The Minimal Cue Hypothesis: How Black Candidates Cue Race to Increase White Voting Participation

Gregory Petrow, University of Nebraska Omaha

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Gregory A. Petrow
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Racial group interests can compete in politics. One way competition may occur is when Black candidates cue racial thinking among Whites, leading to rivalry at the ballot box. I address this hypothesis with theories of identity, affect, and racial cognition. I argue that Black Congressional candidates cue these factors among Whites, leading the factors of White racial prejudice and White race liberalism to impact Whites’ voting participation. I employ logistic regression analysis of data from the American National Election Study in 1988, 1992, and 2000. The effects of racial prejudice on the predicted probability of voting occur among all Whites, as well as White Republicans, White Democrats, and White conservatives. The effects of White race liberalism occur among all Whites, as well as White Democrats and White liberals. The effects are strongest when Whites are in elections with Black candidates that are either challengers or in open seats.

KEY WORDS: Race, Turnout, Black candidates, Identity, Affect, Racial resentment

Voter turnout is the most widely available avenue by which groups compete for political power. Election Day affords all Americans an opportunity to go to the polls and vote for the candidate they choose. This allows Americans to express their own group interests at the polls. A political candidate’s race can cue voters’ racial identities and affects to cause racial interests to compete at the ballot box. White voting participation becomes racialized when Whites participate based on salient racial considerations.

Racial interests must be cued in order to become salient to individuals, and an increasingly diverse pool of political candidates can cue such interests simply by their presence in an election. This means that Black political candidates can provide the proper context to trigger Whites’ racial identities, affects, and cognitions. These factors then become salient, increasing voters’ motivation to participate in an election. I call this the minimal cue hypothesis—that a Black candidate’s
race alone can evoke racialized thinking, thus engaging Whites in an election and increasing their participation.¹

I evaluate how this minimal cue might trigger White racial prejudice, as well as White race liberalism, causing these factors to affect Whites’ electoral participation. In other words, I study how one context might cause some factors to matter more for electoral participation than other contexts. This is a type III relationship, also called a conditioning relationship. While the history of studying individual-level causes of voting participation is a long one, the study of how context makes some factors more or less salient is a recent development.²

The context I study here is how Black Congressional candidates might trigger racial prejudice and White race liberalism, causing them to impact electoral participation. We should expect these factors to matter the most when cued in the kind of elections I study here—Congressional elections, almost all of which are low stimulus (Campbell, 1960). In such contests, voters have little information about the candidates and campaign, and so the “signal” to voters provided by a candidate’s race or gender should be especially strong. Voters will lack information to disconfirm their feelings and stereotypes associated with a candidate’s group membership. In high-stimulus elections, voters have more information with which to learn about candidates’ beliefs, backgrounds, and issue positions, but in low-stimulus elections, group-based stereotypes and affect should play more of a role (Citrin, Green, & Sears, 1990).

The role of White racial prejudice in impacting voting participation is largely unknown. Claudine Gay finds that in Congressional elections with Black incumbents, White turnout is depressed (Gay, 2001). D. Stephen Voss and David Lublin find that Black Congressional candidates during Presidential election years have no effect on White voter turnout (Voss & Lublin, 2001). In contrast, Ebonya Washington (2006) finds that Black candidates do increase White voter turnout. These studies, however, have been analyses of precinct-level turnout. Such analyses miss the individual-level, psychological dynamics that may be at play.³ In addition, no political scientists have evaluated the flip side of racial prejudice—relationships between White race liberal factors and voting participation.

¹ This is a different type of racial cueing than scholars traditionally consider. Most scholars study racial cueing as involving racial messages, be they implicit or explicit, to cue racial thinking among Whites (e.g., Mendelberg, 2001). That type of racial cueing is a choice made by political actors to manipulate the electorate. My argument is much broader—that Black candidates are themselves inherent racial cues, triggering racialized thinking among Whites.

² The most important individual-level factors motivating individuals to vote include age and education (Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996), income (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980), efficacy (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990), citizen duty (Caldeira, Patterson, & Markko, 1985), political knowledge (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990), and being contacted by a political party (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993).

³ The Washington (2006) article does employ survey data, along with Congressional district-level data and state-level data. However, it does not explore the psychological manifestations of racialized turnout.
I consider racial identity and affect to be important components of White racial prejudice and White race liberalism. Most scholars who study racial animus solely consider racial attitudes: such as Symbolic Racism, Racial Resentment, or Aversive Racism (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Sears, 1988). These are the thoughts, the cognitions, of racism. However, in this analysis I take a social psychological perspective that considers the group-related identities and affects as the causes of behavior, as well as the more “traditional” racial cognitions.

The work of Henri Tajfel (1982), and of Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), demonstrates that group identities should hold a place in the center stage of group behavior. A core prediction of social identity theory (SIT) is that “social categorization per se . . . is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the ingroup” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 38). SIT predicts that group identifiers should have positive feelings for their ingroup, as well as negative feelings for outgroups (e.g., Tajfel, 1982). In other words, triggering racial identity should bring to mind racial affect, which is widely considered one of the most powerful predictors of behavior and attitudes (e.g., Clore & Tamir, 2002; Glaser & Salovey, 1998; Lodge & Taber 2000). This racial affect should be salient to group identifiers when a stimulus evokes their ingroup/outgroup categorization. Racial affect is stored with the group schemas, so when group identifiers’ outgroup schemas are cued, the affect toward the outgroup becomes salient, too (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1985). This perspective also suggests that group-relevant affect should have more power and meaning to group identifiers, compared to others. I expect that the effects of emotion on voting participation will intensify as group identifiers report feeling stronger feelings. In other words, I predict the presence of interaction effects between identity and affect on voting participation. Social psychologists find that people with strong group identities feel stronger group-based emotions (Branscombe & Wann, 1991; Doojse, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; McCoy & Major, 2003). This indicates that for group identifiers, the group-related emotions have greater meaning to them, compared to those who are not group identifiers.

Theory

White Racial Prejudice: White Identity

Black candidates might cue White identities. The effects of activating the White identity vary among Whites, although psychologists agree that for some Whites, a salient racial identity evokes prejudice (Arriola, Jacob, & Cole, 2001; Helms, 1990; Pope-Davis & Ottavi, 1994; Rowe, Bennett, & Atkinson, 1994).4

4 Regarding White identity, the political psychologists Cara Wong and Grace E. Cho (2005) find the effects of White identity to be limited. They acknowledge many Whites do “feel close” to Whites, and
Prejudiced Whites tend to feel that their group is engaged in a struggle against other races, especially Blacks. Psychologists find that the presence of outgroup members in social interactions is the classic cause of this differentiation that makes the group-related thoughts and feelings salient, but political scientists have long considered that political candidates and elected officials have the same effect (e.g., Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Gay, 2001).

Triggering the identity brings Whites’ positive social identity to mind. Evidence that some Whites value their racial group’s position in society is that Whites have a cohesive political interest they strive to maintain (Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006). In other words, prejudiced Whites resist policies promoting racial equality because they have a sense that such policies threaten the collective interests of Whites. Some Whites evidently oppose affirmative action on the grounds it decreases the likelihood Whites will get jobs or education they otherwise would have had (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). White identity serves as the link between the threat of Whites losing employment opportunities to affirmative action and opposition to the policy (Lowery et al., 2006).

**White Racial Prejudice: Affect**

Although the triggering of White identity is important in this model of voting participation, it is the prejudice that the cueing of identity corresponds with that may be the strongest link to voting participation. While researchers disagree over how exactly they should define prejudice, I am defining racial prejudice in the most traditional way for psychologists—race-related affect (e.g., Fiske, 1998).

A variety of scholars study the link between affect and action. All of these scholars conclude that dislike for a group, the kind of dislike that prejudiced Whites feel toward Blacks, can make people take action. In political science, the most notable of these authors are George Marcus and his colleagues (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). Marcus and his co-authors group all affects into three classes—enthusiasm, anxiety, and aversion—and find each type is related to different types of behaviors. Aversion is the intense dislike people feel for a person or group with which they are familiar. Marcus and his colleagues find that aversion causes people to act against those they feel the aversion towards. Psychologists find these results as well (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). A Black candidate should cue this negative Black affect (which Marcus calls aversion) in prejudiced Whites and cause an increase in White electoral participation.

this identity increases: positive feelings for Whites, positive White stereotypical evaluations, negative Black stereotypical evaluations, and symbolic racism. However, the magnitudes of the effects are small. In addition, the authors consider the determinants of four race-related policy preferences measured in the American National Election Study from 1972 to 2000, finding effects for White identity in some years but not others.
What this work suggests is that negative affect toward an outgroup—prejudiced Whites’ dislike of Blacks—should motivate action against them. However, other researchers explore how the positive ingroup affect, or the positive White affect, might actually be a more important factor for motivating action against the outgroup. These researchers find that prejudice is typically more a matter of ingroup favoritism than outgroup derogation (Lowery et al., 2006). This manifests itself as positive ingroup affect (Brewer, 1999). Given this perspective, what typically motivates discriminatory behavior is the desire to benefit one’s group.

