International Trade, Factor-Market Distortions, and the Optimal Dynamic Subsidy: ReplyThe American Economic Review
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Publication VersionPublished Version
AbstractJames Cassing and Jack Ochs' comment is, I believe, a very interesting extension of the analysis of my paper. Their two basic results are: (i) that congestion will occur in the search for jobs; and (ii) that given costly labor mobility, private decisions regarding voluntary quits will yield a socially optimal adjustment path if individuals have perfect foresight and if there is no congestion (externality) in the search process. Thus, they argue that even if factor prices are not rigid, the presence of congestion in the search process implies private decisions will not be socially optimal, and therefore that a subsidy will be needed to support the optimal plan.
Copyright OwnerAmerican Economic Association
Citation InformationHarvey E. Lapan. "International Trade, Factor-Market Distortions, and the Optimal Dynamic Subsidy: Reply" The American Economic Review Vol. 68 Iss. 5 (1978) p. 956 - 959
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/harvey-lapan/54/