INTERORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN COASTAL MANAGEMENT: THE 1976 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE EXPERIENCE

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Interorganizational Considerations in Coastal Management: The 1976 California Legislative Experience

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Abstract Among coastal management programs, most states have found the question of appropriate administrative structure difficult to cope with. The dilemma of decision trade-offs caused by the dual governmental needs of “efficiency” and “representation” has led to some alternative patterns of administration. For complex issues that transcend local boundaries, the choice between trade-offs means adopting either (a) some form of consolidated bureaucracy or (b) some system of concurrent jurisdictions. Both alternatives have their inherent benefits and disadvantages but, considering the degree of environmental complexity and array of competing interests involved in coastal resource use, the most appropriate administrative form would seem to be concurrent control, as interagency reciprocal review promotes thoroughness and broad representation. Affected both by swings in political climate and by traditional reform politics, the case of California legislation represents a conscious deliberation over administrative alternatives. After experimenting with concurrent control under Proposition 20, California reversed its legislation in 1976 by mandating the consolidation of coastal management authority into existing bureaucratic line organizations and a reduction of the coastal agency after 1979 to a planning and advisory body.

Introduction
In response to environmental and other concerns, most coastal states have adopted some form of control over the use of development and resources in the coastal zone. As a consequence, coastal management represents one of the more...
advanced areas of planning and land-use administration. Although many of the experiments have proved successful, there have also been difficulties. One problem in particular that apparently affects all states is the question of administration. What type of organizational structure and administrative decision rules are appropriate for the complex issues of coastal resource allocation? What intergovernmental considerations are critical for successful management? Among the most significant cases in point is California.

Until 1973, control of the California coast was almost exclusively under the jurisdiction of local government. As in most states, the influence of developers and increased local revenues led most coastal cities and counties to grant developers a free hand in transforming the open seacoast for private use. This resulted in both a lack of statewide perspective regarding coastal planning and severe overuse and access problems for the public. In 1973, only 29% of California’s 1100-mile coastline remained for public use, and the State Attorney General argued that the availability of easy-access sandy beaches had diminished to 8% (87 miles) of the total resource. For the state’s 20 million people, local governmental control of the coastline’s future appeared unworkable.

This process of public control over the coast was changed through the passage of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, a voter’s initiative known as Proposition 20. Without eliminating the traditional zoning and permit authority of local government, the Act created an overlapping state authority that scrutinized development proposals from a statewide perspective. Created primarily as an interim planning effort, state control of new development was tied to producing a comprehensive coastal plan. To manage this dual role of permit approval and planning, the Act established a bi-level commission system whereby state regional commissions were granted original jurisdictions in permit review, and a statewide commission was given primary responsibilities to create the plan. To assure conformity to the Act and the comprehensive planning effort, the statewide agency was also granted permit review powers in cases of appeal from the regional commissions.

As an interim authority, the Act stipulated that the commissions were to terminate January 1, 1977. The four-year existence was sequenced to allow for a period of coastal regulation experience, the submittal of the coastal plan by the statewide commission not later than December 1975, and a year of legislative deliberation on accomplishments and future directions prior to expiration. Hence, among other purposes, the interlude provided a useful assessment of the administrative costs and benefits of controlling coastal land use by special jurisdiction.

The year of decision for coastal management in California came in 1976 with the legislature having to make critical choices over the state’s long-term role and methods. Being an unusually important election year, 1976 did not provide the
ideal circumstances for controversial issues and, for coastal management, the legislative process was especially rough. In the sequence of events that led to a new act, a number of issues ranging from local control to preserving coastal agriculture competed for public attention. Yet, underlying all these concerns were questions of intergovernmental coordination and administrative appropriateness.

