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Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences
Games and Economic Behavior (2010)
  • Hanna Halaburda, Harvard University
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that the literature focuses on), unravelling is more likely to occur when participants have more similar preferences. Moreover, any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling and the ex-post stable mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it prevents unravelling.
  • two-sided matching; unravelling; similarity of preferences
Publication Date
Citation Information
Hanna Halaburda. "Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences" Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 69 Iss. 2 (2010)
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