Taken in its entirety, the literature suggests that those who are prejudiced against Blacks should have more positive feelings for Whites, as well as more negative feelings for Blacks. The increasing difference should represent greater levels of prejudice (ingroup favoritism over Blacks). This perspective combines the predictions of the two psychological views, of prejudice as positive and negative racial affect, just described (Sears & Savalei, 2006). Thus, if both types of affect are equal representations of prejudice, then perhaps the strongest sign of prejudice will be the difference between positive White affect and positive Black affect (in other words, positive White affect difference).

White Racial Prejudice: Cognition

Of all the racial cognitions, racial resentment is among the most studied in political science and found to be a powerful predictor of racially conservative policy preferences (e.g., Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Racial resentment is a more recent incarnation of symbolic racism—the idea that Blacks violate societal norms (through their perceived laziness and taking of social welfare benefits). Whites embrace these beliefs widely, leading to opposition to social welfare programs, affirmative action, and busing (e.g., Sears, 1988). Importantly, racial resentment operates independently of White identity (Sears & Savalei, 2006).

Might these attitudes be cued by a Black candidate, stimulating racially motivated political participation? Perhaps when Whites encounter Black candidates they are reminded of their negative beliefs and they act on them. There is evidence to support this from other studies. Kinder and Sanders (1996) find that racial resentment predicted the vote for Bush over Dukakis in 1988, and Jackman (2008) finds that racial resentment predicted the vote for Hillary Clinton against Barack Obama in the 2008 Democratic primary. A Black candidate might cue these negative cognitions of racial resentment (or stereotypes; Virtanen & Huddy, 1998), and the beliefs might motivate Whites to participate on Election Day to defeat the Black candidate because they want to punish Blacks for violating social norms, or to ensure that policies won’t be introduced to assist a group they view as undeserving.
What feelings might be the components of White race liberalism? In other words, what feelings would motivate Whites to take positive action to assist Blacks in advancing their political goals? Engaging in such an act can be considered a “facilitation action,” which is an action of association with an outgroup that leads to group helping (Cuddy, Glick, & Fiske, 2007). Such actions are the result of positive feeling (“warmth”), coupled with belief in the group’s competence (Cuddy et al., 2007). In the case of Whites’ feelings toward Blacks, this positive feeling would be some kind of positive Black affect.

Of course, Whites’ feelings for their own racial group should be relevant as well. Whites’ negative White affect has not been widely studied, and so little is known about how Whites’ negative feelings for their own group might influence their attitudes and behaviors. However, given that affect is one of the most important determinants of people’s policy preferences and attitudes, Whites who like Whites less should be less supportive of policies and actions to further the advancement of that group. Among White race liberals, this affect should be less positive than among other Whites, possibly leading to action to help Blacks.

Combining these two views, a White race liberal will have warmer feelings for Blacks, as well as colder feelings for Whites, relatively speaking. Higher levels of this positive Black affect difference will reflect a greater bias toward Whites’ racial outgroup, than their own racial ingroup.

In addition to the affect, facilitation actions are motivated by certain cognitions as well—believing in the group’s competence. What might group competence mean in the political context? From the perspective of a majority group, a minority group is competent (i.e., capable) when it conforms to the norms of behavior set forth by the majority group. If a minority group meets these standards, it is judged as being capable, and functioning well in society. Racial resentment is based on the belief that Blacks do not conform to (Whites’) societal norms, because Blacks don’t work hard enough and receive too much welfare. White race liberals, on the other hand, reject judgments of Blacks as incompetent. At the same time, they are conscious of the conflict between their racial acceptance and others’ racial resentment. A Black candidate may motivate these voters to vote in order to advance the group they see as misjudged. By voting for that candidate, they can attempt to redress the wrong of misjudgment while also promoting more Blacks to leadership—thus demonstrating Blacks’ competence.

The determinants of White race liberalism are largely unexplored. However, one source of racial policy liberalism among Whites occurs when Whites live in high socioeconomic areas that are also racially integrated (Branton & Jones, 2005). Also, in some circumstances, Black friendship brings forth greater esteem for Blacks, as well as racial policy liberalism (Jackman & Crane, 1986).
Political scientists find that a party realignment began with the passage of the civil rights agenda in the mid-1960s (e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1981, 1986; Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002). At that point in time a clear distinction developed between the parties: the Democrats were the racially progressive party, and the Republicans were the racially conservative party. This clear distinction marks the Republican Party as the welcoming home to many Whites who hold anti-Black attitudes and affect (Valentino & Sears, 2005). As a result, those with the constellation of factors of racial prejudice (White identity, positive White affect, negative Black affect, and racial resentment) should identify with the Republican Party due to its status as the racially conservative political party. The factors of White prejudice should also be more salient to them than they would be to Whites in the Democratic Party.

This should hold for the Republicans’ core supporters, as well: political conservatives. Scholars find that voters’ racial attitudes are now a major source of meaning for what it means to be liberal or conservative (Carmines & Stimson, 1982). Given that ideological self-identification is largely driven by symbolic considerations (namely, feelings toward groups), and given the great salience of race, this finding makes sense. As Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman (1981) discuss, voters use “symbolic cues” on “easy issues” to make voting decisions. People’s linkage of racial attitudes with their own ideological identifications makes racial cues an easy-to-use heuristic. Conover and Feldman (1981) present evidence that evaluations of racial groups matter for liberals and conservatives, and Carmines and Stimson (1982) find that liberals and conservatives define themselves, in part, based on their racial attitudes. Conservatives, then, should tend to be “more prejudiced” than nonconservatives, because one of the reasons that some are drawn to the conservative label is its implications for racial groups and racial policy. And the opposite should be true as well: White race liberals should be attracted to the Democratic Party, and the liberal label, because of their standings as symbols of racial progress.

The Number of Black Major Party Candidates, and Incumbency

Voters can face one or two major party candidates that are Black: either the Democrat can be Black, or the Republican, or both. One hundred and thirty-one elections for Congress during the Presidential election years from 1988 to 2000 involved Black Democrats facing non-Black (White) Republicans, nine involved Black Republicans facing non-Black Democrats, and six involved both the Democratic and Republican candidates being Black (Barone & Ujifusa, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001). Given that there is some (though limited) variability in the number of Black candidates that White voters face, one should consider how hypotheses may vary when Whites face one, versus two, Black candidates.
There are three possible combinations of Black candidates that White voters will face: a Black Democrat against a non-Black (White) Republican, a Black Democrat and a Black Republican, and a non-Black (White) Democrat against a Black Republican. As I just discussed, if a voter faces one Black major party candidate, it is almost certainly a Democrat (the odds are 14.5 to 1). Democrats, and especially Black Democrats, stand as the symbolic representatives of the civil rights movement, and thus Black advancement. This can cue racial threat in prejudiced Whites, and racial group thinking and feelings among all Whites. This should lead the factors of White race prejudice and White race liberalism to positively affect voting participation. However, two Black major party candidates may be a different matter. In that case, the factors of White prejudice may lead Whites to feel ambivalent because they have only one choice who might be acceptable to them in the election—a Black Republican. While the party label indicates that the candidate will oppose policies to bring racial equality, the candidate is also a member of the disliked racial group whose presence cues the prejudice. The ambivalence will either decrease voting participation, or leave it unchanged, compared to some baseline probability of voting. In the presence of two Black candidates, White race liberals should not become ambivalent because they still have the opportunity to vote for the Black Democrat. Finally, a Black Republican facing a White Democrat should cause prejudiced voters the same ambivalence just discussed. In this case, however, voting for the Democratic candidate might be more palatable because the candidate is White. This suggests that in Congressional elections with Black Republicans and White Democrats, White prejudice will lead Whites to either vote less, or it will not affect their participation. The prediction for White race liberals is similar. White race liberals may be engaged by Black Republican candidates because of their race. The candidates’ partisanship, however, communicates the opposite cue, as Republicans do not support racial equality-bringing programs to the same extent Democrats do. However, the White race liberal is not limited in voting for a White Democrat the way prejudice limits Whites in voting for a Black Republican. The question is whether they will do so with the same enthusiasm as voting for a Black Democrat, and this should generally not be the case. This suggests their turnout will also be lower, or unchanged.

