Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony

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Abstract

Individuals who are related to an entity such as a corporation sometimes claim that when they communicated with the entity lawyer, they honestly and reasonably believed that the lawyer represented them. Thus, they claim that the attorney-client privilege applies and protects their statements from disclosure even when the entity has waived its privilege with regard to the communications. Many courts have given privilege claims by entity individuals harsh treatment. These courts, in the interest of protecting the entity, have required individuals to make proofs beyond that required by the traditional definition of the attorney-client privilege. In addition, these courts have ignored the traditional approach to the recognition of an attorney-client relationship which requires giving value to the honest and reasonable belief of the person in the position of client. Courts have erred by creating these special rules to protect the entity in this situation. This approach has contributed to an environment in which lawyers often do not use their best efforts to dispel the confusion of entity individuals about the lawyer’s relationship to the individual and the protections afforded the communications. This is so even though the tenets of professional responsibility provide a background requirement for lawyers of honesty and forthrightness. Courts should apply the traditional definition of the attorney-client privilege and should honor the traditional approach to recognition of an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers can protect their entity clients by giving very clear warnings, often called Upjohn warnings, to the individuals. Individuals who are told that the lawyer does not represent them and who are told that communications with the lawyer are not privileged, will have a difficult time arguing that they honestly and reasonably believed that the lawyer represented them and that the communications are privileged. The warning preserves the entity’s right to control the disclosure of the communications. More important, however, the individual is dealt with forthrightly and not misled. Lastly, this conduct follows the teachings of the tenets of professional responsibility for lawyers.

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I. Introduction

An entity such as a corporation occasionally asks its lawyer to investigate a particular matter. Often the investigation requires the lawyer to interview employees, officers, directors, or other individuals related to the entity. The individuals interviewed may be high-ranking members of management if the matter the lawyer investigates relates to a high-level matter such as stock option granting activities. The lawyer may interview rank and file individuals who work on the loading dock if the lawyer is investigating the existence of a drug-dealing ring on the dock.

The lawyer, seeking to render the best possible representation to the entity client, wishes to obtain complete and unfettered disclosure by the individuals with whom the lawyer communicates. The more complete the disclosure, the better counsel the lawyer can give to his or her client, the entity.

The individual in this tripartite situation may be inclined to disclose all to the lawyer because the individual does not truly understand where the loyalties of the lawyer and the entity lie. The individual may view the entity, the lawyer, and the individual as on the same team just as they are with regard to the typical day-to-day happenings involving the entity. The individual may not understand that the attorney does not view the individual as a client. The individual may not understand that the attorney places the entity’s interest well above that of the individual. The individual may not realize that he or she has no right to block disclosure of his or her own communications with the attorney. The individual may not realize that statements made to the attorney ultimately
might be used against the individual by the entity or other parties such as the government in a criminal prosecution.

The lawyer could eliminate any confusion of roles by clearly explaining, in writing or otherwise, the situation to the individuals with whom the lawyer talks. A lawyer’s explanation to the individual in the tripartite situation has been referred to as a corporate *Miranda* warning or an *Upjohn* warning. In fact, the rules of professional

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   An essential component of the investigative process is the “*Upjohn* warning,” which clarifies to an employee being interviewed that the attorney is representing the corporation and not the individual. Establishing this relationship at the outset precludes the employees from reasonably asserting ownership of the privilege relating to interactions with in-house counsel.

   See also infra Section III.D. This recognition that the corporation’s lawyer could have communications with all sorts of individuals and the entity’s attorney-client privilege could protect those communications created an environment in which individuals speak with entity counsel and may not understand the role of the attorney, the role of the individual, and privilege rights of the entity and the individual. The *Upjohn* case did not deal with warnings or explanations about the lawyer’s role. It simply discussed the context in which explanation or warnings for the individual might be needed. Thus, the clarification of roles is sometimes called an *Upjohn* warning. See Lee Dunst & Daniel Chirlin, *A Renewed Emphasis on Upjohn Warnings*, *Mondaq*, Sept. 17, 2009, 2009 WLNR 18275146.

   The clarification or explanation is sometimes called a corporate *Miranda* warning in honor of *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). That case established that a person must be informed of his or her constitutional rights before any custodial interrogation can occur. An interrogation without informing the interrogated of constitutional rights violates the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. An attorney’s clarification in the entity context is, simply, analogous, but not truly related, to the criminal context of the *Miranda* case.


   Most recently, the White Collar Crime Committee of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Section established a Task Force to examine the issue of just what lawyers need to say. In July of 2009, the Task Force issued a report with recommended best practices which provides a suggested *Upjohn* warning along with recommended procedures. See *Upjohn Warnings: Recommended Best Practices When Corporate Counsel Interacts with Corporate Individuals*, ABA White Collar Crime Committee of the ABA’s
responsibility governing lawyer conduct require the lawyer in the tripartite situation to be honest and forthright.³

Yet, cases in which attorneys have been less than clear in their explanations or in which the attorneys cannot prove that they gave any clarification to the individuals with whom they dealt are anecdotal evidence that attorneys are not rigorous in their explanation of the implications of the tripartite situation to the individuals with whom they communicate.⁴ The lawyer’s desire to serve the entity client well by obtaining complete disclosure perhaps explains this behavior. Unfortunately, because attorneys want to provide the best possible representation to the entity clients who pay their fees, and thus because these attorneys want to obtain the fullest possible disclosure from the individuals, these attorneys have the incentive to give weak explanations or no explanation at all of the situation to the individuals regardless what the governing standards of professional conduct might suggest.⁵

Not infrequently in recent years, this tripartite relationship of entity, attorney, and individual has come under scrutiny by the courts. The judicial scrutiny does not arise from claims against attorneys for professional misconduct, however. Rather, the typical

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Criminal Justice Section, July 17, 2009
³ See infra Section VI.
⁴ See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (the court commented on the lack of explanation given even though the need for the explanation has been well-known for many years). See also United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009). In Ruehle, the Ninth Circuit noted that the District Court had found that the lawyers had not provided any sort of Upjohn or Miranda warning to the individual. The Ninth Circuit refused to declare that lower court finding “clearly erroneous.” Id. at 604. In fact, the District Court stated than even if the lawyers gave a warning, the warning described by the attorney was “woefully inadequate.” See United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
⁵ See Dunst & Chirlin, supra note 2; Jossen & Steiner, supra note 2. One lawyer who handles white-collar matters has said, “That particular tension is one of the most difficult things that any in-house counsel can manage.” See Steven Andersen, Full Disclosure: U.S. v. Ruehle Underscores the Inherent Tension of Internal Investigations, Inside Counsel 36 (Dec. 2009).
context bringing the issue to the courts is that the entity waives any attorney-client privilege right it has with regard to the communications between the lawyer and the individual and discloses the content of the communications to an arm of the government. Sometimes the entity does this so as to garner favor when the government has targeted the entity for prosecutorial scrutiny. The government then may seek to use the individual’s communications with the lawyer in the prosecution of the individual.

The individual typically attempts to block the use of his or her communications with the lawyer by asserting that the communications are privileged apart from the entity’s privilege. There are several different ways an individual can assert the attorney-client privilege in the tripartite situation. First, the individual might claim that he or she was a client of the lawyer for purposes of the communications such that the individual has the right on the basis of the attorney-client privilege to block disclosure of the communications. The individual might claim that the attorney represented him or her separately or jointly with the entity. With a separate representation the privilege and the waiver right is the individual’s alone. The attorney simply has two clients with separate attorney-client privilege rights. With a joint client representation, the entity and the individual share the privilege such that both must agree to a waiver of it. Generally, the clients must share a common interest for a court to recognize a joint client privilege.\(^6\) The

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\(^6\) The *Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers* section 75 states:

1. If two or more persons are jointly represented by the same lawyer in a matter, a communication of either co-client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under §§ 68-72 and relates to matters of common interest is privileged as against third persons, and any co-client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the communication.
2. Unless the co-clients have agreed otherwise, a communication described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as between the co-clients in a subsequent adverse proceeding between them.

*Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers* § 75 (2000). *See also* Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 263 F.R.D. 142, 145-46 (D. Del. 2009) (The court stated that in a joint client situation, a co-client “may unilaterally waive the privilege regarding its communications with the joint attorney but cannot unilaterally waive the privilege for the other joint clients or any communications that related to those*
only exception to the dual waiver requirement is that if the parties become adverse, one of the joint clients can disclose and use communications against the other without the other’s consent.\(^7\)

An individual in a tripartite situation might make a third type of privilege claim. The individual might claim that a joint defense or community of interest privilege protects the communications from disclosure. With such a claim, the individual does not assert that the entity attorney represented the individual. Rather, the claim is that the entity and the individual shared a community of interest or joint defense such that any communications between the parties or their lawyers enjoy a privilege and are not disclosable unless all parties agree.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) For an example of a claim of a joint defense or community of interest privilege in a corporate tripartite setting, see United States v. Weissman, 1996 WL 737042 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Weissman, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield claimed that Empire improperly disclosed protected communications he had with Empire’s counsel. The CFO did not claim an individual privilege. The court said it would not have recognized one anyway because there can be no attorney-client privilege about corporate events. Id. at *13. The CFO claimed that the communications were privileged because the CFO and the entity were a part of a joint defense or a community of interest arrangement. Id. at *6. See also United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1995) (A vice president of an entity claimed that the entity’s in-house counsel represented him and, in the alternative, the individual unsuccessfully claimed a joint defense arrangement.).
Courts often confuse the joint defense or community of interest situation and the joint client situation. Any claim of attorney-client privilege based on a claim that the attorney represented the individual separately or jointly is centered on the relationship between the attorney and the individual. In contrast, a claim of attorney-client privilege based on a claim that the individual and the entity share a community of interest or a joint defense is centered on the relationship between the individual and the entity.

This article focuses on claims by individuals that the attorneys not only represented the entities but also the individuals as a separate or joint clients. This article leaves for another day an analysis of claims of a community of interest or a joint defense.

Given the apparent client-interest-based incentive lawyers in the tripartite situation have to not explain the lawyer’s role and the implications of that role to the individual, and given that the entity client benefits from the lack of clarity at the expense of the individual, one might expect courts dealing with an individual’s privilege claim, to look upon the individual, rather than the entity, sympathetically. Interestingly, the contrary has occurred.

For example, in In re Grand Jury (00-2H), 211 F. Supp. 2d 555 (M.D. Pa. 2001), the government sought testimony from a lawyer who had represented the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the entity. There was no dispute that the attorney represented both the individual and the entity. Id. at 558 (“Both the Government and Attorney acknowledge that Attorney represented all parties in the Individual Litigation.”). The entity waived its privilege and the government argued that the individual could not block disclosure. Id. at 557. The court disagreed, finding that the CEO and corporation were part of a joint defense. [The] CEO has not waived his privilege. Therefore, any confidential statements by CEO, pertaining to the Individual Litigation, are privileged. CEO's statements to Attorney are protected by CEO's individual attorney-client privilege. Just as CEO cannot unilaterally prohibit Corporation from consenting to disclosure of its confidential communications with counsel, Corporation cannot waive the privilege belonging to CEO. If CEO made statements to Vice President, who then relayed those statements to Attorney, those statements fall within the joint defense privilege. Although the Third Circuit has not addressed the issue, the court agrees with Attorney that Corporation cannot unilaterally waive the entire joint defense privilege.

Id. at 559. In this situation, the corporation and the individual, the CEO, were really joint clients in that both were represented by the same attorney. See also In re Jack C. Benun, 339 B.R. 115, 128 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2006) (discussing confusion of joint client and community of interests); 24 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth A. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure §5493 (1st ed. Current through 2009) (noting the confusion between the joint defense privilege and the privilege for joint clients).
Many courts have engaged in flawed analysis and narrow vision in denying privilege to the individual.\textsuperscript{10} The courts have been eager to protect the entity’s control over its attorney-client privilege at the expense of any competing privilege of the individual. These courts have not applied the traditional attorney-client privilege used in other settings. Rather, these courts have added requirements when the question is whether the privilege applies to communications of the individual and attorney in the tripartite situation. For example, some courts have refused to recognize the right of the individual to assert the protection of the attorney-client privilege and thus have refused to recognize an individual’s right to control disclosure of his or her communication with the attorney unless the communication involved matters unrelated to the business or operations of the entity.\textsuperscript{11} In other settings, there is no such similar requirement for application of the attorney-client privilege.\textsuperscript{12}

In applying these additional requirements to the tripartite situation, these courts have failed to give effect to the individual’s honest and reasonable belief in the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Such a failure is a failure to apply a basic and accepted legal principle. Historically, whether the question has been malpractice liability, conflicts of interest, or the application of the attorney-client privilege, the courts’ decisions have been guided by the honest and reasonable belief of the person dealing with the lawyer.\textsuperscript{13} If the person honestly and reasonably believes that the attorney represents or may represent the individual in the future, then there is an attorney-client relationship for

\textsuperscript{10} See infra Section V.
\textsuperscript{11} See, e.g., In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corporation, 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986), United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
\textsuperscript{12} See infra Section III.
\textsuperscript{13} See, e.g., Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D. Del. 2009) (question is the reasonableness of the client’s belief). See also infra Section IV.
purposes of malpractice, conflicts of interest, and attorney-client privilege. Yet, in the
tripartite setting, the additional and exacting requirements for the existence of an
attorney-client relationship and recognition of a privilege render the individual’s honest
and reasonable belief irrelevant. Thus, an individual in the tripartite situation may
honestly and reasonably believe that the attorney for the entity also represents him or her.
The individual may honestly and reasonably believe that in talking with counsel, the
individual is consulting in confidence with the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice. The individual may honestly and reasonably not understand the implications of
that lack of representation for purposes of the privilege and disclosure of the statements
of the individual. Even so, the analysis of many courts yields a finding of no attorney-
client relationship and no privilege.

These courts have ventured away from traditional doctrine by requiring an
individual in the tripartite situation to satisfy more and different requirements in order to
enjoy the protection of the privilege. These courts have ventured away from traditional
document in making irrelevant the individual’s honest and reasonable belief that the
attorney in the tripartite situation represented the individual. The courts apparently have
followed this approach in a misguided effort to protect the entity’s privilege rights,
especially its waiver right and to ensure narrow application of the attorney-client
privilege in general. The courts have done so at the expense of the rights of the
individual.

An added effect of the courts’ treatment of claims of privilege by individuals in
the tripartite situation is that the approach in no way encourages lawyers dealing with
such individuals to clarify the situation to the individuals. To the contrary, the courts’
treatment creates a situation in which the lawyer may have added incentive to not clarify the situation and perhaps even mislead the individual since the individual’s claim of privilege can rarely succeed. If there is little chance a court will recognize that an individual has an attorney-client privilege with regard to communications with the lawyer, the incentive for the lawyer in the entity tripartite situation is to allow the individual to misunderstand the situation so that the individual discloses more fully to the lawyer than he or she might do if the individual fully understands that the lawyer represents only the entity and that the individual has no control over disclosure of the communications. The individual discovers the true story only after the communications are a fait accompli. This approach is grossly unfair to the individual. Even such an injustice might properly exist in the law if an outweighing benefit can only be created with that cost. Yet, in the tripartite situation the entity’s privilege rights can be protected without such a cost.

An elegant and superior approach is to apply the traditional attorney-client privilege in the traditional manner to an individual’s claim of a personal privilege in the tripartite situation. The individual should be required to meet the same application requirements as any other privilege claimant in any other context. In addition, the traditional approach of honoring the claimant’s honest and reasonable belief regarding the existence of an attorney-client relationship should govern. No special rules are needed.

