to negotiate wages and working conditions as in the outsourcing example. But the fact that workers may prefer to adopt franchisee status only shows how important evading the secondary activity ban is for them.

c. Contractors with Vertical Monopsony Power

The secondary boycott ban also weakens worker bargaining power in circumstances where transactional primaries have vertical monopsony power over direct employers. Vertical monopsony power may occur in supply-chain structures where a direct employer only buys or sells a critical supply or distributional service to another employer within a supply chain. For example, Ford was formerly vertically integrated but since the late 1960s and early 1970s has vertically disintegrated its supply chain. Imagine that Ford now has contracts...
with four widget manufacturers to supply widgets for a specific car model.

Figure 4. Supply-Chain Monopsony Power

Similar to the model depicted in Figure 3, direct employers in this scenario intermediate between the lead company and their workers, and the intermediaries are either competitors in the same product market in the lead company’s supply chain or are complements in product markets with low barriers to entry. This supply-chain model is duplicated in a range of settings, from the supply of raw materials, assembly, or processing, to manufacturing in the clothing, grocery, and other industries. Where the lead company has monopsony power, say, because the manufacturer is producing lead company-specific products and has sunk costs (for example, by having invested in technology geared exclusively to the lead company), the intermediary entities have less leverage in renegotiating their contracts with the lead company because their costs of transferring production to another product line would be higher. Therefore, just as in the building-owner example, if Ford sought to lower its contract price with a widget manufacturer and had monopsony power over that manufacturer, the manufacturer would have little leverage to negotiate the contract price up where it is in a competitive market with low barriers to entry. To remain competitive with other widget manufacturers, then, it would likely cut worker wages, and if workers can only lawfully picket their direct employer rather than both their direct employer and Ford, their bargaining power is reduced.


213 To the extent parts manufacturers produce product market complements and function as exclusive suppliers to Ford, they would have more bargaining power with Ford in a worker strike. In that case, workers’ bargaining power would only be weaker to the extent the manufacturers collude with each other and/or Ford, and then only if the parts are universal to Ford products. The workers’ bargaining power in relation to Ford would thus directly depend on the widget manufacturers’ monopoly power relative to Ford.

214 See BARENBERG, WIDENING THE SCOPE, supra note 76, at 3–10 (describing various supply chain structures).
Thus, the supply-chain scenario is very similar to the outsourcing and subcontracting scenario.215

d. Horizontal Wage-Fixing and Tacit Collusion

Employers may come to a horizontal agreement or tacitly collude to suppress wages in oligopsonistic industries or specific geographic markets. As mentioned above, both government and private attorneys generally have targeted such wage-fixing in a range of industries.216 To the extent workers may lawfully picket their direct employer in a bargaining dispute over wages, however, the secondary boycott ban prohibits them from picketing employers that have either come to wage-fixing or other agreements with their direct employer that suppress wages, have tacitly colluded with their direct employer, or rely on labor market-restricting mechanisms, such as “no-compete” clauses, to keep wages down in a particular industry. The prohibition thus reduces their bargaining power relative to their direct employer because they can assert no leverage or economic pressure over other employers that are effectively colluding with their direct employer to lower wages.

2. Adverse Effects of Decreased Bargaining Power Under Unified Principles

By decreasing worker bargaining power, the secondary picketing ban fails under the unified principles for achieving successful labor regulation. First, excessive prohibition of secondary activity overly restricts otherwise First Amendment–protected activity. The Supreme Court has long rejected the view that labor picketing is conduct, and restrictions on labor picketing are content- and speaker-based restrictions that run contrary to contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.217 As a normative matter, the prohibition on secondary activity in the New Economy and under current workplace arrangements restricts workers’ expression on a critical aspect of their

215 For a discussion of whether secondary picketing would effectuate a better wage, see discussion infra Section IV.A.
216 See, e.g., Blair & DePasquale, supra note 129; Press Release, DOJ Requires Six High Tech Companies, supra note 129.
self-realization within the economic sphere, access to economic opportunity, and ability to participate in decisions that impact their livelihood.\textsuperscript{218} The ability of workers to engage in peaceful speech in a public forum on a matter of public concern is important not only for democratic and civil society values, but also for bringing to light the social effects of employment disputes, the nature and impacts of transactional relationships in the fissured workplace, and exposing coordination costs in the New Economy.

