Venture Capital Contracting in the Information AgeFaculty Scholarship
AbstractMost venture capitalists provide services to their portfolio companies beyond capital investment. Although these services form an important part of the bargain between the venture capitalists and the entrepreneur, they are rarely specified or even capable of specification in venture capital contracts. This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection problems facing entrepreneurs who hire venture capitalists to provide value-added services and describes the role of the market for venture capitalist reputation in addressing those problems. Further, the Article speculates about whether advances in information technology - specifically, the World Wide Web - are likely to improve the efficiency of the market for venture capitalist reputation.
General NotesFor "Financing Innovation" sponsored by Lewis & Clark School, Portland, Oregon on September 26, 1997.
Citation InformationD. Gordon Smith. "Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age" (1998) p. 133 - 176
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/gordon_smith/45/