Estimating the Cost of an Article V Convention: State Constitutional Conventions in the 1960s and 1970s

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I. Introduction

Advocates of amending the U.S. Constitution through state-initiated proposals adopted at a convention to propose amendments under Article V often fail to grapple with commonsense questions about the process, preferring instead to publish esoteric tracts on constitutional law and history. However, at bottom, an Article V convention is a governmental activity. One of the most basic commonsense threshold questions that should be asked about any governmental activity before it begins is: “How much will it cost?” The same question should be asked about the cost of an Article V convention; especially as interest in convening such conventions gains steam around the country for everything from a total revision of the Constitution to single amendment proposals.

This article provides a reasonable estimate of the ultimate cost of an article V convention predicated on an analogy to the expenditures for state conventions during the 1960s and 1970s. Although an Article V convention is not legally empowered to accomplish everything a state constitutional convention can accomplish, both types of conventions can have similar organizational structures and, therefore, can be expected to have similar cost components. During the 1960s and 1970s, several
states made significant constitutional amendments and revisions by convention, including many related to reapportionment.5 These bodies reflect the substantial variation in cost for such a convention.6 The following sections immediately offer our findings and conclusions; and then briefly address relevant characteristics of state conventions and their rules, including their duration, the number of delegates, their election, compensation, and occupations, state appropriations for conventions, the selection of officers, the structure and appointment of committees, the proposals by each convention, and their relative success.7


6 See e.g., Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1972–1973, in The Book of the States, 1974–1975 at 12 (1974) (explaining the Rhode Island convention in the 1970s only received a $20,000 appropriation); compare HENRIK N. DULEA, CHARTER REVISION IN THE EMPIRE STATE: THE POLITICS OF NEW YORK’S 1967 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION at 12 (1997) (describing the more than $10 million that was spent on the convention, not including the amount spent by third-parties to establish support for the proposed constitution).

7 As mentioned, characteristics of state conventions varied substantially. For example, Rhode Island held multiple conventions during the two decades reflected the second being substantially shorter, more limited in scope, and more successful than the first. See Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1972–1973, in The Book of the States, 1974–1975 at 12 (1974) (describing the stark contrast between the two Rhode Island conventions). Thus, the following analysis controls for such variations as best as possible—for example, the duration of each convention reflects the time from which the body was convened until the date the first proposals offered by each body were submitted to voters for approval—however, many conventions first met to establish procedures and elect officers before adjourning for a period, others returned to make amendments after apparently adjourning, and others held committee meetings and hearings while not in session. See infra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. Therefore, the discussion should also be read with the understanding that the ultimate duration of a convention is subject to variation based on these differences.
findings and conclusions reached by this article arise from a methodology described in more detail in the appendix. Essentially, we have estimated the cost of various types of Article V conventions based on a standard statistical regression model using inflation-adjusted data from analogous historical state conventions.

II. Findings and Conclusions

Based on the available data from state constitutional conventions during the 1960s and 1970s, the projected expenditures for an article V convention are reflected in Table 1. The average cost of the conventions, their average duration, and the average number of delegates and committees is reflected in Table II, as well as the cost of each convention relative to each of these characteristics. Furthermore, the following subsections provide a general breakdown of information regarding state conventions based on the conventions that were limited in scope compared with those that were unlimited reflected in Tables III and IV respectively.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projected Cost of an Article V Convention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limited convention of 450 Delegates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unlimited Convention of 450 Delegates</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limited Convention of 150 Delegates for 24-hour period</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All figures in this table were rounded to the nearest thousand.

Note. The data for this table reflects the prediction intervals for the cost of each approach to an article V convention, based on the data reflected in Table 2. Specifically, the data from that table—not including New Hampshire and New Jersey—was used to formulate multiple linear regressions for limited and unlimited conventions, based on their duration, the number of delegates, and the number of committees. The number of delegates—and the duration for the
third category—were then input as new data and used with the regression models to create a prediction interval reflecting the projected cost for each convention approach. 

