THE LAWLESSNESS OF SEBELIUS

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ABSTRACT

After the U.S. Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius held nearly all of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act constitutional, praise rained down on Chief Justice John Roberts. The Chief Justice’s lead opinion broke with his usual conservative allies on the Court by upholding the Act’s individual mandate as a valid enactment under the Taxing Clause. Numerous commentators have lauded the Chief Justice for his courage and pragmatism. In this essay, Professor Magarian challenges the heroic narrative surrounding the Chief Justice’s opinion. He contends that the opinion is, in two senses, fundamentally lawless. First, the opinion is lawless in a normative sense. The Chief Justice’s analyses of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause make no contribution to his ultimate decision to uphold the mandate. Including those analyses in his opinion therefore flouts essential norms of constitutional judicial review. In addition, the opinion is normatively lawless to the extent it willfully abdicates legal analysis in order to defuse politically grounded complaints about judicial activism. The Court has legitimately made that sort of tradeoff on a few past occasions, but those instances differ decisively from Sebelius, and in any event the Chief Justice’s attempt at institutional stewardship appears ill-fated. Second, the opinion is lawless in a descriptive sense. Every part of the opinion fails to state or adequately to defend some important legal conclusion. The Chief Justice’s discussions of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause literally contain no law, because they state no conclusion necessary to the Court’s decision. His Taxing Clause discussion fails to defend key premises about both the application of the Anti-Injunction Act and the scope of the taxing power. The final part of the Chief Justice’s opinion, which dramatically weakens the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, implicates the Spending Clause. That analysis leaves open crucial ambiguities about the nature of the constitutional violation and the necessary extent of the remedy, rendering the legal conclusion incoherent. Professor Magarian concludes that the profound lawlessness of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Sebelius provides a cautionary model of how the Supreme Court should not make decisions.
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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius\(^2\) shocked the legal world. Many observers predicted the decision’s central holding: that Congress in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act\(^3\) (PPACA) had proper constitutional authority to require that all Americans purchase health insurance if they can afford it (the Act’s “individual mandate”). Almost everyone expected the Court’s four more liberal Justices to vote to uphold the Act and at least three of the Court’s conservatives to vote to strike most or all of it down. But Chief Justice Roberts’ lead opinion produced a cascade of surprises. The conservative Chief Justice joined the Court’s liberals in upholding the individual mandate; he reached that conclusion based on Congress’ taxing power, rather than its powers under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause; he nonetheless declaimed at length about how those other powers did not support the mandate; and he struck down a key element in the Act’s expansion of the federal Medicaid program. Meanwhile, the Court’s four other conservative Justices filed a jointly authored dissent that conspicuously failed to endorse even those aspects of the Chief Justice’s opinion on which all five conservatives agreed, while two of the Court’s liberals – Justices Breyer and Kagan – joined the Chief Justice in weakening the Medicaid expansion.

Most public reaction to the decision has celebrated the Chief Justice’s break with his conservative colleagues over the individual mandate. The constitutional challenges to the PPACA attained extraordinary political prominence, because they called into question the central legislative achievement of a first-term President set to face voters just over four months after the Court handed down its decision. The legal stakes were similarly high: the Act’s challengers asked the Court to take its most aggressive action against a federal statute in more than 75 years, potentially undermining congressional power in other areas. Against that background, Chief Justice Roberts’ leading role in upholding the individual mandate left conservatives angry, liberals elated, and opinion-makers falling over one another to praise the Chief Justice’s courage, resistance to partisanship, and embrace of judicial restraint. “For bringing the Court back from its partisan abyss,” wrote Jeffrey Rosen in a representative paean, “Roberts deserves praise not only from liberals but from all Americans who believe that it’s important for the Court to stand for something larger than

\(^2\) No. 11-393 (U.S. June 23, 2012).
politics.”

Echoed Linda Greenhouse: “He spoke for the country.”

The days following the decision brought accounts of discord among the Court’s conservatives, fueled by an extraordinary succession of apparent leaks from within the Court. But those revelations barely disturbed the heroic narrative growing up around the Chief Justice.

This essay challenges that heroic narrative. In my view, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Sebelius plays fast and loose with legal analysis at nearly every turn, leaving the nation with a profoundly lawless resolution of a singularly important legal controversy. I accept the prevalent assumption that the Chief Justice voted to uphold the individual mandate out of a deeply held concern for the Court’s institutional reputation. I also agree with most of the Chief Justice’s cheerleaders that the PPACA is both a constitutionally proper enactment and good (though in my view not nearly optimal) public policy. But I think the Chief Justice’s opinion, in the long run, will do the Court, and the country, far more harm than good. To call a judicial opinion “lawless” can mean two things: either the opinion contains no law, which leaves it lawless in a descriptive sense; or it reflects an active contempt for law as properly understood, which makes it lawless in a normative sense. The Chief Justice’s opinion, at different points, manages to exemplify both senses of lawlessness. He fails to provide sufficient legal justification for any of his major conclusions, and – particularly in rejecting the government’s arguments under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause – he violates fundamental norms of constitutional judicial review.

The sections of the opinion that deal with the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, which I discuss in section I.A., do not say anything necessary to the Chief Justice’s legal conclusion. They therefore contain no law. At the same time, the Chief Justice’s very inclusion of those sections in his opinion reflects an active contempt for the law by violating the Court’s well-

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6 See infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
established practice of decisional restraint in constitutional cases. The Chief Justice’s crucial discussion of the taxing power, which I discuss in section I.B., depends on two legal premises for which his opinion fails to mount adequate defenses. That discussion thus embodies a species of descriptive lawlessness. The Chief Justice’s discussion of the Medicaid expansion under the spending power, which I discuss in Part II, similarly fails to resolve two gaping ambiguities that make assessment of the decision’s reach impossible. Accordingly, that analysis as well suffers from descriptive lawlessness. Taking a step back from the legal particulars, I acknowledge in Part III the symbiosis of law and politics, and I consider whether Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion deserves a kinder evaluation as an effort to protect the Court from charges of judicial activism. I conclude that, to the contrary, the opinion departs in troubling ways from past decisions that have sought to reconcile institutional concerns with political realities. It thus commits normative lawlessness without any credible justification. In the long run, perhaps sooner, the Chief Justice’s opinion will do the Court’s institutional reputation far more harm than good.

I. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE ANALYSIS: BURNING THE STATUTE IN ORDER TO SAVE IT

*Sebelius* involved arguments that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The first of those provisions, the individual mandate, requires people who can afford insurance to purchase it or else pay a penalty to the federal government. The government posited three alternative sources of constitutional authority for the mandate: the “Power . . . to regulate commerce . . . among the several states”; the Necessary and Proper Clause, as an adjunct to the commerce power; and, based on the penalty option, the “Power To lay and collect Taxes.” Chief Justice Roberts, in a portion of his opinion joined by no other Justice but echoed by the four joint dissenters (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), thoroughly and emphatically rejected the government’s reliance on the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause. This portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion flouts well-established principles of judicial restraint while creating no legally binding precedent. As such, it is both normatively and descriptively lawless. Then, in the most practically significant portion of his opinion, the Chief Justice wrote for a 5-4 majority (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and

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8 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 3.
10 U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8, cl. 1.
Kagan) in upholding the mandate under the taxing power. This portion of the opinion, while arguably defensible, relies on two crucial legal premises that the Chief Justice fails to defend, rendering it descriptively lawless.

A. Advice We Don’t Need

The PPACA’s individual mandate is a novel provision in federal law. Never before has the federal government required citizens to purchase a good in the private marketplace. The Act maintains our health care system’s reliance on private insurance, but it imposes several regulatory constraints on private insurers. Most notably, it bars insurers from refusing to issue new policies based on applicants’ preexisting medical conditions and from charging higher premiums to less healthy people. The individual mandate offsets these requirements by forcing lower-risk people into the insurance pool, requiring everyone to purchase private insurance or to pay a penalty to the government. The government in *Sebelius* primarily defended the mandate on the ground that it directly regulated the interstate market in medical insurance. In the alternative, the government argued that the remainder of the PPACA properly regulated interstate commerce—a premise that no one seriously disputes—and the mandate was a necessary and proper measure to effectuate the remainder of the Act.

Chief Justice Roberts spends fifteen pages of his opinion refuting these contentions. The Chief Justice begins by adding to the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence a novel distinction between regulation of commercial action and regulation of commercial inaction. He rejects the commerce power as a basis for the individual mandate because the mandate “does not regulate existing commercial activity [but] instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product . . . .” Validating the mandate as a Commerce Clause regulation “would justify a mandatory purchase to solve almost any problem” and, more broadly, would “permit[ ] Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of its authority.” The Chief Justice dismisses the government’s

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11 See Nan D. Hunter, *Health Insurance Reform and Intimations of Citizenship*, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1955 (2011) (“There seems to be little dispute that this precise form of federal mandate – that individuals must purchase certain private goods or pay a penalty – is unprecedented”).

12 This is known as the “guaranteed issue” provision. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-3, 300gg-4(a) (2006 ed. Supp. IV).

13 This is known as the “community rating” provision. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg (2006 ed. Supp. IV).


15 See id. at 18-20.

16 Id. at 20.

17 Id. at 22.

18 Id. at 23.
claim that the uninsured affect the health care market because they will inevitably use health care services: “[W]e have never permitted Congress to anticipate [commercial activity] in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce.”

The Chief Justice’s rejection of the government’s Commerce Clause theory sets up his rejection of the government’s alternative theory that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the individual mandate. Allowing Congress to regulate commercial inactivity in the service of the power to regulate actual commerce would “vest[ ] Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.” Thus, while Congress may have considered the mandate “necessary” for effectuating its Commerce Clause authority to regulate interstate market in health care services, the Chief Justice finds that the mandate was not a “proper” means of doing so.

The joint dissent echoes and elaborates the Chief Justice’s conclusions about the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, but none of the joint dissenters joins any part of his opinion. Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion lacerates Chief Justice Roberts’ analyses of the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Perhaps the individual mandate’s distinctive requirement that people must purchase a good in the private marketplace will limit the significance of the Chief Justice’s analysis for future challenges to federal programs. Nonetheless, his restrictive analysis takes by far the Court’s most aggressive posture against federal power in over 75 years. The Chief Justice’s action-inaction distinction, if the Court decided to push it aggressively, might undermine countless federal mandates that require regulated entities to take various new actions. At a deeper level, as Justice Ginsburg points out, both the Chief Justice and the joint dissent appear to harbor within their federal power arguments an economic substantive due process theory, under which the mandate offends the Constitution by

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19 Id. at 26.
20 Id. at 29.
21 See id. at 30.
22 See id. at 4-16 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
23 See id. at 12-37 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
25 Indeed, the Chief Justice suggests that federal commands to act may only survive constitutional review if grounded in “constitutional provisions other than the Commerce Clause.” Sebelius, slip op. at 18 n.3 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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undermining economic liberty. Chief Justice Roberts, channeling widespread political anxiety about the mandate, frets that “[a]ccepting the Government’s theory would give Congress . . . license to regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation between the Citizen and the Federal Government.” Taken to its logical extreme, a substantive due process analysis of the PPACA could portend a revival of the Lochner-era constitutionalization of laissez-faire economics. Commentators have already sounded alarms about how the Chief Justice’s restrictive analysis of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause might portend broad restrictions on federal power.

But at present, properly understood, none of what Justice Ginsburg sharply calls “the Chief Justice’s Commerce Clause essay” means anything at all for the law. In both a descriptive sense and a deeper normative sense, this portion of his opinion is profoundly lawless. The Chief Justice’s analysis of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause announces no legal holding of the Court. No other Justice joined or concurred in this portion of his opinion, in whole or in part; it represents the Chief Justice’s solitary view. The four joint dissenters echo the Chief Justice’s restrictive federal power analysis, making five votes in support of the Chief Justice’s view of federal power. Why did the joint dissenters decline to concur at least in the judgment on these points? Reports have suggested that the joint dissenters, furious at the Chief Justice for voting ultimately to uphold the mandate, boycotted his opinion out of pique. But for anyone who wants to indulge a more generous view of the joint dissenters’ judicial temperaments, they had a perfectly valid reason not to concur in the judgment: this part of the Chief Justice’s opinion announces no judgment in which to concur. The commerce power and Necessary and Proper Clause analyses are entirely unnecessary to the Chief Justice’s ultimate judgment upholding the individual mandate.

The descriptive absence of law in Chief Justice Roberts’ cramped analysis of federal power points toward the sense in which this portion of his opinion is

26 See id. at 26-27 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
27 Id. at 23-24 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (footnote omitted).
28 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding strong constitutional protection for a right to contract). This is not the first time that critics of the Roberts Court’s conservative majority have noted echoes of Lochner in its opinions. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s extension of First Amendment protection to commercial data mining repeats the error of Lochner).
30 Sebelius, slip op. at 37 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
also normatively lawless. Why, if the discussion of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause forms no part of the Court’s ultimate judgment, does the Chief Justice discuss those issues at all? Here is his attempted justification:

[T]he statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that [the individual mandate] can be interpreted as a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt such a saving construction.32

In essence, the Chief Justice tells us that, when a court considers a constitutional challenge to federal authority that the government defends on several alternative grounds, the court should (1) organize the government’s justifications along a spectrum from most to least intuitively “natural”; (2) fully analyze and pronounce a legal holding on each of those constitutional justifications, in order of “naturalness,” until (a) the court finds one of them straightforwardly persuasive or (b) it rejects all justifications save the last one; and (3) if it reaches the last justification, construe the statute if possible to support that justification, leaving all its foregoing constitutional pronouncements in place and in force.

