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Only Blood would be more red: Irigaray, Merleau-Ponty and the Ethics of Sexual Difference

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Much has been made of Luce Irigaray’s critique of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s oculocentrism -- his privileging of vision at the expense of touch; but Irigaray never writes that visual perception is to be disregarded. Indeed, she has drawn upon Merleau-Ponty’s intuitions about the perception of color to develop her own insights into the cretative emergence of sexuate identity. Although she criticizes Merleau-Ponty for not revealing how sexual difference shapes embodied complicity with thought, Merleau-Ponty’s attention to the phenomenal perception of color provides for Irigaray a point of mediation between the body and the world, between sexual identity and thought. For, as Merleau-Ponty writes, “the dimension of color ... creates identities, differences, a texture, a materiality, a something.” Phenomenal perception of color calls into question any corporeally unmediated relations with the world, since color, which defies formal codes, is a quality of the flesh. Indeed, colors are welcomed by the body because they “awaken an echo.”

At stake for both writers is the opening of our perception and hence our thinking to new possibilities, to fluidity, to change, to an other dimensionality that emerges in the "perceived world [in] nuclei of meaning which are in-visible" though not "in the sense of the absolute negation." Opening up perception to the invisible is also the dilemma of rediscovering silence through philosophy, which is itself dependent upon language. For both philosophers it is the qualities of the flesh which have the revolutionary potential of disturbing the established structures of thought. Thus, for Merleau-Ponty the question is how is the philosopher to "return to the immediate" world given in sense experience,
to the silent transcendence of the phenomenal which has not yet been colonized by language or perceptual structures, even as this "immediate, this original ... can be forgotten to such an extent"9. In other words, how is the philosopher to return to a brute meaning, to perception that has not been colonized by Euclidean forms which tend to stabilize? For what Merleau-Ponty well knows is that perception is shaped by that which precedes it. We learn how to see. Paradoxically, then, it is the very openness of perception that makes it so vulnerable to being structured. Irigaray is preoccupied with a similar query, but importantly, it is for her one that needs to be articulated in terms of sexual difference, since this other dimensionality that exceeds articulation, the invisible that supports the visible, is the maternal-feminine, the other of sexual difference. The question she raises, then, is how can we open up creative possibilities for an intertwining of thought and embodied perception when these possibilities have not only been obscured, but have been systematically obliterated?

Indeed, the subordination of perception to cognitive knowing underlies Irigaray’s concern that sexual difference is in danger of being lost before we even know what it is. In response to Martin Heidegger’s claim that the issue of our age is our forgetting of the ontic/ontological split, that is, the forgetting of how ontic beings have come into being, she claims that sexual difference is the primary issue of our age10. For her, a recognition of sexual difference is fundamental to an experience of the sexuate identity necessary to articulating the noncoincidence of the ontic and ontological. Her assertion of the primacy of sexual difference as an issue is not, then, disconnected from Heidegger’s claim since if we continue to organize our world according to the representational sphere of existence, that is, in terms of a conceptual ordering marked by rational efficiency. we rely Jess upon our situated perception that grounds us in the present. Both the
cognitive and the perceptual areas of existence imply an apprehension of the future. The first, however, is one that requires a planning for the future based on a cognitive and secured apprehension of past structures. The second mode provides for an anticipation of the future according to a situated and embodied apprehension of the present. The first demands assurance of what is to come; the second is open to contingency and wonder. Thus, if we do not perceive difference, specifically sexual difference, in an embodied way, but rather understand it categorically according to laws and regulations that are severed from embodied perception, the potential to understand sexual difference will be Jost to us. Such a Joss has, for Irigaray, ethical significance since it entails a forgetting of the primary recognition of the other and of otherness.

