Source Material: Presidential Recordings as Presidential Data: Assessing LBJ’s Presidential Persuasive Attempts

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This article evaluates the usefulness of one currently available set of presidential recordings, those of President Lyndon Johnson. It demonstrates that these recordings constitute a sample of the president’s phone conversations and a reasonable representation of his contacts with others. It demonstrates the use of these data in assessing presidential persuasion and activities. It also suggests how popular presentations of these data, through other published means, have distorted the picture of presidential activities.

If presidents lead by persuasion, then how they communicate their ideas, with whom they speak, about what, and to what effect constitute the central evidence of leaders in action. Yet, because the modern presidency remains a closed institution, our theoretical and empirical analyses of these critical persuasive exchanges rest on very scant evidence. The advent of portable recording devices, particularly the common dictation machine, created an unparalleled opportunity for presidents to record their activities. And for those wishing to become “archival participants” in the presidential process (Sullivan 1992, 1993), the use of these devices has created an unprecedented opportunity.

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This article describes one collection of these emerging presidential recordings, those released by the Johnson Presidential Library, and evaluates their qualities as a database. It concludes that these presidential recordings represent a potentially significant resource, a sample of the president’s activities. This article also suggests how useful these data may become by illustrating their use in developing a theory of persuasion. And by assessing Michael Beschloss’s (1997) book Taking Charge, advertised by its publishers as a research resource, it demonstrates how, without proper controls, such efforts can misrepresent the realities of presidential work.

Presidential Recordings as a Research Question

Thanks to Watergate, presidential recordings have a limited history, covering the four presidencies from Eisenhower through Nixon. Briefly, at the beginning of his administration, President Ford discontinued all White House record keeping, including his presidential diary. When it became obvious that the White House needed this record keeping to carry out its daily business, the president resumed the presidential diary but did not reinstitute the audio-recording system. The advent of these recordings raises two kinds of questions, those having to do with their archival presentation and those having to do with their usefulness in research.

The archival issues involve the development of transcripts for the tape recordings. Often, the recordings challenge the researcher, because they have a great deal of background noise and other elements making them difficult to understand. Transcriptions, produced by sophisticated services, provide useful written presentations that help the researcher “hear” the recordings. In some instances, transcripts actually accompany the currently available presidential recordings. The Kennedy Library initially transcribed many of its presidential recordings, while the Nixon Papers Project has not. The Johnson recordings present an interesting challenge. Initially, the Johnson White House staff produced transcripts of the recordings as part of their regular activities. When the Johnson Library began releasing recordings, and probably based on how much staff time producing transcripts consumed, the National Archives set policy not to make transcripts. In effect, the recordings themselves constitute the only official “record” for preservation. For most researchers, this transcription question has a simple policy answer: making transcripts slows down access.

In addition, though, transcriptions have generated authenticity problems that the National Archives has chosen to avoid. Consider this example (although it does not directly involve the National Archives). In the week following the Kennedy assassination, the White House hosted head of state missions from America’s most important allies. The president’s schedule, therefore, contained a number of meetings with foreign leaders and ambassadors sprinkled between his other activities. In one phone conversation with Kennedy staffer Theodore Sorenson, the president apologizes for having to go, blaming his pressing schedule. “I have tha Pakastani Ambas’dor waitin’ for me,” he tells Sorenson. However, in the transcript of that conversation produced by the Johnson White House staff during the press of business, the president...
breaks off his conversation by apologizing that, “I have a pack of bastards waiting for me [emphasis added].” Given these sorts of gaffs and the delay entailed in transcription, doing one’s own makes more sense.

On its face, the chance to eavesdrop on presidential conversations would seem a wonderful research opportunity. However, two research objections to using presidential recordings seem worth considering. First, critics suggest that recordings do not capture the president’s activities. Instead, they capture what the president thought a priori would sound presidential. As such, the recordings constitute nothing more than a window on the president’s message. Second, since presidential recordings only capture a single presidency, their analysis would not fill our need for broader research. Once we know what President Johnson did or said, for example, what actually do we know about other presidents or presidents in general?

Regardless of their motivations for initiating them, White House recordings became routine during each administration. These routine efforts recorded more than “presidential” conversations. Even a brief examination of the limited number of transcripts that have appeared in Michael Beshcloss’s Taking Charge (1997) will suggest that the Johnson recordings, for example, capture a wide range of presidential and not so presidential moments. And, of course, Nixon’s tape recordings captured the full range of that president’s moments, as well. In such recordings as these, the presidents set administrative policies, how to handle speech requests, visitations, meetings, staff memos, and so forth. Sometimes, after answering the president’s desk phone, an aide has simply held the receiver while the president continued his meeting, effectively making a record of that meeting as an accident of the other process. Or an annex to another phone conversation captures the president complaining about staff operations. In one case, President Johnson goes on a brief tirade about the ineffectiveness of the White House phone system, just three days after the Kennedy assassination. In another, he chides confidante Abe Fortas for wanting to bring important Democratic party donors to see the president.