Chief Justice Roberts understandably fails to cite any prior instance of the judicial methodology he lays out here. In fact, his approach departs radically from well-established norms of constitutional judicial review. Justice Brandeis, concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,33 offers the classic statement of what we now call the canon of constitutional avoidance. Two distinct but related elements in his formulation of the canon matter for assessing Sebelius. First, Justice Brandeis posits that “[t]he Court will not pass on a constitutional question . . . if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”34 Second, he posits that, before considering the constitutionality of any statute, “this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”35 The canon of constitutional avoidance, then, obligates a court that reviews a constitutional challenge to a statute to do two things. First, it must

32 Sebelius, slip op. at 44 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). I discuss the Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis infra section I.B.
34 Id. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 348 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
determine whether some independent ground for decision obviates the need to
decide the constitutional question at all. Second, if compelled to address the
statute’s constitutionality, it must construe the statute, if possible, in a manner that
avoids the need to declare the statute unconstitutional.

What makes Sebelius unusual, from the perspective of constitutional
avoidance, is that the government offered three alternative constitutional grounds
– the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Taxing Clause
– as justifications for the individual mandate. The Court had to resolve some
constitutional question in order to decide the case. In order to strike down the
mandate, the Court would have had to render a constitutional judgment that each
of the three alternative grounds failed as a basis for congressional authority. To
uphold the mandate, the Court needed to render a decision that one of the three
alternative grounds supported the mandate. Upholding the mandate might or
might not have entailed a sympathetic construction under the second Ashwander
principle. The possibility of employing such a saving construction, however, does
not alter the essential requirement for upholding the mandate: finding that one of
the three alternative constitutional grounds gave Congress authority to enact the
mandate, however construed. What the Court had no need to do, under any
scenario, was render a constitutional judgment about more than one of the three
alternative grounds if it found any of those grounds sufficient to support the
mandate. But that is exactly what Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion does. He
argues, in effect, that he needed to eviscerate the first Ashwander command –
makes no unnecessary constitutional decisions – in order to fulfill the second:
construe a statute, where possible, in a manner that renders it constitutional.
Never before has a Supreme Court Justice pronounced these two principles,
articulated by Justice Brandeis as complementary elements in a scheme of judicial
restraint, mutually exclusive.

The canon of constitutional avoidance invites the compelling criticism that
avoidance enables the Court to send a strong signal about a constitutional issue

36 The presence of parallel, conceptually coequal constitutional theories distinguishes Sebelius
from constitutional tort cases that present constitutional claims alongside procedural defenses such
as qualified immunity. For a critique of constitutional avoidance arguments in the constitutional
tort setting, see Michael L. Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 S.M.U.
37 Courts occasionally state two alternative legal conclusions that affirmatively support a result.
That sort of decision can cause difficulty in identifying which conclusion forms the controlling
(discussing the problem of assessing “independent and adequate state grounds” for state court
criminal procedure decisions). But what Chief Justice Roberts does in Sebelius deviates much
farther from sound judicial practice, because he announces legal conclusions that have no claim
for relevance to his ultimate holding.
without having to expend the institutional capital to make an actual decision.\footnote{See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander \textit{Revisited}, 1995 \textsc{Sup. Ct. Rev.} 71, 86-88 (arguing that the judicial practice of constitutional avoidance entails tacit constitutional decision-making).} We do not want the Court to influence the development of constitutional law under cover of a doctrine meant to avert unnecessary constitutional decisions. A defender of the canon might respond that in no event do any constitutional signals the Court sends through constitutional avoidance amount to binding precedent. The critic might then question the practical value of the defender’s assurance.\footnote{See id. at 88-89 (arguing that rational legislators will treat the tacit constitutional judgments that constitutional avoidance entails as authoritative).} Chief Justice Roberts’ analyses in \textit{Sebelius} of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause double down on the canon’s troubling allowance for \textit{sub rosa} constitutional decision-making. The Chief Justice renders a legally unnecessary constitutional decision that limits federal power, as a necessary predicate – he tells us – for a tenuous saving construction imposed to avoid having to render a constitutional decision that limits federal power. From the government’s standpoint, this approach yields the worst of both constitutional worlds: the Chief Justice weakens two sources of government power, explicitly, on his way in the door and a third source, implicitly, on his way out.

Any judge committed to the most basic norms of judicial restraint would treat the government’s justifications for the mandate not as a sequential obstacle course but as analytic elements of a single problem. She might conclude, in reasoning through the case, that the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause could not sustain the mandate. But if she further concluded that the taxing power supported the mandate, the constitutional avoidance canon would properly lead her to write an opinion that discussed only that outcome-determinative theory. Which theory the government pressed most vigorously and which theory the judge found most “natural” would make no difference in how the judge wrote her opinion. Likewise, the determination to employ a saving construction, if the judge found that step necessary to validate the government’s most persuasive theory, would simply become part of the background analysis that she performed before writing. Chief Justice Roberts’ methodology, in contrast, requires a judge to show all the work he performs en route to his result, making conclusive legal pronouncements about discarded alternative theories. A more destructive inversion of constitutional avoidance is hard to imagine.

The substantive legal issues that \textit{Sebelius} presents about the scope of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause are challenging, and I think they are inherently political. Between 1937 and 1995, the Court followed the plain language of the Commerce Clause to the conclusion that Congress, in current economic conditions, has virtually plenary authority to regulate.
Beginning with *United States v. Lopez*, however, the Court has sought to reconcile the language of the Commerce Clause with a conviction that congressional regulatory authority has concrete limits under structural principles of federalism. Either advancing or resisting that effort implicates deep questions of normative political theory. I think the idea that the Constitution imposes an irreducible limit on federal power, a limit that trumps a straightforward reading of the Commerce Clause in contemporary circumstances, enjoys neither support in the constitutional text nor a persuasive grounding in normative political theory. But I do not object here on political grounds to Chief Justice Roberts’ pursuit of that idea in *Sebelius*. Rather, my charge of lawlessness rests entirely on the fact that the Chief Justice did not need to write a word about the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause in order to reach his legal conclusion.

A legal positivist might assert that, if the Chief Justice of the United States portrays what he writes as legally necessary, then it is legally necessary. But anyone who values “a government of laws and not of men” should condemn the flimsy pretext by which Chief Justice Roberts in *Sebelius* denigrates congressional power. Despite the Chief Justice’s elaborate plea to the contrary, he did not need to analyze the government’s alternative theories to reach his conclusion that the PPACA’s individual mandate, properly construed, passes constitutional muster under the taxing power. The Chief Justice’s mischief skirts the far edge of the Article III command that federal courts may render judgments only about “Cases [and] Controversies.” His discussion of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause reads very much like an impermissible advisory opinion. It is unnecessary advice, and we should discard it.

