THOUGHTS ON THIRDNESS

To The Reader

Within this text are unedited, fragmentary, unfinished ideas about the uses of Three (Peirce's "Thirdness") in various contexts. Over the years I have made use of them in writing classes, interpretation of literary texts (e.g. Swift's A Tale of A Tub) and lectures on linguistics and the philosophy of language. I recommend you start after reading C. S. Peirce on Thirdness in "A Guess at the Riddle" (nature of signs) and as a structural device in "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." Thirdness presupposes a "middle between two "extremes" (or opposites). Of three seats in a theater, plane, train, one can always find a middle seat. Of four seats this is impossible. To illustrate this in more detail I addend, at the end, "Game of Between." You may find duplicates of certain texts as well as grammatical infelicities. Skip lightly over them.

For "Guess" go to:
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/guess/guess.htm; For "Neglected" see:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319821?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. You can also find many interpretations of Peirce and his importance online under his name.

So RUN with it.

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See Miller essay "The Magical number Seven Plus or Minus Two at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Miller/

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JONATHAN SWIFT ON THREE IN A TALE OF A TUB (1706)
Now, among all the rest, the profound Number THREE is that which hath most employ'd my sublimest Speculations, nor ever without wonderful Delights. There is now in the Press (and will be publish'd next Term) a Panegyrical Essay of mine upon this Number, wherein I have by most convincing Proofs, not only reduced the Senses and the elements under its Banner, but brought over seeral Deserters from its two great Rivals SEVEN and NINE.

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**DREIHEIT** (THIRDNESS)

*Three (the number) connotes great vastness, plurality, totality and completeness.* Kahn

Plotinus is considered to be the founder of Neoplatonism. Taking his lead from his reading of Plato, Plotinus developed a complex spiritual cosmology involving three foundational elements: the One, the Intelligence, and the Soul. It is from the productive unit

Thinking and representing with Thirdness seems to be as old as the imagination and new as the iPod. One only needs mention the linguistic first, second and third person (I, you, it), the Trinity, three-dimensional reality, Goldilocks and so on. The seminal work on this topic is perhaps Usener's *Dreiheit* (1903). In the first part of his work, Usener assesses the importance of three in Greek antiquity. (H. Usener 1903: Dreiheit Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 58: 1-, 161-208, 321-362[an umlaut over "o" in "fur."]) He notes the significance of three and its continuations in various folk and religious traditions. He finds fifteen different trinities of gods in
Hesiod’s *Theogony*. He identifies groupings composed of three gods of equal status and then goes on to men triads that entail divinities of unequal status. In the second part of his work, Usener focuses on visual depictions of the trinity, three-headed gods and goddesses, the best known being Hecate, goddess of crossroads.

In the third, and last part, of his essay, Usener (please note his use of Thirdness as an organizing principle for Thirdness) focuses on the movement from "2" to "3." Examples here are god-pairs that became trinities, the transformation of two seasons into three, paths and roads becoming perceived as three-pronged forks and the winds going from two to three. Finding symbolism in numbers appears in the Pythagorean system of "arithmetic theology." (351). Usener claims that ancient people did not simply grasping numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time concepts, starting with the number "7" and going up. In contrast, small numbers, such as "2", were used for expressions for quantity, while three was used to communicate completeness. More problematic, however, is Usener’s suggestion that the Greeks could not count above three. To support this view he cites the research of Von den Steinen that members of the Bakairi tribe (in Brazil) can only count to two. To continue counting, they construe three as 2+1, four as 2+2 and so on. (H. Von en Steinen. 1897: *Unter den Naturvolkern Zentral-Brasiliens*. D. Reimer: Berlin [umlaute over "O” in Naturvolkern])

The principal modern advocate of thinking by Thirdness is C. S. Peirce. "Thirdness," he says, "pours in upon us through every avenue of sense" (*Writings* 5:98) With this, and other statements, Peirce would no doubt agree with Usener that
Thirdness, or Peirce's "universal categories, can represent completeness, finality, wholeness—a situation analogous to not counting beyond three. One of Peirce’s succinct definitions of Thirdness is this:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (Writings 248).

First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is reaction to a First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example, three kinds of reasoning, deduction, abduction and induction; three "departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and Metaphysics (Writings V and VI: 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (Essential 253). But Peirce's descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations—or what I later call here the "manifold." In the words of one of Peirce's editors, Peirce was familiar with "the fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or
adicity) greater than triadic can be expressed in combinations of triadic relations. This is known as Peirce’s reduction thesis" (Essential xxx). Finally, there is Peirce’s use of Thirdness to showcase "novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like. In conventional terminology, the new thing (the Third) is always greater than the sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce’s speculations on Thirdness one can see the influence of Aristotle’s thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":

A totality (what emerged or is emerging) is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts (Metaphysics 1045A 9-10).

The oldest things lie in the present.

According to the Peircean "reduction thesis" every explanatory principle can be phrased as a Third. Implicit in the reduction is a "sub-reduction" of language and thought to symbols, graphs, charts and the like. As an example of this let us consider briefly the following figure, one initially "empty" of empirical content:
If we let A stand for the past, B for the future then it follows that C can stand for the present as In-Between. From here we can go on to ask questions about such things as the length of each line. Should we say that only A and B can represent infinity, the past and the future stretching both back and in front of us? C, perhaps representing a person's lifespan, would then represent finitude, a time stretching between birth and death. Furthermore, there are questions about how the lines converge, bottom left, and what such convergences represents. Bergson, for example, seems to be thinking of such convergence in the following observation about the "present moment" as an In-Between:

Nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible limit which divides the past from the future. When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet; and when we think it as existing, it is already past. If, on the other hand, what you are considering is he concrete present such as it is actually lived by
consciousness, we may say that this present exists in large measure, in the immediate past. In the fraction of a second which covers the briefest possible perception of light, billions of vibrations have taken place, of which the first is separated from the last by an *interval* which is enormously divided. Your perception, however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable number of remembered elements; and in truth every perception is already memory. Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future.” Henri Bergson *Matière et mémoire* (1896) *Matter an Memory* (1919). (qtd Paul Muldoon. ”Open Invitation” TLS 24 & 31, 2010: 17)

Still, one cannot afford to look away from the past and future. Here one is reminded of Walter Benjamin’s "angel of history"—an angel that flies toward the future facing backward with its eyes on the facts piling up higher and higher in the past.

In theory, there are no limits on what such a line-triad (like the above) can represent. The only condition, for its individuation, is that it be "filled” with empirical content, general and specific. Such content would typically include one’s *actual* life experiences, *possible* ("virtual") ones or some combination of the actual and the possible. Here two examples come to mind, the story of Goldilocks (which I return to below) and the thinking that goes into writing a cook book. Here one typically finds a list of ingredients, a menu to follow (a combining order of ingredients), cooking time and the like. Empirical content, in short, includes not
only the "substance" of the content, but also how they have to be combined according to the goal one has in mind with the whole.

Let us, referring to A, B, and C, consider how two other In-Betweens might "capture" empirical content.

THE GAME BALL: Picture line C as a ball thrown by A to B or B to A. Before it is thrown, it represents certain possibilities not yet actualized. A (any person) might throw it to B (another person) or A might throw it through a hoop. Throwing the ball activates certain forces within the ball and actualizes In-Between conditions in the system. Forces intrinsic to the ball as a physical object (a per se object in a non-relational condition) would include incidentals like spin, speed, direction and the like. With these it can be taken as a metaphor for time—insofar as such incidentals, of necessity, represent change. But a game ball is, by definition, a relational object. That is, one ultimately dependent on someone throwing it and someone, or something, receiving it. Additionally, the rules of the game help cause the ball to lose its independence.

THE LINE: Here we take A, B and C represent lines of dancers, real or imaginary, We can start filling the lines with empirical content with basics like space, time and number. In the world of dance one talks about a line of dancers as a two-dimensional contour that three-dimensional bodies describe. Consequently, one has the option of drawing a single contour or a line of dancers as a series of contours. In mathematics (especially in the language of geometry) one can represent the dancers
as points on lines like A, B and C. To establish a system of measurement on the line we must assign a distinct number to each point on the lines. The numbers must be ranged along the lines in unbroken sequence. Inasmuch as a dancer can shift positions on any given line, or move to another line, we can say that each assigned number on the line must continue to be attached to a single distinct point. It follows from this that any dancers shifting positions will leave two numbers attached to the same points as before. By the law of contradiction (though for no other reason as far as I know) the points would only retain their identity as a particular point by not being "named" by the same number at the same time and place. It is clear from this that a line, in order to be in relationship to another line, must resist any attempt to reduce it to a single point; or any attempt to stretch it to an infinite distance— that is, to an uncountable number of points. Finitude must be countable, for both real and imaginary points.

With this we have a rough conception of the interdependence of space, time and number as they relate to the (minimal) empirical contents of an In_Between. Points occupy space; as numbered points shift they reify time as change; numbers that "name" points complete the construction of the line. In order to originate empirical content for an In-Between then one must be able to do something like create (draw?) a lines-triad like that above; or, alternatively, triangulate rows of dominos (or one's friends) only connected at the base of the triangle (see Critique of Pure Reason A26-B44).
METAPHOR: Like a game ball and a line one creates metaphors with Thirdness. A relates to B on the basis of (or because of) C. We add empirical content to A, B, and C with the following kind of "material," or world knowledge.

1. It is not the most beautiful nor the strongest who win prizes at the Olympics but (only) those who compete
   (Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1099a3-6)

2. How is a divorce like a Texas tornado? In both you lose your trailer.

3. Poverty is a giant that uses your face as a rag to wipe a dirty world (Celine, *Journey to the end of night*)

One can analyze the infrastructure of #1, 2 in a number of way. What follows is one option. Another analysis, one I turn to below, is one that tries to answer the question, "What kind of WORK does an In-Between do?

1. "Compete" stands as the Middle of the In-Between, one that reciprocally relates "beautiful" to "strongest," and, by so doing, robs both of its independence. Please note that this example is the only one that uses negatives to "construct" an In-Between. With the help of Aristotle, the acknowledged master, of the form, I return to negation below (see Horn).

2. "Lose your trailer" happens with *both* a divorce and trailer. Therefore "lose" is the Middle that bestows similarity on both.

3. "Poverty" initiates the action of wiping a dirty world. Therefore poverty is the Middle as *cause* of the relationship between of "face" and "world." In more technical
language "poverty" is *prior* to both "face" and "world" in both time and in "account."
That is, we can’t give an coherent account of the relationship between "poverty," "face" and "world" without assuming that "poverty" was there *before* "face" and "world."

