How Our Life Experiences Affect Our Politics: The Roles of Vested Interest and Affect in Shaping Policy Preferences

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Correction to Prysby and Watkins
“Change in Southern Congressional Elections, 2004-2008”

Two formatting errors were made in the Fall-Winter 2010-2011 issue (Volume 31) for Tables 4 and 5 of Change in Southern Congressional Elections, 2004-2008 by Charles Prysby and Katherine Watkins. For Table 4, the coefficients for two of the variables (“Change in Democratic campaign expenditure, 2004-2008” and “Change in Republican campaign expenditure, 2004-2008”) appear in the first column, under the heading Model 1, but these entries should be in the second column, under Model 2.

The correct title for Table 5 is “Regression Analysis of Change in Congressional Campaign Spending, 2004-2008.” The correct note for that table should read “Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the change in the campaign spending by the designated party in the district from 2004 to 2008. Vote percentages are measured as percentages of the two-party vote, and the congressional vote is adjusted as explained earlier. Change in the campaign expenditure is measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars and is adjusted as explained earlier. The loss or gain of incumbent by either party measures whether there was a change in the incumbency situation of a seat between 2004 and 2008. See the text for details on these variables.”

We apologize for the errors.

Andrew Dowdle
Editor, American Review of Politics
How Our Life Experiences Affect Our Politics: The Roles of Vested Interest and Affect in Shaping Policy Preferences

Gregory A. Petrow and Timothy Vercellotti

Scholars investigating the role of self-interest in determining policy preferences find that self-interest has weak effects. However, researchers have refined their concepts of self-interest and are now finding a greater role for it (e.g., Crano 1995). We continue along this line of research, considering different mechanisms by which self-interest may come to be important. We argue that measuring people’s perceived self-interest in a policy (which we call vested interest) is important for understanding how people pursue their self-interest. We find that while life circumstances can cause people to endorse vested interest, emotion is an important mediator of this relationship. Finally, we test the notion that value change mediates between vested interest and support for a policy, and find evidence for a reciprocal relationship.

If asked in casual conversation, most scholars knowledgeable about political behavior would downplay the connection between individuals’ life events and their politics. In all likelihood, however, that conclusion would probably be met with skepticism by the other conversation participants. Indeed, the simple and intuitive relationship between people’s experiences, self interest, and their politics forms the bedrock of democratic theory (e.g., Hamilton et al. 1961). Much of the relevant literature, however, concludes there is no relationship between self-interest and policy preferences. Instead, scholars usually find that symbolic attitudes, such as political ideology, have the most consistent and powerful effects (see Sears and Funk 1991 for a review).1

There is a developing literature, however, that is exploring the link between self-interest and policy attitudes (e.g., Crano 1995). This paper advances that literature and takes a step toward explaining how the events that befall people affect their political attitudes. While the effects of these events on policy preferences might operate through a variety of mechanisms, we argue that people’s perceived self-interest (which we and other scholars label “vested interest”) is an important factor to consider. In other words, we propose a model of how events in people’s lives cause them to believe that certain public policies are in their self-interest, thus increasing support for...
those policies. We call those life-changing events the *antecedents of self-interest*.

We refer to two literatures in building our theory. First, we consider the symbolic politics literature. Scholars in this literature demonstrate the powerful and consistent relationship between people’s symbolic predispositions and policy preferences, while at the same time emphasizing the weak relationship between people’s life circumstances (as manifested by their self-interest) and their policy preferences. Second, the vested interest literature attempts to buttress the modest role allowed for life events by explaining that when people perceive that certain public policies are in their self-interest, they support those policies (e.g., Crano 1995). The crucial difference between the two literatures is in conceptualizing, and then measuring, self-interest.

In the symbolic politics research, scholars assume that certain circumstances ought to routinely produce self-interest. For example, someone lacking health insurance should support a national health care program, or someone whose child is bused across town should oppose school busing to desegregate schools. In the vested interest literature, however, self-interest is seen as a psychological process that varies between individuals. The vested interest literature explores how antecedents of self-interest lead some people to perceive that certain policies are in their self-interest, thus increasing support for the policy.

In addition, we introduce a provocative hypothesis—that when people believe they will benefit from a certain policy, that belief causes individuals to change their political values in a way that is consistent with support for the policy. We further expect that emotion will mediate the relationships between the antecedents of self-interest and their vested interest, as well as the antecedents of self-interest and policy preferences.

In this paper we develop a model that incorporates the antecedents of self-interest, vested interest, political values, and emotion as predictors of preferences for public policy. We test the model using a specific policy—a government-backed national health insurance program. We chose national health insurance because health care costs constitute a growing proportion of household expenditures, and the percentage of the adult, non-elderly population in the United States that lacks health insurance has risen steadily in recent years (Holahan and Cook 2005).

This paper seeks to advance the literature in three important ways. First, we consider the mechanism by which people’s changing life circumstances—which we term antecedents of self-interest—might affect a policy preference. We, like others, expect them to affect vested interest (e.g., Boninger et al. 1995). In turn, we expect that the effect of vested interest can be mediated by a change in an important symbolic predisposition—the
political value that is associated in citizens’ minds with the public policy. If we find evidence for this relationship, it will be a radical change in scholars’ understanding of how political values operate in influencing policy preferences.

Second, we take these models out of the domain of the purely cognitive to consider affect. We predict that life events that evoke self-interest and group interest also will generate emotions that influence vested interest and policy preferences.

Third, we test the causal direction of two key sets of variables—vested interest and political values. Scholars to date have rejected the possibility that political values, which are considered long-enduring predispositions, can be affected by self-interest (Sears and Funk 1991), but we argue here for a chance to test this assumption. We accept that symbolic and abstract beliefs serve as stable guiding principles, but we seek to tell a more complete story that involves conditions under which people may adjust their beliefs in response to life circumstances.

**Theory and Hypotheses**

The theoretical model is displayed in Figure 1. We view the antecedents of self-interest as the beginning of the causal chain in the model. The point of the study is to understand how people’s changing life circumstances prompt them to perceive that certain public policies are in their self-interest, thus causing them to hold a vested interest. These situations stimulate affect, which we predict mediates between the antecedents of self-interest and vested interest. Taken broadly, different types of antecedents of self-interest will stimulate different emotions.

We believe that situations that lead to someone not being able to pay his or her medical bills will cause anxiety. This hypothesis is consistent with the work of Ortony et al. (1988), who considered anxiety to be a “fear emotion” that results when one is displeased about the prospect of an undesirable event. Certainly, not being able to pay medical bills would lead to deep dread, as one’s health care can be denied, and many even have to file for bankruptcy after not being able to pay resulting debts. Thus we predict that:

**Hypothesis 1:** Antecedents of self-interest increase anxiety about paying for health care.

Broadly speaking, anxiety has several effects, mainly causing greater processing of information and learning. Political scientists find this effect in political campaigns (Marcus et al. 2000; MacKuen et al. 2007), when people search the Internet during political campaigns (Valentino et al. 2008;
Valentino et al. 2009), and to a limited extent during the run-up to the War in Iraq (Huddy et al. 2007). However, the role of anxiety is clearly, to some extent, contextual. People anxious about a presidential candidate are more interested in the campaign, but only those people high in internal efficacy (Rudolph et al. 2000). Anxiety may only promote learning if people believe they can overcome the threats they face (Nadeau et al. 1995). Too much anxiety can limit processing, and learning, because people engage in avoidance behaviors (LeDoux 1996; Panskepp 1998). After people have chosen a candidate in an election, anxiety about that candidate only leads to more learning when people discover unsettling information about the person, and then the learning only occurs about that candidate (Redlawsk et al. 2007). In the aftermath of 9/11, the anxious did not learn more about the situation compared to the non-anxious, nor did they in the run-up to the War in Iraq (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Huddy et al. 2007).

Despite these limitations to the role of anxiety, there is still clearly a general relationship between greater anxiety and more information processing. However, even more important for this project is the finding that increased information-seeking displaces the dominant role usually played by people’s long-standing symbolic predispositions, such as partisanship or ideological identification (Marcus et al. 2000; MacKuen et al. 2007).

The consequence of the greater processing is that people become thoughtful regarding the threat they face. They come to focus on the threat. The result is that people will give thought to solutions to their problems, and
in the process, they are more likely to see a national health care program as a political solution. This would be the result because some will come to see that the policy will benefit them. These cognitive effects lead us to predict that anxiety will cause people to perceive they have a vested interest in the public policy. This is a result of anxiety prompting individuals to pay closer attention to relevant information, which then informs their views, as well as softens their commitment to their predispositions. We expect that:

**Hypothesis 2:** Anxiety increases vested interest concerning health care.

**The Role of Political Values**

Turning to the theoretical model as displayed in Figure 1, the vested interest may then affect the political value by prompting individuals to align their value to be consistent with their vested interest. This is a position at odds with what we call the “consensus view” of political values. Scholars with this view argue that values are learned through an uncritical socialization process in childhood, and that values are guiding principles that shape subordinate attitudes, but not vice-versa (e.g., Sears and Funk 1999, Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). A core claim of the “consensus view” is that self-interest never affects values (Sears and Funk 1991; see also Eagly and Chaiken 1998).

However, an alternative view is that values often are truisms with little cognitive support. They are composed of affect and behavioral associations (that is, value-consistent behaviors). Thus, if life circumstances are sufficiently powerful, people may reexamine their limited cognitive support for values and thus change their values (Maio and Olson 1998; Bernard et al. 2003). Scholars have shown that values only affect choices and behaviors when they are cognitively activated and central to one’s self-concept (Verplanken and Hollard 2002). McCann (1997) argues that values are not more stable than other attitudes. Furthermore, Boninger et al. (1995) find that self-interest causes people to think of their political values, and Baron and Leshner (2000) find that protected values are amenable to change when challenged. Some of the most recent work on the malleability of political values finds that partisanship affects the political values people endorse, but not vice-versa (Goren 2005).

A consideration of the cognition of attitudes reveals how these values might, in fact, be changed when individuals consider their self-interest. One way that values and self-interest can become associated is if they are embedded attitudes in an associative network. Attitude embeddedness is the degree to which attitudes are associated with other attitudes (Prisline and
Ouellette 1996). For those in the American electorate struggling with health care costs, we may expect that their values, self interest and support for national health insurance are embedded with one another because highly embedded attitudes are associated with the experience one has with an attitude object and with attitude-related knowledge (Prisline and Ouellette 1996). For those facing major medical bills, the personal benefit to them of national health insurance may become apparent. Because their political values are embedded in the same cognitive structures as policy preferences, they would align their relevant values (for which they have little cognitive support) to maintain cognitive consistency with their policy preference (Eagly and Chaiken 1998).

We believe two core political values may be important for evaluating a national health insurance plan: that of active government, and egalitarianism. Active government is the degree to which people value a government that intervenes in the affairs of society (Markus 1990). In the context of access to health care, creating a national health insurance program would involve a dramatic expansion of the government’s role. The value of egalitarianism is the degree to which one values equality of outcome, which involves eliminating societal inequalities with government intervention in the economic marketplace (e.g., Feldman 1987; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). Creating a national health insurance program is a government action that would increase equality, and is likely to draw support from those also embrace egalitarianism.

Turning to the relationship between vested interest and values, we predict:

**Hypothesis 3:** Vested interest in the national health insurance condition increases the political values of active government and egalitarianism.

Furthermore, we expect that valuing active government and egalitarianism will cause support for a national health insurance program. This is because values and preferences are embedded in a hierarchical attitude structure whereby values cause policy preferences, and this holds for all types of people. It is inherent to human cognition that people use broad general principles to guide their decisions and actions. This leads to our understanding that in politics, people’s preferences are generally consistent with their political values. And as we argue here, values are not frozen in place after adolescence, but change according to experience and new information. We expect that valuing active government, and equality in particular, should increase support for a national health insurance program because values are powerful determinants of peoples’ policy preferences, and being
predisposed toward government intervention and equality are congruent with programs that expand such government activism and promote equality (e.g., Feldman 1988). Hence, we predict:

**Hypothesis 4:** Active government and egalitarianism increase support for national health insurance.

Our final hypothesis is that vested interest increases support for a national health insurance program. Vested interest is said to exist when five criteria are satisfied: an actor perceives a stake in a given attitude object, the object is salient to the actor, the actor believes certain specific consequences ensue from an attitude-relevant action, the consequences are immediate, and the actor believes that his or her action can affect the attitude-implicated behavior (actor’s self-efficacy; Crano 1995). In other words, vested interest requires that the attitude object be relevant to an individual’s well-being and of perceived importance in terms of consequences (Lehman and Crano 2002). Such attitudes should be powerful for several reasons. Issues that are both personally relevant and that have perceived important consequences should prompt people to pay closer attention to the details of arguments regarding the issue. That heightened attention should result in greater thought about the topic and greater openness to being persuaded (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).

**Hypothesis 5:** Vested interest increases support for a national health insurance program.

**Data and Methodology**

We test our hypotheses using data from a random-digit-dial statewide telephone survey in North Carolina conducted April 18-26, 2005. The sample used in this research consists of interviews with 748 adults ages 18 and older. We weighted the data to reflect the distribution of the population of adults ages 18 and older in North Carolina based on gender, race, Hispanic/non-Hispanic, and age. Further details about the demographic composition of the sample, both weighted and unweighted, can be found in Appendix A.

The key endogenous variables for the model are:

- **Support for a national health care plan:** “Would you support or oppose the creation of a government insurance plan that covers all medical and hospital costs for all citizens?” (5-point scale, with 1 = strongly oppose it and 5 = strongly support it.)
Political value of active government: An additive scale (alpha = 0.72) combining responses to three questions about active government. (Full text of the questions is found in Appendix B.)

Political value of egalitarianism: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “All in all, I think economic differences in this country are justified.” (5-point scale, with 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree.)

Vested interest: “Thinking about you personally and your life as it is, if the government set up a national health insurance plan, would the consequences for you, in general, be very positive, somewhat positive, somewhat negative, very negative, or would there be no consequences for you personally?” (5-point scale, with 1 = very negative and 5 = very positive.)

The model contains measures of the antecedents of self-interest, such as needing help paying medical bills; a prospective view of the health of the national economy in the coming year; and a measure of affect in the form of concern about being able to pay medical bills. The model also controls for political ideology, political party registration, gender, whether the respondent is African-American, education, annual household income, and the respondent’s age. The model includes a squared age term to control for possible curvilinear effects of age. The very young and the elderly might be less supportive of national health care for different reasons. Young people tend to be healthier and in less need of medical care, and individuals ages 65 and older already are covered by Medicare.

We tested our hypotheses using Three-Stage Least Squares regression. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, the only way to test for relationships between vested interest and political values is to allow each variable to affect the other. The resulting model is non-recursive, and using Ordinary Least Squares in the analysis is ill-advised. When we place the equations for vested interest and political values in reduced form, the independent variables in the equations are correlated with the error terms, leading to estimates that are biased and inconsistent (Berry 1984). The typical approach to analyzing non-recursive models is to use Two-Stage Least Squares, in which estimates for the reduced form equation are calculated in the first stage. The estimates for the dependent variables in question are then used to create instrumental predictors in the second stage that are not correlated with the error terms for the equations. Three-Stage Least Squares takes the model one step further by estimating all of the equations in the model simultaneously, which controls for the possibility that error terms for all or some of the equations in the model might be correlated with each other (Berry 1984; Godwin 1985). This is a more cautious approach to control for possible correlated error terms across the equations, and it presents two advantages. The models’ estimates have smaller variances, making them more efficient than those in
Two-Stage Least Squares (Godwin 1985). The model also produces a system-weighted R-squared statistic for the entire model. We can thus measure the explained variance for all of the endogenous variables in the model and compare the model fit between different nested models. Two-Stage Least Squares generates R-squared statistics for the individual equations in the model, but those statistics are not meaningful for the non-recursive equations given the feedback going on between the equations.

The disadvantage of using the Three-Stage Least Squares method is that it is a “full information” estimator, and thus carries with it the assumption that the model is properly specified. If specification errors seep into any of the model’s equations, the error affects the estimations in all of the model’s equations (Berry 1984; Godwin 1985). We believe our model is properly specified, based on our theory and previous findings from the literature. We also conducted diagnostic tests of the model to confirm that the model is well-specified, and that our identification and exclusion restriction assumptions are valid. We find this to be the case, and we report results in Appendix C.

We report our results using fully standardized coefficients, meaning the coefficients are in the metric of standard deviations. This allows us to compare the direct effects of vested interest and political values on each other despite the varying scales for the measures. Using fully standardized estimates also allows us to calculate direct and indirect effects for the models.

Results

Reporting Apparent Effects

We report the results for four models. The first two models are the fully-specified vested interest models, with measures of the antecedents of self-interest, vested interest, political values, and anxiety. The first model includes egalitarianism as the political value, and the second includes active government. The final two models are meant to represent the kinds of models political scientists traditionally estimate to ascertain the effects of “self-interest”—these include measures of the antecedents of self-interest to stand for self-interest, but excluding vested interest. We will contrast the two different stories these types of models tell. We present the results for Model 1, including vested interest, and egalitarianism, in Table 1.

We find that all four of the antecedents of self-interest increase people’s worry over being able to pay their health care bills (p < .01 for all four results). The other factor that increases worry is age (p < .01), although age-squared and income both decrease worry (p < .01). The age-squared result indicates that advancing into the oldest ages decreases worry, probably
because these people qualify for Medicare. Education and income (both at p < .01) predict less worry over health care expenses.

The aforementioned heightened worry, in turn, predicts higher values of vested interest (p < .05), as does egalitarianism (p < .01). African-Americans perceive vested interest at lower levels (p < .01), with income (p < .01) and education (p < .10) also predicting lower levels of vested interest. The vested interest, in turn, predicts higher levels of egalitarianism (p < .01). Party registration (p < .01), income (p < .10) and African-American (p < .01) do as well.

We tested for the presence of a causal feedback path from egalitarianism to vested interest, and we do find a statistically significant feedback path (p < .01). However, we note that the standardized coefficients allow us to compare the magnitudes of the effects, and that vested interest has a bit of a larger effect on egalitarianism that egalitarianism has on vested interest.

Finally, we find five direct effects on support for a national health insurance plan. The standardized effects allow us to compare the magnitudes of the effects. The largest effect is for vested interest (B = .90, p < .01). The next largest is for egalitarianism (B = .54, p < .01). The third largest is for

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**Table 1. The Vested Interest Model of Policy Support with Egalitarianism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Worry</th>
<th>Vested Interest</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>National Health Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No health coverage</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>.90*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to pay medical bills</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed a major purchase</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective personal finance</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective national economy</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td>-.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>.54**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vested interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party registration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.04+</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.26**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-1.20**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.13+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>2.02**</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>-1.84**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2950, System-weighted R² = .265.**
worry (B = -.31, p < .05). The next largest effect is for party registration (B = -.13, p < .01), and the smallest statistically significant effect is for not having health insurance (B = .09, p < .05). We note two surprising results here: worry decreases support for a national health plan, as does party registration (with Democrats coded as the high value). This suggests that once spurious and intervening factors are controlled for, these factors actually have negative effects. We note, however, that in the case of worry, the total effects are quite small in both the vested interest models.

Importantly, while the antecedent of self-interest has a small direct effect upon the policy preference, the psychological manifestation of that belief in the form of vested interest has a direct and powerful effect. Indeed, the standardized effect coefficient allows one to compare the magnitude of the effect to others, and it is one of the largest in the model. A one-unit increase in vested interest leads to a .90 standard deviation increase in support for a national health insurance program.

In Table 2 we report the results for Model 2, which includes vested interest with the active government political value.

Table 2. The Vested Interest Model of Policy Support with Active Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Worry (B)</th>
<th>Vested Interest (B)</th>
<th>Active Government (B)</th>
<th>National Health Plan (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No health coverage</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to pay medical bills</td>
<td>.29**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed a major purchase</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective personal finance</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective national economy</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
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<td>-.12</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Government</td>
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<td>.61**</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vested interest</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party registration</td>
<td>.07*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Age²</td>
<td>-1.20**</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.09*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.08*</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>1.28**</td>
<td>2.81*</td>
<td>-.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2950, System-weighted R² = .260.
The same pattern of results that we report in Table 1 holds here. The antecedents of self-interest increase people’s anxiety regarding their health expenses (p < .01 for all results). Age also increases such anxiety (p < .01), although age-squared decreases it (p < .01). People with more education and income are also less worried about such expenses (p < .01).

The antecedents increase anxiety, which in turn increases peoples’ sense that a national health care program is in their self-interest (p < .05). The other factor that increases such a sense of self-interest is the political value of active government (p < .01). The factors that decrease vested interest are income, and being female or African-American (all at p < .05).

Vested interest then goes on to increase valuing active government (p < .01). As with the value of egalitarianism, we find that there is a causal feedback here between vested interest and the political value. However, as before, the relationship from vested interest to the value is slightly stronger than the reverse. Ideology and party registration also increase valuing active government (p < .01 and p < .05, respectively), as does being female and African-American (both p < .01). Older people tend to value it less (p < .01).

We turn now to the results for the direct effects upon support for a national health care program. We find three statistically significant results. The largest is for vested interest (B = .60, p < .01). The next largest is for active government (B = .39, p < .01). The final statistically significant effect is for not having health insurance (B = .10, p < .01).

We conclude reporting results with Tables 3 and 4: models that drop vested interest. In Table 3 we report the results including egalitarianism, and in Table 4 we report results including active government.

In Table 3 we find that the antecedents of self-interest continue to be predictors of worry (p < .01). Age predicts higher levels of worry as well (p < .01). Education leads to less worry, as do age-squared and income (all at p < .01).

Ideology and party registration lead to higher levels of egalitarianism, and African-Americans and women endorse higher levels of the political value as well (p < .01 for all, but women p < .10). People with higher incomes endorse egalitarianism at lower levels (p < .01).

In this model, we find that various factors directly affect support for national health insurance. Not having health insurance predicts greater support (B = .14, p < .01). Egalitarianism is the most powerful predictor of support (B = .73, p < .01). Health-related anxiety (B = .16, p < .10) and ideology (B = .12, p < .01) predict support as well. Party registration predicts opposition (B = -.13, p < .05).

In Table 4 we report results for the models including active government but lacking vested interest. The pattern of results is the same as before. The antecedents increase levels of worry, as does age (p < .01). Education decreases worry, as do age-squared and income (p < .01). Ideology, party
Table 3. The Basic Self-Interest Model with Egalitarianism: No Vested Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Worry</th>
<th>Egalitarianism</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Health Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No health coverage</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to pay medical bills</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed a major purchase</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective personal finance</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective national economy</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>.16+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
<td>.73**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party registration</td>
<td></td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-1.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-1.0**</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.25**</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age^2</td>
<td>-1.20**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-1.16**</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>3.12**</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2214, System-weighted R² = .228.

Table 4. The Basic Self-Interest Model with Active Government: No Vested Interest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Worry</th>
<th>Active Government</th>
<th>National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Health Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No health coverage</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to pay medical bills</td>
<td>.28**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed a major purchase</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective personal finance</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective national economy</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td></td>
<td>.14+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party registration</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-1.0**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.25**</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age^2</td>
<td>-1.21**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-1.16**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>7.73**</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10 (two-tailed tests). Results are standardized estimates using Three-Stage Least Squares regression. Degrees of freedom = 2214, System-weighted R² = .238.
registration, African-American and female lead to greater endorsement of active government (p < .01). Age and income lead to opposition (p < .01). Finally, active government leads people to support a national health care program (B = .61, p < .01), as does health-expense related anxiety (B = .14, p < .10) and not having health insurance (B = .12, p < .01).

A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 with 3 and 4 suggests that including vested interest alters the apparent role of self-interest in guiding people’s policy preferences. A simple way to evaluate this is to look at the direct effects. Without vested interest, the largest direct effects on support for a national health insurance program are the political values egalitarianism and active government. However, with vested interest, these values play less of a role and are supplanted by the larger effects of vested interest. We will make this case more clearly by considering how including vested interest affects measures of model fit, as well as considering the direct and indirect effects from our path models to compare the total effect of vested interest to the total effect of the symbolic politics variables.

**Reporting Changes in Model Fit**

How important is the concept of vested interest to support for a national health care program? One can compare the measures of model fit from the first two models that include vested interest, to the last two to that do not, to ascertain the cost in model fit of excluding vested interest. The first two models have system R-squared statistics of .265 and .260, for the models with egalitarianism and active government, respectively. The second two models, lacking vested interest, have system R-squared statistics of .228 and .238, again with egalitarianism and active government, respectively. In other words, for the models with egalitarianism, dropping vested interest decreases the percent of the variance explained by the independent variables by 3.7 percent, and for the models with active government, the drop is 2.2 percent. These differences are statistically significant at the p < .01 level, using an F-test.

Taking this type of analysis one step further, a common approach in the symbolic politics literature is to compare measures of model fit for models that include only the symbolic politics measures to those that contain only the measures of self-interest (e.g., Lau and Heldman 2009). Typically, the symbolic politics variables explain substantially more of the variance in policy support than the self-interest variables do. We conduct our own statistical exercise of this type to see if including vested interest might produce a different outcome.

We estimate a 3SLS model without any measures of self-interest, but including all of the other variables, as well as the measures of symbolic
politics (results not reported). For the models with egalitarianism we find an R-squared of .182, and for active government an R-squared of .218. We then estimate a model with all of our measures of self-interest (vested interest and the antecedents of self-interest), and all of the other variables, but none of the symbolic variables, and find an R-squared of .215. One cannot compute a difference in fit statistic because these models are not nested in one another. However, the self-interest model explains 3.3 percent more of the total variance of the endogenous variables than the egalitarian value model, while the measure of model fit for the self-interest model, compared to the active government model, is practically identical. Including vested interest among predictors of policy preference, then, produces models that fit as well as, if not better than, models employing only symbolic variables.

**Considering Direct Effects and Indirect Effects**

We presented some preliminary evidence that including vested interest as a measure of self-interest alters one’s conclusion about the importance of the role of self-interest. With a path model such as ours, however, one cannot truly assess the total magnitudes of the effects of the independent variables without partitioning the effects into direct and indirect. We engage in this exercise now to demonstrate the importance of vested interest to making self-interest a concept that can compete viably with the variables of symbolic politics.

To begin the comparison of the effects of vested interest versus the antecedents of self-interest, we analyze the results for Tables 3 and 4, in which vested interest is not included, to decompose the direct and indirect effects. We consider this to represent the standard treatment of self-interest, and we engage in this exercise to show how excluding vested interest does reproduce the standard middling effects of self-interest one finds in the literature. We decompose the total effects into direct and indirect effects in Table 5.

We start with the model from Tables 3 and 4, with egalitarianism and active government. The largest total effects are for the political values egalitarianism (B = .73) and active government (B = .61). We sum up all of the total effects of the antecedents of self-interest, and all of the total effects of the symbolic politics variables. Consistent with previous findings, the size of the effect of all of the symbolic politics variables is three times larger than the self-interest effects when egalitarianism is in the model, and four times larger when active government is in the model. One would conclude that while self-interest seems to matter, its effect is clearly dwarfed by the variables of symbolic politics.
Table 5. Direct and Indirect Effects on Support for a National Health Care Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Table 3 (Basic self-interest model with egalitarianism as a political value)</th>
<th>Table 4 (Basic self-interest model with active government as a political value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No health coverage</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult medical bills</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaying a major purchase</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prospective personal finance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum of self-interest antecedents</strong></td>
<td><strong>.14</strong></td>
<td><strong>.11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political value</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party registration</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum of symbolic variables</strong></td>
<td><strong>.72</strong></td>
<td><strong>.04</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indirect effects for the antecedents of self-interest are through worry. Indirect effects of worry are through the political value. Indirect effects of ideology and party registration are through the political value.

However, bringing vested interest into the equations alters this conclusion. We decompose the total effects for all of the theoretically-important variables from Tables 1 and 2 in Table 6.

The variable with the largest total effect from both tables is vested interest (B = 1.10 with egalitarianism and B = .68 with active government).

Adding together all of the direct effects of the self-interest variables, and comparing that to the total effect of all of the symbolic politics variables reveals the total effect of self-interest to be larger. Comparing the total effects, one concludes that while the self-interest variables appear to be a bit more important, both sets of variables are roughly equal in magnitude.

**Discussion**

**Reviewing Hypotheses**

We begin discussing these results by reviewing how well the hypotheses fared in light of the statistical tests. The first hypothesis is that the antecedents of self-interest increase health expense-related anxiety, and the
Table 6. Direct and Indirect Effects on Support for a National Health Care Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Table 1 (With egalitarianism as a political value and vested interest)</th>
<th>Table 2 (With active government as a political value and vested interest)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No health coverage</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difficult medical bills</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaying a major purchase</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of antecedents</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vested interest</td>
<td>.90</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of self-interest</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political value</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
<td>N.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party registration</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of symbolic variables</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Indirect effects for the antecedents of self-interest are through worry and vested interest. Indirect effects of worry are through vested interest and the political value. Indirect effects of vested interest are through the political value. Indirect effects of the political value are through vested interest. Indirect effects of ideology and party registration are through the political value and vested interest.

evidence strongly supports this hypothesis. In all four of the models, every antecedent of self-interest increases anxiety at the \( p < .01 \) level. The second hypothesis is that this health expense anxiety increases vested interest, and this hypothesis is strongly supported as well—in both models with vested interest, worry increases vested interest at the \( p < .01 \) level. The third hypothesis is that vested interest increases support for the political values of egalitarianism and active government. Our results support this hypothesis. However, we also find a strong reciprocal relationship, with egalitarianism and active government affecting vested interest as well. Our fourth hypothesis is that the political values increase support for a national health insurance program. We find that this is the case, with both active government and egalitarianism increasing support for a national health program at the \( p < .01 \) level. Finally, we hypothesize that vested interest increases support for a national health insurance program. This hypothesis is strongly supported, as vested interest increases support for the program in each of the two models, and the effects are among the largest in the models.
Reconsidering a Role for Self-Interest

Our models confirm our hypotheses, and the strongest confirmation comes for the role of self-interest in affecting people’s support for a national health care program. As we noted earlier, the models without vested interest suggest an important but not dominant role for self-interest in shaping these policy preferences. However, once we include vested interest in the model, the total effects of self-interest are among the largest in the model, and they are larger than the total effects of the symbolic politics variables. In addition, the models with the vested interest enjoy better fits with the data than the models without. When including vested interest, the self-interest models fit the data better than, or as well as, the symbolic politics-only models.

These results demand that scholars not close the book on the role of self-interest. Past findings that the role of self-interest is limited are based on studies in which self-interest is not allowed to operate as a psychological concept that varies among individuals. Instead, people who are in certain categories or situations are assumed, by scholars, to be self-interested. This approach does have certain advantages, as researchers have noted (e.g., Sears and Funk 1991). The antecedents of self interest are clearly exogenous from the factors that they are believed to affect. Because of this clear exogeneity, there is no presence of causal feedback from other attitudinal variables of interest. Escalating health expenses are not caused by ideology, or party, or other symbolic political attitudes.

We, of course, define and operationalize self-interest in a different way, finding a powerful role for it. Our definition leads to measures of it that are not exogenous from other symbolic political attitudes. The resulting disadvantage to this approach is that vested interest is associated with ideological identification and some political values, and possibly other symbolic political attitudes. The advantage of this approach, however, is that it is the superior theoretical way to approach self-interest. First, the theoretical assumption that being in a certain group or condition automatically leads to a self-interested attitude is faulty. Such beliefs should be shaped by individuals’ own beliefs and perceptions. Second, theory can account for what these beliefs should be. Third, once we measure vested interest and model it in such a way to account for the beliefs that influence how people perceive their own self-interest, the role of vested interest is powerful. The models with vested interest fit better than those without it, and the size of the effect is large.

A second finding of this study, and a second provocative one at that, is that political values are affected by self-interest. Some scholars of self-interest argue that such a relationship is impossible (Sears and Funk 1991). However, we find that the values of active government and egalitarianism
are affected by vested interest. Of course, we do find there is also a projection effect, whereby people find the policy to be in their self-interest because it is consistent with their political values.

Finally, we take note of the role of affect in this model. Affect is the catalyst that brings forth vested interest. Anxiety is probably the most suited emotion to do so, because it brings forth extra thought, which is necessary for people to abandon their predispositions (such as altering their endorsement of political values). The total effect of anxiety in the vested interest models is quite small: weakly negative with egalitarianism (B = -.09), and weakly positive with active government (B = .06).

**Conclusion**

We conclude by noting some limits to this study. First, the data we employ is from a random sample telephone survey of residents of North Carolina, and thus we cannot generalize our results to the entire U.S. population. That said, theory tells us that we have no reason to believe that the relationships between the antecedents of self-interest, anxiety, vested interest, values, and the policy preference should be any different nationally.

A second caveat has to do with our effect estimates for vested interest. We find large effects for self-interest, but, as we noted, vested interest is not exogenous from symbolic attitudes. It might be the case that some of the magnitude of the relationship is due to other factors not included in the model, such as some other excluded political value. That said, however, we have certainly included the most important factors—active government, egalitarianism, party registration, ideological identification, and anxiety. In addition, we model the causal feedback between vested interest and the political values, thus accounting for them statistically. We contend that while there may be other unaccounted for factors, their impacts on the results should be minimal.

A third caveat has to do with our statistical analysis of cross-sectional survey data. Because we do not have data over time, we have to use an instrumental variables approach to estimate the non-recursive paths. As we reported earlier, tests of the instruments reveal that they are properly identified and exogenous. However, the magnitudes of the paths are partly functions of the exclusion restrictions that are necessary to identify the model given the non-recursive paths. While the tests indicate these are good assumptions, using other instruments, or making other exclusion restrictions, may result in the model reporting different results.

A fourth caveat is that our study involves only one policy preference. While the evidence we present for self-interest influencing support for a national health care program is strong, it may be possible that this model
cannot be applied universally to all policy preferences. One possible limit on the generalizability of the model could have to do with the kind of affect evoked by the policy. While anxiety has clear links with increased information processing and the willingness to abandon predispositions, other feelings, such as anger and happiness, do not (Marcus et al. 2000). This model may only be applicable when the policy evokes anxiety, because the anxiety may be necessary to increasing vested interest, or for vested interest to affect a political value.

Our fifth and final caveat is that in this model we test only one dimension of the two-dimensional model from Affective Intelligence theory (Marcus et al. 2000). We consider the impact of the surveillance dimension on processing, and the policy preference, but not the impact of the disposition dimension (which is tapped by happiness). We expect that enthusiasm or happiness leads to more heuristic processing, and thus this feeling would not mediate between the antecedents of self-interest and the policy preference. However, this hypothesis is untestable with our data. In addition, we do not consider the role of anger, and any possible relationship between anger and anxiety.

In conclusion, and with these caveats noted, we believe that our findings present a challenge to the clear consensus in the literature on the minor role of self-interest. We find that when conceived of as vested interest, self-interest plays a powerful role in shaping policy preferences. We find this when we consider the direct effect of vested interest, as well as the total effect. We also find that self-interest leads people to align their political values to be consistent with perceived self interest, thus increasing support for the relevant policy. Dropping vested interest from these models of policy support reduces how well the models fit the data. Finally, comparing the model fit of the self-interest models to the symbolic politics models reveals that the self-interest models fit the data at least as well as, if not better than, the symbolic politics-only models.
Appendix A. Demographic Composition of Sample
Characteristics of North Carolina Survey Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weighted Data</th>
<th>Unweighted Data</th>
<th>Unweighted N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>139</td>
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<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 and up</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>High school or less</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
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<td>Household</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Less than $10,000</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$10,000 to under $25,000</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$25,000 to under $50,000</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000 to under $75,000</td>
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<td>28%</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000 to under $100,000</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100,000 or more</td>
<td>14%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B. Measures

The data used in this research come from a random-digit-dial statewide telephone survey in North Carolina conducted April 18-26, 2005. The sample consists of interviews with 748 adults ages 18 and older. The survey contained the following measures:

Political value of active government: An additive scale (alpha = 0.72) combining the following questions.
1. Next, I am going to read two statements. Please tell me which statement is closer to your view: The less government, the better; or, there are more things the government should be doing.
2. Please tell me which statement is closer to your view: The government should try to ensure that all Americans have such things as jobs, health care, and housing; or, the government should not be involved in this.

... Appendix B continues
Appendix B (continued)

3. Please tell me which statement is closer to your view: We need a strong government to handle today’s economic problems; or, the free market can handle these problems without the government getting involved.

(Each of the three active government questions was re-coded so that respondents choosing the less active government statement were coded as 1, those saying they didn’t know were coded as 2, and those choosing the more active government statement were coded as 3. Combining the three variables created a seven-point scale.)

Antecedents of self interest (four measures):
1. “Are you currently covered by any type of health insurance plan, including private plans, Medicaid, or Medicare?” (0 = yes and 1 = no)
2. “For various reasons, some people have difficulty paying their medical bills, while others are able to pay those expenses. In the past six months, have you had to take extra steps, such as borrowing money or using money from a savings account, to help pay medical bills?” (0 = no and 1 = yes)
3. In the past six months, have you had to do any of the following? Delay buying a large item, such as a major appliance or car. (0 = no/don’t know/no response, 1 = yes)
4. Do you expect your personal financial position to get better, get worse or stay about the same within the next year? (1 = get better, 2 = stay about the same, 3 = get worse)

Prospective national economic outlook:
Do you expect our national economy to get better, get worse, or stay about the same within the next year? (1 = get better, 2 = stay about the same, 3 = get worse)

Affect: “Are you concerned about being able to pay medical bills for you and your family? Which statement best describes your feelings about paying medical bills?” There were four response categories, ranging from, “I am not worried” to “I am very worried.” We recoded “don’t know” responses to place them at the midpoint of a five-point scale.

Ideology: We measured political ideology using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 = extremely conservative to 7 = extremely liberal.

Partisanship: Measure of political party registration, with -1 = Republican, 1 = Democrat, 0 = all others.

Age: 2005—year of birth.

Age squared: Squared term to measure curvilinear effects of age.

Education: Highest level of education with 1 = some high school (or less), 2 = high school graduate, 3 = some college, but no college degree, 4 = associate degree, 5 = bachelor’s degree, 6 = some graduate school, but no graduate degree, 7 = graduate school degree (includes master’s, Ph.D., law or medical).

Income: Annual household income, with 1 = Less than $10,000, 2 = $10,000 to under $25,000, 3 = $25,000 to under $50,000, 4 = $50,000 to under $75,000, 5 = $75,000 to under $100,000, 6 = $100,000 or more.
### Appendix C. Assessing the Three Stage Least Square Model’s Assumptions

#### Three Stage Least Squares: Vested Interest Model of Policy Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vested Interest (Egalitarianism)</th>
<th>Vested Interest (Active Government)</th>
<th>Active Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[A] Under-identification Test: Anderson Canon. Corr. LM statistic (p-value)</td>
<td>54.4 (p&lt;.01)</td>
<td>71.2 (p&lt;.01)</td>
<td>78.8 (p&lt;.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[B] Weak identification test: Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistic</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[C] Over-identification test of all instruments: Sargan Chi-Square Statistic (p-value)</td>
<td>2.1 (p=.15)</td>
<td>0 (p=.99)</td>
<td>.001 (p=.98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of results:

[A] The under-identification test tests the relevance of the instruments to the endogenous variable. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the equation is identified and the instruments (the variables that affect the endogenous variable only) are relevant. In these models we reject the null hypothesis, p < .01.

[B] With the weak identification test we test whether or not the instruments are weak instruments; in others words, that they are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. Instruments are considered to be weak if the resulting F statistic is less than 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). All of the statistics here are greater than 10.

[C] The over-identification test checks whether or not the instruments are correlated with the equations’ error terms. If they are correlated, the parameters are biased. The null hypothesis is that they are not correlated, and that the exclusion restrictions are correct. We accept the null hypothesis for all equations, p > .10.

### NOTES

1. In the vote choice literature specifically, the originally minimal role found for pocketbook voting is giving way to a more nuanced understanding of when voters do, and do not, use their own personal economic conditions to make their vote choices. Originally, scholars concluded that voters voted based on sociotropic, and not pocketbook, economic reasoning (e.g., Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Kiewiet 1983; Sigelman et al. 1991). Some scholars found that both mattered, although sociotropic factors mattered more (Markus 1988). However, more recent scholarship finds a role for pocketbook voting (in Congressional elections or evaluations, Romero and Stambough 1996; Rudolph 2002; or, in Presidential elections, Grafstein 2005; Gomez and Wilson 2001).

2. Recent work suggests a reason for these results is because people use their notions of self-interest to make decisions about things that will affect them immediately, while using symbolic considerations to make decisions about issues that occur more distantly in the future (Hunt et al. 2010).
This concept of vested interest requires that scholars measure individuals’ perceptions of their own self-interest. Such measures are absent from most data. Even when measures of vested interest are missing, however, the antecedents of self-interest clearly moderate the effect of symbolic attitudes. As a debate in the literature between William Crano and David Sears reveals, as well as later work by Lehman and Crano, symbolic attitudes have more effects on policy preferences among those whose self-interest is high (for the debate, see Crano 1997a, 1997b, and Sears 1997; see also Lehman and Crano 2002).

For a neurochemical explanation, see Jeffrey Alan Gray (1987).

This suggests that the directions of the causal relationships may not be entirely clear-cut. Indeed, such complications are a major reason that the antecedents approach to self-interest dominates the literature, because the alternative we propose is messy. However, we contend that it is the empirically more accurate way to see self-interest.


There were only two “don’t know” responses to the measure of affect. At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we re-ran the analyses omitting the “don’t know” responses from the measure of affect, and also coding “don’t know” along with “I am not worried” as the lowest value in the variable. Both approaches yielded results virtually identical to the results that we report here. Also at the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we ran analyses using a squared measure of affect to test for a curvilinear effect. Results using the squared term did not differ significantly from what we report here.

This feedback is consistent with MacCoun and Paletz (2009), who find that ideologues discount research findings when they conflict with their own ideological beliefs. In our view, this is similar to people discounting public policies that would benefit them, when the policies conflict with their political values-based beliefs.

We include one antecedent of self-interest as a predictor of vested interest: not having health insurance. We include this variable because it is a strong instrument for vested interest (see Appendix B).

Lacking health coverage is the only antecedent of self-interest that we model as directly affecting support for a national health insurance plan. We exclude the others to help identify the model. However, in other versions of the model, we find the direct effects of the other antecedents to be small and typically statistically insignificant (results not reported).

Thus, we control for party identification, ideological identification, egalitarianism and active government in our models.

We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to our attention.