The status of the Black candidates may matter as well: whether they are incumbents or non incumbents (challengers, or candidates for an open seat). The work of Zoltan Hajnal (2001, 2007) suggests that voters process information differently about Black candidates, depending if they are incumbents or not. Voters bring more prejudice and stereotypes to their evaluations of Black nonincumbents because they lack disconfirming information about them, and also because they haven’t had experience with the candidate serving in office to disconfirm any racial fears they may have. I hypothesize, then, that the factors of racial prejudice should matter more for White voting participation when Black candidates are nonincumbents. I expect this to be the case for the factors of White race liberalism as well,
because the presentation of a nonincumbent Black candidate will represent a new possibility to advance the achievements of Blacks. Reelecting an incumbent Black candidate, however, may simply represent continuing something already achieved.

**Data and Measures**

I conduct individual-level analyses with logistic regression analysis. The voter turnout literature is one of the most comprehensive in the discipline, and scholars have identified scores of factors that influence whether or not someone votes on Election Day. These factors should be controlled for to remove the influence of confounding factors. Stephen J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen (1993) estimated comprehensive voter turnout models, controlling for a myriad of individual-level factors, as well as higher-level factors (these are factors that represent the influence of the context in which individuals reside, such as the racial diversity of one’s neighborhood). Their models certainly rank among the most rigorous in terms of their statistical controls. With the goal of estimating a fully specified model, I estimate models that control for almost all of the individual-level factors that they include in their models. I include some higher-level factors as well: the percent of the respondent’s census tract that is Black, whether the respondent lives in the South, the closeness of the Congressional election, the incumbency status of the Congressional candidates in the respondents’ elections, as well as four state-level variables—the closeness of the Presidential election, whether the respondent lives in the South, the number of Black interest groups that lobby the respondents’ state governments in 1997, and the percent of the respondents’ state legislatures that are Black (Bositis, 2000; Brasher, Lowery, & Gray, 1999). The percent of the individual’s census tract population that is Black is included to control for Black mobilization and racial threat. The latter two measures are included to control for levels of Black mobilization, a possible confound between a Black Congressional candidate and higher White turnout (e.g., Browning, Marshall, & Tabb, 1986).

Scholars often find a relationship among Whites between the density of Black population, racial threat, and racially conservative policy preferences (e.g., Glaser, 1994). Therefore, I control for the percent of the population in the respondents’ census tracts that is Black. This controls for a powerful predictor of racial threat, but also controls for another important confounding factor—Black empowerment or Black mobilization (Browning et al., 1986). A determinant of Blacks exercising political power is their size in the population (Browning et al., 1986). By controlling for the size of the Black population, I control for Black empowerment. My

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6 Ideally, controls for Black mobilization and political empowerment would operate at the Congressional District level, instead of the state level. However, variables measured at that level are not available to me.
model also includes two other controls for Black empowerment: number of Black interest groups and percent of the seats in the state legislatures held by Blacks.\(^7\)

These analyses utilize responses to the American National Election Study (ANES) in the Presidential election years of 1988, 1992, and 2000. They involve analyzing ANES participants’ responses in the three separate cross-sections, pooled together. I pooled the cross-sections together to maximize the efficiency of the estimator of the effect of Black representation. Given how unusual it is for Whites to have Black members of Congress, combining the cases together allows for more efficient tests of statistical significance.\(^8\)

I choose these years in particular for two reasons. First, they include measures of all of the concepts I am interested in (the ANES did not include measures of racial resentment in 1996, and they dropped measures of White identity after 2000). Second, the data were collected during Presidential elections. Presidential elections famously involve the stimulus of higher turnout, making it less likely one would find effects for Black candidates because they could be swamped by the higher turnout and stimulus of a Presidential election (Campbell, 1960). In other words, the test should be conservative.

The individuals’ self-reported electoral participation is the dependent variable. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, the probability function of turning out to vote is not linear (e.g., Aldrich & Nelson, 1984). I have chosen the logistic distribution to represent this functional form, leading me to perform logistic regressions (e.g., Kmenta, 1997). The coefficients from the logit models are in the unit of “logits.” Thus, I convert the logit parameters to predicted probabilities. I use the parameters to estimate the changes in the probabilities of voting caused by the racial factors in the three Presidential election years.\(^9\)

\(^7\) I controlled for the percent of the census tract that is White, as well. I reversed the measure to reflect lower numbers of Whites in a precinct, expecting that this might be another kind of racial threat—not only from Blacks, but other racial minorities as well (Branton & Jones, 2005). Controlling for percent White in this way tends to make the statistical results I present here larger, suggesting that the percent of a census tract’s population that is Black is a greater confound than the percent White. The results reported here include percent Black as a statistical control.

\(^8\) This pooled dataset includes 237 Whites who lived in Congressional Districts with Black Congressional candidates. Of these 237 Whites, 173 of them faced Black Congressional candidates that were also incumbents, and about half of the 237 Whites lived in the South. Forty-six of them were in districts that were included in more than one of the cross-sections (19%), and of the 32 Congressional districts with Black candidates included in these pooled ANES cross-sections, four were included in more than one of the cross sections (12.5%).

\(^9\) I adjust the logit model estimates according to the variance at the census-tract level. The model assumes that every individual observation is a random draw from a distribution. This assumption is violated when Whites live in areas populated by Blacks, triggering racial threat (e.g., Glaser, 1994). Thus, I use clustered standard errors at the census-tract level to make the parameters in the models more efficient. This is one level of analysis where scholars observe this variance (e.g., Branton & Jones, 2005).
Measures of the Concepts

The key factors for White racial prejudice are White identity, positive White affect, negative Black affect, positive White affect difference, and racial resentment. The key factors of White race liberalism are positive Black affect, negative White affect, positive Black affect difference, and racial acceptance. I choose individuals’ responses to specific ANES questions to represent these factors.

For White identity, I utilize the standard ANES “group closeness” measure. This measure has many advantages, but perhaps its strongest is that it has face validity as an indicator of social identity (Wong & Cho, 2005). For positive White affect, negative Black affect, positive Black affect, and negative White affect, I utilize the group feeling thermometers for Whites and Blacks. For the positive White affect difference variable, I subtract the White feeling thermometer from the Black feeling thermometer, and for the positive Black affect difference variable, I do the opposite.

In addition to the psychological concepts, the contextual factors have to be operationalized as well: the Congressional candidates’ incumbency status, the Black Congressional candidate, the percent of the census tract population that is Black, the closeness of the Congressional and Presidential election outcomes, the number of Black interest groups that lobby the survey respondents’ state governments, and the percent of the seats in the state legislatures held by Blacks. I collected both the Black Congressional candidate variable and the candidate incumbency status variable from the Almanac of American Politics (Barone & Ujifusa, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001). The Almanac provides pictures of the Representatives and notes if they were Black, or if their opponents in the elections were. I hired a coder to collect the data, and I replicated the coding for 200 of the Congressional districts. In addition, I collected the census-tract population data from the U.S. Census Bureau (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990, 2000), the state legislature data from the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (Bositis, 2000), the Congressional and Presidential election outcomes from The Almanac of American Politics (Barone & Ujifusa, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001), and I thank David Lowery for allowing me access to the Black interest group data (Brasher et al., 1999).

The analysis also includes control variables. These begin with the individual-level control variables included in the Rosenstone and Hansen models of voter turnout (Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). The control variables include demographic factors (education, age, income, working status, marriage status), political predispositions (strength of party identification, ideological identification, efficacy, party affect), election specific factors (political interest, caring who wins, candidate

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10 The feeling thermometer is not an ideal measure of affect. The best measures of affect involve using words that represent specific feelings, such as anger or hope (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000). However, the feeling thermometer does enjoy face validity in the sense that people are asked to rate how they feel about the attitude object.