In such an environment a lawyer can easily protect the entity’s privilege and waiver rights by being clear with the individual that the attorney does not represent the individual and the individual has no control over disclosure. Then the individual cannot
infringe upon the entity’s rights. A belief that the attorney in the tripartite situation represents the individual would be unreasonable. Importantly, however, this approach does not trample needlessly the individual’s rights. Because the attorney clarifies the individual’s position and rights and the lawyer’s role in the tripartite situation, the individual is not affirmatively or negligently misled. This approach also encourages the very conduct espoused by the standards of professional conduct for lawyers. The individual is not misled or confused. There is no infringement on the rights of the entity. The lawyer conducts himself or herself forthrightly and in a professionally responsible manner. There is fairness for all. All interests are protected.

If the lawyer is not clear in explaining the situation to the individual, then it is fair to have not only the lawyer but also the entity who selected the lawyer to suffer the consequences of having a court determine that the lawyer represented both the entity and the individual. If the lawyer’s representation of the individual means that the entity cannot alone control the disclosure of the communications between the lawyer and the individual, so be it. The lawyer’s lack of clarification may have been motivated by a desire to obtain the greatest individual disclosure so as to benefit the entity. Since the entity would benefit from the obfuscation, intentional or otherwise, it is just that the entity suffer the negative effects of the obfuscation as well.

Section II of this Article presents two recent examples of confusion of roles when entity individuals deal with entity lawyers. Section III discusses the traditional parameters of the attorney-client privilege. Section IV explores the traditional approach for determining the existence of a lawyer-client relationship. Section V examines the

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14 See infra Section VI.
15 In United States v. Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court stated that at least in cases of deception, it would be fair to have the entity client shoulder the burden of the obfuscation. Id. at 462 n.13.
treatment the tripartite situation has received in the courts when the question is privilege. Section VI then examines the standards of professional responsibility governing lawyer conduct in the tripartite setting.

The Article concludes in Section VII that the application of the attorney-client privilege to the situation of an individual communicating with an entity lawyer requires no special legal standards, rules, or exceptions but rather the application of traditional principles applied traditionally. Such a treatment should lead to a legally correct, professionally responsible, and fair result for all.

II. Recent Situations Illustrating the Problem

Several recent matters have brought the tripartite situation into the light of media coverage. An understanding of these widely-publicized situations can provide a basis for realistic analysis of the interests involved and how various rules and holdings affect the interests of the entity, the interests of the individual, the interests of the lawyer, and the interests of the justice system. These situations illustrate what happens, or does not happen, “in the real world.”

A. The Broadcom Situation

1. The Facts

In the Spring of 2006, Broadcom Corporation became concerned that it had engaged in impermissible stock option granting activities. Broadcom asked the law firm

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16 Several published articles indicated that certain corporations had engaged in impermissible stock option granting activities. In May, an investor rights group publicly identified Broadcom as a company that had backdated stock options in contravention of laws and regulations. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 602 (9th Cir. 2009).
of Irell and Manella LLP to investigate Broadcom’s stock option practices.\textsuperscript{17} At about the same time, a group of shareholders filed a derivative suit against William Ruehle, Broadcom’s Chief Financial Officer, and several other Broadcom individuals. The basis of the suit was that Ruehle and the others had engaged in improper stock option granting activities. In another suit, an amended complaint was filed dealing with the same subject and named Ruehle as a defendant.\textsuperscript{18} The lawyers’ individual representation of Ruehle did not stand out as unusual since Irell and Manella attorneys had represented Ruehle in several other recently concluded lawsuits dealing with Ruehle’s involvement in Broadcom securities activities.\textsuperscript{19}

On June 1, 2006, the Irell and Manella lawyers met with Ruehle to discuss stock option granting activities at Broadcom.\textsuperscript{20} On June 13, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation of Broadcom.\textsuperscript{21} In August of 2006, the Irell and Manella attorneys disclosed the substance of Ruehle’s June communications to Ernst and Young LLP, Broadcom’s auditors.\textsuperscript{22} The attorneys later disclosed the substance of Ruehle’s June 1 conversation with the lawyers to the SEC, and to the United States Attorney.\textsuperscript{23}

Ruehle knew of the disclosure to Ernst and Young in 2006.\textsuperscript{24} He learned of the disclosure to the government in 2008 when the government indicated that it intended to use the substance of Ruehle’s June 1, 2006, conversation with the Irell and Manella

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id.} at 603.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{19} United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2009), \textit{rev’d sub nom.}, United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
\textsuperscript{20} Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 604.
\textsuperscript{21} Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
\textsuperscript{22} Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 604.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Id.} at 605.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Id.} at 610.
lawyers in the criminal prosecution of Ruehle. Ruehle had been indicted on charges of conspiracy, securities and wire fraud, and other violations of Title 15 of the United States Code. Ruehle asserted that his personal attorney-client privilege protected his June 1 conversation with the Irell and Manella lawyers. He asserted that the privilege belonged to him individually and that he had not consented to the disclosure.

2. The District Court

The United States District Court for the Central District of California agreed that the June 1 conversation was privileged and refused to allow the government to use the communication. The District Court determined that Ruehle was reasonable in believing that the Irell and Manella attorneys represented him when they conversed on June 1. Irell and Manella lawyers represented Ruehle in regard to the two other lawsuits at roughly the same time and the court did not believe that the lawyers clarified their role to Ruehle before the June 1 conversation. In other words, the District Court did not believe that the attorneys explained to Ruehle that they did not represent him in that conversation though they represented him generally before and after. The Irell and Manella attorneys presented no written evidence of such a disclosure. The District Court noted that even if a warning was given as one of the lawyers described, the warning was “woefully inadequate.” The lawyer testified that he told Ruehle that the lawyers were speaking with

25 Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
26 Ruehle, at 605.
27 Id.
28 Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
29 Id. at 1115 (“There is no serious question in this case that when Mr. Ruehle met with the Irell lawyers on June 1, 2006, Mr. Ruehle reasonably believed that an attorney-client relationship existed, he was communicating with his attorneys in the context of this relationship for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and that any information he provided to Irell would remain confidential.”).
30 Id. at 1116-17.
him on behalf of the entity, Broadcom, in connection with the investigation of Broadcom’s stock option granting procedures. The lawyer testified that the lawyers did not tell Ruehle that the lawyers did not represent him, did not tell him that he should consult with another lawyer, and did not tell him that his statements to the lawyers could be disclosed to third parties such as the government and could be used against him in a criminal prosecution.\textsuperscript{31}

In addition, the District Court noted that even if the lawyers gave Ruehle an oral warning, it was ineffective given that Ruehle was not simply an individual who needed to be reminded that the lawyers did not represent him. In fact, these lawyers represented Ruehle on other matters, the civil cases, and so an oral warning could not dissolve the relationship between the lawyers and Ruehle, the client, already in existence, could not waive the conflict of the interview in light of the representation, and thus could not waive the attorney-client privilege.\textsuperscript{32} The District Court determined that the attorney-client privilege applied. The conversation was a communication between attorney and client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and was intended to be confidential.\textsuperscript{33}

Finally, the District Court noted that the Irell and Manella attorneys violated their duty of loyalty to Ruehle in three ways. First, the lawyers did not disclose and obtain consent to the obvious conflict of interest in which the lawyers labored in representing both Broadcom in the investigation and Ruehle with regard to the two other related

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Id.} at 1117.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Id.} at 1116-17. The court rejected the government’s argument that there was no expectation of confidentiality since Mr. Ruehle knew that there would be a disclosure to the auditors, Ernst and Young. The court stated, “This argument is unpersuasive. Mr. Ruehle never understood that Irell might disclose statements adverse to Mr. Ruehle’s interests to the Government for use in a criminal case against him.” \textit{Id.} at 1116.
actions.\textsuperscript{34} Second, the lawyers questioned Ruehle as part of the representation of Broadcom.\textsuperscript{35} Lastly, the Irell and Manella attorneys disclosed Ruehle’s June 1 communications with them without his consent.\textsuperscript{36} The District Court stated that the Court would report the lawyers to the discipline authority of the California Bar.\textsuperscript{37}

3. The Ninth Circuit

The Ninth Circuit took a very different view of the situation on interlocutory appeal. Recognizing that the District Court found that the Irell and Manella lawyers did not provide any sort of \textit{Upjohn} warning, the Ninth Circuit did not hold that finding to be “clearly erroneous.”\textsuperscript{38} Likewise, the Court of Appeals accepted the lower court determination that Ruehle reasonably believed that the Irell and Manella lawyers represented him in the June 1 conversation.\textsuperscript{39} The Court noted that the Irell and Manella attorneys also represented Broadcom in the June 1 conversation.\textsuperscript{40}

The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s conclusion, however, that Ruehle had the right to prevent disclosure of his June 1 conversation with the lawyers. While not denying Ruehle the theoretical right to control disclosure of his communication with the lawyers, the Ninth Circuit determined that Ruehle did not prove that the situation met the traditional definition for application of the attorney-client privilege.\textsuperscript{41} In

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Id.} at 1117-18.  
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Id.} at 1119.  
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Id.} at 1120.  
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Id.} at 1121.  
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ruehle,} 585 F.3d at 604.  
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Id.} at 607.  
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Id.}  
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Id.} at 609. The Court of Appeals noted the narrower test of privilege applied by some courts to the tripartite situation but determined that it need not “decide the propriety of adopting the specialized test” because it could resolve the matter using the less restrictive traditional attorney-client privilege definition. \textit{Id.} at 608 n.7.
particular, Ruehle failed to prove that the communications he had with the lawyers on June 1 were “made in confidence.” Ruehle, as the Chief Financial Officer, had been present at Broadcom meetings before June 1 in which it was clear that the findings of the investigation would be turned over to the outside auditors. In the view of the Ninth Circuit, Ruehle could not “credibly claim ignorance of the general disclosure requirements imposed on a publicly traded company with respect to its outside auditors or the need to truthfully report corporate information to the SEC.” Because Ruehle knew that his statements would be shared with third parties such as Ernst and Young, the Ninth Circuit refused to find Ruehle’s communications with the lawyers privileged.

This Broadcom situation is helpful in illustrating the complexity of the tripartite situation, even for sophisticated high-level entity representatives and even for the lawyers involved. The situation is also helpful in providing an example of lawyers’ conduct in the tripartite situation in terms of the kind of explanation lawyers provide to the individuals with whom the lawyers communicate.

B. The Stanford Financial Group Situation

While not involving a specific claim of attorney-client privilege, the recent Stanford Financial Group situation also illustrates the confusion inherent in the tripartite relation of the entity, the entity attorney, and the entity individual. The SEC charged that the Stanford Financial Group had conducted a “massive fraud.” Specifically, the SEC

42 Id. at 609 (ultimately quoting 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2292, at 554 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
43 Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 609.
44 Id. at 610.
45 Id. at 612 (“His admitted awareness that anything relating to the former would not be held in confidence but rather shared with at least one third party destroys the confidentiality essential to establishing the privilege as to both.”).
claimed that the Group made unrealistic promises of returns in selling $8 billion in high-yield certificates of deposit.\footnote{See Katheryn Hayes Tucker, \textit{Stanford GC’s Resignation Offers Lessons}, \textit{Fulton County Daily Report} 1, Vol. 120, No. 68, April 8, 2009 (The regional director of the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional Office stated, “We are alleging a fraud of shocking magnitude that has spread its tentacles throughout the world.”). \textit{See also} Tom Fowler, \textit{Firm’s Leader was Warned}, \textit{Houston Chronicle} 1, March 12, 2009, 2009 WLNR 4766046; Julie Creswell & Clifford Krauss, \textit{Scandal’s Small Sanctum}, \textit{New York Times} B1, February 28, 2009, 2009 WL 3900687.}

In February of 2009, in the midst of an investigation by the SEC, Lisa Pendergest-Holt, the Chief Investment Officer for the Stanford Financial Group, was deposed. Thomas Sjoblom, outside counsel to the Stanford Financial Group, attended the deposition with Pendergest-Holt. A result of her deposition testimony, Pendergest-Holt later was arrested and indicted for obstruction of the investigation.\footnote{See Lisa A. Cahill, \textit{Cases Highlight Minefield in Internal Investigations}, \textit{N.Y.L.J.} Vol. 241, May 21, 2009. Allegedly, she failed to reveal the extent of what she knew about the Group’s investments. \textit{See} Creswell & Krauss, supra note 46 (Pendergest-Holt responded when the SEC asked about a category of investments referred to as Tier III holdings, “If I knew anything about Tier III, I’d tell you … God’s honest truth.”).} Pendergest-Holt sued Sjoblom and his firm for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that Sjoblom and the firm led her to believe that they represented her at the deposition but then failed to fulfill the duties inherent in the representation. In particular, Pendergest-Holt claimed that Sjoblom never told her that he did not represent her, he never told her she could refuse to appear before the SEC, he never told her about criminal penalties related to sworn testimony before the SEC, he never told her about her Fifth Amendment right not to testify, he never told her that her statements to him were not privileged, he never told her that he could not represent her because of the conflict of representing both her and the entity, and he never told her that she should engage separate counsel.\footnote{See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra, note 2; Mary Flood, \textit{Ex-Lawyer for Stanford Sued}, \textit{Houston Chronicle} 2, March 28, 2009, 2009 WLNR 5975472.} At the deposition Sjoblom stated in response to a question about who Sjoblom represented, “I represent the company Stanford Financial Group and affiliated companies” and then
stated regarding Pendergest-Holt, “I represent her insofar as she is an Officer or director
of one of the Stanford affiliated companies.”\textsuperscript{49}

Pendergest-Holt’s attorney on the malpractice claim stated that even when
Sjoblom stated during the testimony that he represented Pendergest-Holt to the extent she
was an officer of the company, “She didn’t know what that meant.”\textsuperscript{50} Pendergest-Holt
later moved to have the matter dismissed without prejudice.\textsuperscript{51} Eventually the SEC filed a
civil suit against Pendergest-Holt and criminal indictments were issued adding charges
against Pendergest-Holt and others.\textsuperscript{52}

As is true with the Broadcom case, this real-world situation and the involvement
of the lawyers and the individual bring to life the complexity of the tripartite relationship
and the confusion that easily can result.

\textbf{III. The Traditional Attorney-Client Privilege}

\textbf{A. The Definition}

The attorney-client privilege protects from compelled disclosure communications
between a client or prospective client or the client’s agents and an attorney or the
attorney’s agents. To be protected, the communications must be for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice or assistance. The client or prospective client must intend such
communications to be confidential when making them. If a communication meets this
definition but is in furtherance of a crime or fraud, the privilege does not protect the

\textsuperscript{49} See Cahill, \textit{supra} note 47; Dunst & Chirlin, \textit{supra} note 2; Abramowitz & Bohrer, \textit{supra} note 2.
Law Blog},
\textsuperscript{51} See Cahill, \textit{supra} note 47.
\textsuperscript{52} See Mary Flood, Tom Fowler, & Jennifer A. Dlouhy, \textit{Seven Indicted in Stanford Ponzi Case}, \textit{Houston
Chronicle} A1, June 20, 2009, 2009 WLNR 11939528; Mary Flood, \textit{Indictment Delay OK with Stanford
Figure}, \textit{Houston Chronicle} B6, March 24, 2009, 2009 WLNR 5550146.
communication. If the client or prospective client waives the privilege for a communication, the privilege no longer protects the communication from compelled disclosure. Judge Wyzanski of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in *United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.* described the privilege in a passage that has been much quoted over the years:

The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client, (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been claimed and (b) not waived by the client.

