PUBLIC CONTROL OF LAND USE: ARE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES APPROPRIATE?

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Public Control of Land Use: Are Existing Administrative Structures Appropriate?

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The last 30 years has seen an enormous urban expansion and an increase in the complexity of metropolitan processes. This is visible in a continually greater competition for land and the renewed emphasis on land use planning. Although land allocation problems exist in all areas, this condition is especially acute in the urban periphery where competition includes not only urban industrial and development interests, but pastoral, recreational, and natural resource interests as well. Moreover, the competition does not revolve merely around traditional property rights and the economic use of land. Instead, a “new land ethic” of environmental interest may be emerging which suggests “that there is an element of livability in the development of land, that the highest good is not necessarily the economic use of land, and that this livability element can, if need be, overrule the economic element.” As a result, land use control has emerged as a central political issue in many areas of the United States.

The process of land allocation involves a system of multiple mechanisms, engaging both economic forces of the market and the administration of public authorities. The market, of course, has been the instrumental element in the process, and the configuration of land use occurs principally through the aggregation of individual locational choices. The criterion for choice results from the prioritizing of land use according to utilitarian value. “Land resources are at their highest and best use when they are used in such a manner as to provide the optimum return to their operators or to society.” This “highest and best use” doctrine is important economically, but it is also reinforced culturally by Jeffersonian thought and the pre-industrial circumstance of the frontier. Consequently, the market is relied upon heavily as both the most efficient and most legitimate mechanism.

Nevertheless, the market is not without its dysfunctions, and a public decision-making role has been used to direct, alter, and sometimes supersede the price mechanism. Public responsi-
bility and authority for land use control traditionally has been vested in local governments: towns, cities, and counties. These public agencies have shaped the character of urban growth through zoning ordinances, use permits, general land use plans, and project evaluations. Such methods have sought to follow a Euclidian geometry or flat-plane grid system which separates a limited number of land use categories so as to provide a well-ordered comprehensive physical pattern. The role of state and national government, until recently, has been to improve the capacity of local authorities by providing fiscal incentives and technical assistance.

These instruments for public control of land, especially zoning ordinances, are not of recent origin and are certainly not unique to American society. The comprehensive structure of methods employed presently, however, stem from the Progressive era and the desire to eliminate corruption in government and promote orderly professional administration of the public interest. State enabling legislation, giving local government authority over land use, became widespread during the 1920s and was especially aided by the federal government. Under the direction of Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, the Federal Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was issued in 1924, a model upon which most state land use control instruments are still based.

The essential purpose of public land use control has been three-fold: to maintain orderly development by separating uses physically, to protect property values by restricting obnoxious activities, and to provide public land for private development. With the growing competition for land, public control procedures have been subject to renewed interest. As illustrated by legislative activity and much judicial controversy, the concentration of effort has centered around zoning administration. Such heavy reliance on strengthening existing land use controls has precipitated a number of constitutional issues ranging from down zoning and the “taking” issue, to no-growth zoning such as the Petaluma Plan and its implications for the right to “travel,” to environmentally sensitive zoning and legal “standing.” A number of unique experiments have precipitated as well.

In addition to strengthening the existing controls, the renewed public interest promises to allocate a more direct role to the federal government in the form of multiple agency involvement, a National Land Use Policy, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. However, with the trends toward more complex zoning administration and a consolidation of power in larger bureaucracies, a number of questions must be asked: if past zoning measures are inadequate for present circumstances, will new zoning and control procedures mitigate the problem? Will an emphasis on the use of administrative instruments and synoptic planning instead of a politicizing process satisfactorily deal with contemporary land use problems? Do the conventional purposes of zoning effectively deal with emerging land use issues? Can politics really be separated from administration?

Two Stages of Urban Growth

One cannot begin to answer these questions without formulating some image of the nature and complexity of existing urban forces. Of central importance is the configuration of urban growth and its relationship to population characteristics and natural resources. The past assumption has been that “with increasing population growth and the increasing material requirements of modern life, the area needs of almost every type of land use are bound to increase.” The compounding problem in such an assertion, however, is that the context of these dynamics has become highly uncertain and the relationship between diverse interests and land resources is ambiguous.