The bargaining power imbalance as currently structured into the law's primary-secondary distinction can also have adverse microeconomic wage effects.\textsuperscript{219} Where transactional primaries have monopsony power over workers and workers are prohibited from engaging in concerted activity against them, the prohibition reduces worker opportunity to exert economic pressure to correct for artificially suppressed wages and achieve a competitive wage.\textsuperscript{220} The structural asymmetries between labor and capital can occur because labor markets function differently than the auction model of competitive economic theory due to unique frictions caused primarily by information asymmetries, heterogeneous preferences, and mobility costs.\textsuperscript{221}

The converging trends of workers’ loss of bargaining power, rising industry concentration, and more widespread evidence of monopsonistic wage-setting can lead to substantial inefficiencies. Specifically, "it can lead to inefficient reductions in employment and output, where some workers who would have been willing to work at the competitive market wage are never hired, and the output they would have produced is produced less efficiently by other firms if at all."\textsuperscript{222} Such monopsonistic wage-setting can also weaken the link between


\textsuperscript{219} See Stone, Policing Employment, supra note 96, at 357–59 (discussing the impacts of legal regulation of strike protections, union organizing, and bargaining rules on employer-employee bargaining power and distributive outcomes).

\textsuperscript{220} For a discussion of bargaining power and the ability to influence wage rates, see FRITZ MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY: BUSINESS, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES 369–70 (1952). For evidence of the effects of labor market monopsony on worker wages, see supra note 121; see also CEA I, supra note 124, at 10–13.

\textsuperscript{221} MANNING, supra note 88, at 4; ROBINSON, supra note 121, at 296; see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 105–11 (1997) (presenting results of an empirical study testing workers’ knowledge of legal rules concerning at-will contracting).

\textsuperscript{222} CEA I, supra note 124, at 3.
labor productivity and wages because when firms no longer compete aggressively for workers, wages differ between and within firms and even among workers with similar skills. These “differing degrees of worker bargaining power across different groups of workers . . . may lead to varying degrees of wage depression [and] within-firm inequality[,]” particularly for workers in protected classes under the employment discrimination laws. Wage discrimination is even more prevalent where firms are able to contract for the price of services as opposed to setting wages within an internal labor market because of the absence of internal equity pressures and increased information asymmetry between employers and outsourced or subcontracted workers relative to direct employees. Additionally, there is extensive empirical evidence that wage theft through wage-and-hour and overtime violations are more pervasive in the fissured workplace than in other work arrangements, resulting in workers not being paid an efficient wage with limited, if any, labor law protections to pressure indirect employers for wage increases. Empirical evidence suggests that workers in contingent or outsourced arrangements earn considerably less per week than do direct employees with similar characteristics and in similar occupations. Thus, the overbroad secondary picketing ban can have adverse microeconomic wage effects.

Finally, the secondary activity ban’s overinclusive definition of “secondaries,” with its negative effects on worker bargaining power, precipitates material distributive harms. The ban strips workers in current workplace arrangements from being able to economically pressure employers that shrink their share of the pie: “Fissuring results in redistribution away from workers and toward investors. It therefore contributes to the widening income distribution gap.” Arbitrarily prohibiting worker picketing beyond the confines of a direct employer prevents workers from exercising leverage over “capital providers [that] have both the potential interest and the potential ability to offer enhanced wages” so as to ensure “joint returns of labor and the capital it makes productive, and of an increase in the labor share of these joint returns.”

224 CEA I, supra note 124, at 3.
225 WEIL, supra note 11, at 80.
226 Id. at 76–92, 131, 139–42, 154–58.
229 WEIL, supra note 11, at 20; see also id. at 92, 280–82.
230 Harper, supra note 29, at 331.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PICKETING RULE

Given the significant uncertainty surrounding the status of employee protections in the New Economy, now is an opportune time for government action to reevaluate secondary activity regulation, and specifically, the primary-secondary distinction. This Part first explores how the application of a “market power rule” could predictably and narrowly protect worker picketing of secondaries as “transactional primaries” in line with the values of the unified principles. The Part then discusses other benefits of the proposed rule, including more effective enforcement of labor and employment laws and its potential to modernize labor law enforcement by developing the economic expertise of the Board and the courts in regulating worker protections. The Part concludes with a discussion of how the market power rule could be applied in adjudication and through legislation or rulemaking.

