Limited Rationality and Convergence to Equilibrium PlayWorking Paper (2016)
The psychology and behavioral economics literatures show that real world decision making at the individual level is frequently inconsistent with the rational actor model. An important question is therefore the extent to which a proportion of agents who make mistakes affects market level outcomes. Previous theoretical and experimental research showed that market level outcomes are less likely to match the rational actor model in settings characterized by strategic complementarity and more likely in settings characterized by strategic substitutability. We extend this research both theoretically and experimentally by introducing important real world complications – specifically, periodic shocks to the payoff structure and a periodic inflow of inexperienced players. We find that these complications can significantly slow convergence to rational actor equilibrium play, possibly even indefinitely.
Citation InformationKristen Cooper, Henry S. Schneider and Michael Waldman. "Limited Rationality and Convergence to Equilibrium Play" Working Paper (2016)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/henry_schneider/13/