*Note.* The descriptive statistics for the regressions mentioned above, while helpful to demonstrate the variation in the adjusted cost of conventions attributable to their duration and the number of delegates and committees is less significant with respect to the prediction intervals provided in the table because the prediction interval necessarily accounts for uncertainty in a single prediction compared with a predicted mean of an additional sample.

*Note.* The primary purpose of the regression models based on data reflected in Table 2 is to provide a method for establishing the prediction intervals in the above table. Therefore, although the t-statistic and p-value for each variable provides interesting insight into their relationship with the adjusted cost of a convention, the p-values for each of the regression models in their entirety reflect a sufficient relationship to establish significance with 90% confidence and the above prediction intervals necessarily account for the potential error in projecting the cost of a single convention. Thus, the models provide a more accurate estimation of an article V convention based strictly on the 1960s and 1970s state constitutional conventions than using minimum, maximum, and average figures alone.

a The lower bound of the estimate for a 150 delegate 24-hour convention is not available because the model for state conventions has a negative intercept and the limitations to only 150 delegates and a single day yield sufficiently low values that the projection exceeds the scope of the model and yields a negative cost. Therefore, the lower most bound of the prediction interval, without undermining its fit by trying to force the intercept, is most accurately stated as outside the scope of the model.

b Although the lower bound for a single-day, 150 delegate, limited convention exceeds the scope of the model, it is nonetheless possible to produce a reasonable projection. For example, the $41,046 figure reflects the average daily per delegate cost for limited conventions, applied to 150 delegates, for a single 24-hour period, which provides a potential lower bound for the approach.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Duration (days)</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost (per day)</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost (per delegate)</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost (per committee)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,777,000</td>
<td>22,752</td>
<td>44,963</td>
<td>1,258,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15,756,000</td>
<td>41,572</td>
<td>119,362</td>
<td>1,312,985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11,114,000</td>
<td>77,178</td>
<td>68,182</td>
<td>1,389,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>11,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2,749,000</td>
<td>7,121</td>
<td>27,763</td>
<td>137,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18,341,000</td>
<td>89,905</td>
<td>101,329</td>
<td>1,410,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,209,000</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>22,087</td>
<td>169,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5,474,000</td>
<td>43,794</td>
<td>53,669</td>
<td>342,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18,673,000</td>
<td>50,195</td>
<td>160,970</td>
<td>1,556,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14,248,000</td>
<td>58,156</td>
<td>100,339</td>
<td>1,295,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>144</td>
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<td>1,273,000</td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>8,842</td>
<td>97,945</td>
</tr>
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<td>Montana</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>2,933,000</td>
<td>15,439</td>
<td>29,334</td>
<td>209,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,621,000</td>
<td>12,763</td>
<td>23,155</td>
<td>135,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Proposals</td>
<td>Delegates</td>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Adjusted Cost</td>
<td>Adjusted Cost by Duration</td>
<td>Number of Delegates</td>
<td>Number of Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71,241,000</td>
<td>328,300</td>
<td>383,016</td>
<td>4,749,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,525,000</td>
<td>12,960</td>
<td>35,970</td>
<td>271,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11,536,000</td>
<td>51,157</td>
<td>78,670</td>
<td>956,519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Averages for the first three columns were rounded to the nearest whole number, the average for adjusted cost to the nearest thousand, and averages for the final three columns to the nearest whole number. Further, figures for adjusted cost were rounded to the nearest thousand and figures for the adjusted cost by duration, the number of delegates, and the number of committees were rounded to the nearest whole number.

*Note.* As mentioned, the duration of each convention reflects the date from which the body was convened until the date in which the vote for the first proposals by the relevant body was to be submitted to voters for approval. This standard is used because the different procedures for each convention make estimating the number of actual days each body was convened unclear. For example, certain conventions adjourned, but were later reconvened to make amendments, some were continuing bodies, others only held partial meetings for the entire body and largely operated through committees, and some initially met and adjourned for a period with committees working the interim. Thus, considering the ultimate goal of an article V convention would be proposal and ratification of an amendment, the amount of time from the initial convening until the date of submission for voter approval is used as a standard to allow for reasonable comparison.


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*a* See infra at Section III.

*b* See infra at Section IV.

*c* See infra at Section VI.