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Importantly, it is the lack of recognition of sexual difference in Merleau-Ponty's work that Irigaray cites as hindering his attempts to bring the body into language. According to Irigaray, Merleau-Ponty perpetuates the suppression of the maternal-feminine that ultimately mires his work in a nostalgic memory of the maternal body. In this "pathos of remembering and forgetting" there is a repetition, a searching for "something that has been erased, or inscribing it so that it shall not be erased"11. For Irigaray, this nostalgic evocation of the "eternal feminine" does not allow for an embodied memory of the feminine necessary to sexuate identity. This "historical pathology" which Merleau-Ponty challenges in his descriptions of embodied perception, and yet reenacts as he draws on maternal metaphors without acknowledging their source, is the double forgetting that Heidegger associates with Dasein’s relation to being. It is, for Heidegger, not so much that we forget being, that we forget how things have come into appearance, as that we forget
that we have forgotten that beings presence, that they are given to appearance. Similarly, there is, for the child, a necessary forgetting of the originary and absolute dependence on the mother, in order to project into the future an autonomy the child will attempt to achieve. But as a culture, we have forgotten this necessary forgetting in a melancholic suture that does not allow for the healing of the traumatic wound of separating from the mother. The wound then structures and shapes the present in a way that disallows an authentic experience of the maternal-feminine. Its sameness "has been assimilated before any perception of difference"12. In other words, for Irigaray, it is not perception that is primary as it is for Merleau-Ponty. He has forgotten the originary giving, the originary fecundity of being, the gift of the maternal which allows for the presencing of beings, and importantly of perception. The consequence for Merleau-Ponty is that in place of a memory that could never be, there is a nostalgia for a past that was never present, and moreover, could never be present as past13. Merleau-Ponty queries how to return to the immediate even as he concedes that there is no immediate perception unsullied by culture. For Irigaray this return to the immediate is a nostalgic wish for a return to the womb, to a perception that precedes culture. Merleau-Ponty claims in the Phenomenology of Perception that there is no perception in "pre-natal existence, [since] nothing was perceived, and therefore there is nothing to recall"14. If we move from his important intuition that perception can only happen where there is difference or differentiation, and his claim that there is no perception in pre-natal existence, then it becomes apparent that Merleau-Ponty cannot recognise differentiation prior to the inauguration of the subject’s perspective that, for him, only begins to be articulated at birth. Because for Merleau-Ponty there is no differentiation prior to the birth of the subject, the mother's perspective cannot be acknowledged. This position obscures the sexual and originary difference which takes its primacy in allowing for the presencing of beings in the first
place. According to Irigaray, the resulting nostalgia for this unacknowledged Joss prevents Merleau-Ponty from ultimately accomplishing a privileging of the present necessary to an embodied memory of the flesh.

In privileging perception over the giving of presencing, Merleau-Ponty forgets that there was another vision that preceded his own, another perception of him, of a differentiation (*ecart*). Irigaray claims that if this prior vision is not recognized, "if the cord is not cut", if the child does not achieve a symbolic dependent autonomy, and the mother remains his nourishing source, then "there is no end to the osmotic exchanges with the maternal world and its substitutes"15. How can sublimation of the flesh take place? Her life is lived for him and his perception; she is denied her own perspective. Thus when Irigaray writes: "If the mother, or the woman, sees the world only from the perspective of the maternal function, she sees nothing"16, she means that if Merleau-Ponty sees vision as beginning with his own birth, if he does not recognize the autonomous vision of the mother but rather coopts this vision as his own reversibility, then there can be no perception of sexual difference. It is not that Irigaray does not recognize the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of difference, of dimension, of elements that he was developing in his last work; it is rather that she reveals the blind spots, the limitations of a philosophy of difference that does not acknowledge this first difference. She writes:

If man achieves autonomy from a maternal that supports him, from the kind of all powerful Other that is finally extrapolated into God, then perhaps be will discover that there is something inhering in the female that is not maternal? Another body? Another machine? (At worst?)17

Thus a recognition of sexual difference is dependent upon a recognition of another world, another landscape, of an other vision that is independent of, indeed precedes, his own vision.
In the suppression of color, then, of the flesh, of our bodies in this epoch, so too is sexual difference suppressed, since sexual difference is not merely a transcendental concept but rather a lived fleshy existence. The problem is, however, that this lived bodily existence has been cut off from language, making it impossible to have "any thought, any imaginary or symbolic of the flesh". This cut or wound is accompanied by a splitting of the empirical and the transcendental, and a splitting of "the roles fulfilled by man and woman". Of course, in this splitting "the body falls on one side, language on the other". Moreover, this splitting is bolstered by a divine and transcendental male ideal or god, that allows for the displacement of matter to women. In the deferred access to the divine, in the promise of a beyond, the body becomes unnecessary since it is not in the living present that this ideal will be encountered. For women, then, it becomes almost impossible to establish a sexuate identity since they are denied both a divine transcendental ideal as well as a language or cultural production that allows for an embodied memory of the flesh. They are instead shaped by the nostalgia for the womb. This means that culturally the primacy of the present is suppressed in favour of a future perfect, and a past that never was.

