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Article
Passive-Aggressive Investments: Minority Shareholdings and Competition Law
European Business Law Review (2012)
  • Gian Diego Pini
Abstract

Minority share acquisitions between competitors have been mistakenly considered of concern only in case they result in a change of control. First the economic theory, closely followed by courts and doctrine, explained and demonstrated that even the acquisition of non-controlling shareholdings may distort competition and requires a close scrutiny by competition authorities. This article analyzes the impact of minority shareholdings on the incentives of rival firms and ascertains whether the authorities are provided with adequate tools to investigate and address the potential anticompetitive effects. The results of the economic theory are the starting point to assess whether the legal treatment of minority shareholdings under the EU and US antitrust systems is appropriate and adequate.

Keywords
  • minority shareholdings,
  • minority,
  • interests,
  • partial,
  • ownership,
  • competition,
  • antitrust,
  • merger,
  • acquisition,
  • non-controlling,
  • anticompetitive,
  • EU,
  • US,
  • Commission,
  • Clayton,
  • Sherman,
  • 101,
  • 102,
  • gap,
  • interlocking,
  • interlocks,
  • interlocking directorates
Publication Date
Fall September 3, 2012
Citation Information
Gian Diego Pini. "Passive-Aggressive Investments: Minority Shareholdings and Competition Law" European Business Law Review Vol. 23 Iss. 5 (2012)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/giandiegopini/1/