*d* See infra at Section V.
a. Limited Conventions

As used in this article, a “limited convention” is: a convention with authority to propose changes confined to specific subjects or areas. Conventions that were characterized as limited bodies, included Connecticut, Louisiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas. On average, limited conventions approximately 210 days, with 127 delegates serving on 11 committees. Furthermore, average appropriations for limited conventions were $7,668,375.25 when adjusted for inflation. As a result, the average adjusted cost per day was $35,448.97, the average adjusted cost per delegate was $53,891.78, and $920,217.25 per committee. Finally, Figures 1–3 represent the relationship between the duration of limited conventions, the number of delegates and committees and the adjusted cost of each convention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Limited Conventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Duration (days)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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8 Albert L. Sturm and Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1980–81 and the Past 50 Years, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1982–1983 at 120–23 (1982). The clearest example of a limited Article V convention would be the one that would be organized by the Compact for a Balanced Budget. See Nick Dranias, States Can Fix the National Debt: Reforming Washington with the Compact for America Balanced Budget Amendment, Goldwater Institute Policy Report No. 257 at 17–19 (Apr. 23, 2013). It would limit the convention to voting up or down a particular amendment. Other examples could include topic-limited conventions, such as the longstanding Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force effort. See Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force, Balanced Budget Amendment Convention, at 8–9 (2013). However, topic limited conventions could be subject to creative legal arguments regarding germaneness rules that render them effectively unlimited conventions. See infra n.12.

9 See Table 3. Texas was only limited in the sense that the Legislature acting as a convention was not permitted to change the state Bill of Rights, but could make changes to any other article or provision within the state Constitution. See Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1974–1975 at 170 (1974).

10 See Table 3.

11 See Table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,777,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15,756,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11,114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>107,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2,749,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,834,1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8,640,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Averages were rounded to the nearest whole number, expect the adjusted cost, which is rounded to the nearest thousand.

Note. The data for this table reflects the figures provided in Table 1 limited to those conventions characterized as limited conventions, meaning they did not have plenary authority to propose amendments.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the adjusted cost of limited conventions by duration (days) and number of delegates, respectively, for different states.
**Figure 3**

Limited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Number of Committees

[Graph showing the adjusted cost in millions of dollars for limited conventions by the number of committees for various states, including Connecticut, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas.]
b. Unlimited Conventions

As used in this article, an unlimited convention is one that has complete authority to propose any constitutional change. The group of unlimited conventions included Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, and North Dakota. The average duration for unlimited conventions was 322 days and composed of approximately 118 delegates and 13 committees. For unlimited conventions, the average cost adjusted for inflation was $12,206,600. Finally, Figures 4–6 represent the relationship between the duration of limited conventions, the number of delegates and committees and the adjusted cost of each convention.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Duration (days)</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
<th>Committees</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,209,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5,474,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18,673,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14,248,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 Albert L. Sturm and Janice C. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1980–81 and the Past 50 Years, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1982–1983 at 120–23 (1982). It is possible for a purportedly limited convention to function as a de facto unlimited convention under pressure from creative interpretations of a rule of germaneness. For example, the Convention of States effort calls for a convention limited to “proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States requiring that in the absence of a national emergency the total of all Federal appropriations made by Congress for any fiscal year may not exceed the total of all estimated Federal revenues for that fiscal year, together with any related and appropriate fiscal restraints.” See Balanced Budget Amendment Task Force, Balanced Budget Amendment Convention, at 7 (2013) This may appear to be a request for a limited agenda on its face. However, a creative convention delegate may attempt to argue that amendment proposals transferring federal governing authority to the United Nations, other countries, or new governmental bodies are germane. If such an argument were to persuade the convention parliamentarian, there would be no effective limit on such a convention.

13 See Table 4.

14 See Table 4.

15 See Table 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,273,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,933,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,621,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71,241,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>322</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13,466,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Averages were rounded to the nearest whole number, except the adjusted cost, which is rounded to the nearest thousand.