The one claiming the privilege has the burden of proving that the privilege applies.

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53 *See Rice, supra* note 6, § 2:1, at 6-10. Wigmore’s treatise on evidence states that the attorney-client privilege applies

(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.


55 *Id.* at 358-59.

The actual existence of an attorney-client relationship is not necessary. The privilege applies in the situation of a prospective client consulting with an attorney the prospective client honestly and reasonably believes may eventually become the client’s lawyer. The privilege attaches even though no attorney-client relationship actually develops as a result of or after the communication. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained this point as follows:

There is nothing anomalous about applying the privilege to such preliminary consultations. Without it, people could not safely bring their problems to lawyers unless the lawyers had already been retained. “The rationale for this rule is compelling,” because “no person could ever safely consult an attorney for the first time with a view to his employment if the privilege depended on the chance of whether the attorney after hearing his statement of the facts decided to accept the employment or decline it.”

**B. The Rationale of the Privilege**

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57 See Barton v. United States District Court for the Central District of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2005) (website said that no attorney-client relationship was created and might never exist but this did not defeat claim of attorney-client privilege because the privilege attaches before the attorney-client relationship exists). The Barton court stated, “‘Prospective clients’ communications with a view to obtaining legal services are plainly covered by the attorney-client privilege under California law, regardless of whether they have retained the lawyer, and regardless of whether they ever retain the lawyer.” Id. at 1111.

58 See Pucket v. Hot Springs School Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 579-80 (D.S.D. 2006) (if a person seeks legal advice and reasonably believes he represents the client, the attorney-client privilege can apply even though no attorney-client relationship actually exists or develops).


In addition, the privilege applies even if the person consulted as an attorney is in fact not one. The privilege applies if the person consulting the lawyer honestly and reasonably believes the person is a lawyer. See infra Section IV.D.2.
The primary rationale for the privilege is utilitarian. By protecting communications between attorneys and clients, the privilege encourages clients to fully and completely disclose information. Only with this complete information can attorneys render competent and proper legal assistance and advice. The assumption is that clients will not be so open and disclose so much and thus cannot obtain such assistance and advice unless those clients are confident that the communications with attorneys will remain confidential. Long ago in *Annesley v. Anglesea*, an English court stated:

> No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law, without employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable of doing it in point of skill, the law will not let him; and if he does not fully and candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he apprehends may be in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney upon, it will be impossible for the attorney properly to serve him.

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61 *See Rice, supra* note 6, § 2:3, at 14-15. See also Bailey v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 179 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Iowa 1970) (This privilege is “of ancient origin. It is premised on a recognition of the inherent right of every person to consult with legal counsel and secure the benefit of his advice free from any fear of disclosure.”).  
63 17 How. St. Tr. 1139, 1237 (1743). See also Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (The attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”); Phoenix Solutions Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 254 F.R.D. 568, 575 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)). (“The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’”); Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 956 A.2d 937, 951 (Pa. 2008) (“The attorney-client privilege, on the other hand, renders an attorney incompetent to testify as to communications made to him by his client in order to promote a free flow of information only between attorney and his or her client so that the attorney can better represent the client.”).
Two hundred and thirty-eight years later, the United States Supreme Court in *Upjohn Company v. United States*, reiterated this rationale and expanded upon it by noting that the attorney-client privilege encourages client candor and full disclosure and frequent consultation by the client with the attorney. This complete candor and consultation means that attorneys can counsel clients as to how to conduct themselves within the bounds of the law. Ultimately, the administration of justice improves.

The utilitarian rationale of the privilege depends on the certainty of the application of the attorney-client privilege. The privilege encourages a client to communicate fully with his or her lawyer only to the extent that the client can determine before the opportunity for disclosure that the privilege will protect the communication from future disclosure. As the Supreme Court has stated,

*If the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be*

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65 The *Upjohn* Court stated:

[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.

*Id.* at 389. *See also* Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) (“The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to ensure free and open communications between a client and his attorney.”); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”); *In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas*, 454 F.3d 511, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The purpose of attorney-client privilege is to ensure free and open communications between a client and his attorney.”).

Deontological Justifications are sometimes suggested such as the notion that the client’s privacy interest in the communication justified the privilege or the notion that respect for the client’s autonomy justifies the privilege. *See* Albert W. Alschuler, *The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative*, 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 342, 350 (1981); David W. Louisell, *Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today*, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 112-113 (1956).
certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.66

C. Cost of the Privilege and Related Skepticism

The generally-recognized cost of the privilege is that applying the privilege in a particular situation may keep relevant evidence away from the truth-finder.67 This cost probably is less than one might imagine because the privilege protects communications between client and lawyer but does not protect the facts underlying the communications.68

66 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393. See also In re Teleglobe Communications Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 359 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It is essential that parties be able to determine in advance with a high degree of certainty whether communications will be protected by the privilege.”); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)) (“If we intend to serve the interests of justice by encouraging consultation with counsel free from the apprehension of disclosure, then courts must work to apply the privilege in ways that are predictable and certain. ‘An uncertain privilege—or one which purports to be certain, but rests in widely varying applications by the courts—is little better than no privilege.’”); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) (“Only if the client is assured that the information he relays in confidence, when seeking legal advice, will be immune from discovery will he be encouraged to disclose fully all relevant information to his attorney.”).


68 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting City of Philadelphia, Pa. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 830 (D.C. Pa. 1962)) (“Protection of the privilege extends only to communications not to facts. The fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an entirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney.”). See also Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J. Simeone, The Realities of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 Ohio St. L. J. 1, 9 (1963). But see Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 St. John’s L. Rev. 191, 228-231 (1989).
Even with this downside, the attorney-client privilege has been an accepted creature of the law for centuries. This acceptance indicates a shared belief that the benefits of the privilege ultimately outweigh the costs. Yet, courts recognize and fear the obstruction of the truth that the attorney-client privilege may cause. As a result, courts have “strictly confined [the privilege] within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.” As a United States District Court for the District of New Jersey recently stated:

While it is true that the attorney-client privilege is narrowly construed because it “obstructs the truth-finding process,” …, the privilege is not “disfavored.” … Courts should be cautious in their application of the privilege mindful that “it protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the privilege.” … In all instances, the facts underlying any given communication remain discoverable.

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69 See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 600 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw v. Better Government Bureau, Inc., 522 U.S. 1047 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)) (“The Supreme Court, however, has expressly recognized that the attorney-client privilege enjoys a special position as ‘the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law’ and that the privilege serves a salutary and important purpose: to ‘encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.’”). See also Hazard, supra note 62; Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and Client, 16 Cal. L. Rev. 487 (1928).

70 See In re Teleglobe Communications Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 361 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007) (the privilege is not “disfavored”); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The privilege encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer confidences necessary for the lawyer to provide advice and representation. As the privilege serves the interests of justice, it is worthy of maximum legal protection.”).

71 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979). See also United States E.E.O.C. v. ABM Indus., Inc., 261 F.R.D. 503, 507 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Clarke v. American Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992)) (“Still [b]ecause the attorney-client privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the fact finder, it is only applied when necessary to achieve its limited purpose of encouraging full and frank disclosure by the client to his or her attorney.’’); Siegler v. Zak, 874 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (narrow construction).

Placing the burden on the claimer to prove the applicability of the privilege also reflects a healthy skepticism of it.  

**D. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Entities**

The attorney-client privilege applies to entities such as corporations just as it applies to individuals. This principle has long been accepted by the courts. Of course, an entity must speak and act through its agents and so a frequently-asked question is which communications by which agents of the entity enjoy the privilege.

In *Upjohn Company v. United States*\(^\text{76}\), the Supreme Court reviewed a situation involving an internal investigation by Upjohn. The corporation sought to determine whether illegal bribes had been offered or paid by agents of Upjohn. Lawyers acting at the behest of Upjohn interviewed a variety of individuals.\(^\text{77}\) The government later sought access to those communications. Upjohn claimed that its attorney-client privilege protected the communications from compelled disclosure.

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\(^{77}\) *Id.* at 387.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded that communications between Upjohn’s counsel and any employee within the control group of Upjohn were protected by Upjohn’s privilege, assuming other requirements of the privilege were satisfied. Communications between Upjohn’s counsel and other employees were not protected by Upjohn’s privilege. An employee was considered to be within the control group of Upjohn if the individual could control or would be involved in planning Upjohn’s response to legal advice.

The Supreme Court rejected the control group analysis. The Court concluded that the applicability of the entity’s attorney-client privilege did not depend on whether the communications involved individuals in the control group of an entity for purposes of federal common law. The Court stated:

In the corporate context, … it will frequently be individuals beyond the control of the group as defined by the court below … who will possess the information needed by the corporation’s lawyers. Middle-level—and indeed lower-level—individuals can, by actions within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these individuals would have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.

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78 Id. at 388-89.
80 Upjohn, 449 U. S. at 389-91.
81 Id. at 391.
The Court stated that applying the narrow control group analysis hindered the free flow of information to lawyers and thus thwarted the rationale of the privilege.\footnote{Id. at 392.} The Court explained that limited the application of the privilege to control group agents of the entity “makes it more difficult to convey full and frank legal advice to the individuals who will put into effect the client corporation’s policy.”\footnote{Id. at 392.} The Court ultimately held that Upjohn’s privilege applied to the communications in question but the Court provided little guidance as to a specific analysis to apply. The Court discussed a list of factors it considered in support of its holding.\footnote{See id. at 394-95. See also \textbf{Rice}, supra note 6, §4:14, at 4-67 (listing five factors).}

In response to the \textit{Upjohn} opinion’s rejection of the control group analysis for purposes of federal privilege law, courts have adopted less limiting tests for application of the attorney-client privilege for entities. For example, some courts have adopted an analysis that protects as privileged any confidential communication between an employee and the attorney for the corporation for the purpose of obtaining legal assistance for the corporation. The entity’s privilege applies if the communication concerns matters that are within the scope of the responsibilities the individual has as an employee.\footnote{See, e.g., Barton v. Zimmer Inc., 2008 WL 80647, *4 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“This so-called ‘subject-matter’ test asks whether the communication was made at the instance of the individual’s superior and whether the subject matter of the communication, upon which the attorney’s advice is sought by the corporation and contained within the communication, was within the scope of the individual’s duties.”); National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Tex. 1993) (the subject matter test is met if “the individual makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney’s advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the individual of the duties of his employment”). \textit{See also} Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (“We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his employment.”). \textit{See generally} \textbf{Rice} supra note 6, §§ 4:13-4:14; Bufkin Alyse King, Commentary, \textit{Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate}}
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in section 72, proposes a test which focuses on whether the communication “concerns a legal matter of interest to the organization.”

If the nature of the individual’s communication with the entity’s lawyer is such that a court would recognize the communication as a privileged communication of the entity with it’s counsel, then the entity has the right to assert or waive that privilege. The difficulty is that the entity’s attorney-client privilege may apply to a communication between an employee and entity counsel but that same individual may not have the right to assert or waive the privilege on behalf of the entity. Only those agents of the entity responsible for the policy and operation of the entity may assert or waive the entity’s privilege. In other words, that employee’s communications create a privileged communication for the corporation but that employee does not necessarily have control over the assertion or waiver of the corporation’s privilege.

The bottom line is that the entity’s attorney-client privilege may apply to communications with all sorts of individuals. Because such communications are privileged, corporate counsel has incentive to talk with individuals who might know about a particular issue; the communications actually take place. And, absent clarification by the attorney, the individual, sophisticated or unsophisticated, may be confused as to

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87 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985) (“When control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege passes as well.”). See also Rice supra note 6, 4:20, at 4-113 (“Courts universally accept the notion that the corporate board of directors and the officers to whom it delegates its management authority have both the right and the responsibility to either assert or waive the corporation’s attorney-client privilege claims for the benefit of the corporation”).

88 See In re In-Store Advertising Sec. Litig., 163 F.R.D. 452, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 & 89-4, 734 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 (E.D. Va.), aff’d in relevant part, 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Where the client is a corporation, ‘the power to invoke[e] or waiv[e] a corporation’s privileges is an incident of control of the corporation.’”). See also Rice supra note 6, § 4:25, at 4-144.
his or her control over the disclosure of those conversations. Such an individual may believe that he or she has the ability to control the entity’s privilege with regard to the individual’s own statements. Or, such an individual may believe that the lawyer for the entity is also the individual’s lawyer such that the individual has attorney-client privilege rights apart from any rights of the entity.

IV. The Traditional Approach to Determining the Existence of a Lawyer-Client Relationship

A. The Standard Generally

Though no attorney-client relationship is absolutely required for the attorney-client privilege to apply,89 the recognition of an attorney-client relationship is very helpful in attorney-client privilege analysis. The privilege applies only to communications between an attorney and client for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice. The existence of an attorney-client relationship makes the finding that the communication was for the purpose of obtaining or rendering legal advice more certain. The honest and reasonable belief of the person in the position of the client generally determines the existence of an attorney-client relationship in contexts other than the entity tripartite setting.90 The courts look to all of the circumstances of the situation such 

89 The privilege can apply when the person or entity in the client’s position seeks representation by the lawyer but the relationship has not yet formed. See Section III.A, supra. See also Barton v. United States District Court for the Central District of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition, the privilege can apply even if the relationship never actually ripens into an attorney-client relationship. See Pucket v. Hot Springs School Dist. No. 23-2, 239 F.R.D. 572, 579-80 (D.S.D. 2006).

as the existence of a representation agreement, written or otherwise. The presence of an agreement to represent and be represented is not necessary for a court to find an attorney-client relationship.\textsuperscript{91} If there is an agreement, however, courts are very likely to find an attorney-client relationship.\textsuperscript{92} Paying the lawyer is an indication of an attorney-client relationship as well, although a person may pay a lawyer for the representation of another and thus have no attorney-client relationship with the lawyer.\textsuperscript{93} Statements or other indications by the lawyer to the effect that the lawyer represents a person or entity are also excellent evidence of an attorney-client relationship. For example, if a lawyer gives the person or entity in the position of the client legal advice or other legal assistance, a court likely will find an attorney-client relationship. If a person makes statements or otherwise signals that he or she believes the lawyer represents him or her and the lawyer knows of these statements or other signals and does not correct this belief, a court may

\textsuperscript{91}See Tinn v. EMM Labs, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1192 (D. Or. 2008) (no express written or oral contract necessary); Smith v. State, 905 A.2d 315, 325-26 (Md. 2006) (no express agreement necessary).

\textsuperscript{92}See, e.g., Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elec., 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1004 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (engagement agreement said law firm represented a corporation “and its affiliates” and so the affiliate’s claim of representation was reasonable). See also Johnson v. Schultz, 671 S.E.2d 559, 569 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting North Carolina State Bar v. Sheffield, 326 S.E.2d 320, 325, cert. denied, 332 S.E.2d 482, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981 (1985)) (“[T]he relation of attorney and client may be implied from the conduct of the parties, and is not dependent on the payment of a fee, not upon execution of a formal contract.”).

