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Monotone Strategyproofness
Games and Economic Behavior (2016)
  • Guillaume Haeringer, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
  • Hanna Halaburda, Bank of Canada
We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a mechanism to be monotone strategyproof when declaring a ``more truthful" preference ordering in the mechanism dominates--with respect to the true preferences--declaring a less truthful preference ordering. Our main result states that a mechanism is strategyproof if, and only if, it is monotone strategyproof. This result holds for any deterministic social choice function on any domain; for probabilistic social choice functions it holds under a mild assumption on the domain.
  • strategyproofness,
  • Kemeny sets,
  • truthful,
  • dominant strategy
Publication Date
Citation Information
Guillaume Haeringer and Hanna Halaburda, "Monotone Strategyproofness," Games and Economic Behavior 98 (2016) 68–77