REFERENCES


Demythifying the “Dark Side” of Social Capital: A Comparative Bayesian Analysis of White, Black, Latino, and Asian American Voting Behavior

Baodong Liu

Previous studies have suggested that Americans who regularly attend church develop important civic skills which facilitate their participation in politics (e.g., see Verba et al. 1995). Churches were also heralded as important repositories of social capital, particularly for disadvantaged minority groups who have fewer opportunities to develop civic skills (Putnam 2000). Moreover, social capital theorists have argued that homogenous congregations foster the development of bonding (in-group) rather than bridging (out-group) social capital. One important fact, which has not been examined closely in the voting literature, is that American churches are still highly segregated by race/ethnicity according to a recent Gallup Poll (2004). Also unclear in the literature is the differential impact of bonding versus bridging social capital on political participation. Scholarship by Putnam (2000) and Gutmann (1998) suggests that heterogeneity within associational memberships is healthier for democratic citizenship than those with more homogenous memberships. This paper evaluates this claim and investigates whether or not bonding social capital fosters or discourages political participation for both white-majority voters and minorities. Using Bayesian statistical methods, this study, for the first time, conducted a national, cross-racial analysis of whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans based on data from the General Social Survey (2002), National Election Studies (2000), and the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (2001). The finding suggests that church attendance is significant and positively associated with voting participation among racial/ethnic groups that attend churches with mostly homogenous memberships. Contrary to the negative implications purported to stem from the “dark side” of social capital, the results of this research show that bonding social capital positively influences participation in politics. These findings lead to important implications for understanding the mobilization of immigrant communities, a group that political parties rarely attempt to mobilize (Kim 2007; Wong 2006).

During the middle of the Democratic primary season in March of 2008, presidential candidate Barack Obama’s “preacher problem” exploded into the national political landscape. Images of an “angry black man” spewing “anti-American” rhetoric were looped continuously in the media market for American voter consumption. Controversial sound bytes pulled from the Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s sermons prompted many Americans to pause and consider what Obama’s twenty-year membership at a historically black church in the South Side of Chicago might reveal about his identity and his politics. What was initially considered a potential “campaign killer” did not ultimately cost Obama the election. On Election Day, he won 365 electoral votes. The author would like to sincerely thank the editor of ARP and the reviewers of this article for very helpful comments and suggestions that greatly improved the quality of the paper.

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votes, more than doubling Senator McCain’s 173 votes, making Barack Obama the first African American President of the United States.

The impetus for this study emerges from some of the negative reactions to Obama’s membership in an overtly color-conscious congregation. Obama’s church affiliation did not cost him the election, but the early controversy surrounding his membership in a black liberation theology teaching church raises an important issue for scholars of political behavior. Of particular interest is the relationship between one’s church involvement and his/her political participation. Political science research suggests “bonding social capital” (in-group solidarity), which typically develops in homogenous settings, has the potential for producing negative and illiberal effects on democracy (Gutmann 1998; Putnam 2000). Leaders and organizations that mobilize their constituents along racial/ethnic lines have undergone severe criticism by scholars contending that homogenous voluntary organizations threaten “America’s national identity” and leads to “racial balkanization” (Huntington 2004; Schlesinger 1993). In light of these criticisms and the recent controversy over Obama’s church membership, this research asks, “Does membership in a racially homogenous church increase or decrease participation in the American political system?”

To answer this question, an integrated approach is used in this research, which situates the research question in the context of American elections and voting. In an attempt to demythify the “dark side” of social capital, the article evaluates previous claims and investigates whether or not bonding social capital fosters or discourages political participation for both white-majority voters and minorities. Using Bayesian statistical methods, this study, for the first time, conducted a national, cross-racial analysis of whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans based on data from the General Social Survey (2002), National Election Studies (2000), and the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (2001). Contrary to the negative implications purported to stem from the “dark side” of social capital, this study shows that bonding social capital positively influences electoral participation. These findings presented in this paper, thus, demands a new theory that is generalizable to all four major racial/ethnic groups, and the results of this comparative analysis of four racial groups, in particular, have especially important implications for understanding the mobilization of immigrant based communities, a group that political parties rarely attempt to mobilize (Kim 2007; Wong 2006).

**Political Participation and Social Capital: A Racial Dimension**

Scholars of political behavior have spent a great deal of time identifying factors that either foster or diminish prospects for political participation.
In their seminal work on electoral and non-electoral participation, Sidney Verba and Norman Nie (1972) established the classic socioeconomic status (SES) model of participation. Their findings were among the first to show that individuals with higher levels of education, occupation, and income are more likely to participate politically than those with lower levels of SES. In terms of generalizability, the SES model serves as a particularly strong predictor of political participation among whites, but is less consistent in predicting the political behavior of racial/ethnic minority groups such as African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. For instance, racial group consciousness, not SES, is the most consistent predictor of participation among African Americans (Dawson 1994; Tate 1993; Verba and Nie 1972). Based on studies of Latino political behavior, scholars find that education, rather than income or SES overall, is the strongest predictor of political activity (Pantoja et al. 2001). Also, the SES model is problematic in predicting Asian American political behavior. As a group with relatively higher median household incomes, the SES model would predict higher rates of participation among this group. Yet, previous studies show that Asian Americans participate at rates lower than all other major racial and ethnic groups (Cho 1999; Lien 2001; Nakanishi 1991).

But individual resources are not the only source of increasing civic engagement. Spanning back to Tocqueville’s (1835) early observations of American democracy, it is well known that participation in associational life cultivates interest in political affairs and provides opportunities for recruitment into political activities. Similarly, institutions such as political parties have been shown to engage and recruit individuals into electoral activity (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Nie 1972). However, not all groups are equally targeted by party recruiters. For instance, newer immigrant communities, such as Asian Americans, are rarely mobilized by either of the two major parties (Kim 2007; Wong 2006). Janelle Wong’s (2006) research clearly demonstrates how community organizations fill this void by serving as an institutional bridge between these communities and the larger American political system. Although community organizations do not serve as replacements for political parties, particularly in the realm of generating mass mobilization, she argues that these institutions have great potential to foster civic skills, which ultimately increase the capacity for individuals to engage in political life. Furthermore, based on the study of Wong et al. (2005), membership in an ethnic organization is not necessarily associated with voting. Wong et al’s main finding is that membership in an ethnic organization may actually be associated with non-voting political activities, such as signing a petition, contacting an elected official and working with others to solve a community problem (also see Uslaner and Conley 2003).
Verba et al. (1995) specifically point to church involvement as one way to decrease the political participation gap. This is particularly relevant for members of disadvantaged minority groups and the working class, since they typically have fewer opportunities to develop civic skills in the workplace. Within the environs of the church, there are ample opportunities for developing civic skills by giving speeches, organizing and facilitating meetings, mediating disagreements, and holding leadership and administrative responsibility positions. Churches are also heralded as important repositories of social capital. Social capital is the connection between and among social networks developed through face to face contact that foster norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness. Putnam (2000) identifies two types of social capital: bonding and bridging capital. While bonding capital refers to the interpersonal solidarity that typically develops among small groups and local communities over extended periods of time, bridging capital focuses on relationships linking heterogeneous groups together (Putnam 2000; Wuthnow 2002).

In fostering a liberal participatory democracy, many scholars herald bridging capital as superior to bonding capital because it fosters out-group reciprocity, has greater potential for solving collective action problems, and improves the quality of public discourse and deliberation that is healthier for democratic citizenship (Gutmann 1998; Putnam 2000). In contrast, bonding capital has been described as the “dark side” of social capital and has the potential to be oppressive, exacerbate segregation, and produce illiberal effects (Putnam 2000). Given that many Americans spend more time in churches than any other type of voluntary organization, church involvement appears to have great potential for fostering “bridging social capital” rather than “bonding social capital” (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006).

Yet upon closer examination of the racial/ethnic composition of congregations, American churches are more likely to foster bonding rather than bridging capital. According to the National Congregations Survey, nine out of every ten American church congregations are racially homogenous, with at least ninety percent of the congregation representing just one racial group (Chaves 1999). In a separate study, the Multiracial Congregations Project shows that only eight percent of Christian religious communities are multiracial, where no one racial/ethnic group constitutes over eighty percent of the congregation (Emerson 2000). In a more recent survey of racial diversity in American congregations, a 2004 Gallup Poll finds a similar trend. Sixty-four percent of whites attend mostly or all white congregations and 56 percent of blacks belong to mostly or all black congregations. In contrast, only half of Latinos attend churches that are mostly or all Latino. Thus, Latinos are distinct in their propensity to attend mostly heterogeneous churches where fellow members are less likely to share their same ethnic background.
Although there is no national comparative data available for Asian Americans, research in ethnic studies firmly establish that religion remains centrally important in the community (Ecklund and Park 2005) and that the ethnic church is one of few available institutions for gathering with co-ethnics (Hurh and Kim 1990). Particularly among individuals hailing from immigrant based communities, the ethnic church provides meaning, belonging, and comfort for those uprooted from the communal and associational bonds they left in their home countries (Hurh and Kim 1990). Moreover, churches have been found to help first generation Asian immigrants overcome deficits in social status as a result of their immigration to a new country and help the children of immigrants maintain their ethnic identities (Ecklund and Park 2005).

Similar to claims about the oppressive and divisive nature of bonding social capital, racial/ethnic based institutions are also viewed as antithetical to the development of liberal democratic values (Huntington 2004; Schlesinger 1993). Adopting this viewpoint, attendance at racially homogenous church congregations should then decrease one’s engagement in the American political system. Yet research on African American churches has consistently shown that church attendance increases the political participation of blacks (Brown and Brown 2003; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Tate 1993), Asian American voting participation increases with church attendance (Lien et al. 2004), and studies of immigrant communities show that ethnic based organizations draw immigrants into the political system to a greater extent than ever before (Wong 2006). To explain the positive effects of ethnic based organizations, Wong (2006) would argue that they are better positioned to generate collective action because they possess cultural, linguistic, and substantive knowledge of their local immigrant populations that non-ethnic based organizations typically lack.

For racial/ethnic minorities, there are additional barriers that might inhibit the accrual of benefits perceived to flow from church membership. Emerson and Smith (2000) contend that there is a greater “cost” of acquiring “meaning, belonging, and security” when one belongs to the minority group within a congregation. Moreover, minorities who remain on the “edge” of a heterogeneous congregation have fewer relational ties to the core of the group and are likelier to leave the congregation altogether (Emerson and Smith 2000; Jeung 2005). The sociology literature also points to the “homophily principle,” the theory that similarity cultivates connection and that relationships forged between similar individuals will be more binding (Marsden 1987; McPherson et al. 2001). While the homophily principle explains why so many American churches are racially/ethnically segregated today, the perspective that members on the “edge” endure greater costs suggests
that it is more difficult for congregational minorities to develop civic skills in racially/ethnically heterogeneous environments.

Taken altogether, we anticipate that opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities to develop civic skills are diminished in settings where they constitute a numerical minority within that congregation. In contrast, in settings where one constitutes a numerical majority, individuals will possess stronger relational ties with other members and bear a lower cost for developing a sense of belonging within the church. Consistent with the principle of homophily, the racial/ethnic homogeneity of the congregation reduces the costs of developing meaningful connections among church members that facilitate greater church involvement. Members who feel more socially connected to other church members will be more likely to take advantage of opportunities to develop the civic skills that translate into greater civic participation down the line.

The continuing prevalence of racially/ethnically homogenous church congregations in America provides an excellent opportunity for us to assess whether or not bonding social capital has either positive or negative consequences for political participation. If churches provide ample opportunities to develop civic skills which facilitate their participation in politics, and racial/ethnic based organizations are better equipped to mobilize their members because they possess “insider” knowledge of the community that mainstream organizations typically lack (Tate 1993; Wong 2006), we hypothesize that a homogenous church environment may be a real boon for political participation, particularly for groups that are typically ignored by larger, more established recruiting institutions.

**Anticipated Findings**

This paper challenges the assumption that bridging social capital is better for fostering democratic citizenship. It is contended here that bonding social capital developed in racially homogenous church congregations can have a positive mobilizing effect on political participation. The focus of our investigation is on voting behavior across four major racial/ethnic groups: whites, Blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans. It is hypothesized that groups that attend mostly racially homogenous church congregations will be more likely to vote. Since Latinos are the least likely group to attend a racially homogenous congregation, we expect that church attendance will not encourage Latino participation in voting. In contrast, we expect that church attendance will have a positive and significant effect on the voting behavior of whites, Blacks, and Asian Americans, groups that tend to belong to racially homogenous congregations.
Data and Methods

To investigate how social capital either positively or negatively influences voting behavior across racial groups, one must first rely on data that enables cross group comparisons. Unfortunately, as stated earlier, no such data are available to conduct either cross-sectional or longitudinal studies for all major racial groups with the same quantitative measures. The two major national surveys, GSS and NES either did not sample all racial groups, or do not have variables that would allow us to examine all four racial groups simultaneously. In this paper, we use data from three different national surveys: General Social Survey (2002), National Election Studies (2000), and the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS [2001]). The key dependent variable in the analysis is voting in the 2000 election. The key independent variable of interest is church attendance (1 for respondents who attend church, 0 for those who do not). The control variables we include from all three surveys are as follows: age, gender, income, education, activism, political interest, internet use, and trust. In analyzing Asian Americans using the PNAAPS dataset, we added two additional independent variables in the analysis: born in Asia and membership in ethnic organizations.

For our method, we use the Bayesian approach to test the effect of church attendance on voting. We believe the Bayesian approach is superior to other methodological approaches (i.e., using logistic regression for dichotomous dependent variables) for three reasons. First, the Bayesian approach allows all parameters to be estimated in probability terms. Second, because results using the Bayesian approach are based on the posterior distribution of the quantities of interest, it indicates the improvement of the estimation. Third, we can specify the model to make the data (not the priors) more dominant if we are unclear about what we estimate. In doing so, we are able to make the Bayesian approach a maximum likelihood run of the model, and nothing is lost in the hypothesis testing. Thus, we believe the Bayesian approach improves on the drawbacks of the null-hypotheses approach, which often arbitrarily makes decisions based on the p-value at a critical point (normally p must be less than .05).

Moreover, the Bayesian approach is better equipped at analyzing survey data variables, which often suffer from missing data issues in the dependent variable and major independent variables. This is especially important if the survey data have “racial” aspects. For example, minorities are not often sampled, even in national surveys such as the GSS. The key dependent variable, voting, can create a missing data problem especially when we want to compare whites with minorities. If we only rely on the GSS (2002) and we test our hypotheses based on the nine variables we need (see below), then only 45 respondents were classified in the “other races” category (i.e.,
Latinos, Asians, and so on). Furthermore, because only 39 of the 45 respondents answered the question on voting, we are missing important data about the dependent variable. In this case, the traditional “Neyman-Pearson” frequentist approach is virtually useless because of the small-N and missing data issues.

In the Bayesian model, the dependent variable can be estimated. The missing data problem can be handled through “multiple imputation” (Gill 2004, 333). To illustrate our empirical model, we began with our dependent variable, which is a dichotomous measure indicating whether individuals voted or not. We first derived a probability distribution of the dependent variable with a simple Bernoulli distribution. We then used WinBugs software to write a logit link model. We tested our model based on the uninformative priors (i.e., let the data be more dominant). To be more specific, the priors for the Beta parameters are specified as multivariate normal with two parameters. We then compared this base model with other models that specify our major independent variable, church attendance based on past research findings. In doing so, we evaluated our model improvement through posterior distribution of our quantities of interests for different racial groups.

**Results of Descriptive Statistical Analysis**

Before discussing the results of our main hypotheses, we first present the results of descriptive analyses for each of the four racial groups’ frequency in church attendance. Table 1 lists the dispersion of the standard church attendance variable used in typical national surveys (NES 2000 and NES 2004). Based on the most recent 2004 data, Asian Americans (32%) are the group most likely to attend church on a weekly basis, slightly more frequently than African-Americans (29%). Whites (23%) and Latinos (21%) are the least likely groups to attend church services on a weekly basis. Two simple chi-square tests for both NES 2000 and NES 2004 indicate there are statistically significant differences in the frequency of church attendance when comparing all four groups.

Examining religious activities and beliefs associated with church attendance offer another important point of comparison for at least three of the four racial groups. The results in Figures 1 and 2 show the religious activities and belief systems that church involvement fosters. We constructed a religious index based on a composite scale of four variables in the NES which not only measures church attendance, but also prayer frequency, opinions on the Bible, and the overall influence of religion on their lives.

Figure 1 compares Whites with Blacks based on these four composite variables. Based on these data, Blacks are much more religiously active than
Table 1. Church Attendance by Race (NES 2000, 2004)

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<td>N=80</td>
<td>N=32</td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>N=1157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Religious Activities of Whites and Blacks, Compared (NES 2004)
Figure 2. Religious Activities of Whites and Latinos, Compared (NES 2004)
Whites. Blacks are more likely to attend church, believe in the Bible as the Word of God, pray frequently, and rely on religion as the major influence in their lives. The mean for the black racial group’s religious index is 9.6 while that for the white group is 10.3. \((t = -4.3, \text{ significant at .001 level})\).

Figure 2 compares Whites with Latinos in terms of their religious activity distribution. Overall, Whites and Latinos were engaged in strikingly similar level of religious activities based on their prayer frequency, belief in the Bible, religious influence as well as church attendance. The mean for the Latino group’s religious index is 10.1, which is almost identical to that for the white group at 10.3 \((t = -.77 \text{ and obviously statistically insignificant})\).

In terms of denominations, Table 2 provides a snapshot of each group and their affiliation. Whites (53%) and Blacks (90%) are the two likeliest groups to belong to Protestant churches. Latinos are the group least likely to attend Protestant churches (27%) and the group most likely to be Catholic (53%). In terms of political interest and activities, Protestants are slightly more likely to vote in the 2000 presidential election (71%), more interested in following campaigns (38%), care more about who wins a presidential election (88%), but less likely to belong to a labor union (15%) than Catholics.

Considering that Latinos are the group most likely to be Catholic, how do Latino Catholics fare against Catholics in general for these same measures? The results presented in Figure 3 indicate that Latino Catholics (56%) are less likely to vote in the 2000 presidential election than Catholics in general (66%). Latino Catholics are also less interested in following campaigns and care less about who wins the presidential election. This initial comparison suggests that at least among Latinos attending Catholic churches, church attendance alone does not have enough of a political mobilizing effect to increase political interest and activities to the level of Catholics in general. It is most likely a factor related to the immigrant experience that inhibits their participation but could also be due to factors yet to be discovered. To find out more, we need to take our analysis to the next level. We now turn to the results of our Bayesian regression analysis to identify which factors are most significant for predicting voting behavior.

**Results of Bayesian Regression Analysis**

The results of the four models (for each racial group) are presented in Table 3 with beta posterior parameter estimates and their respective credible intervals at different levels. The key to interpreting the results is to find the credible intervals that do not contain zero, which shows the non-zero effect of the variable. The mean is based on the average value of the simulations for the specific parameter, and its sign reveals the direction of
Table 2. Denominations by Race (NES 2000, 2004)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Church Attendance</th>
<th>White (%)</th>
<th>Black (%)</th>
<th>Latino (%)</th>
<th>Asian (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>Catholic</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>26.0</td>
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<td>Jewish</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>N=1169</td>
<td>N=868</td>
<td>N=191</td>
<td>N=178</td>
<td>N=87</td>
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Figure 3. Catholics in General and Latino Catholics, Compared (NES 2004)
Figure 4. Religious Activities of Protestants and Catholics, Compared (NES 2004)
### Table 3. A Bayesian Analysis of Voting Participation in 2000 Presidential Election

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<tr>
<th>node</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>2.5%</th>
<th>5.0%</th>
<th>10.0%</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>75.0%</th>
<th>90.0%</th>
<th>95.0%</th>
<th>97.5%</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.4074</td>
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<td>-0.2534</td>
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<td>-0.1716</td>
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<td>-0.01999</td>
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<td>0.1767</td>
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<td>0.2485</td>
<td>0.4212</td>
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<td>0.6849</td>
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</table>

| The posterior distribution for Blacks (GSS 2002) |       |       |       |       |       |        |       |       |       |       |
| beta[2] | -0.1999 | 0.4277 | -1.052 | -0.9067 | -0.7464 | -0.4797 | -0.2032 | 0.0818 | 0.3508 | 0.5092 | 0.6627 |
| beta[3] | 0.08929 | 0.03098 | 0.02953 | 0.03913 | 0.04995 | 0.06806 | 0.08921 | 0.1095 | 0.1285 | 0.139 | 0.1498 |
| beta[4] | 0.3055 | 0.03703 | 0.07868 | 0.1311 | 0.2114 | 0.3013 | 0.3968 | 0.4847 | 0.5404 | 0.5926 |
| beta[5] | 0.9322 | 1.238 | -1.444 | -1.07 | -0.6447 | 0.09261 | 0.9034 | 1.736 | 2.54 | 3.03 | 3.465 |
| beta[6] | -0.6979 | 0.357 | -1.435 | -1.321 | -1.177 | -0.9319 | -0.6771 | -0.4424 | -0.2537 | -0.1504 | -0.04472 |
| beta[7] | 0.694 | 0.5305 | -0.3707 | -0.1901 | 0.007782 | 0.3333 | 0.7017 | 1.066 | 1.366 | 1.543 | 1.688 |
| beta[8] | 0.4312 | 0.3932 | -0.3376 | -0.2125 | -0.06165 | 0.1665 | 0.4272 | 0.6862 | 0.9258 | 1.092 | 1.219 |
| beta[9] | 0.2192 | 0.147 | -0.06477 | -0.01847 | 0.03535 | 0.1202 | 0.2175 | 0.3142 | 0.4098 | 0.4702 | 0.5181 |
| beta[10] | 1.139 | 0.69 | -0.1908 | 0.001141 | 0.2316 | 0.6644 | 1.142 | 1.607 | 2.033 | 2.27 | 2.498 |

... table continues
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<th>Coding of variables:</th>
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<td>follows</td>
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<td>boycott, sign petition, protest, contact official, give change</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>attend (How often R</td>
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<th>Median</th>
<th>75.0%</th>
<th>90.0%</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. A Bayesian Analysis of Voting Participation in 2000 Presidential Election (continued)

**Coding of variables:** beta [1] constant, beta [2]-[9] are as follows

- **ASIANBORN[ ]** yes = 1, no = 0
- **AGE[ ]** number of years
- **ATTEND[ ]** 1 = every week, 2 = almost every week, 3 = once or twice a month, 4 = a few times a year, 5 = never
- **ACTIVISM[ ]** event count: contact official + protest + sign petition
- **ETHNIC[ ]** belong Asian or ethnic organizations
- **EDUC[ ]** 1 = grade school or less…9 = post graduate-degree
- **INCOME[ ]** 1 (less than 10,000), 7 (over 80K)
- **POLINT[ ]** 1 = very interested, 2 = somewhat interested, 3 = slightly interested, 4 = not at all interested
- **SEX** 1 = male, 2 = female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>node</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>2.5%</th>
<th>5.0%</th>
<th>10.0%</th>
<th>25.0%</th>
<th>median</th>
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<th>95.0%</th>
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The posterior distribution for Latinos (NES 2000)
Table 3. A Bayesian Analysis of Voting Participation in 2000 Presidential Election (continued)

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<th>Coding of variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>number of years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTEND[]</td>
<td>1 = once a week or more, 2 = almost every week, 3 = once/twice a month, 4 = a few times a year, 5 = never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABLE[]</td>
<td>Does R have cable or satellite TV, 1 = yes, 5 = no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTACT[]</td>
<td>Does R have internet or WWW access, 1 = yes, 5 = no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUC[]</td>
<td>1 = less than high school, 2 = high school, 3 = more than high school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME[]</td>
<td>1 (&lt;$15,000), 2 ($15,000-$34,999), 3(&gt;=$35,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLINT[]</td>
<td>R follows government and public affairs: 1 = most of the time, 2 = some of the time, 3 = only now and then, 4 = hardly at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX[]</td>
<td>1 = male, 2 = female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the relationship. To minimize the MC error, we performed at least 10,000 simulations to approximate the posterior distribution for each model.

For Whites, we ran Bayesian analysis with both the GSS and NES data concerning the 2000 presidential election. The results are substantially similar. For Blacks, we ran the basic Bayesian model with the priors dominated by the data. We then tried different prior specifications based on the findings from the GSS and performed a similar model using the NES. The results, of course, were not identical, because GSS and NES are two different surveys with different sets of variables. However, we report the results based on the models that maximized the findings of possible explanations for voting for each specific racial group. For Latinos, we were able to run the NES model based on its reasonable sample size that did allow the same Bayesian operation. For Asian Americans, we only reported the Bayesian findings from the PNAAPS data, rather than the NES data, because using the Bayesian model would have only 21 cases in the 2000 NES data for Asian Americans (N = 21).

To help better organize the findings, we provide a summary report in Table 4. The results of the analysis reveal different outcomes for whites than for nonwhites. In our model, Whites exhibit more positive signs than all other racial groups based on both NES and GSS models. Thus, Whites possess more positive cues to participate in voting than other minority groups. Furthermore, all minority groups had at least one factor that significantly decreased their likelihood of voting. For Asian Americans, those who were born outside the U.S. were less likely to vote than those who were native-born. For African Americans, the access to internet in fact limited them to vote, which suggests that the development of internet technology indeed may play a negative role in social capital accumulation, as implied in Putnam’s (2000) original study of the impact of modern technology. But this finding only applied to African Americans. With respect to Latinos, the political interest variable is negative. One possible explanation is that Latinos who pay attention to politics may be more attuned to the difficulty Latinos face insignificantly influencing election outcomes, reducing their propensity to vote. Finally, involvement in Asian ethnic organizations did not play a positive role in enhancing Asian Americans’ voting ratio. Although previous research highlighted the mobilizing effect of membership in Asian-American ethnic organizations (Wong 2006) our study finds that church membership is a significant mobilizing force for Asian Americans.

To briefly summarize some of the control variable results, only age emerges as significant for most racial groups; older Whites, African Americans and Asian Americans are more likely to vote than their younger counterparts, even when controlling for the related influences of SES and social capital. Our results reveal no differences between males and females in
A Comparative Analysis of American Voting Behavior  |  51

Table 4. Explanations for Voting Participation in the 2000 Presidential Election, Four Racial Groups Compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SES</th>
<th>Asian American (PNAAPS)</th>
<th>African-American (GSS)</th>
<th>Latino (NES)</th>
<th>White (NES)</th>
<th>White (GSS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>sex</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia_born</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>church_att</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>internet</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic trust</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>trust</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

voting patterns. Although traditional participation models predict that SES will increase voting participation of all racial groups, we find that SES fails to significantly influence voting for African Americans (the credible interval includes zero or “no effect” as a possible estimate). Education is a positive factor for all racial groups, except for Blacks. This finding is consistent with previous findings that show SES models are poor predictors of African American participation (Verba and Nie 1972). Finally, for our key variable of interest, for whites, two social capital variables, social activism and church attendance, both enhance voting participation based on the GSS model (the 95% credible intervals for these variables do not include zero). For African Americans, church attendance is the only social capital variable that significantly increased voting participation. For Asian Americans, church attendance led to increased levels of voting. For Latinos, attending church has no significant effect on voting behavior. These findings confirm our hypothesis that church attendance increases participation among racial groups that attend racially homogenous churches.

Conclusions and Discussion

To conclude, the most important finding to emerge from this study is the significant and positive effect of church attendance on all racial groups, except Latinos. This finding confirms our hypothesis, suggesting that the
so-called “dark side” of social capital does not seem to occur in the realm of voting behavior. As the Gallup Poll data indicate, Americans tend to belong to racially homogeneous church congregations. Our results suggest that this homogeneity may play a positive, rather than negative role in mobilizing voters.

In contrast, Latino voting behavior does not seem to obtain a boost from church attendance. Thus, since Latinos are more likely to attend churches that are more racially heterogeneous, which generates bridging capital instead of bonding capital, we believe the racial composition of the church may prove to be a critical factor in how social capital influences voting behavior. Our findings run counter to the belief that bridging capital is always more beneficial to fostering democracy than bonding capital, at least in the realm of voting behavior.

In light of these results, this paper contends that the racial composition of church congregations may influence the type of social capital that develops within churches (bridging versus bonding forms of capital) and reduce the otherwise positive effects of church attendance for participation. Opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities to develop civic skills may be diminished in church settings where they constitute a numerical minority within that congregation. In contrast, in settings where one constitutes a numerical majority, individuals may possess stronger relational ties with other members and bear a lower cost for developing a sense of belonging within the church. Consistent with the principle of homophily, the racial/ethnic homogeneity of the congregation may reduce the costs of developing meaningful connections among church members that facilitate greater church involvement.

Members who feel more socially connected to other church members may be more likely to take advantage of opportunities to develop the civic skills that translate into greater civic participation down the line. Moreover, if churches provide ample opportunities to develop civic skills which facilitate their participation in politics, and racial/ethnic based organizations are better equipped to mobilize their members because they possess “insider” knowledge of the community that mainstream organizations typically lack (Tate 1993; Wong 2006), it is quite possible that a homogenous church environment may be a real boon for political participation, particularly for groups that are typically ignored by larger, more established recruiting institutions.

Finally, a further note on the limitation of this paper is necessary. First, due to the nature of the national survey concerning white respondents, this paper was not able to address some important research questions. One such question would be whether or not attendance in homogenous vs. heterogeneous and/or multiracial churches matters for Whites. Second, there are a
large number of non-Judeo-Christian religious adherents among Asian ethnic groups who do not attend “church.” In fact, they attend certain temples, dependent upon how “religious languages” are used in the survey questions. Further, some groups, such as Buddhists, may be quite religious, but they do not attend religious services regularly. The most serious problem for the student of race, as far as Asian Americans are concerned, however, is that church attendance (at Christian churches) may vary greatly by national origin—making it fairly difficult to distinguish between the effects of religion and national origin.

NOTES

1 Asian Americans were not sampled in the 2004 Gallup Poll on race and religion.
3 It should be noted that the 2000 NES data do have some internal sampling problems. First, NES has always been a national survey, which has not used an oversample of minorities, especially Latinos and Asians. Second, the survey was conducted in English, thus, it excluded those non-English speakers from the sampling procedure.
4 The PNAAPS, it should also be noted, was not a national survey. Instead, it was a survey conducted in five metropolitan areas. Thus, the readers of this paper should be cautioned to make limited generalization of the results presented in this study about the national population.

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Descriptive Representatives, Party Status, and Latino Representation in Congressional Legislation

Walter Clark Wilson

Empirical research has yet to adequately address the substantive implications of Latino descriptive representation in legislative activities like bill sponsorship, or to explore whether party status impacts the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. I examine an original dataset of bills sponsored during the 109th and 110th congresses to assess the effect of descriptive representation on the sponsorship of Latino interest bills. Results illustrate that Latino representatives sponsored more Latino interest bills than their non-Latino colleagues during both congresses. The heightened commitment of Latino representatives to the sponsorship of Latino interest bills was unaffected by important partisan changes during the period in question, underscoring the substantive effect of descriptive representation.

Do Latino U.S. Representatives sponsor more bills that represent Latino interests than their non-Latino colleagues? Does party status affect the relationship between descriptive representation and the substantive representation? Empirical research has yet to adequately address these questions. Studies suggest that female and African American members of Congress sponsor more legislation representing female and black interests, respectively (Canon 1999; Swers 2002). Minority representatives appear to increase their overall sponsorship activities during Democratically controlled congresses (Rocca and Sanchez 2008). Evidence suggests that female representatives increase their sponsorship of social welfare bills when they are in the majority (Swers 2002, 49). In this article, I explore the relationship of descriptive representation to the sponsorship of Latino interest bills during the 109th and 110th congresses, and examine whether changes in party status due to the recent change of partisan control in the U.S. House of Representatives impact this relationship.

The literature relating descriptive representation to substantive representation is well known to scholars interested in the representation of politically disadvantaged groups like women, African Americans, and Latinos. Descriptive representation, typically conceptualized as the presence of an important shared physical trait like sex, race or ethnicity between groups of constituents and elected officials, is often theorized to enhance the substantive representation of female, African American or Latino constituencies (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998). A number of empirical

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studies suggest that female (Swers 2002; Wolbrecht 2002), African American (Canon 1999; Lublin 1997), and Latino (Huerta and Santos 2006; Kerr and Miller 1997; Lublin 1997; Wilson 2009) representatives are “on average . . . more likely to represent the concerns and interests of citizens from those groups” (Williams 1998, 6).

While numerous studies demonstrate consequential differences in the representative behaviors of male and female, black and white, and Latino and non-Latino representatives, these literatures pay inadequate attention to the influence of partisan contexts. For example, one might expect partisan context to significantly shape representative behavior with respect to activities like bill sponsorship, where success may often rest on majority party status (Frantzitch 1979; Moore and Thomas 1990; Swers 2002). Particularly in an era of increasingly cohesive congressional parties (Theriault 2008), it is important to ask whether party status significantly impacts the efforts of descriptive representatives to substantively represent disadvantaged groups like Latinos. With respect to Latino representation, research also seldom examines substantive contributions to the legislative process. In other words, the Latino representation literature contains few studies of behaviors that can affect the scope and content of the congressional agenda—a critical shortcoming if we desire to fully understand the implications of descriptive representation to the substantive representation of Latinos. This study addresses each of these shortcomings by examining the sponsorship of Latino interest bills in changing partisan contexts. The results of this analysis clarify qualities of legislative representation that differentiate Latino and non-Latino representatives, shed light on whether party status impacts the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, and strengthens evidence that descriptive representation influences substantive representation.

**Descriptive Representatives, Bill Sponsorship, and Majority Party Status**

Bill sponsorship is clearly related to policy responsiveness, but researchers have yet to adequately explore the behavior as an indicator of Latino representation. At the congressional level, most analyses of Latino representation focus on voting patterns using the familiar model of preference congruence to indicate policy responsiveness (Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau and Karps 1977). With mixed results, scholars have examined whether Latino representatives vote more liberally than their non-Latino colleagues (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Casellas 2007) and also whether Latino representatives are more supportive of Latino interests during roll call votes (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997; Santos and Huerta 2001; Huerta and Santos 2006; Knoll 2009).
At the local level, an important literature examines the impact of Latino representatives on school boards and among school administrators on Latino student performance. Generally, Latino descriptive, or passive representation in these circumstances appears associated with better educational outcomes for Latino students (Meier 1993; Ross et al. 2010). While existing literatures on Latino representation provides important insights, they do not assess qualities of contributions to policymaking, or whether party status affects the responsiveness of Latino representatives to Latino constituencies. The following analysis of Latino representation in congressional bill sponsorship behaviors addresses these lacunae in the literature.

Much as position taking in behaviors like roll call voting can be used to measure congruence with constituency preferences or support for constituency interests, and therefore policy responsiveness, bill sponsorship can be evaluated with respect to the positions legislators take that represent interests of their constituents. This observation has not been lost on scholars examining the relationship between descriptive representation and substantive representation. As an activity with high “attitudinal and resource demands” (Tamerius 1995, 104), and which can indicate a representative’s commitment to bringing group issues to the policy agenda (Swers 2002, 34), bill sponsorship is a behavior that reveals the policy preferences and priorities of representatives (Hall 1996).

Literature on the representation of both women and African Americans at the Congressional level includes studies that assess the effect of descriptive representation on the substantive representation of these groups by delving into the content of the bills representatives sponsor. An important example of this research is Swers’s (2002) analysis of the relationship between descriptive representation and the sponsorship of women’s issue bills in Congress. Swers found that female representatives of both parties generally sponsored larger numbers of “feminist” and “social welfare” bills than their male colleagues during congresses controlled by both Democrats and Republicans (2002, 44-45). Swers’ study also illustrates that partisans of both sexes sponsored more women’s issue bills when their party was in the majority (38-39). Canon (1999) conducted a similar study that examined the sponsorship of legislation with “racial content” during the Democratically controlled 103rd Congress. Black representatives he termed “commonality members,” as well as older black representatives, sponsored more bills with “racial” content than white representatives, further supporting the notion that descriptive representation impacts substantive representation in sponsorship behaviors (1999, 196).

The literature on Latino representation addresses questions about whether Latino representatives are more active sponsors of bills that represent Latinos at state legislative level, but not the congressional level.
Bratton’s (2006) study of Latino representation during 2001 in seven state legislatures revealed that, while Latino representatives did not differ significantly from their partisan counterparts in terms of their sponsorship of education, health or welfare related bills, they did sponsor a significantly larger number of “Latino Interest” bills than non-Latinos. At the congressional level, previous studies of Latino representation in bill sponsorship rely on measures of sponsorship productivity rather than legislative content in order to assess the impact of Latino descriptive representation on sponsorship patterns. Research by Santos and Huerta (2001) revealed no significant differences between Latino and non-Latino representatives with regard to numbers of bills they sponsored or the numbers of public laws they authored. Rocca and Sanchez (2008), however, discovered that Latino representatives sponsored significantly fewer pieces of legislation than did non-Latinos. Their study, which assessed sponsorship patterns across congresses controlled by both Democrats and Republicans, also revealed that Latino representatives (and African American representatives) sponsored more legislation during Democratically controlled congresses (Rocca and Sanchez 2008).

Whether party status impacts sponsorship of specific subsets of bills by descriptive representatives, like those linked to specific constituencies (Latinos, for example), remains an open question. A number of studies suggest that majority party status increases the sponsorship activities of representatives (Frantzitch 1979; Moore and Thomas 1990; Swers 2002; Rocca and Sanchez 2008). Such a phenomenon is to be expected, according to Swers, because “majority party status translates into agenda control and responsibility” (2002, 39). Because of the greater influence rank-and-file members of the majority have with influential gate-keepers like party leaders and committee chairs, Swers argues that “representatives increase their sponsorship rates when the believe they have an opportunity to shape policy outcomes and to see their proposals enacted into law” (2002, 39).

The question of whether party status impacts the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is particularly interesting given the centrality of shared experiences between descriptive representatives and constituencies to expectations of an empirical relationship between descriptive and substantive representation (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998). Theorists argue that descriptive representatives who are “existentially close to the issues” affecting groups like women, African Americans, or Latinos by virtue of the life experiences they share with those populations, possess advantages in terms of their abilities to recognize, understand, and articulate the interests, concerns, and perspectives of such constituencies (Mansbridge 1999). The theoretical literature on descriptive representation provides little reason to expect party status to intervene on its substantive effects. Scholars
framing the substantive importance of descriptive representation in terms of the representation of perspectives, and the ability of descriptive representatives to articulate “uncrystallized” group interests in processes of deliberation, deemphasize the attachment of such activities to traditional forms of legislative accountability (Mansbridge 1999, 635). Rather than party, electoral, or other concerns informing the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation, theorists articulate a much more relational logic, whereby descriptive representatives approach issues from internalized social perspectives that establish stating points for reasoning, rather than determine the content of conclusions or specific actions (Young 2000, 136). Under such a conceptualization, the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation appears independent of traditional mechanisms of accountability, and we might expect a heightened commitment to the needs of group constituencies from descriptive representatives regardless of partisan context. Given that descriptive representation appears theoretically tied to starting points for policy discussion and deliberation, we might also expect it to influence agenda setting behaviors like bill sponsorship substantially.

An alternative possibility, which would indicate that the effect of descriptive representation is contextual, is that descriptive representatives might increase their sponsorship of group interest bills when they are in the majority due to enhanced influence with leaders and committee chairs. Along similar lines, we might expect minority status to depress the efforts of descriptive representatives to sponsor bills designed to address group interests because minority party status diminishes representatives’ influence, making such efforts less likely to succeed. Such findings would indicate that the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is contingent upon party status or institutional position, and that the likelihood descriptive representatives act on behalf of their group constituencies depends on their opportunities to produce results.

As a behavioral indicator of representation, bill sponsorship straddles a theoretical divide between expectations based on traditional mechanisms of representative accountability like party and reelection, and expectations that shared experiences and perspectives between representatives and groups lead to greater action on behalf of groups by representatives. Clearly, the likelihood of legislative success must condition a significant amount of representatives’ sponsorship behaviors. But bill sponsorship also stands out as an important way for representatives to articulate problems and policy solutions. If descriptive representatives possess heightened commitments to expressing the interests, concerns, and perspectives of the groups in which they are members, it seems plausible that these efforts are exerted independent of party effects. By addressing the relationship of descriptive represen-
tation to sponsorship of Latino interest bills in Congress, and the effect of majority party status on this relationship, the following analysis moves literature on Latino representation in directions that refine our understandings of the contextual and qualitative importance of descriptive representation.

Data

In order to examine whether Latino members of Congress differ from their non-Latino counterparts in terms of the Latino interest content of the bills they sponsor, and to assess the effects of party status on these sponsorship patterns, I considered 9300 public bills sponsored during the Republican controlled 109th Congress (2005-2006) and 10420 public bills sponsored during the Democratically controlled 110th Congress (2007-2008). From this population of bills, I identified and coded all Latino interest bills. Latino interest bills contain measures that “might decrease discrimination against Latinos or alleviate the effects of that discrimination, or [that] were designed to improve the socioeconomic status or health of Latinos” (Bratton 2006, 1142). I also considered symbolic bills that addressed Latino cultural or societal concerns, or paid tribute to important Latino leaders to be Latino interest bills because of the function such bills serve in fostering greater inclusion and recognition of Latino concerns in American society. Among bills sponsored during the 109th Congress, I identified 241 Latino interest bills, 80 of which (one-third) were sponsored by Latino representatives. Among 110th Congress bills, I identified 218 Latino interest bills, 83 of which (38%) were sponsored by Latino representatives. The inclusive definition of Latino interest legislation used for this research resulted in the analysis of bills that address diverse issues and policies. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of issues within the set of Latino interest bills examined.

Latino interests in congressional legislation appeared both explicitly, calling for actions that impact specific Latino and Hispanic populations directly, and implicitly, in proposals tied to disproportionate concerns of Latinos in certain areas of public policy. A few examples help to illustrate the presence of Latino interests in bills examined by this analysis. The Latino interests in HR 512, sponsored by Representative Xavier Becerra (D–CA) during the 110th Congress, are quite explicit. The bill would establish a “Commission to Study the Potential Creation of the National Museum of the American Latino.” Latino interests are also clear in HR 468, sponsored by Representative Hilda Solis (D–CA) during the 110th Congress, which would “make grants to carry out activities to prevent teen pregnancy in racial or ethnic minority or immigrant communities.” Implicit Latino interests in many linguistic education and immigration-related issues make HR 2957,
Table 1. Issues in Latino Interest Bills, 109th and 110th Congresses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>109th Congress</th>
<th>110th Congress</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>79 (12)</td>
<td>31 (11)</td>
<td>110 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>31 (14)</td>
<td>57 (17)</td>
<td>88 (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td>48 (20)</td>
<td>40 (22)</td>
<td>88 (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights/Equal Opportunity</td>
<td>23 (7)</td>
<td>39 (9)</td>
<td>62 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>19 (8)</td>
<td>27 (9)</td>
<td>46 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>16 (7)</td>
<td>6 (4)</td>
<td>22 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Issues</td>
<td>25 (12)</td>
<td>17 (11)</td>
<td>42 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>241 (80)</td>
<td>217 (83)</td>
<td>458 (163)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Number of bills sponsored by Latino representatives in parentheses.

