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Article
Emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes
Journal of Public Economics (2004)
  • Hans Gersbach
Abstract

We examine how refunding emission taxes to firms dependent on market shares should be designed. While refunding is harmful under perfect competition, a first-best self-financing tax/tax-refunding scheme exists if the marginal damage from pollution exceeds the marginal distortion in an imperfectly competitive output market with symmetric firms. Under pre-investment in cleaner technology with short-term abatement opportunities, a first-best refunding scheme exists if pollution refunding can be made dependent on both market and investment shares.

Keywords
  • Emission taxes; Refunds
Disciplines
Publication Date
February, 2004
Citation Information
Hans Gersbach. "Emission taxes and optimal refunding schemes" Journal of Public Economics Vol. 88 (2004)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/hans_gersbach/13/