A. The Market Power Rule

This Article is the first to put forward an economic standard for distinguishing primary from secondary employers for the purposes of the labor law’s secondary boycott ban. It proposes that workers be able to defend against the claim that they engaged in secondary activity by showing, via economic evidence, that the target of their boycott or picket, even if not a direct employer, nevertheless has sufficient market power over the direct employer’s product market or the relevant labor market to determine picketing workers’ wages and/or terms and conditions of work (i.e., the market power rule). The rule would apply as a defense if workers have demonstrated majority support for a union and are engaged in recognitional picketing or picketing due to a bargaining dispute with their direct employer.231

231 See Weiler, Striking New Balance, supra note 15, at 417–18 (discussing democratic deficit concerns where workers strike without majority support). To the extent a picketing target is designated a “primary” under the market power rule, all lawful picketing restrictions that would apply to a primary would also apply to the “transactional primary.” The rule goes beyond the exemption for “area standards” picketing—or picketing to protest an employer’s failure to pay an “area standards” wage—because such picketing requires unions to demonstrate a bona fide attempt to determine whether the targeted employer is paying below-standard wages. The proposed rule rejects such a requirement in favor of a strict-liability approach based on market power. See Auto. Emps., Local 88 (W. Coast Cycle Supply Co.), 208 N.L.R.B. 679, 680 (1974) (summarizing union obligations in defending area standards picketing).
1. Success Under New Labor Law’s Unified Principles

Compared to current law distinguishing primaries and secondaries, the market power rule better protects workers’ expressive activity with minimal effects on the expressive activity of others, can better correct for adverse microeconomic wage effects, and promises enhanced distributional benefits under the unified principles.

First, the rule would dramatically benefit employees in the fissured workplace by circumscribing the government’s prohibition of otherwise First Amendment-protected activity. A labor law that recognizes the importance of free collective bargaining must give employees the ability to ask firms and fellow workers at those firms not to deal with their direct employer when that would be necessary to make the legal right to strike meaningful in practice.\(^{232}\) By restricting secondary targets to only those “transactional primaries” with market power over workers’ wages and working conditions, the rule is more protective of expression and association in the workplace with little or no constraints on the expression of picketed employers who are still free to express their views on their own private property, or of those employers’ employees, who may express their views and associate with others consistent with any First Amendment or labor law restrictions. There are also normative reasons to allow workers and their unions to appeal to others to join in common cause with them: it resonates in core values of freedom of association and encourages self-regulation in labor disputes by placing the burden on workers to make sure their agreements with employers preserve their right to engage in sympathy actions rather than trading it away for short-term gains.\(^{233}\) This could reinforce altruism among workers, “driv[ing] home the lesson that the primary responsibility for rescuing the institution of collective bargaining from its current straits lies not with the government, but with the workers themselves.”\(^{234}\)

Second, the market power rule is more beneficial than the current law in its micro- and macroeconomic effects without being overinclusive. As a matter of economic theory, multi-employer picketing in the settings described in Section III.B can correct for workers’ unequal bargaining power and the resulting adverse micro- and macroeconomic effects of fissuring. It provides a mechanism for discerning when labor market segmentation has impacted wage determination for distinguishing primaries from secondaries, and more closely tracks the nature and scope of multiple contracting employers’ control over a given workforce. The rule also invites the Board to