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41 *See, e.g., Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 575-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court must preserve a definite measure of state authority within the federal balance).


43 JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS; OR, A HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA, Essay No. 7 (1774).


45 *Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III*, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (1994) (suggesting that “statements a judge makes knowing them to have no direct precedential weight, but which she nevertheless hopes will be influential . . . in some sense . . . violate[ ] the rule against advisory opinions”).
B. A Tax by any Other Name

Having rejected the government’s justifications for the individual mandate under the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion turns to the mandate’s final hope: Congress’ power to impose taxes. The argument that the taxing power supports the mandate rests on the PPACA’s allowance that persons whom the Act requires to carry private medical insurance may pay a penalty to the IRS in lieu of purchasing insurance. The government, in litigating the PPACA challenges, showed ambivalence about the taxing power argument, probably because of the political cost of defending the mandate as a tax. The argument also posed a distinctive structural problem. The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars taxpayers from challenging the legality of any tax prior to paying the tax. Because the individual mandate, along with other central provisions of the PPACA, does not become effective until 2014, no one has yet had to pay a penalty pursuant to the mandate. Accordingly, a conclusion by the Court that the mandate amounted to a tax would have seemed to require dismissal of the immediate challenges to the mandate, subject to reconsideration of the mandate’s validity under the taxing power once someone in 2014 had paid the penalty and sued to recover the payment.

To most observers’ surprise, the taxing power formed the sole basis for Chief Justice Roberts’ decisive vote to uphold the individual mandate and, with it, the rest of the PPACA. The Chief Justice’s taxing power discussion bifurcates his statutory and constitutional analyses of the mandate. As a statutory matter, the Chief Justice emphasizes that the Act clearly identifies the mandate as a “penalty.” That identification, he explains, authoritatively places the mandate outside the protection of the AIA, allowing the Court to consider the substantive constitutional challenge immediately. As a constitutional matter, the Chief Justice construes the mandate as a proper enactment under the taxing power. The PPACA’s “penalty” language, though conclusive on the AIA question, does not constrain the Court’s inquiry whether, and how, the Constitution authorized Congress to enact the mandate. Indeed, the Chief Justice notes, the Court in past cases has sustained under the taxing power measures not labeled “taxes.” Payments pursuant to the Act will raise revenue for the government, helping to offset the cost of providing medical services to people who refuse to buy

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50 See id. at 33-34; see also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“The question of the constitutionality of an action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.”).
51 See Sebelius, slip op. at 34 (opinion of the Court).
insurance. Based on several factors – the payment cannot exceed the cost of private medical insurance, the mandate contains no scienter requirement, the Act empowers the IRS to collect the payment by ordinary means, and the conduct that triggers the payment need not be classed as unlawful – the Chief Justice concludes that the Court can fairly uphold the mandate under the taxing power.\textsuperscript{52}

In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’ analysis of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, his taxing power analysis makes law, insofar as it holds that the Constitution gave Congress the power to enact the individual mandate. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court’s four liberal Justices, eagerly joined the Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis, providing the only outright majority for any aspect of his opinion.\textsuperscript{53} The legal basis for the Chief Justice’s disposition, however, remains elusive. The conclusion that the taxing power saves the mandate rests on two critical premises that he fails to defend in any substantial way. That absence of legal support renders the Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis descriptively lawless.

First, Chief Justice Roberts posits that Congress in the PPACA waived the Anti-Injunction Act’s protection by declining to label the individual mandate a “tax.” “The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act,” he explains, “are creatures of Congress’s own creation . . . [h]ow they relate to each other is up to Congress.”\textsuperscript{54} When the Court inquires into that relationship, “the best evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”\textsuperscript{55} Those propositions make sense, as far as they go. Congress must have power to waive the AIA’s protection explicitly.\textsuperscript{56} When Congress makes no explicit statement, the Court should make a text-based inquiry into Congress’s intent. But the Chief Justice provides no additional legal grounding for his analysis, and beyond those starting points, difficult questions quickly arise. Should not the AIA’s purpose of shielding revenue measures from premature legal challenges – a purpose that serves both the government’s interest in not defending overzealous lawsuits and the judiciary’s interest in not

\textsuperscript{52} See id. at 35-38.
\textsuperscript{53} Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Sotomayor, also concurred in the portion of Chief Justice Roberts’ judgment that severs from the Act the spending condition that the Chief Justice, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, finds an unconstitutional component of the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, although she vigorously disputes the underlying constitutional judgment. See id. at 60-61 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). I discuss the Medicaid expansion \textit{infra} Part II.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Sebelius}, slip op. at 13 (opinion of the Court).
\textsuperscript{55} Id.
\textsuperscript{56} The Chief Justice goes so far as to suggest that Congress may secure the AIA’s protection for any measure it labels a “tax,” even if the Court concludes that the measure is not a tax at all. He supports that proposition with a single citation to a 90 year-old case. See id. (citing \textit{Bailey v. George}, 259 U.S. 16 (1922)). The idea that Congress may implicate the Court in a categorical charade would seem to demand a more thorough defense, but the Chief Justice shows no interest in scrutinizing a notion that points toward the conclusion he wants to reach.
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adjudicating them – lead the Court to inquire, in determining whether Congress intended the AIA to shield a given revenue measure, whether or not the measure in effect imposes a tax? 57 Even if the Court should not make such a substantive inquiry, is any evidence beyond the fact that Congress happened to call a measure a “tax” or a “penalty” relevant to the AIA inquiry, or must Congress recite the word “tax” to avoid waiving the AIA’s protection? The task of determining whether or not the AIA barred the Sebelius challenge should have prompted thoughtful consideration of these questions. Instead, the Chief Justice simply reduces his examination of “Congress’s intent” to a robotic word search, follows that approach to his preferred outcome, and leaves a void where legal analysis belongs. 58

Second, Chief Justice Roberts posits that the taxing power authorizes only taxes, not penalties, but he concludes that the individual mandate falls on the proper side of the divide. The Court for decades has taken an exceptionally lenient posture toward the taxing power, treating any measure that raises revenue as a tax. 59 But the Chief Justice, startlingly, asserts that the Taxing Clause does not empower Congress to impose penalties. He does not define the universe of impermissible penalties, but he spends considerable energy establishing that the individual mandate is not one. He even holds up the long-disfavored restrictive analysis of the Child Labor Tax Case 60 as his exemplar of judicial review under the Taxing Clause. 61 The four joint dissenters take the Chief Justice’s tax-penalty distinction and run with it. They insist that the Court has never upheld under the taxing power any law that imposes “[a] penalty for constitutional purposes,” 62 and they argue vigorously that the mandate is just such a penalty. This objection implicates the essential character of the mandate, and it therefore looks past the Court’s general authority to identify the constitutional basis for a federal law. Despite the Chief Justice’s indulgence of the tax-penalty distinction, his response to the joint dissenter’s argument boils down to a single precedent: United States v.