In the so-called "Controversion Theory" of metaphor, the immediate above would be analyzed on the basis of "tension. Tension, defined as a sort of semantic contradiction, created by a metaphor helps us, in Fill's words, to see "both areas in a new light" (108). By "both areas" Fill means what I call here the two Extremes of an In-Between. What he means by "tension" is what I mean by Middle: "The theory that metaphor establishes a tension between two areas of life which makes us see both areas in a new light was first established by Max Black in his book *Models and Metaphors* (1962)” (108)

Let me now generalize the work of a Middle by citing recent research on gathering and processing information. Chess players, playing against experts, sometimes think that they are playing in a different game? The short answer, supplied by recent research, is that the experts, employing both parts of the brain, use information about the chess board in a different gaming strategy. Whereas the novice chess player "looked directly at the pieces to recognize them, the experts looked on the middle of the boards." In other words, the experts were taking in everything on the board by combining information supplied by peripheral vision with a strategic next move. (Dylan Loeb McClain. "Harnessing the Brain's Right Hemisphere to Capture Many Kings" NY Times January 25, 2011: D3.)
DEATH: EXISTENCE, LOCATION, DURATION

(Prolegomena to any Future Grammar of Textual-Death)

epitaphes have alwayes bene most respected, for in them love was shewed to the deceased, memory was continued to posterity, friends were comforted, and the reader put in mind of humane frailty—William Camden

With the possible exception of love (sex), nothing is more common in imaginative writing than representations of death—not death itself, which, in itself, cannot instantly be experienced or represented. It is "the undiscovered country, a bourn from which no man returns" (Hamlet 3:1). Death in these pages is what I call "textual-death," or what one scholar characterizes as "quoting death," or epitaphs featured in the literature of early modern England (Newstok). Why are textual-death so common in imaginative writing and not just in obituaries, epitaphs and elegies? The quotation about, from Camden, tells much of the story. But a great part of its "popularity," I claim, is its "undiscoverability" and so our fear of it.

Two well known responses to the fear of death, according to Michalski's account, are those of Plato (in the Phaedo) and St. Mathew:

The dying Socrates wanted to give us concepts that would provide peace, concepts that will soothe our anxiety in the face of death. The Gospel of Matthew, as I understand it, is the complete opposite: it testifies to the incurable presence of the Unknown in every moment of my life, a presence that rips apart every human certainty built on what is known, that disturbs all peace, all serenity--that severs the continuity of time, opening every moment of lives to nothingness, thereby inscribing within them the possibility of an abrupt end and the chance at a new beginning. Two visions of death, two visions of the human condition (88-89).

We might want to add to this Epicurus' take on death, part of a letter to his friend Menoceceus:

Accustom yourself to believing that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply the capacity for sensation, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life a limitless time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly understood that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain
when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.

As a long time teacher of imaginative writing and literature I have long struggled with the problem of devising a "grammar" that might explain, at least in part, what goes into creating textual-deaths. Are textual-death a means to an end or an end in themselves? Are they a sort of Ash Wednesday, a way of reminded the reader of h/h own mortality? Or are the purpose of textual-deaths intractable? An undiscovered and undiscoverable country?

Leaving the reader with h/h own definition of "imaginative writing," I pass on to the main claim of this essay: textual-death have their beginning in what a classical scholar identifies as the three components, and uses, of the Indo-European "to be" verb, "is," "estar," "einaî," "ist" and so on (Kahn). The three components, and uses, of "to be" are:

1. Existence-predication: Death is

Is there a common infrastructure for them and a common purpose? Or will the subject always remain a mystery, " the undiscovered country, the bourn from which no traveler returns"?

What I propose here is a beginner's "map" of this "country," one for which the reader is invited to "piece out our imperfections with your thoughts" (Prologue, Henry V). Let me begin with some classic (with one exception) representations of death and then go on to the parts of the "map" I have in mind for interpreting them:

A: No longer mourn for me when I am dead
Than you shall hear the surly sudden bell
Give warning to the world that I am fled
From this vile world, with vilest worms to dwell:
Nay, if you read this line, remember not
The hand that write it; for I love you so
That I in your sweet thoughts would be forgot
If thinking on me then should make you woe.
O, if, I say, you look upon this verse
When I perhaps compounded am with clay,
Do not so much as my poor name rehearse,
But let your love even with my life decay,
Lest the wise world should look into your moan
And mock you with me after I am gone.
(Shakespeare, Sonnet 71).

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B: After attending a memorial for young skiers killed in an avalanche.

Hearing the young voices in that long place,
Grieving in their loss, for their dead friends.
I sadly remember the faces, their grace,
My own friends, now gone, from the Winds,
Copper Mountain, Zermatt, Yosemite, Vail,
Trailheads now remote in sight, out of touch,
Steel Canyon, the Sinks, Sun Valley, Quail Hollow, it was freedom vested by toil, gruff joy, Mammoth and Whistler, not then having Children and wives to care for, to look after,
We forced the high frozen surfaces, skiing,
Climbing, till we could go no higher, master Of breathless air, scheming the next ascents Of the blood, Alta, Cortina, Aspen, the Dents.
(Washington).
C: Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume,
labuntur anni nec pietas moram
rugis et instanti senectae
afferet indomitaeque morti,
non, si trecenis quotquot eunt dies,
amice, places illacrimabilem
Plutona tauris, qui ter amplum
Geryonen Tityonque tristi
compescit undâ, scilicet omnibus
quicumque terrae munere vescimur
enavigandâ, sive reges
sive inopes erimus coloni.
frustrâ cruento Marte carebimus
fractisque rauci fluctibus Hadriae,
frustrâ per autumnos nocentem
corporibus metuemus Austrum:
visendus ater flumine languido
Cocyotos errans et Danai genus
infame damnatusque longi
Sisyphus Aeolides laboris.
linquenda tellus et domus et placens
uxor, neque harum quas colis arborum
te praeter invidas cupressos
ulla brevem dominum sequetur;
absumet heres Caecuba dignior
servata centum clavibus et mero
tinguet pavimentum superbo,
pontificum potiore cenis.
(Horace Odes 2:14)

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D: From my mother’s sleep I fell into the State,
And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze.
Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters.
When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.
(Randall Jarrell, "Death of the Ball Turret Gunner").

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D: Men die because they cannot join the beginning to the end
(Alkmeon of Croton  6th BC).

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E: Adieu, farewell, earth’s bliss;
This world uncertain is;
Fond are life’s lustful joys;
Death proves them all but toys;
None from his darts can fly;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Rich men, trust not in wealth,
Gold cannot buy you health;
Physic himself must fade.
All things to end are made,
The plague full swift goes by;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
Beauty is but a flower
Which wrinkles will devour;
Brightness falls from the air;
Queens have died young and fair;
Dust hath closed Helen’s eye.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
Strength stoops unto the grave,
Worms feed on Hector brave;
Swords may not fight with fate,
Earth still holds open her gate.
“Come, come!” the bells do cry.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Wit with his wantonness
Tasteth death’s bitterness;
Hell’s executioner
Hath no ears for to hear
What vain art can reply.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
Haste, therefore, each degree,
To welcome destiny;
Heaven is our heritage,
Earth but a player's stage;
Mount we unto the sky.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

(Thomas Nashe 1567-1601)

The map I have in mind, following Kahn's comments on the verb "to be" in the Indo-European languages, has three parts, Existence, Location and Duration—defined as any period of time during and after the instant of death. Death exists, in actual form and textual representations. As such it has a specific location and an indefinite duration as an "afterlife." There is always a "before" and an "afterlife" of death. The "before" of death is typically the locus of the cause (or causes) of death, the "afterlife" its effects. (Please note here that "afterlife" does not only refer to the personal afterlife of the individual soul, but also to that of the species as a whole, the existence of our children, grandchildren and following generations after our own individual death).

I ask students to think of these three aspects in term of spatial "containers." Are they equal in volume or unequal in volume? How do the things contained differ? How are they alike? Is there any relation between them? There is, obviously, no clear answer to these questions. But that is, as I hope will become clear, the nature of a prolegomena. We are talking about starting places with no clear vision of where we will end or if and where we will find closure.

Consequently, any textual representation of death must be treated within the context of a Peircean triad, what the author (C. S. Peirce) calls a "First, Second and Third."

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (Writings 248).

A salient example of this is Peirce theory of signs.
In all these passages, it seems fair to say, the writers are talking essentially about the human condition as a whole. Moreover, the structure of such "talking" is triadic, or what C. S. Peirce calls "Thirdness" and the German scholar, "Dreiheit." The claim of both these writers is that the mind processes information (objective and subjective) in three, increasingly abstract, way:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which It is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (Writings 248).

sensory data by a three stage ." To be human, in short, is not only to fear death but to respond to it with a plan to control one’s fear of it. To a person with common experience and intact mind, death, in its physical reality, is "the If death itself cannot be materially experienced, and so not described, unlike our experiences of pain, hunger and other bodily states, it seems then an imaginative writer is left with thoughts about the "before" and what I will call the "afterlife" of death—not just those of h/h-self but also those of others.

Further distinctions between the "before, after and afterlife" of death are these. All of these distinctions, please notice, depend on how we treat what can be called the "now-consciousness" or how I see and imagine death from the present moment as not the present moment, as the "not-now" yet an event still possible. Language, of course, principally represents such event with conditional and modal verbs.

A: I express the "before' of my own death with forms like "I am dying," "me estoy muriendo," "je meurs" and "ich sterbe." That is, with forms representing an incomplète state, a coming but not yet évant.

One night Edison Peñia moaned as he tried to sleep, "I'm dying I'm dying," he said. Sepulveda was lying next to him...He launched Into a movie-like death-speech, "This is the end, Edison, he moaned Weakly, "I'm dying, I'm going. Tell...my...wife...that." (Tobar 67-68)
B: Imaginative writing, as I use the term, is any linguistic représentation contingent on the imagination, the not hère and the not now. The chief linguistic marker is négation, specifically, the réduction of the positive to the negative, something to nothing, by what Sorenson calls an "exhaustive" procedure.

Since I cannot actually expérience what will happen after my own death, I have to imagine it—but from what I know now. Imagining follows knowing as smoke is contingent on fire, steam on water.

I take "afterlife" in the way Scheffler takes it. Not as any personal life after death, but as the life of those who come after my death, my children, grandchildren, the species itself—in short, all the unborn.

Here is a list of the salient possible representations of death I suggest any future rhetoric should feature—all within the context of "before" and the "afterlife:"

1. Necessary versus contingent
2. Stated or implied
3. Affirmed or denied.
4. Subjective versus objective
5. My death versus the death of the other.
6. Metaphor./analogy. Death as X.
7. Paradox or death as the presence of absence.
8. Excess meaning (according to David Tracy). This is only applicable to what Tracy calls a "classic" text: such as Hamlet, The Odyssey, or Divine Comedy.

This list is an important aspect of the multiple (and often overlapping) uses of the plural form "prolegomena." Each "prolegomenon" (single form) functions as a starting place, closure and sometimes thesis of a particular part of the proposed rhetoric. Item #9, above, often stands in, as a thesis.

Here are some examples of what I mean by the overarching structure of the "before" and "afterlife" of death. I simply quote them here and will return to discuss them in more detail later.

A: No longer mourn for me when I am dead

Than you shall hear the surly sudden bell
Give warning to the world that I am fled
From this vile world, with vilest worms to dwell:
Nay, if you read this line, remember not
The hand that write it; for I love you so
That I in your sweet thoughts would be forgot
If thinking on me then should make you woe.
O, if, I say, you look upon this verse
When I perhaps compounded am with clay,
Do not so much as my poor name rehearse,
But let your love even with my life decay,
Lest the wise world should look into your moan
And mock you with me after I am gone.
(Shakespeare, Sonnet 71).
B: After attending a memorial for young skiers killed in an avalanche.