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\(^{232}\) Weiler, Striking New Balance, supra note 15, at 418.
\(^{233}\) Id. at 419.
\(^{234}\) Id.
delineate the effects of different employers’ control and influence over workers under a more nuanced theory of the firm, assessing asset usage over primary employers in their contractual arrangements as well as the division of ex post surplus in those arrangements relative to worker wages. By extending picketing to transactional primaries, workers can impose the same pressure on those employers as they would on their direct employer: establishing a picket line imposes costs on the indirect employer—by forcing that employer to reduce or cease production—to equalize the bilateral-monopoly character of labor-management negotiations.235 The strike-threat itself can function to realign the interests of those in contractual relationships by incorporating the risks of economic disruption into the bargaining terms of direct and indirect employer agreements, as well as employment agreements between the direct employer and its employees.236 An effective bilateral-monopoly against all employers that determines workers’ wages and working conditions can counter inefficient deadweight loss that result from artificially suppressed wages and employer wage discrimination.237 Competitive wages that more closely track worker productivity produce efficiency gains for firms and workers.238 The rule may also produce efficiency gains by allowing workers to exert pressure on multi-employer contractual arrangements that have disrupted ILM benefits, reducing high transaction costs associated with exclusively transacting in the external labor market such as asymmetric information and strategic behavior between firms and between employers and employees.239 In addition, clarity in the law’s application could simultaneously target those not “wholly unconcerned” with an underlying labor dispute while contributing to labor peace by allowing unions and employers to plan strikes and bargaining positions based on how much economic pressure they can exert.

Finally, where workers have the opportunity to pressure multiple

235 For discussions in economic theory of the effects of striking, see, e.g., Posner, supra note 28, at 997–98.
237 For a discussion of deadweight loss and wage discrimination, see supra Section II.D. For the effectiveness of bilateral monopolies, see Dau-Schmidt, supra note 30, at 492–93 (discussing how a bilateral relationship that includes strike threat is “the necessary prerequisite[] to . . . employees’ fully sharing in the proceeds of the enterprise”); Posner, supra note 28, at 997 (arguing that balancing of cost imposition in bilateral monopoly “determine[s] the ultimate settling point between the union’s initial demand and the employer’s initial offer”).
238 See MANNING, supra note 88, at 347–48 (discussing the impact of unions on bargaining for efficient wages); Ian M. McDonald & Robert M. Solow, Wage Bargaining and Employment, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 896, 899–902 (1981) (discussing the efficient bargain model under which wages and employment are negotiated jointly for efficient outcomes).
employers to come to better wage terms through picketing, as in the CIW example, they have access to better distribution outcomes, even if the microeconomic gains of creating a larger pie fail. In other words, secondary picketing of transactional primaries has fairness benefits that can effectuate the macroeconomic goals of the labor law by putting more money into the pockets of lower-income workers.

An objection could be raised that picketing in accordance with the market power rule would not be effective for a number of reasons. First, workers’ picket lines may not be respected, resulting in a failure to disrupt the primary employer’s business relations. Second, transactional primaries could already have anticipated and either “baked into” their contracts or contracted around any potential disruption in business relations with the primary employer such that any picket of a transactional primary would not produce any additional costs on either that primary or the direct employer. Indeed, the effectiveness of a secondary boycott will depend on the nature of the direct employer’s contractual and other relations with transactional primaries, the willingness of the employees and others related to the transactional primary to disrupt that employer’s operations, the risks that those respecting workers’ picket lines may incur by refusing to cross it, and conditions in both the labor and final product markets. For example, while sympathy strikes may be protected under the NLRA, employees who engage in them can be permanently replaced by their employer. To the extent those employees have no-strike clauses in their collective bargaining agreements, they could also suffer discipline or discharge without statutory protections.

However, as discussed in Part III, employee picketing of transactional primaries can pressure other employers as well as their employees to cease dealing with those transactional primaries. The effectiveness of picketing a transactional primary comes from workers’ ability to limit or block a lead employer, franchisor, or other employers, with monopsony power from alternative, substitutable labor inputs or products or services reliant on substitutable labor inputs. Enlisting the assistance of other employees can “temporarily interrupt[] business

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240 I thank Saul Levmore for identifying these effectiveness concerns.
241 Weiler, Striking New Balance, supra note 15, at 419.
244 See supra Section III.A–B.
relations between outside firms and the struck employer[,]”245 particularly where the expansion of secondary boycott protections were neither anticipated by nor incorporated into existing contracts between primary employers and transactional primaries.