Thus the present is privileged for both Irigaray and Merleau-Ponty precisely because it is in the present that the ecstatic intertwining of temporalities collide. But also, importantly, it is in the present that we are open to corporeal perception imbued as it is with past structures, open as it must be to a future. It is in the present that creative sedimentation takes place, and this is because it is in the present that we perceive. It is not merely that we impose cultural structures of sexual difference upon our ability to make sense of the world, rather it is through our sensual embodied perception that we literally apprehend difference at all. Thus the suppression of the embodied present is accompanied by a suppression of difference. This means that we lose identity when
everything is reduced to mastery and logic. It is not that we cannot cognitively know that there are differences between men and women; but such a cognitive knowing is not the same as perceiving differences corporeally. For example, we might know that there is a black felt pen mark on the black wall, but we would not perceive this mark as we would white chalk drawn upon the same wall. Perhaps it is not then so much that differences can be perceived but rather that there must be difference in order for there to be perception. As Irigaray claims, "if I can no longer perceive, I am hallucinating or dead"; thus perceptual difference is necessary to the creative fecundity of life.

Still it is not enough to perceive the figure against the background, the gestalt that is so central to Merleau-Ponty's elaboration of perception. The gestalt allows for the perception of difference, of differentiation, of non-coincidence, but it already has its own logic or logos that tends to structure perception according to that which has already been perceived and is thus recognizable. But Irigaray describes a differentiation that arises from the flesh that is prediscursive, and thus has its own rhythms; it is an alterity that is never absolutely determined nor complete. For this reason art is for Irigaray a way of mediating the body, of bringing its affections into culture, into the collective imaginary: "whereas the signs of writing seek to contain and repress blood, painting and colors try to express blood". It is art that prevents sexuality from falling into a natural immediacy. Accordingly, she calls for a creativity that emphasises means and not ends. Ends are tied to anality, to a male sexuality that denies women's fecundity, that reduces women's bodies to lesser copies of men's; whereas the means refers to a painting of the imaginary, to a re-enfleshing through color of a differentiated sexuate identity tied to the imagination as well as to genetic identity. This is of course not to imply biological determination, but rather to recognize that there is a natural body that is taken up and intertwines with culture.

This intertwining becomes clearer in the ways Irigaray takes up Merleau-Ponty's elaborations on the imaginary; she understands it with him to be an element that is not
simply added on to the real, but rather one that emerges through the intertwining of the inward weightless dream-life of the body, and the outward tangible body as "enclosure". Yet it is an enclosure which, because it is visible, allows for a "sort of reflection" between the body and the world. Thus a sharp boundary cannot be drawn between the subject and the objective world; rather the imaginary is for both philosophers the "true Stiftung (founding) of Being". It traces out the chiasmic relation between inward vision and the world that we see, emerging in an intertwining of bodily existence and being, and which, as such, allows for the development of an individual identity or imaginary that is still engendered from within the cultural one. In this light, color is an aspect of visual perception that, for both Irigaray and Merleau-Ponty, resists the colonization of conceptual thinking underlying our cultural symbolic, and that, moreover, is essential to an embodied imaginary. The imaginary as an element is, for Merleau-Ponty, a "non-thetic being", a "being before being". Thus, the "Rotempfindung", the sensation of red, is chiasmatically intertwined with the "Rotempfundene", that which is experienced as red. While there are no distinct boundaries to be drawn, neither is there an exact coincidence between experience and that experienced. Rather, there is a dehiscence, a spread which allows for an individual identity within an ontological understanding of being.

"Philosophy is not [then, as Merleau-Ponty tells us,] the reflection of a pre-existing truth, but, like art, the act of bringing truth into being". Although there is a tension between the imposition of concepts and categories that structure our everyday being in the world, and an openness to creative sedimentation, to seeing anew, it is art which reveals the world as we perceive it, claiming the invisible as well as the visible in its vision. While the phenomenal body gathers together the different speeds of perception in an identity, an embodied memory, these speeds of perception are also gathered together for Merleau-Ponty in the painting which could contain "within itself even the smell of the landscape... [since] a thing would not have this color had it not also this shape, these
tactile properties, this resonance, this odour”²⁹. While Merleau-Ponty was critical of abstract painting which for him spoke only of a “negation or refusal of the world”³⁰, his own writings belie a dismissal of the importance of the affectivity of color. His contemplation of the blue of the sky yields a bodily synchronizing: “I do not possess it in thought ... I abandon myself to it and plunge into this mystery”, he writes. Since, “the sensation of blue is not...knowledge” as such, one's engagement with the colored world entails rhythms, abductions and adductions; one may be either attracted or repelled; but importantly it is overall a sentient and sympathetic relationship³¹. Phenomenal being is “orientated or polarized in the direction of what” the subject is not³². It is a rhythm that entails a fundamental dehiscence or difference, a going beyond oneself, an incorporation of otherness that can never be completely incorporated.