This is partially evidenced in the fact that land use issues do not stem from land scarcity per se. About 90 per cent of the population lives in metropolitan areas (SMSAs) which constitute only about 35 per cent of the land. Moreover, the essential issues cannot be explained in terms of territorial propinquity either. Those issues that deal with air and water quality, resource extraction, energy use, transportation, industrial production, and leisure activities have in the past been associated with migration toward and concentration of territorially bounded urban cores. This association has diminished. For example, figures for urban growth and population density indicate that absolute increases have decreased measurably since the pre-World War II years (see Figure 1). According to Census data, the average decade rate of increase in population density was 22 per cent between 1880 and 1940, but only 13.5 per cent between 1940 and 1970. Likewise, the per cent urban population changed at an average decade
FIGURE 1
POPULATION DENSITY AND URBAN GROWTH
1880-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Population (mil.)</th>
<th>Population/Sq. Mi.</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>% Urban*</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>203.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>179.3</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>151.3</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>14.5 avg.</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>132.2</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>123.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>106.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>20.9 avg.</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>20.8 avg.</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Previous urban definition

rate of 14 per cent between 1880 and 1940, and then dropped off to 4.25 per cent from 1940 to 1970. What these figures suggest is that while land use issues in the postwar period have reached their greatest visibility since the 1920s, the frequently attributed causes of conflict among competing demands have diminished significantly from prewar years.

The anomalous condition raises the possibility that urbanization has changed from the prewar territorial image to something that defies physical boundedness. Such a condition can be elucidated by distinguishing two states of growth, with the Depression and start of World War II marking the transition. The first state is the period of rural to urban migration, while the second is the postwar period involving the spillover of urban culture into an enlarged regional identity.

Shaped primarily by technologies of the American Industrial Revolution and European migration, this first stage consumes both the Populist and Progressive images of society. The character of city life reflected a dualistic perspective with the provincial purity of rural life on the one hand, and rational cosmopolitan existence matched with ethnic territories on the other. Social thought was replete with both cultural and physical boundaries between "just plain folk" and the "gatekeepers of mass society." Further, this dualism was linked to governmental reform, which believed the dichotomy "should be clearly expressed in the physical and spatial form of the city, that orderliness depends upon boundedness, and that boundaries are in some way barriers."^{15}

From this emerged the territorial model of urban activity and governance. The referent assumption of the model was that municipalities of any size existed in finite space. Virtually all of the urbanized population resided within the city limits, with the hinterland beyond. Limited by walking distance or early forms of mass transit, most people's interests, including jobs, businesses, social and religious associations, and recreation, were geographically ascribed and contiguous. Even those who moved out of the urban center were limited to a contiguous suburban ring and were either consolidated into the core city or incorporated into suburban municipalities. Unwanted actors or messages from the "outside" were excluded on the basis of legal residency, and through censorship. The governance process including jurisdictions and administrative methods mirrored territorial interests, such that most large cities could be accurately described as "territorial-bounded governmental systems."^{16}

The first stage of urban growth then, is perhaps best analyzed as a period of intensive expansion within established boundaries. By contrast, this confinement gives way in the late 1930s to the emergence of urban forces flowing throughout an extended metropolitan area and causing a complex
regionwide interdependence among interests, problems, and activities. Suburbanization, which started for most cities at various times prior to World War II, became widespread in unincorporated rural areas and was simultaneously less dependent on any single urban center. Moreover, with an increasing dispersion of persons and activities, the distinction between urban and rural was lost.

Under these circumstances, a regional core is not filled to capacity before peripheral areas are influenced by the urban process. Instead, regionwide land use is nonparametric and activity in peripheral areas will result from multiple demands of the amorphous region as a whole. For example, as shown in Figure 2, the influence of urban pressures is evident in change-of-use price differentials for farm land. The figures show the value of farm land when sold for different categories of use. The price differentials are greatest where peripheral areas are consumed in an urban region. This is especially apparent with land proximal to megalopolis, notably in the Pacific and northeastern states. By contrast, farm land in the mountain states is much less affected. Thus the price differentials illustrate increased urban competition (i.e., industrial, commercial, residential, etc.) for rural lands caused by suspension of parametric restrictions and the diminishing importance of propinquity. The traditional relationship between contiguous land and human activity has been lost, thus blurring the traditional conical image of economic values which involved intense activity at the region's center, and rapid tapering off toward the periphery.