11 I calculated an Intercoder Reliability Statistic of .98 for all coding.
affect, contacted by a political party, perceiving the election is close), media exposure (self-reported reading of the newspaper and watching television), social capital factors (years in community, church attendance), and higher-level factors (the percent of the census tract that is Black, whether the respondent lives in the South, the closeness of the Congressional and Presidential election outcomes, the number of Black interest groups registered to lobby the state government, the percent of seats held in the state legislatures by Black representatives, and the incumbency status of the candidates in the respondents’ Congressional elections). I included year dummies for 1988 and 1992 as well. Finally, I also added racial factors that might serve as confounds. All of the White race prejudice models included controls for the racial factors of White identity, positive White affect, negative Black affect (or positive White affect difference), and racial resentment. All White race liberal models included controls for positive Black affect, White affect (or positive Black affect difference), if Whites indicated they feel close to Blacks, and racial acceptance.12

Interpreting Logit Coefficients and Interactions Effects

Logit involves transforming the probability of an event occurring (ranging from 0 to 1) into a coefficient that can range from negative infinity to positive infinity (Aldrich & Nelson, 1984). This logit coefficient, then, represents the effect of the independent variable on this “unbounded index” (Berry, Esarey, & Rubin, 2007). The models presented here are more complicated than standard logit models, however, because they involve interaction effects. The summary nature of the logit coefficient for an interaction effect may obscure more of the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable than it reveals (Berry, Esarey, & Rubin, 2007). There are two reasons for this. The first reason is the same reason as is the case with the regular logit coefficient—the slope of the relationship between x and y is different, given different levels of x. In the case of the interaction effect, this means that at some levels of x a strong interaction effect may be present, while at other levels there may be none at all. The result is that a statistically significant interaction effect parameter may reveal an interaction (as detected by plotting the predicted probability), or not—and the same is true for a statistically insignificant effect. Indeed, even the sign of the coefficient may be wrong, indicating that at some levels of the independent variables, the true effect may be positive (while at others, the effect may be negative). In other words, a statistically insignificant interaction effect parameter may obscure that at some levels of the independent variable, a true interaction is present—and it may also not reveal the true direction of the interaction (Berry et al., 2007).

12 I note that including racial resentment as a control makes the models especially robust as it is a powerful predictor of racially conservative policy preferences, and indeed conservative beliefs in general (Kinder & Sanders, 1996).
The second reason is that the interaction coefficient represents the effect on the unbounded index and not on the predicted probability. They are not directly synonymous. As a result, in my analysis I plotted the predicted probabilities even when the interaction effect was not statistically significant. In some cases I find meaningful conditional effects of Black candidates even when the coefficient for the interaction is not significant, or is in “the wrong direction.” Other scholars have also found meaningful changes in predicted probability with nonsignificant interaction parameters (Berry, Berkman, & Schneiderman, 2000).

**Predicted Probabilities**

In order to translate the interaction effects into predicted probabilities, I use the J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese (2005) spost suite of commands for Stata. I estimate the predicted probabilities of voting given the parameters from the logistic regressions, holding the nonracial factors included in the models, the covariates, at their means.

I now turn to report the results of the statistical tests. I begin by considering the impact of the factors of White racial prejudice (White identity, positive White affect, negative Black affect, positive White affect difference, and racial resentment) and White race liberalism (negative White affect, positive Black affect, positive Black affect difference, and racial acceptance) for Whites. I then consider how these factors impact the voting participation of Republicans and Democrats, and then finally conservatives and liberals. I translate the logit parameters into changes in the probability of voting compared to a baseline model in which Whites face no Black candidates, and I estimate how these predicted probabilities vary according to different values of the racial factors.

**Results**

All of the hypotheses are conditional ones: the factors of White racial prejudice and White race liberalism should exhibit stronger effects among Whites facing Black major party Congressional candidates than Whites who do not. As such, the hypotheses call for including interaction terms in the models. For all of the racial factors, I included double or triple interaction effects in which I interacted the factors with having a Black Congressional candidate.

In Table 1 I report the results for the factors of White racial prejudice among all Whites, White Democrats, White Republicans, and White conservatives. In all of the tables I bolded the interaction effect I report results for. Starting with all

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13 Due to space restrictions, I cannot report all of the results here. I note, however, that for the factors of racial prejudice, positive White affect and negative Black affect produced very similar results to those reported here for positive White affect difference. Also, for the factors of White race liberalism, the factors of positive Black affect and negative White affect produced very similar results to those reported here for positive Black affect difference.
### Table 1. Logistic Regression: Black Congressional Candidates Conditioning the Effects of White Racial Prejudice on the Electoral Participation of Whites, 1988, 1992, and 2000

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<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.86**</td>
<td>-3.93**</td>
<td>-2.69**</td>
<td>-4.3**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.99)</td>
<td>(.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black candidate</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.39)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White id</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive White affect difference</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial resentment</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Black candidate × Positive White affect difference × White id

Black candidate × White id × Racial resentment

Black candidate × White id

Black candidate × Positive White affect difference

Positive White affect difference × White id

White id × Racial resentment

---

**Bolded coefficients indicate the main interaction effect of interest for the model.**

**Notes:**
- Coefficients are estimated from a logistic regression model.
- Bolded coefficients indicate the main interaction effect of interest for the model.
- Results control for education, income, age, employment status, marital status, homeownership, strong partisanship, ideological identification, efficacy, political interest, political knowledge, party affect, candidate affect, concern for the election outcome, years living in one’s community, church attendance, contacted by a political party, the perceived closeness of the election, racial resentment (racial acceptance), positive White affect difference, White identity, the percent of the respondent’s census tract that is Black, whether or not the respondent lived in the South, the number of Black interest groups registered to lobby the state government, the percent of the seats in the respondent’s state legislature held by Blacks, the closeness of the Congressional election outcome, the closeness of the state-level Presidential election outcome, the number of days the respondent watched TV, and the number of days the respondent read the newspaper, and the Congressional candidate’s incumbency status. Year dummies for 1988 and 1992 were included as well.

---

**Results:**
- **Pseudo R²**
  - Whites: 0.28
  - Rep.: 0.28
  - Dem.: 0.23
  - Con.: 0.28
  - 1025
  - 1025
  - 1025
  - 1025
  - 1025
  - 1025

---

**Significance Levels:**
- **p < .01, *p < .05.**
Whites, and based on the interaction effect parameter alone, I find that the interaction effect of Black candidates with White identity did not increase Whites’ voting participation. However, the results for the interaction effect between the Black candidate, White identity, and positive White affect difference indicates an increase in voting participation (p < .01). There is a similar effect among White conservatives (p < .05). However, the remaining interaction effects of interest do not indicate any statistically significant relationships. While the triple interaction between the Black candidate, White identity, and positive White affect difference is statistically significant for all Whites, it is not for White Republicans. The interaction for White Democrats between the Black candidate variable and positive White affect difference is also not statistically significant. Finally, two results for White conservatives are not statistically significant: one for the interaction between the Black candidate variable, White identity, and positive White affect difference; and, the other for racial resentment in elections with Black Congressional candidates.

While these nonsignificant interaction effects indicate that these factors are not cued by a Black candidate to increase voting participation, the predicted probability plots reveal that there are actually positive effects on the predicted probability for some values of these interactions. This is consistent with Berry et al. (2007). Turning to the plots of the predicted probabilities will clarify this.

The Black candidate variable can take on three possible values that reflect the number of Black candidates voters encountered in the general election: 0, 1 (either the Democrat or the Republican), or 2 (both the Democrat and the Republican). As a result, the predicted probability of Whites voting can be calculated for the cases in which the Black candidate variable is one or two. In Figure 1, I plot the change in the predicted probability of voting among Whites facing a Black Congressional candidate given White identity and also the interaction between White identity and positive White affect difference. The y-axis reflects the change in the predicted probability of voting when Whites faced Black candidates, given the racial factor, compared to the impact of the racial factor when Whites did not face Black candidates. The x-axis reflects the range of the White identity variable, or the range of the identity and affect interaction. The x-axis breaks these variables down into deciles, among the Whites in elections with Black candidates. While the ANES measured White identity dichotomously, I increased the value of White identity in increments of .10 (from 0 to 1) for the purpose of estimating the predicted probability plot. For example, the 10% decile involves setting the value of the White identity to .10 among those Whites in elections with Black candidates. For the double interaction, the 10% represents those Whites in the lowest 10% of the distribution of the interaction.

