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Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy Compass (2009)
  • Gualtiero Piccinini, University of Missouri-St. Louis
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism and reaches the following conclusions. Computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing computational theories comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done.
Publication Date
May, 2009
Citation Information
Piccinini, G. (2009), Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy Compass, 4: 515–532. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00215.x