The forces attributable to dispersion may be explained in the context of increasing resources and decreasing mobility and communication costs for people and organizations. For most households, resources in the form of higher family incomes, spreading educational opportunities, and more leisure time have advanced much more rapidly in the post-World War II period than before. In addition to resources, activity of an enlarged regional scale is also due to declining costs for communications and mobility. Technological innovation in communications has provided the ability to maintain close relationships with those separated by distance and has created the means for decentralized production operations previously subject to spatial propinquity. Furthermore, penetration of national and regional network media, especially television, has enlarged the knowledge of distant and diverse opportunities for greater numbers at low cost. Reinforcing all of this is the impact of transportation technology, especially the urban and interurban freeway system. Among other things, the high-speed network augments an unprecedented degree of freedom in moving among widely separated establishments in conducting affairs. The "energy crisis" of the mid 1970s did not seem to slow this trend except during the few months when gas was simply unavailable. Even with gas prices more than doubling, the demand remained inelastic. Beyond this, adaptation to smaller cars and use of more

FIGURE 2
FARM REAL ESTATE TRANSFERS: AVERAGE VALUE FOR AN ACRE
BY POTENTIAL USE AFTER SALES, March 1, 1970
(in dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Use</th>
<th>Pacific States</th>
<th>Mountain States</th>
<th>Northeastern States</th>
<th>Total U.S. Excl. Hawaii &amp; Alaska</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent rural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residence</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minerals</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>223</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-home</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subdivision</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economic Research Service, August, 1971
efficient engines will tend to mitigate rising fuel costs in the future.

With greater resources and lower costs, individuals have the ability to substitute mobility for location and have used this opportunity to develop interests beyond their immediate geographical associations. As a result, individuals are less likely to identify with the fate of geographical communities per se and more with activities that are closest to their interests: "...the networks of interdependence among various groups are becoming functionally intricate and spatially widespread." Such a community, then, may be composed of different sorts of people who are distributed among distant settlements, but who develop bonds around shared and specific interests.

Furthermore, while order and boundedness may be less visible in terms of spatial propinquity and physical demarcations, the patterns of human activities may be seen in a psychic context where diverse and dispersed locations are linked together in a mental network of interests. This is at least partially evidenced in the behavior of such groups as environmentalists and civil rights activists. Environmentalists, who have acute interests in the urban periphery, tend to define a "mental space" concerning the quality of life on an ecological significance scale. Consequently, the efforts to preserve a wilderness area from resort development, save fishing by blocking dam construction, and stall an atomic reactor utility plant along an isolated seacoast may all be within the operating scope of a community of individuals, even though the activities and actors are spatially separated.

This second stage of urban growth raises the problem of how to administratively deal with complex forces and relationships. The blurring territorial model appears to be outmoded for administrative purposes because it does not adequately account for the patterns, modes, and connecting flows of people, information, and commodities that transcend boundaries and territorial subsystems. As an alternative to it, some have proposed the idea of an "urban field" which is viewed "as an enlargement of the space for urban living that extends far beyond the boundaries of existing metropolitan areas ... into the open landscape of the periphery." Such a field is not seen as merely an extension of contiguous physical boundaries, but more as a dynamic system of overlapping activity modes. Some of these modes may have a high degree of propinquity for some life styles or issues, while others may appear as physically disassociated parts connected only by transportation routes. Their numerous points of overlap, however, generate a degree of complexity not usually recognized in conventional city terms.

A Problem of Governance and Administration

The construct of an urban field is not meant to do away with the study of cities, but it does raise some concern about existing forms of governance and administration. By transcending the territorial boundaries and forming flow networks of activities and processes (i.e., as seen in activity or transactions analysis), the "pattern of the urban field ... will be difficult to rationalize in terms of a Euclidean geometry." The effect is to recognize that the political process and mutual adjustment will exist on a plane different from conventional constructs, and in the case of competition for land, may involve overlapping political spheres and problems of trans-territorial actors.

