Effects of Changes in Contribution Skills on the Voluntary Provision of Public GoodsOsaka Keidai Ronshu (2006)
AbstractUsing two-person simultaneous-move and sequential-move games of private provision of public goods, this note investigates the questions of which person, skilled or unskilled, and which leader or follower has an incentive to heighten (or lower) his/her skills in contributing public goods. It is shown that (1) there is a tendency for the relatively skilled person to want to be more skilled, whereas the unskilled person wants to be more unskilled, and (2) a leader never has an incentive to lower his/her contribution skills whereas a follower may have such incentive.
- Private provision of public goods,
- Contribution skills,
- Sequential-move game
Citation InformationKeisuke Hattori. "Effects of Changes in Contribution Skills on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods" Osaka Keidai Ronshu Vol. 57 (2006)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/hattori/10/