Hearing the young voices in that long place,
Grieving in their loss, for their dead friends.
I sadly remember the faces, their grace,
My own friends, now gone, from the Winds,
Copper Mountain, Zermatt, Yosemite, Vail,
Trailheads now remote in sight, out of touch,
Steel Canyon, the Sinks, Sun Valley, Quail
Hollow, it was freedom vested by toil, gruff joy, Mammoth and Whistler, not then having Children and wives to care for, to look after,
We forced the high frozen surfaces, skiing,
Climbing, till we could go no higher, master
Of breathless air, scheming the next ascents
Of the blood, Alta, Cortina, Aspen, the Dents.
(Washington).

C: Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume,
labuntur anni nec pietas moram
rugis et instanti senectae
afferet indomitaque morti,
non, si trecenis quotquot eunt dies,
amice, places illacrimabilem
Plutona tauris, qui ter amplum
Geryonen Tityonque tristi
compescit undâ, scilicet omnibus
quicumque terrae munere vescimur
enavigandâ, sive reges
sive inopes erimus coloni.
frustrà cruento Marte carebimus
fractisque rauci fluctibus Hadriae,
frustrà per autumnos nocentem
corporibus metuemus Austrum:
visendus ater flumine languido
Cocytos errans et Danai genus
infame damnatusque longi
Sisyphus Aeolides laboris.
linquenda tellus et domus et placens
uxor, neque harum quas colis arborum
te praeter invisas cupressos
ulla brevem dominum sequetur;
absumet heres Caecuba dignior
servata centum clavibus et mero
tinguet pavimentum superbo,
pontificum potiore cenis.
(Horace Odes 2:14)

D: From my mother’s sleep I fell into the State,
And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze.
Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters.
When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.
(Randall Jarrell, "Death of the Ball Turret Gunner").

D: Men die because they cannot join the beginning to the end (Alkmeon of Croton 6th BC).

E: Adieu, farewell, earth’s bliss;
This world uncertain is;
Fond are life’s lustful joys;
Death proves them all but toys;
None from his darts can fly;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Rich men, trust not in wealth,
Gold cannot buy you health;
Physic himself must fade.
All things to end are made,
The plague full swift goes by;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Beauty is but a flower
Which wrinkles will devour;
Brightness falls from the air;
Queens have died young and fair;
Dust hath closed Helen’s eye.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Strength stoops unto the grave,
Worms feed on Hector brave;
Swords may not fight with fate,
Earth still holds open her gate.
“Come, come!” the bells do cry.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Wit with his wantonness
Tasteth death’s bitterness;
Hell’s executioner
Hath no ears for to hear
What vain art can reply.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
Haste, therefore, each degree,
To welcome destiny;
Heaven is our heritage,
Earth but a player’s stage;
Mount we unto the sky.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
(Thomas Nashe 1567-1601)

Before going on to raising questions about what a "future" rhetoric can (and often should look like), let me briefly give an account of how I propose to use "prolegomena," "textual" and "rhetoric." Following Wittgenstein, I take the "meaning" of a word to be its "use " in a specific context (Philosophical Investigations # 11, 12, 43, 77) Using a word then is much like using a tool. We also use a tool, say a drill, in a certain context, as a preparation, for example, for hanging a picture. In this we have an image of where the picture will be hung, a wall, plus a hole in which to insert a hanger for the picture. "Use" then involves an exclusionary process. Just as a drill cannot be used in any context with any purpose, a word cannot not be used just anywhere for every purpose.

As the immediate following will hopefully show, much of the "use" of "prolegomena," "textual" and "rhetoric" is determined by their history.

Prolegomena: The plural form of the present participle of prolegein, "to say something before (saying) something else"

Textual: Since every text (written and spoken) is a textual artifact, then every text-occurrence of "death" is textual. "Death" may or may not have reference to an actual death. Obituaries, epitaphs, elegies generally presuppose an actual (biological) death.
THIRDNESS:


2. Reaction

   B. "My father's wife died. My mother said we should drive down to his place and see what might be in it for us." (Amy Bloom. "Lucky Us." P. 1)

3. Interpretation (of event)
   A. Moral indignation by friends and family of the crash victims. News media coverage and interpretation of the event.


   C. "Mask of tears concealing the smiles of the heir." (Voltaire).

Does death exist?

What is it?

Cause/effect

Horace Eheu Posome

Larkin's Aubade

Washington Trailheads

SCOTT NEWSTOK, Quoting Death in Early Modern England.

See Hemingway's Theater of Mortality

Article on Chileans miners, Nyrker: July 7 * 14. 14

NOTES

Brombert, Victor. Musings on Death. Chicago UP

Eliot, T. S. What is a Classic?


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TEXTUAL BETWEENS
(Seeing Three Moves Ahead)

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By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes,

(Nicomachean Ethics 1105b 29-30)

Linguists make a distinction between "absolute" and "implicational" language universals. For example, all languages have pronouns; all spoken languages are accompanied by hand gestures (absolute). If a language has negatives then it has the nasal sound; if the personal pronouns of a language have a triadic form (I, you, she) then it also has a dual form (I, you; I, he; you, him) (implicational). In between these two "schools," are "tendencies." These are mainly statistical guesses. For example, English relies more on stress, as a feature of meaning, than French does; speakers of Chinese have more "tones" available to them than speakers of Spanish.

Here I borrow, and modify, the terms "absolute" and "implicational," to explore some of the uses writers make of "seeing three moves ahead." With three "proper" moves one can create what I call a Textual Between. Such Betweens serve many purposes, to immerse the reader in a scene, to create a virtual reality or
control the flow of information in a text. Some of these purposes will be explained in some detail; others, more problematic ones, will only be hinted at. Most of my examples are from English, but some mention will be made of examples from other languages familiar (presumably?) to the reader.

Later in this essay I will give reasons for taking a Technical Between, not as a linguistic universal in itself, but the effect of a sensory universal. Because part of our experience of the world is as Betweenness, or experiencing things from the middle, we encode Betweenness in various linguistic ways—as a "family," of Betweens. A generalization of this "family" yields a diagram like the following.

A Textual Between, in short, is one transferred from our experience of reality to the pages of a text.

The example is from certain texts of Aristotle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extreme</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Akron)</td>
<td>(Meson)</td>
<td>(Akron)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this scheme we can go on, thinking in thirds, to exemplify Betweenness as Textual Betweens, with sentences like these:

A. The Mirage of a Space Between Nature and Nurture. i

B. As in so many of her poems, (Elizabeth) Bishop brings us to such a place of utter poise, balancing between the real and the ideal…between the dreamt-of and the impossible, between love and loss; between sleep and waking, between solitude and communion ii

C. Edgelands in England are for the most part the zone of the
in-between, places neither urban nor rural, often marked by
desire paths, dead cars and hawthorn trees.iii

D Between the idea/And the reality/Between the motion/And the
act/Falls the Shadow (T. S. Eliot "The Hollow Men.")

E. Present state, past state and the space in-between.iv

F. Don’t mess with Mr. In-Between.

We can think of the effect of a Textual Between, like those above, on an
analogy with a magnet. A magnet has the power of drawing an iron filing (call it a
needle) to itself, and the needle has the property (which a piece of wood, for
example, does not) of experiencing and answering to the pull of the magnet. As
potentialities, these two properties are distinct and inert. But when the magnet and
needle are brought into proper relations of distance with each other, they both
actualize their potentialities simultaneously.

In other words, on this analogy, the "shadow" in Eliot’s lines, is the mediating
force (like magnetism) that draws out the potentialities of "idea/reality" and
"motion/act." The movement of the line is from potentiality to actuality by means of
between. (See below for THE IMMEDIATE VS. BETWEENNESS)

In this text I attempt to exemplify thirdness, the infrastructure of a Textual
Between, with thirdness. That is, the text is meant to be self-referential. This,
hopefully, will appear to the reader as a series of "movements." 1) One step forward;
2) one step back; 3) One step to the side, slightly askew.

THIRDNESS
Representing the world by thirds must be taken as a "absolute" linguistic universal.

![Diagram showing the concept of betweenness with categories: Extreme, Middle, Extreme (Center), (Before), (Now), (After), (Past), (Present), (Future), (Periphery), (Core), (Periphery), (Outer Wall), (Hub), (Outer Wall), (Husk), (Core), (Husk), (Peel), (Core), (Peel).]

language, as a representative of the world, has contrived to in part, make the soft claim that Textual Between are a combination of The "absolute" part of this is, in the terminology of Peirce and Usener, "thirdness" (Dreiheit). The implicational Textual Betweens, as the term suggests, are ones transferred from perception, thinking or discourse to the pages of a text, of any genre. They are perhaps coeval with the origins of writing, in the same way, as Samuel Johnson says that epitaphs are "one with the beginnings of writing."

THE IMMEDIATE VS. BETWEENNESS
For Aristotle, a basic distinction language makes in the way things are (or the way things happen) is between the "immediate" (amesos) and the mediated (mesos). In one sense, the immediate is a unity, like the universe before the Big Bang. There were no discernable differences in its parts—or no "parts" at all. In another sense, the immediate is an arrest of time as regards an object or thought. It has no discernable history, no before or after. C. S calls this "Firstness," in distinction to "Secondness" and "Thirdness (CP, 8, 328) He describes Firstness as the mode of being of that which is without reference to any subject or object. Firstness may be manifested by quality, feeling, freedom, or multiplicity. There is, as yet, no ground for Betweenness. That only develops with Secondness, in which a First establishes a relationship with a Second and a Third. The transition to Thirdness, in Peirce's description, creates a "sign" that "mediates relationships between their objects and their interpretants." (For more on Peirce and Thirdness please see below).

Another way to say the above is that the immediate, in contrast to mediation, is "self-evident." The subject in question, unlike the subject of mediation (a representation as a Textual Between), needs no explanation.

Before going on to describe some possible ways Textual Betweens appear as "relationships between their objects and their interpretants," in this case readers, I want to look in more detail at the ubiquity of Thirdness.

**SPACES OF BETWEENNESS**
One creates a Textual Between by opening up and occupying a space between (at least) two other inhabitable spaces. An occupied middle space always implies (at least) two other non-middle inhabitable spaces. In mathematical terms, the middle space is a constant, like the speed of light; the non-middle ones variables, contingent on the constant middle.

A real world example of betweening is taking the middle seat in a row composed of three seats. The seat one occupies becomes a nascent between only when the seats on either side are occupied. If we tell the story from the point of view of the seats, then we can say betweenness exists as long as there are three seats in the row. If we tell it from whatever (or whoever) occupies the middle seat then there can be no betweenness as long as something (or someone) does not take seats on either side of the occupied middle seat.

Betweenness, in short, emerges only if one thinks three moves ahead that opens up three different inhabitable spaces. An analogous situation is a chess player thinking three moves ahead or a golfer visualizing three different clubs h/s might use between the tee and the hole. In each of these examples the chess pieces and the golf ball have their reality by reference to the spaces realized as the positions they occupy.

These examples invite us to image betweenness in a horizontal dimension. But, as I describe below, betweennes can also take a vertical dimension—as is the case in most theological representations of man's position in the cosmos.

PLAYING THE GAME OF BETWEEN
Kafka's short parable HE features a speaker caught between two opposing forces:

He has two antagonists; the first presses him from behind, from his origin. The second blocks the road in front of him. He gives battle to both. Actually, the first supports him in his fight with the second for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but himself as well, and who really knows his intention? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment—and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet—he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of His experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other.