In this case, the question of constituent representation is critical. The urban field alludes to a condition of significant mismatch between physical and political boundaries which limits the ability of governmental jurisdictions to correspond to the forces and impacts relevant to the decision process. Because of trans-territorial interests, most people have a stake in the public facilities, services, and land use profile of areas they regularly visit but do not have primary residence. However, with most urban government based on the territorial model, public administrators and planners are not well equipped to handle influences and "constituents" from the urban field.

Consequently, to overcome the threat of public decisions "without representation," many affected parties have insisted on political access in jurisdictions where they have no residential standing. The experience is especially common in periphery areas where small non-metropolitan communities have had their political systems "swamped" by external actors. For example, urban-based environmental groups, who operate in a political space that has little to do with formal boundaries of their own municipalities, have become active and skilled in overturning public decisions of hinterland towns which would foster economic development. Likewise, public authorities in large cities have been required to
negotiate issues with non-resident regional and national alliances such as construction unions, environmentalists, and minority groups. Hence, the new order of interdependent relationships has precipitated a different basis for political involvement, conflict, and legal standing.

Territorially oriented urban planning and administration agencies have limited success in corresponding to this new plane of activity because they concentrate on the physical indicators of size, shape, and density. The discontinuity lies in the fact that while metropolitan jurisdictions view processes through spatial form, many political forces act without association to spatial consistency. Thus, solutions tend to ignore discontinuity, and advocate larger scale governmental forms when large-scale impacts are involved. 23

Since most land use jurisdictions exist at the local level, the target of concern has been with the viability of local government in dealing with issues and actors that permeate its boundaries.

At the heart of this ferment is recognition that states must have the responsibility to control land-use decisions that affect the interest of people beyond local boundaries if critical environmental lands are to be protected and if development needed by a regional population is not to be blocked by local governments. 24

The sanctity of local discretion is based on the assumptions of abundant land, low regional interdependence, and local segmented demands for land. Where these assumptions are reversed and an amorphous urban field is apparent, three central concerns exist. 25 First, local government is seen as not of sufficient size to efficiently respond to or gain compliance from a variety of processes and institutions that are organized on a regional or national scale. This is reinforced by the emergence of environmental quality as a national issue and the belief that local government by itself cannot make decisions that internalize the ecological base of an interdependent region.

A second concern is with parochial interests versus regional development needs. With unilateral control by local governments in an interdependent region, the coordination of development and change may be blocked. This is the major concern, for example, with such concepts as the Petaluma and Ramapoo plans which unilaterally limit growth within local jurisdictions. Without a regional scope, accommodation of complex overlapping demands is potentially jeopardized.

The third concern is with the inability of local government to adequately evaluate impacts and effectively represent interests when dealing with large corporations that operate on an extraregional scale. Such firms usually have the financial capacity to construct a variety of projects simultaneously and have the flexibility to use more than one site in a region. Such leverage creates the possibility of overshadowing the local review process.

The most often cited solutions to these inadequacies spring from the traditional reform movement and involve the consolidation and shifting upward of authorities usually into a single "streamlined" bureaucracy at the state or national level. Some states like Hawaii and Oregon already have centralized land use control at the statewide level. With the single professional bureaucracy, the assumption is that the public interest is best achieved for large impacts with comprehensive and consolidated authority. The problems of home rule are viewed as mitigated by scale. The shifting of control to larger units provides the boundary of authority suitable for gaining compliance among various influences and for making more inclusive plans. Likewise, the greater autonomy of a single authority provides a more conducive atmosphere for a coordination of experts to more rationally plan for growth and deal with giant corporations.