The question of whether employees of transactional primaries would respect others’ picketing of their employer is indeed a difficult one. But there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to believe they would, as well as normative justifications for granting picketing protections in any case. First, employees of a horizontal transactional primary, such as direct employees of an employer or a franchisor-run firm that temporary or franchisee employees are picketing, would respect a secondary picket because of self-interest: it may aid in achieving higher industry-standard wages and help “to preserve their jobs . . . .”246 Second, employees of a transactional primary within a vertical arrangement, such as within a supply-chain arrangement, may decide that possible costs are worth long-term gains of increased union density or larger union or labor movement support for their own labor disputes down the road (logrolling).247 Empirical data supports these explanations for why transactional primaries’ employees would respect others’ picket lines.248

2. Anti-Evasion of Labor and Employment Law Enforcement

Second, the market power rule is a key anti-evasion mechanism to enhance labor law enforcement and employer-employee incentives to self-regulate. Allowing unions to place economic pressure on multiple employers with market power to determine wages can pressure those employers to internalize the social costs of others’ bad labor

246 REES, supra note 88, at 42–43.
247 Id. at 43.
248 See Brian S. Klaas & John A. McClendon, Crossing the Line: The Determinants of Picket Line Crossing During a Faculty Strike, 16 J. LAB. RES. 331, 331–32, 340–45 (1995); Michael H. LeRoy, Multivariate Analysis of Unionized Employees’ Propensity to Cross Their Union’s Picket Line, 13 J. LAB. RES. 285, 285–91 (1992). Indirect evidence of the success of picket lines comes from extensive litigation and injunctions imposed on picket lines prior to the NLRB’s grant of worker strike protections; the number of secondary pickets enjoined prior to Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin; and consistent employer reliance on the NLRB and the courts to enjoin or seek damages for union picketing (at least 1775 NLRB and federal court decisions). See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 13, at apps. I–II (listing the litigation history of federal labor injunction cases, including secondary boycott cases, between 1901–1927); ALAN K. McADAMS, POWER AND POLITICS IN LABOR LEGISLATION 53 (1964) (arguing that before Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin, secondary boycotts were “powerful economic weapons in the hands of unions” and often “the only effective tool available” in union attempts to organize workers); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 147–48 (1987) (discussing the impact of secondary boycotts in the nineteenth century).
management or failures to comply with labor and employment laws. As in the CIW example, picketing can pressure lead employers to more closely monitor bad labor management and failure to comply with labor and wage-and-hour law protections. Further, by protecting workers’ public picketing that brings pressure to the doors of those that impact their working conditions, targeted exemptions from the secondary boycott ban facilitate exposure of the social effects of employment disputes, the nature and impacts of transactional relationships in the fissured workplace, and coordination costs in the New Economy. Adjudication of multi-employer picketing would also create a public record detailing employers’ market power over employees’ wages and working conditions. The rule can thus assist in publicizing rents received by indirect employers, as well as the transaction costs of purchasing labor inputs through mediating firms. This can facilitate a correction of information asymmetries and resulting labor market failures, allowing more effective worker bargaining. In sum, the rule would function as a critical anti-evasion tool to remove arbitrary barriers between employees and employers that impact their wages and conditions of work, while also disincentivizing employers’ shirking of obligations and responsibilities under existing law.

3. Economic Analysis and Modernizing Labor Law

Finally, the market power rule uses economic analysis developed from the insights of labor economics, theories of the firm, and antitrust law, providing an ideal regulatory framework that modernizes labor law enforcement and develops Board expertise in assessing the relative bargaining power of employees and employers. The rule isolates out only those employers that impact wage determinations and working conditions without being overinclusive of secondaries that have no relevance to or impact over labor disputes, as was the original concern of the prohibition’s drafters. It also establishes clearer rules to assess whether a target is truly neutral, promoting uniformity and predictability in the NLRB, an agency infamous for politically turbulent adjudication.

