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Conflict Between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders: Much Ado About Nothing
Entrepreneurship Theory & Practive (2016)
  • Geoffrey P Martin, Dr, University of Melbourne, Melbourne Business School
  • Luis R Gomez-Mejia, Prof, University of Notre Dame
  • Marianna Makri, University of Miami
  • Pascual Berrone, IESE Business School
Abstract
We examine the unique nature of conflict between controlling family owners and minority shareholders (principal-principal conflict) in publicly traded family controlled firms through examining shareholder proposals. Implicit in prior governance and family business research has been that non-family shareholders are likely to be in conflict with the dominant family owners. In general, we find that much of this fear may be unwarranted except under specific circumstances. Our findings elucidate sources of heterogeneity in family firm principal-principal conflict and add greater nuance to our understanding of this type of agency problem within family firms.
Keywords
  • Family firm,
  • Agent,
  • Principal,
  • Agency problem
Disciplines
Publication Date
Winter December 1, 2016
Citation Information
Geoffrey P Martin, Luis R Gomez-Mejia, Marianna Makri and Pascual Berrone. "Conflict Between Controlling Family Owners and Minority Shareholders: Much Ado About Nothing" Entrepreneurship Theory & Practive (2016)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/geoffrey_martin/9/