I plot the change in the voting probability, indicating where that change was statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence (i.e., at the p < .05 level of significance). The line is dotted where the result is not statistically significant, and
the line is full where the result is. I estimated the predicted probability plots for the cases in which Whites faced two Black candidates, and in which they faced one.

I turn now to the results. In Figure 1, I plot the changes in the predicted probabilities of voting among all Whites, given changes in White identity, and changes in the interaction of White identity with positive White affect difference. Both produce statistically significant changes in the predicted probability of Whites voting, whether they faced one or two Black Congressional candidates. For the Black candidate interaction with White identity, given two Black candidates, the increase in the predicted probability of voting becomes significant at the 60th decile, continuing to the 100th. At the 60th decile White identity increases the probability of voting about 13% and increases to 17% by the 100th decile. For the same interaction with one Black candidate, the increase becomes significant at the 80th decile, continuing to the 100th, for an increase from 10% to 12%.

The results for the triple interactions between Black candidates, White identity, and the positive White affect difference are also presented in Figure 1. The increases in the interaction, in this case, represent the division of the positive White affect difference variable among White identifiers in elections with one or two Black candidates. With two Black candidates the statistically significant effect begins at the 50th decile, and with one Black candidate it begins at the 40th decile. The increase in the predicted probability of voting ranges from 17% to 24% with two Black candidates and from 11% to 24% when Whites encounter one Black candidate.

Figure 1. All Whites: White Identity and Positive White Affect Difference among White Identifiers.
Regarding Figure 1, it appears that the largest increase in the predicted probability of voting occurs with the identity by affect interaction, when Whites face two candidates. The smallest increase appears to be among Whites with White identity in campaigns with one Black candidate. The difference between these results, however, is not statistically significant; only the difference from no change is statistically significant. Thus, these differences, as with the other differences between the changes in predicted probabilities across the figures, are more apparent than real.

I continue reporting results from Table 1 in Figure 2. Figure 2 displays the changes in the predicted probability of voting given factors of White racial prejudice for White Republicans and White Democrats. For White Republicans, the interaction between identity and positive White affect difference increases voting participation, while for White Democrats, it is the positive White affect difference operating alone. Beginning with the White Republicans, the result becomes statistically significant at the 50th decile with two candidates, and at the 30th decile with one. The probability of voting increases from 17% to 18% with two candidates, and from 22% to 25% with one. Turning to White Democrats, two Black candidates bring positive White affect difference into statistical significance at the 60th decile, while for one Black candidate the result becomes significant at the 50th decile. For two Black candidates the range in the increase in the probability of voting is from 16 to 22%, and for one Black candidate from 13 to 21%.

**Figure 2.** White Republicans and White Democrats: White Identity with Positive White Affect Difference, and Positive White Affect Difference.
In Figure 3 I round-out the probabilities of voting generated from Table 1. Figure 3 reports results solely for White conservatives. I find two triple interactions with the Black candidate variable that increase the predicted probability of voting: White identity by racial resentment, and White identity by positive White affect difference. Both factors matter for either one or two Black candidates. For the interaction between White identity and racial resentment, the increase in the probability becomes significant at the 90th decile when White conservatives encountered either one or two Black candidates. In both cases, the increase in the probability of voting is 12%. For the White identity and positive White affect difference term, the increases in the probability of voting become significant at the 30th decile with either one or two Black candidates. When White conservatives face two Black candidates, the increase in the predicted probability of voting on Election Day ranges from 22 to 26%, and the increase for one Black candidate ranges from 20 to 25%.

These results conclude reporting from Table 1, for the factors of White race prejudice. Table 2 reports the effects of the White race liberal factors on White voting participation among all Whites, White Democrats, and White liberals. Among all Whites, racial acceptance, coupled with positive Black affect difference, predicts higher participation when cued by a Black Congressional candidate. Conversely, racial acceptance seems to predict lower White voting participation among all Whites when cued by a Black candidate. For Democrats, the interaction coefficient between the Black candidate and positive Black affect difference predicts higher voting participation, and for liberals, racial acceptance may predict
lower voting participation. None of the results for those coefficients are statistically significant. I turn now to the predicted probability plots to ascertain the effects on the changes in the predicted probability of voting.

Figure 4 displays the first probability plots for the White race liberal factors. This figure reveals that racial acceptance, and racial acceptance interacted with positive Black affect difference, produce some increases in the predicted probabilities of voting among all Whites. These increases occur in the lower values of the factors, with the magnitude of the increases becoming smaller as Whites have higher values of the factors. The factor of racial acceptance increases the prob-

### Table 2. Logistic Regression: Black Congressional Candidates Conditioning the Effects of White Race Liberalism on the Electoral Participation of Whites, 1988, 1992, and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All Whites</th>
<th>Dem.</th>
<th>Lib.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>-4.57**</td>
<td>-4.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.43)</td>
<td>(.93)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Black candidate</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.18*</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.66)</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
<td>(.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial acceptance</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Black affect difference</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td>(.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black candidate × Racial acceptance × Positive Black affect difference</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black candidate × Racial acceptance</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black candidate × Positive Black affect difference</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial acceptance × Positive Black affect difference</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01, *p < .05.

Results control for education, income, age, employment status, marital status, homeownership, strong partisanship, ideological identification, efficacy, political interest, political knowledge, party affect, candidate affect, concern for the election outcome, years living in one’s community, church attendance, contacted by a political party, the perceived closeness of the election, racial resentment (racial acceptance), positive Black affect difference, White identity, the percent of the respondent’s census tract that is Black, whether or not the respondent lived in the South, the number of Black interest groups registered to lobby the state government, the percent of the seats in the respondent’s state legislature held by Blacks, the closeness of the Congressional election outcome, the closeness of the state-level Presidential election outcome, the number of days the respondent watched TV, and the number of days the respondent read the newspaper, and the Congressional candidate’s incumbency status. Year dummies for 1988 and 1992 were included as well. **Bolded coefficients indicate the main interaction effect of interest for the model.**
ability of voting participation when cued by two Black candidates, starting at the lowest decile, and continuing to the 80th. When cued by one Black candidate, the increase again starts at the lowest decile and ceases to be significant at the 50th. The ranges of the increase in the probabilities of voting begin at 22% and decrease to 17% with two Black candidates, and begin at 13% and decrease to 9% given one Black candidate.

In Figure 5 I report the corresponding results for White Democrats and White liberals. For White Democrats, either one or two Black candidates cue positive Black affect difference to increase the predicted probability of voting. Two Black candidates begin the significant increase in the probability of participation at the 70th positive Black affect difference decile, while one Black candidate begins it at the 80th. The range for two Black candidates is from 11 to 12%, and for one Black candidate it is from 14 to 16%.

For White liberals, two Black candidates cue racial acceptance, but one Black candidate does not produce any statistically significant change in the predicted probability of voting. The increase in the probability of voting begins at the lowest decile, and continues to the 40th. At the lowest decile the increase in the probability of voting is 14%, and it decreases to 13% at the 40th decile, before dropping into statistical insignificance.

I now turn to the table for the results concerning how these factors might interact with whether Black candidates are incumbents or nonincumbents (challengers, or candidates for an open seat). I report these results in Table 3. As was the
case with Table 2, none of the results are statistically significant at the p < .05 level. I start with the factors of White racial prejudice, and I report two results for all Whites: the triple interaction between Black candidate, nonincumbent candidate, and positive White affect difference; and, the triple interaction between Black candidate, nonincumbent candidate, and White identity. Both coefficients are positive.

I also find a White prejudice interaction among White Democrats. Nonincumbent candidate and Black candidate impact voting among White Democrats when interacted with positive White affect difference. The coefficient from this model, however, suggests that the affect actually decreases voting participation among this group. Turning to the predicted probability plot will clarify this result.

Table 3 reports results for the White race liberal factors as well. Among all Whites, the coefficient for the interaction with racial acceptance indicates an increase in voting participation. I find two results for White Democrats: positive Black affect difference may increase their participation, while the interaction with racial acceptance may decrease it. The results for White conservatives and White liberals follow those for White Democrats, with the interaction between the Black candidate, challenger candidate, and racial acceptance, seemingly decreasing voting participation among these two White subgroups.