The Administrative Issue
The legislative process, involving months of testimony, open debate, and numerous amendments, dealt with the administrative issue in the context of a dilemma. Whereas there was concern over organizational and governmental efficiency, there was also the demand for broad constituent representation. Under Proposition 20, the coastal commissions had been granted authority independent of other existing agencies in order to more adequately “preserve, protect, and where possible, to restore the resources of the coastal zone for the enjoyment of the current and succeeding generations. . . .” In short, the new jurisdiction was mandated to represent a different public interest than the alleged prodevelopment bias of existing line agencies, and in so doing provided an avenue of representation for that constituency which was formerly underrepresented in coastal resource allocation. But along with new governmental sensitivity to resource preservation came administrative problems involving jurisdictional disputes and integration of the new authority in a system of separate, but overlapping, jurisdictions. Was the coastal commission simply a wasteful additional layer of government, or did it provide a necessary function in a larger organizational system?

During the legislative process, two opposing forces consequently solidified over the issue of more “representation” versus more “efficiency.” Those primarily interested in operating government activities at “least cost” promoted a single structure of bureaucratic hierarchy and central authority9 to manage coastal issues. Coming partly from the reform tradition, central coordination of experts was seen as occurring through the arrangement of “symmetrical divisions” and “orderly gradations of office.”8 Reinforcing this traditional view was the belief that experts are in a position to “know what is best for society,” and that their functional role can be attained only through “large powers and unhampered discretion”7 provided by the single authority. Hence, the appropriateness of centralized responsibility for issues overlapping that of coastal resources came out of the assumption that “. . . government can be better conducted by one agency than by fourscore of unrelated agencies, and . . . the immediate effect will be greater efficiency . . .”8

Currently referred to as “consolidation” or “streamlining,” such a structure would provide a one-stop procedure for permit approval of coastal development. Arguing for a subordinated staff department in the state’s giant Resources
Agency, one proconsolidation group stressed that the "administration of the state’s role in coastal management should be better integrated with the executive branch to make it more accountable." Professing the need to eliminate costly redundancy and interagency conflict, this viewpoint sought to withhold from the coastal agency all authority over the coast that overlapped either local government or other state agencies, such as Energy Development, Forestry, Public Utilities, and Water Quality. In effect, it would limit the role of the coastal agency to supplementary planning and advising for other functional agencies.

The opposing line of reasoning advocated a continued independent authority for the coastal commission that would promote coastal preservation within a governmental system otherwise dominated exclusively by agencies with nonenvironmental bias. Retention of this authority was argued for two reasons. First, environmental considerations were seen as minority values subject to subordination by any agency directed toward developmental needs. Second, setting appropriate limits on administrative discretion was not seen as fulfilled by "impartial" bureaucratic experts. Rather, countervailing limits were found more acceptable because fragmented authority meant that no single agency could act independently of agencies representing other interests.

The prorepresentation groups were largely advocating a federalist logic of administrative "checks and balances." In relating governmental jurisdictions to different uses in and impacts upon the coastal zone, such a system depends on a nonhierarchical, but interdependent, structure of interest and knowledge-specific agencies that provide alternative routes of public access. Interdependency is brought about when each agency has only partial control concentrated in different aspects of development, which requires some degree of interagency collaboration in reaching mutually compatible decisions. For example, although both a coastal agency and an energy agency may have concurrent authority over power-plant siting on the coast, the former represents scrutiny of environmental impact, whereas the latter deals with economic need. No public decisions are finalized until both agencies mutually agree that their respective statutory public interests have been met.

Unlike a consolidated central authority that reaches decisions by singlehandedly working out the priority interests, differing perspectives in a concurrent system provide a greater chance that the intergovernmental process will encourage agencies to "work out settlements under the terms of decision rules which are subject to review and reconsideration by others." Pointing to the advantages of such reciprocal review, the prorepresentation groups argue that separate but concurrent Jurisdictions provide the means for expression of a greater range of considerations, broader evaluation of consequences, and fuller representation of affected interests.
In contrast to the view of the coastal commission as representing a "single-minded devotion to the environment to the exclusion of other important values," a coastal commission staff member pointed to the need for such a countervailing role, stressing that "there's an inherent conflict of interest in [a development-bias] agency... regulating itself." In short, the pro-representation side contended that fair accommodation of differing interests could occur only by incorporating the different biases into a system of agencies with equal authority to represent segments of the total constituency.