“To amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to improve educational practices for limited English proficient students and immigrant students” sponsored by Representative Joe Baca (D–CA) during the 110th Congress, a Latino interest bill. Large numbers of recent Latino immigrants similarly make implicit Latino interests evident in HR 427, sponsored by Representative Edolphous Towns (D–NY) during the 110th Congress, which would “assure coverage for legal immigrant children and pregnant women under the Medicaid Program and the State children's health insurance program.” And a diversity of social problems accompanying the exploding Latino population in the Mexican border region makes HR 2068, sponsored by Representative Sylvestre Reyes (D–TX) during the 110th Congress, a Latino interest bill. The bill proposes a Southwest Regional Border Authority to address the many educational, economic, and infrastructural challenges faced by growing immigrant communities.

In addition to bills that address issues substantively, or programmatically, I also consider a number of symbolic bills because of the importance of such legislation to raising Latino concerns, incorporating Latino traditions and figures into American culture, and articulating “uncrystallized” Latino interests (Mansbridge 1999). House Concurrent Resolution 426, sponsored by Representative Maxine Waters (D–CA) during the 110th Congress, which recognizes the 10th anniversary of, work done by, and challenges faced by, the Minority AIDS Initiative, publicizes the disproportionate health threat HIV and AIDS pose to Latinos and other minority communities. H Res 347, sponsored by Representative Joe Baca (D–CA) during the 110th congress, recognizes the significance of Cinco de Mayo, and serves to incorporate this Mexican holiday into American culture. While it is arguable that symbolic bills do not “do” anything substantive for Latinos, such legislation clearly helps to give Latinos “voice” in the legislative process.
Both substantive and symbolic Latino interest bills, then, constitute legislative efforts that “act for” Latinos as a constituency, and provide substantive representation (Pitkin 1967).

**Dependent Variables**

I created four separate dependent variables for the following analysis of Latino representation in bill sponsorship, each of which assesses sponsorship behavior at the member-level of analysis. The first is the *Total Bills Sponsored* by representatives per congress. This analysis establishes the dynamics related to overall patterns of bill sponsorship in the data examined here. Second, I considered sponsorship of *Latino Interest Bills*. This dependent variable equaled the total number of Latino interest bills sponsored by individual representatives per congress. Finally, I divided Latino interest bills into subcategories to create two additional dependent variables: *Substantive Latino Interest* bills and *Symbolic Latino Interest* bills. Examining sponsorship of these types of bills helps to refine my analysis of the influence of descriptive representation on Latino interest bill sponsorship and address potential concerns related to the conflation of these types of legislation in relation to the concept of substantive representation.

**Independent Variables**

My analyses of Latino representation in congressional bill sponsorship consider a number of independent variables. Most important is whether the bill sponsor is a *Latino representative*.¹ This dummy indicator captures the effect of descriptive representation on sponsorship patterns. Based on differences in experiences and political perspectives that theoretically set members of disadvantaged groups apart from more privileged groups, and descriptive representatives apart from their colleagues (Mansbridge 1999; Williams 1998), I would expect Latino representatives to be more active sponsors of Latino interest bills than their non-Latino colleagues.

A second critical independent variable is the *Latino population proportion*² of districts represented by bill sponsors. Given well-established electoral connections reflected by policy responsiveness on the part of representatives, the importance of this variable to analyses of Latino representation in bill sponsorship is obvious (Mayhew 1974; Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau and Karps 1977). I would expect representatives with larger Latino constituencies to sponsor more Latino interest bills.

Two additional variables of heightened importance tap the effect of party status and appear in a set of models that examine sponsorship patterns of representatives who served complete terms in both the 109th and 110th
congresses. The first of these is a dummy indicator that captures the effect of Majority Party Status on sponsorship patterns for all representatives examined. I would expect majority party status to increase the overall sponsorship activities of Latino and non-Latino representatives (Franztich 1979; Moore and Thomas 1991; Rocca and Sanchez 2008).

A second variable assesses the effect of majority party status on the sponsorship patterns of Latino representatives specifically. To capture this effect I created a variable which interacts ethnicity with party status by multiplying Latino representative by Majority Party to create Latino*Majority. Rocca and Sanchez (2008) suggest that marginalization within a majority white institution depresses overall sponsorship by Latino representatives, especially during Republican controlled congresses when most of these members are in the minority. This analysis explores whether minority party status similarly depresses the sponsorship of Latino interest bills by Latino representatives, therefore impacting the relationship between descriptive representation and the substantive representation of Latinos. In essence, this variable assesses the relative resilience of descriptive representation as a factor affecting the substantive representation of Latinos in congressional legislation.

I modeled a number of control variables in each of the following analyses. I control for political party (1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican) and Member Conservatism because Democrats and more liberal representatives may be more supportive of Latino interests (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Bratton 2006; Knoll 2009; Wilson 2009). In models of Latino interest bills and Anti-Latino Interest bills, I control for the Total Bills Sponsored because I expect more active bill sponsors to sponsor more legislation in subcategories of bills (Swers 2002). I control for whether a sponsor is a Female Representative or Minority Representative (African American or Asian American) because some studies suggest that minority representatives are more supportive of Latino interests than white representatives (Huerta and Santos 2006; Bratton 2006).

The following analyses also model a number of constituency-level control variables. I control for the Black Population in congressional districts because historical experiences with social and political marginalization give blacks and Latinos overlapping interests in a number of issue areas addressed by Latino interest bills. I control for Constituency Conservatism because of the importance of constituency policy preferences to dyadic models of policy responsiveness (Miller and Stokes 1963; Eulau and Karps 1977). Finally, I control for Border State District to indicate whether representatives’ districts are in states that border Mexico. This variable taps regional effects related to heightened interests in immigration issues along the border.
Methodology

My examination of Latino representation in bill sponsorship considers sponsorship patterns of representatives during the 109th and 110th congresses separately, and in a combined assessment of the sponsorship patterns of all representatives that served full terms in both of these congresses. My approach is therefore able to assess the effect of descriptive representation on the sponsorship of Latino interest bills in two different partisan contexts, and to assess the effect that changes in majority party status have on the sponsorship patterns of individual representatives. I used negative binomial regression models to estimate the numbers of bills sponsored in each bill category (Total Bills Sponsored, Latino Interest Bills, Substantive Latino Interest bills and Symbolic Latino Interest bills) in each of the following analyses. Observations in the third set of models, which assess the effect of changes in party status on sponsorship patterns, are clustered on the 368 representatives that served full terms in both the 109th and 110th Congresses in recognition of the likelihood that multiple observations of the same representative’s sponsorship patterns are not independent (Long and Freese 2003).

Results

Results of my analyses of Latino representation in sponsorships during the 109th and 110th Congresses appear in Tables 2 and 3. Consistent with Rocca and Sanchez (2008), I found that average Latino representatives sponsored significantly fewer bills, overall, than non-Latino representatives during both congresses. Given a district population that was 50 percent Latino (a vast majority Latino representatives in both congresses served larger Latino constituencies) and holding other variables at their means, Latino representatives were estimated to sponsor approximately 16 bills during the 109th Congress and 18 bills during the 110th Congress. Similarly situated non-Latino representatives (the vast majority represented smaller Latino constituencies) were estimated to sponsor approximately 26 bills during the 109th Congress and 27 bills during the 110th Congress.

While Latino representatives were less active legislators overall than non-Latino representatives, they still sponsored, on average, significantly more Latino interest bills than their non-Latino colleagues during both Congresses. The relationship between descriptive representation and Latino interest bill sponsorship appears to have been stronger during the 110th Congress than during the 109th Congress. During the 110th Congress, Latino representatives sponsored significantly more Latino interest bills, as well as significantly more Substantive and Symbolic Latino interest bills.
Table 2. Bill Sponsorship Patterns, 109th Congress  
Negative Binomial Regression, Counts of Bills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Bills Sponsored</th>
<th>Latino Interest Bills</th>
<th>Substantive Latino Interest</th>
<th>Symbolic Latino Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Representative</td>
<td>-0.481*** (0.187)</td>
<td>0.716* (0.391)</td>
<td>0.630 (0.433)</td>
<td>0.730 (0.668)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>-0.232 (0.181)</td>
<td>0.254 (0.562)</td>
<td>0.327 (0.602)</td>
<td>0.272 (1.286)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Conservatism</td>
<td>0.230 (0.209)</td>
<td>-0.077 (0.621)</td>
<td>-0.066 (0.659)</td>
<td>0.204 (1.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Bills Sponsored</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.029*** (0.005)</td>
<td>0.031*** (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Representative</td>
<td>0.122 (0.088)</td>
<td>-0.071 (0.231)</td>
<td>-0.164 (0.253)</td>
<td>0.143 (0.461)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Representative</td>
<td>0.110 (0.158)</td>
<td>0.501 (0.440)</td>
<td>0.431 (0.473)</td>
<td>0.506 (0.943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Population</td>
<td>0.005 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.033*** (0.008)</td>
<td>0.029*** (0.009)</td>
<td>0.057*** (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency Conservatism</td>
<td>-0.018*** (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.024* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border State</td>
<td>-0.014 (0.102)</td>
<td>0.248 (0.266)</td>
<td>0.256 (0.294)</td>
<td>0.142 (0.510)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.040*** (0.236)</td>
<td>-1.877*** (0.663)</td>
<td>-1.778*** (0.705)</td>
<td>-4.999*** (1.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnalpha</td>
<td>-1.020 (0.074)</td>
<td>-0.645 (0.381)</td>
<td>-0.579 (0.391)</td>
<td>-0.289 (0.696)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alpha</td>
<td>0.361 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.525 (0.200)</td>
<td>0.561 (0.219)</td>
<td>0.749 (0.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square</td>
<td>38.730</td>
<td>171.330</td>
<td>153.27</td>
<td>77.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; Chi-Square</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Square</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.2166</td>
<td>0.2761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01; two-tailed significance tests (standard errors in parentheses).
Table 3. Bill Sponsorship Patterns, 110th Congress
Negative Binomial Regression, Counts of Bills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Bills Sponsored</th>
<th>Latino Interest Bills</th>
<th>Substantive Latino Interest</th>
<th>Symbolic Latino Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Representative</td>
<td>-0.397*</td>
<td>1.159***</td>
<td>0.868*</td>
<td>2.493***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.436)</td>
<td>(0.502)</td>
<td>(0.825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>-3.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.842)</td>
<td>(0.896)</td>
<td>(2.335)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Conservatism</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>-0.632</td>
<td>-0.454</td>
<td>-3.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td>(0.920)</td>
<td>(0.987)</td>
<td>(2.342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Bills Sponsored</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.024***</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>0.043***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Representative</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>-1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Representative</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>1.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
<td>(1.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Population</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>2.507***</td>
<td>2.635***</td>
<td>3.274*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(0.876)</td>
<td>(1.001)</td>
<td>(1.763)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population</td>
<td>-0.702**</td>
<td>1.668*</td>
<td>1.741*</td>
<td>-2.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(0.983)</td>
<td>(1.057)</td>
<td>(3.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency Conservatism</td>
<td>-0.013***</td>
<td>-0.020*</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border State</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.452</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>2.103***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.300)</td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.711)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.650***</td>
<td>-2.082***</td>
<td>-2.229***</td>
<td>-3.102*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.763)</td>
<td>(0.827)</td>
<td>(1.846)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inalpha</td>
<td>-1.185</td>
<td>-0.409</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>-0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.340)</td>
<td>(0.336)</td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alpha</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.664</td>
<td>0.912</td>
<td>0.765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square</td>
<td>62.140</td>
<td>172.29</td>
<td>134.33</td>
<td>104.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; Chi-Square</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Square</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.2364</td>
<td>0.2025</td>
<td>0.4595</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01; two-tailed significance tests (standard errors in parentheses).
than their non-Latino colleagues. During the 109th Congress, the effect of descriptive representation on sponsorship patterns was only present when substantive and symbolic Latino interest bills were considered together as a single category of Latino interest bills. Combined, these analyses suggest both that descriptive representation influenced the sponsorship of Latino interest bills, and that these effects applied to the sponsorship of both substantive and symbolic forms of Latino interest legislation. Importantly, then, the impact of descriptive representation on Latino interest bill sponsorship did not appear disproportionately shaped by either symbolic or substantive legislation, but rather reflected greater efforts to both voice Latino cultural concerns and priorities, and to place Latino interest policy proposals on the agenda.

Latino population also shared a positive and strongly significant relationship with the sponsorship of Latino interest bills during both Congresses, suggesting that Latino and non-Latino representatives of both parties respond to larger Latino constituencies with greater efforts to represent them in their sponsorship behaviors. Constituency conservatism shared a weak negative relationship with Latino interest bill sponsorship during both Congresses, and sponsorship productivity, measured by total bills sponsored, was strongly related to Latino interest bill sponsorship, as expected. Two items worthy of note from the analysis of sponsorship during the 110th Congress are that Border State representatives sponsored more symbolic Latino interest bills than their colleagues, and that black population size was positively related to sponsorship of substantive Latino interest bills, but not symbolic Latino interest bills. With regard to the former, I speculate that some border state representatives—perhaps those in politically precarious positions—saw symbolic bills as a good way to reach out to Latinos without wading into controversial policy territory during a period of electoral upheaval. The fact that black constituencies appear related to the sponsorship of Latino interest bills in substantive, but not symbolic ways is more straightforwardly interpreted. Representatives of black and Latino constituencies respond to many similar substantive socio-economic interests and concerns.

I calculated the estimated differences in the numbers of Latino interest bills sponsored by Latino and non-Latino representatives in relation to varying Latino population sizes in order to illustrate the effect of descriptive representation more concretely. Given a congressional district that was 40 percent Latino and holding other variables at their means, Latino representatives were predicted to sponsor 1.17 Latino interest bills during the 109th Congress and 1.03 Latino interest bills during the 110th Congress. Similarly situated non-Latino representatives were predicted to sponsor only .57 Latino interest bills during the 109th Congress and .32 Latino interest bills during the 110th Congress.
The estimated gap in sponsorship patterns widened substantively among Latino and non-Latino representatives who served larger Latino constituencies. Given a congressional district that was 60 percent Latino and holding other variables at their means (more than 60 percent of Latino representatives served Latino constituencies at least this large during both congresses), Latino representatives were estimated to sponsor 2.27 Latino interest bills during the 109th Congress and 1.7 Latino interest bills during the 110th Congress. Similarly situated non-Latino representatives (only one non-Latino representative served such a large Latino constituency during these congresses) were estimated to sponsor 1.17 Latino interest bills during the 109th Congress and .56 Latino interest bills during the 110th Congress.

While the raw numbers of bills presented here appear small, they are important given that Latino representatives hail almost exclusively from heavily Latino districts. Most Latino representatives come from districts that are more than 60 percent Latino, and would have been expected to sponsor multiple pieces of Latino interest legislation during either congress analyzed here. Only non-Latino representatives with very large Latino constituencies—a handful of legislators—would reasonably have been expected to sponsor even one Latino interest bill during either congress. The evidence presented here clearly demonstrates that Latino representatives, on average, took disproportionately greater action with regard to sponsorship of Latino interest bills during both Republican and Democratic Congresses.

Table 4 shows the results of analyses that examine bill sponsors who served full terms in both the 109th and 110th Congress. As expected, majority party status had a positive effect on overall sponsorship behaviors. Both Democrats and Republicans sponsored more bills when their parties were in the majority. And while Latino representatives sponsored fewer bills than non-Latino representatives across these congresses, as they did during each individual session, majority party status increased the sponsorship productivity of Latino representatives significantly. Given a Latino population of 50 percent and holding other variables at their means, majority status boosted the overall sponsorship productivity of the average Latino representative by more than seven bills.

My analysis of Latino interest bill sponsorship across congresses reveals that party status was not a factor in determining this type of sponsorship generally, nor did party status impact the sponsorship behaviors of Latino representatives specifically. In other words, party status was neither a major determinant nor deterrent of Latino interest bill sponsorship by Latino (or non-Latino) representatives. Consistent with their behaviors during the 109th and 110th Congresses, Latino representatives sponsored significantly more Latino interest bills than their non-Latino colleagues across congresses. Latino constituency size also positively and significantly predicted Latino
Table 4. Bill Sponsorship Patterns, 109th and 110th Congresses
Negative Binomial Regression, Counts of Bills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Bills Sponsored</th>
<th>Latino Interest Bills</th>
<th>Substantive Latino Interest</th>
<th>Symbolic Latino Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latino Representative</td>
<td>-0.729***</td>
<td>1.131***</td>
<td>0.952**</td>
<td>1.529**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
<td>(0.614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party</td>
<td>0.243***</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>-0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Rep.*Majority</td>
<td>0.242**</td>
<td>-0.275</td>
<td>-0.275</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(0.451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>-1.596*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.207)</td>
<td>(0.492)</td>
<td>(0.548)</td>
<td>(0.881)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Conservatism</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>-1.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.545)</td>
<td>(0.599)</td>
<td>(0.941)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Bills sponsored</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Representative</td>
<td>0.148*</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Representative</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.823</td>
<td>0.844*</td>
<td>1.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.437)</td>
<td>(0.623)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino Population</td>
<td>0.598*</td>
<td>2.871***</td>
<td>2.807***</td>
<td>4.088***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.338)</td>
<td>(0.694)</td>
<td>(0.801)</td>
<td>(1.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Population</td>
<td>-0.731**</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>0.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
<td>(0.935)</td>
<td>(1.063)</td>
<td>(1.692)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituency Conservatism</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td>-0.022***</td>
<td>-0.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border State District</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>1.454***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
<td>(0.390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.698***</td>
<td>-1.756***</td>
<td>-1.887***</td>
<td>-3.337***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td>(1.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnalpha</td>
<td>-1.112</td>
<td>-0.452</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alpha</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.849</td>
<td>0.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td>(0.378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-Square(12)</td>
<td>134.850</td>
<td>352.810</td>
<td>277.86</td>
<td>141.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; Chi-Square</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-2868.969</td>
<td>-516.841</td>
<td>-478.976</td>
<td>-148.51098</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05, ***p ≤ .01; two-tailed significance tests (standard errors in parentheses).
interest sponsorship across congresses, suggesting the presence of general policy responsiveness to Latino constituencies on the part of representatives in the sample. Finally, constituency conservatism was significantly and negatively related to Latino interest bill sponsorship across congresses.

Results from analyses of substantive and symbolic Latino interest bill sponsorship across congresses were largely similar to those analyzing sponsorship of all Latino interest bills, with a couple of noteworthy exceptions. First, Democrats sponsored significantly fewer symbolic Latino interest bills, holding other variables constant, suggesting that Republican representatives in the sample were comparatively disposed toward sponsoring such bills. Second, and as was the case during the 110th Congress, representatives from Border States sponsored significantly more symbolic Latino interest bills. It seems plausible that some Republicans saw sponsoring symbolic Latino interest bills as a relatively costless method for reaching out to their Latino constituents. Along similar lines, representatives from Border States may have been comparatively likely to view symbolic Latino interest bills as a relatively non-controversial way to demonstrate responsiveness to a population that is especially politicized in the Southwest United States. Both of these findings suggest, ultimately, that some of the symbolic Latino interest bill sponsorship activity during the period was motivated by electoral impulses in the context of complex and tumultuous electoral climates.

Discussion

Who represents Latinos in their legislative efforts? What effect does party status have on those efforts? And what can the findings of this analysis tell us about the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation? An obvious place to begin this assessment is with the familiar relationship between representative behavior and constituency interests. The results of this analysis illustrate that U.S. representatives respond to larger Latino constituencies by sponsoring more Latino interest legislation—with both substantive and symbolic content. This is important because it establishes the presence of an electoral connection between this underrepresented population and the legislators by whom Latinos are served (Mayhew 1974). Much as we might expect representatives to respond to issue based constituencies, then, there appears to be a level of congruence or correspondence between the volume of Latino interest in a district and the legislative agendas of representatives (Miller and Stokes 1963). Sponsorship of Latino interest bills contributes to substantive and vital “hard” policy connections (Fenno 2003) between Latino constituencies and their representatives.

Also clear from this analysis is the fact that Latino representatives play a substantial and significant role in representing Latinos in congressional
Latino Representation in Congressional Legislation

Latino concerns and interests characterized the bills sponsored by Latino representatives during the 109th and 110th Congresses to a much greater extent than they characterized the legislative agendas of non-Latinos. Although Latino representatives made up only about six percent of congressional membership during either congress, they were responsible for at least a third of the Latino interest bills sponsored during each individual congress. Twenty-four Latino representatives (of the 368 who served full terms in each congress) were responsible for 154 of the 415 Latino interest bills (37%) sponsored by these members across the two congresses. The effort put forth by Latino representatives to represent Latinos in the bills they sponsored indicates something important about their closeness to and comfort with Latinos as a constituency (Fenno 1977, 2003). As an activity that is demanding of representatives’ time and efforts, the sponsorship patterns of Latino representatives illustrate the extent to which they prioritize Latino concerns and interests (Hall 1996). The legislative behaviors of Latino representatives underscore a bond with Latino constituencies through a heightened level of activism on their behalf.

Evidence that majority status impacted overall sponsorship patterns of Latino and non-Latinos representatives, but not Latino interest bill sponsorship, suggests a number of important conclusions about the effect of institutional factors on Latino representation. First, while representatives tend to expand their legislative portfolios when in the majority, Latino interest bills do not appear substantially tied to these calculations. The fact that sponsoring Latino interest bills seem based on factors different from those that govern legislative activity more generally suggests motivations that shape this behavior are somewhat unique. Second, and especially given that the overall number of Latino interest bills identified during the Democratically controlled 110th Congress was lower than the number sponsored during the Republican controlled 109th Congress, it appears that Latino interests receive no automatic boost from Democratic agenda setting. While we might speculate that Democratic control would favor initiatives related to Latino interests, given that many Latino interest bills propose programs associated with more liberal priorities, and also given that the vast majority of Latino representatives are Democrats, representatives neither appear to ramp up sponsorship of Latino interest bills during Democratic control, nor curtail such efforts under Republican control. Party control and party status, it would seem, have little to do with efforts to place Latino interests on the policy agenda.

The fact that party status failed to influence Latino interest bill sponsorship among the most active group of sponsors, Latino representatives, arguably underscores the strength of the relationship between descriptive representation and the substantive representation of Latinos in congressional
The greater efforts of Latino representatives to represent Latinos in the bills they sponsor appears unmoored from considerations about legislative success that shape sponsorship behaviors more broadly. This suggests a deep commitment to such initiatives, and strengthens notions that experiential connections between these descriptive representatives and their Latino constituents motivate action on behalf of Latinos.

As suggested earlier, institutional factors do not figure into theoretical discussions about the mechanisms by which descriptive representatives enhance substantive representation. The findings presented here help to establish more firmly that the effect of descriptive representation is independent of some important institutional factors that generally shape legislative behavior. By extension, they also illustrate a portion of the larger role descriptive representation plays in the substantive representation of groups.

While a number of scholars have questioned the importance of descriptive representatives to group representation, relative to the importance of representatives who are ideologically congruent with group interests, the evidence presented here qualifies such arguments (Swain 1993; Lublin 1997). Larger numbers of descriptive representatives could, paradoxically, be associated with less aggregate-level roll call voting congruence with preferences of groups like Latinos, and diminish Latino representation along an important substantive dimension (Lublin 1997). But evidence presented here suggests that descriptive representatives make contributions to the congressional policy agenda that enhance the representation of group interests in other important ways. Ultimately, these apparently contradictory conclusions likely emphasize substantive differences in the indicators by which substantive representation is measured to a greater extent than they reflect true discord among empirical studies. What appears clear is that descriptive representatives more actively place Latino concerns, priorities, and interests on the congressional policy agenda, enhancing Latino representation. This evidence strengthens arguments that descriptive representation shapes Latino representation in substantial and robust ways.

NOTES

1. In order to identify Latino representatives for this study I adopted the inclusive rule used by the Congressional Hispanic Caucus to determine its membership. The CHC considers representatives with both Spanish and Portuguese linguistic heritage to be Latino representatives. Twenty-seven Latino representatives served during the 109th Congress (21 Democrats and 6 Republicans). Twenty-six Latino representatives served during the 110th Congress (22 Democrats and 4 Republicans). Twenty-four Latino representatives (20 Democrats and 4 Republicans) served full terms in both the 109th and 110th Congresses.

The ideological measure used is the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE data developed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for the 109th and 110th Congresses. Presidential vote for George W. Bush in 2004 is used to indicate constituency conservatism. Because Latino interest bill sponsorship is heavily skewed toward zero, the most commonly used distribution for measuring count outcomes, the Poisson distribution, is inappropriate for this analysis. An underlying assumption of the Poisson distribution, that the variance=mean within the population, is not met (Long and Freese 2003). Negative binomial regression adjusts for this skew in distributions, and alpha tests confirm that due to over-dispersion, it is a more appropriate model for this analysis.

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Introduction:
Impact of C. Vann Woodward’s The Burden of Southern History

Angie Maxwell

In the Spring of 2010, the Diane D. Blair Center of Southern Politics and Society of the University of Arkansas, in partnership with the Winthrop Rockefeller Institute, held the Third Annual Blair-Rockefeller Legacy Series Conference. The interdisciplinary symposium explored the ongoing impact of southern historian C. Vann Woodward’s *The Burden of Southern History*, which was published in 1960. In conjunction with the conference, the *American Review of Politics* issued a call for articles that interrogate Woodward’s key ideas in a twenty-first century context. Woodward tackles questions of equality, white southern identity, the political legacy of reconstruction, the heritage of populism, the place of the South within the nation, among other topics.

Contributions and Contributors

The three articles that comprise this special issue all explore C. Vann Woodward’s vision of the American South. In *The Burden of Southern History*, Woodward, who confessed to being an activist historian, attempted to broaden the definition of southern identity. His private goal was to refocus southern whites on elements of their identity that did not rely solely on the maintenance of white supremacy and segregation. Woodward, for example, investigated the agricultural roots of the South, as well as the political impulse towards Populism that swept through the region at the dawn of the 20th century. In their contribution to this special issue, “When White Goes Right: The Old South in the 2008 Presidential Election,” Matt Fowler, Wayne Parent, and Peter Petrakis attempt to quantify these unique characteristics of southern white identity. Fowler, Parent, and Petrakis note the hegemonic nature of southern voting patterns (barring the change in party label that realigned the region with the Republican Party), arguing that the 2008 Democratic victories in North Carolina, Virginia, and Florida, provides an opportunity to analyze what may be a “shrinking South.” They provide a

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rich historical context for these markers of southern identity, returning specifically to W.J. Cash’s “proto-dorian bond,” a phrase coined in his 1941 book, The Mind of the South. Their innovative effort to make tangible the intangibles of southern white identity offers future scholars new tools through which to reconsider the political nature of the American South.

Hanes Walton, Jr., Josephine A.V. Allen, Sherman C. Puckett, and Donald R. Deskins, Jr., undertake a detailed and nuanced investigation of what Woodward called the “Third Reconstruction” in revised editions of The Burden of Southern History. Writing after the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, Woodward called for a new wave of civil rights reform—one that would move past the violence and “tokenism” that failed to produce true change. Walton et al., in a vein similar to Fowler, Parent, and Petrakis, attempt not only to define this “Third Reconstruction,” but also to quantify and measure its progress in America. Specifically, in their article, entitled “Beyond the Second Reconstruction: C. Vann Woodward’s Concept of the Third Reconstruction in the South,” the authors analyze the success of African American presidential campaigns, including those launched by Jesse Jackson, Shirley Chisholm, and, most recently, Barack Obama.

In his article, “Racism, Resentment, and Regionalism: The South and the Nation in the 2008 Presidential Election,” Joseph Aistrup, ironically, finds that very racial attitudes against which Woodward fought, exist and continue to influence elections. While Walton et al. reconsider the regional response to Black presidential candidates over time, Aistrup focuses on the 2008 election of Barack Obama, comparing regional and national responses to this historic candidate. And clearly Aistrup’s findings point to little for Woodward to be proud of in the South and the country at large. Despite the half-century that has passed since Woodward’s volatile collection first appeared, the ideas that leap from every page remain, for the most part, the debates that still drive the study of the South among countless disciplines, including political science. The efforts of these scholars to interrogate such fluid concepts as racism and identity advance our understanding of the distinctiveness of this region and its place within the every-changing American political landscape. The ideas presented here should spur research projects for years to come.

The Diane D. Blair Center of Southern Politics and Society

The Blair Center, directed by Todd G. Shields, was established by an act of U.S. Congress in the fall of 2001, making it one of the rare research centers in the country to be created by congressional appropriation. Diane Divers Blair taught in the Department of Political Science at the University of Arkansas for thirty years, receiving designation as Master Teacher in
Diane D. Blair was equally committed to scholarly research as she was to public activism, as is witnessed by her personal and career achievements. Moreover, she was a champion of interdisciplinary methods and critical thinking and she reached across the academic aisles often and with ease. The Blair Center reflects her intellectual approach and strives to view the American South from a variety of angles in order to reveal the undercurrents of politics, history, and culture that have shaped the region over time. The Blair Legacy Series invites senior scholars to assess the regional, national, and international impact of southern politicians, intellectuals, and social leaders.

The Rockefeller Institute

The Rockefeller Institute, also part of the University of Arkansas System, is an educational institute and conference center located on Petit Jean Mountain. The 188-acre campus was once part of the home and cattle farm of Governor Winthrop Rockefeller, giving it a remarkably distinguished heritage on which to build. In the 20 years he lived at Winrock Farms, Rockefeller hosted more than 200 conferences and meetings—conclaves that addressed an astonishing range of concerns, from educational needs and rural economic development, to how to build Arkansas and harmonize the races. Today, the Institute continues to build upon the legacy of its namesake by providing an environment conducive to open discussion, for stimulating new perspectives, and for developing future-oriented results.
When White Goes Right:  
The Old South in the 2008 Presidential Election

Matt Fowler, Wayne Parent, and Peter Petrakis

For all the contemporary statistical data documenting regional convergence and the physical evidence afforded by skyscrapers, suburban sprawl, and gridlocked expressways, I have yet to encounter anyone who has moved into or out of the South and did not sense that, for better or worse, living here was different from living in other parts of the country.

James C. Cobb, *Away Down South* 2005

To speak of southern politics is, by necessity, to assert regional distinctiveness. There was a time when this was indisputable; scholars, politicians, and residents took it as a given that the South was different from the rest of America. However, due to the tremendous changes in the American South, from demographics to economics, the region’s distinctiveness has been called into question. Do these unique Southern characteristics endure and do they continue to produce distinctly southern politics?

“Continuity and change” is a phrase that has long been the mantra of Southern political scholars and one that remains surprisingly relevant today. The results of the 2008 elections made it clear that the Solid Republican South had dissipated. Virginia and North Carolina joined Florida in unexpectedly turning blue. On the other hand, the remainder of the South stayed consistently red. Sometimes purplish Louisiana and Arkansas were becoming even redder. Southern change? Yes it can. Southern continuity? You betcha.

Ronald Reagan, rather than natives Strom Thurmond, George Wallace, or Jesse Helms in the end, brought Southern-friendly social issues to the forefront of the Republican agenda and thereby transformed the partisan face of the south. Unlike the racially tinged politics of trailblazing southern Republicans Thurmond and Helms, Reagan was able to forge a Republican message that was both embraced in the South and acceptable in the non-South. And he was enormously successful. Since 1980, only the all-southern Democratic ticket of Bill Clinton and Al Gore was able to even marginally
pierce the rock solid eleven states of the Old Confederacy. The Republicanization of the South was established.

Between 1980 and 2004, this Dixiecrat to Republican narrative became the conventional wisdom. In the 2004 bestseller, *What’s the Matter With Kansas?*, Thomas Frank expanded the same narrative beyond the south, arguing that working class whites in the Midwest behaved similarly. However, Larry Bartels (2006) slapped back with a fairly convincing argument in his review of the book called “What’s the Matter with *What’s the Matter with Kansas*.”

He points out that the white working class conversion from Democratic to Republican was almost exclusively a Southern phenomenon and implies that this social conservatism had clear racial underpinnings: “Low-income whites have become less Democratic in their partisan identifications, but at a slower rate than more affluent whites—and that trend is entirely confined to the South, where Democratic identification was artificially inflated by the one-party system of the Jim Crow era” (201). He concludes, “To a good approximation, then, the decline in Democratic identification among poor whites over the past half-century is entirely attributable to the demise of the Solid South as a bastion of Democratic allegiance” (215-16).

This dramatic political realignment of white southern voters in a period of otherwise national dealignment prompted many to comment on southern distinctiveness. While much fruitful work has been done, our approach was to return to the earliest scholarly assessments of southern distinctiveness and try and develop empirical measures in the hopes of attaining both a longer and more nuanced understanding of the region. We concede that many of these historical explanations, such as sub-tropical climate, distinctively Celtic demographic patterns and the like, are difficult to empirically measure. In many respects, this study is an effort to engage the scholarly community as to the significance of such historical explanations as well as a first effort at developing empirical measures.

And a final note: we recognize that it is white southerners who normally makeup the southern stereotypes, as it was white southerners who lost the Civil War. Indeed, southern culture especially as understood outside the south is a white culture. Therefore, any attempt to characterize a southern culture must grapple with whether it includes both white and black races. This initial exploration will use indicators that account for both the notion that Southern culture is a biracial one and the possibility that white cultural dominance is central to the southern narrative.

**Purpose of Study**

Southern voting history since Reconstruction had been remarkably hegemonic except during the period of transition from Democratic domi-
nance to Republican dominance. In 2008, a more permanent break-up of the Solid South was becoming perceptible. While George Bush’s 2000 and 2004 elections may have secured the Solid Republican South, recent voting and demographic trends would certainly indicate that future Republican candidates would not have as easy a time.

The 2008 Presidential Election had Democrats fielding a distinctly non-southern ticket with an African-American as the standard-bearer. Logically, “southern-ness” or, more precisely, the politics of a southern culture should summarily reject the ticket. However, the Southern reaction was by no means uniform. Virginia, the home of the capital of the Confederacy and North Carolina, the state that made Jesse Helms a southern conservative icon, embraced the ticket. While these may appear to be an anomaly, a closer analysis, like the one here, might suggest otherwise. While these parts of the South are clearly changing, other parts of the south appear to remain as southern, as ever.

Other parts did so even more emphatically than they had when New Englander John Kerry headed the ticket in the previous election. Our goal is to explore what characteristics make certain parts of the south more southern than others. Today, electoral studies typically lump all of the similar voting states of the Old Confederacy into one theoretical construct. The south is normally a control variable, usually a dummy variable in the model. Given the voting behavior of the South, the practice is not without merit and certainly not without theoretical underpinnings. As Bartels suggests, the pre-eminence of the race issue, is the implicit reason. The south is a place where racial concerns in a culture defined by race, have consistently trumped economic concerns in a place marred by economic vulnerability. W.J. Cash’s (1941) “Proto-Dorian Bond” had a profound political and distinctly electoral effect. Poor whites, preferring to identify themselves with white aristocrats rather than their black economic counterparts, came to define southern politics in the Dixiecrat era. Thus, the white elite was successful in convincing the newly politically empowered white lower classes to identity with the whiteness that they had in common rather than the economic hierarchy, thereby successfully subjugating blacks.

Even though race politics may be a core explanation for southern political cultural distinctiveness, it isn’t the only one—unless a cottage industry of scholars of southern culture is not worth taking seriously. For most of America’s history, southern distinctiveness was not subject to debate. A distinct southern identity was stressed even prior to the American Revolution and scholars and statesmen alike offered up wide ranging explanations—from climate and disease to Celtic demographics and the War. Race relations and/or the ‘peculiar institution’ has always been center stage, but other explanations were always prevalent. We think empirical assessments of
these other explanations worthwhile. It may not be. But components of southern distinctiveness that complement the notion of the centrality of race are certainly worth considering. In this paper, we begin to develop a widely construed index of southern political culture, derived from the work of scholars in the field. The main focus of the paper is to present a fairly thorough review of the southern culture scholarly literature, emphasizing potentially measurable concepts that explain southern uniqueness. We will then suggest a range of possible derivative measures. Finally, we will show how these measures are correlated with one logically related electoral outcome and offer a multivariate regression analysis of the variables of key importance.

**Defining the American South**

The awareness of the otherness of the American South has old roots, predating the American Revolution. In 1765, Dr. John Fothergill’s London pamphlet wrote that “[t]he inhabitants of the northern Part live like our lower English Farmers. . . . Their Summers are hot, their Winters severe, and their Lives are passed with the like Labour and Toil . . . as the little Farmers in England.” In contrast, the inhabitants of the South were likened to those in West Indies, complete with all of the ruinous traits of “Sexuality, Selfishness, and Despotism” (Greene 1991, 11). Yet it was not just outsiders who saw differences. Indeed, perhaps the most famous quotation describing the distinct regional cultures and norms in America comes from Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that “In the North, they are cool; sober; laborious; independent; jealous of their own liberties; and just to the liberties of others; interested; chicaning; superstitious and hypocritical in their religion. In the South they are fiery; voluptuary; indolent; unsteady; zealous for their own liberties, but trampling on those of others; generous; candid; without attachment or pretentions to any religion but that of the heart” (Jefferson, 1785 online collection).

There have been numerous explanations for the origins and endurance of southern distinctiveness. So much so that one scholar noted “historians of the American South have devoted so much effort and attention to the quest for a ‘central theme’ explaining the essence of southern distinctiveness that there is little need and inadequate space to review the discussion here” (Koeniger 1988, 25). The literature, of course, has not gotten any more manageable in the twenty plus years. What follows, however, is a brief discussion of the most common and/or persuasive arguments for the origins of southern cultural distinctiveness. This review of the literature is not exhaustive but rather designed to cull out possible variables demonstrating the continued existence of southern culture that can be empirically tested.
Plantation Economy: Rural Life and Poverty

The earliest explanation for southern distinctiveness focused on the subtropical climate of the region. This climatic explanation for southern distinctiveness shaped the discussion, influencing the most renowned early scholars of the South. Commentators ranging from U.B. Phillips to W.J. Cash, argued that climate was of central importance, not least of which because of its role in the development of the plantation economy, which in turn resulted in a virulent strain of white supremacy. V.O. Key (1984) followed a similar vein in his landmark work, *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, pointing out that racial tensions were what distinguished southern politics—“the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro.” More recent scholarship examines how climate resulted in specific structural forces that in turn shaped southern culture. For example, Peter A. Colcanis and David L. Carlton have done important work detailing the initial and long-range influences of the plantation economy as a determining factor of southern distinctiveness. “For all their feudal trappings, plantations must be understood not as landed estates affording steady, unearned income to rentier [sic] . . . but as large-scale business enterprises. . . . Indeed, as late as 1860 plantations were the most numerous large-scale business enterprises in the United States.” They go on to argue, using path dependency theories and other structural social science methods, that southern commitment to large-scale agriculture resulted in “niggardly institutional development” (Carlton and Colcanis 2003, 6). The plantation legacy is one factor explaining the underdevelopment of southern institutions as well as perspectives of the utility and responsibility of government. These structural and attitudinal characteristics were reinforced by subsequent developments, such as the growth of the defense industry in the South.

Other scholars emphasize that climate and culture resulted in very different living standards in the South, leading to a region racked by poverty and disease. David Potter’s work is well known, pointing out that the South developed a thorough going provincialism because of its poor economy. More generally, the South’s legacy of poverty was ingrained into our national consciousness by Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration, in the midst of our greatest economic calamity, that the “South is our nation’s number one economic problem.” The power of economics to shape society and culture has many supporters and we will, of course, rely on SES data in our empirical observations. Therefore, one clear set of indicators of southern culture should be rural life and lower living standards. We can define these areas by lower income, higher poverty and a rural setting.


Plantation Economy: An Aversion to “Yankee” Education

Less attention has been given to how climatic and economic factors in the plantation economy shaped public health. The South’s reputation for ill health was well known in the antebellum period. Insurance companies charged considerably higher premiums for coverage of southerners and New Orleans was popularly known as “the graveyard of the Southwest”—mortality rates were almost three times higher in the Crescent City than Philadelphia or New York. Moreover, outbreaks provoked flight and fear of dramatic proportions. Yellow fever was especially startling, largely because it struck urban centers and “the erratic and unpredictable spread of the pestilence, its awful symptoms, the lack of effective therapy, and the high mortality rate during epidemics inspired considerable private terror and public panic” (Carrigan 1988, 58). In fact, one can make the case that the languid southern archetype was, in actuality, simply ill. This illness was caused only in part by the climate. The lack of modern medical treatments certainly exacerbated it.

One of the more intriguing essays, written by Young, points out that the South developed a distinctive medical tradition, resulting in a thriving patent medicine business. Sectional sentiments were so strident they shaped the region’s medical profession, resulting in what came to be known as States-Rights Medicine or the belief that northern medical thinking, education, and treatments, were ineffective in the South. Southern resistance to scientific advancements is well known, especially as it concerns hot-button topics such as evolution. However, regional resistance to science was never isolated to abstractions, as the development of quasi-professional organizations bent on stressing regional remedies to disease during this period demonstrates. Quite literally, southern medical professionals rejected universal scientific explanations of diseases—ranging from malaria to yellow fever.

This scholarship suggests why there may be a contemporary Southern aversion to and reservations about the Northern bias in advanced education. Continuity of these antebellum suspicions about universities would thrive in parts of the South where higher education is less prevalent. In these counties, a more traditional Southern political culture should exist. Possible measurements of this variable include the number of higher education institutions in and around a county or the proportion of a county’s population who have obtained a college education. The latter measurement will be included in this analysis.

Plantation Economy: Violence

Another argument concerning southern identity also attributed to climatic differences, centers on high levels of and proclivity for violence.
Edward L. Ayers’ (1984) *Vengeance and Justice: Crime and Punishment in the Nineteenth-Century American South* and Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s (1982) *Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South* are the best-known examples. Wyatt-Brown argued that the North was shaped by a Puritan sensibility, a conscience guided by individual morality, responsibility, and guilt. The southern mind, in contrast, was informed by a more primal sensibility, where one’s reputation or status in the eyes of others was what dictated behavior. This difference, although hard to measure, is what accounts for the violent South. Richard E. Nisbett and Dov Cohen’s *Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South* is a more recent example of scholarship focusing on violence, which utilizes social science techniques to make their case. The authors point out that “cultures of honor have been independently invented by many of the world’s societies,” and the South shared conditions—economic vulnerability and a weak state—that promote cultures of violence (Nisbett and Cohen 1996, 4). The scholars maintain that the demographic and economic conditions of the South, herding Celts and their descendents and decentralized government, formed a ‘culture of honor.’ They support their argument by chronicling differences in homicide rates, attitudes concerning the appropriateness of violence, regional differences in social and legal policies, as well as conducting an experiment to measure responses to insults, focusing on anger levels and aggression. The violent South is not simply subjective or a derogatory slight, the empirical evidence supports regional distinctiveness. Therefore an index of southern political culture would, ideally, include a indicator of white violent crime. Homicide or violent crime rates at the county level are appropriate measures of this variable. An issue arises when attempting to obtain reliable data, though. Especially the absence of race-specific violent crime data makes assessing this element of Southern culture a difficult task.