I now turn to the final set of predicted probability plots to bring clarity and specificity to the results as suggested by Table 3. First, however, I clarify the meaning of the interaction between the Black candidate and nonincumbent

---

**Figure 5.** White Democrats and White Liberals: Positive Black Affect Difference and Racial Acceptance.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−4.07**</td>
<td>−4.02**</td>
<td>−4.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.50)</td>
<td>(.51)</td>
<td>(.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black candidate</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonincumbent candidate</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>−.24</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.40)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Prejudice Factors**

Positive White affect difference
-0.00 0.00 −0.00
(.00) (.00) (.01)
White id
.27* .13 .34
(.12) (.13) (.22)
Black candidate × Nonincumbent candidate × Positive White affect difference
.03 −.02
(.03) (.08)
Black candidate × Positive White affect difference
−.01 −.04
(.02) (.02)
Black candidate × White id
.01
(.79)
Nonincumbent × Positive White affect difference
−.00 −.01
(.01) (.01)
Nonincumbent × White id
.83**
(.27)
Nonincumbent candidate × Black candidate
−.15 −.29 .29 −.03 .29 4.08 2.68 1.03
(.57) (.67) (1.41) (1.11) (1.41) (2.66) (2.51) (2.92)

**White Race Liberal Factors**

Positive Black affect difference .00 .01 .01 .00
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.00)
Racial acceptance .13 .05 .05 .35** .05
(.07) (.12) (.13) (.11) (.12)
Black candidate × Nonincumbent × Positive Black affect difference
.02
(.08)
Black candidate × Nonincumbent × Racial acceptance
.02 −1.21 −.76 −.22
(.50) (.76) (.60) (.98)
Black candidate × Positive Black affect difference
.04
(.02)
Black candidate × Racial acceptance
−.04 .03 .01 −.60
(.15) (.32) (.29) (.77)
Nonincumbent × Positive Black affect difference
.01
(.01)
Nonincumbent × Racial acceptance −0.04 .11 −.20 .23
(.14) (.37) (.28) (.28)
N 3306 3306 1024 3306 1024 1024 1025 1339
Pseudo R² .28 .29 .28 .28 .28 .28 .31 .29

**p < .01, *p < .05.**

Results control for education, income, age, employment status, marital status, homeownership, strong partisanship, ideological identification, efficacy, political interest, political knowledge, party affect, candidate affect, concern for the election outcome, years living in one’s community, church attendance, contacted by a political party, the perceived closeness of the election, racial resentment (racial acceptance), positive White or Black affect difference, White identity, the percent of the respondent’s census tract that is Black, whether or not the respondent lived in the South, the number of Black interest groups registered to lobby the state government, the percent of the seats in the respondent’s state legislature held by Blacks, the closeness of the Congressional election outcome, the closeness of the state-level Presidential election outcome, the number of days the respondent watched TV, and the number of days the respondent read the newspaper, and the Congressional candidate’s incumbency status. Year dummies for 1988 and 1992 were included as well. **Bolded coefficients indicate the main interaction effect of interest for the model.**
candidate variables. The Black candidate variable ranges from 0 to 2, and is a simple count of the number of Black candidates in the general Congressional election that a White voter encounters. The nonincumbent candidate variable is dichotomous, coded 0 or 1, with a 1 indicating that the candidate is not an incumbent. In this case, the interaction can take on values of 0, 1 or 2. In the case of 0, White voters encounter no Black candidates. In the case of 1, Whites are in an election with a Black candidate who is not an incumbent. This means the election may be for an open seat, or the opponent may be an incumbent. Also, the race of the opponent is unspecified, but it is not a Black candidate. Finally, in the case of a 2, Whites again are in an election in which a Black candidate is not an incumbent, but in this case both of the candidates are Black. The other Black candidate may or may not be an incumbent. Keeping this in mind, I turn to the results.

Figure 6 reveals the functional forms of the relationships that the factors White identity and positive White affect difference share with the change in the predicted probability of voting among all Whites. For the Black candidate, nonincumbent candidate, and positive White affect difference interaction, higher levels of positive White affect difference lead to higher values of change in the predicted probability of voting. For two Black candidates, the change becomes significant at the 60th decile, ranging from a 13% increase in the predicted probability of voting, to an 18% increase at the 100th decile. For one Black candidate, the increase in the probability of voting begins at the 70th decile, increasing from a 16% change to a 21% change. Remember that these results are different from the
previous results without the nonincumbent variable included in the interaction because these models link the changes in the probability of voting to the presence of a Black candidate who is not an incumbent. The previous results are for effects averaged over Black candidates who are both incumbents and nonincumbents, but these results are for Black nonincumbents specifically.\(^\text{14}\)

The second result from Figure 6 is for White identity. Both one and two Black candidates bring forth statistically significant increases in the probability of voting at the 70th deciles. For two Black candidates, the increase ranges from 17 to 20\%, and for one Black candidate, from 13 to 17\%.

Figure 7 displays the changes in the predicted probabilities of voting for all Whites, White conservatives, and White liberals, given the factor racial acceptance, when cued by Black nonincumbent candidates. For all Whites, both one and two candidates cue racial acceptance to increase the probability of voting.\(^\text{15}\) Higher levels of racial acceptance produce lower changes in the predicted probability of voting among all Whites. However, the initial, lower values of racial acceptance do positively impact voting participation when cued by a Black candidate who is also a nonincumbent. For two Black candidates, the initial increase in the predicted

\(^{14}\) I estimated the effects of the factors interacted with whether or not the Black candidate was an incumbent as well (instead of a nonincumbent), and I found one statistically significant result: the Black candidate by incumbent candidate by racial acceptance variable, for all Whites.

\(^{15}\) I also found this result when I interacted Black candidates, racial acceptance, and an incumbent variable (results not reported but available on request).
The probability of voting is $24\%$ in the lowest decile, decreasing to $19\%$ at the $70^{th}$ decile. For one Black candidate, the lowest decile produces a $16\%$ increase, while the $20^{th}$ decile produces a $15\%$ increase. The changes in the predicted probabilities are then no longer statistically significant.

For White conservatives and White liberals, only two Black candidates, one of whom is also a nonincumbent, cue the factor to increase the predicted probability of voting. For conservatives, the effect begins in the lowest decile with a $42\%$ increase in the predicted probability of voting, dropping to a $40\%$ increase by the $40^{th}$ decile. For liberals, I find an $11\%$ increase in the $10^{th}$ and $20^{th}$ deciles, followed by a drop into statistical nonsignificance.

The final figure, Figure 8, reports results from the Black candidate by nonincumbent candidate interaction for White Democrats. Positive Black affect difference and racial acceptance increases their probabilities of voting, when cued by either one or two candidates. For positive Black affect difference, higher levels of the factor lead to larger changes in the predicted probability of White Democrats voting. One or two Black nonincumbents lead the factor to become significant between the $60^{th}$ and $100^{th}$ deciles, with two Black candidates leading to an increase of $16\%$, and one Black challenger candidate leading to increases between $13$ and $14\%$. For racial acceptance, the statistically significant increases begin in the lowest deciles, and then the sizes of the increases become smaller at higher values of racial acceptance. For two Black nonincumbents, the $10^{th}$ through $80^{th}$ deciles see an increase in the predicted probability of voting of $16\%$, which then declines slightly into a nonsignificant range. One Black candidate also produces an
increase of 16%, but only in the lowest two deciles, then also declining into a statistically nonsignificant range.

Considering all of these results as a whole raises one question—what percent of Whites in Congressional elections with Black candidates experience these voter turnout increases? This question can be addressed by considering the distribution of the sample across the racial prejudice and race liberalism variables. What percent of Whites for each of the factors experiences a statistically significant increase in their voting participation? This question is addressed in Table 4.

In Table 4, I list the statistically significant range of the change in the predicted probability of voting for all Whites and the various White subgroups. The change in the predicted probability of voting that begins with a higher number, and then followed by a lower number (e.g., 25%–20%), indicates that the lower values of the racial factor generated higher voting participation, and that the change in the voting participation decreased as the racial factor had higher values. The last number (20% in this example) is the last statistically significant increase in voting participation. When the change begins with a lower number followed by a higher number (e.g., 10%–14%), then lower values of the racial factor had lower changes in voting, and the changes increased as the value of the racial factor increased.

Most importantly, the table displays the percent of the White sample that was within these statistically significant categories of the racial factors among Whites in elections with Black candidates. For example, for the interaction among all Whites of White identity with positive White affect difference, with two Black candidates, 50% of Whites were within the 17%–24% predicted probability increase range and experienced a statistically significant increase in the probability voting participation. For the result for White identity, I divided White identity into deciles by increasing the value of the variable at .1 increments, and so this consideration of the distribution of Whites is not applicable.