*Note.* The data in this table reflects that from Table 2, for only conventions characterized as unlimited conventions meaning they exercised complete authority in proposing amendments, revisions, or entirely new constitutions.
Figure 4

Unlimited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Duration (Days)

Figure 5

Unlimited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Number of Delegates
Figure 6

Unlimited Conventions: Adjusted Cost by Number of Committees

Adjusted Cost (Millions of Dollars)

Number of Committees
III. Duration

The duration of state constitutional conventions during the 1960s and 1970s varied substantially with the shortest lasting only weeks and the longest in Rhode Island lasting several years.16 With the exception of Rhode Island’s convention in the 1960s, nearly every other state convention lasted approximately one year or less.17


IV. Delegates

New Mexico’s seventy-delegate convention was the smallest during the period contrasted by the four hundred delegates
attending the New Hampshire constitutional convention.\textsuperscript{18} Few other states had less than one hundred,\textsuperscript{19} and all others had between one hundred and two hundred delegates.\textsuperscript{20} Every state

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provided for the election of a portion of delegates, if not all delegates. Delegates for Texas, however, included members of


the state legislature. Delegates to the Hawaii convention were paid $1,000 a month, up to $4,000, mileage based on their location, and a per diem. Illinois delegates received $625 a month, not to exceed eight months, and a per diem for a maximum of 100 days, a postage allotment and expenses. Maryland delegates received a flat fee of $2000 and a $25 per diem for expenses. Delegates in Michigan received $7,500 and mileage once a month between their home and the convention. Significantly, New Hampshire did not have a pay plan for

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delegates and merely reimbursed certain expenses. Conversely, New York paid delegates the same salary as legislators, which included $15,000 per annum and $3,000 for expenses. Finally, Tennessee delegates received the same per diem and mileage as legislators, which was approximately $63 per day.

Further, in Hawaii, state or county officials were required to take an unpaid leave of absence to serve as delegates. Michigan, however, prohibited active members of the legislature, active circuit judges, and sheriffs from being delegates, but individuals could still generally receive compensation from private employers. New York permitted numerous sitting judges to act as delegates for its convention. In Michigan, as in other states, there were many attorneys, businessmen, former state and local officials, and similar individuals acting as delegates, however, there were also technical workers, manufacturers, and

homemakers. Not every state explicitly provided for the replacement of delegates other than officers, but Hawaii and Michigan permitted the governor to appoint a qualified elector from the same district and New York permitted the remaining delegates from the district or the group of at large delegates to vote a qualified elector in as a replacement. Texas exclusively had delegates that were legislators on leave while acting as delegates. In every state, delegates elected the president or chairman of the convention shortly after being convened.


V. State Appropriations

The amount states appropriated for their conventions also varied considerably, for example, Rhode Island’s conventions only initially included $224,000 and $20,000 appropriations respectively, despite the duration of the first convention, while Texas provided legislators with $3.8 million. Occasionally other states, including Michigan, provided smaller appropriations, but relied on private grants to help subsidize the cost of preparation and organization. New Hampshire provided $180,000, New Mexico’s brief convention received a $250,000 appropriation, and Montana followed at $499,281. Connecticut appropriated $500,000, North Dakota $600,000, Arkansas $605,200, and Tennessee’s convention exceeded its appropriations more than once costing in excess of $700,000. Every other state provided

39 Albert L. Sturm, Constitution Making in Michigan, 1961–1962, MICH. GOV. STUD. at 69–70 (1963) (discussing the State’s use of an $85,000 grant from the W.K. Grant Foundation before the convention).
more than $1 million, and, in some cases, well over $2 million.\textsuperscript{42}

VI. Committees

While most other characteristics of conventions varied, the organization and establishment of committees was relatively consistent.\textsuperscript{43} Further, in most cases, individuals were appointed to committees by the president or chairman of the convention, occasionally after consulting with Vice Presidents and subject to provision otherwise by the convention, and delegates would generally serve on multiple committees, except for Connecticut


delegates. Specifically, Pennsylvania maintained 8, Rhode Island 9, Maryland 11, Illinois, Louisiana, and New Mexico established 12, Arkansas, Michigan, North Dakota, and Texas each had 13, and Montana, New York, and Hawaii established,


14, 15, and 16 committees, respectively.\textsuperscript{50} Connecticut and Tennessee were the greatest outliers, the former establishing only 3 and the latter maintaining 19.\textsuperscript{51}