Representing the Middle as an unending battle between the past and the future sets up a dialogue of the "we" with the "non-we" and the actual with the virtual—where the actual and the "we" are conditioned by time, space and contingency and the virtual and the "non-we" as the absence of them. Out of time, space and contingency the virtual and the "non-we" are unchanging and always necessary. They are eternal, unlimited, inexhaustible. Beckett’s Godot comes to mind as a "non-we" in this sense as do the characters of Satre’s No Exit and, of course, Lemuel Gulliver. There is no one around in the narrative to give them a proper name by which they can be "called" to appear.
bove) of "extremes" for outside spaces "intermediary" for the inside space. The name for this structure is "textual between." These are betweens transferred from perception, thinking and discourse to the pages of a text.

Physics 190b 29-37 (ultimate principles of changing things is three: "actual change itself takes place between the terms of an antithesis, such as cultivated and uncultivated, hot and cold...and so forth; third thing, "non-antithetical subject" (190a37) Extremes "cannot act on each other"

Def of "between" def in terms of change: 226b 25-28: "[that which it) reaches before it reaches that to which it changes last, is between" "Now every change implies a pair of opposites and oosites may be either contraries or contradictories, since then contradiction admits of no mean term, it is obvius that "between' must imply a pair of contraries" 227a 30-35.

Place: "potency of place" (is) a marvelous thing, and take precedence of all other thing. For that without which nothing else can exist while it can exist without the others must needs be first" 208b 33-35; 209a, 1-2.

Wittgenstein’s style of writing may be described as a composite of answered, answerable and unanswerable questions. This means, in part, that these kinds of questions all contain a proposition (Satz), whether it is true, false, ironic or
nonsensical. If evidence is needed for the truth of this proposition, please consult Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*.

and substance, series of "guesses" on the contexts and functions of what I call "Textual Betweens." These are a family of linguistic structures transferred from discourse and thinking to the pages of a text. The above passage from Aristotle is an example. Others are these from different contexts (genres?)

A. The Mirage of a Space *Between* Nature and Nurture. vi

B. As in so many of her poems, (Elizabeth) Bishop brings us to such a place of utter poise, *balancing between* the real and the ideal…*between* the dreamt-of and the impossible, *between* love and loss; *between* sleep and waking, *between* solitude and communion vii

C. Edgelands in England are for the most part the *zone of the in-between*, places neither urban nor rural, often marked by desire paths, dead cars and hawthorn trees. viii

D *Between* the idea/And the reality/*Between* the motion/And the act/*Falls the Shadow* (T. S. Eliot "The Hollow Men.")

E. Present state, past state and the *space in-between*. ix
In C. S. Peirce’s words not everything needs explanation. Among this class of things are what philosophers have called "ultimate facts." Ultimate facts are facts that exhibit "isolated aggressive stubbornness and individual reality." Why a fact, say a grain of sand, got to be here and now, an isolated place on a beach, is "not a question to be asked; it is simply an ultimate fact." Nor it would be unfair to ask for the "general fact" underlying why some things are frequent and some are rare (p. Essential 275). What facts do stand in need an of explanation, however, are "every fact of a 'general or orderly nature." Kant, in accordance with Peirce, characterizes such a "fact" as one that exhibits a "regulative principle. One attempts to explain it on the basis of its potential intelligibility. Accordingly, one does not attempt to explain neither the "impossible" nor the "necessary" (Essential, p. 275).
The subject here rises from the common use of what appears to be a "general (linguistic) fact." But is it, in the Peircian definition, "orderly? Does it have certain conditions of use? Are we justified in calling it a "fact?" In order to give these questions an intelligible context, I would like to discuss them as a "Game of Between"—specifically a Game anchored a larger game of the Language Game (Wittgenstein).

***

**CONTROLLING FLOW FROM THE MIDDLE**

A problem common to thinking, and writing is controlling the flow of information: should the information be fast or slow? Should the conduits of the information (clauses, sentences, paragraphs and the like) be long or short. When should the flow be stopped? In a recent interview with *The New Yorker*, Tom Stoppard (the playwright) makes a similar observation about his writing practice: "It’s about controlling the flow of information—arriving at the right length and the right speed and in the right order….if the audience is made to do not enough work, they resent it without knowing it. Too much and they get lost. There’s a perfect pace to be found. And a perfect place that is different for every line of the play." (Mar 7, 2011:27). Analogous to controlling the flow of information in a text is a scientist in a lab attempting to duplicate a natural process. Certain variables must be controlled. A recent example, reported in *The New York Times* is to "reinvent silk." Silk has many actual and potential uses, in textiles, medicine, even as a glue. But spiders and silk worms (*Bombyx mori*) do not produce enough silk. So the need to fabricate it
and with this the problem of control. As one scientist has it: "What these creatures (silk worms) do is something no laboratory has been able to achieve: control the chemistry so exquisitely that the silk, which is a liquid inside the organism, becomes a solid upon leaving it." (Henry Fountain: "The Reinvention of Silk" March 8, 2011:D1-D4)