Regardless of the motivation for making them, then, presidential recordings end up capturing a “sample” of what presidents do and say. How we properly answer this first objection about reliability, then, rests not on how we assess the initial presidential motivation but instead on how we assess these recordings as data samples. The next section addresses this question.

We can address the second objection about generalizability by suggesting that we consider presidents as something like comets. By analogy, one might ask, would it serve us to observe systematically the Haley’s Comet, that singular comet most accessible, purely by chance, to our available research apparatus? Haley certainly has a unique orbit, and it surely possesses other unique characteristics. In the natural sciences, though, we take no critical notice whatsoever of researchers’ elaborate plans to study this unique comet. Instead, we find their endeavors acceptable as a matter of scientific inquiry. By analogy, then, might we consider the systematic study of a single president also a worthwhile effort? The argument against such singular presidential observations, then, must rest on the claim that every president faces such special circumstances with such unique experiences and skills as to constitute completely
special data. The uniqueness of these data claims, itself, constitutes only a methodo-
logical assertion, however. We ought to require evidence of this assertion in quanti-
ties at least equal to the evidence we require supporting the notion that any
presidency has much in common with other administrations. Certainly, the more we
subject the notion of presidential uniqueness to systematic analysis using proper con-
trols and competing variables, the less these claims of presidential uniqueness seem
supportable. For example, Hager and Sullivan (1994) test models of presidential
activities, including a number of empirical models suggesting the importance of presi-
dential individuality. In all of these tests, the models of individuality (of so-called
president-centered explanations) did not perform well by comparison with models
suggesting the importance of institutional variables (so-called presidency-centered
explanations).

In light of how this proposition of unique presidencies seems to have faltered, we
suggest that an in-depth study of those presidents for which we have the data might
prove useful. Later, and with these data, we might evaluate whether some circum-
stances (and which those might be) have undermined the usefulness of specific his-
torical observations. Arguments against the validity of observing presidents ought to
occur, however, in light of specific findings rather than a priori. Therefore, let us
amass specific observations and study these in a systematic way and then determine
what we know of individual presidents or of presidencies.

Evaluating the Johnson Samples

The characteristics of samples, then, become the important aspects in judging
the usefulness of these data. To date, the Johnson Library has released all of those
recordings it can locate having to do with the Kennedy assassination and recordings
from November 1963 through October 1964 on any subject. We can characterize
these recordings in terms of their date and time, duration, location, subjects discussed,
and those individuals involved. In this way, we can create variables with which to
evaluate this sample of the president’s activities. What kind of a sample do these
recordings constitute? Can we have confidence that analyzing the recordings tells us
something useful about the president’s contacts?

Using White House diary data originally provided by James Best, we have devel-
oped an empirical model of Johnson’s activities.1 Table 1 summarizes some selected
characteristics of three important data segments: all the president’s contacts, his
phone calls, and those calls the White House recorded.

The president’s diary records some fifteen thousand contacts during this period.
In keeping with Johnson lore, almost half of the president’s contacts occurred over the
phone. Of those, the White House recorded about three thousand, or 41 percent.
Also consistent with Johnson’s emphasis on legislative leadership, the White House
appears to have oversampled conversations with members of Congress while it

1. These data were extensively corrected for transcription errors and some omissions. They were also supple-
mented with data from the records of the phone recordings themselves.
undersampled contacts with White House staff. The other groups noted in the table suggest that for these, the recordings come very close to representing the diary totals.

To address the issue of oversampling congressional contacts, we can assess the degree to which the recorded conversations capture peculiar characteristics or specific member types or if, in fact, the additional numbers merely reflect more emphasis on recording congressional contacts. As one answer to this question, we have compared the means for these data segments on forty-two descriptors of members of Congress. These variables included fourteen member characteristics (e.g., seniority, ADA and other support scores, peer groups, electoral success), twenty constituency descriptors (e.g., region, labor characteristics, employment, demographics), and eight descriptors of positions within various institutional settings (e.g., party leadership positions, committee chairs, committee seniority).

