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Article
Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm
Economics Letters
  • Brent Hueth, University of Wisconsin-Madison
  • Giancarlo Moschini, Iowa State University
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Submitted Manuscript
Publication Date
1-1-2014
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.003
Abstract
When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry-deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage
Comments

This is a working paper of an article from Economics Letters 124 (2014): 283, doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.003.

Citation Information
Brent Hueth and Giancarlo Moschini. "Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm" Economics Letters Vol. 124 Iss. 2 (2014) p. 283 - 285
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/giancarlo-moschini/71/