**Emigration Patterns: Celtic Heritage, Protestantism, and Nativism**

Nisbett and Cohen’s work was, in large part, building off previous scholarship, such as Grady McWhiney and Forrest McDonald’s (1989) arguments concerning Celtic heritage, that points to demographics. Immigration patterns reveal that English or Anglo-Saxon northerners moved into the Midwest while Celtic descendents made spread west and south into Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. McWhiney’s *Cracker Culture: Celtic Ways in the Old South* is the most sustained argument for this thesis, but subsequent scholarship has been quite critical, pointing out substantial problems. The huge in-migration of Irish into northern cities is not addressed nor is the very real fact that many of the planter class were of English ancestry.
Other scholars point out that ancestral roots are not the chief difference but rather that the South experienced very different demographic patterns. Largely insulated from the mass migrations of eastern and southern Europeans, Catholic Irish fleeing the famine, as well as Asian and Hispanic until well after World War II, the South had a relatively stable population. Thus, the demographic distinctiveness in the South was less its particular inhabitants and more is enduring homogeneity or, put differently, the South remained a bifurcated society of African-Americans and White “Anglo-Saxon” Protestants. This demographic stasis became most noticeable precisely as America was becoming a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. Picking up on the rising anti-immigrant sentiment, several southern states loudly declared the region to be the last bastion of “Anglo-Saxon” Protestant heritage. Even though the South is currently experiencing tremendous demographic changes, its relatively recent homogeneity suggests that one way to measure southern identity is to compare native to non-native residents.

This part of the literature would suggest two obvious measures of southern culture—southern nativism and Protestant religiosity. McWhiney’s “Cracker culture” certainly suggests the importance of Celtic ethnicity, especially relative to English heritage and we will explore that possibility. However southerners adopted the mantle of “Anglo-Saxon,” as distinctly non-African heritage, we suspect that Celtic continuity is overwhelmed by “white” exceptionalism. To test this element of Southern culture, the proportion of native southerners, Celtic identifiers, and Southern Baptists at the county-level are included in our model.

The Civil War and the Ubiquitous Race Factor

The focus on the Civil War as the distinguishing southern characteristic is the most traditional explanation of Southern culture and has prominent supporters, including such luminaries as C. Vann Woodward. In the influential essay, “The Search for Southern Identity,” he argues that what distinguishes the South from the North does not derive from below the Mason Dixon line but rather has its roots in the mythologies associated with ‘American Exceptionalism.’ The ‘American Way of Life’ is profoundly optimistic and untroubled; rooted in its abundance of resources and opportunities, America sees itself as a ‘people of plenty,’ in David Potter’s phrase. Moreover, America has (or had) the unique experience of always being successful, and the “absence of these Old World ills in America, as well as the freedom from much of the injustice and oppression associated with them, encouraged a singular moral complacency in the American mind. The self-image implanted in Americans was one of innocence. . . . They were a chose people and their land a Utopia on the make” (Woodward 1970, 20).
Southern history, in contrast, has to confront failure, militarily, economically, and, in many ways, morally. Southern experience is shaped by tragedy, embarrassment, and humiliation—profoundly anti-American sentiments—and the Civil War is the most startling example.

Others argue that the Civil War had a more direct influence in that the South factionalized American politics by introducing and adhering to a virulent and irrational form of sectionalism. But, as Peter Onuf’s work demonstrates, sectional identity struggles can be traced to the formation of the country. His analysis demonstrates that sectionalism was “integral to the original conception and construction of the federal system” and points out that the first strident sectionalists were from New England (Ayers et al. 1996, 12). This is not to dismiss the powerful influence of the Civil War but to understand how the South is often portrayed as the culprit despite more complicated historical realities. Put differently, the idealized South misleads more than just southerners. Indeed, James Cobb suggests that it is precisely the legacy of the Civil War that explains why so “many historians have [mistakenly] blamed white southerners for introducing the virus of sectionalism into the American body politic and praised their northern adversaries for their selfless devotion to the Union” (Cobb 2005, 17). Winners write history, as the saying goes, and in the struggle to define events such as the Civil War and modern civil rights, the South has not been portrayed favorably.

A more complicated question of the building blocks of a southern culture is the degree to which the co-existence of whites and blacks heightens or depresses it. In counties with larger white majorities, southern culture may wane, since so much of it is based on the conflicts between the races, where whites strive to keep their place in the social hierarchy. In counties where both races remain in fairly constant contact, we may see continuity in old south ways. While this is a point of some debate (see Giles and Hurtz 1994 and Voss 1996), our general hypothesis is that the greater proportion of a racial minority, especially African-Americans, the more southern the culture.

The Changing South

This denigration of the South is not a new phenomenon. Several recent scholars note that many of the early descriptions of southern identity, including Fothergill and other Europeans, portrayed southerners as having more in common with the lazy Caribbean than the sturdy and reliable Yankee. This presentation of the South as the “American tropics” was neither accidental nor benign, argues scholar Jennifer Rae Greeson (1999). Working from a post-colonial tradition, she points out that “the new vocabulary of nationhood engineered by early national writers involved not simply
replacing the colonial tropes previously used to figure the New World colonies in general, but also displacing those tropes onto the south of the newly forming U.S.” (Greeson 1999, 209).

Examinations of the literary record, from fictional works such as Crevecoeur’s Letters from an American Farmer and Tyler’s The Algerian Captive to Martin Bruckner’s innovative work on school textbooks used during the period, reveal that the formation of early American identity was achieved by denigrating the South. Given the North’s preeminence in letters and publishing, it is hardly surprising which cultural model or, in Benedict Anderson’s phrase, which “imagined community,” was promoted. This work is important, at least historically, in that it demonstrates that the initial definitions or descriptions of the South were not the work of native southerners. Not all depictions of southern culture are negative, of course, but are important to understand what elements of distinctiveness remain.

So what do we mean when we say ‘the South?’ We begin from the assumption that in order to have endured the tremendous changes throughout its turbulent history it must be something that transcends the individual and is bigger or more inclusive than geography or demographics. Southern identity is rooted in a specific culture but rather than merely ascribing distinctiveness to an amorphous concept, we think empirical measures can test this hypothesis. From John Shelton Reed’s work to Larry Griffin and Ashley Thompson more recent efforts, previous efforts to empirically identify southern culture rely on survey data, asking individuals to respond to specific questions about violence, heritage, race, public policy, and most notably, whether they are willing to self identify themselves to this or that region. This is important research but it has certain unavoidable limitations because culture is not an individual level construct. Culture is or can be influenced by individual actors, but culture is better measured by aggregate level data. In addition county level analysis affords almost perfectly reliable measurements of a variety of characteristics found only in official sources, like census data and actual voting returns.

**Hypotheses**

We hypothesize that southern political culture plays a crucial role in the story of southern realignment. More specifically, we hypothesize that white voters in counties that strongly exhibit characteristics associated with traditional southern culture are less likely to vote for Barack Obama than white voters in counties that don’t exhibit these characteristics. The 2008 presidential election presents an ideal opportunity to study the effects of white southern culture on vote because Barack Obama, more than any candidate in the history of the United States, represents the anti-thesis of most traditional
southern culture values—a non-Southerner, a liberal progressive and not a member of the dominant race. In addition, his almost uniform support from African-Americans allows us to measure the white vote in ways not available before this election.

**Deriving Measurements of Southern Culture**

Our goal, then, is not to predict voting results, but to create a measure of southern culture, analyzing where it exists to a greater or lesser extent. Our analysis below will explore how this variation relates to voting behavior in the 2008 Presidential Election, but the emphasis, again is not only explaining this dependent variable, but rather on creating the independent variable. The voting measure is a way to help examine whether the southern index has some utility.

We use county level data in our analysis for reasons of both validity and reliability. Since culture is more than an individual level characteristic, aggregate measures, such as county level data, are more valid. County level data has some limitations, but it has three important characteristics—it is aggregate; reasonably small; and can be reliably measured. Moreover, given the apparent evidence of a “Bradley effect” among white voters in these states, actual voter returns are more reliable than survey data.

As noted above, southern political culture can be conceived as either one that crosses racial lines or as solely the dominant white culture. Since there are reasonable arguments for both and often the literature is unclear, we leave that question open and explore both empirically. Where practicable we will present both the characteristics of the entire county and of only the white population.

Three Deep South states—Louisiana, Alabama and South Carolina—were selected and analyzed. These states were selected mainly because of their readily available racial data. These three states should allow for some ability to generalize across the region.

First, we examine an array of measures associated with the characteristics described above and present some descriptive statistics to illustrate the variation in them across the counties in the three states. We then test the relationship between them and a 2008 Presidential election measure to see which measures appear to have some political relevance in the manner expected.

We expect poorer and less well educated counties to have stronger southern cultures. We use county demographic measures from the 2000 United States Census and are measured both as a characteristic of the entire population and of only the white population. Poverty is the percentage of
households in the county under the poverty line. Median income is the average household median income.

College education is not a characteristic of Southern culture. The college measure is the proportion of the population holding a baccalaureate degree or higher degree, again from the 2000 Census.

Rural counties should exhibit stronger southern cultures than urban ones. The 2000 United States Census designates rural areas as those outside urban areas or clusters.

Protestant religiosity is another measure of southern culture. It’s most prominent manifestation in the twentieth century is Southern Baptist Christianity. The data is taken from the Association of Religion Data Archives and is measured as the number of Southern Baptist adherents as of the year 2000. More religious counties should exhibit more southern characteristics.

We expect counties with a larger proportion of Native Southerners to have stronger southern cultures. We combine those born in the state with those born in the census designated South which includes the eleven states of the Old Confederacy plus Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia. This is an imperfect measure because of the slightly broader definition of the South, but a reasonably good one nonetheless. It is exactly this type of broad based measure, which used by many, that we are hoping to improve upon with this study.

The Southern culture literature suggests that a Celtic population is a fundamental part of the Southern tradition. Although Celtic consciousness is a difficult concept to measure, we attempt it with two measures. First, is a simple measure of the proportion of the total population that identifies a Celtic heritage (Irish, Scotch, Scotch-Irish, or Welsh). Second is a variable that measures Celtic heritage relative to English heritage.

Finally, we use the 2000 census measure of African-American proportion of the population. We expect that the higher the proportion, the greater the southern culture. Unfortunately, we are not yet convinced any of the available measures of white violence are complete enough to use in our study. We introduced this concept because it is a significant part of the southern culture literature, but it is the one that we have to omit because of inadequate measures.

**One Measure of Electoral Impact**

We constructed a measure of the non-black county level vote for Obama because the hypothesis is derived from strictly racial rather than ethnic divisions in the traditional southern culture. Specifically the electoral variable is percent vote for Democratic Presidential candidate Obama in 2008, beyond what is predicted by black voter registration immediately after
the election. This is a measure of the vote for President Obama that allows us to ascertain support in the county beyond his rock solid black constituency.

**Findings**

The mean and standard deviations for each of the variables for each of the three states are presented in Tables 1 and 2. South Carolina counties are more prosperous and more highly educated both in total populations and in white only populations. Alabama and Louisiana are similar on most of these measures. Louisiana and Alabama contain larger proportions of native southerners in both populations (around 93% and 91% respectively), while South Carolina has fewer (roughly 85%). South Carolina and Alabama have similar and somewhat higher Celtic populations. Louisiana stands out as the least rural of the three states.

**Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Southern Culture Components for Total Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alabama</th>
<th>Louisiana</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (StdDev)</td>
<td>Minimum (StdDev)</td>
<td>Maximum (StdDev)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>30152 (6380)</td>
<td>16646 (6370)</td>
<td>19799 (5757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>55440 (6370)</td>
<td>47883 (5757)</td>
<td>46992 (5623)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>.19 (.072)</td>
<td>.22 (.063)</td>
<td>.17 (.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>.13 (.063)</td>
<td>.13 (.063)</td>
<td>.16 (.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native South</td>
<td>.91 (.044)</td>
<td>.93 (.043)</td>
<td>.86 (.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celtic</td>
<td>.13 (.043)</td>
<td>.10 (.043)</td>
<td>.12 (.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>.70 (.258)</td>
<td>.52 (.286)</td>
<td>.57 (.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black*</td>
<td>.28 (.221)</td>
<td>.31 (.146)</td>
<td>.37 (.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Baptist*</td>
<td>.33 (.144)</td>
<td>.25 (.175)</td>
<td>.23 (.105)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alabama N=67 Louisiana N=64 South Carolina N=46

*Total Only
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Southern Culture Components for White Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alabama</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Louisiana</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (StdDev)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (StdDev)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mean (StdDev)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>17165 (4398)</td>
<td>11582</td>
<td>17914</td>
<td>9569 (4429)</td>
<td>27534</td>
<td>21082</td>
<td>(4522)</td>
<td>35866</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>33946 (4429)</td>
<td>27534</td>
<td>35866</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>0.12 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.16 (0.07)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native South</td>
<td>0.91 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celtic/English</td>
<td>0.71 (0.24)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.50 (0.23)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alabama N=67        | Louisiana N=64 | South Carolina N=46

Our correlation findings are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The tables show the Obama vote measure in relation to white-only characteristics of the county and characteristics of the entire population of the county. We expect that counties that exhibit stronger southern culture characteristics would have lower rates of voting for Barack Obama, when black registration is taken into account. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship to our Obama measure from counties with higher native south populations, higher Southern Baptist populations, counties that are more rural, counties with stronger Celtic influence, and those with lower socio-economic status.

Poorer counties generally and poorer white counties in particular are less likely to show support in our Obama vote measure. In addition, college education is significant and in the expected direction for both the total population and the white population in South Carolina. In Louisiana, college education is in the expected direction in both populations and mixed in Alabama. These findings suggest that lower rates of college education, lower income and higher poverty are all characteristics that might well belong in a Southern culture index, particularly as they are exhibited in the white population.
Table 3. Pearson Correlations Components with Obama Difference, Total Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Alabama</th>
<th>Louisiana</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>Pearson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native South</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celtic</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black*</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Baptist*</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alabama N=67       | Louisiana N=64 | South Carolina N=46

*Total only

The correlations with native south populations are strong and consistent. In all three states, and in both total and white populations, the higher the proportion of native southerners, the lower the proportion of vote for Obama beyond what is expected from black voter registration. Clearly this demonstrates counties with more apparent Southern consciousness (by having more Southerners) are more averse to political change. The Southern Baptist variable results are mixed. Alabama’s results show that the more Southern Baptists, the higher the vote for Obama, whereas Louisiana shows the opposite and is strongly significant.

Rural counties are negatively associated with our Obama vote measure. In all three states, this relationship is significant and in the expected direction when it characterizes the entire population. The white rural population is not a significantly related indicator. Racially diverse rural populations are
Table 4. Pearson Correlations Components with Obama Difference, White Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alabama</th>
<th>Louisiana</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>Pearson</td>
<td>Pearson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native South</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celtic/English</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alabama N=67         Louisiana N=64        South Carolina N=46

a signature characteristic of the South. And, indeed, it is the rural character of the whole county, not just of the white population, that appears to be most related to southern cultural continuity.

The strongest negative correlate with our Obama vote measure is percent of the population that is African-American. There are some notable individual county exceptions where a high percentage of African-American population is associated with change. Those exceptions are more urban counties. For example, Louisiana, the most urban state, shows the weakest relationship underlines the point that the racial percentage relationship is rural centered. A quick glance at the counties themselves reveals that Orleans Parish, which is entirely composed of the city of New Orleans, scores highest on both the Obama measure and almost highest on the percentage of African-Americans. This contrary finding, which lowers the Pearson Correlation statistic, is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that it is an urban center.

Since only a handful of the counties in the three states are urban, it is understandable. This rural racial dynamic, again, is a hallmark southern characteristic. This study powerfully supports that conclusion. Of all of the
findings, this one suggests that the southern culture index should include some interactive measures.

Finally, in Louisiana and South Carolina there appears to be some relationship between the Celtic population and Southern continuity. In Alabama, and more demonstrably so, higher Celtic presence is related to political change, not continuity.

**Multivariate Analysis: Race Trumps Everything**

We performed a multivariate analysis and the results are presented in Table 5. As most of the literature in Southern politics would predict, in every state race trumps everything: the higher proportion of African-Americans in a county, the lower the proportion of white voters voting for Barack Obama. In Alabama, Louisiana, and South Carolina the relationship is significant and strong.

**Table 5. OLS Regressions Predicting the Estimated White Vote for Obama, Unstandardized Parameter Estimates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alabama</th>
<th>Louisiana</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>White Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.197 (.144)</td>
<td>0.318 (.097)**</td>
<td>0.253 (.115)*</td>
<td>-1.77 (.90)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>-0.0000014</td>
<td>-0.00000025</td>
<td>0.00000015</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>(.0000015)</td>
<td>(.00000095)</td>
<td>(.0000023)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Educated</td>
<td>(.104)</td>
<td>(.057)*</td>
<td>(.099)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native South</td>
<td>(.153)</td>
<td>(.091)*</td>
<td>(.087)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)**</td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>-0.169</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.28)**</td>
<td>(.02)**</td>
<td>(.04)**</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>(.051)**</td>
<td>(.021)**</td>
<td>(.061)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.779</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>0.808</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01, *p < .05, ^p < .10 (two-tailed test). Standard error in parentheses.**
Even after racial make-up is taken into account, some characteristics remain significant in two of the states. In Alabama, the results indicate that the more rural the county, the lower the white vote for Obama. Also, the more Southern Baptists in an Alabama county, the lower the white vote for Obama. In Louisiana, counties with more white college educated people have a higher white vote for Obama. Louisiana counties with more white native southerners or more Southern Baptists tend to have a lower white vote for Obama. The $R^2$ in each model indicates that quite a bit of the variance in white vote for Obama can be explained by our southern culture model.

Since racial proportion so thoroughly dominates our model, we ran a model without it in order to discover if the remaining variables were significant when controlling for each other (table not shown). Indeed some are in two of the states. In Alabama, more rural counties and counties with higher proportion of native southerners, have higher white Obama vote percentages. In South Carolina, where black percentage of a county had the most overwhelming effect, the more rural counties in this model were significant. The only significant relationship that ran counter to the hypothesized direction was education in Alabama counties, where lower college education levels were significantly related to higher white vote for Obama.

The bivariate analysis generally supported the hypothesis the lower SES, more rural counties and counties with a higher percentage of African-Americans were those least likely to have white support for Barack Obama. The multivariate analysis, however, pointed more clearly to the racial threat effect, where higher proportions of African-Americans lead to lower white support for the African American candidate. To a somewhat lesser extent, the multivariate analysis also supported the notion of a rural racial dynamic in old South counties.

Conclusions

In this analysis we have attempted an initial definition of a southern culture. Utilizing characteristics of “southern-ness” derived from the southern culture scholarship, we have shown that certain factors can define southern tendencies. Where past research has attempted to define the south loosely, we hope to fill the gaps where southern uniqueness truly exists and doesn’t. The strongest and clearest relationships were found in South Carolina, where there is more variation in southern-ness across counties. As we move away from the Deep South states, we may find that these measures have even more explanatory utility.

Poverty, income, and higher education should be included in a southern culture index. The proportion of native southerners in a county should certainly be part of the same index. This study also suggests the more rural the
county, the more southern, and that characteristic deserves consideration in any index of southern political culture. The results were less clear on Celtic heritage. The scholarship is mixed on its importance and we found no compelling reason to include it. While we can’t comfortably suggest an appropriate measure of white violence, we remain convinced that one should be found. Finally, race should be a fundamental part of the analysis, either by presenting race specific and total populations or including race variables as part of the broader explanation.

Therefore, an initial index of southern political culture would contain theoretically derived, convincingly reliable measures of concepts that have shown at least some value in explaining political phenomena. Southern political culture is characterized by lower income and higher poverty rates, lower rates of attaining a college degree, are more rural, more racially bifurcated and certainly have higher proportions of native southerners.

How is such an index utilized? First, in a purely utilitarian sense, candidates for office, no matter where they lie on the political spectrum, will have a better sense of how to frame their messages in various parts of the south. Similarly, advocates of particular issues might want to target local ordinances and referenda first in areas (either old south or new) where they can find a more receptive audience.

Perhaps more significantly, the areas of “continuity” are those most often left behind both economically and politically. Once it is clearly recognized which locales are likely to exhibit a more traditional social structure, often even reflecting pre civil rights era societal norms, adaptive strategies can be formulated. These areas would require a different approach to community building and economic development.

This can be accomplished either by addressing the old structures head on and trying to change them or by working within them. Either way, the reality of the continuity of the culture of Old South must not be ignored.

Even though there is a tendency to generalize about the South, a uniform political culture no longer permeates the region. This is not new; to paraphrase V.O. Key’s observation that while northerners see the South as one giant Mississippi, southerners with their eye for distinction, realize that Mississippi is in a class of its own (Key 1984, 229). We contend that there are empirical measures of a stubborn southern political culture, even if it is often within driving distance of a more or less homogenized America.
REFERENCES


Beyond The Second Reconstruction: C. Vann Woodward’s Concept of the Third Reconstruction in the South

Hanes Walton, Jr., Josephine A.V. Allen, Sherman C. Puckett, and Donald R. Deskins, Jr.

Best known for the innovative historical and analytical concept of the “Second Reconstruction,” Professor C. Vann Woodward is much less known for his other related and linked concept the “Third Reconstruction.” Moreover, this latter concept is clearly not as well understood, described, and explained as was the initial one. Yet, it exists. Professor Woodward in the updated third edition of his classic, The Burden of Southern History (which came out initially in 1968, 1991, 1993, and 2008 with an added Postscript in April of 1968 after the assassination of Reverend Doctor Martin Luther King), discusses the “Third Reconstruction” in Chapter Eight entitled: “What Happened to the Civil Rights Movement” (Woodward 2008, 186).

Writing in that Postscript, Professor Woodward noted upon Doctor King’s death that “it is true that as young as he was at the time of his death King was still more identified with the Second Reconstruction, which had largely run its course, than he had yet come to be with the Third Reconstruction, which was struggling to be born” (Woodward 2008, 186). This major comment in his writings and others dealing with this same concept that are scattered in the same work does not hesitate to indicate that this noted historian of southern history was moving intellectually and conceptually beyond his original and highly influential and impactful “Second Reconstruction” concept. Embedded in his vision of a “Third Reconstruction” was a very strong belief that the South was ever changing and not always in a linear fashion (Woodward 1960). On this matter of change, Professor Woodward himself commented that:

What the perspective of years will lend to the meaning of change we cannot know. We can, however, recognize and define the area and extent of change. I shall even be so bold as to maintain that recent changes are of sufficient
depth and impact to define the end of an era of Southern History (Woodward 1957, 11).

In addition, this statement on the Third Reconstruction tells reveals that Professor Woodward was trying to date and define clearly these two times periods. Since the First Reconstruction had a specific periodization and he had given the Second Reconstruction a time frame, it would be obvious that the next period had to have a time frame. But there was a much more important factor: goals and objectives that he had for his beloved South. If certain goals and objectives did not come to fruition in the First or the Second time frame, it would be essential for these things to come in the next time period. And each one of these time frames had to have some event, moment or turning point that would signal and cue his readers to the fact that another period had arrived and/or was in the throes of arriving. Moreover, Woodward championed the idea that the South would inevitably shake off and relieve itself of its burden, and, in this process of transformation, would become its better self. This driving characteristic was at the very core of Professor Woodward’s thesis and it had been shaped by his understanding and analysis of what had happened in the First Reconstruction.

In a book of essays written in Woodward’s honor, several of his former doctoral students comment on this drive and his continual intellectual growth. Professors J. Morgan Kousser and James McPherson note that:

> Woodward’s range of knowledge and the flexibility and sheer playfulness of his mind have cast up so many new and striking ideas that there are many ‘Woodward theses’—some merely accepted, some repeatedly confirmed, some discarded, some challenged, some forcefully disputed, some discarded, some (in our view, unfortunately) ignored (Kousser and McPherson 1982, xxv).

But not only did his students see this change theme in his works, even his critics do so. One of Woodward’s colleagues and co-authors, historian William Leuchtenburg writes on this point that another colleague noted:

> When prominent critics pointed out an omission or flaw in his works, or disagreed with his conclusions, Woodward patiently explored the issue and did more research until he had either changed his mind or chose (to use a favorite word of his) to remain ‘unrepentant’ (Leuchtenburg 2008).

Thus, since change was a central core to his seminal ideas about the South as well as in his intellectual growth and progress, the question can be raised at this point, what role and/or function did it play in his conceptualizations, specifically in the concepts of the Second and Third Reconstructions? And more importantly, what can these innovative and periodized concepts tell us
about (1) the dominant factor and object in these different stages of Reconstruction and about (2) the Southern African American and his emergent political and suffrage rights? Herein lay the subject matter of this paper as well as our reasons for proposing the intellectual groundwork and imagination for future scholars who want to work on and use Woodward’s concept of the “Third Reconstruction.”

The Data and Methodology for the Concept: Third Reconstruction

Of his prodigious works and seminal ideas, two of his students, Professors Kousser and McPherson, have written that “two major avenues of research toward which Woodward pointed the way either have not been much traveled or have only begun to attract other scholars” (Kousser and McPherson 1982, xxxii). The first avenue involves his 1960 the “Age of Reinterpretation” article with its thesis about the “age of free security,” while the second avenue launches the quest and need for work in the area “of comparative history, and particularly of comparative Reconstruction,” which he claimed was “a road that has not as yet been taken very far by very many American historians, except those studying slavery and antislavery” (Kousser and McPherson 1982, xxxii), but this two avenue typological assessment of his work is incomplete because the academic avenue set into motion by his dual Second and Third Reconstruction concepts are a road not yet taken. In point of fact, even in the book written by his doctoral students, there is not a single chapter devoted either to the First, Second or Third concepts of Reconstruction, much less a comparative analysis of the latter two. Seemingly, his students found nothing intellectually interesting about the concepts despite the fact that they had become quite popular in two major academic disciplines, history and political science (Valelly 2004).

In an edited volume with chapters written by his critics, one finds the same type of omission. Not a single chapter is devoted either in a singular or comparative fashion to either the First, Second or Third Reconstruction. The closest that this work comes is in the chapter written by Historian Howard Rabinowitz “More Than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing The Strange Career of Jim Crow.” In this chapter, Professor Rabinowitz not only shows that “there were distinct stages in the subsequent developments of the three revised editions that appeared in the next twenty publishing seasons,” but he also focuses on the three main contributions of Woodward’s book, one of which is his concept of the Second Reconstruction (Rabinowitz 1997 184). He declares that of the three “contributions of Strange Career . . . the second is the concept of the Second Reconstruction as a way of gaining perspective on Reconstruction or, in Woodward’s term, the ‘First Reconstruction’” (Rabinowitz 1997, 184). Having indicated his focus on this concept,
Professor Rabinowitz offers a detailed discussion and explanation of it beginning on page 191 in the chapter and continuing on through page 197, making it one of the longest scholarly coverages currently available (Rabinowitz 1997, 191-97).

Finally, there is the biography on Woodward by Professor John Herbert Roper, the editor of the critics’ volume. Although there are no chapters on the First, Second or Third Reconstructions, nor any subsections of chapters devoted to any of them, one does find single and/or two sentence references on pages 247, 289, 290, and 291 (Roper 1987). Specifically, Chapter 7, “The Strange Career of Jim Crow, 1954-1955,” does not offer any coverage and/or analysis of the concept. Nor does Chapter 8, “The Burden of Southern History: Ironic Perceptions, Ironic Commitments, 1955-1965.” Surprisingly, it is the last Chapter 10, “The Gift,” that offers the most pages of single sentence references. Hence, even in this first biography on Professor Woodward there is very little about this influential concept.

Collectively speaking, then, there is only brief mention and discussions in any of the current three sources; the book by his students, the book by his critics and the lone biography. Yet, when one goes searching for perhaps one of his most seminal ideas, there is little to be had from his colleagues, peers and critics despite the heavy and enduring use of it in both the discipline of history and political science. Hence, the purpose of our goes beyond an analysis of Professor Woodward’s elusive, barely mentioned and hardly discussed concept known as the Third Reconstruction.

Thus, it is first essential and necessary to delineate, describe and explain Woodward’s conceptualization of the First Reconstruction and then Second Reconstruction. None of the current academic and scholarly works at this writing does that. Therefore, we will have to undertake a content analysis of his works to collect his own rendering of these two background and preceding concepts. Once we have collected the major and key statements, references and discussions from Woodward’s works on the First and Second Reconstructions, our next step will be to organize and structure such data so that we will have as much as possible a holistic conceptual portrait of each of these two enduring concepts. And using these distilled portraits, we will be able to not only understand each of these two concepts separately but also use each one to tell us about the Third one.

Once we have his rending of the first and second conceptualizations then it is possible to extrapolate from them insights, clues and suggestions to help us formulate and then further conceptualize the rather vague and imprecise concept the Third Reconstruction. Here, our inferential analysis and approach derived from an understanding of how Woodward put together these first two concepts can guide and assist us in the further exploration of his evolving third concept. And with these background concepts it might just
be possible to generate a robust conceptualization for the first time of all three of these dramatic and dynamic stages of Reconstruction in the American South.

Thus, our basic data for structuring and organizing two of Woodward’s three concepts and possibly building and structuring the third concept will be Woodward’s own books and articles as well as some of the key secondary works on the man and his works. Admittedly, there is not much in the secondary sources and to an extent in his original sources. Moreover, in dealing with such theoretical concepts, it is necessary to reframe Woodward’s ideas as analytical and logical concepts. Therefore, we are planning to place these analytical and logical concepts inside an empirical context to see if his logical concepts have any grounding in a quantitative fashion in the South.

To undertake this empirical investigation and evaluation this study will collect election return data from the South using African American and White majority counties during the presidential primaries when African American Democratic and Republican presidential candidates ran in 1972, 1984, 1988, 2004, and 2008. And it is the last campaign that will allow us to use the same type of election return data from the South in the general election. Findings from both the primary and general elections will provide empirical based insights about how well the Second and Third Reconstruction concepts are becoming accepted in the region by both groups of voters. Thus, the second source of the data for this article will be election return data at the county-level in the eleven states of the old South.

In addition, the recent 2008 presidential election and its African American winner would obviously be a keystone characteristic moment and date inside the Third Reconstruction concept that we will need to begin with a quantitative analysis of this unique and rare historical event in the nation and the South instead of our proposed initial conceptual analysis. First, a quantitative analysis will enable one to see if any patterns and trends emerge in these African American presidential candidacies in the major party’s presidential primaries. And secondly, if such empirical facts evolve then it might be quite useful to use these patterns and trends to assess and evaluation and illuminate the nature and scope and significance of not only the Third Reconstruction concept but the other two as well. With this approach, we can establish some empirical tendencies that hopefully will be thought-provoking enough to generate new work with Woodward ideas.

And in terms of the methodologies used in this article, there will be a content analysis of the relevant books and articles of the theorists, Woodward and his observers and critics. Secondly, in order to summarize and manage the election return data, the paper will employ the standard descriptive statistics and the appropriate visual statistics to present and graphically
compare and contrast the different and diverse findings evolving from the different states and the two categories of counties in the region.

Overall, the purpose of this work is to determine how well these three conceptualizations of Reconstruction in the South as advanced by Professor Woodward enable us to understand and grasp the strengths and weaknesses of three different reform efforts in the region and whether there will be in the future the need for a “Fourth Reconstruction.”

**C. Vann Woodward's Concept of the Third Reconstruction as Seen from a Quantitative Perspective on African American Presidential Candidates**

Professor Woodward seems to place the Second Reconstruction in the period marked by the Supreme Court *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in May 17, 1954 through 1966 (Woodward 2008, 173). Although Woodward is not quite clear in his writings when the Third Reconstruction started, he suggests that it was struggling to be born at the time of his death on April 4, 1968 (Woodward 2008, 186). Despite this uncertainty, Woodward was nevertheless discussing it and a central feature has to be the African American winner in 2008. Thus, a quantitative rendition of this central feature might just help us in our theory building efforts here.


> It may be that in due course, say on the eve of the Third Reconstruction, some enterprising historian will bring out a monograph on the Compromise that ended the Second Reconstruction, entitled perhaps *The Triumph of Tokenism*. And he may judiciously set forth the background of how the people wearied of the annual August ghetto riots, and the inevitable call for troops, of the farcical war on poverty and all the corruption and the squandering of public funds, of the rise of racial demagogues, and their shameless antics in New York, Baltimore, Atlanta, and Los Angeles. . . . Then, observing that since in the first instance the cycle ran from 1865 to 1877 and in the second from 1954 to 1966, our future historian may tentatively hypothesize that a baker’s dozen years is par for the course (Woodward 2008, 173).

Learning from Woodward’s conceptualization of the First and Second Reconstruction, we know that some major reform movement launched by one or more branches of the federal government to rectify some new or continuing breaches in the South of African American constitutional rights.
Secondly, we learn from the above passage that this reform effort will probably last some twelve years before it runs its course.

After these opening remarks and comments Woodward adds to his evolving concept of the Third Reconstruction by raising the pertinent question: “How long before the country would be prepared to face up to a Third Reconstruction—which is what a realistic solution of the new national problems really amounted to—remained to be seen.” He continues:

and whether much of the spent momentum and the old élan of past crusades would be marshaled and how many veteran leaders could be enlisted to get an entirely new program off the ground was problematical. The White House Conference of June, 1966, which was designed to do just these things, failed of its purpose.

Thus, he concludes with the perceptive suggestion that “veterans of the Second Reconstruction and planners of a Third would do well to face up to the fact that the one is now over and the other is still struggling to be born” (Woodward 2008, 178). While these combined remarks and comments are quite helpful, they still do not provide the beginning of the Third Reconstruction.

Nevertheless, help arrives from elsewhere in his writing. He tells us that there are “two distinctive features of the Second Reconstruction: (1) the predominance of the Negro, and (2) the predominance of youth.” This suggests that part of the story and characteristic of any Third Reconstruction will be the “Negro” and the South. Thus, one needs to launch an investigation into the recent political behavior of the African American electorate in the South and the responses of the white South to this recent political behavior. The recent presidential elections where African American presidential candidates were running for major party nominations offer the events necessary to make a quantitative assessment. Therefore, whatever the nature and scope of the Third Reconstruction might become and the length and attainment of any reforms as a consequence of it, it will have embedded in it, the impact and influence of African American presidential candidates for the nominations of the two major political parties in the South (Walton et al. 2010, 167-86).

Although African American presidential candidates seeking major party nominations began with Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm’s 1972 campaign for the Democratic party nomination, currently there is not available county-level data from that campaign. Thence, we have moved to Reverend Jesse Jackson’s two campaigns in 1984 and 1988. Figure 1 shows how candidate Jackson fared in the African American majority counties in the four southern states that held presidential primaries in 1984. Jackson both won and lost some of these counties. He won nine in Alabama and lost
Figure 1. Performance of Jesse Jackson in African American Majority Counties of the South, 1984 Presidential Primaries

Figure 2. Performance of Jesse Jackson in White Majority Counties of the South, 1984 Presidential Primaries
one, while in Georgia he won sixteen and lost three but won six in North Carolina and two in Tennessee but lost one in these two states.

Figure 2 shows the number of white majority counties that Jackson won and lost in four of the southern states in 1984. In Alabama, he won seven and lost fifty, while in Georgia he won eighteen and lost 122; in North Carolina he won fifteen and lost seventy-nine and in Tennessee he won four and lost eighty-nine. Thus, the pattern across the South was that he lost more white majority counties than he won. And when these two Figures are compared and contrasted, Jackson in 1984 won more white majority counties in Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee than he did African American counties. Just the opposite was true in the state of North Carolina.

Table 1 (1984) reveals that Jackson won about 89 percent of the African American counties but only about eleven percent (10.8%) of the white majority counties. But in actual totals, Jackson won more white majority counties than he did the African American majority counties. Here, we see in empirical terms at the county-level in the South how the African American and white electorates initially responded to an African American presidential candidate. Simply put, the white electorate opposed such a candidate in these four southern states.

### Table 1. Performance of Jesse Jackson in Counties of the South 1984 Presidential Primaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Racial Majority</th>
<th>Counties Won</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Counties Won</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total Number of Counties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>87.7%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>87.7%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>84.2%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>87.1%</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
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<td>16.0%</td>
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<td>84.0%</td>
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<td>84.0%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>97</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>6.3%</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>93.7%</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>93.7%</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black County Totals</td>
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<td>89.2%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White County Totals</td>
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<td>11.5%</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td>384</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Totals</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>421</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3. Performance of Jesse Jackson in African American Majority Counties of the South, 1988 Presidential Primaries

Figure 4. Performance of Jesse Jackson in White Majority Counties of the South, 1988 Presidential Primaries
However, Jackson ran again in 1988. This time ten of the eleven southern states held presidential primaries. Only South Carolina did not hold a presidential primary. Figure 3 (1988) reveals the numbers of counties that Jackson won and lost in these eleven states. The pattern and trend is quite clear. Jackson won every African American majority county in all ten states. Moreover, when comparing his performances in the four states in 1984 to the same four states in 1988 he improved in terms of the number of counties won in only two of the four states, Alabama and Georgia because he had maxed out in North Carolina and Tennessee in 1984 anyway.

Figure 4 (1988) shows the white majority counties in the South won by Jackson in the 1988 Democratic presidential primaries. Only in two of the ten states, Mississippi and Virginia, did Jackson win more white majority counties than he lost. In the other eight states he lost more white majority counties than he won. Clearly, the majority of the counties in the South were not in his electoral coalition but he did improve over his performance four years before.

Table 2 (1988) reveals that Jackson won one hundred percent of the African American majority counties, which was about a ten percent improvement over his 1984 performance. In addition, he won one-fourth (25.9%) of the white majority counties and lost some three-fourths (74.1%) of said counties. This too was nearly a fifteen percent improvement over his 1984 performance. White support for Jackson had grown.

In the interim presidential primaries, Alan Keyes, an African American Republican ran and neither one of his efforts eventuated into the winning of a single county anywhere in the South (Walton and Lester 1999). Nor did former U.S. Senator Carol Moseley Braun win any counties in her 2004 run but the Reverend Al Sharpton did win one county in his 2004 run for the Democratic Party nomination. However, all of that would change with U.S. Senator Barack Obama’s (D–IL) race in 2008 (Deskins et al. 2010).

Figure 5 (2008) shows the number of counties that Senator Barack Obama won and lost in the African American majority counties in all eleven of the southern states (Texas shows no victories or losses simply because by the year 2008 there were no African American majority counties in the state). Hence, only in Arkansas did Senator Obama lose an African American majority county and this is due in part to the fact that Arkansas was the adopted “Home State” of Senator Hillary Clinton, his opposition (Walton 2000).

Figure 6 (2008) shows the number of counties which Senator Obama won in the white majority counties in 2008 in all eleven southern states. The pattern and trend in this empirical data is that in two of these states, Georgia and Virginia, Senator Obama won more white majority counties than he lost while in the other nine states he lost more counties than he won. Thus, to put
## Table 2. Performance of Jesse Jackson in Counties of the South 1988 Presidential Primaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Racial Majority</th>
<th>Counties Won Number</th>
<th>Counties Won Percent</th>
<th>Counties Won Number</th>
<th>Counties Won Percent</th>
<th>Total Number of Counties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>31.0%</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>1097</td>
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</table>
Figure 5. Performance of Barak Obama in African American Majority Counties of the South, 2008 Presidential Primaries

Figure 6. Performance of Barak Obama in White Majority Counties of the South, 2008 Presidential Primaries
it lightly, while the Obama candidacy improves in the white counties over previous African American presidential candidates, there is still a very strong opposition to this candidacy.

Table 3 (2008) demonstrates that Senator Obama won nearly one hundred percent (99%) of the African American majority counties while he won one-third (37.5%) of the white majority and lost some two-thirds (62.5%) of said counties in his initial election bid. Thus, there is still strong opposition to this African American presidential candidacy.

African American empowerment at the presidential level is, in this Third Reconstruction period, a problem for the two-thirds of the white southern electorate. And this should come as no significant finding at the moment simply because in this Third Reconstruction phase, African Americans hold essentially local, county and a few congressional offices as well as a very few statewide elective offices. And on this score they are about the same as the First and Second Reconstruction.

Resistance and opposition this time is coming from whites that by the end of the Second Reconstruction had realigned with the Republican Party. Most of the statewide officials are white Republicans as is the voting patterns of the white electorate. Secondly, the majority of southern congresspersons House and Senate are now Republicans. The rise of African American political empowerment via the Voting Rights Act and its extensions has led to the abandonment of the Democratic Party by the white southern electorate and the realignment with the Republican Party. And now African Americans have nearly taken over the southern Democratic Party by default.

But during the First and Second Reconstruction periods, the southern white party elites and masses took over the Democratic Party and left the African American party elites and electorate in the Republican Party. The empirical data generated from our analysis of African American presidential campaigns in the major parties reveals a pattern and tendency of party realignment based on race. The two electorates in the South realigned to political parties where the opposite racial group is not present in large numbers. And the other pattern and tendency is that there is at least in the First and Second and now the Third Reconstruction opposition to statewide African American candidates and particularly African American presidential candidates. Finally, from the 2008 presidential general election, we find that the opposition which is seen in the presidential primaries, is even stronger when it comes to the general election. The opposition becomes even more pronounced and dominant at the state-level. Although there is no data to compare 2008 with because there were no African American presidential nominees before then, in 2008 Obama won only four states: (1) Virginia, (2) Florida, and (3) North Carolina.


<table>
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Having now discerned some key patterns and tendencies from the unique and rare 2008 presidential election contests we can now proceed to a theoretical analysis of the first and second concepts of Reconstruction and discern if these empirical regularities inform and/or relate to the theory building in the first and second concepts.

C. Vann Woodward’s Concept of the First Reconstruction

Remarks and comments regarding the “New” or Second Reconstruction were present in the 1955 first edition of *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, and were often made when Woodward discussed the First Reconstruction. He commented, “the New (or Second Reconstruction as he would eventually call it), unlike the old, was not the monopoly of one of the great political parties” (Woodward 1955, 10). To these insights he argued that “great impersonal forces of history . . . lay behind emancipation, the First Reconstruction, and Redemption. They included economic revolution, rapid urbanization, and war—war in a somewhat new dimension, called total war” (Woodward 1955, 10). Here, what he means is that a number of social forces generated and attained the reforms that came out of the First and Second Reconstructions.