As a result, the central administrative question the legislature had to grapple with was: How can coastal resource administration operate with more efficient coordination and with greater sensitivity to the diverse needs of California? The answers to this question cannot be made objectively, as there is no one best way to organize governmental activity without incurring some distribution of cost to society. Trade-offs of cost/benefit among alternative administrative forms are made by adjudicating and setting up priorities for "public preferences" in a "constitution-making process." Thus, the choice among alternatives is made subjectively by exchanging one set of consequences for another as they correspond to the dominant values imposed in the legislative process.

For government, the essential trade-offs are between providing lower decision costs (that is, time and expense in reaching decisions) and accommodating a broad spectrum of constituent interests. The frequently attributed advantage of a "streamlined" and consolidated bureaucracy is that its centralized authority structure reduces the points of interagency conflict, minimizes the cost of administrative negotiation, and mitigates "indecision" through hierarchical coordination. The costs associated with this form include a greater chance for administrative error, exclusion of interests antithetical to a central objective, and the probability that these two oversights may result in a broad, adverse impact on the public through underrepresentation. The potential advantages of a concurrent system as an alternative are that its multinucleated structure (1) provides reciprocal scrutiny over different collectives of experts, (2) enhances greater awareness of alternative courses of action, and (3) encourages public participation through multiple access. The costs associated with this form include higher public decisionmaking costs and sometimes longer delays created by thoroughness (i.e., redundancy) and the need for interagency negotiation (i.e., mutual adjustment).

Attempts to make an empirical validation of the association of alternative administrative forms with these trade-offs have not occurred in a systematic way, and several propositional questions have been raised. First, one might argue that the distinction between the decision costs associated with bureaucracy and those for concurrent jurisdictions may have little relationship to structural considera-
tions. For example, even using the criterion of bureaucratic conformity, the necessity of interdepartmental discussion on complex issues may be equivalent in terms of time and money to the interagency negotiation process. Even large, centralized agencies experience internal mutual adjustment. However, equivalent costs seem unlikely because of the difference in the character of decision-making. In a bureaucracy, the policy aspects of decisionmaking are more likely to be "preformed" for the hierarchy as a whole and thus more separated from the administrative deliberation process. In a concurrent system, the promotion of different representative roles creates the probability that joint interagency policy will have to be partially reestablished for each major land-use proposal. The absence of a "final say" authority is translated into a great deal of energy being spent on working out priorities.

Likewise, one could argue that because of the potential for arbitrariness and oversight in the single-agency approach, the necessity for reassessment imposed by judicial review raises decision costs for an indefinite period of time. Thus, the "hidden" decision costs of bureaucracy may be a large component of the total, whereas the possibility of judicial appeal is minimized by the thoroughness of concurrent review. In another vein, one might also assert that the relatively greater number of public access points in a concurrent system creates additional costs for participants in the form of information-gathering activities and additional delay times (in the case of developers). These ambiguities may be propositionally argued in several ways, but only empirical assessment will resolve cause-and-effect relationships.

A second line of questioning deals with representativeness. Some have argued that the single-agency form, with its clear hierarchical chain of command, would provide greater representation than would a diffuse system of concurrent jurisdictions, in which there are many public access points and decisionmakers. Having a single authority accountable to the public prevents obscuring the responsibility of administrative acts inherent in the multinucleated form of power. This argument may be relevant under assumptions of achieving public welfare at large, but broad representation of different affected interests is not served by the "unhampered discretion" of the single-agency form. The problems of citizen-preference identification, domination by special interests, and relevant information are not mitigated by clear lines of authority. Moreover, without an administrative system of checks, decisions may be worked out away from public scrutiny. With a system of concurrent jurisdictions, many more decisions must be worked out in an interagency process and are thus subject to greater public exposure. Evidence of this logic was seen during the Proposition 20 years when the coastal commission promoted much public visibility for those agencies engaged in coastal review activities. Recognizing this period as the roots of repre-
sentation, the state coastal commission chairman once said that "Controversy and criticism are not signs of failure; they are signs of public involvement in a democratic process."21

A third area of questioning involves public participation. One could argue that the single large-scale agency has equal or better resources than does a system of smaller agencies in providing the equivalent number of public information inputs to the decision process. Moreover, even with more access points, some view a concurrent system as having a tendency to substitute "sympathetic" bodies of experts for direct citizen participation.