57 Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 (1974) (finding, in concluding that the AIA barred a pre-enforcement suit against revocation of a tax exemption, “no evidence that [the revocation] does not represent a good-faith effort to enforce the technical requirements of the tax laws,” and emphasizing that the challenger “has not shown that the [Internal Revenue] Service’s action is without an independent basis in the requirements of the [Tax] Code.”).
58 The joint dissent, which also purports to consider the AIA question, reaches the same conclusion as the Chief Justice based on even shallower analysis. See Sebelius, slip op. at 26-27 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Kahniger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (upholding under the taxing power a federal levy on bookmakers aimed at discouraging gambling); see also Eduardo M. Penalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2200-04 (2004) (describing the wide range of revenue measures that the Court has permitted under the taxing power).
60 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (striking down a tax on goods produced by child labor as a penalty not authorized by the taxing power).
61 See Sebelius, slip op. at 35 (opinion of the Court).
62 Id. at 17 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Sotelo,\textsuperscript{63} which validated a penalty for nonpayment of taxes as a nondischargeable “tax” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.\textsuperscript{64} But Sotelo, as the joint dissenters easily respond, did not present an issue about the constitutional authority for any congressional enactment.\textsuperscript{65} In fact, the issue in that case closely resembled the AIA question in Sebelius, requiring the Court to decide only whether the “penalty” at issue fit within another statutory definition of “tax.” The Chief Justice’s meaningless rejoinder – that both Sotelo and Sebelius are statutory construction cases\textsuperscript{66} – must be either disingenuous or amateurish, and he is no amateur. The Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis strongly suggests a renewed level of legitimacy for the tax-penalty distinction, but he leaves that suggestion hanging in the air, and he fails to explain how the supposed distinction spares the individual mandate.

The utter lack of legal support for these two key elements in the Chief Justice’s pivotal determination that Congress validly enacted the PPACA’s individual mandate under the taxing power leaves that determination descriptively lawless.

II. THE MEDICAID EXPANSION ANALYSIS: AN OFFER STATES COULDN’T REFUSE?

The second primary object of the constitutional challenge to the PPACA was the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, the longstanding federal program that provides medical assistance to the poor. Most significantly, the Act makes every person under age 65 with an income up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level eligible for Medicaid.\textsuperscript{67} The practical complication of the expansion is that Medicaid has always been an exercise in “cooperative federalism,” under which the federal government imposes broad policy directives, provides the majority of

\textsuperscript{63} 436 U.S. 268 (1978).
\textsuperscript{64} See id. at 273-275. The Chief Justice cites other cases that either declined to extend the taxing power to measures that Congress labeled “taxes” or upheld under the taxing power measures that Congress did not label “taxes.” See Sebelius, slip op. at 33-35. But only in Sotelo did the Court treat as a “tax” what Congress labeled (and the Court acknowledged as) a “penalty.”
\textsuperscript{65} See Sebelius, slip op. at 17 n.5 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, J.J., dissenting). The dissenters similarly might have pointed out that another case the Chief Justice cites for the proposition that categorical labels should not govern taxing power analysis, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), does not involve Congress’ taxing power at all but rather strikes down a state tax under the Commerce Clause. See Sebelius, slip op. at 34 (opinion of the Court).
\textsuperscript{66} See Sebelius, slip op. at 35 n.7 (opinion of the Court).
funding, and oversees the program while the states decide on numerous aspects of implementation, provide substantial funding, and administer the program. To ensure that states would effectuate Congress’ changes to Medicaid, the Act contained a leverage provision that allowed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold, at most, all Medicaid funding from any state that refused to implement the expansion. Chief Justice Roberts – joined without comment by Justices Breyer and Kagan and substantively supported by the four joint dissenter – held this condition on federal funding unduly coercive, in violation of Congress’ constitutional authority to spend money.

The Court’s leading decision on the spending power as a regulatory lever, South Dakota v. Dole, provides what scant authority exists for the Chief Justice’s spending power analysis. The Court has long held that the spending power allows Congress to achieve through spending leverage policy outcomes that it might lack power to achieve under the Commerce Clause. Dole elaborates that Congress may impose conditions on grants to states if the conditions satisfy four criteria: the spending must serve the general welfare, a determination as to which the Court defers substantially to Congress; the grant must unambiguously state the terms of the condition; the condition must relate “to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs”; and the condition must not violate any extrinsic constitutional provision. The Sebelius challengers could make no serious argument that the PPACA’s Medicaid condition failed any of those four criteria. The Dole Court, however, also notes “that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” The Dole Court does not elaborate on that single sentence about coercive conditions. It offers no description of what might constitute undue coercion, no indication that Congress has ever crossed the line, and no indication of what remedy the Constitution might authorize the Court to impose if Congress ever did so.

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70 See U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 1 (granting Congress “Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of the United States”).
72 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (endorsing Alexander Hamilton’s view that §8’s authorization to spend for the “general welfare” had independent content over James Madison’s view that the scope of Congress’ other enumerated powers limited the “general welfare” language).
73 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
74 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
Chief Justice Roberts’ treatment of the Medicaid expansion dwells on the Court’s decisions that bar Congress from “commandeering” state institutions to implement federal policy. But he does not hold that the expansion commandeered the states. The Chief Justice also foregrounds Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, which upheld against charges of undue coercion the Social Security Act’s abatement of payroll taxes for employers that paid money into federally certified state unemployment programs. But he rests no conclusions on Steward Machine, whose factual context differs markedly from that of Sebelius. Instead, the Chief Justice parleys the Dole Court’s one-sentence anticoercion dictum into a severe constraint on the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion. The Chief Justice calls the Act’s allowance for the federal government to withhold all Medicaid funding from a state that fails to comply with the Medicaid expansion “a gun to the head.” He emphasizes the leverage provision’s massive stakes for states, citing statistics that federal Medicaid funding accounts for between ten and twenty percent of most state budgets. The Chief Justice proclaims that the Act’s Medicaid expansion does not, in fact, expand Medicaid at all. Instead, the Act “enlist[s] the States in a new health care program.” Congress could not possibly have authority to hold federal funding for an existing program hostage to ensure implementation of a new program. To remedy this coercion, the Chief Justice fully excises the leverage provision from the PPACA. Sebelius leaves the Act’s substantive changes to Medicaid intact, but the federal government now lacks any mechanism to ensure that states implement the changes.