Continuing his comparisons and contrasts, Woodward ventured the remark:

The New Reconstruction addressed itself to all the aspects of race relations that the first one attacked and even some that the First Reconstruction avoided or neglected. These included political, economic, and civil rights. Few sections of the segregation code have escaped attack, for the assault has been leveled at the Jim Crow system in trains, buses, and other common carriers; in housing and working conditions; in restaurants, theaters, and hospitals; in playgrounds, public parks, swimming pools, and organized sports to mention a few examples. Most recently the attack has been carried into two areas in which the First Reconstruction radicals made no serious effort: segregation in the armed services and in the public schools (Woodward 1955, 11).

Woodward explains that the First Reconstruction avoided two distinct areas of public and private life for systematic reform, public schools and the armed services. As he saw it, this was one of the major differences between the two different stages in southern history.

Woodward did not stop with these exceptions and differences in regard to the First Reconstruction; in fact, he expanded upon them. Accordingly, Woodward saw some of the roots of segregation inside the First Reconstruction. He found “some important aspects of segregation were achieved and sanctioned by the First Reconstruction. One of these was segregation of the great Protestant churches, a process accomplished by the voluntary with-
drawal of the Negroes and their establishment of independent organizations” (Woodward 1955, 15). Secondly, he wrote that “segregation became the almost universal practice in the public schools of the South during Reconstruction, with or without explicit sanction of the radicals” (Woodward 1955, 15). This was followed by description of a third major characteristic of the First Reconstruction. In “the military services, segregation was strengthened by the Civil War and left unaltered during (First) Reconstruction” (Woodward 1955, 15). And finally, there was a fourth characteristic of the First Reconstruction: “Equality in social gatherings of a private nature, there is little evidence that even the high Negro officials of the (First) Reconstruction governments in the South were extended that recognition—even by the white radicals” (Woodward 1955, 15).

With these remarks and comments, Woodward had offered all of the incisive and insightful reflections about the concept of the First Reconstruction in the initial edition. More remarks and comments would be forthcoming in the second edition of the book two years later. And in this 1957 edition, Woodward expanded upon his partisanship linkage made in the 1955 book. In a new Chapter to the second edition, he found that “Reconstruction in the 1860’s and ’70’s was pretty strictly identified in origin, implementation, and execution with the Republican Party, and about as consistently opposed by the Democratic Party” (Woodward 1957, 174). To these new reflections he went even further: “The creation of a large new electorate devoted to the Republicans and the simultaneous crippling of an electorate equally devoted to the Democrats was one meaning of Reconstruction, the crude political meaning” (Woodward 1957, 174-75). And this meant “whatever the merits of the reconstruction plan in terms of justice, principle, and human rights, its success spelled political advantage for one party and disadvantage for the other” (Woodward 1957, 174).

Finally, Woodward closes out his expanded discussion of the First Reconstruction by further expanding on an earlier comment on churches by saying that “the First Reconstruction tended to widen instead of close the sectional breach that had opened with the great national church organizations in the ante-bellum struggle over slavery” (Woodward 1957, 176). Simply put the northern and southern branches of the very same religious churches during this period were now taking opposite positions on slavery.

Since both of Professor Woodward’s definition and conceptualization of the First Reconstruction emerged and evolved from specific and/or comparative and contrasting remarks, a composite portrait of this First Reconstruction would have to be used in order to be comprehensive and systematic. Thus, as Woodward’s comments, remarks and insights reveal, he saw a reform movement emerging in the South in the period 1865-1877—the period of the First Reconstruction—that included efforts by the federal
government in the form of Congressional Reconstruction, along with the Republican Party in the South, and African American Republicans and voters assisted by local whites, to institutionalize needed and necessary reforms. The scope of these reforms was limited rather than broad based because they failed to reform the school system and the federal military. However, these two major societal organizations, one local, i.e., the school system and the other national, the U.S. military, left huge areas of the southern states segregated.

Then, another major societal organization, “Protestant Churches” which had helped to launch, promote and sustain the emerging reform movement failed to desegregate from within and therefore abetted the rise of segregation by allowing the African American community to establish their own separate African American churches both North and South. Hence, the churches, which were both national and local in scope, became ironically one of the roots and pillars of the eventual system of segregation in the South along with the schools and the military. Churches in this fashion worked to undercut the very thing, which they had been working to avoid, a desegregated society. And this renders the reform movement only a partial one.

Next, Professor Woodward not only saw the churches as having a flawed strategy and program during the First Reconstruction period (1865-1877) but also the political parties. He bemoans the fact the only one political party embraced and pushed the reforms, the Republican Party and even this inclusionary effort was half-hearted. In his description of the political parties, he found that even the Republican Party socially isolated even the black elected Republican officials and snubbed them. Although, he does not say it in his specific discussion of the First Reconstruction, he does indicate that the party relegated Black Republicans to only minor elective offices and a few major elective and appointive offices when they could not absolutely avoid it.

In Professor Woodward’s concept of the First Reconstruction (1865-1877), the Presidential Reconstruction efforts of both President Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson were arrayed against reform. To be balanced, they were in both camps, i.e. support for reform and against some aspect of the reform. Both men were for limited suffrage rights, suffrage rights with an educational qualification. And eventually, Johnson was even opposed to that, coming out during his administration against suffrage rights altogether. And Presidential Johnson’s stand emboldened southern states to also oppose suffrage rights for the Freedmen, and they, in turn, did not grant these rights when President Johnson restored them back to the Union.

Congress had gone along with this approach when they passed the First Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 because it left the granting of suffrage
rights up to the ten southern states. When not a single one of the ten states complied with the law, Congress passed the Second Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 giving the U.S. Military Commanders the right to register both Freedmen and whites, hold a state constitutional convention, draft a new state constitution that gave the Freedmen the right to vote and then hold elections for the new state governments (McPherson 1982, 524).

The other principal force arrayed against this First Reconstruction was the Democratic Party (known initially as White Conservatives). When reconstituted the southern Democratic Party became the dominant party in the region. Of how this party eventually arrived at this position, Professor Woodward writes “it would be a mistake to picture the Democratic Redeemers as the first Southern whites to appeal successfully to the Negro voter with the conservative race philosophy. That distinction belongs to the conservative ex-Whigs planters of Mississippi, turned Republicans, who took over the party from the radicals and dominated it for several years with Negro support” (Woodward 1955, 33). And when this group of White conservative leaders returned en masse to the Democratic Party these

Southern whites accept them (Freedmen voters) precisely as Northern men in cities accept the ignorant Irish vote, —not cheerfully, but with acquiescence in the inevitable; and when the strict color-line is once broken they are just as ready to conciliate the negro as the Northern politician to flatter the Irishman (Woodward 1955, 55).

At this point, Woodward concludes: “as a voter the Negro was both hated and cajoled, both intimidated and courted, but he could never be ignored so long as he voted,” by the southern Democratic party (Woodward 1955, 55). Thus, when the opportunity came, this party moved in the late 1880s and 1890 to completely disenfranchise this voter. This party ultimately impeded and helped to eliminate the reform both nationally and regionally. At the national level under the divided terms of Democrat Grover Cleveland, the party literally removed almost all of the suffrage rights laws written during the reform thrust of the First Reconstruction. Thus, Woodward does not say it explicitly, yet we find it in our empirical analysis of the major event of the Third Reconstruction, racial party realignments that eventually undercut the reform effort and set in motion the next needed reform.

Military Commanders, who helped to carry out the reforms, were not always in agreement with them and only partially implemented them. This was helped by Republican President Grant who came out publicly opposed to the 15th Amendment. Such national and local activity by the military ensured poor implementation and, at best, curtailed the reforms of the First Reconstruction. And when these forces that were arrayed against the reforms are joined with the Democratic Redeemers recapture of the southern govern-
ments away from the reformers and allowed them to pursue their own local strategy in dealing with the so-called race problem in the political deal granted by Republican President R.B. Hayes in the Compromise of 1877, the First Reconstruction collapsed.

But it was not just these sundry political leaders, national and local forces undermining the First Reconstruction there was also the matter of the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan and numerous local offshoot organizations that wage extralegal violence to assist the white Democratic Redeemers in maintaining their recaptured power. And to ensure that the white masses went along with this recapture and the violence that was needed to sustain it led to the emergence of a new ideology known as “White Supremacy.” Soon this ideology was pervasive enough so that it captured the public opinion of the region, helping to institutionalize a new socio-economic and political system known as segregation.

According to Woodward, segregation had its roots in the First Reconstruction and it was this ever rising and omnipresent system that ensured that the First Reconstruction would come to an end and set in motion the need for a Second Reconstruction.

C. Vann Woodward’s Concept of the Second Reconstruction

C. Vann Woodward first used the term “Second Reconstruction” in his article “The Political Legacy of Reconstruction,” which appeared in the special summer 1957 issue of the Journal of Negro Education. Editor Charles Thompson wrote

> each summer the Journal of Negro Education publishes a Yearbook on some specific problem dealing with the life and education of the Negro or some other minority group. The 1957 Summer Yearbook is devoted to a discussion of the Negro voter in the South, and of some of the educational implications involved (Thompson 1957, 213).

According to Editor Thompson, he had divided the Yearbook into five key parts. The second section provides a brief historical overview of the First Reconstruction and the first chapter in this second section began with Professor Woodward’s article “The Legacy of Reconstruction. And it is in this article that Woodward “indicates how the Negro obtained the vote, how it was practically lost through revolution and political compromise, and what effect this history has had upon the current situation” (Thompson 1957, 217). Overall, Editor Thompson was making an attempt at a comprehensive and systematic study of the African American electorate in the South after the 1956 presidential election, the first such effort since the Supreme Court’s historic decision on Brown v. Board of Education. Not only had Professor
Woodward prepared a legal brief for this landmark case but also, almost all of the major participants in that court case wrote articles in this Yearbook volume.

Of the twenty-three articles, there were twenty-six participants and among the contributors were the Executive Secretary of the NAACP, Roy Wilkins, Public Relations Director of NAACP, Henry Lee Moon, and Attorneys Thurgood Marshall and James Nabrit, Jr., who had helped to argue the Brown case before the Supreme Court. And beyond such notable African American professors who contributed was historian John Hope Franklin, who also had provided a legal brief and Clarence Bacote, sociologists Henry Lee Bullock, Tilman Cothran, and Charles G. Gomillion, political scientists Earl Lewis and I.G. Newton; State and local government officials Robert Weaver, and James T. McCain; and Research at the Southern Regional Council, Florence Irving, to name just a few key people. And also among this list were several white scholars and activists, like Woodward, political scientists John Fenton at Tulane, and Donald Strong at University of Alabama and the well-known political journalist Samuel Lubell.

In his article, Professor Woodward had this to say about his innovative and inventive concept:

> During the present struggle for Negro rights, which might even be called the Second Reconstruction—though one of a different sort—I have noticed among Negro intellectuals at times a tendency to look back upon the First Reconstruction as if it were in some ways a sort of Golden Age. In this nostalgic view that period takes the shape of the race’s finest hour, a time of heroic leaders and deeds, of high faith and firm resolution, a time of forthright and passionate action, with no bowing to compromises of ‘deliberate speed.’ I think I understand their feeling. Reconstruction will always have a special and powerful meaning for the Negro. It was undoubtedly a period full of rich and tragic and meaningful history, a period that has many meanings yet to yield. But I seriously doubt that it will ever serve satisfactorily as a golden Age—for anybody. There is too much irony mixed with the tragedy for that (Woodward 1957, 240).

Although he formally launches the concept of the Second Reconstruction in the last paragraph in the article, he provided this article to a much larger audience when he placed it three years later in 1960 in his popular collection of essays The Burden of Southern History as Chapter Five. Nevertheless, the forerunner of the concept of the Second Reconstruction actually appeared in 1955 in the initial edition of The Strange Career of Jim Crow, as the “New Reconstruction” (Woodward 1955, 10).

Historian and critic Howard Rabinowitz explains that “Woodward was even more sympathetic to the aims, legacy, and problems of the First Reconstruction in an article that also marked his full commitment to the term
Second Reconstruction.” Moreover, in the very same year that he mentioned the concept he brought out in 1957 a revised second edition of his popular The Strange Career of Jim Crow, which includes a fourth Chapter entitled: ‘Deliberate Speed’ vs. “Majestic Instancy.” And in this chapter Professor Woodward almost fully embraces the concept that he announced in the Journal article and in his rather extended discussion uses it to displace this initial phrasing with the term “New Reconstruction.” New is now nearly gone and the Second Reconstruction becomes the standard usage. The concept is now formally announced and thrust upon both the academic and scholarly and the lay and general reading public audiences.

Again, Professor Rabinowitz comments on the evolution and transition of Woodward from the “New” to the Second Reconstruction concept. He writes: “in his view, the nation in 1955 was in the midst of a ‘New Reconstruction,’ a term later used interchangeably with ‘Second Reconstruction,’ until the latter unaccountably replaced ‘New Reconstruction’ in the 1966 edition,” of the Strange Career (Rabinowitz 1997, 191). In the 1957 edition, Second Reconstruction is used jointly but more often in the new chapter but it does not replace the use of “New Reconstruction” in this and/or in the initial chapter. Hence, there is at least mixed usage in the 1957 edition. The evolution of the concept was already underway when it was announced in the 1957 journal article.

Of his remarks and comments in the 1957 edition of the Strange Career, Woodward began as he did in the earlier edition with a comparison and contrast statement. Writing on the matter he opined, “already the Second Reconstruction could be claimed to have accomplished more genuine change in some aspects of human relations than the First Reconstruction had done with all its blood and thunder and histrionics” (Woodward 1957, 155). Later in the chapter he adds more insights about the concept by saying: “in this mood and in view of prevailing retrogression, it is natural to speculate whether the New Reconstruction, in spite of its promising start, is not doomed to repeat the frustration and failure of the First Reconstruction” (Woodward 1957, 169).

After these opening remarks and comments, Woodward quickly comes back to make some remarks and comments about the First Reconstruction. He suggests that “the revolutionary architects of the First Reconstruction, moreover, were untroubled with scruples about state rights and quite ready to use force without stint to accomplish their purposes” (Woodward 1957, 170). According to Woodward, as the white conservative Democratic Redeemers saw it, “if the Constitution got in their way they changed it or ignored it, and they took much the same attitude toward the President and Supreme Court” (Woodward 1957, 170). Such a political will allowed that “the will of the defeated, discredited and for a time, helpless South to
prevail” over the reformers and their achievements (Woodward 1957, 170-71). Such was the outcome of the First Reconstruction.

Professor Woodward offers more detail about the First Reconstruction seemingly to instruct the reader about the Second Reconstruction. He says, “for the national background of the First Reconstruction was the Gilded Age. It also was a postwar era that, after a few years of peace, had had enough of idealism, self-sacrifice and crusades and was exuberantly pre-occupied in material things and self-indulgence” (Woodward 1957, 173). After these additional insights about the First Reconstruction, he quickly returns to remarks and comments about the Second Reconstruction.

The Second Reconstruction has no such strongly marked partisan character. It originated under the leadership of one party and was continued by the other. It has received important contributions and encouragement from both . . . the success of the Second Reconstruction is not tied to the fortunes of one political party” (Woodward 1957, 175).

Unlike in the First Reconstruction where both the northern and southern sections of the Democratic party were of like minds on the southern Negro question and the South’s approach to it, in the 1950s and 1960s there was an evolving intra-party struggle going on in the Democratic party where not only were northern party elites opposed to the southern Democratic party efforts to deny the African American electorate civil and suffrage rights, but also the white electorate as well. And one of the reasons for this reality is that the African American electorate that had migrated out of the South into the large northern industrial states that had significant electoral votes had become something of a balance-of-power force in helping the Democratic party win post-war presidential elections with Truman in 1948, and Kennedy in 1960 (Moon 2005). Here without saying it, Woodward is showing that the African American migration to the northern states eventually permits a racial party realignment but this time they are realigning into the party of the southern whites. This helps to set the stage for the central defining feature and characteristic of the Third Reconstruction.

Writing further Woodward argues that in “the Second Reconstruction . . . the defection of the Border States from the cause of segregation is becoming more and more apparent . . . (and) . . . each month brings news of additional retreats along the segregation front” (Moon 2005, 178). With this view and perspective on the Second Reconstruction, Woodward predicts “in spite of resistance and recent setbacks, therefore, the preponderant evidence points to the eventual doom of segregation in American life and the triumph of the Second Reconstruction—in the long run” (Moon 2005, 178-79). And this comment led Woodward to make his final remark about the Second Reconstruction. Woodward declares:
but the ‘long run’ implies ‘gradualism,’ and ‘gradualism’ is a word that has acquired almost as evil associations as the word ‘appeasement’ once had. . . . Undesirable or not, gradualism is an inescapable fact and a basic characteristic of the New Reconstruction.

Accordingly, for Woodward, this gradualism holds the seeds to the possible failure of the reform thrust embedded in the Second Reconstruction. And this then sets the stage for the emergence of the Third Reconstruction.

In this Second Reconstruction concept, at the theoretical level, one sees what we found in our empirical analysis, race based partisanship in the South and the African American and White partisans are attached to different parties and party movement is in the opposite direction and at great odds, if not in electoral conflict with each other. Thus, to fully grasp and understand the role of race in regional partisanship realignment one needs to see it in the theoretical context of Woodward’s first, second and third concepts. And it is now necessary to acknowledge the reality that it is pertinent to all three concepts as well as the connecting linkage and relationship.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Professor Woodward’s conceptualization about the Third Reconstruction is at this writing incomplete in terms of definition, and especially in terms of a periodization. There is in the period from 1966 through the present no major reform event and/or events with the exception of the renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 2006. No major leader replaced King, except Reverend Jackson and he did so in the electoral arena. Following Jackson has been the election of the first African American president Barack Obama. The majority of whites in either the nation and especially in the South did not vote for him and since being in office, opposition has come from all regions of the country. And while some of this opposition has evolved supposedly as a consequence of his economic policies and high employment, all of the polls taken before he took office and particularly in the majority of the states of the old South revealed significant opposition to him because of his race. And while he did win three states in the region, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia in many of the other southern states the white support for the Republican Party grew over what it had been four years earlier.

With these new realities streaming from the struggle of African American empowerment at the national level many in the aftermath of President Obama declared that the nation had now passed into what they dubbed post-racial America. As a consequence, numerous African American candidates entered the 2010 southern Democratic primaries seeking nominations for a variety of statewide offices. The vast majority lost to white candidates and where they did not, the African American electorate secured the nomination
for them due to the fact that the white electorate in the South is no longer voting in the Democratic parties. Thus, a few African American statewide candidates won the party’s nomination and will face Republicans in the forthcoming general elections in November. Their chances are quite bleak due to the fact that the white electorate is voting Republican and in every increasing numbers. This means that the chances and/or victories for the African American Democratic statewide candidates are near impossible unless some political crossover voting takes place (Bositis 2010).

Therefore, the Third Reconstruction now faces a vastly different political party situation in terms of the “party-in-the-electorate” in the region. Neither the First nor the Second Reconstructions faced these phenomena. And Professor Woodward did not attempt of theorizing on this point of racial partisanship in the region. The empirical evidence not only finds it but sees it as the dominant characteristic and suggests that Woodward’s theorizing implies it. Nor had it appeared in the past. Therefore, we know that any reform during this period must address not only this issue but a rising new one known as felony disenfranchisement that appeared in Florida during the 2000 contested presidential outcome in the State. New congressional legislation did come forth to deal with the problems inherent in electoral administration known as the HAVA Act. But this reform legislation did not address the larger problem of felony disenfranchisement that has been targeted toward members of the African American electorate (Hull 2006; Manza and Uggen 2008). Clearly, there is much to consider before the scholarly community can properly conceptualize Woodward last great idea and term, the Third Reconstruction. Hopefully, there are enough intriguing and revealing insights to launch a new series of fruitful investigations into Woodward’s rich constellation of ideas about the South, African Americans and political partisanship in the region to say nothing of his three concepts of Reconstruction.

REFERENCES


Racism, Resentment, and Regionalism: The South and the Nation in the 2008 Presidential Election

Joseph A. Aistrup

This paper assesses the influences racial resentment and racial stereotypes on Southern and non-Southern white, Asian, and Hispanic voters in the 2008 presidential election. I use logistic regression to test the hypotheses that racial resentment and racial stereotypes influenced support for McCain and that the influence of these two variables is greater in the South than in the non-South. The findings suggest that racial resentment’s influence extends across both regions but that the affects of racial stereotypes is confined to the South. The analysis is replicated for U.S. House elections in 2008, finding that the impact of racial resentment and racial stereotypes is insignificant in both regions. In 2008, the influences of racism, resentment and regionalism on voting are confined to the presidential level.

There is a growing chorus of studies suggesting that Barack Obama did not garner as many votes as a white Democrat presidential nominee would have under similar electoral conditions. Sniderman and Stiglitz (2008) were the first to suggest that Obama may have underperformed. Using indicators of racial prejudice developed by the authors, they found that self-identified Democrats who were high on the racial prejudice scale were significantly less likely to vote for Obama, whereas Republicans, no matter what their level of racial prejudice were all equally unlikely to support Obama. Carl Klarner’s (2008) analysis also found evidence that Obama underperformed. Using methods similar to ecological regression, his findings suggest that Obama should have obtained roughly 55 percent of the popular vote compared to 52.9 percent. Michael Lewis-Beck, Charles Tien, and Richard Nadeau’s (2010) economic model for predicting presidential voting support echoes Klarner’s findings. They found that Obama underperformed by at least 5 percent of the popular vote. Moreover, they tie this performance gap to negative attitudes about blacks, specifically with the perception by some voters that if elected Obama would institute policies that favor blacks. Most recently, Spencer Piston (2010) and Aistrup, Kisangani, and Piri (2010b) added to this chorus. Piston found that negative stereotypes about blacks in comparison to whites significantly lowered the probability of white voters supporting Obama, while Aistrup et al, showed that racial resentment significantly affected the probability of supporting Obama for white voters in the South. However, not all studies concur with these conclusions.
Ansolabehere and Stewart (2009) suggest that Obama benefited from a racial dividend through increased turnout of blacks and Hispanic voters (compared to 2004) who voted overwhelming for him. Extrapolating from exit poll data, they conclude that McCain would have won if blacks and Hispanics would have voted at the same levels as 2004. Even though Grose, Husser, and Yoshinaka (2010) find that race influenced presidential vote choice in 2010 more so than any election since 1996, they note that there were a number of other independent variables that had a greater effect.

This paper builds off the work of Piston (2010) by assessing the influences racial attitudes on Southern and non-Southern white, Asian and Hispanic voters in the 2008 presidential election. I use logistic regression to test the hypotheses that higher levels of racial resentment and negative stereotypes about blacks increased the likelihood of supporting McCain and that this likelihood is greater in the South than in the non-South. The findings show that racial resentment affected presidential voting patterns in the South and non-South, but that negative racial stereotypes only influenced the voting patterns of southerners. I also tested an analogous model for the U.S. House contests in 2008, finding that racial attitudes had no impact. The conclusion discusses the significance of these findings as it relates to the three Rs, racism, resentment and regionalism.

The Three Rs: Racism, Resentment, and Regionalism

The research questions for this study come from the interaction among three converging conditions, all of which collided in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. The first condition is the most obvious; the unprecedented and historic introduction of race into the 2008 presidential contest. Since World War II, racial issues have been a key aspect of the 1964 and 1968 presidential contests (Sundquist 1983), and a more subdued component of the 1980, 1984 and 1988 elections (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Black and Black 2002; Aistrup 1996). Obama, as the first African American to win a major party’s presidential nomination, brought the race of the candidate, as opposed to racial issues, front and center. Although unprecedented at the presidential level, African Americans have been running in congressional and statewide contests for decades. Qualitative studies of black candidates who won in majority white constituencies suggest that they share several common attributes. They tend to be career politicians, moderate, race-neutral, but tough on crime. Despite being race-neutral they find a quiet but effective way to mobilize the black communities in their state to turnout in high numbers. This high turnout is necessary to counter balance the loss of white voters at the polls (Frederick and Jeffries 2009; Jeffries 1999).
With the exception of the Reverend Jeremiah Wright controversy,¹ which is a major exception that almost derailed Obama’s march to the Democratic nomination, Obama and his handlers followed this prescription for victory. When combined with Obama’s eloquent speaking ability, which transcends racial boundaries, and his juggernaut grassroots campaign organization, he was able to extend the field of battle into states like Indiana, North Carolina, and Virginia, states that other Democratic presidential candidates usually abandoned shortly after the convention. His opponent, John McCain, also contributed to Obama’s efforts to be race-neutral. McCain did not explicitly or implicitly use the race card, even though he could have easily made an issue of the Reverend Wright controversy during the general election campaign. Except for media outlets reminding voters that Obama would be the “first black elected president,”² the general election campaigns of both candidates steered clear of race (Piston 2010). This created an electoral environment where if race mattered in the choice between Obama and McCain, Obama’s African American heritage would be the primary triggering mechanism. Obama and McCain did their parts to make this a “post-racial” campaign (Piston 2010).

This segues to the second converging condition: The continuing existence of racially based attitudes in the U.S. Historically, racial prejudice in the form slavery and then Jim Crow laws kept blacks from experiencing the freedoms that white Americans enjoyed. Even though over 40 years has passed since the passage of the civil rights and voting rights acts, which put an end to de jure segregation, racially based attitudes towards African Americans still persist among whites. The question is whether these racially based attitudes translate into political behavior. Over the years, the findings on this issue have been inconsistent. For example, Terkildsen (1993, 1032) used an experimental research design to build a convincing case that the skin color of the candidate matters for white voters. She found “that black candidates were penalized by white voters based on the candidate’s race, skin color, and individual levels of racial prejudice.” Moreover, her findings suggest that the darker the skin tone of the black candidate, the more likely white voters will process racial information. Alternatively, Colleau and her colleagues (1990) used an experimental research design to test McConahay’s idea (1986) that negative attributions to black candidates only emerge when ambiguous or negative qualities are present. They found that while race is a source of discrimination, black candidates were evaluated higher, not lower than the other candidates. Similarly, Highton (2004) using exit poll data from Congressional elections in 1996 and 1998, found no evidence that white voters penalized black candidates for their race.

Racially based attitudes come in a variety of shades.³ Failure to recognize this reality has been the source of much controversy within political
science over the proper measurement of racial attitudes. Explicit racial prejudice is its most insidious form. This is the belief that members of another race are inherently inferior based on “faulty and inflexible generalizations” (Allport 1988). The survey evidence suggests that explicit forms of prejudice have decreased in the U.S. (Peffley and Shields 1996; Cotter et al. 2006), with the caveat that these prejudicial attitudes are difficult to uncover because respondents do not like to reveal socially unacceptable answers to surveyors. As the more explicit forms of racial prejudice have declined and/or become tough to measure, analysts have turned their attention to racially based opinions that may or may not rise to the level of racial prejudice. Referred to originally as “symbolic racism” and later revised to “racial resentment” (Stoker 1998; Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay and Hough 1976; McConahay 1986; Sears 1988), this construct assesses the feelings that African Americans fail to live up to the American work ethic and wrongfully seek favorable treatment to redress the effects of discrimination.

Compared to measures of racial resentment, measures of explicit racial prejudice have not had as successful of a track record of predicting whites’ voting behavior in racially charged elections. The most extensive research record was developed in the 1970s and 1980s centered on Tom Bradley’s campaigns for mayor of Los Angeles and then governor of California. These studies found that racial resentment predicted white votes for Bradley’s opponents (Kinder and Sears 1981; McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears and Kinder 1971), but that measures of explicit racism had a minor impact (Citrin et al. 1990). Similarly, racial resentment was also useful for explaining votes in other types of elections where race played a prominent role. Susan Howell found that racial resentment was “by far the most influential factor” in explaining the votes for the former Klansman David Duke in his three statewide elections in the early 1990s in Louisiana (1994, 190).

However, explicit racism may have made a come back during the 2008 presidential election. Spencer Piston (2010) showed that racial prejudice, in the form of negative stereotypes about blacks in comparison to whites, significantly lowered the probability of white voters supporting Obama.

Given Obama’s race, this research suggests that racial attitudes may have translated into political behavior during the 2008 presidential election, even though McCain did nothing in his campaign to make Obama’s race a factor. I expect that Obama’s race will be enough to trigger significant relationships between racially based attitudes—both racial prejudice and racial resentment—and white support of McCain versus Obama.

The historical crossroad for the intersection between race and politics in U.S. is in the South, the home of the Confederacy, the epicenter of Jim Crow segregation, the civil rights movement, and white resistance to integration. To be fair, this history is rather dated. In fact, much has changed in the
South due to a variety of causes but most importantly the large migration of non-natives in the post-WWII/air conditioned era (Black and Black 1987). This population shift helped to fuel the development of modern urban centers like Dallas, Houston, Atlanta, Charlotte, Northern Virginia, and Miami and helped to transform the old South into the new South. This transformation has led some scholars to question the continued distinctiveness of the region (Shafer and Johnston 2006). Thus, the third converging condition can be translated into the following research question: Are there substantial political differences between voters in the South and the North, or more accurately the “non-South,” such that one can expect the impact of racial attitudes on voting in the 2008 presidential contest to be greater in the South than the non-South.

If the 2008 presidential election took place in the old South in 1950, the answer would be an unequivocal yes. V.O. Key used presidential voting patterns of the eleven Confederate states to show that the South’s presidential voting patterns were distinctive (1949, 10). Sixty years after Key’s observations, the answer is anything but unequivocal. On one side of this divide are studies comparing the attitudes and opinions of Southerners to non-Southerners (see Cotter et al. [2006] for a review of this literature), all of which suggests the new South remains distinctive, although maybe not as distinctive as in the past. This literature finds that southerners are more inclined to support school prayer (Feig 1990) and less inclined to support sex education, abortion rights, and gay rights (Rice et al. 2002). Southerners range from slightly more conservative than non-southerners (Beck and Lopatto 1982; Cotter and Stovall 1990; Carmines and Stanley 1990) to considerably more conservative (Black and Black 1987; Wright et al. 1985) depending on data sources. In some survey years, southerners are found to be more conservative on government spending for the poor, education and health care, but in other survey years, this is not the case (Rice et al. 2002). Even though the racial attitudes of southerners have softened since the days of de jure segregation, white southerners tend to be the most conservative on the issues of school integration and affirmative action, and have the most negative attitudes about the civil rights movement and blacks (Schuman et al. 2005).

There are also a subset of public opinion studies that analyze the changing nature of party identification in the South and non-South using racial resentment as a predictor. Both Knuckey (2005) and Valentino and Sears (2005) find that racial resentment tends to fuel the rise in white Republican identifiers in the South more so than the non-South. In addition, Valentino and Sears (2005) find that racial resentment structures presidential voting preferences up to 2000 more so in the South than the non-South. On the other hand, Cowden (2001) finds that a racial issues axis now cleaves both
Southerners and non-Southerners in a similar manner, suggesting there is little difference between voters in the South and non-South.

The controversy among southern politics scholars is most notable when analyzing the voting patterns. Some scholars find distinctive patterns of office holding and voting when comparing the South to other regions (Bullock et al. 2006; Black and Black 2002) while others find that the South’s regional patterns of voting are no longer exceptional in congressional (Shafer and Johnston 2006, 189-99) and presidential elections (Aistrup 2010a). The results of the 2008 presidential election underscore this controversy. In the Northeast, Midwest, and West, Obama tallied 59 percent, 54 percent, and 57 percent, respectively. Whereas in the southern states, Obama managed only 46 percent, despite carrying by a slim margin Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina, three of the southern states that have experienced much population change over the past 50 years. This regional disparity reignites an on-going controversy regarding the exceptionalism of the South, especially on matters associated with racially based attitudes (Key 1949; Bass and DeVries 1976; Bullock et al. 2005; McKee 2009; Shafer and Johnston 2006).

All of this suggests that Obama’s race will trigger the reemergence of old South. Thus, when compared to racially based attitudes of non-South whites, these attitudes among Southern whites will have a greater influence on the odds of supporting McCain versus Obama.

**Data Sets, Measurement, and Model**

The data for this study come from the *ANES 2008-2009 Panel Study* (ANES 2010). This study is an internet based panel survey administered by Knowledge Networks. I use this data set versus the *American National Election Studies, 2008: Pre and Post Election Surveys* (ANES 2009) to assuage issues with the social desirability of answering sensitive questions dealing with race via face to face interviews. Piston (2010, 437) showed that respondents were more likely to answer race based questions about stereotypes in a socially acceptable manner if the questions were administered in a face to face personal interview versus an Audio Computer-Assisted Self-Interviewing (ACASI) system. The internet based panel survey is also a self-administered survey. Given Piston’s findings, answers to racially based questions on this internet survey are less likely to be plagued by social desirability concerns.

The dependent variable is presidential vote choice, coded 1 if the respondent voted for McCain and 0 if the respondent voted for Obama. This question was administered in Wave 11, shortly after the November 2008 elections. Because over 90 percent of African Americans support Demo-
I include two indexes of racial attitudes. The first is meant to tap into explicit racism. Similar to Piston (2010) I use indicators of stereotypes, but the question wording for the internet panel survey varies from the traditional wording used in ANES’s face to face surveys. Under the traditional format, respondents are asked to rate most people in a racial group on a seven point scale ranging from “hardworking” to “lazy” and then “intelligent” to “unintelligent.” In the panel survey, respondents answer “How well does ‘[insert characteristic]’ describe most [insert racial or ethnic group]?” on a five point scale ranging from “extremely well” to “not well at all.” To replicate Piston’s work, I use the questions about blacks and whites dealing with “intelligent at school,” “lazy,” and “hardworking.” Similar to Piston, I subtract the ratings for blacks from the ratings of whites for these three characteristics. Thus, if a respondent answers “not well at all” to blacks are hardworking and the same for whites, the difference would be 0. But, if instead the respondent answers for whites “extremely well,” the difference would be +4, suggesting a negative stereotype against blacks. I added the differences on these three topics together and divided it by three, leaving an indicator that ranges between a low of -4 to a high of +4, where -4 represents explicit stereotypes against whites and a +4 represents explicit stereotypes against blacks.

The other indicator of racial attitudes is racial resentment, which is measured by summing the responses to four questions. On a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, respondents are asked: 1) “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.” 2) “Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve.” 3) “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” 4) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” Previous research has shown that these indicators are valid and reliable (Henry and Sears 2002). The principle components factor analysis shows that these four items load onto one factor. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the index is .698. These four items are added together so that conservative racial attitudes reflect higher values. The additive index ranges between -8 and +8.

For some, the construct of racial resentment is controversial. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) showed that some of the statements in the original index
only measured “government intervention on racial matters” which had “little or nothing to do with prejudice” (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Schuman 2000; Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Even after a revision of these questions in 1986, there remains a correlation between higher racial resentment scores and conservatism in the U.S. (Kinder and Mendelberg 2000). As these scholars note, conservatives simply oppose, as a matter of principle, the use of government to address issues of this nature, racially based or otherwise. For this reason, ideology is an important control variable for any analyses that include racial resentment as an independent variable. Ideology will absorb any variance due to respondents’ being principled conservatives versus individuals who score high on the racial resentment index due to other concerns.

Even with this control for ideology, some scholars argue there is still a broader theoretical measurement question associated with racial resentment: Is it an indicator of racial prejudice or is it simply another manifestation of ideology? For this study, it is neither. Rather, I consider racial resentment as simply a continuum focused on valid political issues regarding the state of African Americans as a group in the U.S. No doubt that these racially based attitudes are correlated with partisanship and ideology just like any other set of issues dealing with economics, the War in Iraq, gun control, welfare, etc. As with any other valid indicator of political opinion, proper controls for partisanship and ideology should be included or the results of the analysis will be biased.

Table 1 shows the frequencies and summary statistics for racial biased stereotypes and racial resentment indices. For racial biased stereotype, most of the respondents are clustered between +1 and -1, with a plurality of whites at zero. Racial resentment has greater variation than racially biased stereotypes. The scores tend to be clustered on the positive side of the index, toward higher levels of racial resentment.

I conducted a breakdown of the racially biased stereotypes and racial resentment indexes by region. Given the previous literature showing that southerners tend to be more conservative on racially based issues (Cotter et al. 2006), the breakdown should show that southerners have higher values on both indices when compared to respondents from the non-South. The findings correspond with these expectations. For southern whites, the average stereotype score is .221, whereas for the non-South it is .114 (p=.004). The difference is even greater on the average racial resentment score. For respondents in the non-South, the average is 1.21, while in the South it is 2.36 (p=.0000).

By including an indicator of explicit racial prejudice (stereotypes) and racial resentment together in the same equation, I follow the path of Citrin et al. (1990) who used both types of indicators in their analysis of votes for
### Table 1. Frequencies for Racial Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial Resentment Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Resent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>2.51</td>
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<td>-6</td>
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<td>3.67</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>15.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>21.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>28.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>41.28</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>9.13</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>9.57</td>
<td>59.98</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>67.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>75.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>82.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>5.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>93.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Resent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2069</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bradley in the 1980s California gubernatorial contests. This approach varies from Piston (2010) who used only an index of stereotypes to predict the voting behavior of whites in the 2008 presidential election and Aistrup, Kisangani, and Piri (2010b) who used only an indicator of racial resentment to do the same in the South. Including both, allows the analysis to tap into two different components of racial attitudes: explicit racism and attitudes toward the condition of African Americans as a group in the U.S. Thus, this model is more fully specified than either of these two previous studies.

However, including both indicators of racial attitudes together in the analysis could pose some problems because the two indices will have some shared variance. Given the previous research, this may cause racial resentment to drown out the effects of racially biased stereotypes. To resolve this issue, it is necessary to understand the relationship between the two indices. A respondent who holds a number of stereotypes against blacks is also very likely to score high on the racial resentment index. On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that a respondent who scores high on racial resentment will also score high on stereotypes against blacks. This means that by definition, overt racism trumps racial resentment and any shared variation between the two indices is really owned by the racial biased stereotypes index.

To remove this shared variation between racially biased stereotypes and the racial resentment index, I regress stereotypes on racial resentment and use the unstandardized residuals from the regression as the indicator for racial resentment. This effectively removes the shared variation between the two indices, allowing each to account for its own independent influence on the probability of voting for McCain.

The main foci of this analysis are the influences of stereotypes and racial resentment on the 2008 presidential vote choice. The other independent variables that are included in the analysis are chosen for the purposes of fully specifying the model of presidential vote choice. For this analysis, party identification and ideology are the most important controls. Party identification is a durable measure of party support (Campbell et al. 1960; Campbell 1966; Miller and Shanks 1996), especially in the South where those identifying themselves as Republican vote more cohesively for Republican candidates at all election levels (Bullock et al. 2005; Knuckey 2005; Shaffer et al. 2000). In addition, previous research shows that party identification and racial resentment are significantly related (Knuckey 2005; Valentino and Sears 2005).

Ideology has also been shown to predict vote choice (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998), and as noted earlier, some contend that conservative ideological predisposition may be the real cause of voters favoring Republican
candidates versus conservative racial resentment attitudes (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Schuman 2000; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Including both partisanship and ideology means that this model seeks to understand the influence of stereotypes and racial resentment after controlling for these other two variables. In this sense, the analysis tilts toward Type II error.

The other independent variables are retrospective evaluations, represented by President Bush’s job approval ratings (Fiorina 1981), religious values, as represented by church attendance (Green et al. 2002; Green et al. 2003; Knuckey 2006; Schneider 1998; Smith 1997; Oldfield 1996), economic class represented by education level (Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Shafer and Johnston 2006), and age (Schuman et al. 1997; Virtanen and Huddy 1998). I control for the influences of ethnicity by including a dummy variable representing white-Hispanics.

Party identification, ideology, Bush approval, age, income, education, and church attendance are coded so that the distribution of each is centered around 0, where 0 is defined as the median of the distribution or the value of the middle point of the scale. This aids in the interpretation of the constant, which represents the logged odds of a McCain vote when all of the independent variables are held constant at 0 (Jaccard 2001, 30-34).

Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression to assess the effects of each independent variable on the logged odds of voting for a Democratic presidential candidate (Long and Freese 2006, 177). In addition to coefficients and Z-scores, each table reports the factor change in the odds of voting for McCain for each unit change in the independent variable, holding the other independent variables constant at 0, and the change in probability of voting for McCain as one goes from the minimum value to the maximum value of the independent variable, holding the other independent variables constant at their mean values.

To assess the differential effects of stereotypes and racial resentment in the South and non-South I use conditional coding (Wright 1976; Aistrup 2010a). The coding of these four conditional variables is straightforward. For example, RacialResentS is coded the value of the racial resentment index for Southern respondents and 0 for non-Southern respondents, whereas RacialResentN is coded the value of the racial resentment index for non-Southern respondents and 0 for Southern respondents. The same is also done with the index for racially biased stereotypes. For those interested, the following endnote explains the interpretation of conditional coefficients. 5 The formal logit model tested is:
\[
\ln \left\{ \frac{\Pr(McCainVT = 1 \mid x)}{1 - \Pr(McCainVT = 1 \mid x)} \right\} = \ln \Omega(x) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 South + \\
\beta_2 Hispanic + \beta_3 PartyID + \beta_4 Ideology + \beta_5 BushApproval + \\
\beta_6 Age + \beta_7 Education + \beta_8 ChurchAttend + \beta_9 RacialResentS + \\
\beta_{10} RacialResentN + \beta_{11} StereotypesS + \beta_{12} StereotypesN
\] (1)

The first two hypotheses tested are:

**Hypothesis 1:** Voters with higher levels of racial stereotypes and racial resentment are more likely to support McCain.

**Hypothesis 2:** The impact of racial stereotypes and racial resentment will be greater in the South than in the non-South.

Given these hypotheses, I expect that the coefficients $\beta_{10} RacialResentS$ and $\beta_{10} RacialResentN$ will be positive and significant. The key difference will be in the magnitude of the effect, which should be larger for $\beta_{10} RacialResentS$. This same type of pattern should also occur with $\beta_{11} StereotypesS$ versus $\beta_{12} StereotypesN$.

**Presidential Elections**

How much if at all did the electorate make the transition to a post-racial election? What influence did racially based attitudes have on the probability of voting for McCain over Obama? Are there any regional patterns for the racial attitude variables? Table 2 shows the findings from this analysis.

In short, the white electorate did not make the transition to a post-racial electorate and there is a regional pattern to the impact of racial attitudes. First, the Southern dummy variable is statistically significant. After controlling for the effects of the other independent variables, being a white in the South increased the probability of supporting McCain by .192. As the aggregate statistics suggest, there was a predisposition in the South toward supporting McCain over Obama.