Such an administrative structure is acceptable for enlarged regional interdependence, but only if proposals of change carry a high degree of consensus among the affected interests, and if the proposals require primarily routine functional decisions. Under these circumstances, the professional bureaucrat operates under less uncertainty, can follow an at-large public interest mandate, and thus, minimize decision-making costs. However, where unique decisions are required or where the scale of a proposal affects multiple interests arrayed in an urban field, the single areawide bureaucracy may not have the means to appropriately perceive and internalize constituent needs and desires. This is especially acute in land use control where the role of planning and zoning activities is largely that of anticipating land use development and making adequate provision for all acceptable uses. 26 The urban field involves a process of overlapping flows and subsequent conflicts which is not conducive to stable and predictable patterns of low uncertainty needed for standardized bureaucratic mechanisms to work properly. 27 The single authority consequently carries a higher risk of neglecting pertinent
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considerations and of underrepresenting constituents within its broad jurisdiction.

Yet, advocates continue to argue without substantial evidence that “increased scale brings significantly greater opportunity to create quality, as well as some incentive to do so.” This is tantamount to saying that efficiency and effectiveness are a function of monopoly, which is in contrast to much of what is known about markets and economic theory. Moreover, in virtually every land use issue, there are value choices which transcend objective analysis and professional judgment. These values form professional predilections from ideological heritage, and are seldom made explicit in the decision-making process. Affected parties, overwhelmed by the power and technical language of bureaucratic professionals, frequently are incapable of relating their legitimate interests and of testing unstated values. Thus, with practically no limit to the number of factors pertinent to land use decision making nor guides to rank importance, the weakness in the approach is that maximum discretion rests upon the single comprehensive bureaucracy. Reflecting on this, the California attorney general has argued that future land use control “must be balanced and directed by democratic processes...”

For the major discontinuities in land use control to be seen and understood, the normative assumptions about the territorial city and hierarchically ordered administration need to be suspended. In their place, the urban field calls forth the searching for what constitutes a valid political decision process under land use circumstances of complex overlapping interests. There is no single set of strategies or structure that can guarantee rational decisions for all values that are affected by land use policy. The problem is not to seek out a “one best way,” but instead to devise decision processes that are both efficient and effective with regard to institutional fairness toward affected parties.

The question of fairness is especially crucial because all affected interests are not satisfied by welfare maximization of society at large. The broad spectrum of interests evident in any major land use issue yields an implicit disparity between who receives the benefits and who absorbs the costs. In this context, fairness toward affected interests is a necessary condition for overall societal satisfaction, and suggests that the rational criteria for public decision making is to either compensate adversely affected parties or internalize externalities. Consequently, the function and role of the political process is not in allocating and separating land uses (this is the market function), but instead lies in dealing with market allocation inadequacies. Because of the variety of potential external impacts, this requires not standard procedures and rules, but a process of intergovernmental deliberation and contractual negotiation with affected parties.

In addition to decision rules, governmental structure is also in question. What sort of alternative apparatuses might be useful under the rules of efficiency and effectiveness? What forms of intergovernmental coordination of responsibilities are required? Different patterns of jurisdictional power will affect both political access and who is included in the majority and minority on different issues, thus conditioning the distribution of costs and benefits. The inadequacies of both local government and the areawide bureaucracy pose significant problems when confronted by a trans-territorial network of actors and physical conditions. Furthermore, simultaneous solution of these inadequacies is a complicated matter that necessitates coaligning governmental structure with spatially disassociated, but frequently overlapping political spheres.

In taking these questions into account, administrators and scholars alike tend to overlook a plausible alternative. It involves the viewing of land use authorities—local, state, and federal—as if they composed an open system of concurrent government. In matching governmental jurisdictions to an urban field, the system utilizes an interdependent and non-heirarchical structure of interest and knowledge specific agencies, local government, and partisan inputs. The system includes a coordination of overlapping jurisdictions based on individual agencies having specialized certification authority. Mixes of these agencies are consequently drawn together around specific land use proposals or issues and the decision process emphasizes “partisan mutual adjustment” where agencies and partisans negotiate for benefits and accept the costs of accommodation. Trade-off mechanisms are appropriate in a system where internalizing external effects becomes the basis for consensus among diverse interests. The incentive for such a system to coordinate and operate efficiently and effectively stems from the interdependency of jurisdictions.
and the power of reciprocal review among participating agencies. With incomplete authority over any proposal or issue, individual agencies have a need for on-going and predictable intergovernmental relations in order to carry out their statutory responsibilities. To ignore or circumvent other concurrent jurisdictions creates administrative dysfunctions detrimental to all parties in the long run and provides a motivation to cooperate. Cases of this non-hierarchical approach are becoming more widespread as the need forces agencies into a cooperative system.\textsuperscript{32}