Beyond Chief Justice Roberts’ inflation of a sketchy dictum into a pillar of Spending Clause doctrine, his analysis and disposition of the Medicaid expansion reflect two critical ambiguities that render his opinion on this critical issue nearly incomprehensible, and thus descriptively lawless. First, the Chief Justice’s treatment of “existing Medicaid” and “new Medicaid” as two separate federal programs anchors his holding, because the Medicaid Act explicitly states that Congress may expand or alter Medicaid. But the separation has no discernible basis in law or logic. By the Chief Justice’s reasoning, the government could never expand a program beyond its initial scope of coverage without unwittingly creating a new program. With critical distance, the problem gets much worse. As

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76 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
77 See Sebelius, slip op. at 48-49 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
78 Id. at 51.
79 See id.
80 Id. at 54.
81 See id. at 55-56.
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes, Congress has in fact substantially changed and expanded Medicaid on numerous occasions over the years.83 What makes this expansion any different? The Chief Justice can offer no better response than his empty insistence that “[this] Medicaid expansion . . . accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree.”84 The PPACA also applies longstanding Medicaid procedures to the new beneficiaries.85 Does “new Medicaid” somehow incorporate the numerous salient provisions of “existing Medicaid” by reference? What constitutional principles would govern congressional prerogatives if a state balked at applying an “existing Medicaid” procedure to a “new Medicaid” beneficiary or to a mixture of new and preexisting beneficiaries? At a broader level, should we now understand the Dole anticoercion dictum as forbidding the government to withhold funds from any existing program in order to ensure compliance with any new federal requirement? Such a bar would upend the holding of Dole that a spending condition must simply relate to some federal project or program.86 The Chief Justice’s failure to provide any grounding for his cleavage of Medicaid suggests that its only virtue is convenience.

Second, Chief Justice Roberts’ reasoning about coercion and his disposition of the Act’s leverage provision may – or may not – suffer from a crucial disconnect. The Chief Justice emphasizes that Congress should not be able to withhold all of a state’s funding under a government program in order to encourage a state’s compliance with a federal policy, especially when the funding amounts to a large portion of the state’s overall revenues.87 Although that argument has only the barest basis in precedent and rests on the dubious premise that states may credibly claim detrimental reliance on federal funds, it at least makes a comprehensible claim.88 But the Chief Justice proceeds to hold that Congress may not withhold any of a state’s Medicaid funding to ensure compliance with the PPACA’s expansion.89 That holding may simply reflect the Act’s architecture: striking the entire leverage provision may have been the only way for the Court to remedy the provision’s constitutionally impermissible excessive possibilities. That explanation, however, ignores the alternatives of imposing a limiting construction on the leverage provision or waiting to entertain

83 See Sebelius, slip op. at 41-43, 54-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (documenting past congressional changes to Medicaid).
84 Id. at 53 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
85 See id. at 49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
86 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); see also Huberfeld, supra note 68, at 467-68 (suggesting that effectuating the anticoercion language of Dole would contradict the Dole Court’s broad holding that the Tenth Amendment does not limit Congress’ spending power).
87 See Sebelius, slip op. at 51-52 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
88 For a thorough extrinsic critique of Chief Justice Roberts’ anticoercion argument, see id. at 41-60 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
89 See id. at 55-56 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
as-applied challenges to actual federal withholding of Medicaid funds. Either of those approaches would have enabled the Court to address the Chief Justice’s concern about extreme coercion without kicking the Medicaid expansion’s legs out from under it. The remedial explanation for the Chief Justice’s “all”-“any” disconnect also belies his objection to the leverage provision as a “retroactive condition,” an objection that suggests he might reject federal power to impose even de minimis penalties for states’ noncompliance with the expansion. But the Chief Justice refuses to wrestle or even engage with the question of how much coercion is too much: “It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”

The Dole anticoercion dictum has proved notoriously difficult for lower courts to administer, leading many courts and commentators to treat the anticoercion principle as nonjusticiable. Chief Justice Roberts, in giving the dictum serious legal effect for the first time, had a responsibility to provide lower courts guidance about how to evaluate claims of federal coercion. In striking down a key provision of federal law, he had a similar responsibility to provide guidance to Congress should it seek to repair or replace the PPACA’s leverage provision. May Congress pass a new authorization for the Secretary to withhold up to, say, five percent of noncompliant states’ Medicaid funds? If not, why not? The Chief Justice’s failure to provide any legal insights as to these essential questions adds to his opinion’s catalog of descriptive lawlessness.

III. ASSESSING THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S INSTITUTIONAL STEWARDSHIP: A QUESTIONABLE PLAN, BADLY EXECUTED

Perhaps my analysis to this point has judged Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Sebelius too harshly by holding it to the wrong standard. At critical moments in the past, the Supreme Court has compromised its legal analysis of constitutional issues in order to defuse potentially explosive political conflicts and

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90 Id. at 54 (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91 Sebelius, slip op. at 55 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
93 The incoherence in Chief Justice Roberts’ analysis of the Medicaid expansion makes Justices Breyer and Kagan’s decision to join this portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion without comment puzzling. Perhaps they sought to claim a stake in the opinion so they could argue credibly in a later case that the Court should resolve the opinion’s ambiguities in favor of a narrow reading.
safeguard the Court’s institutional authority. Two prominent examples from the Rehnquist Court are *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey* and *Dickerson v. United States*. In each of those cases, the Court reaffirms a controversial precedent – *Roe v. Wade* in *Casey*, *Miranda v. Arizona* in *Dickerson* – for which public support appeared to have decreased over time. Each decision imposes or indulges significant constraints on the challenged precedent, vindicating the Court’s institutional authority while simultaneously adjusting to changed political norms. Both decisions succeeded, to some extent and for some years, in dialing down legal controversy about the precedents at issue. *Sebelius* arguably shares key characteristics with *Casey* and *Dickerson*. The Court has long promoted an expansive vision of federal power, but a majority of the public has opposed the PPACA. Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, by its defenders’ account, manages to vindicate broadly the Court’s established constitutional judgment, make reasonable concessions to changed public norms, and safeguard the Court’s institutional reputation.

If Chief Justice Roberts in *Sebelius* abdicated legal analysis in order to address political threats to the Court’s institutional interest, then his opinion on its own terms embodies lawlessness in the normative sense. But his defenders seek to justify that lawlessness on institutional grounds. I share their premise that constitutional law overlaps substantially and inevitably with politics, such that courts cannot and should not bar certain political considerations from constitutional adjudication.

