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Article
Security Analysis of Some Proxy Signature
Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003: 6th International Conference, Seoul, Korea, November 27-28: Revised Papers
  • Guilin WANG, Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore
  • Feng BAO, Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore
  • Jianying ZHOU, Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore
  • Robert H. DENG, Singapore Management University
Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Publication Date
3-2004
Abstract

A proxy signature scheme allows an entity to delegate his/her signing capability to another entity in such a way that the latter can sign messages on behalf of the former. Such schemes have been suggested for use in a number of applications, particularly in distributed computing where delegation of rights is quite common. Followed by the first schemes introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996, a number of new schemes and improvements have been proposed. In this paper, we present a security analysis of four such schemes newly proposed. By successfully identifying several interesting forgery attacks, we show that these four schemes all are insecure. Consequently, the fully distributed proxy scheme is also insecure since it is based on the (insecure) LKK scheme. In addition, we point out the reasons why the security proofs provided are invalid.

Keywords
  • Digital signatures,
  • proxy signatures,
  • security analysis
ISBN
9783540246916
Identifier
10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_23
Publisher
Springer Verlag
City or Country
Berlin
Additional URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24691-6_23
Citation Information
Guilin WANG, Feng BAO, Jianying ZHOU and Robert H. DENG. "Security Analysis of Some Proxy Signature" Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2003: 6th International Conference, Seoul, Korea, November 27-28: Revised Papers Vol. 2971 (2004) p. 305 - 319
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/gwang/6/