Second, racially biased stereotypes among whites in the non-South do not significantly effect the odds of supporting McCain, but this is not the case for stereotypes held by whites in the South. Each unit change toward stereotypes unfavorable to blacks increases the odds of voting for McCain by a factor of \((e^{(.845+1.093)}) 6.94\). Even accounting for the fact that most respondents are in the middle of this index, the effect of racially biased stereotypes in the South is robust. Racial resentment, on the other hand, has a positive and significant effect in both regions. Even though the effect
Table 2. Logit Analysis Predicting McCain vs. Obama Using Stereotypes and Racial Resentment and Controlling for Region, ANES 2008 Panel Survey

| Variables      | Coefficient | Z     | P>|z| | Logged Odds | Min to Max |
|----------------|-------------|-------|------|-------------|------------|
| South          | 0.845       | 2.602 | 0.009| 2.327       | 0.192      |
| Hispanic       | -1.298      | -1.343| 0.179| 0.273       | -0.310     |
| Party ID       | 0.622       | 6.644 | 0.000| 1.863       | 0.722      |
| Ideology       | 0.510       | 3.652 | 0.000| 1.665       | 0.642      |
| Bush Approval  | 1.399       | 4.745 | 0.000| 4.051       | 0.520      |
| Age            | 0.012       | 1.327 | 0.184| 1.012       | 0.212      |
| Education      | -0.081      | -0.665| 0.506| 0.922       | -0.078     |
| Church Attend  | 0.154       | 2.330 | 0.020| 1.166       | 0.217      |
| Stereo South   | 1.093       | 2.701 | 0.007| 2.983       | 0.847      |
| Stereo North   | 0.172       | 0.672 | 0.501| 1.188       | 0.265      |
| Resent South   | 0.213       | 2.325 | 0.020| 1.237       | 0.770      |
| Resent North   | 0.195       | 3.502 | 0.000| 1.215       | 0.720      |
| Constant       | 0.562       | 2.265 | 0.024|             |            |

Number of obs = 1164  Wald chi2(12) = 308.00  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  Log pseudolikelihood = -281.02478  Pseudo R² = 0.6501  ML (Cox-Snell) R² = 0.592

Statistically Significant Coefficients Bolded (P<.05)

is slightly greater in the South than in the non-South, the main differences between the regions appear to be small. Figure 1 graphically shows this by translating these logit coefficients for racial resentment into probabilities of supporting McCain for white respondents from the non-South and South who are independent, moderate, neither approve or disapprove of Bush, and are at the mean levels of the other independent variables. I focus on these voters because they are in the middle of the political spectrum. The line with the diamond symbols represents the probability of supporting McCain for a given level of racial resentment. Consistent with the findings noted above, racial resentment’s impact on southern respondents is slightly steeper and starts off with a higher probability of supporting McCain when compared to their non-Southern counterparts (dots). This difference is mostly a function of the significant effect of the southern dummy variable. The contrast between the regions weakens at the high ends of the index.
Figure 1. Moderate Independents by Region

Third, similar to Piston’s (2010) analysis, I find support for Sniderman and Carmines’ (1997) contention that Democrats are more affected by racial attitudes than Republicans. They note that Republicans uniformly vote for Republican candidates no matter how racist they are. On the other hand, Democrats who hold racially biased opinions are conflicted over their position on racial issues and their Democratic leanings. These voters are more likely to stray from their party identification. Figure 2 illustrates that both southern and non-South Democrats with low levels of racial resentment have about a 10 percent probability of voting for McCain, whereas Democrats with the highest levels of racial resentment range from 60 percent for non-South Democrats to over 75 percent for southern Democrats. By contrast, both southern and non-South Republicans with low levels of racial resentment have about a 75 percent probability of voting for McCain. At the high end of the index the probability for both types of Republicans is very close to 1.7

Fourth, the effects of the other independent variables mostly correspond with normal expectations for presidential elections in the 21st Century. For example, party identification, ideology, and approval of President Bush significantly determine support for McCain. Each unit change toward GOP partisanship increases the odds of voting for McCain by a factor of 1.863. For ideology, factor is 1.665, for church attendance, 1.166, while for approval of Bush, a whopping 4.051. The coefficients for age, education and Hispanics are insignificant at the .05 level.
One striking aspect of these findings is how important racial resentment is for influencing presidential voting behavior even after removing its shared variance with racially biased stereotypes and controlling for ideology. Moderates in the non-South with the lowest level of racial resentment have less than a 30 percent probability of supporting McCain. On the other hand, moderates in the non-South with the highest level of racial resentment have almost a 90 percent probability of supporting McCain. Given this finding, I did additional analyses to assess the robustness of the coefficients. Even after including a host of other types of racially oriented questions (for example feeling thermometers for blacks, Hispanics, and Muslims) the coefficients for racial resentment do not deviate from the findings shown in Table 2. As noted earlier, racially biased stereotypes have a greater influence in the South than non-South. These results partially replicate Piston’s (2010). The coefficient for racially biased stereotypes is significant for only the South, instead of the entire U.S. The most likely reason for this deviation in findings is the differences in question wording and format. Unfortunately, the Panel Study did not include a battery of stereotype questions in the same format as the face to face ANES survey. If so, I would be able to develop a more systematic and rigorous explanation.

The final research question is to assess the extent to which these results are isolated to the case of Barack Obama in 2008 versus any other election. In examining this same type of question, Piston found that since the 1992 presidential election, racially biased stereotypes had a significant effect
in only the 2008 presidential election. He also demonstrated that racially biased stereotypes influenced only Obama’s feeling thermometer score, but not those of Joseph Biden’s, Bill Clinton’s, or the Democratic Party’s. Understanding the significance of these results would be enhanced if the relationship between voting and racially based attitudes were confined solely to the presidential level in 2008 versus other elective offices. To explore this possibility, I turn my attention to the congressional elections, focusing on contested U.S. House races in 2008. If the effects of racial attitudes became systemic in 2008, then one would expect to find a similar relationship at the U.S. House level as the presidential level. Thus, I hypothesize:

**Hypothesis 3:** Voters with higher levels of racial stereotypes and racial resentment are more likely to support Republican U.S. House candidates.

**Hypothesis 4:** The impact of racial stereotypes and racial resentment will be greater in the South than in the non-South.

**U.S. House Elections**

Similar to the presidential analysis, I use logistic regression, where a vote for a GOP candidate is coded 1, and a vote for a Democratic candidate is coded 0. Respondents in uncontested races or who cast their ballots for independent or third party candidates are excluded from the analysis. Any respondent who is a member of a district represented by a member of the Congressional Black Caucus is also excluded. These respondents are not included because while it may be noteworthy to determine if racial attitudes influence the voting behavior of whites in these districts, there are too few cases to conduct a viable analysis. Excluding these respondents avoids any confounding influence that the race of the candidate may have on the analysis. In addition to using the same list of independent variables from the first analysis, I also include an additional control variable representing incumbency, where Democratic incumbency is coded +1, open seats are coded 0, and Republican incumbency is coded -1 (effects coding). The logistic model is:

\[
\ln \left\{ \frac{\Pr (\text{GOPVT} = 1 \mid x)}{1 - \Pr (\text{GOPVT} = 1 \mid x)} \right\} = \ln \Omega (x) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{South} + \\
\beta_2 \text{Hispanic} + \beta_3 \text{PartyID} + \beta_4 \text{Ideology} + \beta_5 \text{BushApproval} + \\
\beta_6 \text{Age} + \beta_7 \text{Education} + \beta_8 \text{ChurchAttend} + \beta_9 \text{RacialResentS} + \\
\beta_{10} \text{RacialResentN} + \beta_{11} \text{StereotypesS} + \beta_{12} \text{StereotypesN}
\]
Table 3. Logit Analysis Predicting Republican Vote in U.S. House Elections Using Stereotypes and Racial Resentment and Controlling for Region, ANES 2008 Panel Survey

| Variables           | Coefficient | Z     | P>|z| | Logged Odds | Min to Max |
|---------------------|-------------|-------|-------|-------------|------------|
| South               | 0.034       | 0.106 | 0.916 | 1.034       | 0.008      |
| Hispanic            | -0.784      | -1.144| 0.253 | 0.457       | -0.175     |
| **Party ID**        | **0.534**   | **6.600** | **0.000** | **1.705** | **0.656** |
| Ideology            | 0.239       | 2.273 | 0.023 | 1.271       | 0.333      |
| Bush Approval       | 0.338       | 1.929 | 0.054 | 1.402       | 0.167      |
| Age                 | -0.008      | -0.914| 0.361 | 0.992       | -0.148     |
| Education           | -0.013      | -0.116| 0.908 | 0.987       | -0.013     |
| Church Attend       | -0.009      | -0.167| 0.867 | 0.991       | -0.014     |
| Stereo South        | 0.346       | 0.725 | 0.468 | 1.413       | 0.431      |
| Stereo North        | 0.165       | 0.911 | 0.362 | 1.180       | 0.267      |
| Resent South        | 0.076       | 0.883 | 0.377 | 1.079       | 0.335      |
| Resent North        | 0.015       | 0.386 | 0.700 | 1.015       | 0.071      |
| **Incumbency**      | **-0.970**  | **-7.180** | **0.000** | **0.379** | **-0.443** |
| Constant            | -0.210      | -1.138| 0.255 |             |            |

Number of obs = 947
Wald chi²(13) = 232.53
Prob > chi² = 0.0000
Log pseudolikelihood = -378.34104
Pseudo R² = 0.4231
ML (Cox-Snell) R² = .443

Statistically Significant Coefficients Bolded (P<.05)

Table 3 shows that the direct effects of racial resentment on U.S. House contests are statistically insignificant in the South and non-South. In addition, both regional measures of racially biased stereotypes are insignificant. The only variables that predict GOP U.S. House votes are party identification, ideology, and incumbency. Of the rest of the variables, only approval of President Bush approaches statistical significance.

Suffice to say that I reject both hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4. The implications of this analysis are that racially based attitudes need a trigger to directly influence voting behavior. Even within the context of the same election, the influences of racially based attitudes were confined to the presidential level, where Obama’s African American heritage provided the stimulus. The U.S. House level remained immune from these considerations in the South and non-South. The three Rs only apply to the presidential level in 2008. These findings replicate Piston’s (2010).
Conclusion

None of this should take away from what was an historic event; the election of the U.S.’s first African American president. This fact, in and of itself, is a testament to the progress the U.S. has made in exorcizing the demons of slavery and racial discrimination. However, not all of these demons have been removed.

Resentment: The findings show that voters in the U.S. have yet to completely remove themselves from these racial considerations. Racial resentment taps into whites’ attitudes regarding why some African Americans struggle with achieving economic parity within American society. Even though some may find fault with this indicator as being too closely embedded into conservative ideology, its resilience in predicting white voting behavior when an African American is on the ballot remains impressive (Citrin et al. 1990). Indeed, even after controlling for partisanship and ideology, the findings show that racial resentment shaped the probabilities of voting for McCain for voters in the middle of the political spectrum and Democrats in both regions.

Interestingly, these analyses suggest that the direct effects of racial resentment on voting are largely confined to presidential level in 2008. This finding corresponds to the previous research that underscores that racial resentment’s direct impact on voting is triggered when racial cues are present. Whereas in Louisiana in the 1990s, David Duke was the activating agent, the race of the candidate is triggering mechanism in the case of Bradley in California in the late 1960s through the 1980s and Obama in 2008.8

Racism and Regionalism: The findings also speak to the controversy regarding the distinctiveness of the South, especially as it applies to racism. The most striking finding is that the influence of racially biased stereotypes is still concentrated in the South and not anywhere else, debunking, at least in this one instance, the recent literature suggesting that the old South had “gone with the wind” (Aistrup 2010a; Shafer and Johnston 2006). At this stage, the effects of racism appear to be an isolated incident associated with the election of Obama. However, given the “shellacking” the Democrats took in the mid-term elections and the fact that almost all previously reliable mid-term election models were off in their predictions by 20 or more U.S. House seats (see October 2010 edition of PS: Political Science and Politics), a viable hypothesis is that racism and resentment may have contributed to the GOP landslide, working through the presidential approval ratings of Obama and helping to motivate the GOP faithful to participate at very high levels.
Finally, did Obama miss his landslide in 2008 as suggested by Lewis-Beck et al. (2010)? The findings here suggest that Obama paid a price for his race through racial resentment in the non-South and through both resentment and racially biased stereotypes in the South. Whether racial issues lower his national landslide by as much as 5 percent is difficult to determine with these data. Nonetheless, one thing is for certain: Basic attitudes about race helped to shape the election of Obama in 2008 and there were regional disparities associated with this outcome.

NOTES

1Reverend Wright was Obama’s pastor in Chicago who made some rather racially inflammatory remarks from behind the pulpit, which were recorded and available to the public on DVD.

2Ironically, studies of statewide contests show when media outlets emphasize the “first black to win” story, it is counterproductive to black candidates’ ability to win (Jeffries 2002; Reeves 1997).

3The subtlest form of racial prejudice is what psychologists call implicit racism. This subconscious form of racism is measured by the attributions that respondents make when shown a variety of pictures of different races, including African Americans. Piston in dismissing implicit racism notes that many have taken issue with this indicator on “grounds, ranging from the argument that conscious intent is required for prejudice to exist (Arkes and Tetlock 2004) to concerns about the variability and stability in the IAT, the most common measure of implicit racism (Blanton and Jaccard 2008)” (Piston 2010, 434).

4The 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study is a telephone-recruited Internet panel with two cohorts. The first cohort was recruited in late 2007 using random-digit-dialing (RDD) methods common to high-quality telephone surveys. Prospective respondents were offered $10 per month to complete surveys on the Internet for 30 minutes each month for 21 months, from January 2008 through September 2009. Those without a computer and Internet service were offered a free web appliance, MSNTV2, and free Internet service for the duration of the study. The second cohort was recruited the same way in the summer of 2008 and asked to join the panel beginning in September 2008. To minimize panel attrition and conditioning effects, only 10 of the 21 monthly surveys were primarily about politics. Other surveys were about a variety of non-political topics, using questions not written by ANES. The panelists answered political questions prepared by ANES in January, February, June, September, October, and November, 2008, and in January, May, July, and August 2009” (ANES 2010).

5Interpretation of the coefficients of the conditional model is straightforward. For example, to calculate the logged odds of McCain vote in the non-South for a given level of racial resentment, the equation is $\beta_0 + \beta_1\text{RacialResent}_N$ (holding all other independent variables constant at 0), whereas for the South, the equation is $\beta_0 + \beta_1\text{South} + \beta_9\text{RacialResent}_S$. Wright notes that a conditional model can be viewed as two regression analyses where separate coefficients are estimated for each group within one equation (1976, 359-60). Please note that the conditional model is mathematically equivalent to the
interaction model, however, the coefficients from the conditional model are easier to interpret.

Given the possibility for collinearity among the list of independent variables, which may confound the effects of the racial attitude variables, I ran multicollinearity diagnostics (Variance Inflation Factor, and Conditional Index). All tests showed that there are no issues with multicollinearity. The average VIF = 1.28 and the sum Condition Index = 15.4. This suggests that the following analysis should be able to determine the independent influences of racial attitudes on presidential vote choice, controlling for the effects of the other independent variables.

I ran separate logistic regression analyses for Democrats and Republicans, confirming these patterns.

In many respects, the consistency of this construct’s influence on voting behavior over several decades is astounding.

REFERENCES


Since 1984, Laurence W. Moreland (Larry), the late Tod A. Baker, and Robert P. Steed (Bob) spearheaded efforts to understand the changing nature of presidential elections in the South. *A Paler Shade of Red* is the 2008 edition of this important endeavor. This edition, however, represents a significant milestone for reasons unrelated to the election of Barack Obama as the nation’s 42nd president. This is the last volume that will include Bob and Larry as co-editors. Both retired from the Citadel at the end of the Spring 2010 semester, bringing to a close a very successful academic partnership. Along with Tod, this partnership produced a biennial conference, The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics, numerous co-authored papers, and 14 edited volumes analyzing various facets of political change in the American South. How fitting that their last book focuses on the election of the first African American president in the United States.

The volume’s organization follows V.O. Key’s approach of single chapters devoted to each of the eleven former confederate states. Each of the eleven state chapters shares the same basic format; beginning with a discussion of the primary election season, followed by an analysis of the presidential election results. All chapters use exit poll data and some also use county results to describe presidential voting patterns. Finally, each chapter concludes with a section focused on the congressional election outcomes. Because of the parallel structures for each chapter, the findings for each state can be easily compared, which makes the volume ideal for state politics, presidential politics, or southern politics courses at the undergraduate or graduate level. The disciplined and coherent structure of each chapter also makes *A Paler Shade of Red* an easy read for students, political junkies and professors alike.

As the book’s title implies, *A Paler Shade of Red* shows the incremental but important changes that characterize the election results in these eleven states. Even though all the chapters have their own appeal, four of the state chapters are particularly fascinating because they highlight contrasting trends. Arkansas and Tennessee trended heavily toward the GOP column in 2008, despite being states that the Democrats had won in the 1990s and
suffered only single digit losses in 2000 and 2004. Jay Barth, Janine Parry, and Todd Shields show that rural, largely homogenous white counties in Arkansas led the dramatic shift to the GOP column. They speculate that voters in these rural counties rejected the “social diversity” of the Democratic ticket (p. 136); or as they state in the title of their chapter, that Obama was “not one of (most of) us.” Noting a similar pattern among white homogeneous rural counties in Tennessee, Ronald Keith Gaddie sarcastically titles his chapter “Cracker Barrel Realignment,” double entendre not withstanding. His weighted least squares analysis shows that counties with the higher percentages of white evangelicals had the highest rates of change toward the GOP.

The Virginia and North Carolina chapters are compelling because they document a trend in the opposite direction, toward a more blue hue at almost all levels of office holding. For example, Virginia exhibits many of the same trends noted throughout the South, clear majorities of evangelicals, conservatives, and whites supported McCain. On the other hand, urban voters were joined by suburban voters in counties like Fairfax to lift Obama to a convincing five point victory in Virginia. As opposed to Tennessee and Arkansas, where the rural white vote moved heavily against Obama, the rural white vote in Virginia remained consistent with previous elections. In North Carolina, a similar story emerged except that the trend toward Democratic blue was more intense. Obama won and North Carolina Democrats swept the gubernatorial and senatorial levels as well. As Charles Prysby notes, “few pundits would have predicted” that the Democrats in North Carolina would have the level of control the party enjoys after the 2008 election, especially given that the top of the ticket was led by an African American.

My only complaint about this volume is that at times each chapter cried out for multivariate models to help to provide explanation as well as description. More multivariate analysis of county level results, similar to Gaddie’s, would have also provided additional information regarding demographic changes in voting patterns. Nonetheless, this volume provides plenty of insights for any scholar looking to understand the nature of the historic election in the South in 2008. The book is a fitting capstone for two Citadel scholars who have done so much to enhance and advance our knowledge of Southern politics. Prost my friends and colleagues to Larry and Bob, for all of their outstanding contributions, including this one, to the study of Southern politics.

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Conventional wisdom tells us that Americans are unwilling to sacrifice current consumption for future environmental gains. Anyone urging Americans to drive less, turn thermostats down, or their air conditioning off to address problems such as global warming is widely regarded as advocating something un-American. Increasing consumption is so widely embedded in American notions of progress that calls to reduce consumption voluntarily are regarded as heretical. Even some environmentalists have suggested that the environmental movement needs a message that is not predicated on gloomy calls for reductions in consumption that they believe are destined to fail. Far better, they claim, is action designed to foster technological and market-based solutions to environmental problems. Putting faith in technology and the market place reduces the need to make hard choices about patterns of consumption, and largely negates the need for meaningful sacrifices.

The essays in The Environmental Politics of Sacrifice challenge this conventional wisdom. First, they show that voluntary sacrifice is commonplace rather than rare in the United States. To give a common example of voluntary sacrifice: large numbers of parents, particularly mothers, make constant sacrifices for their children every day. The important point here is not simply that such sacrifice is ordinary and commonplace, but that it does not necessarily involve self-abnegation. Voluntary sacrifice means giving up something for the sake of something regarded as more important and can lead to self-fulfillment. That Americans are willing to do this so frequently suggests that offering sacrifice as a way to tackle environmental problems may not be as foolhardy as supposed. Second, they note that disguised sacrifice is ubiquitous in the United States. Millions of car drivers, for example, sacrifice health, money, and the lives of other people killed in accidents for the sake of personal transport. A challenge for environmentalists is to make Americans aware of these sacrifices and ask them whether it is worth it. Third, they show that structural obstacles may prevent environmental sacrifice. It is possible that Americans may wish to drive less but be prevented from doing so by the design of cities and the absence of viable alternative transport systems. Environmentalists need to identify these structural obstacles and campaign to have them removed.

Overall the essays in The Environmental Politics of Sacrifice provide an important examination of an under-studied topic. They successfully challenge conventional wisdom and show that environmental sacrifice may not be the dead-end that many imagine. However, some improvements to the volume could have been made. The number of essays that examine the
concept of sacrifice could have been cut dramatically as they all say essentially the same thing. This would enable more space to be devoted to case studies and practical examples of environmental sacrifice. There is also a sense in some of the essays that a discussion of sacrifice has been added as an afterthought to other preoccupations. Finally, the sacrifice of capital letters on the cover of the book is probably a sacrifice too far. But these are largely niggardly points. The Environmental Politics of Sacrifice makes an important contribution to the literature and should be read by anyone interested in environmental politics.

Christopher J. Bailey
Keele University


The Obama Victory takes a retrospective look at the outcome of the historic 2008 presidential election. The authors cover many topics in this comprehensive book, but their primary goal is to determine the extent to which media coverage, candidate rhetoric, and campaign funding explain how a biracial first-term Illinois Senator became not only the 44th President of the United States but also the first POTUS of color.

The authors divide The Obama Victory into four parts. The first four chapters explore the various “forces and messages” that set the stage for the 2008 presidential campaign. These contextual forces include, but are not limited to: a declining economy and unpopular lame-duck president (Chapter 1); an information environment dominated by characterizations of McCain as “McSame” and Obama as a “tax-and-spend liberal” (Chapter 2); attempts by the McCain campaign and its surrogates to brand Obama as self-promoting, politically inexperienced, and anti-American (Chapter 3); and efforts by Democrats to discredit McCain because of his age and unpredictability (Chapter 4).

In Part 2 of The Obama Victory, the authors break up the major events of the campaign into five distinct “periods”. The first and longest period (June 7 through August 22) is characterized by McCain gaining political momentum in large part, according to the authors, because of widespread favorability among voters for the Arizona Senator’s stance on the issues of energy independence and foreign oil (see Chapter 5). The sixth and seventh chapters discuss August 23 through September 9, a three-week period that
culminated in national party conventions in which the Republican and Democratic nominees confirmed former Alaskan Governor Sarah Palin and Delaware Senator Joe Biden as their respective running mates. The Palin pick brought much-needed enthusiasm to the McCain campaign, but the meltdown on Wall Street—a major focus of the third period (September 10 through October 14)—and Obama’s perceived advantage on economic issues overwhelmed the GOP. Intriguingly, the race began to tighten in the fourth period (from October 15 to October 28) because of a conversation about small-business tax policy that Obama had with an Ohio resident named Samuel Joseph Wurzelbacher. The McCain-Palin campaign polititized Wurzelbacher’s reservations about Obama’s plan to redistribute wealth, making “Joe the Plumber” an overnight celebrity and his anti-tax viewpoints a rallying cry among blue-collar conservatives. This late October surge was short-lived, however, and Obama’s lead widened in the fifth and final period (October 29 through November 4) as the financial crisis, combined with questions about Palin’s qualifications, the appeal of Obama’s “hope and change” rhetoric, and perceived similarities between McCain and President George W. Bush, ultimately swayed voters.

The third part of the book explores how the 2008 election altered the “landscape” of campaign politics. Specifically, the authors examine the role of absentee and early voting in Chapter 11, they chronicle differences in the candidates’ spending patterns while recognizing the increasing importance of “micro-targeting” (the practice of mobilizing voters using marketing data-mining techniques) in Chapter 12, and the authors conclude with some remarks about the vital role of campaign messaging in Chapter 13. The final two chapters include some of the most sophisticated analyses of the book: multivariate analysis of the determinants of Obama voting, reveal that, other things being equal, Obama’s ability to out-fundraise and outspend his opponents gave him a distinct advantage in the war over ad space (Table 12.1) and media exposure (see Table 12.2). Not surprisingly, Figure 13.1 confirms not only that partisanship, ideology, Bush approval, and perceptions of the national economy played major roles but also that Obama enjoyed strong support among higher-income and African-American voters. Furthermore, Figure 13.1 shows that campaign messages (particularly, those that linked McCain to Bush or made light of McCain’s expertise on economic matters) improved Obama’s electoral chances.

What have we learned from this presidential race? In the books’ Afterword, the authors conclude that Obama won with a nearly boundless bankroll, disciplined campaign messages, and relatively favorable press coverage. Of course, Obama benefited from a political context that was ripe for the change his campaign promised. The 2008 presidential race offers many lessons to the pundits and scholars, and the authors conclude with some
recommendations (and warnings) about the potential uses and abuses of campaign funding, targeted messaging, and digital technology in future presidential elections.

The Obama Victory is an ambitious and well-executed book. The authors tell their story with elite interviews, anecdotes, and a wealth of political advertising and polling data. The sheer scope and even-handed tone of this book distinguishes it from other works of its type, and the readability and high quality of the research is what one would expect from the analysts at the Annenberg Public Policy Center. The insights of this book will appeal to students of U.S. electoral politics, public opinion, and political communication. Those who study social identity will find Chapter 4 (which discusses, among other things, the impact of Obama’s race on voter support) particularly fascinating, and, considering the media’s obsession with the racial significance of Obama’s success, such readers would most likely want more from the authors. Moreover, I hope that others will follow Kate Kenski, Bruce Hardy, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s example and create an analogously comprehensive treatise on the 2008 presidential primaries, for scholars concerned with gender politics will be just as fascinated with Hillary Clinton’s challenges and triumphs as they are with the introduction of Sarah Palin to the national political stage. These, of course, are small criticisms to an otherwise excellent study, and I look forward to reading more from Jamieson and her colleagues.

Ray Block, Jr.

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Once a stalwart of the Democratic Solid South, Texas has transformed into a major Republican stronghold not only in the South, but for the entire nation as well. In Cowboy Conservatism, Sean Cunningham explains the process of the party shift that Texas experienced when the Republican Party became dominant in a state that had been controlled by Democrats for more than a century.

Cunningham analyzes the political changes that took place in Texas in the years between the assassination of JFK and the election of Ronald Reagan. Examining the state’s geography, history, economy and social outlook, he details how Texas was transformed by a series of political events during these tumultuous years. He points to how the social upheaval from
that time period, in the form of anti-war protests, the federal government’s
push for civil rights, the breakdown of social order in several American
cities, an economy hobbled by inflation and excessive regulation, an anxiety
over America’s military strength, and the distress over moral laxity in the
country, resulted in Texans fundamentally questioning the Democratic
Party’s new found liberal philosophy and the party’s ability to handle the
formidable crises the country faced. Public perception that the conservative
ideology embodied by the Republican Party could address their concerns
eventually paved the way for Texas to become a Republican stronghold.

The first part of the book lays out that conservative tradition. Cunningham
demonstrates how the state’s history of rebellion, independence, annex-
ation, secession, and reconstruction created hostility to all sources of control
and dominance based outside the state. For over a century, Texans were
convinced that the Democratic Party was the party that represented their
conservative values of independence, patriotism, and loyalty.

While federal intervention under Democratic administrations did in-
crease during in the 1940s and 1950s, Cunningham points out that the shift
to the Republican Party was delayed by fears that Republicans were extrem-
ists. Right wing hostility to the Kennedy administration put Republicans on
the defensive after the young president was assassinated in Dallas. Conserv-
ative Democrats were successful in labeling Republicans as radicals and
Texans were fearful of being perceived as extremists. When you add in
Lyndon Johnson’s presidential bid in 1964, Texas continued to remain faith-
f ul to the Democratic Party.

However, factionalism in the state’s Democratic Party between the
liberal and conservative wings led to a split in the party. More importantly,
events began to overtake Texans’ view of the two parties and their respec-
tive governing philosophies. The state’s resistance to the Democratically-
controlled federal government’s push for civil rights, the perception by
Texans that the nation seemed to be spinning out of control during the
1960s, the liberal George McGovern as the Democrat’s presidential nominee
in 1972, and the failed presidency of Jimmy Carter, all undermined Demo-
cratic loyalties and opened the door for Texas Republicans to attract Demo-
cratic conservatives.

We are introduced to the individuals who helped push that door wide
open and persuade Texans to cross the partisan threshold into the Republican
Party. The seminal start of the conversion begins with staunchly anti-
communist Republican Bruce Alger’s election to Congress in 1954. Alger,
Cunningham argues, never introduced or passed a single piece of important
legislation, but was a key figure in the rise of modern conservatism in Texas.
John Tower’s surprise election to the Senate seven years later legitimized
the idea of Republicans being electorally viable, and certainly at least as
conservative as a Democrat. The partisan makeover gained momentum when the most popular and influential Texas Democrat in the state, Governor John Connally, defected to the Republican Party.

The real hero in this southwestern saga, however, is Ronald Reagan. Cunningham highlights the rise and influence of Reagan over several chapters illustrating how the former actor’s conservative philosophy, combined with his sunny optimism, made him the state’s most popular advocate for conservatism and a crucial contributor to the states’ partisan conversion. It was Reagan who made Republicans respectable and who convinced native Texans in the state’s conservative political climate they were at home in the Republican Party. By 1980, Texas was Reagan country. His efforts were a critical element in the seismic shift in Texas from a solidly Democratic state to a staunchly Republican state. A remarkable transformation had taken place. Texas was now a Republican powerhouse on the national stage.

One interesting point the author brings to light was how Texans, who, as Cunningham emphasizes, were averse to extremism in the 1960s, came to support Ronald Reagan in the 1970s, a candidate who many considered an extremist. In the 1976 presidential election, Texas’ favorite son, John Connally, labeled Reagan as an extremist (p. 221), and conservative Texans began distancing themselves from moderate Republicans like John Tower. Even moderates like George Bush moved rightward and adopted a more conservative tone. Something that was long perceived as risky had come to be embraced by Texans.

From a summary perspective, there is much to like in this effort. It is a fine piece of scholarly work that is readable enough for use in an undergraduate classroom and might make a nice addition to a first year graduate seminar. Cunningham’s extensive research is presented in an easy-to-read and easy-to-follow format that describes how multiple factors played an important role in shifting Texas from a solidly Democratic state into a Republican stronghold.

Many political experts are aware of the events and facts from the period between 1963 and 1980. That said, while Texas is a big state and deserves some consideration because of its size, this book doesn’t really offer anything new or unique to the literature on partisan realignment in the south. The forces that fueled the partisan conversion in Texas are the same ones found throughout the once all-Democratic south. Ideological conservatism and opposition to federal mandates helped realign many voters in other southern states into the Republican Party. Conservative Democrats throughout the south joined Texans in their negative reaction to the Democratic Party’s shift from a racially conservative party to a racially liberal one. The resistance to federal enforcement of integration policies was also apparent throughout the region. Ronald Reagan’s influence on the region’s partisan
shift is almost legendary. Beyond that, however, the historical richness of Cowboy Conservative makes it a worthwhile read when considering the rise of modern conservatism.

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When one thinks of the history of the struggle for voting rights in the United States, the Tu-pik speaking people of Bethel, Alaska or antebellum Connecticut (which in 1855 became the first state to adopt the literacy test) are not likely to come readily to mind. Rather, as C. Vann Woodward taught us to do in his most famous work, we tend to think of the “strange career of Jim Crow” and voting discrimination as a southern phenomenon. The great contribution of James Thomas Tucker’s The Ballot for Bilingual Ballots is to make us aware of the plight of language minority groups in the drive for a more democratic and just America. This valuable book will find a wide audience among those who are interested in voting rights, ethnic politics, or civil rights more generally.

The essence of the book is a detailed legislative history of the various incarnations of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act that apply to American citizens whose first language is not English. The author brings the insider’s enthusiasm and expertise to this narrative. Indeed, the reader will find a picture of the author and other leaders of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) on page 172 of the book. As the author rightly contends, the study of language minority groups and their voting rights is an underappreciated topic and likely to grow in importance as waves of new immigrants continue to reach American shores.

The book has six parts. The first four parts describe the development of federal laws dedicated to the protection of the rights of language minorities. The fifth section presents a case study of remedies for voting discrimination against Alaska native-Americans who are not fluent in English. The final section consists of very brief contributions from five other authors on topics like the protection of Asian American voters. Collectively, the volume is a spirited defense of the principle of guaranteeing the right of all U.S. citizens to participate in U.S. elections.
A central question that is featured in all of the legislative debates is whether protecting the voting rights of language minorities through various iterations of the Voting Rights Act is truly necessary. Legislators also disagree about what jurisdictions and language groups should be protected and how. For example, Section 4(e) of the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act applies only to residents of Puerto Rico. Section 4(f)(4) was applied to political subdivisions “where significant concentrations of minorities with native languages other than English reside.” Disagreement has revolved around how and where these provisions of the Voting Rights Act should be applied. For example, as Tucker notes, “Complete census data was [sic] only available for 50 of the 90 Alaska Native reservations under the 2002 Determinations” (p. 122).

Critics of these provisions of the Voting Rights Act, generally Republicans, argued that the law was unnecessary, too costly to implement, or too punitive. Republican Steve King of Iowa, for example, contended that the Voting Rights Reauthorization Act (VRARA) of 2006 was “a serious affront to generations of immigrants” that had to learn English and that it would create language enclaves destructive of American unity (p. 178). Republican Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama claimed that providing election materials in languages other than English would tear the country apart and “destroy national unity (p. 182).” Although defenders of the law dismissed these objections as misleading or even mendacious, 33 (out of 423) members of the U.S. House voted against final passage of the 2006 VRARA. Twelve of these Republican dissidents were from Georgia and Texas. This is understandable when one recalls that Texas has had at least 105 Section 5 objections since 1982. Nevertheless, Republican leaders of the House like Speaker Dennis Hastert, Judiciary Committee Chair James Sensenbrenner, and Subcommittee on the Constitution Chair Steve Chabot all supported the renewal of the law. The 8th chapter of the book is devoted to debunking myths about language assistance like the mistaken belief held by writers like George Will that knowledge of English is a requirement for U.S. citizenship.

The book has just a few very minor errors. For example, on page 135 the author mistakenly writes that the General Accounting Office was renamed the General Accountability Office (instead of the Government Accountability Office). More significantly, one might question the author’s decision to depart from the academic convention of including a final chapter that synthesizes the author’s principal contribution to existing research on a topic or question. A successful conclusion gives the reader a clear sense of a book’s place in the scholarly literature and how our understanding of a topic might be altered or enhanced by the research the author presents. It is surprising, for example, that Tucker did not include a discussion of the existing research tradition on voting rights represented by writers like Chandler...
Davidson and Morgan Kousser. Instead, the volume concludes with four very short essays by other authors and several very lengthy appendices (pp. 293-370) that list some of the covered jurisdictions and samples of bilingual ballots. Although the author shares original survey data on how the law is implemented that his team collected, we might like to know more about how significantly the voting rights law has contributed to the goal of creating a more just and inclusive political system in the United States.

Despite possible questions one might raise, *The Battle Over Bilingual Ballots* provides invaluable insights into the challenge of integrating Americans who may lack English proficiency into our political system. It is an irony of American history that the United States, the ne plus ultra of immigrant nations, has long been home to fierce nativism. In an era of political leaders like Tom Tancredo, it is clear that defending the voting rights of Native Americans, Asian Americans, Spanish-speaking citizens, and others who struggle with English fluency, is as vital as ever. James Tucker reminds us of this important reality.

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In February 2003, President George W. Bush proclaimed to the world, in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, that “a liberated Iraq can sow the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions.” This bold foreign policy directive represented a signature achievement of the American neoconservative cause but was worlds removed from the movement born forty years prior among liberal domestic policy critics. How, exactly, did we get here from there? Justin Vaisse provides illumination in a rich historical rendering of neoconservatism in contemporary American politics. He skillfully traces the impact of the movement and its ideas through a meandering odyssey of influential individuals, organizations, and events across three historical ages from the 1960s to present day.

The first age of neoconservatism, according to Vaisse, was born out of backlash against the leftward drift of American domestic policy under Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs. Vaisse contends that original proponents of neoconservatism were disgruntled New York intellectuals who were mostly un-interested in foreign affairs, instead advocating for
restrained use of state power both at home and abroad. Neoconservative ideas, including a hardened Cold War focused foreign policy, soon found a home within the pages of Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell’s *The Public Interest* and Norman Podhoretz’s *Commentary*, and voice from a growing body of respected advocates such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Seymour Martin Lipset.

The second age, Vaïsse recounts, emerged as a “silent majority” conservative alternative to the left’s embrace of the counterculture, chiefly represented by “new politics” and the McGovern wing of the Democratic Party. During this era, we saw the emergence of outspoken foreign policy hawks, led by Scoop Jackson, who dissented from their party’s tepid Cold War posture, and the creation of such bedrock neoconservative organizations as the Coalition for a Democratic Majority and the Committee on the Present Danger. Their political mission reflected a broader effort among conservative intellectuals and opinion leaders to persuade, or wedge off, discontented Democrats on the basis of a need for more muscular foreign policy objectives. Over time, the vaunted “Vital Center” had shifted from Schlesinger’s Truman to Podhoretz’s Reagan.

The third age of neoconservatism took hold during the Reagan presidency and may have seemed to find difficult footing as a right-wing opposition to Bill Clinton’s foreign policy. However, as Vaisse notes, the Democratic Leadership Council served as an effective counter-balance. More importantly, a new generation of neoconservative leaders would come of age and achieve access to the foreign policy-making apparatus during the George W. Bush administration. This doctrinal shift was particularly remarkable given that Bush the candidate derided the Clinton administration for its internationalist focus on nation building and human rights. Nonetheless, neoconservatism thrives today as the dominant ideological perspective of the Republican Party, as the cross-party migration of neoconservative principles and proponents has become virtually complete. As Irving Kristol (1995) trumpeted in 1995, “the Democratic party of today is not the Democratic Party of yesteryear” (p. 370).

Vaïsse describes how the seeds for neoconservative renewal were planted right around the time when some observers, including some of the movement’s “godfathers,” had eulogized its demise. In particular, the Project for a New American Century, and the *Weekly Standard*, would become the central driving force of the new neoconservative energy. PNAC, and its members, gained strong prominence within the “establishment” during the W. Bush Presidency and effectively leveraged their influence in the foreign policy and national security debates in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
Vaïsse’s well-researched historical narrative confirms conventional understanding regarding the ideas promoted by those who would found and promote the neoconservative cause. Others, such as Ehrman (1995), have chronicled how leftist intellectuals who initially promoted a socialist worldview transferred their idealist concept of internationalism toward neoconservatism. Vaïsse’s book, however, looks through a much wider lens, providing novel insight into domestic political fallout of this ideological strain. Particularly welcome is his depiction of how discontent within quintessentially liberal organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action reflected broader schisms in the party’s New Deal coalition. Union-backing traditionalists found resonance in the neoconservative’s unashamedly anti-communist message.

Neoconservative opposition to the New Left, McGovern, and Carter is also well documented and receives fair treatment in this book. Vaïsse’s account excels in chronicling intra-party fractures during Republican Party administrations which were equally as critical in the development of the movement. For example, he meticulously details neoconservative challenges and eventual triumphs over the Nixon–Kissinger’s détente agenda and the rather harsh public expressions of discontent over George H.W. Bush’s “realist” conclusion to the first Gulf War. Finally, the author presents one of the clearest depictions of foreign policy debate within the ranks of the George W. Bush administration.

In _Neoconservatism_, Vaïsse cautions against ascribing the sort of “artificial coherence” (p. 5) to neoconservatism as others have proffered, stating that the term has “always been close to meaningless (p. 271). It is true that “multiple and contradictory interpretations have been proposed” (p. 271), but Vaïsse also steers clear of any attempt at a lexical statement on the matter, instead conceding that “connections are tenuous, and the filiation is complex and indirect” (p. 4).

I expect some readers will grow frustrated with the author’s broad brush historical portrayal of the movement and its key players while avoiding clear-cut lines of conceptual demarcation. For example, he argues that no neoconservatives reached the level of President Bush’s “inner circle,” a characterization Max Boot, a neoconservative, would agree with. “A cabal of neoconservatives has hijacked the Bush administration’s foreign policy. . . . If only it were true!” (Boot 2004, 20). Ultimately, Vaïsse claims that Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld were “assertive nationalists” while Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith were neoconservatives. Such a distinction appears to be without practical difference, especially since neoconservatives and their “allies” share and promote common policy objectives. In the end, however, Vaïsse effectively employs neoconservatism, the concept, as a practical historical device, demonstrating how American
political history may be illuminated when seen through the prism of a series of remarkable intellectual debates and the networks of people, organizations, and institutions that represent them. Vaïsse thereby fulfills his book’s overarching goal of highlighting the bridge between normative ideals and practical policy—how “ideas, represented by people and their networks, take hold and direct public policy” (p. 20). One might even carry this discussion forward. Only two years after President Obama’s landmark victory and the proclamation of a “new liberal order” (Beinart 2008), there seems to be growing public discontent over economic (rather than national) security, domestic policy priorities, and clarion calls for conservative purity in the Republican Party ranks. Whether this means we have thereby entered into yet another, fourth, age of neoconservatism remains to be seen.

References

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Stanley Renshon places the context of noncitizen voting in Western, multiethnic and multi-racial democratic states. He examines specifically the challenges of integrating diverse groups into an already established national community with suffrage rights without formal status of American citizenship. Voting is seen as an essential marker of full community membership. Non-citizens had suffrage rights in almost one-half of the American states during the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries; yet almost every state rescinded those provisions by the 1920s, resulting in the “intertwining” of citizenship status with voting rights. Renshon examines the “current debate” about extending suffrage to non-citizens and applies the criterion of emotional attachment to the United States, the existing requirements for naturalization, and the relationship of voting to the civic and community incorporation of new immigrants. This “... requires of citizens a degree of cosmopolitan thinking, being able to transcend, even if only episodically, less inclusive identities than one’s national identity as an American” (p. 13).
Renshon identifies “feelings of warmth and affection for, an appreciation of, a pride in, a commitment and responsibility toward and support for the [American] community” (p. 13) in which being an American is the core attachment, so claims of fairness are not sufficient to justify alien suffrage [in a short time]. Renshon examines political theories and psychological issues to support or deny non-citizen suffrage, and he pushes for evidence that demonstrates “the development of deliberative capacities and democratic commitments among immigrants and potential citizens” (p. 53). Many of the “talking points” by non-citizen suffrage advocates are criticized as devoid of empirical evidence. If there is some evidence, then adding additional conditions (i.e., size of the community, time lapse to grant suffrage, transnationalism, etc.) serve to undermine non-citizen suffrage.