\textsuperscript{93}See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (a professional relationship is not dependent on the payment of fees); Tinn v. EMM Labs, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1192 (D. Or. 2008) (payment of fees not necessary); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shoup, 979 A.2d 120, 136 (Md. 2009) (“Our cases make clear that an explicit agreement or payment arrangement is not a prerequisite to the formation of an attorney-client relationship.”).
very well recognize that the person honestly and reasonably believes that the lawyer represents the person. A lawyer’s “failure to dispel [the putative client’s] expectations” is telling.\textsuperscript{94}

The existence of a conflict of interest may be a factor arguing against a putative client’s reasonable belief of representation, but only if it is a conflict that would be obviously problematic to the particular client.\textsuperscript{95} The lawyer’s belief as to the relationship is largely irrelevant.\textsuperscript{96} The lawyer’s actions are important only in that the person or entity in the position of client bases the belief of a relationship on the lawyer’s actions.

The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers Section 14 is generally in agreement. Section 14 states:

A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:

(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either

(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or

(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services; or

\textsuperscript{94}See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brooke, 821 A.2d 414, 425 (Md. 2003).
\textsuperscript{95}See Harry A. v. Duncan, 330 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141 (D. Mont. 2004) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, sec. 14, cmt f (2000)) (“Where appropriate, due consideration should be given to the unreasonableness of a claimed expectation of entering into a co-client status when a significant and readily apparent conflict of interest exists between the organization or other client and the associated person or entity claimed to be a co-client.”).
\textsuperscript{96}See Carnegie Cos, Inc. v. Summit Properties, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (“The law does not look to the reasonable expectations of the lawyer in order to determine whether an attorney-client relationship has been established by implication.”). See also In re Conduct of Wittemyer, 980 P.2d 148, 153 (Or. 1999) (lawyer argued that the lawyer and the alleged client were really partners in the business transaction).
B. Determining the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship in the
Conflicts Context

Often, the question of the existence of an attorney-client relationship arises in a
conflict of interest scenario. A party moves to disqualify counsel on the basis of a conflict
of interest. The court then must determine whether the suspect counsel has or had an
attorney-client relationship with a party. If the court determines there is or was a
relationship, then the court may remove the attorney as counsel.

Sometimes the question is an easy one. In Avocent Redmond Corporation v. Rose
Electronics, a party claimed that the court must disqualify opposing counsel because
opposing counsel recently represented it in a substantially related matter. In the earlier
matter, an engagement agreement provided that lawyers of a law firm represented a
corporation “and its affiliates.” The party demanding the disqualification was an
affiliate of the corporation. The court held that the lawyers of the law firm were in an
attorney-client relationship with the affiliate. The court, stated:

The existence of the relationship “‘turns largely on the client’s subjective belief
that it exists.’ The client’s subjective belief, however, does not control the issue

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Professional Conduct, Preamble & Scope ¶ 17 (ABA 2009) (“[F]or purposes of determining the lawyer’s
authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a
client-lawyer relationship exists.”). See also Ingrid A. Minott, Note, The Attorney-Client Relationship:
98 491 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
99 Id. at 1006.
100 Id.
unless it is reasonably formed based on the attending circumstances, including the
attorney’s words or actions.”\textsuperscript{101}

Frequently, the existence of the relationship is cloudier. In \textit{Westinghouse Electric
Corporation v. Kerr-McGee Corporation},\textsuperscript{102} the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced
an intricate situation. Lawyers in a firm represented Westinghouse in an antitrust action
against several uranium suppliers.\textsuperscript{103} In addition, the very same law firm represented a
trade group of which the uranium suppliers were members. The law firm contacted the
supplier members in an effort to prepare a report about the effect on them if certain
legislation was enacted.\textsuperscript{104} The resulting report was released on the day the antitrust
matter was filed.\textsuperscript{105} The uranium suppliers then asked the court to disqualify the law firm
from representing Westinghouse in the antitrust matter.\textsuperscript{106} The court noted that the
attorney-client relationship is fiduciary in nature and that therefore it is not completely a
creature of contract\textsuperscript{107} or agency.\textsuperscript{108} The attorney-client relationship “does not arise only
in the agency manner such as when the parties expressly or impliedly consent to its
formation.”\textsuperscript{109} The court noted that the uranium suppliers did not request that the law firm
act as its lawyer, the law firm did not accept such employment orally or in writing, and
the suppliers did not pay the firm.\textsuperscript{110} Yet, the court stated, “[a] fiduciary relationship may

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Id}. at 1003-04 (quoting Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71, 75 (Wash. 1992) (quoting \textit{In re McGlothlen}, 663
P.2d 1330, 1334 (Wash. 1983))).
\textsuperscript{102} 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Id}. at 1313.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Id}. at 1314.
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Id}. at 1312-1313.
\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id}. at 1317.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id}. at 1316.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Id}. at 1317.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Id}.
result because of the nature of the work performed and the circumstances under which confidential information is divulged.\textsuperscript{111}

The court determined that each of the companies “entertained a reasonable belief that it was submitting confidential information regarding its involvement in the uranium industry to a law firm which had solicited the information upon a representation that the firm was acting in the undivided interest of each company.\textsuperscript{112} The court refused to allow the law firm to oppose the members of the trade group who were also defendants in the antitrust matter.\textsuperscript{113}

In \textit{Montgomery Academy v. Kohn},\textsuperscript{114} the District Court for the District of New Jersey faced a claim of disqualification in the context of an entity tripartite situation. An attorney discussed with an employee the possibility of representing the entity but the individual understood that the Board of Directors would have to approve the official hiring of the attorney. The employee confided in the attorney. The employee discussed personal matters such as the employee’s personal investments, insurance coverage and such.\textsuperscript{115} The lawyer had represented the individual individually in the past in other matters. The court approved a finding that the individual “reasonably considered [the lawyer] to be her personal lawyer and thought that [the lawyer] would protect her interests.”\textsuperscript{116} The court then approved the magistrate’s disqualification of the lawyer.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{111} Id. at 1320.
\textsuperscript{112} Id. at 1321.
\textsuperscript{113} Id.
\textsuperscript{114} 82 F. Supp. 2d 312 (D.N.J. 1999).
\textsuperscript{115} Id. at 315.
\textsuperscript{116} Id.
\textsuperscript{117} Id. The lawyer testified that the lawyer told the individual that the lawyer could not represent both the individual and the employer but the magistrate did not believe the testimony.

In \textit{Cody v. Cody}, 889 A.2d 733 (Vt. 2005), a son moved to disqualify a law firm from representing his parents and a corporation in an action against him. The lower court granted the motion to disqualify. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Vermont disagreed. The Supreme Court noted that the lower court
C. Determining the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship in the Malpractice Context

Another setting in which the question of the existence of an attorney-client relationship often arises is an action for malpractice. Absent an attorney-client relationship, a lawyer owes no duty of care to the person or entity. The existence of the relationship is a necessary first step to the success of any malpractice claim. For example, in *Mansur v. Podhurst Orseck, P.A.*, a Florida appellate court held that the lower court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm because there was some evidence that the firm’s statements and actions led brothers to believe that the lawyers of the firm represented all of the brothers as opposed to only one of them. The firm had sent a letter to a third party stating the desires of all of the brothers. The firm had filed a motion on behalf of one brother but stated that the brother acted on behalf of the other brothers. The firm had sent the brothers communications that were at best ambiguous but appeared to render legal advice. Also, the firm had sent a letter to a third party referring “to the four Mansur brothers we represent.”

“employed an appropriate test” by evaluating “the objective reasonableness” of the son’s belief regarding the representation.” *Id.* at 739. Yet, the Court disagreed that the evidence necessarily supported a finding that the son’s belief that the firm represented him was reasonable. *Id.* at 740. The Court then ordered the lower court to hold an evidentiary hearing so that all relevant evidence could be considered in determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship. *Id.*


119 *Id.* at 439. See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. GAB Robins North Am., Inc., 999 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (correspondence specifically limited the representation to one suit and not others so belief of representation on other matters was not reasonable and so no malpractice action was possible).

120 *Mansur*, 994 So. 2d. at 436.

121 *Id.* at 437.

122 *Id.* at 438.
D. Determining the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship in the Attorney-Client Privilege Context

In the context of applying the attorney-client privilege, courts have used the concept of honoring the honest and reasonable belief of the person or entity in the position of a client in several different ways.\textsuperscript{123} For example, courts have used an honest and reasonable belief analysis to answer the question of whether the person and the lawyer were in an attorney-client relationship. The courts have used this analysis as a stepping stone to determining whether the person consulted the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance such that the attorney-client privilege applied to the communication. Courts have also used the honest and reasonable belief analysis to determine whether the privilege should apply when the person in the position of lawyer is not, in fact, a lawyer. Also, courts have used the honest and reasonable belief analysis to determine whether the privilege should apply when the communication is not, in fact, confidential.

To use the honest and reasonable belief analysis in these ways is consistent with the utilitarian rationale of the privilege. Yet, such use results in a more expansive application of the privilege. Honoring the client’s or prospective client’s honest and reasonable belief about a situation supports the privilege’s rationale because the belief of the person or entity in the position of client determines that person’s or entity’s

\textsuperscript{123} See \textit{In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum}, 112 F.3d 910, 923 (8th Cir.), \textit{cert. denied sub nom., Office of President v. Office of Independent Counsel}, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated,

In some aspects of the law of attorney-client privilege, the client's reasonable beliefs may be relevant. For example, courts have found the privilege applicable where the client reasonably believed that a poseur was in fact a lawyer, reasonably believed that a lawyer represented the client rather than another party, or reasonably believed that a conversation with a lawyer was confidential, in the sense that its substance would not be overheard by or reported to anyone else. All these situations involve, in essence, reasonable mistakes of fact.

\textit{Id.} at 923 (footnotes omitted).
willingness to disclose to the lawyer. In other words, if the putative client believes the
privilege protects a communication, then the client will more willingly provide a full
disclosure to the attorney. The occurrence of this complete disclosure is the primary
rationale of the privilege itself.124

1. Reasonable Belief that the Lawyer Represents the Person or Entity

Perhaps the most complex and detailed treatment of the honest and reasonable
belief analysis of whether a lawyer represents the person or entity in an attorney-client
privilege setting is Sky Valley Limited Partnership v. ATX Sky Valley, Limited.125 In Sky
Valley, a group of entities and individuals comprising the plaintiffs had been represented
by a certain law firm.126 The defendants in the litigation, also a group of entities and
individuals, claimed that the same law firm had represented them as well as the plaintiffs.
The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs and the defendants had been joint clients of the
law firm.127 Rather than the more common use of the joint client privilege to block
disclosure of communications, the defendants sought to use the claim of joint client
privilege to require disclosure.128

When parties sharing a joint client privilege become adverse, there is no privilege
between the former joint clients.129 The Sky Valley court referred to this disclosure right
as the “‘joint client’ exception.”130 The joint client privilege shares the same basic
rationale as the privilege in general. It encourages full communication between joint

124 See supra Section III.B.
126 Id. at 650.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 651.
129 See supra text at note 6. See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 75(2)
(2000); Rice, supra note 6, § 4:33.
130 Sky Valley, 150 F.R.D. at 651
clients and the lawyer so the clients can obtain the best possible advice. In contrast, the rationale of the joint client exception which leads to disclosure is

(1) to prevent unjustifiable inequality in access to information necessary to resolve fairly disputes that arise between parties who were in the past joint clients-when the disputes relate to matters that were involved in the joint representation and (2) to discourage abuses of fiduciary obligations and to encourage parties to honor any legal duties they had to share information related to common interests.

In order to determine whether the joint client exception applied, the court first had to determine whether the lawyers in the firm and the defendants were in an attorney-client relationship. The court then had to determine whether the defendants and the plaintiffs were joint clients of the lawyers in the firm.

In performing this analysis, the court stated that “the courts have focused on whether it would have been reasonable, taking into account all the relevant circumstances, for the person who attempted to invoke the joint client exception to have inferred that she was in fact a ‘client’ of the lawyer.” The court continued that resolution of the dispute will turn on whether a contractual relationship was formed implicitly. To answer that question, courts necessarily look to circumstantial evidence, taking into account all kinds of indirect evidence and contextual considerations that appear relevant to determining whether it would have been reasonable for the person to have inferred that she was the client of the

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131 Id. at 653.
lawyer. Thus, in this setting, whether the attorney-client relationship existed is a question of law that is resolved through an objective test.\textsuperscript{134}

The \textit{Sky Valley} court then listed a plethora of factors to consider in determining whether a party’s belief in a representational relationship and a joint representation in particular was reasonable. The court noted that the analysis might be different in other contexts but that this was the proper analysis when evaluating whether to apply the joint client exception and thus force a disclosure.\textsuperscript{135}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{134}\textit{Sky Valley}, 150 F.R.D. at 652. \\
\textsuperscript{135}\textit{Id.} at 652-53. The court noted:
\end{flushright}

\begin{quote}
There are a great many factors that the courts should take into account when deciding whether an implied contractual relationship exists for purposes of the joint client exception. These pertinent circumstances generally will include: the conduct of the party and counsel, what the party and counsel communicated to one another (both about their relationship and about other things, taking special note of any communications from the party to counsel that courts would not expect the party to have made if it had not considered itself to be a joint client of the lawyer), what drove the party to communicate with the lawyer and the lawyer to communicate with the party (considering especially whether the party was obligated to communicate what it did to the lawyer or was free to decide whether or not to make the communications to the lawyer), the capacity in which the party communicated with the lawyer and the capacity in which the lawyer communicated with the party, whether (with respect to matters on which the party and the lawyer communicated) the party played a decision-making role comparable to the role that the law empowers clients to play, whether the party was free to ignore the lawyer’s advice or was bound to act in conformity with directives from the lawyer, whether the party paid or was obligated to pay the lawyer for her services, the relative sophistication of the party and the magnitude or significance of the interests of the party that were implicated in the matters covered by the alleged attorney-client relationship (the more sophisticated the party, and the more significant the interests affected, the more skeptically courts should view arguments that it was reasonable to rely on an implied attorney-client contract), and whether and to what extent the party also consulted or had access to any other lawyers during the relevant time period and with respect to the subject matter as to which that party is seeking to invoke the joint client exception.”
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{Id.} at 653.
\end{flushright}

In addition, the court stated the following:

Moreover, since the ultimate question is whether the law will deem two (or more) parties to have been “joint clients” of a particular lawyer, it also is necessary (in conducting this inquiry into all the relevant circumstances) to analyze all pertinent aspects of the relationship and dynamics between (a) the party that claims to have been a joint client and (b) the party that clearly was a client of the lawyer in question. This analysis should include (but not necessarily be limited to) (1) the conduct of the two parties toward one another, (2) the terms of any contractual relationship (express or implied) that the two parties may have had, (3) any fiduciary or other special obligations that existed between them, (4) the communications between the two parties (directly or indirectly), (5) whether, to what extent, and with respect to which matters there was separate, private communication between either of them and the lawyer as to whom a “joint” relationship allegedly existed, (6) if there was any such separate, private communication*653 between either party and the alleged joint counsel, whether the other party knew about it, and, if so, whether that party objected or sought to learn the content of the private communication, (7) the nature and
The court accepted that the defendants believed that the lawyers of the firm represented them. The court, however, found such beliefs “clearly unreasonable.”

Thus, the defendants were not clients of the lawyers of the firm, were not joint clients of the firm, and therefore, could not compel disclosure via the joint client exception.

2. Reasonable Belief that the Person Consulted is a Lawyer

a. Case Law

 legitimacy of each party's expectations about its ability to access communications between the other party and the allegedly joint counsel, (8) whether, to what extent, and with respect to which matters either or both of the alleged joint clients communicated privately with other lawyers, (9) the extent and character of any interests the two alleged joint parties may have had in common, and the relationship between common interests and communications with the alleged joint counsel, (10) actual and potential conflicts of interest between the two parties, especially as they might relate to matters with respect to which there appeared to be some commonality of interest between the parties, and (11) if disputes arose with third parties that related to matters the two parties had in common, whether the alleged joint counsel represented both parties with respect to those disputes or whether the two parties were separately represented.

