Designed to Fail: Modeling Terrorism’s Losing BattleJournal of Terrorism Research (2017)
Terrorism is costly and unlikely to survive any selection process that favors behaviors with higher payoffs. Our evolutionary game model and agent based computer simulations show that group benefits offset the within-group behavioral selection against terrorism. Only those displaying the fittest strategy choices will thrive and multiply. By increasing the number of alliances and the size of their membership, terror groups can contribute to their longevity. Fitness reducing strategies fail to pass on to the new generation. We conclude that costly terror campaigns may reduce popular support among terror organizations’ potential constituency and thus, hasten the demise of terror groups.
Citation InformationGiti Zahedzadeh. "Designed to Fail: Modeling Terrorism’s Losing Battle" Journal of Terrorism Research (2017)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/giti-zahedzadeh/4/