There are four results for which voting participation increased among 80% or more of Whites. First, one can see that the results for the interaction of White identity with the positive White affect difference increased participation among 83% of all Whites when Whites faced one Black candidate. The second result is for racial acceptance among all Whites with two Black candidates. The third and fourth results are for interactions with the Black nonincumbent candidate: racial acceptance with two candidates, among all Whites and White Democrats.

The table lists 27 results (not counting White identity), and more than half of Whites experienced a voting participation increase in 14 of them.

---

For example, from Table 4, the very lowest decile of racial acceptance among all Whites in an election with two Black candidates increases White voting participation by 22%. The lowest statistically significant decile of racial acceptance increases it by 17%. And 94% of the White sample in a Congressional election with at least one Black major party candidate was within these deciles.
### Table 4. Percent of the Sample with Black Congressional Candidates Experiencing a Voting Participation Increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Number of Black candidates</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Statistically significant voting participation increase&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Percent of sample with increased voting participation&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>White identity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All Whites</td>
<td>13%–17%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>White identity × Positive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All Whites</td>
<td>17%–24%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>White affect difference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>11%–24%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>White identity × Positive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>17%–18%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>White affect difference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%–25%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Positive White affect difference</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>16%–22%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>White identity × Racial resentment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>White identity × Positive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>22%–26%</td>
<td>67%</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>White affect difference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>20%–25%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Racial acceptance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All Whites</td>
<td>22%–17%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Racial acceptance × Positive</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>All Whites</td>
<td>26%–17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Black affect difference</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>22%–12%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Positive Black affect difference</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>11%–12%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Racial acceptance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>14%–16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Black affect difference</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>14%–13%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**White prejudice factors**

**Racial acceptance**

1. **Positive Racial acceptance**
   - All Whites: 13%–17% increase
   - Conservatives: 17%–24% increase
   - Liberals: 14%–16% increase

2. **Negative Racial acceptance**
   - All Whites: 12%–18% increase
   - Republicans: 17%–24% increase
   - Democrats: 16%–22% increase

3. **Racial resentment**
   - All Whites: 12%–17% increase
   - Conservatives: 17%–24% increase
   - Liberals: 14%–16% increase

**Racial affect difference**

1. **Positive Racial affect difference**
   - All Whites: 13%–18% increase
   - Republicans: 17%–24% increase
   - Democrats: 16%–22% increase

2. **Negative Racial affect difference**
   - All Whites: 12%–17% increase
   - Republicans: 17%–24% increase
   - Democrats: 16%–22% increase

**White race liberal factors**

**Racial acceptance**

1. **Positive Racial acceptance**
   - All Whites: 12%–18% increase
   - Conservatives: 17%–24% increase
   - Liberals: 14%–16% increase

2. **Negative Racial acceptance**
   - All Whites: 12%–17% increase
   - Republicans: 17%–24% increase
   - Democrats: 16%–22% increase

**Nonincumbent candidate interactions: Prejudice**

1. **Positive Black affect difference**
   - All Whites: 13%–18% increase
   - Republicans: 17%–24% increase
   - Democrats: 16%–22% increase

**Nonincumbent candidate interactions: White race liberal factors**

1. **Positive Racial acceptance**
   - All Whites: 24%–19% increase
   - Conservatives: 42%–40% increase
   - Liberals: 11% increase

2. **Positive Black affect difference**
   - All Whites: 16% increase
   - Republicans: 13%–14% increase
   - Democrats: 16% increase

3. **Racial acceptance**
   - All Whites: 13%–17% increase
   - Conservatives: 17%–20% increase
   - Liberals: 16% increase

4. **Racial affect difference**
   - All Whites: 16% increase
   - Republicans: 16% increase
   - Democrats: 16% increase

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<sup>a</sup>The range of the increase in the predicted probability of voting that is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. Sometimes the increase occurs over declining values of the factor, such that low levels of the factor produce the positive change in voting probability, with the degree of the increase declining at higher levels of the factor. For example, for Whites facing two Black candidates, racial acceptance increased the probability of voting 22%. This decreased to a 17% increase at higher levels of racial acceptance.

<sup>b</sup>The percent of Whites in the sample in districts with one or two Black candidates who experienced a statistically significant increase in the predicted probability of voting at the 95% level of confidence.

### Discussion

These findings confirm that even in our contemporary, post-civil rights era, racial group interests compete in politics, seemingly because Black candidates...
remind Whites that they have racial group interests at stake in elections. The Black candidates cue identity, affect, and attitudes among all Whites, as well as White Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, to increase voting participation. The result is that voting participation becomes racialized, and the most widely available form of political participation, the only form of political participation in which all citizens have an equal opportunity to participate, becomes an avenue where racial group interests compete.\footnote{Some may wonder how these factors operate in the traditional context of a White Democrat facing a White Republican in a Congressional election. I replicated all of the models and plotted predicted probabilities for White major party candidate elections and found that none of the racial factors were statistically significant causes of voting participation (results not presented but available upon request from the author).}

It is worth considering the magnitudes of the increases of the voting probabilities. The magnitudes of the increases are usually between 10\% and 20\%, with the 95\% confidence interval tending to indicate that the true value in the population would be between 5\% and 25\% (these results not reported but available upon request). Compared to the increases in the predicted probability of voting given the “standard” causes of voting participation, as estimated by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), these are effects of moderate to large magnitude. For example, the authors find that age causes the greatest total increase in the predicted probability of voting of 29\% (Rosenstone & Hansen, 273). Education increases the predicted probability of voting by 17\% (Rosenstone & Hansen, 273). While the race-related impacts on the predicted probability of voting is less than these factors, the racial cueing I find tends to have the same magnitude as factors such as external efficacy and the strength of party identification, and more of an impact than factors such as being contacted by a political party or being a homeowner.

This indicates that the magnitudes of the increases are substantive. The Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) finding for political party contact was heralded as a powerful way that parties engage the electorate. Among the Whites who face Congressional campaigns with Black major party candidates, the increases in voting participation occur at an even greater magnitude than being contacted by a political party. The group dynamics that such campaigns engage are indeed powerful. As a percentage of the total electorate, the share of the White electorate in such Congressional elections is small, but the implications for Black Representation may be dramatic depending on how these turnout patterns play themselves out at the ballot box.\footnote{How do these factors affect vote choice? Such a question must be answered by a different model, and thus qualifies as a different research project. Some scholars find that voters’ racial attitudes affect their votes for Black candidates (e.g., Bullock & Dunn, 1999; Gay, 1997; Reeves, 1997; Terkildsen, 1993; Washington, 2006), while others do not (Bullock, 2000; Citrin et al., 1990; Highton, 2004; Voss & Lublin, 2001). Another relevant question is how these patterns of turnout and vote choice play out in majority-minority districts versus majority-White districts. This topic is also under analysis for a separate manuscript.}
That said, these results suggest that Black candidates can mobilize “both sides” of a racial divide. Both the White prejudice factors, as well as the White race liberal factors, affect White voting participation in elections with Black Congressional candidates. I found that the factors of White prejudice were cued by Black candidates to impact voting participation among all Whites, as well as White Republicans and White conservatives. Interestingly, however, I found that White racial prejudice factors were also cued among White Democrats to increase voting participation. I further discovered that the factors of White race liberalism impacted electoral participation among all Whites, White Democrats, and White liberals. This is evidence that the “ideological divide” on race does not operate equally for prejudice and White race liberalism. At least as it relates to the cueing of these factors to impact voting participation, it appears that these White race liberal factors are simply more salient to Democrats and liberals, while the White racial prejudice factors are equally salient to Republicans and Democrats.

The Number of Black Candidates, Party, and Incumbency Status

One glaring point to address is that while I hypothesized that two Black candidates would cause the factors of White racial prejudice to predict either no increase in the predicted probability of voting, or a decrease, the findings here indicate that two candidates produce what is essentially the same increase in the predicted probability of voting as one Black candidate does. I note that for the factors of White prejudice, the magnitudes of the increase tend to be smaller when cued by two candidates, rather than one. Of course, I view these differences as merely suggested and not definite, because they are not statistically different from each other. However, this result does indicate that when it comes to Congressional elections, prejudiced Whites are really cued by Black Democrats. This suggests that prejudiced Whites’ group-centric thinking and feeling is cued by the perceived threat of the Democratic candidate. Black Democrats, after all, are those candidates most perceived to support government action to act against White racism.