Id. at 654.

Id. In support of its finding that the defendants’ belief of representation was unreasonable, the court noted that the lawyers subjectively did not consider the defendants to be clients and never told anyone the firm represented the defendants. The lawyers told several people, including representatives of the defendants, that the firm did not represent the defendants. The defendants never paid the firm for services and the firm never billed the defendants for services. The defendants received letters from the firm identifying the plaintiffs as clients but not identifying the defendants as clients. Also, the defendants had separate counsel. Id. at 654-55 The court found that the defendants sought legal advice from the law firm and received legal advice from the law firm but only in the defendants contractual role as project manager, not individually. The project contract required that the project manager consult with that law firm. Id. at 656-57. During the project the defendants also consulted a separate lawyer about project. Id. at 656-57. The court concluded that “it would not advance the purposes of the privilege to hold that there was an attorney-client relationship between [the defendants] and [the law firm]” but might discourage communication by a party such as the plaintiffs. Id. at 659

In concluding that the defendant’s belief that the defendants and the plaintiffs were joint clients was unreasonable, the court noted that the parties were not equals with regard to the project and the flow of information about it and were aware that they were not equals. The plaintiffs and defendants also were not fiduciaries to each other, and were not insurers or former clients. So even though the parties had “economically significant commonalities of interest,” the court stated that such could not be “legally sufficient to invoke the joint client exception to the attorney-client privilege.” Id. at 659-61 In applying the joint client exception, the court stated that

courts also should take into account the history of the relationship between the parties, the extent and character of any tensions in their relationship or of any asymmetry in their interests, and the likelihood and foreseeability of conflicts arising between the parties in the future. We hasten to acknowledge that the existence of some asymmetry of interests and/or the possibility of future disputes by no means foreclose the possibility that the joint client exception applies.

Id. at 661-62.
In addition to applying the honest and reasonable belief analysis in the attorney-client privilege setting to the question of representational relationship, courts have also applied the analysis when the person consulted is not, in fact, a lawyer. The courts addressing this issue have stated that the privilege applies to a communication even if the person consulted is not admitted to any bar and has enjoyed no legal training. If the putative client honestly and reasonably believes that the person consulted is a lawyer, and if the other requirements of the privilege are satisfied, the privilege applies even though the person consulted is, in fact, not a lawyer.138

138 See United States v. Rivera, 837 F. Supp. 565, 568 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“It is common ground among the parties that the attorney-client privilege attaches to confidential communications made to an individual in the genuine, but mistaken, belief that he is an attorney. (citations omitted) Accordingly, it is irrelevant for the purposes of this motion that Rivera was not an attorney, since the parties agree that his clients were operating under the mistaken belief that he was.”). See also United States v. Tyler, 745 F. Supp. 423, 425 (W.D. Mich. 1990)(privilege applied if person reasonably believed that cell mate was a lawyer); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 523 (D. Del. 1981)(privilege applied if person reasonably believed that one consulted was a lawyer).

In Dabney v. Investment Corp., 82 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1979), the court acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege could apply if “the client is genuinely mistaken as to the attorney’s credentials.” Id. at 465. The corporate client in Dabney was not “genuinely mistaken” because at the time of the communication the client knew that the person was at first a law student and then a law graduate who had not been admitted to any bar. Id.

In United States v. Mullen, 776 F. Supp. 620 (D. Mass 1991), the court faced a claim of privilege with regard to communications with accountants. The court stated, “the attorney-client privilege may apply to confidential communications made to an accountant when the client is under the mistaken, but reasonable, belief that the professional from whom legal advice is sought is in fact an attorney.” Id. at 621. The Mullen court then noted that the record was devoid of any proof supporting such a reasonable belief. The court ordered that such proof be produced if available so a correct decision on the matter could be rendered. Id. at 622.

In Financial Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. Smith, 2000 WL 1855131 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2000), the court faced a claim that the privilege should apply to communications between a corporate client and a person who was not a lawyer but who the client honestly thought was a lawyer. And had employed as in-house counsel. The court stated:

On balance, the Court finds these sources compelling and is of the opinion that an individual who reasonably believed that the person consulted was a duly admitted attorney should be afforded a measure of protection. The alternative would require individuals to check the background of a prospective attorney to insure that they were confiding with a “real” attorney. The inherent delay in such a process might well deprive the person of effective counsel at a time when advice is most valuable.

Id. at *6. Having said that, the court refused to extend such an approach to the corporate claimant before it. The court took the position that a corporation or other entity, in employing in-house counsel, must at the least investigate the background of the individual to confirm the individual’s status as a lawyer. Id. at *6-7. See also NXIVM Corp. v. O’Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 130 n.23 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“since NXIVM is a
In *United States v. Boffa*, the defendants in a criminal matter claimed that they had communicated with a person believing him to be a lawyer and, thus, the defendants claimed that the attorney-client privilege protected those communications. The court stated:

[T]he rationale behind the privilege equally supports the theory that the privilege should be extended to those who make confidential communications to an individual in the genuine, but mistaken, belief that he is an attorney. Prudence dictates that such a belief should be reasonable in order to lay claim to the protections of the privilege and that a “respectable degree of precaution” in engaging the services of the “attorney” must be demonstrated. Where such a belief is proved, however, the client should not be compelled to bear the risk of his “attorney’s” deception and he should be entitled to the benefits of the privilege as long as his bona fide belief in his counsel’s status is maintained.

Unfortunately, the court did not find that the defendants honestly and reasonably believed the person to be an attorney.

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_140 Id. at 523 (citation omitted)._ 
_141 Id. at 524-26. The court so concluded because of the unusual compensation arrangement, the facts surrounding the person’s employment, and activities in which the person was involved, all of which were known to the defendants._
The court in United States v. Tyler,\textsuperscript{142} applied the honest and reasonable belief analysis but, unlike in Boffa, the court determined that the privilege protected the communications. In Tyler a criminal defendant claimed that his conversations with his cellmate, who was not a lawyer, should not be admissible. The defendant testified that he honestly and reasonably believed that his cellmate was a lawyer. To support his claim the defendant noted that a law school diploma, among others, hung on the cellmate’s wall.

The inmate population referred to the cell mate as counselor.\textsuperscript{143} Also, the cellmate assisted other prisoners on all types of legal matters.\textsuperscript{144} The defendant paid the cellmate for assistance on a parole board matter.\textsuperscript{145}

In an effort to defeat the defendant’s privilege claim by defeating the defendant’s claim that he honestly and reasonably believed the cellmate was a lawyer, the government pointed out that the law school the cellmate claimed to have attended did not exist at the time he claimed to have attended it and that the defendant knew the cellmate had committed a felony.\textsuperscript{146}

The court found that the defendant had an honest and reasonable belief at the time of the communications that the cellmate was a lawyer. The attorney-client privilege applied and protected the communications from compelled disclosure.\textsuperscript{147}

\textit{b. Other Law}

\textsuperscript{143} Id. at 424.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 425.
\textsuperscript{145} Id. at 424.
\textsuperscript{146} Id. The government argued that if the defendant knew the cellmate committee a felony, he must have known that the cellmate was not a lawyer in good standing because no jurisdiction allows felons to practice law. The court disagreed, stating: “To expect a layperson to be familiar with the internal discipline procedures of the Bar is unreasonable.” Id. at 426.
\textsuperscript{147} Id. at 426.
Some jurisdictions define the attorney-client privilege by rule and more precisely address the issue of the status of the person. For example, several states have rules that specifically define “lawyer” as “a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized to engage in the practice of law in any state or nation.” Many of these states have been influenced by the language a Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 503, which was proposed but rejected by Congress in the 1970s.

The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, in section 72, also has adopted this stance. Section 72 states that the privilege applies when the communication involves a person “who is a lawyer or who the client or prospective client reasonably believes to be a lawyer.”

3. Reasonable Belief that the Communication is Confidential

Another situation in which courts have used an honest and reasonable belief analysis in the context of the attorney-client privilege is on the issue of confidentiality. Courts find communications confidential for purposes of the privilege if the client honestly and reasonably believes that the communications are confidential.

For example, in Griffith v. Davis, the court evaluated a claim of privilege by a former government employee. The employee had been involved in a shooting within the

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149 See, e.g., Ky. R. Evid. 503(a)(3); Tex. R. Evid. 503(a)(3).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687 (C.D. Cal. 1995). See generally Rice, supra note 6, §6.1, at 6-4 (“The client’s subjective intention of confidentiality must be reasonable under the circumstances.”).
scope of his employment. As a result of the shooting, the employee met with
representatives of the government and his attorneys. The agent was told that any
information he conveyed to the representatives of the government would be revealed to
authorized government individuals. The employee later claimed that the privilege
applied to the conversation with the government representatives because these
representatives later became agents of government counsel and thus were within the
circle of privilege for those sharing a “common interest” privilege. The Griffith court
agreed “that whether or not a given communication is ‘confidential’ within the meaning
of the privilege is determined from the perspective of the client,” but noted that “[t]he
client’s expectation of confidentiality, however, must be reasonable.” Because the
former employee knew at the time of the communication that the communication would
be shared with third parties, the court determined that the employee could not have had a
reasonable belief that the statements would remain confidential.

Similarly, in United States v. Ruehle, the Broadcom matter, the court held
that the privilege did not apply to Ruehle’s communications with attorneys he thought
represented him. The court did not deny the privilege on the basis of a lack of

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155 Id. at 690.
156 Id. at 692. Some courts refer to a joint defense or community of interest privilege as a “common interest
privilege.” If the person to whom the IRS agent was speaking was a representative of a party or person with
whom the IRS agent had a common interest, then the attorney-client privilege could apply to the
communications, assuming the situation satisfied the confidentiality requirement of the privilege. See supra
text at note 7(discussing the joint defense or community of interest privilege).
157 Griffith, 161 F.R.D. at 694.
158 Id. at 696. See United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991), in
which the court evaluated an argument that the privilege did not apply because the conversation between
the attorney and clients took place with a third party present. The court stated that the privilege applied
because the clients intended the conversations to be confidential. One of the clients had “expressed
concern” about the effect of the presence of the third party and had been told that he was a part of the
representation team. Id. at 752 n.14. See also United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv.,
Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989)(client’s reasonable belief is “key question”).
159 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
160 See supra discussion Section II.
representation, however. Rather, the court determined that Ruehle did not establish that he had an honest and reasonable belief that the communications were confidential.\textsuperscript{162} The court noted, in particular, that Ruehle, the Chief Financial Officer, understood before the conversation with the attorneys that the information uncovered by the attorneys would be disclosed to the independent auditors of Broadcom.\textsuperscript{163} Ruehle also knew that “Broadcom intended to fully cooperate with the SEC and the auditors.”\textsuperscript{164}

The \textit{Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers} agrees that an honest and reasonable belief analysis is appropriate on the issue of confidentiality. In section 71 the \textit{Restatement} provides:

A communication is in confidence with the meaning of [the privilege] if, at the time and in the circumstances of the communication, the communicating person reasonably believes that no one will learn the contents of the communication except a privileged person … or another person with whom communications are protected under a similar privilege.\textsuperscript{165}

V. An Analysis of Courts’ Treatment of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Tripartite Situation

\textsuperscript{162} Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 609 (“The notion that Ruehle spoke with [the] attorneys … with the reasonable belief that his statements were confidential is unsupported by the record.”).

\textsuperscript{163} Id.

\textsuperscript{164} Id. at 610.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers} section 71 provides the following illustration: Client and Lawyer confer in Client's office about a legal matter. Client realizes that occupants of nearby offices can normally hear the sound of voices coming from Client's office but reasonably supposes they cannot intelligibly detect individual words. An occupant of an adjoining office secretly records the conference between Client and Lawyer and is able to make out the contents of their communications. Even if it violates no law in the jurisdiction, the secret recording ordinarily would not be anticipated by persons wishing to confer in confidence. Accordingly, the fact that the eavesdropper overheard the Client-Lawyer communications does not impair their confidential status.

When confronted with a claim of privilege by an individual in the typical tripartite entity situation, many courts have not applied the attorney-client privilege as it has been traditionally defined and have not followed the precedent of using an honest and reasonable belief analysis to determine the nature of the relationship between the individual and the lawyer. As the court in *United States v. Stein* stated in 2006 about the treatment of an individual’s claim of privilege in an entity tripartite situation, “Courts have wrestled with this problem for some time now.” Unfortunately, much of the precedent that is the result of the wrestling match is flawed. Many courts facing such a scenario have taken a harsh approach to an individual’s claim that the corporation’s lawyer also represents the individual. These courts reach the result of denying the individual’s claim of privilege by applying tests for application of the privilege that are more demanding than that used in other sorts of cases. In addition, these courts and the analysis they use is not in accordance with the general law regarding the recognition of an attorney-client relationship.

A. The *Bevill* Case

A particularly influential case in this regard is *In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corporation*. In *Bevill*, trustees of two related corporate entities in bankruptcy and receivership sought disclosure of communications between officers of both entities and a team of lawyers. The trustees waived any attorney-client privilege

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167 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986).
168 *Id.* at 122.
on behalf of the entities and sought the disclosure in a bankruptcy and a receivership proceeding and also as part of an SEC criminal investigation into possible fraud.

The officers claimed that regardless of the entities’ waiver of privilege, the individuals had privilege protection based on their own individual relationships with the lawyers such that their consent was necessary for disclosure. In addition, the officers claimed that that even if the lawyers did not represent the individuals, the individuals consulted with the lawyers as part of a joint defense effort with the entities and thus the conversations could not be disclosed without their consent.

In the communications at issue, the individuals met with the lawyers and told them that they sought to have the lawyers represent “possibly” one or all of them and also “possibly” one of the entities. The lawyers considered the situation for several days and then stated that they would represent one of the entities. The lawyers continued to

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169 Id. at 123.
170 Id. at 122.
171 Id. at 123.
172 Id. The officers claimed that they were represented by the lawyers along with one of the entities. To the extent that this is a claim of joint representation by the lawyers, generally the rule is that disclosure cannot occur without consent of both parties. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 75 (2000). See also supra text at note 5. The privilege does not apply when the communication is to be disclosed in a proceeding in which the co-clients are adverse. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 75(2) (2000). See also supra text at note 6. There is an argument that even if the officers had privilege rights, the officers could not block disclosure of the communications because the co-clients, the entity and the individuals, were adverse.

If the officers’ claim was not of a joint client representation but of a separate representation, then the officers’ claim of the right to block disclosure would be correct even in a setting in which the entities and the officers were adverse. See Rice, supra note 6, §§4: 30.

In the alternative the officers claimed that they enjoyed a joint defense privilege even if the lawyers did not represent them. In a joint defense setting, all parties must agree to a waiver. As with the joint client setting the privilege does not apply when the communication is sought to be disclosed in a proceeding in which the co-clients are adverse. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76 (2000). See also supra text at note 7. So, once again there is an argument that even if the joint defense privilege applied generally here, the officers could not block disclosure of the communications because the entity and the individuals were adverse.

