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Article
Performance Issues in U.S.–China Joint Ventures
California Management Review
  • Gregory E. Osland, Butler University
  • S. Tamer Cavugsil
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-1996
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41165835
Abstract
Based on an in-depth study of U.S.-China joint ventures, this article offers some insights into the performance of such international business relationships. While the conventional literature treats government as an amorphous aspea of the political-legal environment, in this case government is an active participant and influence in the performance of international joint ventures (UVs). It has both a constraining and enabling effect on LJV structure, strategy, and performance. For example, limits can be placed on ownership shares of joint ventures and on prices of the output. At the same time, government can cooperate with LJVs and foreign parent companies by creating partners for foreign parent companies, acting as major customers, and improving financial performance by lowering taxes.
Rights

This article was archived with permission from University of California, all rights reserved. Document also available from California Management Review.

Citation Information
Gregory E. Osland and S. Tamer Cavugsil. "Performance Issues in U.S.–China Joint Ventures" California Management Review Vol. 38 Iss. 2 (1996) p. 106 - 130
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/gregory_osland/26/