One criticism of plea bargaining holds that: "So long as defendants routinely expect to receive some form of sentencing consideration in exchange for an admission of guilt, the essence of a system of bargain justice is present."

Taken as a criticism ― that "bargain justice" is defective justice and that the "routine" upon which it depends should be significantly reduced, or eliminated ― this view is quite mistaken. On the assumption (which I believe to be true, but for which I do not argue here) that a large majority of the criminally accused are in reality guilty, many ― and probably most ― criminal defendants should plead guilty. Any defendant who discharges this duty should receive favorable sentencing consideration. This is not a matter of offering a carrot or threatening a stick to do what would ideally be unnecessary, or a tactical concession in order to wrest a quota of dispositions from reluctant defendants. It is an entirely proper element of sentencing, even a right of the pleading defendant. In short, I argue that defendants (most of whom are, in reality, guilty) should "routinely" plead guilty, and receive a reduced sentence when they do.

Here is how I have organized the argument. In Parts I, and II, and III, I defend the view that the common good, particularly the principles and norms which justify and shape punishment of criminals, not only allows, but requires favorable consideration of the pleading defendant. That is, a sound view of crime and punishment includes favorable consideration of the defendant who pleads guilty. Then, I explore the question: when does the common good call for a trial, even where the defendant is, in reality, guilty? Part IV anticipates and meets one leading objection to plea bargaining in general, and to my account of its moral supports. Part V meets others.

I consider in Part VI the defendant's point of view. Defendants have reasons to plead, or to go to trial, which are outside the common good of political society. For these reasons, many guilty defendants properly go to trial. Who are these defendants? How should they be treated by the sentencing judge? Specifically, should they receive the consideration given to the pleading defendant, because, like the pleading defendant, defendants who go to trial thereby serve the common good, or do what they ought to do, all things considered?

Finally, I briefly consider the implications of my analysis for the conduct of criminal defense attorneys.