173 Id. at 121-22.
consider representing the individuals. Finally, several days later, the lawyers told the individuals that they should obtain separate counsel.\textsuperscript{174}

The lower court determined that communications between the individuals and the lawyers that occurred before the lawyers announced that they represented the entity were privileged. These communications could not be disclosed without the consent of the individuals.\textsuperscript{175} The lower court concluded differently with regard to conversations between the lawyers and the individuals that occurred after the lawyers stated that they would represent the entity but before they announced that they would not represent the individuals. The lower court determined that these communications were not privileged as part of a joint defense or otherwise.\textsuperscript{176}

On appeal the Third Circuit approved of the test applied by the lower court.\textsuperscript{177} That test required, for the recognition of individual attorney-client privilege protection, that an individual in the entity tripartite situation prove 1) that the individual approached counsel for the purpose of seeking legal advice, 2) that the individual was clear with counsel that he or she sought legal advice in his or her individual capacity, 3) that the lawyer communicated with the individual in his or her individual capacity even with the possibility of a conflict of interest on the horizon, 4) that the communications were confidential, and 5) that the communications “did not concern matters within the company or the general affairs of the company.”\textsuperscript{178} The Third Circuit acknowledged that the individual officers may have a personal attorney-client privilege “as to matters not

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Id.} at 122.  
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Id.} at 123.  
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Id.}  
\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Id.} at 125.  
\textsuperscript{178} \textit{Id.} at 123 (The lower court in \textit{Bevill} relied upon the test stated in \textit{In re Grand Jury Investigation}, No. 83-30557, 575 F. Supp. 777, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1983)).
related to their role as officers of the corporation,”¹⁷⁹ but that “they do not have an 
attorney-client privilege with regard to communications made in their role as corporate 
oficials.”¹⁸⁰ Though both the individuals and the attorneys stated that the individuals 
consulted with the attorneys for the purpose of personal representation, and even though 
the attorneys had not stated that they were not representing the individuals,¹⁸¹ neither the 
lower court nor the Third Circuit accepted this evidence as sufficient evidence that the 
individuals’ communications with the attorneys were protected by personal attorney-
client privilege. The Third Circuit approvingly noted that the lower court had 
acknowledged that the individuals might have a personal privilege with regard to 
communications “relating to their personal liabilities, except insofar as they were related 
to their role as corporate officers.”¹⁸² Finally, The Third Circuit determined that the 
individuals had not proved that the communications were part of a joint defense effort, 
that the communications were made in furtherance of that effort, and that the privilege 
had not been waived.¹⁸³ 

The Bevill court’s test and its application in that case renders irrelevant the 
reasonable belief of the individuals in a tripartite entity situation as to the nature of the 
lawyer-client relationship. Regardless of the reasonable belief of the individual, if the 
communications between the individual and the lawyer concerned “matters within the 
company or the general affairs of the company,”¹⁸⁴ even if the communication concerned 
the individual’s involvement and personal liability, no individual privilege can be

¹⁷⁹ Bevill, 805 F.2d at 125. 
¹⁸⁰ Id. 
¹⁸¹ Id. at 122-23. 
¹⁸² Id. at 125. 
¹⁸³ Id. at 126. 
¹⁸⁴ Id. at 123.
recognized. Likewise, if the individual was not clear with counsel that individual representation was desired, no individual privilege is possible. If the lawyer did not communicate with the individual in the individual’s personal capacity, no individual privilege is possible. An individual in an entity tripartite situation could easily not satisfy one of these requirements and yet honestly and reasonably believe that the he or she is in a lawyer-client relationship with the lawyer.

The rejection of the honest and reasonable belief approach is apparent in the lower court’s determination that communications that occurred between the attorneys and the individuals before the attorneys announced that they would represent one of the entities were privileged while communications after the attorneys announced that they would represent the entity were not privileged. One must consider whether individuals in a tripartite situation, even sophisticated ones, would understand that the lawyers’ decision to represent one of the entities necessarily defeated the possibility that the lawyers also represented them or might represent them in the future.

Did the Bevill court intend to hold that no individual can have a reasonable belief that a lawyer who represents the entity could also represent the individual in the matter? Yet, lawyers often represent both the entity and an individual officer or director. Often, lawyers represent even low level individuals and the entity employer in matters such as suits relating to traffic accidents. Lawyers also represent higher level individuals when the interests of the entity employer and the individual appear to be similar. Courts should take care not to establish a standard of reasonableness that does not comport with the realities of the world in which the people being measured by that standard operate.

185 In E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 388 (S.D. Tex. 1969), the court stated, “The Court takes judicial notice that it is not uncommon for corporate counsel to represent an individual corporate officer when his is sued as a result of actions he has taken within the ambit of his official duties.”
In addition to the rejection of the honest and reasonable belief approach, the *Bevill* test requires the claimant to prove elements not included within the traditional definition of the attorney-client privilege. The long-accepted definition of the privilege is that it applies to a communication between an attorney and a client, in confidence, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance and not yet waived. The *Bevill* test changes this basic definition.

An individual claiming the privilege in the tripartite scenario might prove that a communication was between an attorney and the individual. The individual might be able to prove that the individual honestly and reasonably believed that the lawyer represented the individual or might in the future and that in that context the individual communicated with the lawyer for the purpose of seeking legal advice or assistance. The individual might be able to prove that he or she had an honest and reasonable belief that the communication was in confidence and that the individual had not waived the privilege.

In the typical claim of privilege, courts would find that the claimant’s burden had been successfully shouldered. Yet, in the entity tripartite situation, the *Bevill* test would require, at the very least, that the individual prove that the communication “did not concern matters within the company or the general affairs of the company.” Further, the individual must prove that he or she made clear to the attorney that personal legal advice was sought and that the attorney communicated with the individual in that capacity. These are elements required by *Bevill* in the tripartite situation that are not required in other settings. In other settings, for example, what the attorney knew or

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should have known is irrelevant. These requirements may involve facts that are relevant to an evaluation of whether the individual’s belief that the attorney represented the individual was reasonable. To state them as additional independent required elements of proof is different, however.

Since the Bevill approach varies from the usual, one must look to the justification for the different rule. Without doubt, the Bevill approach protects the rights of the entity with regard to its privilege. The Bevill court sought to block infringement on current management’s control of the entity’s privilege, particularly since in this matter the entity’s decision was a waiver, a decision to disclose. In the court’s view, if an individual representative of the entity discusses entity matters with entity counsel, only the entity has a privilege with regard to those conversations and thus only the entity may waive or not waive that privilege. The court supported its decision by noting that allowing individuals to assert a personal privilege would allow information to remain undisclosed.188

The court’s interest in promoting disclosure is understandable. This interest is in accord with the general policy of the courts to apply the attorney-client privilege narrowly.189 Yet, the privilege itself causes nondisclosure and yet it is an accepted creature of the law because its benefits are thought to outweigh the cost of nondisclosure. The joint client privilege expands nondisclosure in certain cases as does the joint defense or community of interest privilege. Yet, these, too, are accepted facets of the law because

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188 Bevill, 805 F.2d at 125 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 353 (1985)) (“To provide a blanket privilege regarding all discussions of corporate matters on the basis of an assertion of personal privileges by the officers would prevent the trustee from investigating possible misconduct by the officers and permit the officers to ‘use the privilege as a shield against the trustee’s efforts.’”).
189 See supra Section III.C.
a perceived benefit outweighs the injury to the interest in full disclosure. The point is that the prevention of nondisclosure rationale is of limited value.

The effect of the Bevill approach of recognizing a privilege for the entity and refusing to consider a privilege for the individual reflects a valuation of the entity’s rights as superior to any privilege rights of the individual. No matter how reasonable the individual’s belief that the lawyer represents or may represent the individual in the future, there is no privilege if, for example, the individual consults with the lawyer about activity “within the company or the general affairs of the company.”190 If an individual goes to a lawyer’s office and discusses his involvement in a matter that involves his actions as an individual, that conversation is protected by the privilege assuming it satisfies the general requirements of the privilege, including the requirement that the individual honestly and reasonably believe that he is seeking legal advice or assistance from a person who may become or is the individual’s lawyer. Under Bevill, if that individual has that same conversation with an attorney who the individual knows represents the individual’s entity employer, the individual has no privilege, regardless of the reasonableness of the individual’s belief about the relationship the individual has with the lawyer.

The Bevill approach values the privilege rights of the entity over the individual’s rights. The logical reverse of this approach would value the individual’s rights over those of the entity. Both the Bevill approach and its logical reverse are inappropriate. The entity has no greater right to the protections of the attorney-client privilege than does the individual, and the reverse is true as well. Rather, courts should entertain the possibility that both the individual and the entity may have privilege protection.

190 Bevill, 805 F.2d at 123.
A court applying the *Bevill* approach is holding that no matter what the lawyer might say or not say to the individual about the representation, the individual enjoys no personal privilege if the conversation relates to his or her involvement in the entity. This would be true even if the lawyers told the individual during the conversation that they represented the individual. This is not a just result. This is not a just result in light of the ease with which the individual’s confusion could be eliminated by forthright explanation by the lawyer. It is not a just result in light of professional responsibility standards that govern the lawyer’s conduct and encourage if not demand forthright explanation of the situation to the individual.

**B. Bevill Progeny**

1. Federal Appellate Courts

In *In re Grand Jury Subpoena*, the First Circuit applied the *Bevill* approach to a situation in which a lawyer represented an entity who had waived the privilege. The lawyer freely admitted that he represented the individuals in various matters in their personal capacities. The lawyer also claimed that in the grand jury investigation he represented the entity and the individuals in a “joint defense agreement” situation. As a

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1. 274 F.3d 563 (1st Cir. 2001).
2. *Id.* at 571-72.
3. *Id.* at 567-68.
4. *Id.* at 571.
5. *Id.* at 568. This court discusses this matter as involving a “joint defense agreement” and also as a “joint representation.” Technically, a joint defense privilege involves two parties who are represented by separate counsel who decide to share information and strategy and otherwise work together. A broader version of this privilege is the common interest or community of interest privilege. *See Rice, supra* note 6, § 4:35 (discussing the joint defense concept and the community of interests concept). *See also* United States v. Bay States Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).

A joint representation is simply a situation in which two parties are represented by the same attorney and share strategy and information. The facts before the court suggest a joint representation, not a joint defense, since the individuals are not claiming to have separate representation by other attorneys. *See*
result of this evidence of representation, the court assumed that the first four *Bevill* factors were satisfied.\textsuperscript{196}

The court then turned to the fifth *Bevill* factor, the one requiring that for an individual privilege to be recognized, the communications must not concern matters “within the company or the general affairs of the company.”\textsuperscript{197} The First Circuit clarified that an individual privilege could be claimed even when a consultation involved the “general affairs” of the corporation if the focus of the consultation was with regard to the “‘individual officer’s personal rights and liabilities.’”\textsuperscript{198} The court limited this position somewhat by stating, “We hold that an individual privilege may exist in these circumstances only to the extent that communications made in a corporate officer’s personal capacity are separable from those made in his corporate capacity.”\textsuperscript{199} The court continued that “a corporation may unilaterally waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to any communications made by a corporate officer in his corporate capacity, notwithstanding the existence of an individual attorney-client relationship between him and the corporation’s counsel.”\textsuperscript{200} In reviewing the communications at issue, the court noted that the communications did not “appear to be distinguishable from discussions between the same parties in their capacities as corporate officers and corporate counsel, respectively, anent matters of corporate concern.”\textsuperscript{201}

\textit{See} Rice, \textit{supra} note 6, § 4:30 (discussing the joint client concept). \textit{See also} Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687 (C.D. Cal. 1995). \textit{See supra text at notes 5-7.}

\textsuperscript{196} 274 F.3d at 572.


\textsuperscript{198} \textit{In re Grand Jury Subpoena}, 274 F.3d at 572 (quoting \textit{In re: Grand Jury Proceedings v. United States}, 156 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998)(italics in original)).

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{In re Grand Jury Subpoena}, 274 F.3d at 569.

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Id.} at 573.

\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Id.} at 572.
In response to the argument that the communications were jointly privileged such that disclosure could not occur without consent of both the individual involved and the entity, the court refused to recognize any joint privilege rights in this entity situation, stating that to hold otherwise “would open the door to a claim of jointly-held privilege in virtually every corporate communication with counsel.”202 Noting that the individuals involved in the matter before it were corporate officers who owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the court simply chose to view the corporation’s rights as superior to the rights of the individuals.203

The First Circuit improved upon the Bevill approach in that it acknowledged that an individual should have privilege protection even when the individual talks with the attorney about the entity. The First Circuit approach limits the individual’s rights, however, in that the individual has the protection of the privilege only when a communication is separable from entity communications with the lawyer and discusses only the rights and liabilities of the individual. As with Bevill, the honest and reasonable belief of the individual is given short shrift. In addition, an individual in the entity tripartite situation has more to prove to obtain the protection of the attorney-client privilege than does an individual in other settings. Even if an attorney tells an individual that the attorney represented the individual, and even if the attorney tells the individual that the communications are privileged, and even if the attorney tells the individual that the communications cannot be disclosed without the consent of the individual, the individual may have no privilege protection.

202 Id. at 573.
203 Id. In addition, the court noted that even if the court were willing to recognize a jointly-held privilege, such communications can be disclosed when the formerly joint clients become adverse. The court noted that the situation before the court in which one former co-client wished to disclose and the other does not in a criminal investigation sometimes has been viewed as an adverse setting. Id.
A similar case is *United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO*. The attorneys involved represented a union election campaign in an investigation into election irregularities. The attorneys had several conversations with an employee of the campaign. The attorneys had not represented the individual in the past and never told the individual that they represented him individually. The attorneys told the employee that they represented the campaign and that the conversations were privileged. The lawyers never indicated whose privilege to which they referred and never indicated who had the power or authority to waive the privilege. After the conversations a lawyer for the entity called to explain to the employee that an election investigator wanted to interview him. The lawyer explained that the individual should obtain his own counsel. Very tellingly, the individual was “surprised by the suggestion” and stated that he thought the campaign lawyers represented him as well. The lawyer then explained that the lawyers represented the entity and “had never represented [the individual] individually.” The entity, the campaign, later waived the privilege and the individual asserted that he had an individual privilege covering the conversations.