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94 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the constitutional right to abortion, upholding some state restrictions on abortion, and rejecting others).
95 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (affirming the constitutional status of *Miranda* warnings and striking down a federal statute as inconsistent with *Miranda*).
96 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects a woman’s right to have an abortion).
99 See Peter Baker, *For Obama, a Signature Issue That the Public Never Embraced Looms Large*, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A12 (describing the unpopularity of the PPACA and noting polling data shortly before *Sebelius* that found public support for the Act at 34 percent).
100 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 4 (claiming that “Roberts’ decision was above all an act of judicial statesmanship” and that “Roberts chose to place institutional legitimacy front and center”).
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substantive reasoning in *Casey* and *Dickerson* does not prevent me from viewing those decisions as properly having taken public perceptions of the Court’s precedents into account. Finally, I agree that being Chief Justice of the United States entails a distinctive role in guarding the Court’s institutional authority, and I assume such an institutional concern substantially motivated Chief Justice Roberts’ lead opinion in *Sebelius*. But measured against that goal, his opinion fails.

*Sebelius* differs materially from *Casey* and *Dickerson*. Those two decisions involved divisive political issues – abortion and coerced confessions – that the Supreme Court chose to constitutionalize. Both issues continued to figure prominently in public political debates after the Court’s intervention. The Court in *Casey* and *Dickerson* made or validated politically beneficial concessions on the underlying legal issues in order to preserve the challenged precedents’ essential holdings. In contrast, while the federal-state balance of power has inspired strong political disagreements throughout our history, federal courts from the beginning have mediated federalism disputes. The constitutional law of federal power has stayed remarkably stable for the past 75 years, with public opposition to the Court’s view concentrated in the debased precincts of the Jim Crow South. The Chief Justice in *Sebelius* cuts deep furrows through substantive federalism doctrine in order to give supporters of the Court’s precedents an immediate political victory. The political heat around *Sebelius* had almost nothing to do with the dispute’s constitutional substance and everything to do with the policy wisdom of the PPACA. The decision’s close proximity to a closely contested national election during a period of political polarization and economic distress made the policy debate about “Obamacare” especially combustible.

In those conditions, the *Sebelius* Court did not confront the difficult balance between adherence to precedent and attention to changed political norms that characterizes *Casey* and *Dickerson*. The Justices merely faced the danger that, should they decide to depart from their own precedents by limiting federal power, opponents of the result would accuse the Court of judicial activism. Even if that danger – the perennial occupational hazard of constitutional judging – somehow justified the same sort of departure from ordinary norms of adjudication seen in *Casey* and *Dickerson*, Chief Justice Roberts’ *Sebelius* opinion would earn low marks for institutional self-defense. *Sebelius* threatened the Court, if the Justices found the individual mandate unconstitutional, with three species of complaints about judicial activism. The Chief Justice’s purported exercise in damage control exacerbates the first of those complaints; yields at best a mixed result on the second; and achieves substantial, probably temporary success only as to the third complaint, which makes the weakest claim on the Court’s attention.

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First, in the difficulty most closely tied to the federalism issues at the heart of Sebelius, the Court ran the risk of appearing unduly activist for moving, broadly, toward a more restrictive view of federal regulatory power. Chief Justice Roberts’ Sebelius opinion pours rocket fuel on that fire. Even if one accepts my argument that the Chief Justice’s discussion of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause makes no actual law, that failing reflects no lack of effort. The Chief Justice, as enthusiastically as the joint dissenters, veers far out of his way to craft the “action-inaction” distinction as a brand new constraint on the commerce power. He mounts the Court’s most serious assault on that power in generations. His attack ranges beyond the Commerce Clause to assault the Necessary and Proper Clause, the spending power, and – given his revival of the tax-penalty distinction – even the taxing power, making his opinion perhaps the most comprehensive salvo against federal authority of any writing in the Court’s history. His one departure from a restrictive reading of federal power, upholding the individual mandate under the Taxing Clause, comes off as rhetorically halfhearted, legally narrow, and shakily persuasive at best. Five Justices now stand on record as eager to reopen federalism battles long thought settled. Activism accomplished.

Second, critics might have charged the Court with judicial activism for striking down a momentous piece of federal social policy legislation and thus transgressing the separation of powers. At this point we can hear the first strains of the fanfare for Chief Justice Roberts: He led the Court in upholding the PPACA’s individual mandate! But the Chief Justice still manages to engineer the Court’s most important weakening of a federal statute since the early New Deal period by excising the funding penalty from the Act’s Medicaid expansion. Several conservative governors immediately seized on that part of

103 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
105 See supra section I.B. Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts simply could not countenance the other conservative Justices’ determination to strike down the entire Act rather than merely striking down the individual mandate and severing the remainder. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 56-58 (U.S. June 23, 2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (holding the remainder of the Act constitutional notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of the Medicaid expansion’s leverage provision) with id. at 46-64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (insisting that the unconstitutionality of the Medicaid expansion requires striking down every bit of the Act). But in that scenario, the Chief Justice could have written a majority opinion that carried the other conservatives in rejecting every posited source of constitutional authority for the mandate and then separately carried the liberals in explaining why severability principles saved other provisions of the Act.
106 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Moving Beyond Its Old Divides, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2012, at A1 (arguing that the Court in Sebelius “proved itself resistant to caricature” and that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion “recast the legacy of his court and improved the political fortunes of a Democratic president”).
107 See supra Part II.
the Court’s decision as a basis for refusing to implement the expansion. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that their recalcitrance will thwart the PPACA from delivering insurance to three million people. The governors’ resistance represents a startling rebellion against congressional action in a sphere of undeniably national scope, orchestrated by Chief Justice Roberts. The mandate’s survival thus represents only a marginal victory for judicial deference to Congress. But how substantial is even that marginal victory? Judicial restraint ordinarily entails robust deference to elected officials’ judgment. In this case, the Chief Justice upholds the individual mandate only after savaging Congress’ professed basis for enacting it and wanly embracing a narrower justification that the government pressed with little enthusiasm. The PPACA remains alive, but it stands on a hollow legal foundation.