Conclusion: A Question of Policy

What has been suggested in this article is that changing societal circumstances have altered the political process in such a way that administrative jurisdictions in land use probably do not account adequately for constituent interests. Beyond this lies a question of policy and thus a summary. Should we be concerned more with how "efficient" (i.e., in a least-cost sense) our land use agencies operate or more with how fair they allocate benefits and costs among affected interests? The answer to this depends partly on how one believes administrative solutions are achieved. If a solution is seen as "known" and the result of professional judgment rather than the political process, the tendency is to advocate a simplified solution to carry out recommendations (usually a consolidated authority without significant reliance on public participation). On the other hand, if solutions are seen as uncertain and agreement is elusive, the tendency is to advocate a more complex political structure where the process of partisan mutual adjustment will yield acceptable outcomes. This article has assumed land use control is characterized more by the latter, and that the administrative problem is not one of scale, but one of interdependence between decisional process, representation, and political access.

A useful way of summarizing this is in terms of the relative costs created for society by the administrative process. Such costs are of two types: decision-making costs and external costs.\textsuperscript{33} The question of policy is cogent because the choice of one administrative pattern over another usually entails a tradeoff between these two costs. As shown in Figure 3, this follows for two reasons. First, decision-making costs (which include administrative expenditures measured by society as tax revenues) will increase with an increase in the number of separate agencies required to make a land use decision (curve DM). Multiple agencies require extra expense for reciprocal review and intergovernmental collaboration/negotiation. Second, external costs (which are those disproportional costs absorbed by segments of society not accounted for in the decision process) will decrease with an increase in the number of separate agencies required (curve EC). The different perspectives and public access routes afforded by multiple agencies are more likely to mitigate administrative errors and create a broader awareness of societal concerns than the single authority pattern. This is logical because the more a problem is scrutinized by different perspectives, the greater the amount of information and analysis that is brought to bear on the search for breakthrough solutions.\textsuperscript{34} Further, multiple access routes provide greater opportunity for affected parties to channel their desires through the political process and thereby afford public decision makers a better chance to make accurate interpersonal comparisons of interest.\textsuperscript{35}

Hence, while these two costs are interdependent from a societal standpoint, they are inversely related and require a policy choice involving a tradeoff between administrative "efficiency" (minimizing decision-making costs) and output effectiveness (accommodating change but minimizing external costs). To complicate this tradeoff, other factors beside administrative structure also influence the curves of Figure 3, and include those issues and actors composing land use
conditions. For example, if land use is characterized more by an urban field than by the traditional territorial model, then substantial changes in the cost curves may occur. With an amorphous image of issues and political actors, the external cost curve is likely to be much higher than originally postulated (curve EC). Decision making costs may also be affected with changes in the number of considerations (curve DM), but through innovations in interagency integration techniques, increases in this cost may be partially mitigated.36

The question of policy rests on legislators’ and administrators’ perceptions of what society is more willing to tolerate in the long run, but where the potential for severe external costs is high, concurrent government would seem to have the advantage over the single authority pattern. One must hesitate with such a conclusion, however, since existing studies of administrative success, failure, and reform have not provided sufficient comparative measures of appropriateness for alternative patterns of governance. Moreover, the assumed complexity in land use has not been empirically assessed and may be simply in the eyes of the beholder. To more fully understand the relationships between decisional process and adequate representation, we need research that will bring together different analytical paradigms of land use governance to examine the functioning of alternative systems and measure relative efficiency and effectiveness under differing land use conditions.

Notes
22. Ibid., p. 319.
24. Reilly, p. 15.
25. Ibid.; Heller.
26. Stanley Scott, Governing California’s Coast (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1975).
29. Younger, p. 17.
34. Ostrom, chap. 8.
36. Boschken.