In *International Brotherhood*, the Second Circuit confronted the individual’s claim that his reasonable belief of the situation should determine whether a personal attorney-client privilege covered the key conversations. The court rejected this path and quoted the *Bevill* text approvingly. The court stated that the *Bevill* approach and not

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204 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997).
205 *Id.* at 213.
206 *Id.* at 212-13.
207 *Id.* at 214.
208 *Id.* at 216-17.
the reasonable belief standard was the proper method for dealing with the “competing” claims of the individual and of the entity.\textsuperscript{209}

Turning to the facts, the \textit{International Brotherhood} court noted that the individual “neither sought nor received legal advice from [the lawyers] on personal matters” and so did not enjoy a privilege to prevent disclosure.\textsuperscript{210} Finally, though noting that the court “need not reach the question of the reasonableness of [the individual’s] belief that he was being individually represented,” the court stated that the evidence supported “the district court’s finding that [the individual] could not reasonably have believed that [the lawyers] represented him individually.”\textsuperscript{211}

The court so concluded even though the court acknowledged the inappropriateness of the lawyers’ conduct, stating that they violated the “spirit, if not the letter” of the ethical principles applicable to them.\textsuperscript{212} Specifically, the court noted that the lawyers did not do all that they could have done to “clarify the conflicts of interest that can and do develop between organizations and their employees, or to clarify that [the lawyers] represented the Campaign alone” or “to clarify that they did not represent [the employee]” until after problematic conversations had occurred.\textsuperscript{213} The court then stated that “the arguably less-than-exemplary actions” of the lawyers did not “lead us to change our interpretation of the law of attorney-client privilege.”\textsuperscript{214}

The focus on whether the individual made clear to the lawyer that he sought personal legal advice places the burden for any misconceptions on the individual and not

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{209}] \textit{Id.}
\item[\textsuperscript{210}] \textit{Id.} at 216.
\item[\textsuperscript{211}] \textit{Id.} at 216-217. The Second Circuit also concluded that it need not deal with the conclusion of the lower court that even if the individual had a reasonable belief, the individual waived any privilege by failing to object to disclosure of the conversations to another person. \textit{Id.} at 217.
\item[\textsuperscript{212}] \textit{Id.} at 217.
\item[\textsuperscript{213}] \textit{Id.}
\item[\textsuperscript{214}] \textit{Id.}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the lawyer. Yet, the lawyer surely has a more sophisticated and nuanced view of how an employee or other individual might misperceive the representation and the applicability and rights relating to the attorney-client privilege. Even sophisticated players in the business world commonly misunderstand the lawyer’s role and the implications for the attorney-client privilege. It is odd that the International Brotherhood court places the burden on the individual to clarify the situation. A lawyer in the tripartite situation should be aware of the potential for the individual to misunderstand the relationship and the application of the attorney-client privilege. It is a slight burden to require the lawyer to clarify so that a reasonable individual would understand that the lawyer does not represent the individual and that the individual has no control over whether the conversations will be disclosed later.\footnote{The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has also placed a significant burden on the individual in the entity tripartite situation. The court emphasized that when dealing with the entity lawyer, an employee or other individual must clearly state a desire to obtain individual advice. In Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2005), the former police director of the city of Memphis sought to defend himself in a section 1983 action by claiming that he enjoyed qualified immunity. The individual supported his defense with a claim that he acted with the advice of counsel. Id. at 598-99. The question before the court was whether the individual’s claim of advice of counsel waived any privilege, including the City’s privilege, that might attach to the key communications. The court recognized that conversations between individuals and a lawyer for related entity attorneys are generally viewed as conversations between the entity and the attorney. The court recognized, however, that an individual can have a privilege in regard to conversations with corporate counsel. The court stated that an individual privilege would not be recognized unless the individual “indicate[s] to the lawyer that he seeks advice in his individual capacity.” Id. at 605. The court stated that such a requirement “allows the attorney to gauge whether it would be appropriate to advise the individual given the attorney’s obligations concerning representation of the corporation.” Id. at 605. In remanding, the court noted that there was some evidence that the individual did just that. Id. at 605-06. See also United States v. Dakota, 197 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Absent an indication that the lawyer should act in a capacity other than that of the company’s lawyer, a corporate officer will not have a privilege.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Michigan, August 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648, at 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff’d, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978) (“If [the officer] makes it clear when he is consulting the company lawyer that he personally is consulting the lawyer and the lawyer sees fit to accept and give communication knowing the possible conflicts that could arise, he may have a privilege.”) The court found the individual did not have a personal privilege.)}

The Tenth Circuit has also followed the teachings of Bevill. In In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas,\footnote{144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. United States, 525 U.S. 966 (1998).} the President and Chief Executive Officer of a hospital claimed that his
individual attorney-client privilege protected certain of his conversations with lawyers who also represented the hospital. Thus, he claimed that the lawyers should not be compelled to testify before the grand jury. The hospital waived any privilege it had protecting communications.\textsuperscript{217} The court noted that a reasonable belief of representation “may be enough to create an attorney-client relationship, but is not sufficient here to create a personal attorney-client privilege.”\textsuperscript{218} Rather, the Bevill factors must obtain and the privilege does not apply if “both corporate and individual liability were discussed.”\textsuperscript{219} Fortunately for the President, the lawyers testified that he sought the advice of the lawyers in an individual capacity and that they discussed his personal situation confidentially. The court determined that the President’s privilege protected the communications from disclosure.\textsuperscript{220}

In a related case, \textit{In re Grand Jury Proceedings},\textsuperscript{221} the same individual sought to block disclosure of certain documents.\textsuperscript{222} The lower court had found that the individual could not satisfy the Bevill analysis because the documents in question “concerned matters within the company or the general affairs of the company.”\textsuperscript{223} The Tenth Circuit clarified, however, that the last Bevill factor is satisfied “if the communication between a corporate officer and corporate counsel specifically focuses upon the individual officer’s personal rights and liabilities … even though the general subject matter of the conversation pertains to matters within the general affairs of the company.”\textsuperscript{224}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{217} \textit{Id} at 657.
  \item \textsuperscript{218} \textit{Id} at 659.
  \item \textsuperscript{219} \textit{Id}.
  \item \textsuperscript{220} \textit{Id}. The court then held that the crime-fraud exception applied such that the privilege, ultimately, did not protect the communications were not protected. \textit{Id}.
  \item \textsuperscript{221} 156 F.3d 1038 (10\textsuperscript{th} Cir. 1998).
  \item \textsuperscript{222} \textit{Id} at 1040.
  \item \textsuperscript{223} \textit{Id}. \textit{at} 1041.
  \item \textsuperscript{224} \textit{Id}.
\end{itemize}
individual must discuss with counsel “his or her *personal* liability, legal rights, or actions, as distinguished from the corporation’s rights and responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{225} The individual could not make this proof so the court denied the claim of privilege.\textsuperscript{226}

2. The Lower Courts

\textsuperscript{225} *Id.* at 1041-42.
\textsuperscript{226} *Id.* at 1042.
The Bevill approach also has influenced the lower courts.\textsuperscript{227} For example, the

\textsuperscript{227} The cases are numerous. In United States ex rel. Magid v. Wilderman, 2006 WL 2346426 (E.D. Pa. 2006), the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania faced a claim by an individual that her communications with an investigator reporting to the employer’s lawyer were privileged. Though recognizing the daunting task placed on the individual claiming privilege protection by so doing, the court applied the five-factor Bevill analysis. \textit{Id.} at *4. The court concluded that “it is by no means clear” that the individual sought personal legal advice and “even less clear that [the lawyer] spoke to [the individual] in her individual capacity.” \textit{Id.} at *5. The court pointed out that the investigator stated that he worked for the lawyer and that the lawyer represented the employer’s entity. Finally, the court noted that the communications all concerned the general affairs of the entity. The court concluded that at the time of the interviews, “[i]t can not reasonably be argued that [the lawyer] represented [the individual].” \textit{Id.} Thus, the court held that the individual had no privilege protection relating to the communications. \textit{Id.} Yet, in a letter sent to the court, the individual stated that “at the time this complaint was filed I was told I was represented by the practice attorney Arthur Shuman. I am now being told he does not represent me and I need to obtain my own attorney.” \textit{Id.} at *2.

In Applied Technology Int’l, Ltd. v. Goldstein, 2005 WL 318755 (E.D. Pa. 2005), the court applied Bevill and found that the individual, the former President of the company, did not prove that he had an individual privilege to protect communications with the attorney who also represented the entity. The attorney stated that he never distinguished between the entity and the President. \textit{Id.} at *3. The court concluded that a lack of distinction by the lawyer resulted in no privilege for the President under the Bevill analysis. \textit{Id.} The reason for this finding is that the individual has the burden of proving that the privilege applies. If the President can prove only that the situation is ambiguous, then the individual has not shouldered the Bevill burden.

In Tuttle v. Combined Ins. Co., 222 F.R.D. 424 (E.D. Cal. 2004), \textit{aff’d}, 225 Fed. Appx. 620 (9th Cir. 2007), a lawyer for a corporation claimed that an employee was a client. The lawyer was defending his conduct in contacting the employee and keeping the employee away from opposing counsel. The lawyer had been present at the employee’s deposition. \textit{Id.} at 429. The court used the Bevill factors to decide that the lawyer did not represent the individual. \textit{Id.}

In Grassmueck v. Ogden Murphy Wallace, P.L.L.C., 213 F.R.D. 567 (W.D. Wash. 2003), an individual claimed the privilege though the receiver of the entity had waived it. The court applied the Bevill factors as clarified by the First Circuit and stated that the individual had no personal attorney-client privilege because there was no showing that the communications were between the person in his individual capacity and the lawyers and “segregable from issues relating to the corporate entities.” \textit{Id.} at 572.

In United States v. Sawyer, 878 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1995), \textit{aff’d}, 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996), an entity investigated gifts and spending on legislators. A Vice President of the entity discussed these matters with the entity’s in-house counsel. The lawyer told the Vice President that he was acting as an attorney for the entity and that information could be disclosed to the State Ethics Commission. The attorney told the individual that they were all a team but that interests could eventually conflict. The court noted that the individual had a duty to talk with the in-house counsel and that the individual met with the attorney in that capacity. He was not individually seeking personal legal advice. \textit{Id.} at 296. The court stated that it “finds that there is no evidence that 1) Sawyer consulted Hancock's lawyers on a personal basis or 2) Hancock's lawyers agreed to represent him on a personal basis.” \textit{Id.}

See also MacKenzie-Childs LLC v. MacKenzie-Childs, 262 F.R.D. 241 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting the Bevill factors but then noting that \textit{International Brotherhood} did not clearly adopt Bevill for the Second Circuit; in the tripartite entity situation the individual must be clear with entity counsel that the individual seeks legal advice on personal matters); \textit{In re Application to Enforce Administrative Subpoenas of SEC v. Nicita, 2008 WL 170010 (S.D. Cal. 2008)} (applying Bevill’s factors and denying application of the privilege); SEC v. Credit Bancorp., Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (sole shareholder, President, Chief Executive Officer, claimed that the general counsel for the entity was also representing the individual; court followed Bevill and \textit{International Brotherhood} and denied individual privilege).

See generally The MJK Family LLC v. Corporate Eagle Management Services, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (using the Bevill factors to determine the existence or absence of an attorney-
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in United States v. Stein, 228 embraced Bevill with the modifications made by the First and Tenth Circuits. 229 The individual in Stein was an employee of KPMG, a large accounting firm. The individual claimed that her personal attorney-client privilege protected certain communications she had with the attorney who represented KPMG and thus those communications could not be used against her in an Internal Revenue Service matter. KPMG had waived its entity privilege. 230 The individual could not prove that the communications involved her interests alone and could not prove that the communications were segregable as required by the First and Tenth Circuit precedent. 231 As a result, the court did not recognize individual privilege protection for the employee. 232

Interestingly, the Stein court recognized at least one facet of the unfairness of the Bevill approach. The court noted that individuals in the entity tripartite situation are often unaware of the untoward consequences of talking with the lawyer for the entity. The

client relationship between counsel for an entity and the principals for purposes of a disqualification motion; no attorney-client relationship found). Few cases decided before or at approximately the same time as Bevill, reach similar conclusions. See United States v. Delillo, 448 F. Supp. 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (entity waived privilege but the Chairman of the Board claimed an individual privilege; the court denied an individual privilege stating that the individual must make clear that a communication is personal and the lawyer accepts knowing the potential for conflicts); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit, Michigan, August, 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (entity waived the privilege; the court denied an individual privilege and stated that the individual must make clear that it is a personal communication and the lawyer accepts knowing the potential for conflicts); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (entity waived the privilege; individual had a privilege but not “as to matters involving the affairs of the [entity], or embracing his role or activities as an [entity] officer or director”).

229 The First Circuit clarified that the individual may claim the privilege only if the communications “regarding individual acts and liabilities are segregable from discussions about the corporation.” See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 573 (1st Cir. 2001). The Tenth Circuit clarified that an individual in the entity tripartite situation can claim the privilege even if the general subject matter is the general affairs of the entity if the communication specifically concerns the individual’s personal liability. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings. 156 F.3d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir. 1998).
230 Stein, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
231 Id. at 465-66.
232 Id. The individual had been represented jointly by the lawyer engaged to represent KPMG in two earlier lawsuits. Id. at 461. The court noted that in both of these representations the individual was a witness only, not a party. Thus, the prior representations did not create a reasonable belief of representation when the individual was a party. Id. at 466.
court perceived that individuals may misapprehend the situation as the result of the entity’s or the attorney’s intentional or inadvertent deception or on the basis of his or her own mistakes of understanding.233 The court noted that any confusion could be clarified by lawyers telling individuals that the lawyer represents the entity and not the individual and that the individual has no attorney-client privilege with regard to communications with the lawyer. The court observed, however, that years after the necessity of such a warning has been made clear, the lawyers involved in the matter before the court had not given such warnings.234 The court speculated that in cases of true deception, perhaps the entity should bear the cost since the entity has much to gain by that deception.235

C. Courts Using a More Traditional Reasonable Belief Approach

A few courts have followed a more traditional path in the tripartite entity context and have applied a test of individual attorney-client privilege that turns on the reasonable belief of the individual involved. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal,236 the Fourth Circuit evaluated the claim of three employees of AOL Time Warner(AOL). AOL’s in-house counsel and outside counsel had done an investigation of a matter that later became the subject of an SEC investigation. In the course of the investigation, the lawyers talked with the three individuals. Later, AOL waived any privilege regarding the lawyers’ communications with the three individuals so that the communications could be disclosed to the SEC. The employees then claimed that each one of the three had an

233 Id. at 462.
234 Id. at 460. The individual stated that she did not recall having been told that the lawyers represented only KPMG or that KPMG could waive any privilege without the individual’s consent.
235 Id. at 462 n. 13.
individual attorney-client privilege that protected the communications with the lawyers from disclosure.\textsuperscript{237}

The Fourth Circuit applied a traditional reasonable belief test. The court stated, that “the putative client must show that his subjective belief that an attorney-client relationship existed was reasonable under the circumstances.”\textsuperscript{238} The claims of privilege failed, however, because the court opined that the individuals could not have believed that the lawyers represented them.\textsuperscript{239} The lawyers, before interviewing the individuals, told them they represented AOL and that the conversations were privileged. The lawyers also told the individuals that the privilege belonged to AOL and could be waived by AOL. In addition, the lawyers told the individuals that they were free to consult with their own lawyers at any time. The lawyers stated that they could represent the individuals unless a conflict arose.\textsuperscript{240} The lawyers did not state that they represented the individuals nor did the individuals ask the lawyers to represent them.\textsuperscript{241}

This case is a good example of how the reasonable belief approach properly protects the interests and rights of the individual and at the same time does not do violence to the interests and rights of the entity. The analysis does, however, synchronize well with the lawyers’ ethical obligations and provides an approach fair to all. These lawyers behaved forthrightly and the individuals were not misled. Unlike what is true

\textsuperscript{237} Id. at 336-37.
\textsuperscript{238} Id. at 339.
\textsuperscript{239} Id.
\textsuperscript{240} Id. at 337.
\textsuperscript{241} Id. at 339. The court expressed displeasure at the weakness of the disclosure. The court stated, “[O]ur opinion should not be read as an implicit acceptance of the watered-down ‘Upjohn warnings’ the investigating attorneys gave the appellants. Id. at 340.

One of the individuals also claimed a common interest privilege. While the individual and the entity did enter into a common interest agreement such that the privilege would apply to communications after the agreement, the conversations at issue occurred before the parties agreed to pursue a common interest arrangement. Id. at 340-41. For a discussion of a common interest privilege, see text supra at note 8. See also Rice, supra note 6, §§ 4:22 & 4:35.
with the *Bevill* approach, with the reasonable belief approach, the lawyer rightfully has the burden to act appropriately and clarify the situation to the people with whom the lawyer deals. The attorney-client privilege analysis does not subtly encourage or tolerate less than candid dealings.

