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Article
Welfare effects of intellectual property rights under asymmetric spillovers
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016)
  • Jeong Eon Kim, Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning
  • Harvey E. Lapan, Iowa State University
Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
10-23-2004
Working Paper Number
WP #04026, October 2004; Old working paper #12206
Abstract
We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and several heterogeneous Southern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume the southern firms differ in their ability to adapt technology and use this heterogeneity to study the differing incentives of southern governments to protect intellectual property rights. We find that governments representing more efficient firms have greater incentive to protect IPR than do those representing less efficient firms. However, efficiency considerations imply that, given policies resulting in the same overall innovation rate, it would be better to have weaker IPR protection for the more efficient southern firms.
Disciplines
File Format
application/pdf
Length
24 pages
Citation Information
Jeong Eon Kim and Harvey E. Lapan. "Welfare effects of intellectual property rights under asymmetric spillovers" (2004)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/harvey-lapan/31/