This supposition cannot be directly confirmed by the analysis presented here, but there are two pieces of evidence that indirectly suggest this is the case. The first I have already mentioned: that the increases in the probabilities of voting are generally higher for one Black candidate, rather than two. This may indicate that the Black Democrat cues the racial thinking among Whites, but that the presence of two Black candidates leads some portion of prejudiced Whites to drop out on Election Day because they perceive that they don’t have an outlet for their racial motivations. The second piece of evidence comes from an analysis not reported here but available upon request. I analyzed all Whites, interacting the factors of White racial prejudice with a variable for Black Democratic candidates, and another for Black Republican candidates. The results for Black Democratic candidates are consistent with the results I report here, while the results for Black...
Republican candidates indicate that the effects are small in magnitude, and only occasionally statistically significant.¹⁹

I also find that the factors of racial prejudice and White race liberalism cue White voting participation more strongly when Black candidates are nonincumbents—challengers, or in open seats. The Black candidate by nonincumbent candidate interaction increased the predicted probability of voting when interacted with the factors of positive White affect difference (for all Whites and White Democrats) and White identity (for all Whites). The candidate by nonincumbent double interaction also increased the probabilities of voting when interacted with racial acceptance (for all Whites, White Democrats, White conservatives, and White liberals) and positive Black affect difference (for White Democrats). Finding these results as significant for the interaction with the nonincumbent candidate, but not the incumbent candidate, indicates that the effects of the factors are stronger when Whites face nonincumbent candidates.

Possible Challenges to the Findings

On another note, these results should not be digested without considering some possible challenges to the findings. First, might the political mobilization or empowerment of the Black community serve as a confounding factor? There is a relationship between the size of a Black community, how politically active it is, and the number of Black elected officials (Browning et al., 1986). It is possible that the real effect being observed here is that due to a politically active Black community. I have tried to address these concerns by incorporating variables into the models as statistical controls. First, the models control for the size of the Black community at the census-tract level. This is a control for racial threat, as well as a control for Black empowerment, because the size of the Black community is associated with Black activism (Browning et al., 1986). Second, the models control for two state-level variables: the number of Black interest groups that lobby the state government, and the percent of seats in the state legislature held by Blacks. These are good controls in the sense that they are indicators of Black political mobilization. They are less than ideal controls, however, because they do not control for Black empowerment at the Congressional District level.

As a second caveat, earlier I argued for the minimal cue hypothesis: that the race of the candidate is all that is necessary to trigger racialized thinking and behaviors among Whites. The reality, of course, is more complicated. For one,

¹⁹ The interaction between the Black Republican candidate and prejudice factors resulting in infrequent changes to the predicted probability of voting indicates that when Whites face Black Republican candidates and White Democrats, the prejudice factors cease to add or subtract from the predicted probability of voting, compared to the baseline model. The results for the increased predicted probability of voting when White race liberals face two Black candidates supports my hypothesis that they remain engaged by the Black Democratic candidate. The interaction between the White race liberal factors and the Black Republican candidate dummy variable did not affect the predicted probability of voting, which is also consistent with my hypothesis.
almost all of the Black candidates in the analysis here are Democrats. Black Democrats tend to be perceived as being more liberal than White Democrats due to their race (McDermott, 1998)—although I do control for the respondents’ ideological identification. In addition, another concern would be that in these types of elections the candidates employ racial messages to cue the racial attitudes of the electorate in an attempt to gain an electoral edge. If this is the case, the effects observed here would be from the racial cueing of campaign messages, and not due to the race of the candidates themselves.

Do racialized campaigns represent an uncontrolled-for confound? Most Congressional elections involving Black candidates take part in noncompetitive districts that are either majority Black districts, or safe, majority Democratic districts (e.g., Gay, 2001). These safe districts typically involve campaigns with only the lowest levels of spending and lacking campaign messages. Thus, these observed effects must be due to the race of the candidate. Also, if racial messages are associated with the closeness of the elections’ outcomes (which they must be), this closeness is controlled for in the model with the respondents’ own self-assessments of the closeness, as well as the actual closeness of the outcome.

Relating this Study to Past Political Science Research

Given these findings, it is worth setting these results in the context of the political science literature on race and electoral politics. One relevant literature regards Black mayors and their effects on Whites (Bobo & Gilliam, 1990; Hajnal, 2001, 2007). Bobo and Gilliam (1990) find that under Black mayors, Whites pay less attention to politics and learn less politically, but that their trust, efficacy, and political participation are unaffected. Hajnal (2001, 2007) finds that Black mayors have stronger effects on Whites: they reduce negative Black affect and racial resentment, but not racial threat. These beneficial effects, however, only occur among Democrats and Independents. Among Republicans, there is a backlash, whereby negative Black affect and racial resentment are increased among this group. Also worth mentioning is that while the reduction in racial resentment is considerable, the size of the reduction of negative Black affect is only a few degrees of the feeling thermometer.

According to the Almanac of American Politics data for all of the Congressional elections in the Presidential election years from 1988 to 2000, winners of Congressional elections without Blacks won by 36% on average, while Black victors who ran against non-Blacks won by 59% on average (Barone & Ujifusa, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001). There were only six Congressional elections during these years with two Black candidates, and in those elections the victor won 27% of the vote, on average. The median spending in elections without Blacks was $628,000, with one Black candidate was $383,000, and with two Black candidates was $660,000. These statistics demonstrate that elections with one Black candidate tend to be low-stimulus affairs. Elections with two Black candidates, however, while very rare, involve both higher spending and closer outcomes than the elections without Black candidates.
The other relevant literature is that on race and voting behavior. As I noted in footnote 18, some scholars find that White racial attitudes affect vote choice with Black candidates, while others do not. Among those who do not, one prominent study is Citrin, Green, and Sears (1990). These scholars study a California gubernatorial election featuring the African American mayor of Los Angeles Tom Bradley, and they find that the election result was not more racialized than many other contests on the same ballot featuring White Democrats. However, they do find evidence of racialized voting in the election for California’s state superintendent of schools, which also featured an African American candidate. That election was different from the gubernatorial election because it was a low-stimulus affair, meaning that the racial cue had a stronger impact among Whites than it would have if it had been reduced by the information from a high visibility political campaign. In this respect, Citrin, Green, and Sears (1990) support the findings here: racial cues can be strong in low-stimulus elections, such as the ones for the House of Representatives.

Conclusion

I find that in campaigns featuring a Black major party candidate for Congress, the candidate’s race can cue racial identity, affect, and cognition, increasing White individuals’ voting participation. This is the first such empirical finding. The candidates from the Congressional elections of 1988, 1992, and 2000 cued the factors of White race liberalism, as well as the factors of White racial prejudice. The White race prejudice factors I report results for here are White identity, positive White affect difference, and racial resentment. The White race liberal factors I report results for here are positive Black affect difference and racial acceptance (the rejection of racial resentment). I observe the effects on changes in the predicted probabilities of voting for the White racial prejudice factors among all Whites, White Republicans, White Democrats, and White conservatives. I observe similar changes for the White race liberal factors among all Whites, White Democrats, and White liberals. The overall magnitudes of the effects of the racial prejudice and White race liberal factors on the predicted probability of voting among Whites is generally of a moderate to large magnitude when compared to other factors known to affect turnout. The average increase in the probability of voting is usually around 15–20%. In addition, it appears that the effects on the predicted probabilities of voting tend to occur in contests with either Black challengers, or in open seats.

Most recently, race has been brought to the center stage of American politics with the election of Barack Obama as President. The results here suggest that because of the high-stimulus nature of the Presidential election, the role of race in voting participation may have been muted by all of the other considerations made salient by the 2008 Presidential campaign. Other factors, however, may have worked to increase the role of the factors I investigate here. The historic nature of
electing the first Black President may have triggered group threat among the White identifiers, which would have made White identity, racial affect, and racial threat all salient (as well as all of the White race liberal factors). I find here that the racial factors of identity and affect operate most strongly in Congressional elections where the Black candidate runs against an incumbent, or for an open seat. Obviously, not only was Barack Obama not the incumbent President, but he was the first Black to be a serious contender for President. A careful analysis of data from the 2008 election will be required to discover which factors were stronger—the factors limiting the role of race in 2008, or the factors strengthening it.

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REFERENCES


