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Article
The political economy of social security
Scandinavian Journal of Economics (2000)
  • Georges Casamatta
  • Helmuth Cremer
  • Pierre Pestieau
Abstract

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.

Disciplines
Publication Date
September, 2000
Citation Information
Georges Casamatta, Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau. "The political economy of social security" Scandinavian Journal of Economics Vol. 102 Iss. 3 (2000)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/georges_casamatta/4/