This reviewer places emphasis upon the breadth and complexity of examining non-citizen voting. Unfortunately, Prof. Renshon embellishes the notion of emotional attachment and the “interwoven” character of the vote and citizenship as his primary basis to determine the benefits of non-citizen voting. Discussion that incorporates the legal foundation of alien standing, rights, and obligations needs to include the underlying principles associated with a representative democracy—citizenship, residency, community, rights, and the legal and political contexts. A discussion of community citizenship incorporates the idea of universal rights guaranteeing fundamental civil and political rights to all residents (Alienikoff 2001). In addition, formal national citizenship (either by jus soli, or jus sanguinis, or by naturalization) accords individuals with rights and privileges that are distinct and broader than those who do not possess this citizenship status (Schuck 2000). Thus, there are legal, political, and value premises that accompany the practice and meaning of citizenship in the U.S. The notions of community membership, civic identity, allegiance to the polity, and attachment fall within the scope of this discussion. Citizenship entails an individual becoming engaged in local, state, and national matters, active in political parties, voluntary associations, religious institutions, and many other aspects of civil society (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). This political incorporation process notes membership in a political community that combines being an inhabitant, political learning and experiences, status and rights, and civic engagement as the basis for full and active membership.

Part of the debate about suffrage access is that immigrants are viewed as not having American interests at heart. Individuals with dual citizenship are criticized because dual status allegedly undermines their integration and loyalty (Renshon 2001). Additionally, there are concerns about voter fraud (Minitte and Callahan 2003), and immigrant bloc voting influencing election outcomes in contentious elections (Sontag 1992). Yet, the over-riding basis for immigration is the desire for a better life, which extends beyond eco-
nomic opportunities and gains. Belief in fundamental freedoms, establishing equity in the “host society”, and integrating and adapting to American life are both inevitable (via assimilation and acculturation) and desired by most immigrants. The extent of incorporation is not the sole responsibility of the immigrant or their respective community. Studies of naturalization and other forms of political incorporation indicate pro-active and supportive programs by governmental agencies affect significantly higher naturalization rates. Thus, discussions about community membership must factor in structural and societal processes and “climate” that will influence immigrant incorporation.

With dual citizenship becoming more prevalent, there are issues for which national citizenship has primacy; possible foreign influences on domestic issues or requirements to relinquish the other citizenship, matters of allegiance, primacy of attention and engagement, and loyalty come into play. Yet, globalization, multiple identities and affiliations, and transnationalism are redefining what citizenship means in the 21st century. Research findings on dual citizens and transnational participants are uncovering relationships with the U.S. (i.e., in terms of loyalty, and civic and political engagement) that are complementary for political incorporation in the U.S. Also, it has been suggested that maintaining citizenship of one’s original nationality is integral to reduce the disadvantages that can follow by acquiring a new nationality such as inheritance, property ownership, and other entitlements (Martin 1999, 30).

Non-citizens are seen as lacking sufficient knowledge to make well-versed decisions about public policies and candidates. Greater political knowledge is argued to be a prerequisite to exercise the voting franchise. Despite the democratic principle that every vote counts, in the case of non-citizens, their voice would be discordant with citizens’ interests and act as a voting monolith. Claims of increased voter fraud (Minitte and Callahan 2003) have also been posited, although there is little evidence. Again, if we seek out evidence to support or refute these claims, there is more evidence that globalization, and historical patterns of migration indicate immigrants are knowledgeable about American society, its institutions, and policies. Historically, literacy tests, ideally, were premised on an informed electorate, but, in practice were exclusionary. Interestingly, Renshon places the standard that non-citizens, in order to exercise a vote, must base it upon the public interest as opposed to self-interests. One could suggest that self-interest is a bulwark of voter participation, motivation, and basis for vote choices in America.

A possible parallel to a discussion of non-citizen voting is the case law for dual domestic residence and voting rights. Dual domestic residents are subject to local taxes, ordinances, and other public policies in their “second
home” community. Issues have arisen about the voice of dual residents in local elections; with over ten percent of the households now owning more than one residence (Ostrow 2002, 1995) and 45 percent of these households have their second residence as their primary home.

Many Western states\(^1\) offer non-residents some voting rights in specific special districts (Harden 2000; Tennessee Code). Such inclusions have raised concerns about voter dilution for permanent residents; yet, any expansion of the electoral base does “dilute” the current base, much like the case when African Americans and women were extended suffrage. The “rational relation standard” (Ostrow 2002, 1966) supports the idea that substantial interest in the subject(s) of the election and being affected by the election outcome warrants inclusion.

New York City allowed resident aliens to vote in local elections (Ostrow 2002, 1986). Rather than restrict their voting, the city had colored forms, separate lists of these voters, and adjacent to the voting machines, provisions to accept votes from these voters (Ostrow 2002, 1986). Similarly, in Mountain Village, Colorado, the county sent absentee ballots to dual residents. In essence, the courts have been “open” to less restrictive alternatives (other than denying the vote) to conduct elections in which dual residents and non-citizens can exercise the right to vote and prevent voter fraud at the same time.

The remaining points are presented in summary fashion. 1) The concept of political community, the rights of the governed and self-determination would require the voice of all residents to be able to participate on matters of representation and the policy-making process. 2) Legally and constitutionally, non-citizens have many of the same rights and obligations as citizens (i.e., military service, taxes, etc.); therefore, they are significant segments of the community. Involvement in the electoral affairs serves to educate future citizens in civic responsibilities and preparations for more involved citizenship. 3) Immigrants are seen as persons of questionable loyalty to the U.S., who, at best, have divided loyalties (Neuman 1995, 279-80.). Yet empirical questions arise from any assumptions of uninformed voting among immigrants and/or their subject to manipulation by outside forces. There are not any tests of knowledge and attachments requirements to exercise one’s vote. When everyone has stakes in their local communities and policies, enabling non-citizens to participate and compete in the process can strengthen local democratic values and, potentially, widen the collective benefits (Raskin 1993, 31). 4) If non-citizens are granted suffrage, then it should apply to only permanent resident aliens who, implicitly, have demonstrated a commitment to reside in the U.S. (declarant voter).

\(^1\)The states of Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wyoming offer non-residents some voting rights in specific special districts (Harden 2000; Tennessee Code),
5) The lack of “informed judgment” was an argument used to oppose suffrage rights for women and African Americans. Level and kinds of “political knowledge” can be directed toward all long-term citizen residents as well (Harper-Ho 2000, 304). 6) Assuming the presence of policy preferences and not having direct electoral access, the non-citizen segment is disadvantaged in the policy-making process and could experience “regular” policy biases. 7) Non-citizens affect the creation and composition of legislative districts, which does not differentiate the legal or citizen status of residents. At the same time, they are unable to participate in the nomination and selection of their representatives.

8) There is a distinction between state and national “citizenship.” State legislatures can pass enabling legislation to allow alien suffrage, or require localities to do so, or enable specific local jurisdictions to pass local enfranchisement, or amend the state constitution to allow alien suffrage (Arnold 1993; Kaiman and Varner 1992). These approaches combine the legal provisions for alien suffrage, with the political will and use of organization from segments of the current electorate to pursue such changes.

The overall examination of alien suffrage encompasses the constitutional issues of citizenship rights and status plus the political/legislative dimensions of whom and what constitutes citizenship in a global society. The scope of alien suffrage far exceeds the characterization found in this work; and a fuller understanding of the precepts underlying community, membership, and standing in a global world are part of the dynamics in the discussion of non-citizen voting in America. These complexities and breadth of examination are undermined by an over-reliance of “emotional attachment” in which direct evidence is even more challenging to corroborate this criterion.

References
For some time now it has been evident that women who run for elective office tend to be as successful as similarly situated men, and accordingly, research attention has turned to the matter of the relative paucity of female candidates. In *It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don’t Run for Office*, Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox argue that understanding the problem requires focus on the decision processes that occur substantially prior to entry into the political fray.

They accomplish this by studying potential candidates, defined as successful individuals in professions that are likely to yield political office-seekers. Almost 3800 women and men in the fields of law, business, education and politics were surveyed in 2001, with 75 percent of the original respondents re-surveyed in a second wave in 2008. Lawless and Fox posit a two-step process of candidate emergence whereby citizens first consider the possibility of ever pursuing elective office, and only later decide whether to make the first run. As important as opportunity structure is, it is mediated by attitudes and experiences that may be quite distant from the decision process regarding whether to enter a particular race.

Women and men in the candidate eligibility pool were quite similar in their level of political engagement and their degree of interaction with elected officials, yet women were not only less likely to pursue elected office, they were less likely to ever have considered the possibility of doing
so. The authors describe this difference in ambition as the critical finding of the book, but the real story lies with the effort to determine why. Indeed, their most compelling findings illustrate the differences between women and men in the way they evaluate their qualifications for political office—evidence of what Lawless and Fox call the gendered psyche. Although on objective indicators men and women were equally qualified for office, women were much less likely to rate themselves as qualified. Women also were less likely to believe that they had the specific skills needed for a successful candidacy—issue familiarity, public speaking competence, and the ability to fundraise and promote one’s candidacy—and less likely to believe they possessed the necessary personality traits such as a thick skin and ability to make deals. Their in-depth supplemental interviews pointed to another difference: men and women did not use the same yardsticks to gauge their qualifications. While men tended to evaluate themselves relative to current office-holders (“Have you seen what’s out there? I must be qualified.” 132), women compared themselves to an idealized standard (“How could I ever get to the point where I could represent everyone’s interests?” 133).

Belief that one is qualified to hold office is the strongest predictor of political ambition, but the effect is much stronger for women. Once a woman believes she is well qualified, she has almost the same probability of considering a candidacy as a similarly situated man, while a woman who believes she is not qualified is about half as likely to consider a candidacy as a man with a similar background.

Gender effects are also in evidence in recruitment to candidacy, which was assessed by asking respondents whether, and how frequently, party leaders, elected officials, or political activists had suggested that they consider pursuing political office. By a variety of measures, recruitment patterns tended to favor men, and despite the limited role of political gatekeepers in the American system of self-nominating candidates, being asked to run increased the probability of considering a candidacy, as well as the probability of taking concrete steps toward a run for office, for both men and women. The gender gap in recruitment was less pronounced among Democratic women because of the role played by women’s organizations such as EMILY’s List. Contact with such organizations compensated for the other recruitment disadvantages faced by women. In fact, the gender gap in recruitment between the two waves of the survey increased among Republicans while diminishing among Democrats.

Traditional family role orientations also affected political ambition, although not always in expected ways. For instance, women were less likely to have grown up in a home where political discussions regularly occurred and to have received encouragement to seek office by parents, other family members and friends. In the candidate eligibility pool, women were less
likely to be married and to have children, but among those who were living in family situations, women were considerably more likely to have primary responsibility for household and childcare responsibilities. Thus, women and men who were similarly situated professionally were dissimilar in their home responsibilities. While this would seem to depress women’s political ambition, current family structures and responsibilities were not a significant predictor of ambition.

Are attitudes and dispositions changing with younger generations? Individuals in the under-40 cohort were more likely than older respondents to have come from egalitarian families, and the gender gap in parental encouragement to run for office completely disappeared among younger respondents. Despite this, the gap between men and women in political ambition was larger for the under-40 cohort than for older respondents and among younger respondent the gap in ambition actually grew between the two waves of the study. Thus speculation about the rise of a new generation of confident women should be tempered by Lawless and Fox’s findings. Gender socialization may be changing, but it still shapes political ambition in politically relevant ways.

In addition to their contribution to our understanding of political ambition, the authors have compiled a useful and comprehensive review of the research. They write in a clear style, sprinkled with anecdotes, which will engage specialists and non-specialists alike. More important, theirs is a clearly articulated argument for the importance of gender to the understanding of politics.

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In the words of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, “Every step toward the goal of justice requires sacrifice, suffering, and struggle; the tireless exertions and passionate concern of dedicated individuals.” Dr. King fostered a socio-political agenda during the Civil Rights Movement that propelled “collective action” to address the “collective problems” of African-Americans. Kevin Anderson, in this well-timed and thought-provoking manuscript, examines past civil rights groups that have strategically responded to the quest for economic, social, and political equality for African-Americans.
Anderson contends that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) were three of the most influential civil rights groups in the 50s and 60s. They fought diligently to challenge the visceral forms of overt discrimination and racism, which subjected African-Americans to a separate but (un)equal way of life. He argues, “Each group sought to address the problems of racism in America by confronting the political system, but the different modes they chose are illustrative of the ideological backgrounds from which each group emerged” (p. 4).

Chapter Two provides a historical analysis of the ideological histories and strategic choices of the three civil rights groups. The theoretical centerpiece of this chapter asks a fundamental question; what role did racism play in the American political system? He approaches this question by first operationalizing a definition for ideology to build a bridge of understanding to show how ideology influences political strategies and how this leads to strategic actions.

Chapters One and Two are filled with a plethora of quasi-research questions and propositions that are provocative, but sometimes overstated. At times, Anderson’s desire to expand the discussion of these civil rights groups is diluted with many questions that only serve to fill space rather than to be answered. After a series of questions have been asked, he does regain the central theoretical framework of the manuscript by laying out a core question in chapter Two. He states, “Did the different ideological frames through which African-Americans perceive American racism produce different strategies for achieving political inclusion?” (p. 29). From this question, he hypothesizes that groups who perceive the racial system to be “stable” will employ racial mobilization strategies for change, whereas those who perceive the system as “ambivalent” will use reform strategies (p. 29).

In the subsequent chapters Anderson does an excellent job of outlining a historical and descriptive account of each civil rights group’s inception, organization, and ideological premise to be an agent of social change. The chapters contain illustrative case studies. In chapter Three, he summarizes the mission and goal of the NAACP. The author posits that in the beginning stages of the formulation of the group, organizers were entrenched in the ideology of American liberalism. Mary White Ovington, one of the founders of the NAACP, believed that this ideological premise would best suit their mission. American liberalism has two core ideals: (1) access to education would drive the civilizing of African-American people, and (2) the attainment of civil equality was the birthright of every citizen (p. 54). It was important to make possible these ideals for the inclusion of African-Americans into mainstream society. This led to the NAACP filing lawsuits
and challenging national and state government to enact legislation to serve the needs and concerns of the black community. The cornerstone case of the NAACP was the school desegregation case *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954). The *Brown* decision later led to the monumental enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

In chapter Four, Anderson suggests that the ministers that founded the SCLC along with the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King practiced an “integrated” ideology that was “a complex set of ideas attacking all the causes of African-American subjugation” (p. 104). The SCLC was most noted for their mass protest model that was influential during the Montgomery bus boycotts. Chapter Five paints a similar picture of how the SNCC engaged in community outreach and empowerment. While the NAACP and SCLC operated on a reactive approach to address the racial oppression plaguing the black community, the SNCC formed an ideological identity based on “confrontations” (p. 125). Their community-based political actions were significant in the “sit-ins” and “freedom rides.”

A nice addition to this manuscript could have been the inclusion of interviews from current political leaderships of these organizations and past and current members. This would have been a conscious attempt by the author to clearly set this study apart from previous research on civil rights groups. For example, interview the president of the NAACP, Benjamin Todd Jealous, SCLC National Chairman, Dr. Sylvia Tucker, and former members of the SSCN (or even the now late Dr. Ronald Walters, Dockum Drug Store sit-in, July 1958). Understandably, this would have been a huge undertaking but the accumulation of this qualitative research would have given the manuscript an added dimension.

In conclusion, Anderson’s work differs greatly from the volume of manuscripts that have provided a historical account of the influence of civil rights groups. The correlation between political ideology and the collective actions of these groups speaks to a new dimension of African-American politics research that goes outside of the norm of the traditional political discourse. The question of whether ideology influences specific strategic types of economic, social, political, and legal actions obviously needs more academic exploration. But the work of Anderson greatly contributes to past and current literature of the struggle of civil rights groups to advance the economic, social, and political agenda of the black community.

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Immigration is one of the most salient topics on American political life. For example, recently the Arizona Legislature enacted a set of statutes and statutory amendments known as Senate Bill 1070, the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act.” Among other things, S.B. 1070 requires officers to check a person’s immigration status under certain circumstances and authorizes officers to make a warrantless arrest of a person where there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a public offense that makes the person removable from the United States. S.B. 1070 also creates or amends crimes for the failure of an alien to apply for or carry registration papers, the smuggling of human beings, the performance of work by unauthorized aliens, and the transport or harboring of unlawfully present aliens. Supporters of the Bill argue, among other things, that the United States government has failed to act on immigration and that it is now a national emergency that demands states take a role.

The United States filed a Complaint challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 1070, and it also filed a Motion requesting that the court issue a preliminary injunction. The United States argues principally that the power to regulate immigration is vested exclusively in the federal government, and that the provisions of S.B. 1070 are therefore preempted by federal law. Judge Susan Bolton granted the request for a preliminary injunction on the most controversial parts of the bill. The initial ruling is now before the circuit court of appeals.

Into this volatile public debate on immigration, one in which federal courts will play a crucial and potentially deciding role, Professor Anna O. Law’s book is timely and welcome. It fills a gap in the literature on immigration and American courts. The book begins on a deeply personal note. The author informs the reader that her great grandfather was a merchant who, although exempt from the Chinese Exclusion Act, nonetheless was subject to harsh interrogations on his trips to Hawaii. The author and her parents are immigrants themselves. The argument and findings thus take on a power and persuasiveness rooted in this individual experience.

While the book does not offer any insight into how the appeals court and ultimately the Supreme Court might rule on S.B. 1070, it does offer an intriguing perspective on how these courts differ in function and gives valuable historical insight into the development of immigration law. A major purpose of the book is to demonstrate how the Courts of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court treat immigration cases differently due to the changing roles in the appellate process over the time period of 1991 through the present day. Using immigration cases as the unit of analysis, the author
argues that the Supreme Court changed from an appellate court to a policy making institution, while the U.S. Courts of Appeals evolved into courts that were insulated from the Supreme Court to become independent policy makers through an error correction function. In addition the author argues for various methods of analyses beyond examination of case outcomes and also presents evidence for the constraint of law and legal doctrine on judicial policy preference. Thus the book also enters a methodological debate about the proper methods to analyze law and judicial decisions.

The book is divided into seven chapters. After the Introduction where the author lays out her thesis and analytical framework, Chapter Two is the critical chapter for understanding the rest of the book and the methodological argument. First, the author reviews the appeals procedure for an alien, including the initial contact with the appropriate agency, usually the Department of Homeland Security (previously the Immigration and Naturalization Service), and then a hearing before one of the nation’s 226 Immigration Judges staffing 54 immigration courts around the United States. The workload is enormous, averaging about 1,200 removal cases per judge per year in 2008. From there an alien can appeal an adverse decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals and then on to the federal courts. The Second and Ninth Circuit courts deal with far more appeals than other circuits, the Ninth Circuit, in particular, which because of its location has had a special role in the history of immigration appeals and rulings.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the method of inquiry. Professor Law relies less on dispositional outcomes—whether the alien won or lost the case which is an often used dependent variable in many behavioral analyses—and instead uses a variety of methodologies, including longitudinal cross tabulated data, interviews with Ninth Circuit judges and court personnel, and doctrinal analysis to ascertain the importance of precedent and legal doctrine. The database includes 2,218 legal opinions, 200 from the Supreme Court, over 2,000 opinions from the Ninth, Fifth and Third Circuits, and even 13 opinions from the circuit courts which existed prior to 1891. Part of the argument is to demonstrate the constraining power of law—that law matters and defines the acceptable modes of outcomes.

Chapters Three through Six flesh out the author’s argument through a combination of the methodological techniques described in Chapter Two. Chapter Three uses data and doctrinal analysis to examine the historical background relating to the development of the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court and the consequences of these differing judicial structures and functions for immigration policy. Chapter Four examines circuit court policy making within the limitations of institutional structure and design and demonstrating, by the sheer number of immigration cases reviewed by the
Courts of Appeals as compared to the Supreme Court, how often these Courts of Appeals judges have the final say in immigration appeals.

Chapter Five is a case study of the Ninth Circuit which along with the Second Circuit experienced a sharp increase in immigration cases in the first decade of the 21st Century. The author argues that due to this development the Courts of Appeals cannot be analyzed as a monolithic unvarying institution because now the Ninth Circuit approaches immigration cases very differently from other circuits. The enormous caseload has led to institutional changes within the circuit. Chapter Six shows how, despite all the institutional changes over time, courts and their commitment to procedural due process act as a binding force throughout the decades constraining attitudes and even congressional power over immigration.

Any reader wanting to know more about immigration and the courts will learn a lot from this book and it is a welcome addition to the literature. However, despite the length and breadth of the book, it still leaves a reader thinking that there is a lot more to the story of immigration and the courts than presented here. While the data and research are impressive, the lack of more sophisticated methodological techniques means there are a lot of unanswered questions. By way of one example, Figure 4.3 compares the pro-alien rates among the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals from 1881-2002. The rates range from about 25 percent for the Fifth to over 40 percent for the Third circuit. It is hard to know what to make of these percentages. Without any meaningful time or spatial controls there is simply no way to understand the reasons for these differences and thus the figure fails to convey any significant information. This same problem persists for many of the figures and tables throughout the book. Longitudinal data without additional information or control does not offer a lot of meaningful insight.

However, this should not detract from the overall worth of the book. Anyone researching or wishing to learn about immigration law and the influence of courts on that law now has a wonderful source of information.

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There are two things to be gained from this book. First, one can learn about Horace Mann; his vision for common schools, civic education and the
political program he mounted to enact that vision. Second, one can learn about a movement that is popping up everywhere in North America (Mitchell 2001), the push to renegotiate the relation in the public education curriculum between, on the one hand, civics, belonging and social responsibility and, on the other, individual intellectual achievement. Bob Pepperman Taylor is a partisan of the latter position and argues forcibly that we should abandon the self-conscious search for a common civic identity—at least in so far as it relies for its implementation on public education—and concentrate instead on teaching students the skills and attitudes they will need to imaginatively and tolerantly confront the tensions, contests, and differences that will probably increasingly characterize the public world. Horace Mann’s legacy and its continuing influence stands in the way of this newer program.

Rather than thinking of education as a way to promote the civic virtues required to tolerate and manage political controversy, Mann ultimately hoped and aimed for a political life without significant controversy at all (p. 14).

Programs like Mann’s are said to be particularly unhelpful today. They are “hopelessly pious and platitudinous” (p. 14) and threaten the intellectual qualities and moral development needed in a democratic education. Mann’s civic education “is so overwhelming that it threatens to drown out both private concerns and more conventional intellectual and aesthetic values” (p. 14).

As I understand it, the push for a curriculum that deemphasizes social responsibility, civic engagement, and community cohesion in the name of discipline, accountability and achievement comes from two sorts of constituencies; first, those who either have little to gain from it or who were never really included in the community fold to begin with, and, second, those with various forms of free market or individualist political agendas. For the first group, as Mitchell (2001) points out, socially inclusive programs were always articulated in ways congenial to the self-image of Progressives and self-styled open minded people. Minority groups and new immigrants were seldom in charge of their own inclusion and know that inclusion envisions a model citizen who doesn’t look like them. Many minority parents and students today see personal responsibility as their only alternative to an abysmal life of want and dysfunction. Wealthier immigrant business families often identify with extremely high levels of material success in an international setting and worry that their children’s relaxed education will hurt their chances in the extremely competitive world of global business and management. The second group is opposed ideologically to any curbs on acquisitive individualism. One might worry that constituencies such as these would be uninterested in any educational curriculum that did not promise economic dividends, and, ergo, that an education in the humanities would be
associated with the lax, unaccountable social responsibility side of things. I admit, I had always thought that classical political theory and literature were quietly subversive of the American commercial ethos. Bob Pepperman Taylor, however, manages to turn all this around, to argue that the humanities will have a crucial role to play in the education of citizens in the brave new world of flexible, rather than rooted, citizenship and personal, rather than social, responsibility. This is encouraging. The drawback is that he does it by arguing that those who, like Horace Mann, believe that the curriculum ought to provide common experiences that glue us together in a national community want us, while absorbing initiative-robbing moral indoctrination, to study science, practical affairs, and, especially, refrain from reading classical literature. Rebel: read the \textit{Iliad}!

Horace Mann, if like me you are unfamiliar with him, was a major proponent of public education in the first half of the nineteenth century who helped shepherd in a profound shift in American understandings of education. Primary education went from being a decentralized affair of towns and congregations to becoming a public priority. The strict emphasis on rote memorization of classical texts and the emphasis on rules and discipline were largely replaced, at least in theory, by a more humanistic model that emphasized practical pursuits, persuasion, and friendship between teachers and students. For a long time Mann was the secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, a position that had little formal power, but, through his annual reports, writings, speeches and energy Mann used the position to amass a certain amount of both political power and national moral authority (p. 38). Later he was the first president of Antioch College where he extended his ideas and influence to include higher education. Taylor has done an excellent job of sifting through a lot of material both by and about Mann and digests it efficiently enough that one can learn quite a lot about him in the space of one hundred and twenty five pages. The book is divided into five chapters, with the second and third being the most interesting from the point of view of scholarship, while the first, fourth and fifth focus attention, if mostly indirectly, on Taylor’s prescriptions for a civil education today, or at least his opposition to that of the educational proponents of civic and social responsibility.

Taylor finds many things troubling about Horace Mann and his legacy, some more serious than others. Here is a partial list in no particular order. --Mann based much of his thinking on a view of human moral development that boils down simply to wishful thinking. While Taylor never actually states this, the reader gets the idea that there is something suspect about Mann’s relaxing of discipline, especially when it comes to the state of education in today’s minority neighborhoods. --Mann undervalued intellectual and aesthetic goods in favor of civic goods; his educational program is more
didactic than intellectual. Alternatively, Mann’s curriculum and civic agenda are scientific and practical at the expense of the humanities, thereby making it difficult for an American student to see the world imaginatively and tolerantly from the point of view of another. Mann’s religious but non-denominational moral curriculum was, in reality, simply a masked religious dogmatism; liberal theology was falsely portrayed as an underlying American religious consensus and imposed on Calvinist children. Mann typically failed to respect private beliefs. Mann based his educational conclusions on too little data; basically one trip to Prussia. His faith that good morals nurture good physique and health, and his belief that his curriculum creates engaged citizens were based on no evidence at all. Mann was a paternalist who saw his mission as trying to save democracy from itself. In general, Taylor accuses Mann of an arbitrary socialization, or social engineering, of American children and college students and of subordinating individuality to the needs of society. In that sense, finally, Mann subordinates education to politics. Even Mann’s view of society is not neutral, but is rather a particular and partisan political agenda pawning itself off as universal. All of Taylor’s criticisms could be profitably discussed, but let it be said that they all depend for their impact on an unexamined premise that political liberal individualist conceptions are sufficient to address the needs of education and are what all right thinking people ascribe to, and need only be evoked in order to show what is troubling about Horace Mann.

Mann comes off here more as an activist than a deeply consistent political thinker. He seems to take bits and pieces from everywhere, and it is instructive that his opponents, then and now, seem unsure whether to reduce him to Hobbes or Rousseau. He can at times be autocratic and at other times humanistic. Sometimes he reminds one of Plato, arguing that lower faculties need to be subordinated to the higher, and he clearly thought that if America wasn’t moral, it was a wasted experiment. Mann could also speak of duty in ways that remind one of Kant or of Unitarians like William Channing. Mann, as Taylor suggests, does sometimes sound like Rousseau, though less like the Rousseau of either The Social Contract or The Origin of Inequality, as Taylor thinks, than of “The Government of Poland” where Rousseau lays out a program to burn a national identity on to inhabitants of a large given territory. Mann also made use of a very Lockean natural law teleology, though he pushed it in community directions that Locke might resist. Theologically, Mann seems to be in tune with the Armenianism of Locke’s essay On the Reasonableness of Christianity (Locke 1999). As opposed to Calvinist doctrine, which places most of its emphasis on God’s omnipotence, Locke and Mann are both more interested in God’s goodness and wisdom. This, I suspect, is the source of Mann’s teleological sense that moral laws, like physical laws, are discoverable and rational and that, properly apprehended, will guide and further the modern quest for human well-being.
However, according to Taylor, Mann’s most important influence was a phrenologist named George Combe. In Combe, Mann found a pop-scientific ratification of his theological and teleological commitments and apparently believed that Combe’s work would abide through the ages. The deeper theo-philosophical commitment seems to be that a good God would not make a world that would leave His ultimate purposes in obscurity. There must be clues and resemblances—say, skull shapes—that bridge science and spirituality. Clearly few today would defend these ideas. Taylor chides Combe for failing to convincingly explicate the relation between biological determinism and the human ability to work on and through the environment to alter human natural ways of life (p. 23). However, to my knowledge no one in modernity has a convincing account of the relation between morals, human nature and biology, and most people with a political agenda are busy not noticing very similar issues in their own programs.

Taylor situates Mann within an old issue of classical political theory, the paradox of democracy. Classically the issue of democracy was that the many are too easily misled by demagogues who pandered to their petty needs for daily bread and security to enlist their support in partisan and destructive rivalries. One might think of this as factionalism. Taylor states it a little differently. People who worry about the problem of democracy are concerned that, “people’s desires are given free play, and every imaginable human want claims equal standing with every other” (p. 2). The emphasis in the two formulations is different. In the second, the difficulty is in maintaining standards or values or distinguishing one interest from another. One goes from worrying that the people, or a majority, might become fearful and herd-like and vote for a tyrannical protectorate, to worrying that the government or a platitudinous priest might arbitrarily constrain the preferences of liberal individuals. Thus, the dilemma of democracy works, in Taylor’s formulation, to awaken fears of having private life interfered with. Further, Taylor’s formulation presumes that there is only one democracy; the one espoused by, for instance, political liberalism. We could instead ask: which democracy, where, and in the interest of what and whom? If we did, we might decide that democracy is not all one thing and that it is not surprising that Whigs in the 1830s might be skeptical about republics (pp. 27-29), though, despite the way they sometimes wrote, what worried them was not necessarily democracy per se, but Jacksonian democracy. The regressive taxes, the love of office, reputation or power, the self-serving convulsions of party strife, the illusions of martial glory, and the ostentatious love of wealth and material gain that Mann decried (p. 18) were all characteristics of a particular style of democracy, one wedded, incidentally, to a particular conception of commercialism. And, Jacksonian democracy, in turn, was not simply a naturally occurring form of democracy either. It was orchestrated by political men like Martin Van Buren, if we believe his Van Buren’s Auto-
biography. Van Buren also wanted a certain fundamental controversy kept off the public agenda, namely whether the nation should be free or slave. Maybe—just supposing—Horace Mann is not at all unique in these areas. And maybe, Bob Taylor is not altogether free of some of the same issues. Why, after all, is it so important to cast Horace Mann—who no one reads and few would really like—as the creator of a legacy that is destroying education, of creating a dangerous anti-intellectual tendency?

Taylor repeatedly uses an implied liberal individualism to trump Mann and to judge him authoritatively as, say, a paternalist. The best example of this may be the comparison in Chapter 4 between Mann and John Stuart Mill. Mill is presented as wanting a less interventionist education than Mann. Mann did not like literary fiction or classics, arguing that they created a false empathy with unreal characters and left one oblivious to the suffering of one’s actual neighbors. Mill says that studying ancient Greece forces one to confront a society so radically different from one’s own that one learns how to imagine the world from the point of view of another, thus making one more imaginative and tolerant. Taylor concludes from this that Mann wants to close people off from seeing the world from the point of view of another. But there is more than one way to see the world from the point of view of others. One way would be through equality. People who live together as equals or whose lives are similar might empathize with one another’s life experiences far better than people from radically different income brackets. Which form of empathy you prefer—the highly educated type that Mill champions or the common experience type that Mann prefers—will likely be influenced by how you understand the political world you live in and what kind of life in common you think we should have.

Taylor presents Mill’s view as politically neutral and less intrusive (ignoring Mill’s proximity to phrenologists, something he decries in Mann) than it is. Liberals intervene differently than communitarians, but they do move to close off ways of life they find incompatible with their own. English liberals in Mill’s day sometimes worried that individualist rights-bearing citizenship and liberal political institutions were experienced in most of the world as colonialist impositions (Kymlicka 1995, 54). To this day they are resisted all over the world, especially among indigenous peoples. Though Mann would probably be as implicated as Mill (and Booker T. Washington), the imposition of liberal individualist educational models has left behind a rather odious legacy in Indian Allotment, Indian Reorganization, Termination, and residential schools. Individualism and private property are not unmixed blessings, and even today wreak havoc in Asian sweat shops and with abused foreign nannies in Asian business hubs. I would go further and say that if the kind of education Taylor and Mill champion is more useful to (some) students today, it is not because it is less intrusive in private life—it is completely intrusive since all of private life is subordinated
to its dictates—and certainly not because there is anything natural about cultivating flexible mobile citizens who are not encumbered by thick ties of family, community, or Progressivism's version of national community.

There is no telling from the text exactly what Taylor's politics are, and he may not even consider himself liberal. However, in his text liberal individualism acts as both plaintiff and judge. One of the ways this is done is the one I am pointing to here, the assumption that liberal citizenship is unproblematic. This presumption makes Mann seem meddlesome, and one could reasonably ask him to butt out. But there is nothing mandatory about Taylor's concepts of understanding. In reading this book I found myself constantly translating into frames different from his that were perhaps more generous to Mann without really letting him off the hook either. Whenever I did this I found myself asking Taylor the same sorts of questions that he was asking Mann. For instance, I could agree with Taylor that despite Mann's best intentions, his attempts at creating a healthy inclusiveness through education were finally not about inclusiveness per se, but inclusiveness from the point of view of one fractional constituency, that is, on terms acceptable to Horace Mann. The evidence of this is, again as Taylor points out, that those most in favor of more aggressive school reform today tend to be exactly those constituencies Mann had hoped to bring into the national fold: minority people, newer immigrants and rural people who find themselves left behind. But it seems to me that the lesson is not that Mann led us down a flawed path or that today's civic republicans are drowning out intellectual endeavor, but that every curriculum enacts a political program, every political program tries to speak for everyone but does so in a partisan voice, and every attempt at inclusion plays differently in different neighborhoods.

Getting back to Mann, one of his enemies of good education—an important one for Mann's opponents today—would be individual competition, especially in disciplinary contexts. Interestingly Mann preferred the word 'emulation' to the word competition. In Taylor's interpretation, Mann thinks emulation appeals to egoistic instincts (p. 55), and, of course, Taylor has no beef with egoism. Reading between the lines, Mann seems to be worried about an education that places too much emphasis on rewards external to the learning process. For emulators, it isn't what you know, but whether you are doing better than your classmates. Expect a lot of cheating. Mann refers to emulation as a "depraver of social affections." Taylor is uncomfortable when Mann writes this way, and seems to think this is hyperbolic and over the top. Taylor characterizes Mann's objections to emulation this way: "Emulation, in short, works to subvert the moral content of education. By removing competitive teaching techniques and the whole universe of external rewards for learning, we make it more likely that the teacher and student will find the right reasons to study and become more receptive to the proper lessons presented by the didactic curriculum" (p. 55). Usually when Taylor says "in
short” I wonder if he is not being a little too short. Turning to the original speech being glossed in this passage, I find that Mann mentions demons and also quotes Jesus acknowledging that some of the worst kinds of human sin have a plural nature, as in: lead us not into temptation (Mann 1969, 47-48; Mann’s emphasis). In other of Mann’s writings cited by Taylor in this context, Mann mentions race, anger, avarice and war. Taylor believes Mann is simply being hyperbolic, but Mann seems to be harkening to a serious Biblical concern; the kind of social enmities that arise when people do not have desires of their own but rather mime the desires of others. This is a very complicated issue, but to get the idea think of Shakespeare’s bastards who connive against their legitimate brothers simply because they want their brothers’ lives and lands for their own. Mann puts it this way: “the vulture of envy . . . forking her talons into his heart” (p. 48). When people achieve their identities at one another’s expense, other people can become stumbling blocks to what one considers rightfully her own and vicious enmities arise—demonic possession, if you will; the kinds of enmity that result in racism, Indian removal, lynching, and civil war (see Richard Wilbur’s poem on Matthew VIII, 28, in Wilbur 1988, 154; Girard 1986). At any rate, if Mann hears a Christian voice of healing, it puts some pressure on Taylor’s interpretation of him as simply a prudish and manipulative didact who wants to circumvent liberal egoism and doesn’t want to allow people to find themselves or know the minds of other people. People caught up in enmity lose their identities, don’t they?

To conclude, I really do not believe that the stumbling block to intellectual education in America is in the legacy of Horace Mann or John Dewey. True, Dewey himself opposed teaching the classics, as did Mann. But my own reply to them would be that there are important resources in classical studies that, given their own political commitments, they would find useful. There are anti-intellectual currents in America, but laying those at the feet of Horace Mann or John Dewey, for me, strains credulity. While both did say that morals were more important than intellect or knowledge, they were not drowning out intellectual activity, nor were they inducting people into a moral cult. Clearly Mann and Dewey were educated people discussing highly intellectual things. Taylor worries that an emphasis on service learning or community involvement steers people into a particular moral point of view, and that what we ought to be doing is simply giving them a very high quality education and allow them to find their own paths to citizenship. But these

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1In this light, Taylor might pay more attention than he normally does to the second half of Federalist #51 where James Madison is worried about the vicious irreconcilable passions harbored by those who desire retributive justice more than freedom. It is exactly that sort of passion that could destabilize the constitution’s checks and balances.
things are not exclusive: many service learners and community activist stu-
dents also take difficult courses and perform very well.

Given these thoughts, I found myself wondering why raise an alarm and
call it Horace Mann? I propose we think of Horace Mann as the field of
adversity for an expanding political movement. A field of adversity is a
stumbling block, a scandal, which is blocking the way of something good.
Every successful political movement I can think of has been as much in-
debted to its stumbling block as to the good it endorsed, and often more so.
Where would Marx be without capitalism; where would Hayek be without
the welfare state and the conspiracy of socialist lawyers who are said to
undermine liberty? Taylor’s stumbling block is civic education. He hopes to
use it to mobilize zeal for a renegotiation of how we think of the aims of
education along the lines of a more individual-centered educational model.
My worry is that he reenacts many of the criticisms he levels at Horace
Mann: he is unhappy with the democracy he finds, he has a moral common
sense that differs from that of students who want social justice and would
prefer to drown theirs out with his own, and he wants to impose the partial
agendas of particular constituencies on everyone. The good I see in Taylor is
that he does want to uphold high standards of education and does see an
important role for the humanities in an increasingly utilitarian world that
threatens to subvert them. We can all agree with Taylor that intellectual
endeavor really is worth doing for its own sake and that familiarity with that
activity has a good chance of tempering the onslaught of an amoral market
upheaval of the most worthy things. I suspect that he and I could find many
points of contact in the actual curriculum we assign, though we might di-
verge in the aims we had in mind in assigning it. What I hope is that in his
next work he gives us a more robust account of the education he endorses
rather than the one he opposes.

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The general notion that people have an enduring character—stable patterns of presentation, thought, and action—extends back for centuries, for millennia. As a concept, personality has a long and rich tradition in scholarship, largely to direct our understanding of political leadership. The examples begin with the Georges’ psychobiography of Woodrow Wilson, but also include, among others, Walter Langer on Hitler, Erik Erikson on Luther, Vamik Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz on Kamil Attaturk, among many other examples. Recently, interest in personality has been applied to those who engage in acts of terrorism, hoping to find answers to the question, “what kind of person would do that?” But, over the years, reliance on personality to account for the actions, and inactions, of everyday citizens has been sporadic, largely centering on single traits, such as Authoritarianism.

Part of this limited exploration reflects the substantial reliance on survey research to probe what the public knows of the various candidates for leadership positions, the issues, current circumstances, and their attitudes towards each of these and more. Hence, even with the extended length uniquely available in the American National Election Series (ANES), adding personality measures has proven to be a tough sell. Once the necessary measures to ascertain where people stand on the issues of the day, what they think, and feel, about the various candidates about various institutions and groups, what they make of current conditions and more are identified, it becomes imperative to make the most economical use of what little time/space remains. But fully exploring personality often demands a broad and lengthy array of items. As Jeffrey Mondak notes, one of the more carefully developed and vetted inventories, the battery developed by Paul Costa Jr. and Robert McRae, includes some 240 items to measure the “Big Five” Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Emotional Stability (more commonly and, more aptly, labeled Neuroticism).

Few political scientists will find attractive a project that mandates adding 240 items to their questionnaires. In so far as personality entered into research on the public, it entered largely by focusing on particular traits. The research tradition on authoritarianism, for example, has been in place for over sixty years and has produced a rich literature. More recent work in this vein has explored such traits as social dominance orientation, social conformity, trait aggressiveness, and of course, racism, both implicit and blatant.
Two developments have lead to another approach, the approach that Jeffrey Mondak takes up in his fine lucid book, Personality and the Foundations of Political Behavior. Over many years, following a tradition largely begun by Louis Thurstone and continued by Raymond Cattell, psychologists have attempted to develop comprehensive batteries that would identify the stable primary traits that provide an all encompassing mapping of personality. Additionally, though many versions of the “Big Five” batteries are necessarily large, resulting from the number of traits needed to be comprehensive with sufficient numbers of items so as to satisfy psychometric standards, recent work in psychology has developed shorter inventories. One such battery requires 44 items to define the five traits that make up the “Big Five.” And even more enticing for political scientists is that two ten item inventories have become available.

Jeffrey Mondak makes use of these briefer personality inventories in three different surveys to explore the role of personality on the major features of political behavior. His book contains separate chapters on political informing (such as media usage), on attitudes, values and other dispositions, and on political participation in its various guises. Some of the “Big Five” traits are shown, in multiple tests across the three studies, to account for variations in a rather broad array of political behaviors. Mondak also explores some of the possible interactions between these traits. Most notable of these findings is the robust effect of Openness to Experience across a wide array of the indices of political behavior examined, but especially attention to and discussion of politics. And the impact of Conscientiousness on ideological orientation and moral traditionalism. A full description of the many fascinating results is beyond the limits of this review. Suffice it to say that this book is essential reading for students and scholars of political behavior. It is a most welcome addition to the corpus. This book fully achieves Mondak’s ambition to bring to center stage the importance of individual differences in political behavior.

I hope Mondak’s book will encourage others to execute the research to attack some issues that lie awaiting. The Big Five are defined at a high level of abstraction. Each of the Big Five traits is thought to have six sub-facets. For example, Emotional Stability (through most of its history labeled Neuroticism, and now sometimes labeled, Natural Reactions) has the following facets: Anxiety, Angry-Hostile, Moodiness, Self-Consciousness, Self-Indulgence, and, Sensitivity to Stress. Similarly the other four traits have their specific six sub-facets. Recent work argues that research at the level of these facets is more productive than at the grander trait levels. That remains to be firmly established.