If the oversampling of recordings represents a mere enthusiasm for congressional contacts, then we would expect to find few statistically significant differences in means between those members contacted on the phone and those members recorded by the White House, with one slight statistical caveat: given a 95 percent confidence level and the number of variables involved, we would expect to observe a significant difference in at least one variable (i.e., a false positive finding) with a probability of 0.88. Thus, to observe a single variable as generating a significant difference would itself not support the claim that the recorded data set differed from the broader segment of phone calls.

Table 2 summarizes our findings on the differences between recorded calls and all phone calls for members of Congress. We do observe one statistically significant difference on party membership. Apparently, the White House recorded a slightly higher proportion of those phone calls made to Republicans than warranted by the general rate of calling Republicans. The president talked with Republican members about 6 percent of the time he talked with members, but about 9 percent of recorded calls with members involved Republicans. This difference amounts to having

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact with</th>
<th>Noted in White House Diary</th>
<th>All Calls</th>
<th>Recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members of Congress</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White House staff</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch personnel</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends and confidantes</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business leaders</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual category</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of contacts</td>
<td>15,369</td>
<td>7,124</td>
<td>2,954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
recorded fourteen more calls than the normal rate. This small difference between the two segments suggests that the discrepancy probably reflects a statistical effect, given our standard of confidence, rather than representing any real difference. Thus, while the White House recorded more of the president’s calls involving members of Congress, they did so without any apparent bias. So, we can conclude that, with some minor adjustments, the recorded conversations present a reasonable representation of the larger segment of phone conversations.

**Applications of Recordings**

If recorded phone calls can represent the population of phone conversations, then what can we learn from them? This section describes the application of these data to the president’s business of persuading others—with whom do they speak, about what, and to what effect? It covers two of these three topics: the targets and the topics of their persuasion. We leave to later analysis the more difficult question of assessing whether these conversations had the hoped-for effect.

**Persuasive Exchange**

This team has begun examining persuasive strategies (e.g., Sullivan 1998; Hora et al. 1999). We have categorized types of persuasive appeals, ranging from the use of “bargaining techniques” like citing “collective responsibilities” for governing to what psychologists call “compliance-gaining” techniques (e.g., see Perloff 1993). In effect, then, the recordings provide researchers an opportunity to build a model of how presidential persuasion proceeds. In that model, one clear empirical pattern seems apparent: we can identify the universal application of a “head of state” appeal.

Table 3 summarizes how President Johnson used appeals distributed across the type of potential follower. The table indicates three general patterns. First, the president persuaded members of Congress far more often than he persuaded others with whom he talked. The magnitude of these differences between the average use of persuasive appeals for others rather than members averaged about 3.5 times more often. Presumably with the White House staff (with whom he had the most contact) and
with members of the executive establishment, the president actually issued orders. In effect, then, we can measure the degree to which presidential power rests on presidential persuasion relative to presidential command.

Second and contrary to this general pattern of difference, the president used appeals to head-of-state responsibilities in a more even way. While the other appeals ranged around 3.5, the figure for head of state stands at 1.4. For those other than members of Congress, the most often used persuasive appeal LBJ used involved his responsibilities as head of state. While others in the system share some of the president’s sources of persuasive appeal (e.g., differences in information on merits, common preferences), only the president can bear the responsibilities as the head of state. Hence, only the president can bring this appeal to bear on others, affording the president a special advantage, equally applicable in all situations and for all listeners. Given that uniquely presidential vantage, the president employs it more widely.

The third pattern evident in Table 3 has to do with LBJ as persuader. Observers commonly characterize LBJ as a master of persuasion, knowing just what to say to those he wanted to persuade. As indicated by the averages, though, LBJ often relied on a wide variety of persuasive appeals instead of making one focused appeal. Every category of appeal appeared in at least one-quarter of the exchanges with members. In his conversations, then, President Johnson regularly employed a litany of arguments. Take, for example, LBJ’s typical appeal for support of his food stamps bill in April of 1964. He would regularly repeat that “I can’t be repudiated on this vote,” that “you’re better off with me than Charlie Halleck [the Republican leader] running things,” and that “foreign powers would watch their votes for signs of weakness” in his leadership. In some instances, LBJ would add a note of familiarity or would refer to particular circumstances. “I’ve got four things to tell you, so hang onto your chair,” he told Congressman Jones when lobbying in August 1964. He then listed two specific favors the administration had done Congressman Jones. But when he had finished with those
particularistic items, LBJ launched into a standard litany on his subject. The precision of the president’s appeal gave way to the weight of the president’s onslaught.