Specifically, the rule integrates developments in economy theory and analysis by providing a functional tool to track the impact of the New Economy on labor relations. By giving the Board scrutiny over how ownership rights within a broadened conception of the firm affects worker and employer incentives, the rule can track employer market

249 See WEIL, supra note 11, at 18–19, 120–21, 286–89 (discussing coordination costs resulting from “fissuring” and the welfare benefits of internalizing those costs).
power over employees more precisely. A better grasp on firm incentives and the effects of corporate organization, firm agreements and ownership rights will be critical for modern labor law to properly grasp and predict employer control and employee bargaining power.

Application of the rule would also incorporate the theoretical and empirical econometric and doctrinal tools developed in contemporary antitrust law and policy to the analysis of monopsonistic and oligopsonistic competition in the labor context. Clarity on the primary-secondary distinction could also serve to better police the line between labor law and antitrust law, carving out labor’s exemption to antitrust liability only to the extent that secondary activity functions to further the goals of the labor laws under the unified principles. A more economically tailored enforcement regime would be sensitive to the intersections of labor markets and firms’ market power in product markets, enabling an assessment of when such activity is likely to affect price competition. For example, where product markets are fragmented, boycotts will not likely harm competition because removing one competitor is unlikely to affect price competition. Likewise, targeting those who deal with a monopsonist employer may serve a competitive function of reducing monopsony rents and encouraging support throughout the supply chain of potential competitor entrants.

Finally, adjudication of the rule would benefit Board and court expertise, and application of economic standards to labor picketing, by requiring them to make economic assessments and build the universe of economic data available for their disposal. The Board currently has no centralized source of empirical data on union-initiated secondary activity, either with respect to their frequency or the economic impact they have on “ neutrals.” Applying the market power rule could harness and effectuate systemic information gathering through secondary activity adjudications to identify and restructure doctrinal patterns based on that information. Similar to proposals made in the criminal law context, the rule can function to pinpoint and tag relevant labor and product market data in secondary boycott cases before the Board as well as complementary data on labor market conditions collected and maintained by the Department of Labor to create a system for better determining whether a targeted party is truly neutral to a given labor dispute.

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The market power rule can be easily and immediately implemented through Board and court adjudication. And a broader, more permanent overhaul of the secondary picketing ban can be implemented through Board rulemaking or congressional amendment to the NLRA. This Section discusses possibilities for the rule’s implementation under each of these avenues.

First, the market power rule can be applied to secondary boycotts through adjudication. Section 8(b)(4) does not define “neutral employer[,]” and the only guidance available from the Act’s legislative history is Senator Taft’s remarks describing its purpose.251 As noted above, those remarks limit the scope of neutrals to those “wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees.”252 In other words, the term “neutral” “is not intended to apply to a case where the third party is, in effect, in cahoots with or acting as a part of the primary employer.”253 While the Board and the courts have often ignored or narrowly interpreted Taft’s “wholly unconcerned” language,254 the Supreme Court requires that the secondary boycott prohibition be interpreted narrowly because it addresses First Amendment–protected “expressive activity . . . .”255 To avoid the risk of injunctions or penalties after the fact, workers intending to engage in a secondary picket could request that the General Counsel file a petition requesting a declaratory order from the Board certifying that the picketing target meets the requirements of the market power rule.256

Additionally, the Board should adopt a lower threshold than the current standard for determining whether two entities are sufficiently related to be “primaries.” This is because, under other NLRA provisions, the government must meet a high burden in showing that two entities are sufficiently related to extend liability to a secondary, but under section 8(b)(4), consistent with the government’s burden to prove

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253 95 CONG. REC. 8709 (1949) (statement of Sen. Taft).
254 See, e.g., Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile & Resilient Floor Covering Layers v. NLRB, 467 F.2d 392, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating “that the mere presence of some economic interdependence between [primary and secondary] will not automatically cause one to lose its secondary boycott protection.”).
unlawful acts, “a finding that an employer is insufficiently related to the primary dispute to forfeit its neutrality results in shielding that entity from what would otherwise be lawful activity under the Act and in assessing liability for an unfair labor practice against a union.” While the Supreme Court has rejected Board or court interference with the substance of employer-employee bargains, the market power rule would not constitute interference because the restriction extends only to adjudicators writing the terms of collective bargaining agreements for the parties, not taking a hands-off approach toward which economic weapons both sides may wield.