No doubt writing teachers have many ways to "control the variables" of writing as information flow, ones that go under names like "thesis statement," "rhetorical stance, "audience identification" and the like. But there is one often overlooked; one I find useful in my own writing but also in showing students of writing how to manage information in their text. For the purpose of this commentary I will call it the "Game of Between." In graphic form it involves dealing with information in three related forms:

```
  BETWEEN
  /          \
 /          |
 Extreme    Middle    Extreme
 /          |
 Center
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Some examples of the options have with this "Game" are these:

A. The Mirage of a Space *Between* Nature and Nurture.  

B. As in so many of her poems, (Elizabeth) Bishop brings us to such a place of utter poise, *balancing between* the real and the ideal…*between* the dreamt-of and the impossible, *between* love and loss; *between* sleep and waking, *between* solitude and communion

C. Edgelands in England are for the most part the *zone of the*
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D *Between* the idea/*And the reality*/*Between* the motion/*And the act*/Falls the Shadow (T. S. Eliot "The Hollow Men.")

E. Present state, past state and the *space in-between*.*

Where the Middle, or the (sometimes) reciprocal relational term, is italicized. In all of these the presumed intention of the author is to direct the reader’s attention to a *space between* (at least) two Extremes. Such a *space*, we might want to say, is the destination of the flow of information. It is where the subject become, ideally, fully intelligible.

Before going on to examine what this *space between* can contain, or represent, we need to examine more closely the infrastructure of the "Game”—that is its triadic structure of Extreme/Middle/Extreme.

**THIRDNESS**

Certainly thinking and representing a subject with Thirdness seems to be as old as the imagination and new as the iPod. One only needs mention the linguistic first, second and third person (I, you, it), the Trinity, three-dimensional reality, Goldilocks and so on. The seminal work on this topic is perhaps Usener’s *Dreiheit* (Thirdness 1903).* In the first part of his work, Usener assesses the importance of three in Greek antiquity. He notes the significance of three and its continuations in various folk and religious traditions. He finds fifteen different trinities of gods in Hesiod’s *Theogony*. He identifies groupings composed of three gods of equal status and then goes on to mention triads that entail divinities of unequal status. In the
second part of his work, Usener focuses on visual depictions of the trinity, three-headed gods and goddesses, the best known being Hecate, the goddess of crossroads.

In the third, and last part, of his essay, Usener (please note his use of Thirdness as an organizing principle for Thirdness) focuses on the movement from "two" to "three." Examples here are god-pairs that became trinities, the transformation of two seasons into three, paths and roads becoming perceived as three-pronged forks and the winds going from two to three. Finding symbolism in numbers appears in the Pythagorean system of "arithmetical theology" (p. 351). Usener claims that ancient people did not grasp numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time concepts, starting with the number "seven" and going up. In contrast, small numbers, such as "two", were used for expressions for quantity, while three was used to communicate completeness. More problematic, however, is Usener's suggestion that the Greeks could not count above three. To support this view he cites the research of Von den Steinen that members of the Bakairi tribe (in Brazil) can only count to two. To continue counting, they construe three as 2+1, four as 2+2 and so on. The same claim is made by Gamow about the "Hottentots" (Khoikhoi), said to have words only for "one", "two", "three", and "many"xvi

The principal modern advocate of thinking in Thirds is C. S. Peirce. 'Thirdness,' he says, 'pours in upon us through every avenue of sense.'xvii With this, and other statements, Peirce would no doubt agree with Usener that Thirdness
represents completeness, finality, wholeness—a situation analogous to not counting beyond three. One of Peirce's succinct definitions of Thirdness is this:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (CP, p 248).

First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is a reaction to a First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example, three kinds of active forces in the world, law, chance, habit-taking; three "departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and Metaphysics (CP, p. 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (Essential, p. 253). But Peirce's descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations.

In the words of one of Peirce’s editors, Peirce was familiar with "the fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or adicity) greater than triadic can be
expressed in combinations of triadic relations.” This is known as Peirce’s "reduction thesis" (Essential, p.xxx). Finally, there is Peirce’s use of Thirdness to showcase "novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like. In conventional terminology, the new thing (the Third) is always greater than the sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce’s speculations on Thirdness one can perhaps see the influence of Aristotle’s thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":

A totality (what emerged or is emerging) is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts.

(Metaphysics 1045A 9-10).xviii

"The day after tomorrow." Does this expression presuppose that the mind can only think (or imagine or plan) only three days ahead—plan with any certainty.

An ancient technique often ignored by writing teachers, however, is one we can call seeing "things from the middle", or from the "center."

So what is a "middle." In its most minimal form, it is whatever lies between two "extremes." In Aristotle’s succinct definition:

By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes

(Nicomachean Ethics 1105b 29-30).
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Usener claims that ancient people did not grasp numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time concepts, starting with the number "seven" and going up. In contrast, small numbers, such as "two", were used for expressions for quantity, while three was used to communicate completeness. More problematic, however, is Usener's suggestion that the Greeks could not count above three. To support this view he cites the research of Von den Steinen that members of the Bakairi tribe (in Brazil) can only count to two. To continue counting, they construe three as 2+1, four as 2+2 and so on. The same claim is made by Gamow about the "Hottentots" (Khoikhoi), said to have words only for "one", "two", "three", and "many"xxiv

The principal modern advocate of thinking in Thirds is C. S. Peirce. "Thirdness," he says, "pours in upon us through every avenue of sense."xxv With this, and other statements, Peirce would no doubt agree with Usener that Thirdness represents completeness, finality, wholeness—a situation analogous to not counting beyond three. One of Peirce’s succinct definitions of Thirdness is this:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The second is that which is what it is by force of something to which
it is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to
things *between* which it mediates and which it brings into
relation to each other (*CP*, p 248).

First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is a reaction to a
First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example,
three kinds of active forces in the world, law, chance, habit-taking; three
"departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and
Metaphysics (*CP*, p. 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the
cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate
potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (*Essential*, p. 253). But
Peirce’s descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory
information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can
be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second
is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations.

In the words of one of Peirce’s editors, Peirce was familiar with "the
fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations
are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or adicity) greater than triadic can be
expressed in combinations of triadic relations." This is known as Peirce’s "reduction
thesis" (*Essential*, p.xxx). Finally, there is Peirce’s use of Thirdness to showcase
"novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts
with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like.
In conventional terminology, the new thing (the Third) is always greater than the
sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce’s speculations on Thirdness one
can perhaps see the influence of Aristotle's thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":

A totality (what emerged or is emerging) is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts.

(Metaphysics 1045A 9-10).

"The day after tomorrow." Does this expression presuppose that the mind can only think (or imagine or plan) only three days ahead—plan with any certainty.

An ancient technique often ignored by writing teachers, however, is one we can call seeing "things from the middle", or from the "center."

So what is a "middle." In its most minimal form, it is whatever lies between two "extremes." In Aristotle's succinct definition:

By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes

(Nicomachean Ethics 1105b 29-30).

THE EXTREMES AS GIVEN

***

SWIFT ON THIRDNESS p. 35, A Tale

Now, among all the rest, the profound Number THREE is that which hath most employ'd my sublimest Speculations, nor ever without wonderful Delights. There is now in the Press (and will be publish'd next Term) a Panegyrical Essay of mine upon
this Number, wherein I have by most convincing Proofs, not only reduced the Senses and the elements under its Banner, but brought over several Deserters from its two great Rivals SEVEN and NINE.

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**INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN CREATIVE WRITING**

From the point of view of everyday language, it seems obvious that every use of "I," "You," "She/It/He" presupposes the existence of the "I" in relationship with the "other." The other can be either ourselves, in a dialogue with ourselves, or with some external other, the reader or the listener. With this we generally assume that the other has some understanding of what we address to him or her. No claim is made that the other always understands what is addressed to him or her. We only assume that there is a possibility of them understanding us, even if it’s not a perfect understanding.

Perhaps the best proof that speaking and writing rest on a prior assumption of intersubjectivity is to assume the contrary and attempt to conduct everyday affairs as if no one could ever understand what we say. Try ordering lunch in a restaurant while at the same time assuring yourself that the waiter cannot possibly understand your order. If we are honest, then we would have to confess that the subsequent appearance of our food under our noses is miraculous and accidental, or that the waiter somehow divines our meaning without understanding it. The
emptiness of solipsism is that no one can truly be a solipsist and live in the world in accord with only h/h beliefs.

If we truly believe that no one could understand us, then why, aside from mere caprice, speak or write at all?

A problem in teaching creative writing is showing how intersubjectivity underlies both dialogue and narrative. What one is looking for is not simply a list of possible relationships, diachronic (father-son, mother-daughter, three generational) and synchronic (brother-sister, wife-husband, same sex) but the fundamental units of intersubjectivity. What must exist prior to, and be a cause or condition of, intersubjectivity? How do we recognize the effects of an intelligible, and adequate, intersubjectivity? Standing in the way of arriving at an understanding of such causes and conditions is the very nature of language: as Wittgenstein puts it, "Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about" (PI, #203).

A linguistic turn on the relationship between the "I" and the other is the current debate in physics about "action at a distance." The question is whether or not two things, separated by a great distance, can affect each other simultaneously. The context here is subatomic physis, not something apparent in everyday life. Here, as in language, we are constricted to local realism (Markoff).

In my career as a teacher of creative writing I find it productive to focus on what I take to be the three salient foundations of intersubjectivity—all found in
everyday language’s representation of everyday life, namely, constraints, thirdness, and context. Before examining these in detail let me give an overview, one I present to students, of the structure and meaning of everyday language. Much of this, I suspect, will be familiar to the reader conversant with works on the pragmatics of language, or its meaning as use (Wittgenstein, Lyons, Tyler, Chafe, Bates, Bickerton and others).

No meaning as use resonates more with everyday opinion than the view that words are the names of things. There are things in the environment and words to refer to them. The word "book" refers to the name of the object we use a certain way. One can say that "book" is a kind of substitute for the object. We know the meaning of the word "book" because we have prior knowledge of the object it represents in our everyday performance of reading or writing a book. The object, we might want to say, is the worldly counterpart of the word. This is perhaps most apparent in the act of pointing, "the paragon of the act of referring" (Tyler 168). This means we know what a word means because we know by other than linguistic means what the word stands for. The environment and the things within it are objects of sense. We can see them, touch them, smell them and so on. Since the environment and language are separate, meaning as a product of use, can be seen as a bridge between them:

Wittgenstein says: "For a large class of cases, though not for all, in which we employ the word "meaning," it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use
in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer" (PH #43).

xxix It should be noted that here, as elsewhere, Wittgenstein is speaking about everyday language, not an ideal, or technical, language, such as mathematics or symbolic logic (Wittgenstein BB, 95-97; see also Chappell).

As I mentioned above everyday language represents everyday life. So what should we take as everyday, or ordinary, life? Primarily, but not always, we can say it is composed of common assumptions about the world. The first and most basic assumption is that the external world, independent of language, contains a number of individual persons, animals and other more or less discrete physical objects. That it is difficult to draw the line precisely between what counts as a discrete physical object and what is not is unimportant, provided that it is possible to identify a sufficient number of what are the indisputably individual physical objects.

Another assumption is that the external world can be divided into three "orders of entities." First order entities are physical objects. Within this order persons occupy a privileged position. The main distinction between a person and a non-person is willing or intention. Only persons have intentions. To say that "this computer has bad intentions" is to ascribe person-like consciousness to an object we normally classify as a non-person. In order to impose an interpretation on any utterance of this kind is to personify, rather than humanize, computers.
It should be noted that there seems to be a hierarchy within first order entities insofar as we take persons to be more strongly individualized than animals and animals more strongly individualized than things.