**Topics of Conversation**

The use of arguments highlights the fact that presidential recordings constitute something of a record of the president’s agenda. We have evaluated the content of LBJ’s recorded conversations using the standard Clausen (1973) typology of topics (see also Sinclair 1982). Originally developed to categorize congressional voting using data from the Kennedy/Johnson period, the Clausen typology divided votes into five policy categories: agriculture, international involvement, civil liberties (including civil rights issues), government management of the economy, and social welfare. These five categories seemed to summarize how members voted. Clausen’s model suggested that when voting on a specific policy question, members first identified how the specific question fit into one of these more general categories on which they had made general commitments. Members then decided how to cast their specific votes by referencing their well-established general positions on the broader issue. Policy debate in this model of decision making, therefore, revolved around the framing of specific votes.

Table 4 describes the distribution of topics. Two results stand out from these data. First, a number of conversations do not fall into the Clausen typology. It seems safe to conclude that the range of presidential conversations varies more than that captured in congressional decisions. In addition, while observers regularly characterize Johnson’s administration as one focused on civil rights, social welfare policy, and the Vietnam War, the picture of topics before the president seems much more varied. Clearly, international involvement constituted a substantial part of the president’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic of Contacts</th>
<th>Represented in Percentage of Recorded Contacts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government management</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International involvement</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture policy</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Clausen Topics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White House administration</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative leadership</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of recorded contacts</td>
<td>2,954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
agenda, but the Vietnam conflict represented less than one-quarter of that foreign policy agenda during the period under study. The bulk of LBJ’s contacts involving foreign affairs focused on Latin America and Western Europe, America’s traditional areas of interest. The president actually spent more time discussing White House administration during this period than he did discussing Vietnam. President Johnson’s conversations focused primarily on his legislative leadership and the government’s role in the economy and social regulation.

The Published Picture of Recordings

Recently, a number of books, including Michael Beschloss’s (1997) collection Taking Charge, purport to provide data from these presidential recordings. Some scholars have taken advantage of what seems like a useful source, and indeed, in his preface, Mr. Beschloss suggests that providing these transcripts for research constitutes the book’s central justification. Our own evaluation suggests that scholars need to exercise restraint in using these compendiums.

Beschloss (1997) transcribed only 455 conversations (or about 7 percent of the total phone calls and about 15 percent of the total number of recorded conversations released). As a result, the Beschloss book covers only a limited number of topics and contacts. We applied the same assessment for this small “sample within a sample” as we applied to the original sample of recorded conversations; that is, how well do they

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic of Contacts</th>
<th>Recorded</th>
<th>Beschloss</th>
<th>Misrepresentation?</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Government management</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International involvement</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>Over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>Over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil liberties</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>Over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture policy</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Under</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Clausen topics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Legislative leadership</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of recorded contacts</td>
<td>2,954</td>
<td>455</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
represent the larger data set in terms of contacts and in terms of subject matter? The results seemed disappointing.

Using the Clausen (1973) typology, for example, Table 5 summarizes the distribution of the Beschloss (1997) transcripts. The first column of data notes the actual distribution of topics. The second column indicates the distribution of topics in the Beschloss transcripts. The third column notes which constitute statistically significant deviations from the actual distribution. Of the ten topics and subtopics noted, the Beschloss distribution differs in a statistically significant way in six.

As we indicated earlier, President Johnson devoted a good deal of his time to discussing legislative leadership, government management of the economy, and international involvement other than the Vietnam conflict. Beschloss's (1997) rendition of the president's concerns, on the other hand, overemphasized international involvement, particularly transcribing more than twice as many conversations on Vietnam as necessary, and investigations of presidential associates (almost double the actual rate) while underrepresenting conversations on government management of the economy by almost a quarter. In addition to misrepresenting the nature of the president's concerns—creating the appearance of obsessing over investigations and Vietnam—the Beschloss transcripts misdepict the president's focus on his central responsibilities, like management of the economy. Beschloss simply cannot answer the question, “What does the president do?”

A simple example will illustrate the loss of this important opportunity to understand the office. Take the recordings made on August 5, 1964. The diary records that President Johnson had some ninety contacts during that day. Of those, fifty-seven involved phone calls, and the White House recorded twenty-seven, a 10 percent deviation above the norm (using lambda). That day, the president started off in Washington, flew to Syracuse to make a speech, and then returned to Washington to lobby for House passage of his poverty bill. The New York Times reported that morning that the president's bill faced stiff opposition: a decision from the conference's policy board to make the vote against the president's bill a “Republican issue vote” and the expected defection of some thirty-five to forty southern Democrats. The president's agenda that day also included concerns stemming from earlier attacks on American Navy vessels, which would eventually lead to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and two civil rights enforcement issues; he talked with FBI Director Hoover about the case of missing civil rights activists in Mississippi; and he talked with Attorney General Robert Kennedy about desegregation enforcement.