Thus, based on the statute’s ambiguous language, its legislative history and purposes, principles of NLRA construction, and constitutional requirements, the Board and the courts may interpret “secondaries” as forfeiting their neutral status and constituting “transactional primaries,” or a more expansive understanding of “allies” under the ally doctrine where they meet the requirements of the market power rule.

When asserting a defense for picketing under the market power rule, instead of presenting evidence of common control under the ally or single employer doctrines, employees would present evidence of the picketed entity’s power over price, in this case, wages or terms and conditions of work. As discussed in Section II.D, evidence could be direct or circumstantial. To summarize, direct evidence includes evidence of: (1) the actual use of monopsony or oligopsony power to lower wages or exclude competition in the relevant labor market; (2) actual detrimental effects, such as reduction in inputs or ability to withhold purchase of labor inputs; (3) artificially suppressed wages and high barriers to entry; or (4) wage-fixing agreements between employers.

Indirect or circumstantial evidence of market power can include

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258 See, e.g., NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960) (stating that the NLRB may not intrude into “substantive aspects of the bargaining process” to influence “substantive terms on which the parties contract”); see also sources cited supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.


260 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464–65, 477 (1992); Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Monopoly power ‘may be proven directly by evidence of the control of prices or the exclusion of competition, or it may be inferred from one firm’s large percentage share of the relevant market.’” (quoting Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998))); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Monopoly power may be proven through direct evidence of supracompetitive prices and restricted output. It may also be inferred from the structure and composition of the relevant market.” (internal citations omitted)).
market share or structural evidence of a monopsonized market or monopsonistic competition. Structural evidence of market power can include the relative size and strength of the picketing target; market concentration in the relevant market for buying labor inputs or selling products; fluctuations in the target’s market share; an upward sloping or somewhat inelastic supply curve in the market for labor inputs; an inability or unwillingness for new or current purchasers to enter or expand the amount of their purchases in the market; ease of entry into the industry and the history of the industry; excess in the demand of labor inputs; evidence of monopsony or oligopsony profit; evidence of anticompetitive conduct; the impact of regulation on the labor market; circumstances indicating that sellers of labor inputs are more dependent on buyers than buyers on sellers; and other evidence that the market environment is conducive to and/or facilitates collusion between employers purchasing labor inputs or selling products in the relevant product market. Where there is no evidence of an explicit agreement between employers on wages, employees could present evidence of “plus factors.” Indirect evidence may also be offered to indicate that the picketing target is less responsive to wage changes of the picketing employees’ labor inputs or price changes in the employer’s product than would be expected in the competitive labor or product market. Finally, evidence of employee search costs, labor market frictions, information asymmetries and barriers to market price discovery, immobile benefits, regulatory or other barriers to worker mobility imposed by the direct employers’ transactional arrangement with the picketing target would be relevant for determining that target’s market power.

Employees may also present evidence of ILM effects on wages but for the fissuring of the labor market as benchmarks. This could include evidence of the development of firm-specific skills, or skills specific to the transactional or contractual relationship between the direct employer and the picketing target as well as evidence of firm-specific value-added by the employees of the primary to the enterprise of the

261 See cases cited supra note 260.

262 See Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 501 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing market characteristics to be viewed in conjunction with market share to infer monopoly power); Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co., 24 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1994) (listing the factors to be reviewed in assessing monopolies); DOJ & FTC, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 146, at 15, 17.

263 See infra Section II.D.


265 CEA I, supra note 124, at 5–10; Stiglitz, supra note 149, at 461.
picketing target.266 It could also include:

- historical evidence that ILMs previously functioned as administrative units within which wage-setting and labor allocation was “governed by a set of administrative rules and procedures” pertaining to methods of compensation, job ladders for in-house promotional hiring, and benefit and welfare packages in the employment of employees in the same market for labor inputs;
- historical evidence of internal pay equity structures or the beneficial impact to workers of the picketing target’s internalization of the pricing of labor inputs on picketing workers’ wages or working conditions;
- historical evidence or evidence determined through econometric regressions that, in a but-for world, the direct employer and the “secondary” benefited or would benefit from establishing internal structures as a means of capturing the complexity of labor as a dynamic input of production (i.e., compensation structures that allow employers to recoup recruitment and training costs and reducing turnover).267

Further indirect evidence of market power may be comparator evidence, for example, that competitors within the same market for labor inputs as the primary employer and that contract with non-picketed employers to provide the same or similar labor services, have higher wages, or that the picketed employer can engage or has engaged in wage discrimination for labor inputs within the relevant labor market.