Salient examples of first-order entities are perceptible objects denoted by words like "chair," "sky," "tree" or parts of the body. Such entities, and how they are grammaticized, is generally a non-controversial issue. They are things situated in space and time. But this is not the case with second and third order entities. By second-order entities we mean events, processes, states of affairs and so on. Such entities are located in time and are said to occur or take place, rather than simply (as first-order entities do) exist. Third-order entities are abstractions, like "ideas" "truth," "propositions." They are outside space and time. They are purely conceptual, and imperceptible. One cannot observe them and cannot be said to occur or to be located in space or time.

With third-order-entities we are more apt to say "virtual" instead of "actual" and "fictional." rather than "factual."

These distinctions between three kinds of entities corresponds, in part, to the traditional distinction between concrete and abstract entities. To say "I see the same person every day" is to be constrained by spatiotemporal continuity and by the additional assumption that the same person cannot be in two different places at the same time. It classifies as a first order narrative. Either one of these conditions, by contrast, may be suspended in particular contexts with "the same thing happened
again today," a second order narrative. The thing that happened can happen not only at different times, but also at the same time.

Creating Constraint, Describing Contraints, Breaking Constraints. With language, humans have created an enormous contraint on representing the first, second and third entities mentioned above—in short we have created the impossibility of representing the world as a whole. But we have, at the same time, created a way to identify, if only in part, the where and how, of linguistic constraints. Books have been written on this subject. Leadiing the way, at least in my opinion is Wittgenstein;

* Thus the aim of the book (Tratatus) is to draw a limit to thought, or rather--not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.

*The limits of my language are the limits of my mind. All I know is what I have words for. (Tractatus 5.6).xxx

Examples of more psychologically colored constraints are mental states like delusions, false assumptions or thinking-what-we-want-to-think-is real. In two
recent books, one by a political theorist and another by a historian, the authors ask us to recognize that the commercial democracies of the West are not the repository of freedom. We are, in fact, swayed by a mass delusion, and the name of the delusion is progress. We swallow any invention, rationalize any injustice and the destruction of the environment. In mastering nature, we are destroying it—including, of course, ourselves (Gray, Fraser).

_Homo Sapiens_ is only one of very many species, and

Obviously not worth preserving. Later or sooner, it

Will become extinct. When it is gone, the earth

Will recover. Life will go on (Gray 73).

expresses this as "the limits of my language are the limits of the world.". A constraint, following Wittgenstein, can be seen as a member of a "family" of related terms, "limit," "boundary," "enclosed" and the like. Each, depending on its context, can either share a common or different use (BB 145). Additionally, as Wittgenstein says in his only published book, _Tractatus_, the main question one asks as a student of language is "where are the limits of thought as expressed in language?":

Here one has the option of discussing the linguistic uses of "constraint," or only the categories of mind and body (Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Ross, Fillmore).
Intersubjectivity, as I mentioned above, can take either the form of the "I" with itself or the "I" with the "you," someone external to the "I." But, present in both cases, is a third other, an "it" or a "they." Language, one can then say, seems to "triangulate," intersubjectivity, most apparent perhaps in the "I/you/it" triadic relational system of personal pronouns.

So the questions intersubjectivity poses, from the point of view of constraints, are "what constrains the relationship of the "I" with itself? The "I" with the "you" and the "I" with the "you" and the "it?"—where constraint, broadly conceived, is a form of resistance varying from resistent, or porous, to irresistible, or an impassable resistance—additionally, how are constraints broken and why are they broken? This last I discuss under the heading of a counterfactual thought experiment.

Language constrains itself, creates constrained situations, events, ideologies and breaks constraints As an overview of how language represents constrained situations we can start with Blake's "London."

I wander thro' each charter'd street,
Near where the charter'd Thames does flow.
And mark in every face I meet
Marks of weakness, marks of woe.

In every cry of every Man,
In every Infants cry of fear,
In every voice: in every ban,
The mind-forg'd manacles I hear

How the Chimney-sweepers cry
Every blackning Church appalls,
And the hapless Soldiers sigh
Runs in blood down Palace walls

But most thro' midnight streets I hear
How the youthful Harlots curse
Blasts the new-born Infants tear.
And blights with plagues the Marriage hearse
(My emphses).

CONSTRAINTS AS 'WHAT'S NOT THERE.' For example: take the hole that defines the hub of a wagon. A hole lacks physicality, yet it constrains the relationship between the wheel and the other components. Or consider the example of living on Mars. The constraints, or what's absent, are proper (earth-like) food, water and oxygen. One could not live solely breathing the air on Mars because it is 96 percent carbon dioxide. The Martian soil is not suitable for growing vegetables. So creatures from earth would mostly likely would opt for methods like hydroponics or airponics, growing plants in the water or the air. For water we earthly beings would have to drill 1,000 feet deep. Scientists speculate that is where, under the ice cap, water would most likely be found. Finally, humans are built to with 14.7 pounds per square inch of atmosphere pushing down. Mars has very little pressure, so speial
pressurized clothes would be necessary. Without it our bodies would swell and our skin and organs would rupture.

Constraints as 'what's not there" obviously has major causal efficacy. The things missing, mentioned above, propel the plot of the 2015 movie, "The Martian."

I suggest to you, now, that the word "idea," in its most elementary sense, is synonymous with "difference." Kant, in the *Critique of Judgment* [...] argues that in a piece of chalk there are an infinite number of potential facts. The *Ding an sich* (thing in itself), the piece of chalk, can never enter into communication or mental process because of this infinitude. The sensory receptors cannot accept it; they filter it out. What they do is to select certain facts out of the piece of chalk, which then become, in modern terminology, information.

I suggest that Kant's statement can be modified to say that there is an infinite number of differences around and within the piece of chalk. There are differences between the chalk and the rest of the universe, between the chalk and the sun or the moon. And within the piece of chalk, there is for every molecule an infinite number of differences between its location and the locations in which it might have been. Of this infinitude, we select a very limited number, which become information. In fact, what we mean by information - the elementary unit of information - is a difference which makes a difference [...]

What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and as you push the question back,
what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series of maps. **The territory never gets in at all.** The territory is *Ding an sich* and you can't do anything with it. Always the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of maps of maps, ad infinitum. All "phenomena" are literally "appearances."

What's not there appears in narrative as the constraint of "what might be."

This category exists in language, specifically in fictional narrative as the author making choices and representing h/h characters as choosing. Without what might be, we cannot speak of choice. Action, in other words, requires the constraints of the possible. To understand an event as an act, we have to understand it in relation to possibilities that were not, in fact, realized. (Kahn 43).

**The Constraint of VaofVagueness**

http://www28.homepage.villanova.edu/megan.m.quigley/BeastlyVagueness.pdf

The visualization of thirdness. Here an example, from physics, are the Feyman Diagrams. Three lines, straight, dotted and squiggly, compose the diagrams. Often they also feature three different colors representing three different subatomic particles. One such diagram, on the Wikipedia site, shows, with lines, intersections and colors the collision of an electron and positron the annihilation of which that produces a proton. C. S. Peirce, in his classical discussions of thirdness, does not visualize thirdness with diagrams. But it can easily be make visual, with Feynman-like lines and colors, as a collision of firstness and secondness (and their
annihilation) that produces thirdness—where thirdness is an emergent whose sum is greater than its parts, an irreducible "new" thing.

Go on w/: breaking constraints; Master of thin air; Annapurna (205; struggle of mind over matter); p. 235 Should I go on? Conquered Anapurna 241; frost bitten and snow blind, 242; constraints of religion (NYRB, p. 22).

In a review of the play, "Ugly Lies the Bone," a reviewer writes: Jess, the main character, has returned to her Florida home from a third tour in Afghanistan, enduring intense pain from injuries and the many surgeries that followed. We can read how much she suffers, from the grimaces and winces that flicker across the actress' face. One leg is cramped. Jess uses a complicated walker to move around. There are skin grafts over most of her body as well...Jess's psyche is under severe stress, too, because of her sardonic responses to her sister (Isherwood C1)

Character Constraints of body, constraints of mind: Body: limping, sick, old; mind: language, history, culture, religion. Blake's "mind forged manacles."
Thus the aim of the book (Tratatus) is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to
thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a
limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e.
we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only
be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the
limit will simply be nonsense.
PREPARATIONS FOR A PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE APPLICATION OF PEIRCEAN THIRDNESS TO CREATION, COMPOSITION AND MEANING

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), philosopher, mathematician, chemist and Episcopalian is best known for his work on the uses of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.

I use the concept in everything I write.

Exerpts from Peirce:

Thirdness pours in on us from all directions.

First and Second, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience, and they satisfy the mind for a very long time. But at last they are found inadequate, and the Third is the conception which is then called for. The Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and brings them into relationship.

We are told that every science has its Qualitative and its Quantitative stage; now its qualitative stage is when dual distinctions,—whether a given subject has a given predicate or not,—suffice; the quantitative stage comes when, no longer content with such rough distinctions, we require to insert a possible half-way between every two possible conditions of the subject in regard to its possession of the quality indicated by the predicate.

Ancient mechanics recognized forces as causes which produced motions as their immediate effects, looking no further than the essentially dual relation of cause and effect. That is why it could make no progress with dynamics. The work of Galileo and his
successors lay in showing that forces are accelerations by which a state of velocity is gradually brought about. The words cause and effect still linger, but the old conceptions have been dropped from mechanical philosophy; for the fact now known is that in certain relative positions bodies undergo certain accelerations.

Now an acceleration, instead of being like a velocity a relation between two successive positions, is a relation between three; so that the new doctrine has consisted in the suitable introduction of the conception of Threeness. On this idea, the whole of modern physics is built.

The superiority of modern geometry, too, has certainly been due to nothing so much as to the bridging over of the innumerable distinct cases with which the ancient science was encumbered; and we may go so far as to say that all the great steps in the method of science in every department have consisted in bringing into relation cases previously discrete.

(Selections from C.S. Peirce, “A Guess at the Riddle”, Collected Papers, 1.354–416)

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Here are some of the uses I have noticed in my reading plus some of my writings on Thirdness.

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Thirdness flows in from every sense. C.S. Peirce

"The calendar (of ancient Egypt) was divided into three seasons linked to the river and the agricultural cycle it determined: akhet, or the inundation; peret, the harvesting season; and shemu, the harvest."xxxi

DREIHEIT (THIRDNESS)
Three (the number) connotes great vastness, plurality, totality and completeness. Kahn

Thinking and representing with Thirdness seems to be as old as the imagination and new as the iPod. One only needs mention the linguistic first, second and third person (I, you, it), the Trinity, three-dimensional reality, Goldilocks and so on. The seminal work on this topic is perhaps Usener’s Dreiheit (1903). In the first part of his work, Usener assesses the importance of three in Greek antiquity. (H. Usener 1903: Dreiheit Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 58: 1-, 161-208, 321-362[an umlaut over "o" in "fur."]) He notes the significance of three and its continuations in various folk and religious traditions. He finds fifteen different trinities of gods in Hesiod’s Theogony. He identifies groupings composed of three gods of equal status and then goes on to men triads that entail divinities of unequal status. In the second part of his work, Usener focuses on visual depictions of the trinity, three-headed gods and goddesses, the best known being Hecate, goddess of crossroads.

In the third, and last part, of his essay, Usener (please note his use of Thirdness as an organizing principle for Thirdness) focuses on the movement from "2" to "3." Examples here are god-pairs that became trinities, the transformation of two seasons into three, paths and roads becoming perceived as three-pronged forks and the winds going from two to three. Finding symbolism in numbers appears in the Pythagorean system of "arithmetic theology." (351). Usener claims that ancient people did not simply grasping numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time
concepts, starting with the number "7" and going up. In contrast, small numbers, such as "2", were used for expressions for quantity, while three was used to communicate completeness. More problematic, however, is Usener's suggestion that the Greeks could not count above three. To support this view he cites the research of Von den Steinen that members of the Bakairi tribe (in Brazil) can only count to two. To continue counting, they construe three as 2+1, four as 2+2 and so on. (H. Von en Steinen. 1897: Unter den Naturvolkern Zentral-Brasiliens. D. Reimer: Berlin [umlaute over "O" in Naturvolkern])

The principal modern advocate of thinking by Thirdness is C. S. Peirce. 'Thirdness," he says, "pours in upon us through every avenue of sense" (Writings 5:98) With this, and other statements, Peirce would no doubt agree with Usener that Thirdness, or Peirce's "universal categories, can represent completeness, finality, wholeness—a situation analogous to not counting beyond three. One of Peirce's succinct definitions of Thirdness is this:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which It is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (Writings 248).