It is these qualities of color, that it cannot be reduced to formal codes, and that it entails a sentient relationship with that which is other, that Irigaray sees as inherent to an art of painting in the psychoanalytic practice, one that contributes to the formation of a sexuate identity³³. It is the tendency to encode, inherent to dream analysis, that reduces images to words. But perception that is attentive to the present, and not merely tied to a conceptual world of representation, would allow for the potential of a sexuate subjective identity for women since it is in the memory of the flesh where identity is formed³⁴. Such a memory is not one that can evolve out of a conceptual universal thinking. It is tied to an embodied and creative engagement with the world.

In her essay "Flesh Colors", Irigaray focuses on the psychoanalytic relationship between analyst and analysand as an ethical one that brings into relief the spatial and temporal shaping of the embodied subject. She identifies this relationship as emblematic of the emphasis on words and language, to the extent that language has become severed from embodied existence in our culture. In the psychoanalytic space, the analyst listens for words and signifiers. The dream, experienced in its richness of color and sensation, is
reduced to words. But, she argues, neither the qualities of the voice, including "timbre, intensity, [and] pitch", nor colors in their many textures and hues, can be reduced to a bipolar couple. Colors cannot be dichotomous nor can they be reduced to two. While there is a potential for bipolarity ("blue/red, high/deep"), the nuances and richness of the textures of color and voice far exceed such tendencies. In her elaboration of color, however, Irigaray’s intent is not to collapse the limit of sexual difference. She writes that men and women must be true to their colors. At the same time, difference is always multiple. This means that even as she insists on sexual difference, this difference is itself not grounded in essentialist descriptions of what it means to be male or female; her elaboration of color provides for this difference. Importantly, while colors cannot be reduced to a dichotomy, they do show up other colors. We see this shade of red in relation to that particular blue; for without at least two colors there would be no difference and hence no perception. At the same time, this differentiation that provides for perception does not emerge as an oppositional difference. Rather, it is more that two colors intertwine with one another in a way that allows for the altering of a shade, the intensifying of a hue. Thus a particular blue shows up a certain red more intensely as the red that it is. The significance of this argument is that sexual difference, as we understand it in Western culture, defines women in how they differ from men and not in terms of their own unique identity. Thus difference is understood only as binary and polar. The differences between colors, however, cannot be so perceived.

This tendency to bracket out the "sensual universe" in our culture means that, according to Irigaray, the subject cannot "possibly come into existence in his present and his history"35. Moreover, in psychoanalytic practice, embedded as it is in this culture, this tendency is further accentuated in that, in the analytic situation, the subject lies on the couch thus detaching her from objective space, and from sensory perception of the present. Since she is not to relate to the "here and now"36 "the subject risks sinking down
and seeing everything go gray”. For grey is the universal color that contains all others but obscures their particularities and differences. With a loss of "sensory contrasts" that grounds the subject in the present goes a loss of identity; instead "there is a demented language without an I" 37. It follows then that this privileging of word and text that is inherent to Western culture suppresses the coming into being of the embodied subject in his or her own situated context. Within a male imaginary, moreover, women too often initiate their own "annihilation", destroying "anything that emerges from their undifferentiated condition, [thereby instituting] their reduction to a sameness that is not their own. A kind of magma, of 'night in which all the cats are gray' ..."38