Among the conversations that day, the president discussed with Secretary of Defense McNamara how to get particularly troublesome members of Congress from Texas and Louisiana to ask for favors to build an account with them. LBJ wanted McNamara to float the story that he had a review under way considering closing air bases in specific congressional districts in Abilene, Texas, and Shreveport, Louisiana,

2. Using a proportional reduction in error adjustment for the lower bound of zero percentage, the underrepresentation amounts to 22 percent of the actual total.
3. All of these transcripts were taken from Recorded Tapes, White House Series, April 18 or August 5, 1964, LBJ Library.
where Democrats had not helped President Kennedy. “We oughta make them come see us about something,” he told McNamara. Following this conversation, LBJ embarked on a number of congressional phone calls both to troublesome House members showing up as “not Right” on his poverty head counts as well as those lobbying for the cause, like AFL-CIO President George Meany, Congressional Director Lawrence O’Brien, and UAW President Walter Reuther. In all, the president called approximately twenty members about their positions and had two group meetings with other members. LBJ ran through a complex of persuasive appeals. He kidded with them, calling Appropriations Chairman and fellow Texan George Mahon “Georgie,” for example, chiding him about being a “grandfather” who went to bed too early to catch the late-breaking news. He praised some of them for their support on other issues without bringing up poverty at all. In a few instances, he reported favors that the administration would shortly bestow on them. He assured them that although he wanted their votes, he would stand behind them “money, marbles, and chalk” regardless of the outcome. So, in typical fashion, the president had something specific to say to many of these targets for persuasion.

Yet, when he came to the heart of the matter—their support on the Office of Economic Opportunity bill—LBJ launched into a standard litany of arguments. He told each that the Republicans wanted to wreck his administration by repudiating his leadership on this, his first independent policy proposal. They wanted to show the world that “I can pass a dead man’s bills, but not my own, the first I put my name and prestige on.” This vote, he told them, had become a test of wills. Losing on it would mirror FDR’s defeat on the Court plan. “They’ll say, ‘Well, he’s lost his leadership.’ And it will be like dominos.” When members tried to deflect his pressure by saying they planned to do all they could to get him reelected, LBJ simply said, “It won’t matter what happens in November if I am repudiated as leader.”

Finally, the president repeated a litany of value added that he had used earlier in the year on food stamps: “George, let me put it this way,” he told Mahon in a typical appeal, “I know one thing. . . . I know I’m right on this.” Pausing between them to let each element sink in, he said, “I know I mean more to you, . . . and Lubbock, . . . and your district, . . . and your State, . . . and your grandchildren, than Charlie Halleck [the Republican House Leader] does.” The president emphasized the value of presidential assistance. “I’ll tell you this,” he told Congressman Bob Jones of Alabama, “if it costs you, I’ll guarantee. . . . I don’t know what it will be thatja. . . that I can do but I’ll guarantee that I’ll more than make up with you with interest.” He repeated compromises he had made and listed new converts who might offer cover for the member. He released them from supporting the administration on other bills. “You can vote against ARA or that Appalachian bill [both coming up within a month]. Those are poverty votes. You can just say, ‘That’s my poverty vote.’ ” In short, the tape recordings show a president engaged in the process of domestic leadership on landmark legislation that would reshape the government’s relationship with the economy for decades. It shows him manufacturing credit through the executive, instructing less proficient cabinet officers on the fine points of manipulating members. And it shows him
deploying his typical persuasive approach: some personal notes but a dependence on burying the target under a barrage of arguments.

Of the twenty-seven recordings from this day, Beschloss (1997) transcribes only two. In the first, Defense Secretary McNamara calls the president to update him on an air strike ordered in retaliation for the Tonkin attacks. That conversation lasts more than six minutes, yet Beschloss transcribes only twelve lines. In the second, Secretary McNamara requests permission to order the ships and planes in the area to stand down from the engagement orders. That conversation lasted only 2.5 minutes, yet Beschloss transcribes eighteen lines. Clearly, these transcripts present a very narrowly defined picture of presidential activities. To rely on them, then, presents the researcher with a picture of the administration’s activities that has little scientific value. Instead, the resultant image reflects only the editor’s personal judgments about the likely marketability of topics and their contribution to a specific story the editor wishes to tell without regard for the more varied one history presents.

Far more useful than these published pictures present, then, the president’s recordings offer a clear and balanced image of what the president does and says to those he seeks to lead and persuade.

References