First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is reaction to a First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example,
three kinds of reasoning, deduction, abduction and induction; three "departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and Metaphysics (Writings V and VI: 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (Essential 253). But Peirce's descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations—or what I later call here the "manifold." In the words of one of Peirce's editors, Peirce was familiar with "the fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or adicity) greater than triadic can be expressed in combinations of triadic relations. This is known as Peirce's reduction thesis" (Essential xxx). Finally, there is Peirce's use of Thirdness to showcase "novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like. In conventional terminology, the new thing (the Third) is always greater than the sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce's speculations on Thirdness one can see the influence of Aristotle's thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":

A totality (what emerged or is emerging) is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts (Metaphysics 1045A 9-10).
The oldest things lie in the present.

According to the Peircean "reduction thesis" every explanatory principle can be phrased as a Third. Implicit in the reduction is a "sub-reduction" of language and thought to symbols, graphs, charts and the like. As an example of this let us consider briefly the following figure, one initially "empty" of empirical content:

(Adapted from Arendt *Thinking*: 209, "Parallelogram of Forces")

If we let A stand for the past, B for the future then it follows that C can stand for the present as In-Between. From here we can go on to ask questions about such things as the length of each line. Should we say that only A and B can represent infinity, the past and the future stretching both back and in front of us? C, perhaps
representing a person’s lifespan, would then represent finitude, a time stretching between birth and death. Furthermore, there are questions about how the lines converge, bottom left, and what such convergences represents. Bergson, for example, seems to be thinking of such convergence in the following observation about the "present moment" as an In-Between:

Nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible limit which divides the past from the future. When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet; and when we think it as existing, it is already past. If, on the other hand, what you are considering is the concrete present such as it is actually lived by consciousness, we may say that this present exists in large measure, in the immediate past. In the fraction of a second which covers the briefest possible perception of light, billions of vibrations have taken place, of which the first is separated from the last by an interval which is enormously divided. Your perception, however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable number of remembered elements; and in truth every perception is already memory. Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future." Henri Bergson Matière et memoire (1896) Matter an Memory (1919). (qtd Paul Muldoon. "Open Invitation" TLS 24 & 31, 2010: 17)
Still, one cannot afford to look away from the past and future. Here one is reminded of Walter Benjamin's "angel of history"—an angel that flies toward the future facing backward with its eyes on the facts piling up higher and higher in the past.

In theory, there are no limits on what such a line-triad (like the above) can represent. The only condition, for its individuation, is that it be "filled" with empirical content, general and specific. Such content would typically include one's actual life experiences, possible ("virtual") ones or some combination of the actual and the possible. Here two examples come to mind, the story of Goldilocks (which I return to below) and the thinking that goes into writing a cook book. Here one typically finds a list of ingredients, a menu to follow (a combining order of ingredients), cooking time and the like. Empirical content, in short, includes not only the "substance" of the content, but also how they have to be combined according to the goal one has in mind with the whole.

Let us, referring to A, B, and C, consider how two other In-Betweens might "capture" empirical content.

THE GAME BALL: Picture line C as a ball thrown by A to B or B to A. Before it is thrown, it represents certain possibilities not yet actualized. A (any person) might throw it to B (another person) or A might throw it through a hoop. Throwing the ball activates certain forces within the ball and actualizes In-Between conditions in the system. Forces intrinsic to the ball as a physical object (a per se object in a non-relational condition) would include incidentals like spin, speed, direction and the like. With these it can be taken as a metaphor for time—insofar as such incidentals,
of necessity, represent change. But a game ball is, by definition, a relational object. That is, one ultimately dependent on someone throwing it and someone, or something, receiving it. Additionally, the rules of the game help cause the ball to lose its independence.

THE LINE: Here we take A, B and C represent lines of dancers, real or imaginary, We can start filling the lines with empirical content with basics like space, time and number. In the world of dance one talks about a line of dancers as a two-dimensional contour that three-dimensional bodies describe. Consequently, one has the option of drawing a single contour or a line of dancers as a series of contours. In mathematics (especially in the language of geometry) one can represent the dancers as points on lines like A, B and C. To establish a system of measurement on the line we must assign a distinct number to each point on the lines. The numbers must be ranged along the lines in unbroken sequence. Inasmuch as a dancer can shift positions on any given line, or move to another line, we can say that each assigned number on the line must continue to be attached to a single distinct point. It follows from this that any dancers shifting positions will leave two numbers attached to the same points as before. By the law of contradiction (though for no other reason as far as I know) the points would only retain their identity as a particular point by not being "named" by the same number at the same time and place. It is clear from this that a line, in order to be in relationship to another line, must resist any attempt to reduce it to a single point; or any attempt to stretch it to an infinite distance— that
is to an uncountable number of points. Finitude must be countable, for both real and imaginary points.

With this we have a rough conception of the interdependence of space, time and number as they relate to the (minimal) empirical contents of an In_Between. Points occupy space; as numbered points shift they reify time as change; numbers that "name" points complete the construction of the line. In order to originate empirical content for an In-Between then one must be able to do something like create (draw?) a lines-triad like that above; or, alternatively, triangulate rows of dominos (or one's friends) only connected at the base of the triangle (see Critique of Pure Reason A26-B44).

METAPHOR: Like a game ball and a line one creates metaphors with Thirdness. A relates to B on the basis of (or because of) C. We add empirical content to A, B, and C with the following kind of "material," or world knowledge.

1. It is not the most beautiful nor the strongest who
   win prizes at the Olympics but (only) those who compete
   (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1099a3-6)
2. How is a divorce like a Texas tornado? In both you lose your trailer.
3. Poverty is a giant that uses your face as a rag to wipe a dirty world (Celine, Journey to the end of night)
One can analyze the infrastructure of #1, 2 in a number of way. What follows is one option. Another analysis, one I turn to below, is one that tries to answer the question, "What kind of WORK does an In-Between do?

1. "Compete" stands as the Middle of the In-Between, one that reciprocally relates "beautiful" to "strongest," and, by so doing, robs both of its independence. Please note that this example is the only one that uses negatives to "construct" an In-Between. With the help of Aristotle, the acknowledged master, of the form, I return to negation below (see Horn).

2. "Lose your trailer" happens with both a divorce and trailer. Therefore "lose" is the Middle that bestows similarity on both.

3. "Poverty" initiates the action of wiping a dirty world. Therefore poverty is the Middle as cause of the relationship between of "face" and "world." In more technical language "poverty" is prior to both "face" and "world" in both time and in "account." That is, we can’t give an coherent account of the relationship between "poverty," "face" and "world" without assuming that "poverty" was there before "face" and "world."

In the so-called "Controversion Theory" of metaphor, the immediate above would be analyzed on the basis of "tension. Tension, defined as a sort of semantic contradiction, created by a metaphor helps us, in Fill's words, to see "both areas in a new light" (108). By "both areas" Fill means what I call here the two Extremes of an In-Between. What he means by "tension" is what I mean by Middle: "The theory that metaphor establishes a tension between two areas of life which makes us see both
areas in a new light was first established by Max Black in his book *Models and Metaphors* (1962)" (108)

Let me now generalize the work of a Middle by citing recent research on gathering and processing information. Chess players, playing against experts, sometimes think that they are playing in a different game? The short answer, supplied by recent research, is that the experts, employing both parts of the brain, use information about the chess board in a different gaming strategy. Whereas the novice chess player "looked directly at the pieces to recognize them, the experts looked on the middle of the boards." In other words, the experts were taking in everything on the board by combining information supplied by peripheral vision with a strategic next move. (Dylan Loeb McClain. "Harnessing the Brain’s Right Hemisphere to Capture Many Kings" NY Times January 25, 2011: D3.)

Lifeless things organize themselves into something alive, three sets of things must be present.
The three key words where are "lifeless, organize, alive, present. See item 50
1. FIRST SECOND THIRD: this is a bottom up procedure, vs a top down one.
2. HERE THERE OVER THERE; Aqui, ahi alli
3. Negation makes a third?
4. Epistemic, nonepisemic and nonseeing
5. 3 generational play
6. Miller essay on maical number seven
7. Aristotle: syllogism; what makes a family (opening politics)
8. Freud: id, ego suer ego
9. feeling, thinking willing
10 Crossroads (trivia)
11. graph as a third: vertical, horizontal lines and diagonal line
12 A concept representing both infinity and finitude (a road w/ two terminal versus a crossroads
13Swift and three
14. 6 degrees of separation 6 directions from the body
15. Ed Leach and maraige
16. Venn Diagrams
17. 3 primary colors
18. Time Space, Agency
19. Hemingway's use of three characters: Hills; Macomber; Clean well lighted
20. Using Peirces proceure we can reduce Aristotle's 4 causes to 3.
21. 3 grammatical genders
22. Archaic Triad: Jupiter Mars, Quirinus
23. Convergence of characters: American captain, the Spanish slaver, and the African rebel: make their way to their fateful meeting. Melville:Benito Cerenon; see meal in winter: convergence of German soldiers, Polish citizens and captured Jews. Hardy's Convergence of the Twain.
25. Emergence of the third: "One of the distinctive features of Christianity is its understanding of monotheism as one God in three persons-traditionally named Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Frequently, the doctrine comes across as an excessive intellectual puzzle, even to many Christians. Why three? In fact, a Trinitarian structure to more subtle aspects of reality has been discerned in other spheres of life. Mature love can be thought of as triangular: there is A's love for B, and B's love for A, but also, thirdly, the jointly created life that emerges between them." (TLS, March 7: p. 23; rev of Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self. An Essay on the Trinity. Cambridge UP 2014)

26. Thirdness and narrative structure: Martin Amis Holocaust novel, Zone of Interest. Novel told from point of view of three central characters, Paul Doll, Camp commandant of death camp; Golo Thomsen, nephew of Martin Borman and Szmul, Jew assigned to dispose of dead. Feast in Winter

27. Triage


29. 3 riotous youths of Chaucer's Pardner's Tale.


31. Movie: "Remembrance" three groups, Gestapos; poles; jews.

32. 3 colors, red, white, blue French & American flags.

33. 3 colors to make a map

34. 3 character scenes in move "What's Up Pussycat," Peter sellers, Peter O Toole, Woody Allen. : steam room scene. And library scene: 2 character active, one idle.

33. Add MS "Guesses at the Riddle."


Hermann Usener


38. St. Paul, Corinthians: 13 And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.

39: META=ETHICS: According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems, or three general questions:

1. What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?
2. What is the nature of moral judgments?
3. How may moral judgments be supported or defended?

40. Land, Sea, Air (metaphor for the whole earth)

41. "Companion" (from Latin "to be with the bread," *panus*) presupposes three conditions: two eat eat and the third thing (between them) food. Meals are common in TV seires like Blue Bloods, in films, "Fury," and religious ceremonies. The Last Supper of Christ is an obvious example.

42. "The very cross was the tribunal of Christ; for the Judge was placed in the middle; one thief, who believed, was set free; the other, who reviled, was condemned; which signified what he was already about to do with the quick and dead; being about to set some on his right hand, but ethers on his left." St. Augustine

43. Three number combination locks.
44. Rather, his (Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*) description involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a subject matter (being), and (3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied (qua being).

45. Tri-border area: Israel, Syria, Lebanon.


47. In **number theory**, **Fermat's Last Theorem** (sometimes called **Fermat's conjecture**, especially in older texts) states that no three **positive integers** $a, b,$ and $c$ can satisfy the equation $a^n + b^n = c^n$ for any integer value of $n$ greater than two.

(Wikipedia)

48. Three Cushion Billiards. The object of the game is to **carom** the **cue ball** off both **object balls** and contact the **rail cushions** at least 3 times before the last object ball. A point is scored for each successful carom. In most shots the cue ball hits the object balls one time each, although hitting them any number of times is allowed as long as both are hit. The contacts between the cue ball and the cushions may happen before and/or after hitting the first object ball. The cue ball does not have to contact 3 different cushions as long as they have been in contact at least 3 times in total. (Wikipedia)


50. "For lifeless chemical compounds to organize themselves into something alive, scientists generally agree, three sets of things must be present:

*Standing water and an energy source

*Five basic elements: carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, phosphorus and nitrogen.
And time, lots of time." "Rover Finds Stronger Potential for Life"; NY Times Dec 9, 2014: p. D6

51. Categorization: "There are many variations and subgenres of Bildungsroman that focus on the growth of an individual. An Entwicklungsroman ("development novel") is a story of general growth rather than self-cultivation. An Erziehungsroman ("education novel") focuses on training and formal schooling, [citation needed] while a Künstlerroman ("artist novel") is about the development of an artist and shows a growth of the self." [10] (Wikipedia)

52. "The Tao gives birth to One/One gives birth to Two/Three gives birth to all things."


53. "A wife is useful at all stages of a man’s life - a mistress in youth, a companion in middle age, a nurse for old age." Francis Bacon, Of Marriage and the Single Life.