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Color, tied as it is to a corporeal creativity, to an art of painting that intertwines with imagination, could provide an important link since it facilitates reflection that incorporates body and mind; but it also allows for reflection that incorporates difference. Importantly, as Merleau-Ponty shows us, perception of color links the past and the present with the "depths of imaginary worlds". The perception of a certain red is never the perception of a "chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible being." Not only does it intertwine with the other colors around it, but it also participates with other appearances of red which are both "simultaneous" and "successive"; for Merleau-Ponty those appearances were the red of "certain terrains near Aix or in Madagascar", the red of the "pure essence of the Revolution" and, tellingly, the red of the "eternal feminine". It is, then, "a sort of straits between exterior horizons and interior horizons ever gaping open". For Irigaray, "all this requires there be a present ... [that] is bound up with perception, or perhaps perceptions, and with the act of creating". If, for Merleau-Ponty, perception is primary, preceding thought, he also shows how we perceive the world because it is the world we inhabit; perception is tied to that which we know. It can become tied up with a past, closed off from the present, and from the future. What Irigaray questions is whether inhabiting is
not perhaps the "fundamental trait" of "man's being", and perception nothing less than the "usual dimension of the feminine". But this perception has an immediacy that denies it of "name or concept" or the mediation of the imaginary. In Western culture women have been tied to a "natural immediacy that is bound up with reproduction". They remain without mediation at the level of perception with no access to conception, either their own or that which they themselves engender. This relation to perception allows women to remain open, watchful and ever-changing, but obstructs their ability to develop an embodied memory of the flesh necessary to identity. Similarly, men have been linked to conception, to the formation of concepts which become cut off from the insights of embodied perception, insights which men insist on transcending, even as their concepts are ultimately dependent upon them. They remain circumscribed by their container-like bodies which they inhabit in a way that cuts them off from their roots, from creativity, from anything other than endless repetition. Language, laws, science and technology have been cut off from the body. This division between the two sides of sexual difference, women attached to perception, and men to conception, means that while women are searching for a way to "find and speak" their meaning, men question whether "meaning is still to be found in language, values and life".

Thus when Irigaray claims that Merleau-Ponty accords an exorbitant privilege to vision, what is overlooked is that she simultaneously charges him with subsuming this privilege under language. She interrogates his structuralist influences which she suggests prompt him to write that a naked color is "less a color or a thing ... than a difference between things and colors". She is cautious. On the one hand, it is this differentiation inherent to perception, in particular to the specificity of color, which has promise for an ontology of perceptual difference; on the other hand, she questions if "for Merleau-Ponty ... sensation [is] already structured like a language", if color, like language, is pure difference, then colors for Merleau-Ponty would be arbitrary and not expressive of
the body”. If difference is arbitrary, always comparative, and not expressive, then how can there be an opening for sexual difference that acknowledges difference as limit, whereby difference is not articulated as difference from? Without difference articulated as a limit there can be no sexuate identity since identity continues to refer to the one, to that which is already known from within this logic of recognition. If language cannot be open to the colors of the flesh, if a balance cannot be found between sound and light, between the affective harmonies and phenomenal vibrancy of “color [which is] linked to the voice” in its timbre “and to the eye” in that it can be seen, then language and culture become locked in a circular reversibility whereby my vision recognizes that which it knows and the world confirms that which I know, and this knowledge is separated from the rhythms of bodies which take up their own space-times, their own creative sedimentations. Writing, cut off from the colors of the flesh, from the enfleshing of life, becomes codified”.

What is at stake for Irigaray is the increasing technicity of the body, whereby the body is subsumed to the rhythms of science and technology, to the rhythms of sounds imposed from the outside which, separated from the body, create noise rather than meaning. The body is not able to express itself. The different speeds of perception, of light and sound lack something elemental or earthly to hold them together. In logical thought there is no room for incompossibles, but in embodied perception they are held together. For example, time is made simultaneous; traumatic moments from the past haunt and reshape the present. Hearing and vision cannot be collapsed into one another, yet they overlap; I can see someone speaking. Thus in the psychoanalytic situation, when dream images are extracted from their space-time and collapsed into a linear analysis, the colors and sounds of the imagination are diminished, the entire fabric of identity, of the memory of the flesh, is threatened.
But because color refuses to submit to systems, codes and intellectual forms of analysis, because it articulates our very contact with being, it offers a way of doubling back, of thinking anew, according to the flesh. For, even before meaning, or even after meaning has been stripped away, according to Irigaray, all that is "left of life beyond forms, beyond truth or beliefs..." is color. Irigaray shows us that, although since Plato's cave light has been an ongoing metaphor for philosophical enlightenment, perception of the world also requires color. Light alone does not allow us to see things, to see the world, since things differentiate themselves through color. As Veronique Foti has argued, color has been virtually derided in philosophical texts perhaps because of its relation to the affective, to its inability to be reduced to concepts and logic. Indeed, what is interesting about color is the phenomenal nature of the way it establishes a relationality between subject and object, between object and object, that cannot be adequately explained by scientific theories of retinal readings of light wavelengths. In fact, this phenomenal nature challenges such oppositional distinctions between subjects and objects. Thus, when Merleau-Ponty writes that "a certain blue of the sea is so blue that only blood would be more red", he reveals a differentiation emerging in color that is not a difference from the one, nor is it the pure difference of structuralist linguistics; while it is an absolute difference, it is one that resonates with the flesh because color is a quality of the flesh, and as such provides for a difference that is also chiasmic. A cultural recognition of such difference would allow for the (re?) integration of the maternal-feminine that has been suppressed by a nostalgia for the womb. Indeed, for Irigaray, it is "color [that] resuscitates" a life that precedes such subject/object distinctions. It is the "ground of the visible where seeing and seen are not yet distinguished, where they reflect each other without any position having been established between them". Moreover, since "color cannot be abstracted from its material ground ... it is more in the mode of participation than of the solitary emergence of the concept". Thus color resists abstraction; it resists
being cut off from the body, from its materiality, from the emergence of the flesh. As such, it allows for a recognition of sexual difference.