These generalizations may be true in some cases, but several influences work against the relative openness of the single agency. First, the larger scale of the single agency with its "professional atmosphere" creates a greater barrier to access. Through formalized procedures, political distance, and the use of bureaucratic jargon, the single agency has a tendency to listen only to those groups with similar values and professional delivery as agency officials. Second, the lack of administrative checks on the single agency creates a sense of autonomy that may easily extend to public access. Agency autonomy reduces the incentive for deliberation over troublesome values and permits officials to adopt an implicit public interest. With more energies directed toward assessment of technical facts, the single agency may assume that "experts know best," hence not take some affected interests seriously. Having only judicial review as an option, these groups may drop out of active participation. Hence, both scale and autonomy raise the transactional costs of participation and isolate important affected interests, no matter how many opportunities for input are provided.22 In contrast, a concurrent system assures these excluded interests of greater opportunity for finding a public unit that will listen, because the units are smaller in size and greater in number.

In spite of the empirical uncertainties alluded to earlier, the association of different trade-offs with alternative administrative forms were premises accepted by most of those involved in the legislative process. Trade-offs posed a dilemma—government, for the most part, cannot offer both "efficiency" and "ideal representation" by choosing one administrative form over another. The dilemma is a function of an administrative "duality" of opposing forces to which all organizations must adjust if they are to be successful in the long run. The structure of administration must be specialized or differentiated enough to have both adequate familiarity with grass-roots issues and sufficient coordination to integrate specialized areas of discretion into achieving larger public interests.23 Although handled in different ways by successful organizations, "Differentiation and integration are essentially antagonistic...one can be obtained only at the expense of the other."24 Thus, one finds an emphasis toward "efficient" coordi-
nation in the single hierarchy which creates an inherently greater problem of underrepresentation, while one finds an emphasis on differentiation in a system of concurrent jurisdictions which incurs a greater difficulty with integration.

An additional quagmire for legislative choice between forms is attributable to environmental circumstances. With citizen expectations of predictable and fair government, the form of administration is dependent upon the tasks and socioeconomic environments with which the system must deal. A circumstance of routine tasks and predictable environments is conducive to emphasizing the "efficiency" of hierarchy, whereas conditions of unique tasks and complex environmental interdependency create the need for a more multinucleated system stressing sensitivity toward diverse political agents. Under environmental complexity, the greater number of partisan interests make agreement over values and factual data more difficult to reach.

Moreover, complexity manifests high levels of scattered and incomplete data, which require significant interpolation from different angles of knowledge. The concurrent system would better correspond to these circumstances because its multinucleated structure provides alternative channels for diverse interests and the means for assessing ambiguous information.

Some have argued, however, that the single hierarchy is superior under these conditions because of a second set of trade-offs. The trade-offs are seen in terms of "effective resources management as opposed to political expediency" where the professional experts of bureaucracy are seen as more rational and less political than those engaged in a system of mutual adjustment. Proponents of this position assert that the greater the number of participants in decision making, the more likely it is that the political bargaining process will trade away environmental values simply because of the need to reach some kind of consensual decision. Hence, political decisions that might be disastrous from a "technical" or environmental point of view may be avoided in an institutional structure that is more hierarchical than multinucleated.

There is little question that the concurrent system provides the potential for coopting adverse impact issues by more dominant political necessities. Indeed, mutual adjustment involves trading away concerns by all parties as those parties prioritize out less important preferences in seeking mutually satisfactory solutions. Nevertheless, information uncertainty is the intervening factor that makes this secondary trade-off an improper consideration. In the absence of complete information, no one knows for certain what the economic, environmental, and other costs and benefits will be for a given solution. There are no "technically" correct decisions under uncertainty. "Rational" decision making is obscured by incomplete knowledge, and paradigms infused with both fact and values become the means of predicting future outcomes under uncertainty. In the final analysis, "good" or "bad" decisions depend on the system that
provides the broadest inclusion of perspectives. One could argue, then, that the stereoscopic vision of a concurrent system is at least as appropriate in making "technically" sound decisions.

