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Article
Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
  • Giancarlo Moschini, Iowa State University
  • Luisa Menapace, Iowa State University
  • Daniel Pick, United States Department of Agriculture
Document Type
Article
Publication Version
Published Version
Publication Date
8-1-2008
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01142.x
Abstract
The economics of geographical indications (GIs) is assessed within a vertical product differentiation framework that is consistent with the competitive structure of agriculture. It is assumed that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as (collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality product is endogenously determined. We find that GIs can support a competitive provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains, although they fall short of delivering the (constrained) first best. The main beneficiaries are consumers. Producers may also accrue some benefit if production of the high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own.
Comments

This is an article from American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90 (2008): 794, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01142.x.

Rights
Works produced by employees of the U.S. Government as part of their official duties are not copyrighted within the U.S. The content of this document is not copyrighted.
Language
en
File Format
application/pdf
Citation Information
Giancarlo Moschini, Luisa Menapace and Daniel Pick. "Geographical Indications and the Competitive Provision of Quality in Agricultural Markets" American Journal of Agricultural Economics Vol. 90 Iss. 3 (2008) p. 794 - 812
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/giancarlo-moschini/62/