It is perhaps this recognition that emerges in a chiasmic intertwining of the works of Merleau-Ponty and Irigaray on embodied perception. That they both turned to color to elaborate a "preconceptual, preobjective, [and] presubjective" articulation of difference is, I would argue, because color is that which inheres in and resonates with the body. Flesh, like things, is colored. Color resists abstraction; it cannot "yield to my decisions [but rather] obliges me to see". This is not to give up on rationality, but rather to open our thinking to embodiment, to an alterity whose negation has provided the foundation of Western thought, but which now, cut off from its roots, is suffocating. Indeed, it is not only that "knowledge alone cannot constitute the unity of the subject", but that, moreover, if the subject is cut off from affect, from sensoriness, as well as from the "imagination as synthetic faculty", the subject will also be cut off from her identity which is a "point of assembly in the flesh". The ways in which Western culture has divided perception and creation between two genders inhibits exactly this ability to establish an identity, a memory of the flesh. Perception is reduced to sensation and the imaginary to a "pathos of the senses" "If we are to survive, in Nietzsche's sense of *ueberleben*, of living life more intensely, we need to create new values, as Irigaray tells us. These new values can only come from an integration of our language, of our bodies, of our culture which entails a recognition of sexual difference.

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Endnotes

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4. 'The Invisible of the Flesh', in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); originally published as 'L'invisible de la chair'; in Ethique de la difference sexuelle (Paris: Les Editions de minuit). The book is abbreviated as "Ethics". For all translated texts the second page number given will refer to the French.


9. V.1., pp.212-213; p.266.


12. Ethics, p.98; p.98.


17. Ethics, p.145; p.137.

18. Ethics, p.87; p.88.

19. See Penelope Deutscher, "'The Only Diabolical Thing About Women...': Luce Irigaray on Divinity", *Hypatia* 9, 4 (1994), pp.88-111 for an excellent elaboration of this aspect of Irigaray's thought.


22. V.1., pp.269-270; p.323.

Interestingly, Charles A. Riley II reports that "research teams at the University of Washington in Seattle and at Johns Hopkins University tracked the genetic basis of red photo pigments, a type of protein, and show that the newly discovered amino acid affects the part of the cone cells where color perception begins. The studies show that there is a nearly infinite number of ways to see red alone. The variations are caused by subtle differences in genetic makeup, offering a biological explanation for the extreme subjectivity of chromatic response". *Color Codes: Modern Theories of Color in Philosophy, Painting and Architecture, Literature, Music, and Psychology* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995), p.2.


26. Merleau-Ponty writes that the imaginary "does not present the mind with an occasion to rethink the constitutive relations of things". E.M., p.165; p.24.

27. v.1., p.267; p.320.


33. F.C., p.l55; p.169.

34. F.C., p.161; p.175.

3S. F.C., p.154; p.168.

36. 'Gesture in Psychoanalysis', in *Sexes and Genealogies*, p.92; 'Le geste en psychanalyse', in *Sexes et parentes*, p.106.


38. Ethic p.104; p.102.
39. VI., p.132; p.175.
40. V.L, p.132; p.174.
41. F.C., p.162; p.176.
42. Ethics, p.141; p.133.
43. F.C., p.165; p.179.
44. Ethics, pp.141-142; p.134.
46. V.I., p.132; p.175.
47. Ethics, p.158; p.149.
49. Ethics, p.143; p.135.
50. Riley, *Color Codes*, pp.3-5.
54. Ethics, p.156; p.147.
55. Ethics, pp.158; p.149.
56. Ethics, p.156; p.147.
57. F.C., p.163; p.178.