In the case of coastal management in California, few could deny the existence of high complexity in discerning appropriate task and environmental considerations. Although complexity of coastal issues was a dominant theme, it competed with the desire for reduced administrative redundancy and conflict (i.e., lower decision costs). Consequently, the state legislature was left with deciding in part whether California was willing to accept greater adverse impacts in the coastal zone imposed by the dominance of developer values or whether the people were willing to accept an exchange involving less "efficiency." An analysis of the legislative process will show that, although avenues were open for making the existing system of concurrent jurisdictions more efficient, the legislature saw the routes as politically risky and opted for a more "streamlined" and consolidated form of management.

The Legislative Outcome
The legislative process of devising an administrative structure around the two problems of differentiation and integration centered on the interdependency among agencies regulating coastal activities. In the case of differentiation, concern was expressed over the division of public authority among agencies, while for integration, interest centered on appropriate mechanisms for interagency coordination.

Differentiation
The interim commission's coastal plan,29 from which the initial draft of legislation had come, advocated a structure of concurrent jurisdictions where the commission would retain separate but overlapping authority with other functionally specialized agencies in the coastal zone. In such cases as utility plant siting, forestry production, or resort development, the coastal commission would hold an interdependent authority over resource allocation approvals with other agencies, and could exercise a veto under conditions of noncompliance to the Coastal Act. This meant an administrative system of specialized governmental units differentiated on the basis of coastal environmental processes, affected constituents, geographic area, and so forth. As a means of promoting thoroughness, it further meant that in lieu of a single large decision, the concurrent process would yield a composite of many smaller decisions by participating agencies tailored to the needs of the affected constituencies.

Within this division of authority, the initial legislation draft30 proposed that "the coastal commission shall have the primary responsibility for implementation of the [Act]."31 To achieve this end, the agency was to have a bivocational
authority that included concurrent review with other state agencies over large-scale projects and an appeal review in cases in which local government failed to comply with certified local coastal plans. Both responsibilities were directed toward reaching the agency's goal of minimizing the adverse effects of development. Proposed areas of jurisdictional overlap in this regard included wildlife habitat, access to public recreation, agriculture and forest resources, water quality, fisheries, sand maintenance, housing, and energy. Where the risks of severe impact were present, the initial bill called for a two-thirds vote for project approval.

Although the intention of the initial draft was to set out a differentiated, concurrent role for the coastal agency, it seemed to reflect a degree of confusion over organizational issues and interagency overlap. In an effort to promote overall public interest, with a strong emphasis on environmental values, the bill would have assigned contradictory responsibilities to the agency. Requiring that it act as interagency coordinator with specialized jurisdiction, the first draft called for the commission "to coordinate and integrate the activities of the many agencies that are involved and to supplement their activities in matters not properly within the jurisdiction of any existing agency."32 This conflict in responsibility was further compounded by the bill's provision that the agency follow a public interest rule of balancing environmental and economic interests.33 In effect, the draft called for the commission to act both as "advocate and judge"—a situation previously attributed to the state's prodevelopment agencies, which prompted the original creation of the coastal commission as a countervailing or mitigating force.

The legislators perceived this contradiction as a problem of duplicating jurisdictions and of creating a biased agency with the authority of "final say." Wishing to avoid the problem of redundancy as well as eliminate the exercise of "veto power" by environmentalists, the chairman of one senate review committee argued, "We can't have two kinds of political jurisdictions. We have got to delineate areas where state agencies operate."34 Although this view identified the need for defining boundaries and the inherent difficulty in promoting separate but interdependent authorities, it tended to discount the functional purposes of redundancy, which are to provide for multiple representation and reduction of errors.35 In order to recognize these purposes, a distinction must be made between those interagency relationships that simply duplicate tasks and those that provide the review process with differing views of the public interest and separate perspectives of scientific expertise. According to this distinction, functional overlap entails "a concurrent structure with full redundancy of means and methods of operation but specialized as to function."36