VII. Successes and Failures
After completing the proposed Arkansas constitution, voters rejected the convention’s work in November 1970.\textsuperscript{52} Conversely, Connecticut’s convention proposed amendments on the topics to which it was limited and voters ultimately approved fourteen articles.\textsuperscript{53} In Hawaii, the convention proposed 34 amendments after considering 105 proposals, and voters eventually approved every amendment.\textsuperscript{54} Illinois voters approved of the convention’s proposed constitution, but ultimately rejected the alternative

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\textsuperscript{51} JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF CONNECTICUT: 1965 at 18 (1965); Albert L. Sturm, \textit{State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision 1976–1977}, in \textit{THE BOOK OF THE STATES}, 1978–1979 at 201 (1978). Although a memorandum by the Legislative Service Bureau for Iowa stated the Tennessee Convention used 20 committees, the discrepancy is likely due to the inclusion of the Committee of the Whole, whereas, the same was likely not included in the count by Sturm. \textit{See IOWA LEGISLATIVE SERVICE BUREAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN IOWA} at 2 (August, 1980).
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proposals made by the convention. Louisiana’s convention proposed a new constitution that was ultimately adopted by voters. The Maryland convention’s proposed constitution, however, was rejected when submitted for voter approval. Michigan voters eventually adopted the new constitution proposed by their convention. Montana voters approved of the new constitution and multiple of the proposed alternatives by the convention. In New Hampshire, voters eventually approved 10 amendments submitted as referendums of the 27 proposed by the convention. Voters approved the New Jersey convention’s proposal that was limited to apportionment. New Mexico’s proposed constitution, on the other hand, was quickly rejected by voters, as were New York’s and North Dakota’s. The Pennsylvania convention’s five proposed amendments were approved by voters. Rhode Island’s constitution was initially

63 Albert L. Sturm, State Constitutions and Constitutional Revision, 1967–1969,
rejected, but several amendments were eventually passed. In Tennessee, of thirteen proposals submitted by the convention, voters approved twelve. Finally, the Texas convention failed to even establish sufficient support to submit a new constitution to voters for approval.

VIII. Conclusion

In sum, the conventions of the 1960s and 1970s reflect the flexibility and variety amongst state constitutional convention rules and procedures. However, it is worth mentioning that the average cost of limited conventions was roughly half that of unlimited conventions, and that proposals offered to voters incrementally or separated from major controversial provisions were more successful than attempts at wholesale revision of an entire, or nearly entire, state constitution. As policy makers and advocates look to the array of Article V convention options, from the Compact to a Balanced Budget to the Convention of States model, it should not be forgotten that their choice will eventually have a price tag. As predicted by our model, the cost range is likely somewhere between six million dollars (strictly limited convention) and two hundred million dollars (unlimited convention).

IX. Appendix: Methodology

As footnoted above, data for the foregoing analysis was collected from a variety of archives of state records, memoranda by state agencies, and articles and books. The duration of each convention is measure from the time the body first convened until the date its first proposals were submitted to voters. The number of delegates reflects the raw number of individuals elected, not the number of votes apportioned among them. The number of committees refers to standing committees of each convention, not

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including the committee of the whole, which generally reflects the entire body operating informally. The cost of each convention is determined by the appropriations made for the body. The adjusted cost reflects that figure, adjusted for inflation net of average annual CPI based on data available through the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, conventions were grouped based on whether they were granted authority to make only particular revision proposals to their state’s constitution or whether they were convened as an unlimited body permitted to propose complete revision or a new constitution.

These figures were then built into a set of data frames in R, grouped by bodies characterized as limited and unlimited conventions. The data frames were used to develop basic descriptive statistics of the minimum, maximum, average, and quadrant breakdown for the duration, number of delegates, number of committees, and adjusted cost. Furthermore, using R, multiple linear regression models were developed for limited conventions and unlimited conventions, including further descriptive statistics of the models. Finally, new data frames were created for each of the proposed approaches to an article V convention and incorporated into the appropriate linear model to create a prediction interval reflecting the projected cost of each.