Market power may also be demonstrated through transactional and residual claimant evidence. This may include evidence that the picketing target has ownership rights that facilitate the joint production and monitoring of the direct employer’s labor inputs, is a residual claimant and central party to all contracts with the labor inputs while retaining rights to observe input behavior, determine assignments, or sell or transfer any of the ownership rights it holds.268 Evidence of the direct employer’s sunk costs and lock-in effects on picketing employees with respect to the picketing target would be relevant, as would relationship-specific worker training and costs to the direct employer of integrating with or contracting for services with other similar entities within the same buyer’s market. Employees may also provide evidence that the picketing target owns residual rights of control over nonhuman assets in the contractual relationship to indicate its market power over the direct

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266 Stone, Policing Employment, supra note 96, at 364–66.
267 DOERINGER & PIORE, supra note 93, at 1.
268 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 108, at 783.
employer.

Additional expert evidence can include econometric analyses that picketing workers have suffered artificially suppressed wages as a result of the direct employer’s contractual arrangements with transactional primaries. Econometric regressions could compare picketing workers’ current wages with competitive “but-for” wages, determined through historical or other benchmarks as just discussed. Economic evidence could also be presented of: general price effects of direct employer and transactional primaries’ anti-competitive conduct; how increasing wages affect employment levels in the relevant labor market; and how closely quit rates match wage changes.

Of course, Congress or the Board could also amend or clarify existing law by establishing the market power rule through NLRA amendments or rulemaking. First, while legislative reform to the NLRA has foundered in recent decades, Congress could clarify the overbroad secondary picketing ban by more clearly designating as “primaries,” or excluding from the definition of “secondaries,” all those who exert sufficient market power to determine picketing employees wages and/or terms and conditions of work.

Alternatively, the Board could engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking to clarify the primary-secondary distinction by using its authority to define primaries or exclude from the definition of secondaries, those entities that have market power to determine picketing employees’ wages and/or terms and conditions of work. Clarification through the rulemaking process would not only expand the scope of legally sanctioned conduct to exert economic pressure on

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secondary targets, but could also seek out industry-specific and labor market-specific comments on the effects of secondary activities. Specifically, the notice-and-comment process could solicit information on how incentives and market effects change, based on which secondary targets are induced or impacted under a range of market conditions and across horizontal and vertical employer arrangements, whether in concentrated oligopolistic markets or competitive markets, and whether the effects fall on neutral employers or the broader social welfare. Developing an effects-based rule that would incorporate comments from labor economists, industry and policy experts, labor unions, workers centers, community organizations, and employers, would provide the strongest foundation for a systemic, network- and market-based approach to resolving ambiguity and the fundamental mismatch between current law and contemporary working conditions.

CONCLUSION

This Article argues that by integrating contemporary developments in labor economics, economic theory, and antitrust policy, the labor law can enhance its expertise and best adapt to achieve much needed social welfare and fairness benefits in the New Economy. It can begin by applying those developments to the regulation of secondary picketing as a means of enhancing worker expression, microeconomic wage effects, and equitable distributional outcomes under the market power rule.

Such an economic effects-based approach is a critical intervention in the analysis of labor law regulation more broadly, and it has applications beyond secondary boycott doctrine. For example, it can illuminate areas of labor law doctrine to better regulate what types of concerted activity should be protected and which terms of bargaining ought to be mandatory or permissive. It can help better tailor remedial mechanisms for labor law violations and the relevant “communities of interest” of union bargaining units. Finally, it can even help us understand when a social wage may be justified where workers cannot achieve an efficient wage.