For example, the question of clear-cutting timber along the coast involves not
only the economic issues of the lumber market but "viewshed" and siltation impacts imposed on those who desire benefits from nearshore fisheries and an uncluttered environment as well. With regard to public policy, at least two distinct perspectives of the public interest and several functionally different collectives of expertise can be identified that would contribute significantly in determining the public choice. It is in this vein that the executive director of the coastal commission argued that "the idea [of concurrent review] is not for dual authority, but to assure that mandated functions are carried out." Therefore, instead of promoting a system whereby the commission had "final say," the creators of the initial legislation were pursuing the Federalist idea, namely, "The several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places." Nevertheless, the initial error of defining contradictory roles for the commission blurred the distinction between functional and ineffective redundancy and made the legislature suspicious of any overlapping areas where the coastal commission could exercise a veto over other agencies. As a result, in amending the initial draft, the legislature failed to see clarification of boundaries between agency authorities as attainable for a system of reciprocal review. In the flurry of opposition amendments that ensued, the legislation's sponsors tried in vain to maintain concurrent jurisdictions by clarifying previous contradictions and ambiguity. At one point, a section was inserted that would allow further research by the State Office of Planning and Research in determining "what duties and responsibilities each such agency should have in... minimizing duplication and conflicts..." Although the section was meant to allow for more rational deliberations over the differentiation problem, it was amended out, and the legislature methodically eliminated any further possibility of providing reciprocal review by a coastal authority.

By the time the legislation reached final passage, the coastal commission was reduced to playing an advisory role under other staff agencies. Seeing the trade-offs of consolidation as less risky, the legislature stated a primary intent "to minimize duplication and conflicts among existing state agencies...." In so doing, it mandated that the coastal commission would not "set standards or adopt regulations that duplicate regulatory controls established by any existing state agency...." Those initial proposals for overlap (i.e., wildlife habitat, forest resource and timber practices, water quality, energy) that formed the basis for reciprocal review were eliminated in favor of "streamlining." The ambiguity of interdependency was eliminated by mitigating the basis for a "veto power." In short, the problem of differentiation was resolved by replacing the specialized authority with the provision that the "commission shall... with respect to any other state agency, submit recommendations designed to encourage it to carry out
its functions in a manner consistent with [the Coastal Act]. The only retention of direct authority for the commission was its limited appeal jurisdiction over local governments' compliance with certified local coastal plans.

Integration
Under strong societal interdependency and complex physical environments, differentiation provides the means for breaking down a single large decision into more discernible subparts specifically tailored to the needs of affected constituents. However, to the extent that the composite result must reflect holistic harmony if it is to achieve broad public acceptance, the attainment of an integrated system represents a more difficult problem for a concurrent structure than for bureaucracy. Each specialized agency has the advantage of in-depth knowledge over its area of discretion (a bureaucracy is primarily made up of generalists who identify with the total hierarchy), but it has the capacity to deal with only a portion of total decision setting. Specialization provides thoroughness; but it simultaneously fragments surveillance for the total system. Unlike the bureaucracy, with its central control over departmental subunits, the multinucleated structure requires a more complex set of integration mechanisms to yield congruent decisions. Consequently, it must deal with the question of who makes decisions when interagency conflict arises.

Integrative mechanisms generally correspond to the nature of public decisions under contemplation. For a concurrent system, in which no single decision may be made without accounting for its impact on other agencies, mutual adjustment emerges as a method of integration. This form of coordination usually entails three categories of simultaneous mechanisms: (1) interagency negotiation and collaborative planning techniques; (2) incentives to voluntarily cooperate; and (3) special arbitrating units, such as ad hoc task forces and cross-functional coordinating teams rewarded on the basis of deriving mutual accords.