Finally, critics might have called the Court activist for voting along predictable ideological lines in a signature case. Here the fanfare for Chief Justice Roberts reaches its deafening crescendo: he courageously broke with his conservative allies to side with the Court’s liberals. But his opinion breaks with conservative dogma only in a thin sense, upholding the individual mandate on the narrowest available ground while effectively gutting the Medicaid expansion and promulgating a right-wing manifesto on the evils of excessive federal power. The vast bulk of what Sebelius does, in fact, breaks down along familiar lines: only the Chief Justice’s heavily compromised vote to uphold the individual mandate and Justices Breyer and Kagan’s inscrutable acquiescence in weakening the Medicaid expansion depart from the usual partisan script. In any event, this third sort of complaint about judicial activism – in contrast to the complaints grounded in federalism and the separation of powers – deserves far less attention than the Chief Justice’s defenders claim he gave it. If a politically polarized public reads the Court’s divisions of legal opinion as mirroring the public’s own political divide, so what? Principled Justices should ignore the danger of appearing partisan as surely as they should resist actual partisan motives. If we suppose the Chief Justice should vote against his legal convictions in order to counter impressions of a partisan divide, how often should he do so, and why was Sebelius the case for falling on his sword? What good does such a move even do? If the Chief Justice next Term votes with a conservative majority

110 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 5 (claiming that the Chief Justice’s opinion in Sebelius “saved the Supreme Court from the stench of extreme partisanship that has hung over the health care litigation”).
to strike down the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act,\textsuperscript{111} to ban race-based affirmative action in higher education,\textsuperscript{112} or to uphold the federal Defense of Marriage Act,\textsuperscript{113} will those votes betray his diplomatic sacrifice in \textit{Sebelius}? Or will that sacrifice simply have exacerbated the partisan divide by providing cover for the later, conceivably more consequential votes?

Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in \textit{Sebelius} ultimately resembles \textit{Casey} and \textit{Dickerson} far less than it resembles a case in which the Rehnquist Court reached a very different sort of accommodation between law and politics: \textit{Bush v. Gore}.\textsuperscript{114} In \textit{Sebelius}, unlike in \textit{Bush v. Gore}, the Court had no choice but to exercise its power of judicial review. But the contrast between \textit{Casey} and \textit{Dickerson}, on one hand, and \textit{Bush v. Gore}, on the other, casts an unflattering light on \textit{Sebelius}. In \textit{Casey} and \textit{Dickerson}, the Court attempted (however clumsily) to fashion legal rules that would both accommodate political realities and provide meaningful guidance for future cases. In contrast, the Court in \textit{Bush v. Gore} notoriously announces an equal protection holding that bears scant resemblance to prior doctrine, then proclaims that its holding has no precedential force.\textsuperscript{115} The Court constructs a Potemkin legal analysis in order to achieve, on the least cynical view of its motives, short-term political stability. The Chief Justice’s opinion in \textit{Sebelius} uses similar means to achieve a similar end, tossing off unsupported or half-formed arguments to defuse immediate political concerns about the individual mandate. Ironically, public antipathy toward \textit{Bush v. Gore} probably accounted in large part for whatever institutional vulnerability the Court faced in \textit{Sebelius}. How could repeating the earlier decision’s mistakes do anything, in the long run, but further erode public confidence in the Court? The Chief Justice should have learned from criticisms of \textit{Bush v. Gore} that the public expects from the Court nothing more or less than an unwavering commitment to the rule of law. The lawlessness of \textit{Sebelius} flouts that expectation.

Finally, no evaluation of Chief Justice Roberts’ institutional stewardship in \textit{Sebelius} should ignore the horrific optics of the Court’s performance. In \textit{Casey}, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter filed a joint majority opinion that

\textsuperscript{111} See Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (upholding preclearance as properly within congressional power under the 14\textsuperscript{th} and 15\textsuperscript{th} amendments), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 20, 2012) (No. 12-96).
\textsuperscript{112} See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 2011) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a state university’s consideration of race in admissions), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012).
\textsuperscript{114} 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
\textsuperscript{115} See id. at 109 (stating that “our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities”).

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placed an unprecedented centrist coalition behind the Court’s qualified reaffirmation of Roe. In Dickerson, Chief Justice Rehnquist rallied a solid majority of the Court behind his qualified reaffirmation of Miranda. In sharp contrast with those decisions, nearly all of Chief Justice Roberts’ lead opinion in Sebelius speaks for him alone. A few cursory lines from Justice Ginsburg contain the only words of direct support for the Chief Justice’s reasoning that any other Justice committed to paper, and Justice Ginsburg spends the rest of her 61-page opinion beating the Chief Justice bloody. Justices Breyer and Kagan, whose votes to limit the Medicaid expansion provide the Chief Justice with his only other alliance across ideological lines, spill not a drop of ink in his defense. The Chief Justice’s fellow conservatives, whose bizarre joint dissent echoes much of what he argues, virtually ignore his opinion and decline to join a line of it. Within a few days of the decision, the media was buzzing with conflicting accounts and accusations about the Chief Justice’s errant behavior during the deliberations and drafting. These tales out of school do nothing to diminish the decision’s authority, and they prove nothing even at the level of gossip. But they appear to have leaked from highly placed sources inside the Court, betraying a climate of dysfunction and recrimination. No capable defender of the Court’s institutional authority would foster such mayhem, let alone allow the public to see it splashed across the headlines.

CONCLUSION

In the wake of the Sebelius decision, praise has rained down on Chief Justice Roberts for his vote to uphold the PPACA’s individual mandate. Whatever one’s view about any of the decision’s bottom-line results, the praise is unwarranted. The Chief Justice’s opinion exemplifies lawless judicial decision-making. He mocks the most elemental conventions of judicial restraint by offering an unnecessary disquisition on the limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. That screed commits both descriptive lawlessness, by failing to state any legal principle


117 The bombshell report, that Chief Justice Roberts had changed his vote on the individual mandate and alienated his conservative colleagues in the process, came from Crawford, supra note 31; see also Paul Campos, Roberts Wrote Both Obamacare Opinions, SALON, July 3, 2012 1:13 PM, http://www.salon.com/2012/07/03/roberts_wrote_both_obamacare_opinions/ (asserting that Chief Justice Roberts himself wrote most of the joint dissent).

necessary to the Court’s decision, and normative lawlessness, by nonetheless making its way into the United States Reports. Then the Chief Justice elides crucial legal issues on the path to his somewhat questionable conclusion that the Taxing Clause supports the individual mandate. He similarly indulges glaring ambiguities in reaching his highly dubious conclusion that the funding condition in the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion violates the Spending Clause. These legal black holes embody descriptive lawlessness. Moreover, all three movements in the Chief Justice’s opinion impose major new doctrines on constitutional law – the action/inaction distinction for the Commerce Clause, the revitalized tax/penalty distinction for the Taxing Clause, and the existing/new program polarity for the Spending Clause – without providing anything approaching coherent guidance about how courts should apply them.

The idea that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion sacrificed his convictions in order to save the Court from devastating accusations of judicial activism might make for a strong defense – except that the opinion bursts with his ideological biases and undermines the Court’s authority rather than fortifying it. History will validate the Chief Justice’s institutional stewardship only if we ignore his parade of offenses against responsible judicial review and cogent legal reasoning. Liberals who rejoice that the Chief Justice saved the individual mandate, conservatives who welcome his assault on federal power, and centrists who commend him for lifting the Court above crass partisanship should all look past his opinion’s rhetoric to its brittle and dangerous core. The lawlessness of Sebelius provides an important, troubling model of how the Supreme Court should not make decisions.