This tradition of personality is very much an “outside-in” approach. Self descriptions are used to identify how people see themselves, and others.
In neuroscience the research is more “inside-out.” That is, how do baseline differences in neural systems generate individual differences. Thus, for example, Jeffrey Gray argues that his Behavioral Inhibition System may have different baseline responsiveness across individuals. Hence, those with a high baseline responsiveness to novelty and threat will be low on Neuroticism while those with a low baseline responsiveness to such stimuli will be high. Marvin Zuckerman’s Psychobiology of Personality is but one example (the publications of Charles Carver offer yet another). The merging of these two approaches has but barely begin.

Lastly, what also remains is the integration of the single trait research on such traits as Social Dominance Orientation, Need for Cognition, and the aforementioned Authoritarianism with the all-inclusiveness of the Big Five (and its many sub-facets). All that lies before us. Mondak’s fine volume provides just what it claims, a foundation on which further explorations can build.

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In The Trouble with Unity, Cristina Beltrán explores the complicated and seemingly contradictory message of modern Latino politics movements: that unity is strength, but that the Latino community is not monolithic and includes a wide diversity of voices. The logical tension created by the reality of diversity combined with a desire to be unified has had important implications for the Chicano and Puerto Rican civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the 2006 immigrant rights marches, and continues to have implications for current Latino electoral politics as well. She argues that while the Leviathan-like “sleeping giant” of the Latino electorate may be a disingenuous myth, the power of the Latino community is still available to influence policymaking through temporary coalitions, as evidenced by the marches of 2006. Beltrán encourages readers to embrace Latino diversity and to recognize the value of ongoing discussions and redefinitions of what is Latino. She writes, “Approaching Latinidad as action—as something we do rather than something we are—this definition sees Latino politics as inherently coalitional” (p. 19).

Beltrán contextualizes her theory through discussion of the three major historical points noted above. For those familiar with the history of the
Chicano and Puerto Rican civil rights movements, Chapter 3 will generate nods of recognition. The internal dissent and particularly the pressure on Latinas to suppress their feminist agenda is well-traveled territory. But Beltrán nevertheless makes the material new by focusing on this struggle for unity in the face of clear empirical evidence to the contrary. She concludes that “the movements’ fundamental flaw was not their specific instances of sectarianism and exclusion—it was the assumption that closure was itself a goal to be achieved” (p. 73). Beltrán references Jean-Jacques’ Rousseau’s theories about the power of non-deliberative democratic encounters as a preferable alternative to debate and discussion aimed at generating an unnatural unity. In other words, inclusive festivals and other civic spectacles can bring a community together. Thus, “[t]he fiestas, flor y cantos, marches, rallies, sit-ins, takeovers, and other mass gatherings of the late 1960s and early 1970s can all be seen as employing a Rousseauian conception of political community” (p. 93). By coming together to read movement poetry, to speak Spanish together, and simply celebrate being part of the broader Latino community, these encounters created unity. Rather than fighting over what constituted Latinidad, this allowed Latinos to feel Latinidad.

Perhaps because the 2006 immigrant marches are still so recent and still being dissected and analyzed, I found Chapter 5 the most thought-provoking. Beltrán argues that most observers miss the true significance of the event:

[m]easuring the success of immigrant action in terms of future participation in the electoral process, xenophobic backlash, replicability . . . or immediate legislative “results” drastically limits our understanding of the demonstrations’ significance. Such circumscribed analysis misses much of what was democratically distinctive and politically consequential about noncitizens laying claim to the political realm (pp. 131-132).

The noncitizen marchers “were actualizing a power they did not yet have” (p. 131), sacrificing “their already-uncertain safety in order to demand dignity and public recognition” (p. 139). At the same time, their peaceful demonstrations were paired with a threat: that they were outraged and frustrated, and that they would take further action (“Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote”) if their voices were not heard.

Were the marches a demonstration of a feeling of inclusion, or a request for inclusion, reflecting the very strong tradition of protest in the U.S. politics (and in the Latino community)? Or were they a demonstration of a lack of inclusion and anger at being criminalized and unable to otherwise exert political power? At the same time, the marchers themselves did not agree on what immigration reform should look like; they were united by their opposition to HR4437. Negative power (i.e., the power to block pro-
posed legislation) is a far cry from positive power (the power to shape new immigration legislation). How far can one go with a coalition that exists for the former? She notes that “[T]he 2006 protests were not an expression of organic Latino community simply waiting to be uncovered but, rather, and example of diverse and mediated publics” (p. 148). Thus, while supporters of immigrant rights may (understandably) criticize the Obama administration and other political actors for not moving more quickly on immigration reform, that criticism does not sit so well when one is reminded that even the 2006 marchers did not agree on what should be done. Is the lack of policy movement on this issue then the result of continued Latino disempowerment, or of the need for the deliberative process to complete its course?

In another thoughtful section, Beltrán notes that many participants argued that their role as laborers made them worthy of better treatment. Yet, this equating of labor with a call for inclusion may have had counterproductive results. Manual labor performed by undocumented immigrants is of value precisely because it is so disposable and endless. Thus, the focus on their economic contributions emphasized the perception of undocumented immigrants “as subjects of little worth or individuation” (p. 152). Further, how can equal rights be due to those being valued for their willingness “to occupy a subject position?” Instead, Beltrán notes, it encourages those who benefit from their labor as well as those who feel threatened by them (because they believe undocumented workers take American jobs and drive down wages) to continue to think of them as inferior.

Returning to her original theme, Beltrán closes with a call to reconsider, in three ways, our conceptions of Latinidad. Building on feminist and queer theory, she encourages readers to embrace “the instability and incompleteness of the category ‘Latino’” (p. 161). She challenges us to think of Latino interests as “multiple, crosscutting, and periodically opposed to one another” (p. 163). And finally, in a section which she admits verges on the poetic and abstract, she suggests thinking of Latinidad as rhizomatic rather than arboreal—as a horizontal stem that puts out lateral shoots and has no center, as opposed to tree-like and rigid: “Random and proliferating, a rhizomatic reading of Latino pan-ethnicity finds value in its capacity to be decentered, opportunistic, and expansive” (p. 167).

With a strong underlying structure drawing on classic and modern political theory, *The Trouble with Unity* may prove challenging reading for those without a strong theory background. Yet, the basic message—that Latino political unity is problematic and often illusory—is clearly stated. As such, the book is thought provoking and at times alarming. Overall, Beltrán has produced a volume that is critical of artificial and silencing demands for unity by Latino political leaders while also hopeful about the ability of
Latinos to come to consensus on policy options. The degree to which these two positions are compatible is open to debate.

This book challenges scholars in many ways, and is sure to be widely read and discussed by both political theorists and Latino politics specialists. Beltrán’s ideas about how to think about the 2006 marches and about *Latinidad* more generally are compelling and profound. *The Trouble with Unity* is destined to have a major impact on how Latino politics scholars think about unity.

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Questions about the electoral fate and policy impact of openly lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender politicians speak to vital issues of democratic representation. Knowing how permeable U.S. political institutions are, and how much room there is for minorities to advance remedies to long-standing inequities, helps us measure political inclusivity. *Out and Running* is important for these reasons, and particularly because it locates these questions in the substantial body of literature that examines ways of enhancing the representation and policy impact of other historically marginalized populations, especially women and ethno-racial minorities. Building on a substantial career of exploring LGBT politics, Donald Haider-Markel asks whether there are barriers to the election of sexual minority candidates for electoral office; and whether their success in gaining legislative seats has an impact on public policy. In formulating answers, he draws on an extraordinary range of descriptive information and quantitative data, including a vast storehouse of material he has gathered himself.

The book shows that open sexual minority membership in U.S. legislatures has grown substantially since the early 1990s, though it reaches fair levels of representivity in only a tiny number of jurisdictions. In assessing impediments, Haider-Markel draws on surveys of national and state-specific populations, finding that even today an important minority of around 25 percent of voters would resist supporting an openly lesbian or gay candidate. And as he points out, there are few groups in America that are the target of as much affective enmity as sexual minorities (measured by “thermometer” scores), which cannot avoid playing a role in most electoral districts, particu-
larly with a Republican Party still dominated by candidates and organizers prepared to marshal homophobic sentiment.

He supplements these findings with a quantitative analysis of data he gathered on state legislative elections in ten states from 1992 to 1996, and with qualitative interpretation of responses to questions he posed to LGBT candidates themselves in 2003-04. He finds that they fare relatively well in those districts they run in, with no discernible disadvantage accruing to their sexual orientation, and sometimes a real leg up in access to supportive LGBT networks. However, they have to choose their districts carefully, and typically do so armed with an unusually strong résumé. The fact that they do well leads Haider-Markel, at times, to conclude that they face no unusual hurdles, though most of the time he acknowledges that the need for very particular strategic calculation reveals a playing field that is (with only a handful of exceptions) far from level. He adds to this general picture some useful specifics, pointing out disturbing indications of persistent voter fears that LGBT candidates will be focused only on one issue area, and that voters may still prefer that gay/lesbian candidates remain “private” about their sexual orientation rather than making it clear from the outset. These are not particularly solid conclusions, but they reinforce for me the still-widespread sentiment that discussing sexual diversity is tantamount to talking publicly about private life, and that anyone committed to change on this front is not likely to be serious about issues of real importance.

Do sexual minority legislators make a difference? Here too, the book artfully draws on rich interpretative detail as well as quantitative data. Echoing an approach adopted in some of his earlier work, Haider-Markel sets out detailed case studies of legislative action by openly-lesbian/gay politicians in six well-chosen states. Chronicling the inside maneuvering entailed in securing policy gains or preventing anti-gay setbacks risks overstating the role of legislators and understating the influence of movement activists outside. Still, in the complex institutional settings that are such a hallmark of American politics, knowledgeable strategizing by those operating within legislative environments is essential, and Haider-Markel serves us well by recounting these stories.

The overall message here, reinforced by an analysis of impressive data sets that include LGBT-related legislative bills introduced and passed between 1992 and 2007 across all states, is that having seats at the table makes an important difference. This is congruent with findings for women and African-American legislators, though the impact of “descriptive representation” is stronger for sexual minorities. As Haider-Markel suggests, this may be due in part to the widespread agreement on formal policy priorities within the broader LGBT movement (despite evidence to the contrary in many academic debates), major shifts in public opinion, and the especially
important educative role that sexual minority politicians play in giving visibility to the issues at stake. I would also add to this the fact that so many policy struggles over LGBT issues have entailed formal and explicit discrimination, and have not raised the prospect of significant public expenditures.

The only significant area in which this book’s analysis is less compelling is in exploring whether an increase in direct LGBT representation produces a legislative backlash. There is no doubt that gains in visibility and policy have produced concerted responses from opponents inside and beyond legislative environments, and Haider-Markel eventually points to that. However, rather too much ink is spilt prior to that point in exploring the less plausible view that the election of openly-gay or lesbian politicians directly leads to backlash.

In other places, the clarity and nuance of the argument is a little obscured by the number of distinct surveys referred to, and the large number of explanatory variables. Haider-Markel is admirably cautious in reporting on the findings of other scholars, and in the conclusions he extracts from surveys of his own and others’ making. But there are times when we might wish him to step further back from the quantitative analytical detail and offer more distilled views.

One area in which somewhat more might have been said is the extent to which “intersectional” location poses additional challenges to sexual minority politicians. Haider-Markel does compare women and men, but does not explore (systematically or anecdotally) the prospects of LGBT politicians who are also members of ethno-racial minorities. He acknowledges the need for research on this in his conclusion, though some attention to the extent to which sexual minority status in mainstream politics is still widely read as “white” in other parts of the book would have been illuminating.

I hesitate to raise a critical note about quantitative indicators, in light of Haider-Markel’s herculean work in building data-sets. That said, it is unfortunate that the primary index used for conservative religiosity is affiliation to specific denominations. This is far better than nothing, and may well be the only measure available for the kind of analysis used in the book, but some additional commentary on the limitations of this approach (and specifically on the underrepresentation of U.S. religious conservatism that this measure produces) would have been helpful.

This does not detract from the great helpfulness of Out and Running, and the impressive work behind it. It is an admirable example of combining quantitative and qualitative analysis in addressing vitally important questions about the democratic inclusiveness of the American republic.

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Congressional scholars in the last few decades have spent much time and effort exploring and evaluating theories of legislative decision making and the resultant policy outcomes. This book takes up those issues, following directly in the tradition of partyless models of supermajoritarian politics posited by Keith Krehbiel and by David Brady and Craig Volden. The author is also strongly influenced by David Mayhew’s analysis of the consequences of divided versus unified government. These perspectives are juxtaposed throughout against viewpoints that, in one way or another, see parties as important actors in shaping legislative behavior and outcomes.

In some instances Saeki confronts the pre-Mayhew work by Sundquist, Fiorina, and others that contended that divided government was a consistent source of policy gridlock in the national government. (He adopts the persuasive Krehbielian definition of gridlock on a policy as failure to replace the status quo.) Contrary to those views, Saeki argues that divided government is not consequential, and that gridlock is mainly due to the president’s veto and the Senate filibuster. He also takes on the perspective of proponents of partisan theories, personified mainly by the work of Cox and McCubbins, concluding that parties matter little beyond the effects of the preferences of their members.

The book begins with a very brief consideration of the theoretical matters I have just mentioned, followed in the next chapter by a discussion of analysts’ efforts to measure legislative productivity and whether those efforts adequately capture the issue of gridlock. Then Saeki explores the implications of the supermajoritarian theories and of Cox and McCubbins’s partisan cartel theory. For each perspective he infers a “gridlock interval” in which change in policy status quos will be blocked. Then in Chapter 4, he develops empirical models to analyze the theoretical implications of the gridlock intervals. The focus is on the fate of ADA-supported and -opposed bills and the change in the aggregate of those outcomes from one Congress to another. Saeki’s analysis leads him to conclude that the evidence is more consistent with the supermajoritarian perspective than the party cartel view.

The next chapter employs an alternative supermajoritarian model, depicting the preferences of pivotal veto players in a two-dimensional plane, based on the two dimensions of the Poole-Rosenthal NOMINATE procedure. Saeki uses the NOMINATE scores to measure the preferences of the veto and filibuster pivots and the House median, and the Mean Winning Coordinate (MWC, defined below) to measure the status quo on legislation for a Congress. All four veto players must support a proposal for it to pass, and the proposals that meet that condition are in the intersection of their
preferences (called the winset). The implication of this analysis is that when the winset is large, policy change will be easier to achieve. The final substantive chapter addresses the major substantive concern of cartel theory: negative agenda control, or the ability of the majority party to protect policies it favors by being able to block legislation that would successfully alter those policies from coming to the floor. Here Saeki’s analysis concludes that the median of the majority party does not control what gets to the floor; rather the dominant influence is the floor median.

In evaluating Saeki’s theory and analysis, I will first note that the same year that Mayhew published his divided-government analysis I was on record in support of the view that divided government was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for gridlock between the president and Congress. Furthermore, I think the supermajoritarian analysts, including Saeki in this work, have made a convincing case that the veto and the filibuster have a powerful impact on the amount of policy stability. However, I would note that it is not necessary to accept the assumption that parties are inconsequential in the legislative process to support these conclusions, and the acceptance of those conclusions is not, therefore, evidence of the correctness of the assumption. Thus my concerns regarding this analysis mostly involve matters of measurement and of interpretation of evidence, rather than the claims about the theoretical consequences of supermajoritarian institutions or divided government.

The issues of measurement mostly revolve around the ways in which the author employs the various Poole-Rosenthal measures. Saeki correctly recognizes that decisions on specific legislation depend not only on the preferences of the floor or party medians, but also on the position of the status quo. However, when doing the empirical analysis of agenda control in Chapter 6 he assumes that a single status quo point can be attributed to an entire Congress, and, as noted above, he measures that location by the Mean Winning Coordinate (i.e., the “mean value of the DW-NOMINATE scores of winning outcomes on roll calls”; p. 109) for the previous Congress.

I view this as seriously problematic. First, many proposals in a Congress seek to change policies that were adopted further in the past than the immediately preceding Congress. Thus for those cases a measure of the status quo from that previous Congress, even if that measure were valid, would be irrelevant. Furthermore, the use of the scores in this way imposes the most powerful possible interpretation of unidimensionality on the NOMINATE measure. That is, it assumes, in effect, a single “Downsian” type policy dimension in which the ordering of members is identical on every issue, and that these positions are measured by the NOMINATE scores. I think that there is a great deal of research now available that demonstrates that this interpretation of NOMINATE scores is not support-
able. The extant work shows, among other things, that when the roll-call agenda is divided into different issues, and separate NOMINATE scores are computed within each issue area, there is substantial variation in the ordering of the members from one issue to another. This problem affects most of the empirical analyses in the book, and thus leaves the reader uncertain about the validity of the empirical conclusions.

However, even where this issue is not relevant, there are problems with evaluation of evidence. Also in Chapter 6, Saeki presents data on final passage votes on bills from 23 congresses on which party majorities were opposed, in order to assess partisan agenda control. The data show that 92.5 percent of the bills were favored by the majority party and only 7.5 percent were favored by the minority. While Saeki is correct in noting that the minority-favored percent is not zero as the most pristine interpretation of cartel theory would predict, the percentage is a lot closer to that than the 50-50 split that the partyless theories would seem to anticipate. Indeed, Saeki says: “The findings in this chapter mainly support a disproportionate, if not unconditional, majority party’s negative agenda power ex ante on the floor” (p. 116). Yet in the final chapter he refers to party government as a “phantom” and “heightened partisanship” as a “façade” (p. 118), and contends that the answer to the question of whether parties influence policy output is “no” or at the very least ‘not that much.’” (p. 122). This view seems to be at variance with what the limited amount of dependable evidence offered in the book shows. So, in conclusion, I recommend this book for the useful and illuminating presentation of a variety of theoretical issues, but cannot endorse the validity of most of the analysis or the conclusions regarding the competing theories.

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Bruce Ackerman has legitimate claim to membership in the dwindling group of Public Intellectuals. In The Decline and Fall of the American Republic he expresses his concerns systematically, identifies dangers to continued constitutionalism, and sets forth proposals for remedies.

Throughout “most of our history, constitutional thought exhibited a healthy skepticism about the Philadelphia achievement,” but triumphalism now prevails. Discarding his own triumphalism, he identifies flaws in
America’s inherited system, and questions whether we can “afford another generation of triumphalism” (pp. 2-3). He sees, in a classically tragic sense, that the very same features that enabled such presidents as Lincoln and FDR to become “credible tribunes of the People,” now conspire to make the presidency “into a vehicle for demagogic populism and lawlessness” (p. 4).

Congress gets no free pass, but he views the executive as more threatening. Nor will he single out individuals, asking whether “John Yoo deserves criminal punishment for writing the justly notorious ‘torture memos.’” Instead, he will “be exploring the institutional conditions that made these memos possible. How was an untested young academic, with notoriously extreme views, selected to occupy such an important position?” Did his post “create perverse incentives to tell the president precisely what he wanted to hear?” (p. 6).

Traditional “gate keepers” have withered with the decline of the press, the rise first of radio, then of television, and most recently and significantly of the Internet. The result welcomes outsider, insurgent, candidates with consultants manipulatively shaping campaigns.

Although Obama is moderate, “stealth candidates” have become possible (p. 21). He names no names, but later does note that “George W. Bush was elected as a mainstream moderate,” not as “a proud representative of the Republican right wing” (p. 32). Instead of conforming to the polls, Bush adopted a “manipulative strategy,” that encourages demagoguery and “extremism” (p. 25). Regardless, he believes that “both Bush and Obama have continued the centralizing path blazed during the Clinton years” (p. 38). Not personalities, but institutions have brought “Extremism. Irrationality. Unilateralism” [sic] (p. 40). “The next insurgent president may not possess the same sense of constitutional restraint,” that he ascribes to Obama (p. 41).

Certainly, open manipulation is demagoguery, but Ackerman seems almost to be denying the obligation of a republican leader to educate the public as well as to reflect its views. Does reflecting the public will, whatever that may be at any given time, bind conscientious leaders to carry out the worst, and least-informed, of the public’s impulses?

Many factors, in addition to signing statements, have brought today’s troubles. Primaries have “displaced the Electoral College, allowing extremist candidates to mobilize true believers; presidents rely on consultants to manipulate public opinion; the separation of powers concentrates power in the White House and politicizes the operation of a massive bureaucracy” (p. 43). The military has become a political power through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who now speaks for the services, rather than acting to coordinate them (p. 46-56). The national security adviser may now be a military officer, and “civilian control is losing its base in sociological
reality” (p. 59). “Wars” once had finite endings. The new “pseudo wars,”
such as the “War on Terror,” can never end, and the extra executive power
they bring will never be relinquished, creating perpetual “government by
emergency” (pp. 72-73). The role of presidential lawyers in the Office of
Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice (OLC) and White House Coun-
sel (WHC) has become pernicious. Their opinions pre-empt some of the
Court’s role. Moreover, during the recent Bush administration, “a single
White House lawyer, David Addington, came to dominate the process,”
without even being counsel to the president” (p. 92).

He suggests open primaries (p. 123); compacts among states to give
their electoral votes to the popular-vote winner (pp. 136-140); senatorial up-
or-down confirmation of all leading staffers (pp. 152-155); a “Supreme
Executive Tribunal” (pp.143-145) to review OLC and WHC opinions (a
nine-member body, staggered twelve-year terms requiring Senate confirm-
ation, with each president nominating three members after each inaugura-
tion); restrictions on the military and on emergency powers (pp. 159-168);
“Internet News Vouchers” and a “National Endowment for Journalism” to
energize critical and objective reporting (pp. 132-135); and, in a paean to
deliberative polling, a national “Deliberation Day” (pp. 127-132). Ackerman
recognizes that this is too formidable to be an agenda. Discussion is his goal.

Space limits us to consideration only of Deliberation Day. Following
television debate among candidates, voters would volunteer, and be selected,
to participate in small discussion groups. The results, reported nationwide,
would “operate as a powerful check on a presidential politics of unreason”
(p. 129). Would that it were so. Ackerman and a colleague are committed to
deliberative polling (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004; Fishkin 2009), but its
techniques have inherent flaws, beginning with the volunteering and the
selection. It may be useful, as Ackerman contends, but cannot be reliable as
a true reflection of public opinion (see Page and Jacobs, forthcoming).

It is too easy to design sessions to shape, rather than assess, public
opinion. I reported as a participant on one such exercise, purportedly objec-
tive but funded by the Peterson Foundation, a billion-dollar enterprise de-
signed openly to create deficit hysteria and undermine Social Security and
Medicare (Skidmore 2010).

Ackerman’s book is valuable, and serious. His concerns are legitimate,
yet even he seems to be ambivalent. He cautions against “hacking away at
presidential power indiscriminately.” The presidency, he says, may have
become a serious threat to the republic, but “the president also remains an
indispensable tribune of the American people” (pp. 11-12). “Great presiden-
cies have been forces for democratic renewal” (p. 119). One author, with
good reason, titled his work on presidents, The Ferocious Engine of Democ-
rency (Riccards 1997).
An old admonition says, “be careful what you wish for.” Unquestionably, an energetic executive presents dangers, but it also presents the only possibility of democratic renewal. Periods of reform in America—however necessary to adapt to corporate industrialism, technological advances, globalism, and the like—are rarely possible and have happened infrequently. They require the right mix of conditions, plus a vigorous president. When either is absent, there is stagnation, or worse, regression.

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Most scholars who have examined the size and reach of national governments in the United States and Europe have concluded that the American separation of powers, which encourages conflict between the President and Congress, has resulted in a weak state. Not so, argues Sean Farhang. On the contrary, he asserts, the interbranch competition for control of national policy that has led Congress to favor private actors over federal bureaucrats has generated a potent army of informal bureaucrats. Congress, wary of bureaucracies responsive to presidential influence, has deliberately placed the implementation of numerous laws in the hands of private litigants. The result, according to Farhang, is creation of “private enforcement regimes,” or a “litigation state” (p. 10) that is anything but weak.

The litigation state is typified by congressional authorization of “radically decentralized intervention [in policy implementation] by an army of litigants and lawyers licensed by the state and paid bounty by defendants at the state’s command” (p. 214). It reflects “a different form of state-building” (p. 214) in which private lawsuits are substituted for administrative power.
Private litigants and their attorneys, in concert with the judiciary, in effect become instruments of federal policy-making.

Farhang demonstrates his thesis by detailing the process involved in the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA). That part of the statute prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. As background for his discussion, Farhang notes that suits alleging job discrimination constitute the second largest category of federal court cases (prisoners’ suits hold pride of place), averaging 20,000 a year. The huge rise in the number of such suits since the 1960s has outpaced by far the overall rise in tort litigation, and Farhang attributes the rise in large part to the CRA’s establishment of a private enforcement regime. Only two percent of all job discrimination cases are brought by the government; the other 98 percent are taken to court by private petitioners. Farhang views CRA as encouraging such litigation by providing that defendants must pay successful plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and entitling the plaintiffs to monetary damages in excess of the actual harm they have suffered.

The CRA’s fees and damages provisions were born of a compromise between congressional Democrats and their more business-oriented Republican counterparts. The civil-rights minded Democrats, eager to emulate a number of states’ equal employment laws, hoped to empower the newly-created Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to investigate and prosecute cases of alleged employment discrimination. The resultant “administrative enforcement framework” (p. 99) would have provided no private right of prosecution. The mid-1960s were, of course, the era of the Johnson presidency, and conservative Republicans worried that a highly politicized EEOC would be excessively tough on employers. Led by Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen, they opted instead for enforcement through private lawsuits. Pro-civil rights congressional leaders such as Hubert Humphrey agreed, on the condition that the bill contained provisions for attorneys’ fees and fee-shifting from successful plaintiffs to employers. What happened, in short, was that “conservative Republicans, whose support for civil rights legislation could not be expected unconditionally, exercised their pivotal legislative powers to derail liberal efforts at bureaucratic state-building, imposing private litigation as an alternative instrument of regulation” (p. 118).

It was a compromise that liberals recognized as inescapable but which left them unhappy. To their surprise, and presumably to the equal surprise of Republicans, the private enforcement regime proved to be a powerful tool. Federal courts in the second half of the 1960s and the 1970s were friendly to civil rights claims, and by the early 1970s lawyers’ fees from civil rights litigation were a major source of funding for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as well as newer groups such as the Native American
Rights Fund and the Women’s Law Fund. Farhang quotes Mary Derfner of the Lawyers’ Committee as commenting, “Fee awards made civil rights law a financially viable practice” (p. 150). That phenomenon, coupled with the disinterest of the Nixon administration in forwarding civil rights, led congressional liberals to embrace the concept of the fee-shifting mechanism and include it in laws designed to facilitate school desegregation and voting rights litigation (the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act and the 1972 Emergency School Aid Act).

A series of Supreme Court decisions in 1989 made it harder for workers to prove job discrimination. The years preceding had been notable for the Reagan administration’s unwillingness to pursue job discrimination claims. The response of the Democrat-controlled Congress to both phenomena was the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reversed most of the Court’s rulings and added the kinds of additional monetary damages and jury trial provisions in job discrimination suits that made litigation more attractive. Plaintiffs and their attorneys could now envision a greater likelihood of success and higher monetary awards. In the six years after passage of the 1991 Act, private job discrimination suits increased by 211 percent. Farhang notes that some of those suits were brought under the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), but the great bulk clearly were CRA litigation.

Farhang provides a careful detailing of the dynamics that led to the final version of the 1964 and 1991 CRAs. He also looks briefly at the private enforcement regimes established by the Taft-Hartley Act and the 1970 and 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, and mentions in passing similar provisions in the ADA, the ADEA, and the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. The contribution of his volume, then, is to provide strong evidence for his assertion that creation of personal enforcement regimes is “a different form of state-building” (p. 214). The substitution of private lawsuits for administrative enforcement has resulted in “a potent strengthening of the American state’s capacity to address job discrimination” (p. 215) and what it views as ills in other aspects of life. Scholars will no doubt have different opinions about whether private litigation, however enabled by the state, deserves to be called state-building. Farhang’s work is a valuable and intriguing contribution to the discussion.

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There are two important parts to this book. The first, taking up the bulk of the analysis, is a criticism of the (primarily Anglo-American) social science of the past generation or so. The second grows from the first, and is a plea for a more participatory democratic practice than that promoted by the politics and political science under consideration. Both projects are important, well conceived, and intelligently pursued.

Bevir identifies two strands of what he calls modernist social science. The first is neoliberal, and it grew from economic and rational choice theory and was most influential in the Thatcher/Reagan years. The second is socio-logically and institutionally informed, communitarian in contrast to the individualism of neoliberalism, and informs the left-liberalism of New Labour in Great Britain (and, presumably to some degree, although it is the not the focus of his analysis, of Clinton style liberalism in the United States).

Bevir’s contribution in this book is less his identification of these schools of political science than in the way he locates them in both a particular intellectual history and a political practice, and then positions himself to criticize them from the perspective of participatory democracy.

For all their differences, the left and right versions of modernist social science share, in Bevir’s view, four fundamental qualities. First, they both identify the need to understand contemporary politics as a more decentralized process of governance than can be explained with a simple and unified conception of government. That is, they both understand that political power is much more diffused, fragmented, and dispersed than any theory of a unified state can possibly convey. Second, and as a result of this first discovery, they recognize that fragmented, dispersed power makes it impossible to explain more than a modest amount of the governing process by appealing to centralized institutions of representative democracy. Third, both schools of modernist social science develop “formal and ahistorical models, correlations, mechanisms, and processes” (p. 3) to explain how governance works. And finally, both positions privilege the power of expertise over the self-governance of citizens.

Bevir agrees that political power is fragmented and dispersed among large numbers of governmental and non-governmental individuals, institutions and networks. He also agrees that this demonstrates the degree to which representative governmental institutions fail to actually control a significant bulk of political life. It is the last two qualities of modernist social science to which he objects. To challenge the formal and ahistorical quality of modernist social science, he offers a “genealogy” of its development. Genealogies, he writes, “denaturalize beliefs and actions that others
think are natural” (p. 10). In the Nineteenth Century, historical and even teleological understandings of the liberal state provided the conventional social science wisdom, through which the centralized institutions of representative democracy were viewed as the source of political power, authority and legitimacy. Bevir’s genealogy places modernist theories both in the intellectual context challenging the conventional wisdom of this older political science, and in the needs and political values of actual political movements (e.g., Thatcherism and New Labour). His purpose is to dispel the illusion of scientific universalism and historical transcendence common to both strands of modernism.

Readers may not find Bevir’s historical critique of modernist social science entirely unique, but they are likely to find it as thorough and careful and well developed as anything they can think to compare it with. It is two other sets of claims, however, that set his analysis apart. The first is his claim that modernist social science not only studies and describes contemporary politics, but that it significantly shapes this politics as well. Bevir convincingly traces the modernist intellectual sources of both Thatcherism and New Labour, and the ways this scholarship influenced and even to an important degree created these political movements. Bevir clearly demonstrates how social science has itself become a significant political actor. The second claim is that both forms of modernist theory have actively discouraged the growth of democratic participation. Center-left liberals and New Labour sympathizers will not be surprised by Bevir’s democratic critique of neoliberalism, but they may be taken aback by the degree to which he accuses them of suffering from the same pathology as the neoliberals, that is, an attempt to replace the diminished authority of representative democratic institutions with the authority of expert opinion. Bevir is relentless in arguing that even left-liberal strategies aimed at consultation with broad constituencies and social networks are more about successful management then they are about helping citizens be more self-governing: “... the institutionalist discourse of networks and community is less a turn to participatory democracy than the imposition of a new form of expertise” (p. 177). Bevir’s advice to the left is that it should be less focused on the elite remediation of social injustice, and more focused on expanding opportunities for genuine democratic participation.

Thus, Bevir’s study of both the intellectual structure and political influence of modernist social science (a study much richer and more detailed than this brief review can fully convey) aims, ultimately, to promote a political vision of participatory democracy. He suggests that we need to replace the illusory ahistorical formalism of modernist social science with what he calls an “interpretative” social science that would “encourage a more participatory and dialogic response to the dilemmas facing representative democracy”
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(p. 252). His first project, historicizing and criticizing modernist social science, leads to his second project of promoting a more pragmatic and historicized (and less presumptuous) social science, all for the purpose of nurturing a more participatory democratic practice.

Although this second project receives less attention than the first in this book, there is enough for the reader to see the logic of Bevir’s position: that modernist social science copes with the reduced power and authority of representative democracy by appealing to various forms of expertise; and that instead, social science would do much better to think of ways of rescuing a diminished democratic practice. This is a powerful position, thoughtfully and carefully developed through Bevir’s broad and impressive scholarship. There are, of course, objections that can be raised. For example, there is probably a great deal more that needs to be said about Bevir’s too blanket condemnation of what he calls the “fallacy of expertise”; there is also a fairly deep literature both promoting and criticizing participatory democracy that Bevir will do well to confront more directly in future work. But issues such as these mustn’t distract us from recognizing the power of both Bevir’s scholarship and his argument. This is a challenging and instructive book for both political scientists and democratic theorists.

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Decisions of the Supreme Court are regularly accompanied by the publication of a concurring opinion. At first, such opinions may appear puzzling. Unlike a justice who authors a dissent because she disagrees with the majority’s resolution of a case, a justice who writes a concurrence agrees with the resolution, and usually with much of the rationale for the resolution. She merely offers additional commentary. Why would a justice who agrees with the majority’s resolution of a case choose to expand time and effort to write a concurrence? What is the status of these opinions, and what effect, if any, do they have on the development of law? To the extent that concurrences reveal something of the attitudes of their authors (who may be in a position to affect future decisions), surely those who must come before the Supreme Court (including lower court judges and litigants) ought to take some account of their content, if only for prudential reasons. Such anticipation, in turn, may undermine the authority and staying power of the majority
opinion—one reason for Chief Justice Marshall’s desire to replace seriatim opinions with a single Opinion of the Court. In short, understanding the impact of the Supreme Court in the American polity requires an understanding of concurring opinions.

Pamela Corley’s *Concurring Opinion Writing on the Supreme Court* is an important contribution in developing such an understanding. The book combines quantitative analysis with well-executed, qualitative case studies, and offers significant new insights into the decision to author a concurrence, as well as the impact that concurrences have on lower court compliance with decisions, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of its own precedents. This is a book that deserves to be widely read by those interested in understanding how justices of the Supreme Court are able to shape the legal landscape, and the extent to which they can do so in ways that go beyond casting votes and writing majority opinions.

The book is short, and consists of five chapters. The opening chapter provides an overview of current understandings of concurring opinions, and then quickly moves to outline the central analytical framework that underpins the remainder of the book. This framework revolves around a six-fold classification of concurrences into different types. The typology, which Corley derives from the literature, corresponds largely to the different purposes that justices may be attempting to serve in writing a concurrence. For example, an “expansive” concurrence seeks to broaden the holding or rationale of the majority opinion while a “doctrinal” concurrence disagrees with the majority’s rationale and substitutes an alternative justification for the result. As Corley argues persuasively, understanding concurrences requires sensitivity to these different purposes, because the circumstances that give rise to different types of concurrences vary, and the impact that concurrences have on the development of law may also depend on the type of concurrence issued.

With this classification scheme laid out, Chapter 2 turns to the question of why justices choose to write concurrences. The centerpiece of this chapter is an empirical analysis of cases decided during the 1986-89 terms. Consistent with the argument laid out in the previous chapter, Corley does not merely investigate which factors predict whether justices write concurrences (thus treating the decision to write a concurrence as a binary decision), but rather concentrates on establishing factors that predict which type of concurrence a justice is likely to write. The results demonstrate the importance of being sensitive to the type of concurrence a justice authors. For example, doctrinal concurrences are less likely if the majority coalition comprises a bare majority—perhaps an indication that justices are more reluctant to undermine a fragile opinion. In contrast, expansive concurrences (which, in a sense, reinforce an opinion) are unaffected by coalition size.
Chapter 3 moves beyond quantitative analysis to rich qualitative case studies based on the papers of justices Blackmun and Marshall. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how negotiations over the content of majority opinions play out among the justices, and how the potential for concurring opinions (and the desire to avoid them) affect this bargaining process. This chapter supplements the statistical analysis well. It demonstrates that opinion authors believe that the ultimate impact of their opinions depends in part on the presence (and absence) of concurrences. It also illustrates what opinions authors are willing (and not willing) to do to preempt them. Finally, the chapter allows readers to see some of the factors that drive the decision to publish a concurrence in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2 in the context of specific cases.

While the first part of the book considers the decision to write a concurrence, the last substantive chapter turns to the downstream effects of concurrences. The first part of the analysis focuses on lower courts, and investigates whether the presence of concurring opinions affects lower court “compliance” with Supreme Court opinions. Once again, the results confirm the importance of differentiating among different types of concurrences: While expansive concurrences are associated with higher levels of lower court compliance, doctrinal concurrences are associated with lower levels of compliance. In the second part of the chapter, Corley examines whether the presence of concurrences affects subsequent treatment of a decision by the Supreme Court itself. The results mirror those for lower court treatment of opinions. The book ends with a short concluding chapter.

There is much to like about this book. What is particularly significant (and not surprising, given the author’s previous work) is that the book makes a serious effort to move beyond traditional political science focus on the “direction” of Supreme Court decisions to a more nuanced understanding that pays attention to the actual content of opinions. Undoubtedly, legal scholars who engage in close textual analysis will still find the approach reductionist, but Corley’s work takes opinion content seriously and moves it to the center of rigorous, quantitative analysis of a large number of cases. In so doing, Corley demonstrates that quantitative approaches do not necessarily demand a binary approach in dealing with decisions. It is possible to employ richer measures of opinion content. More importantly, the results make clear that doing so can lead to significant new insights.

Naturally, as with any book, this book does not offer the final word on concurring opinions. In prioritizing a rich empirical approach to studying concurring opinions, the theoretical underpinnings of the book are often not fully developed. For example, while Corley demonstrates clearly that different kinds of concurring opinions are associated with different treatment of Supreme Court opinions by lower courts and even the Supreme Court itself,
the causal mechanisms that explain these patterns are not obvious. Do concurring opinions themselves affect subsequent legal discourse and expectations, and thus shape the law? Or are concurrences merely a by-product of a complex legal environment that also induces subsequent legal challenges and revision? Importantly, Corley is aware of these limitations, and is careful not to draw overly strong conclusions. In short, this book makes significant headway in understanding the origins and consequences of concurring opinions, while pointing the way for further theoretical and empirical development.

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Scott A. Bonn, in 178 pages, takes on a Herculean set of tasks: to integrate concepts from sociological theory and media studies to utilize in an integrated, interdisciplinary approach he calls “critical communications theory” to analyze both the manner in which the Bush administration sought to generate support for the 2003 war with Iraq and to assess the extent to which the administration engaged in immoral activity and state crimes as it set the stage, and then prosecuted the war. The two specific propositions being investigated are that: 1) the administration successfully engineered “moral panic” about Iraq; and 2) the Bush administration “perpetrated elite deviance or ‘wrongdoing’ . . . as well as state crimes and war crimes in their actions concerning Iraq.”

The author pursues his tasks eclectically, exposing the reader to relevant sociological and communications theory literature, woven together for a new framework with which to view the behavior of U.S. policy makers. He also seeks to forward empirical evidence that links the observation of others (commentators, practitioners, and academics), with content analysis of news coverage, and with public opinion polls. The work is rigorous, and there is much to read here.

There is also much to be frustrated about here. Particularly given the enormous literature in the field of international relations and in the political science discipline regarding the decision to go to war, and/or the domestic politics involved with going to war, those who read this effort from those vantage points should be greatly puzzled about the absence of input from those perspectives. This is not the just the vanity of the neglected: both
political science and the field of international politics offer substantial competing theoretical explanations for what the Bush Administration did and why. Ignoring those perspectives makes this scholarship epistemologically vulnerable, and nowhere more vulnerable than when (as in Chapter 7) the author begins to outline the “real” reasons why the Bush administration pursued the 2003 War.

As a political scientist and an international relations scholar (and one who vehemently opposed our decision to go to war), I could generate an alternative set of explanations to account for the Bush Administration’s actions, and ask the author to show compelling evidence that his are better than mine. I will forgo that exercise since the author has done substantial service in melding other perspectives, and should be judged on that aspect of the work. However, even then, troubling questions remain.

The foremost one is the evidence about how successful the Bush Administration was in engineering the “moral panic” that gave it the legitimacy to invade Iraq. Stubbornly clinging to the reader is the public opinion evidence cited by the author through the use of Gallup polls: before 9/11, before the attempt to engineer the moral panic, 52.5 percent of the public supported an invasion of Iraq; and immediately following 9/11, 73.9 percent did before the administration had the opportunity to engineer such panic. If the baseline is taken as 52.5 percent, Gallup shows that support for the war hovered around 58 percent (or only 6 points higher than before 9/11) one month before the invasion, a change that is virtually the same as sampling error. Could we call this successful engineering if it resulted in such minimal net gain? More important, these data do not suggest, especially given the baseline, that the so-called moral panic about Iraq was elite engineered. Certainly 9/11—which killed more U.S. civilians inside our own borders than the attack on Pearl Harbor—could account for the net gain in public opinion polls.

The arguments about the immorality and commission of state crimes ring far more true; yet, for those of us who have followed this sorry story, there doesn’t appear to be anything new here. The Administration lied about weapons of mass destruction and it concealed facts from the American public as it engaged in a “preemptive” war. We know all of this and probably don’t need new theory to uncover it.

What would be useful however is to provide strong explanation about whether or not these are actions unique to this administration, and if not, the general conditions under which they are repeated or avoided under similar circumstances in American politics. Iraq has not been the U.S.’s only preemptive war, neither is it the first time that a U.S. administration has lied or fabricated information to the American public (and the media gave it extensive coverage). Yet, neither can it be said that these are constants in
American politics: such behaviors have varied, and good theory should uncover the causal mechanisms of such variation. That’s what a political scientist may want here, more so than what is here.

That’s not to say that the book is not valuable and in many ways it is. Clearly, its documentation of the attempted “engineering” of public perspective on Iraq, whether or not it was successful, is fascinating and reveals very powerfully once more the extent to which the media and the public through the media are susceptible to the framing of stories by key political actors, and particularly when Administration voices drown out the minority that may question the evidence. Of course there is no substitute for direct experience and failure…two dynamics that are then personally witnessed by the media in Iraq and indirectly by an American public whose sons and daughters and wives and husbands bring the stories back from the war . . . that additional manipulation and media framing cannot overcome. This we learned in Vietnam and once more in Iraq, and may learn again in Afghanistan.

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