Whereas these integrative devices are commonly used in interagency relationships, questions have been raised as to their superiority over central coordination in promoting effective joint decisions. One could argue, for example, that mutual adjustment devices are offset by the reticence of agencies to bargain away represented interests in full public view and with adjunct citizen involvement. If this is true, it does not necessarily countervail coordination efforts. Rather, it means that public participation helps to maintain the integrity of the agencies in the process of coordination, and it forces interagency interaction away from administrative "convenience" and toward a search for innovative solutions. As Proposition 20 coastal management experience shows, the process may be more costly but, in the long run, it may promote broader public consensus.

Mutual adjustment may thus be a primary tool in coastal management in such
cases as power plant siting or timber cutting, where the act of one agency may promote or preclude the discretion and responsibilities of any other. The sponsors of the initial legislation promoted the idea of mutual adjustment by providing that "the procedures utilized for implementing [the Act] should encourage coordination and cooperation of interagency decisions." Furthermore, a number of methods were suggested, e.g., in creating an incentive to cooperate through mutual reinforcement, the bill called for a "prisoner's dilemma" situation that would have made all state agencies in the coastal zone jointly responsible for establishing a single permit application and review system. Likewise, in reaching joint agreement on the distribution of policy discretion, and in applying the Coastal Plan, the bill called for the commission to collaborate with other agencies in preparing "subregional plans... within those portions of the coastal resource management area where... the cumulative impact of development... might adversely affect coastal resources or coastal access." In an attempt to establish a predictable pattern of interagency relationships, the bill would also have required the coastal commission to create "performance objectives" for the purpose of relating its role of authority to the proposed areas of overlap (i.e., wildlife habitat, and so forth) shared by different sets of agencies. The purpose of defining integrative mechanisms in the Act was to give substance to the nonhierarchical alternative.

Nevertheless, as part of the original ambiguity created by the contradictory roles assigned to the commission, the methods of mutual adjustment were not cohesively packaged and shown to be a mutually reinforcing set of integrative mechanisms. Consequently, the legislature appeared to confound the mechanisms of integration with the process of differentiation in such a way that they were viewed as too costly and more likely to magnify than control the conflict. Making few acknowledgments that administrative conflict can be structured and directed in functional ways, the legislators appeared unwilling to entertain the possibility of nonhierarchical integration. At a very early stage in the amendment process, most legislators sided with those who argued, "The crunch has to come as to who's running the show.... Ultimately, somebody's going to have to decide who has the last word.... If you want the Superior Court to decide, you enhance that by concurrent jurisdiction.""

Fearing that mutual adjustment would be reduced to a "final say" by environmentalists, the legislature removed the collaborative provision for subregional planning and, by eliminating the areas of jurisdictional overlap, obviated the need for defining interdependent performance objectives and joint permit-approval responsibilities. Except for supplemental advocacy-planning responsibilities and appeal authority, integration of the Coastal Plan into the administrative process was to occur through the provision that "all state agencies shall
carry out their duties and responsibilities in conformity with [the Act]. Without an advocacy agency, only the courts were left to enforce administrative conformity.

Assessment
Among the coastal states, little consensus has emerged as to what organizational pattern is most appropriate for managing the allocation and preservation of coastal resources. Although this may be attributable to different constituent interests and resource circumstances, it may also be partially the result of differences in administrative philosophy. For example, the single hierarchy approach was apparently used in coastal management in Oregon and Hawaii, which have historically favored consolidation reforms, whereas the "home rule" of local government still prevails in Texas. In a few states, e.g., New Jersey, the orientation has been toward concurrent jurisdictions, which have achieved some measure of success at finding solutions to the system's problems.

For California, however, the future directions of coastal management are less certain. After entertaining the idea of concurrent control under Proposition 20, the state has apparently retrenched into beliefs of traditional reform. With this reversal of thought came the choice of minimizing the decisionmaking costs of government over the needs of broader representation. As shown in Table 1, the

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<th>Agency authority in the coastal zone</th>
<th>Before prop. 20</th>
<th>Under prop. 20</th>
<th>Under 1976 Act</th>
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<td>State coastal commission</td>
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<td>Planning/recommendation authority</td>
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<td>Permit review authority</td>
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<td>Interagency overlap</td>
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<td>Limited appeal authority over local government</td>
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<td>State agency hierarchy (energy, forestry water quality, etc.)</td>
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<td>Planning authority</td>
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resulting new legislation retained a statewide coastal commission, but its original direct authority over state review was reduced to an adjunct planning and advisory role under other state agencies. Likewise, commission review over local government was reduced to a limited appeal on the basis of noncompliance of cities and counties to "local coastal plans," which they are to create (regional commissions are to be phased out by 1979 as local plans are certified by the state).