Two cases decided before *Bevill* are also helpful. In *Wylie v. The Marley Company*, a Tenth Circuit panel wrote before the Circuit applied the teachings of *Bevill* in *In re: Grand Jury Subpoenas*, and in *In re Grand Jury Proceedings*. The former executive vice president sued the company for breach of his employment agreement. The executive claimed that the attorney-client privilege applied to a conversation he had with the entity’s General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer. This attorney had represented the executive in the negotiation of his employment agreement which was entered into in April of 1981. The conversations at issue occurred in December of 1982. The lawyer claimed that his practice was to refrain from giving personal legal advice to employees. The executive stated, however, that he had conversations with the lawyer about his employment agreement. He stated that he asked the lawyer about his rights under the employment contract and sought legal representation from the lawyer. The executive stated that he thought that the lawyer was still his lawyer. The lawyer denied that the executive requested legal advice and told the individual during the conversation at issue that he was not able to represent him. The lower court found that this statement occurred after the key communication. The appellate court determined that the lower court had

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242 891 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1989).
244 156 F.3d 1038 (10th Cir. 1998).
245 *Wylie*, 891 F.2d at 1471.
246 *Id.* at 1465.
247 *Id.* at 1466-67.
248 *Id.* at 1472.
not abused its discretion in finding that the individual’s privilege protected the conversation. The lower court decided that the executive “could have believed that he could turn to [the lawyer] who negotiated his [employment] contract for the purpose of securing legal advice in the course of their relationship and in confidence.” The trial court had also noted that to hold otherwise would be unfair to the executive who could have been “confused” by the situation.

In another case decided before Bevill, United States v. Keplinger, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals looked first for a manifestation by the individuals of intent to seek legal advice from the attorneys who also represented the entity. The entity had waived its own attorney-client privilege. The court stated that absent a “relatively clear indication by the potential client to the attorney that he believed he was being individually represented,” no attorney-client privilege can be found “without some finding that the potential client’s subjective belief is minimally reasonable.” The court noted that the individuals “never explicitly sought individual legal advice, or asked about individual representation,” the lawyers never “indicated” that a relationship existed, and one lawyer told one of the individuals that he did not represent him. While the court focused on the conduct of the individuals in not clearly seeking individual representation,

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249 Id. at 1471.
250 Id. (quoting the lower court).
251 Id.
252 776 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1183 (1986).
253 Id. at 701.
254 Id. at 700. The individuals also claimed that the joint defense doctrine protected the communications. The court expressed doubt that the entity and the individuals shared an interest. The court stopped short of analyzing the question, however, because the court opined that the statements, in any case, were not made in confidence. Thus, no attorney-client privilege applied. Id. at 701.
there is no doubt that the court did so upon a backdrop of applying a reasonable belief of representation analysis.\(^{255}\)

**VI. Professional Responsibility Standards**

The rules of professional conduct which govern lawyer conduct in the various jurisdictions must inform any consideration of the corporate tripartite situation because these rules guide a lawyer in the appropriate conduct for the practice of law. Most jurisdictions have professional conduct rules patterned after the American Bar Association’s *Model Rules of Professional Conduct*.\(^{256}\) These rules establish a path of honesty and forthrightness for any lawyer dealing with individuals in connection with the representation of an entity such as a corporation.

**A. Model Rule 1.13(a)**

Model Rule 1.13, the rule that specifically deals with representation of an organization, contains several provisions that are particularly helpful. First, Rule 1.13(a)

\(^{255}\) In fact, in response to the argument that the scope of the attorney-client relationship “‘‘hinges upon the client’s belief that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his manifested intention to seek professional legal advice,’” the *Keplinger* court stated, “we do not quibble with that statement.” *Id.* at 701 (quoting *Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.*, 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 955 (1978) (quoting *McCormick on Evidence* § 88 at 179 (2d ed. 1972))). See also *In re Search Warrant for Law Offices Executed on March 19, 1992*, 153 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court recognized that individual principals of a corporate client had standing to raise issues of attorney-client privilege. The court stated that an attorney-client relationship existed. “The individuals understood themselves to be subjects of any possible investigation, along with the corporation itself and the motivation for retaining the law firm to make the preliminary investigation extended to benefiting them individually, as well as their corporation. *Id.* at 59. The court concluded, “It would be slicing the salami unduly fine to claim that the individuals had no attorney-client relationship.” *Id.*


provides that a “lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”\textsuperscript{257} This statement is helpful in the tripartite situation because it clarifies that if an attorney represents the entity, then the attorney generally represents the entity and not those who speak and act for the entity. The acts and words of the agents are the acts and words of the entity for purposes of the attorney-client relationship, if those acts and words are acts and words of the agent \textit{qua} agent and not the individual on his or her own individual behalf. Even lawyers can sometimes forget that the client is the entity. After all, lawyers deal with the individuals involved and those lawyers form relationships with the individuals. This rule is a clarification and a reminder.

\textbf{B. Model Rule 1.13(b)}

Rule 1.13 continues in part (b) by discusses the lawyer’s duty to an entity client. The rule states that representing the entity involves acting “as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.”\textsuperscript{258} This makes clear that the entity client has the same position in an attorney-client relationship as an individual has if a lawyer represented an individual.

\textbf{C. Model Rule 1.13(f)}

Because the corporate tripartite situation is inherently confusing to the individual actors—lawyer and nonlawyer alike, and because this confusion was obvious to the

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct}, Rule 1.13(a) (2009).
\textsuperscript{258} \textit{ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct}, Rule 1.13(b) (2009).
drafters of the professional responsibility rules, Rule 1.13(f) further seeks to ameliorate the confusion. Rule 1.13(f) states:

In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, individuals, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.\(^{259}\)

So an attorney who is investigating a matter for his or her entity client has a duty when talking with officers, individuals, and other such individuals, to clarify who the lawyer represents. The lawyer has this duty because rarely in the typical investigation are the interests of the individuals and the interests of the entity identical. In addition, even individuals who are sophisticated business people perhaps do not easily understand how the interests of the entity and the interests of the individuals might diverge. The many cases discussed in this article certainly make this point perfectly clear not only with regard to a general divergence but also regarding the particular divergence that can occur when the entity wishes to disclose information that the individual wants to keep private. Unless the attorney explains to the individual not only that the lawyer represents the entity but also that the entity could decide to release the individual’s communications with the lawyer to third parties and even law enforcement authorities, the individual may not truly understand the nature and extreme extent of the possible divergence of interests.

D. Model Rule 1.13(d)

Rule 1.13(g) muddies the concept of representation of the entity a bit, especially with regard to the tripartite situation. Rule 1.13(g) states that “[a] lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, individuals, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7.” This rule thus makes clear that it is possible for a lawyer to represent not only the entity but also individuals involved with the entity. The rule provides the caveat that, of course, such a representation should not occur if it violates conflict of interest principles. Representations of all kinds and in all sorts of settings occur with conflicts of interest and these all violate professional responsibility rules. Rule 1.13(g) simply clarifies that a corporate tripartite situation can be the basis for a lawyer representing an entity and an individual or other constituent but that the general approval stated in Rule 1.13(g) is subject to the multiple representation being without impermissible conflicts of interest. In the tripartite setting this rule makes clear that a lawyer can represent both an entity and an individual as long as no impermissible conflict is created. Thus, a lawyer can, at least theoretically, do exactly what the individuals in tripartite situations often claim: that the lawyer representing the entity also represented the individual.

E. Model Rule 4.3

Another very helpful professional responsibility provision is Rule 4.3, which states:

In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer

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knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.\textsuperscript{262}

A lawyer in a tripartite situation must take care not to mislead the individual as to the lawyer’s role. When an entity lawyer knows, or, more likely in many situations, “reasonably should know” that the individual is confused about the lawyer’s role, the lawyer should “make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.”\textsuperscript{263} Lawyers must be aware that in many, many situations, there is confusion.

\textbf{F. Model Rule 8.4(c)}

Finally, the \textit{Model Rules of Professional Responsibility} demand that a lawyer avoid dishonest conduct. Rule 8.4 states, in part: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: … (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”\textsuperscript{264} This rule leaves no doubt as to its meaning. A lawyer in a tripartite situation cannot act dishonestly. In other contexts such as contract law, taking advantage of another’s confusion and not correcting that confusion can be treated as dishonest, deceitful conduct.

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\textsuperscript{262} \textit{ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct}, Rule 4.3 (2009).
\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{264} \textit{ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct}, Rule 8.4(c) (2009).
\end{flushright}
VII. Conclusion: Resolving the Cognitive Dissonance

There is cognitive dissonance in the tripartite situation and in the treatment the corporate tripartite situation is receiving in the law and courts. One dissonance is the actions of lawyers in the tripartite situation when dealing with individual entity actors against the backdrop of the relevant tenets of professional responsibility. A second dissonance is the treatment courts have given the individuals’ claim of privilege when the context is the tripartite situation against a backdrop of the treatment similar claims receive in other contexts.

A lawyer employed by an entity and who is investigating a sensitive matter for the entity must talk with various individuals affiliated as officers, directors, employees, or other constituents of the entity. The governing tenets of professional responsibility provide a backdrop of honesty and forthrightness on the part of lawyers. A lawyer dealing with an individual in a corporate tripartite situation must not be dishonest and must not mislead. Such a lawyer must correct the individual’s misapprehensions to the extent the lawyer reasonably should know of the misapprehensions.

Perhaps the individual with whom the lawyer is dealing is confused about the nature of the representation and the implications that flow from the nature of the representation. Perhaps the individual does not understand that the lawyer represents only the entity. Perhaps the individual does not understand that his or her statements to the lawyer can be disclosed over the individual’s objection. Even a sophisticated corporate actor may be confused on these points. Perhaps the sophisticated corporate actor who deals with counsel for the entity regularly is the individual who thinks of that lawyer as his or her own counsel. Perhaps it is this sophisticated corporate actor, not being a
lawyer, who does not fully appreciate the rather esoteric rules of application and waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The rules of professional responsibility do not tell lawyers when they reasonably should know of the individual’s confusion, but the tenor of the professional responsibility tenets makes clear that a lawyer in this situation should not mislead or otherwise act dishonestly and must, at that hard-to-determine point of reasonable belief, clarify the confusion of the individual with whom the lawyer deals.

One might expect lawyers dealing with individuals in the entity tripartite situation to be exceedingly forthright and clear as to the rights and roles of the actors. For example, when conducting an investigation into entity activity, a lawyer could avoid impropriety by clearly stating to each individual with whom the lawyer communicates that the lawyer represents the entity, that the lawyer does not represent the individual, that conversations with the lawyer will be disclosed to the entity, and that the entity, not the individual, will decide if, when, and to whom the conversations are to be disclosed. A careful lawyer might provide the disclosure orally and in a writing that the lawyer requires the individual to sign. The rules of professional responsibility encourage a clear *Upjohn* warning.

But in case after reported case, there is no evidence of a written disclosure of this sort and often no evidence of even an oral disclosure or clarification. 265 Perhaps there are many reasons for this but three in particular come to mind.

First, the bite of a violation of professional conduct rules is not great. The chance that a lawyer will be reported to discipline authorities is low and the chance and magnitude of a punishment are not great.

Second, obfuscating the tripartite situation allows the lawyer to gain more information for his or her client because the individuals related to the organization might

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be more willing to talk. So a lawyer who wants to do a good job for the entity client might have a tendency to err on the side of lack of clarity.

Third, the treatment the majority of courts have given individual claims of attorney-client privilege in the corporate tripartite situation actually encourages a lack of clarity. These courts— the Third Circuit in Bevill and courts that have followed Bevill’s approach with or without modification— require an individual claiming a privilege in a corporate tripartite setting to make an almost impossible showing for the individual to succeed. These courts erect this great wall in an effort to protect the entity and perhaps, consciously or unconsciously, the lawyer. In so doing these courts have stepped away from traditional attorney-client privilege law by imposing a test for application of the attorney-client privilege that is more onerous that the test used otherwise. The claimant must make more proofs.

In addition, these courts, in using this unique approach, reject traditional concepts with regard to the formation of the attorney-client relationship. The touchstone of the attorney-client relationship is whether the individual in the position of client honestly and reasonably believes that the lawyer represents the individual. This touchstone has been used throughout the law and in particular is a familiar concept with regard to applying the attorney-client privilege. If an individual in an entity tripartite situations claims an individual attorney-client privilege in these courts, not only is the proof exceedingly rigorous, but the individual’s honest and reasonable belief of representation and related

\[\text{Source: supra Section V.}\]
\[\text{See supra Section III.}\]
\[\text{See supra Section IV.}\]
privilege is irrelevant. This attorney-client privilege analysis provides the lawyer laboring in this environment no incentive to be clear as to the lawyer’s role and interest or the interest of the entity as it relates to the individual. In fact, because the typical court’s analysis puts much of the relationship development burden on the individual, the lawyer has no incentive to clarify the situation in the face of incentive to maximize information flow by obfuscation. An individual with an honest and reasonable belief that the lawyer represents or represented him has no port in the storm; the individual loses the privilege claim.

This leaves a situation in which professional responsibility rules teach forthrightness but attorney-client privilege application does not encourage forthrightness. This approach to applying the attorney-client privilege may even encourage the attorney to obfuscate when added with the obvious incentive for the lawyer to do whatever to help the client. A divergence such as this happens occasionally in the law if there is a strong rationale for it. In the tripartite situation in which the courts devised a new rule delineating the application of the attorney-client privilege that is not anchored in tradition and in which the courts rejected the traditional teachings with regard to the formation of an attorney-client relationship, there is no strong rationale. The situation is quite the contrary.

The superior approach in the tripartite situation is to evaluate an individual’s claim of personal privilege by measuring it against the customary test for application of the attorney-client privilege. No special proofs should be required. In addition, the honest and reasonable belief standard regarding the attorney-client relationship should be used.
The privilege should apply, as stated by Judge Wyzanski long ago in the *United Shoe Machinery* case, if an individual in a tripartite situation can prove:

(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client, (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been claimed and (b) not waived by the client.\(^{271}\)

In this analysis the honest and reasonable belief of the individual should be given credence as is done in other areas of the law.

The courts that have developed the *Bevill* line of precedent with its special tests of privilege have been concerned about protecting the right of the entity to control its own privilege unfettered by the claimed rights of the individual. These courts have stated that in the interest of protecting the entity’s rights, and in the interest of disclosure since usually the question occurs when the entity wishes to waive the privilege, any individual rights must be secondary. Contrary to the courts’ fear, a return to traditional legal standards would protect the entity’s interests as well as the individual’s interests. A return to traditional law would also encourage adherence to tenets of professional responsibility and put the lawyer on stable footing vis-à-vis the entity and the individual.

\(^{271}\) Id. at 358-59.
If an entity lawyer wishes to eliminate any possibility of a claim of individual privilege, that lawyer need only act in accord with the rules of professional responsibility and clearly explain to the individual that the lawyer does not represent the individual, that the entity will be told of the substance of any conversations, that the entity will decide the detail of disclosure of any of the individual’s communications, and that the interests of the individual and the entity may diverging if on no other issue than disclosure. A careful lawyer can have a record of this statement. Then an individual in a corporate tripartite situation cannot have a reasonable belief that the lawyer represents him or her even if the individual foolishly has a subjective belief of representation. The lawyer conducts himself or herself forthrightly, the entity’s privilege rights are protected and the individual is treated fairly. Harmony prevails.