![](https://d3ilqtpdwi981i.cloudfront.net/ZIH9H6qWgGDPUGqcxvA07Wjt0yo=/425x550/smart/https://bepress-attached-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/24/c3/1d/24c31d4f-b062-4147-96c0-35fef5077d33/thumbnail_1e6ecf5a-de52-4fd2-aaa9-3b45cab07c6f.jpg)
Article
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
Games and Economic Behavior
(2010)
Abstract
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that the literature focuses on), unravelling is more likely to occur when participants have more similar preferences. Moreover, any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling and the ex-post stable mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it prevents unravelling.
Keywords
- two-sided matching; unravelling; similarity of preferences
Publication Date
2010
Citation Information
Hanna Halaburda. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences" Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 69 Iss. 2 (2010) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/halaburda/8/