By consolidating the provisions of coastal management into existing hierarchy of state departments, the legislature came very close to reinstating the pre-Proposition 20 structure, which gave noncoastal agencies the autonomy to act both as advocate and judge in determining the impact of their decisions on coastal resources. Two examples may serve to illustrate. First, in the review authority over forest timber practices, Proposition 20 granted the commission concurrent jurisdiction with the State Forestry Department. The inherent advocate/judge conflict of interest did not exist, because although the Forestry Department determined timber-cutting practices, the coastal commission controlled impact review of such practices on aesthetics and the nearshore marine ecology. Likewise, in utility plant siting, similar authorities existed where the coastal commission assured conformity to the Act. For these and other overlaps, numerous affected agencies lobbied against continued concurrent permit authority contending that "Endless amounts of time could be spent negotiating with the Coastal Commission to achieve [the Coastal Plan's] ambitious goals." In the end, their wishes prevailed.

Public officials and legislators have all too often assumed that political problems are solved by simply mandating action into law. Although appealing to a legalistic order, such logic overlooks the fact that without corresponding administrative units, past planning and land-allocation policies have seldom achieved the original goals of their framers. Without creating separate advocate authorities for conditions of conflicting public interests, the administrative process usually fails to make adequate representation, because it is delegated a task it is not structurally equipped to handle. Past zoning procedures have not worked, which is what caused the need for Proposition 20. Will more zoning policy instead of a coastal authority solve the problem?

Even if one were to argue that the system of agency reviews in California is multinucleated without the coastal commission, the effect of eliminating the agency as an equal authority is reduction of the accountability for those who seek to preserve public access and public use of the coast. In contrast to much news commentary, the future is less certain as to how much nondevelopment values and environmental concerns will count in coastal management without an advocacy agency to implement the Act.
Acknowledgments
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Notes
2. Harold Keen, "Will we kiss the coastline goodbye?" San Diego Magazine, 24, no. 12 p. 59 (1972).
4. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 497.
12. Ibid., op. cit., p. 46.
15. Constitutional arrangements are special kinds of decisions that precede administrative processes. Because they deal much more heavily with adjudicating values than assessing facts, they require special policy formation criteria that provide for the broadest possible inclusion of those interests affected by future administrative outcomes. See James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965); Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1957), Chaps. III–V.
26. This argument was raised by one of my articles' anonymous reviewers and is an important consideration which, due to the lack of systematic empirical research, can be assessed only through a propositional analysis.
27. Simon, op. cit.
30. The first draft of legislation was introduced in the Senate on February 10, 1976, as SB 1579 (Beilenson Bill). In June, the contents of the bill (which had been defeated) were transferred to another bill, SB 1277 (Smith Bill), which was ultimately passed into law in September. To minimize confusion, this paper will refer to the stream of amended legislation only as succeeding drafts of the initial bill.
32. Ibid., p. 5.
33. Designating an overall balancing rule for a specialized agency places the agency in an anomalous position requiring a large amount of intuitive judgement. With the coastal commission as part of a larger concurrent system, it should have been given a more specific criterion within its specialized realm of competence requiring less comprehensive ordering of priorities of public values. The more specialized rule in coordination with other agency tasks would have avoided the possibility of an "advocacy and judge" conflict of interest.
38. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, op. cit, p.320.
40. SB 1277, August 23, 1976, p.38.
41. Ibid., p. 39.
42. Ibid.
43. Thompson, loc. cit.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.; Lindblom, loc. cit.
47. Lawrence and Lorsch, June, 1967, loc. cit.
49. Ibid., p.71.
52. SB 1277, August 23, 1976, p.39.