54. MOVIE The Third Man.

55. 3 roman soldiers in Hemingway's "Today is Friday."

56. "This article may contain excessive, poor, or irrelevant examples. (April 2013)"

(Wikipedia, "Real Time").

57. A Threefold Cord is not easily broken: Eccliiasties 4:12.

58. A sign, and interpreter of the sign, the meaning of the sign. C. S. Peirce.

59. The three kings from the east who followed the star to Bethlehem to see Jesus.

Mathew2:1-12
60. Then at dawn we came down to a temperate valley, Wet, below the snow line, smelling of vegetation; With a running stream and a water-mill beating the darkness, And three trees on the low sky, And an old white horse galloped in away in the meadow.

(T. S. Eliot; "Journey of the Magi.")

61. Trial

62. Swift's triumvirate bk 3 of GT.

63 Third time is charm.

64. I know there is no happiness for man except in pleasure and enjoyment while he lives. And when man eats, and drinks and finds happiness in his work this is a gift from God….What is, already was, what is to be, has been already (Ecclesiastes 3:12-15).

65. Three daughters of Job; three friends from three different towns, three bands of Chaldeans, three messengers.


67. Christ has died; Christ has risen; Christ will come again.

68. Tao: beyond is and is not.

69. A to B via C. Ballet company; NY Times 13 Jan 15.70.

70. Three fates, Morai: Clotho "spinner" spins thread of life from her distaff onto her spindle; Lachesis (allotter or drawer of lots); measures the thread of life allotted to each person w/ her measuring rod; Atropos, inexorable or inevitable, literally unturning, cutter of the thread of life; choses manner of each person's death and cuts the thread w/ her "adhored shears.: Cf the three weird sisters of Macbeth.
71. BCE Before current era.

72 Three Card Trick

73. Three Cushion Shot

74. Convergence of three cultures in movie: Mongolian, Brazilian Indians, Beduins

(Desert folk

75. One left over: "five, Seven, 13." Mime Math; NYT Apr 16: 15.

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THIRDNESS

From Econ class: Three major variables in macroeconomics are: GDP (Gross Domestic Product); Unemployment; Inflation.

Three functions of money (Chp 11; three motives to hold money.

A. AYCKBOURN’s three plays see rev. in NY Times 22 Apr 09

Economic theory: unlimited wants of people vs. scarcity of resources: allocation of resources, form a line; pricing: analogy of limited # of tickets to a ballgame.

Triplych in painting

Drinking alone by moonlight. Li Po

A cup of wine, under the flowering trees;
I drink alone, for no friend is near.
Raising my cup I beckon the bright moon,
For her, with my shadow, will make three people.
The moon, alas, is no drinker of wine;
Listless, my shadow creeps about at my side.
Yet with the moon as friend and the shadow as slave
I must make merry before the Spring is spent.
To the songs I sing the moon flickers her beams;
In the dance I weave my shadow tangles and breaks.
While we were sober, three shared the fun;
Now we are drunk, each goes their way.
May we long share our eternal friendship,
And meet at last on the Cloudy River of the sky.
See wikipedia, Li Po
From Outside Magazine, Dec 08 about dangers of the sea: The “Three Sisters” 40 to 50 ft waves tall more dangerous than a 100 ft one; first wave plunges ship into a deep trough; second and third waves sink the ship
“Monsterwellen”
Menage a trois
First, second and third “I,” “you” and “it.”

Peirce: B 945 P41 M66 (in the BARN)
B 945 P44 D 39 (second fl)
THIRDNESS ODDS & ENDS
TWO plays by Craig Wright w/ thirdness: “Lady,” 3 old school pals on hunting trip; “The Unseen”; 2 prisoners in adjoining cells nevr see each other; commun w/ words only; thrown off balance by a third person; new risoner a woman? One char persuaded that onverging forces sign this is day will leave prison: NY Times rev. 17 March 09; “Strangers in Prison, onnected b Words”

This is the end (deleted) from Doors AS Limina: data from The Esential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol. 1. Eds Nathan House & Christian Kloesel. Indiana UP. Bloomington and Indianapolis B945 P4125.

Let me end on a personal note of indebtedness to the American mathematician and philosopher, C. S. Peirce. Throughout this presentation I have made use of what he calls trichotomic or “the art of making three-fold divisions. Such a division depends on the conceptions of 1st, 2nd, 3rd. First is the beginning that which is fresh, original spontaneous, free. Second is that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object, necessitated, reacting. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing about” (280). In what I have attempted to do above,
following Peirce’s threefold division, is to first think of door as a “first.” In itself, it is the “beginning, original, and free”; that is it is a whole, or unit neither acting or reacting, independent of human agency, communicating nothing. Purely as a word, “door,” it stands unmodified by any possible adjective or article. At this stage, door(s) in The Fifth Column are, in critical terms, sum to zero. Being without qualities, they tell us nothing at all about the play. We can only move into a discussion of their qualities by conceiving them as a “second,” as “determined, terminated, reacting.” This forced me to think. Is there in all of this one overarching meaning to doors in The Fifth Column? If so, it perhaps lies somewhere in what the American mathematician and philosopher, C. S. Pierce, calls a “third” (or thirdness): “The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other”. “Things,” in this case, are what Peirce would call a “first” and a “second” and their realization in the play in the figures of Philip and Dorothy. Each of them would be a “first” as long as we think of them as possessing no relationship with each other or anyone else. Each is, in Peirce’s words, “present and immediate...initiative, original, spontaneous, and free.” Only when they form a relationship, a scenario of action-reaction, do they become a “second” (248). The door between Rooms 109 and 110 would then become, in Peirce way of seeing things, a “third” in its role of relating Philip to Dorothy (and vice versa) and mediating their interdependent actions and dialogue.

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THIRDNESS; A NEGLECTED HEURISTIC IN TEACHING LITERATURE AND WRITING.


Publisher: Hildesheim, Olms, 1966.

The idea that any subject can be represented by threes (in a certain way) seems to be hardwired in the human mind. I have used it, both in teaching and writing, with some success. "Thirdness pours into us from every side" Peirce.

I give some examples below. Please forgive the grammatical, syntactical and semantic infelicities. The list is incomplete and probably will be forever.

1. FIRST SECOND THIRD: this is a bottom up procedure, vs a top down one.
2. HERE THERE OVER THERE; Aqui, ahi alli
3. Negation makes a third?
4. Epistemic, nonepisemic and nonseeing
5. 3 generational play
6. Miller essay on maical number seven
7. Aristotle: syllogism; what makes a family (opening politics)
8. Freud: id, ego suer ego
9. feeling, thinking willing
10 Crossroads (trivia) or "three ways."
11. graph as a third: vertical, horizontal lines and diagonal line
12 A concept representing both infinity and finitude (a road w/ two terminal versus a crossroads

13 Swift and three characters in A Tale of A Tub

14. 6 degrees of separation 6 directions from the body

15. Ed Leach and marriage

16. Venn Diagrams

17. 3 primary colors

18. Time Space, Agency

19. Hemingway's use of three characters: Hills; Macomber; Clean well lighted

20. Using Peirces procedure we can reduce Aristotle's 4 causes to 3.

21. 3 grammatical genders

22. Archaic Triad: Jupiter Mars, Quirinus

23. Convergence of characters: American captain, the Spanish slaver, and the African rebel: make their way to their fateful meeting. Melville:Benito Cereno; see meal in winter: convergence of German soldiers, Polish citizens and captured Jews. Hardy's Convergence of the Twain.

24. "Being consciousness and bliss provide the book with its overall structure"

25. Emergence of the third: "One of the distinctive features of Christianity is its understanding of monotheism as one God in three persons-traditionally named Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Frequently, the doctrine comes across as an excessive intellectual puzzle, even to many Christians. Why three? In fact, a Trinitarian structure to more subtle aspects of reality has been discerned in other spheres of life. Mature love can be thought of as triangular: there is A's love for B, and B's love for A, but also, thirdly, the jointly created life that emerges between them." (TLS, March 7: p. 23; rev of Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self. An Essay on the Trinity.Cambridge UP 2014)

26. Thirdness and narrative structure: Martin Amis Holocaust novel, Zone of Interest. Novel told from point of view of three central characters, Paul Doll, Camp commandant of death camp; Golo Thomsen, nephew of Martin Borman and Szmul, Jew assigned to dispose of dead. Feast in Winter

27. Triage

29. 3 riotous youths of Chaucer's Pardner's Tale.


31. Movie: "Remembrance" three groups, Gestopos; poles; jews.

32. 3 colors, red, white, blue French & American flags.

33. 3 colors to make a map

34. 3 character scenes in move "What''s Up Pussycat," Peter sellers, Peter O Toole, Woody Allen. : steam room scene. And library scene: 2 character active, one idle.

35. Add MS "Guesses at the Riddle."


38. St. Paul, Corinthians: 13 And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.

39: META=ETHICS: According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems, or three general questions:

1. What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?

2. What is the nature of moral judgments?

3. How may moral judgments be supported or defended?

40. Land, Sea, Air (metaphor for the whole earth)

41. "Companion" (from Latin "to be with the bread," panus) presupposes three conditions: two eat eat and the third thing (between them) food. Meals are common
in TV series like Blue Bloods, in films, "Fury," and religious ceremonies. The Last Supper of Christ is an obvious example.

42. "The very cross was the tribunal of Christ; for the Judge was placed in the middle; one thief, who believed, was set free; the other, who reviled, was condemned; which signified what he was already about to do with the quick and dead; being about to set some on his right hand, but others on his left." St. Augustine

43. Three number combination locks.

44. Rather, his (Aristotle in the Metaphysics) description involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a subject matter (being), and (3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied (qua being).

45. Tri-border area: Israel, Syria, Lebanon.


47. In number theory, Fermat's Last Theorem (sometimes called Fermat's conjecture, especially in older texts) states that no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation $a^n + b^n = c^n$ for any integer value of n greater than two. (Wikipedia)

48. Three Cushion Billiards. The object of the game is to carom the cue ball off both object balls and contact the rail cushions at least 3 times before the last object ball. A point is scored for each successful carom. In most shots the cue ball hits the object balls one time each, although hitting them any number of times is allowed as long as both are hit. The contacts between the cue ball and the cushions may happen before and/or after hitting the first object ball. The cue ball does not have to contact 3 different cushions as long as they have been in contact at least 3 times in total.(Wikipedia)

50. "For lifeless chemical compounds to organize themselves into something alive, scientists generally agree, three sets of things must be present:
* Standing water and an energy source
* Five basic elements: carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, phosphorus and nitrogen.
* And time, lots of time." "Rover Finds Stronger Potential for Life"; NY Times Dec 9, 2014: p. D6

51. Categorization: "There are many variations and subgenres of Bildungsroman that focus on the growth of an individual. An Entwicklungsroman ("development novel") is a story of general growth rather than self-cultivation. An Erziehungsroman ("education novel") focuses on training and formal schooling, [citation needed] while a Künstlerroman ("artist novel") is about the development of an artist and shows a growth of the self.[10](Wikipedia)

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53. "A wife is useful at all stages of a man’s life - a mistress in youth, a companion in middle age, a nurse for old age." Francis Bacon, Of Marriage and the Single Life.

54. MOVIE The Third Man.

55. 3 roman soldiers in Hemingway's "Today is Friday."
56. "This article may contain excessive, poor, or irrelevant examples. (April 2013)"
(Wikipedia, "Real Time").

57. A Threefold Cord is not easily broken: Ecclesiastes 4:12.

58. A sign, and interpreter of the sign, the meaning of the sign. C. S. Peirce.

59. The three kings from the east who followed the star to Bethlehem to see Jesus.
Mathew 2:1-12

60. Then at dawn we came down to a temperate valley, Wet, below the snow line,
smelling of vegetation; With a running stream and a water-mill beating the darkness,
And three trees on the low sky, And an old white horse galloped in away in the meadow.
(T. S. Eliot; "Journey of the Magi.")

61. Trial

62. Swift's triumvirate bk 3 of GT.

63. Third time is charm.

64. I know there is no happiness for man except in pleasure and enjoyment while he lives.
And when man eats, and drinks and finds happiness in his work this is a gift from
God….What is, already was, what is to be, has been already (Ecclesiastes 3:12-15)).

65. Three daughters of Job; three friends from three different towns,; three bands of
Chaldeans, three messengers.

66. Three sets of things essential to transform lifeless matter into life. NY Times, Dec 9:

67. Christ has died; Christ has risen; Christ will come again.

68. Tao: beyond is and is not.

69. A to B via C. Ballet company; NY Times 13 Jan 15.70.
70. Three fates, Morai: Clotho "spinner" spins thread of life from her distaff onto her spindle; Lachesis (allotter or drawer of lots); measures the thread of life allotted to each person w/ her measuring rod; Atropos, inexorable or inevitable, literally unturning, cutter of the thread of life; choses manner of each person's death and cuts the thread w/ her "adhored shears.: Cf the three weird sisters of Macbeth.

71. BCE Before current era.

72 Three Card Trick

73. Three Cushion Shot

74. Convergence of three cultures in movie: Mongolian, Brazilian Indians, Bediums (Desert folk

75. One left over: "five, Seven, 13." Mime Math; NYT Apr 16: 15.

76. There are three significant compoents of a living cell; lipids make the walls of a cell's various compartments; nucleotides store its information; and amino acids assemble into the proteins that control its metabolism" NYT May 5, D4.

79. The prisoners' dilemma. Three options

77. In golf match play, each hole is a separate contest. If you win the first hole, you are "one-up"; if you lose it, you are "one-down"; if you halve it, you are "all-square."

78. Three value logic. True false and some indeterminate value. See Wikipedia.

71. GENESIS 18: two men and God converse.


73. Nineveh, mentioned in the Book of Jonah, as "an exceedingly large city, a three day walk across."?
   Author: Hermann Usener  
   Publisher: Hildesheim, Olms, 1966.

75. The LORD appeared to Abraham near the great trees of Mamre while he was sitting at the entrance to his tent in the heat of the day.  
   Abraham looked up and saw three men standing nearby. When he saw them, he hurried from the entrance of his tent to meet them and bowed low to the ground (Genesis 18).

76. 3 plots of midsummer bights dream: the lovers, the rude mehanicals, and fairies.

77. Tristram Shandy on a squeaky door hinges and Walter's response to it: "Three drops of oyl with a feather, and a smart stroke of a hammer, had saved his honour forever" (3:21; vol 1 Florida ed.)

78. "The essays are divided into three groups, concerned, respectively, with defendinbg, contesting and eventually transcending the boundries of identity." TLS January 30, 2015, p. 28 (Review of Pia Cunco, Animals and Early Modern Identity: London, Ashgate, 2915.


80. Please notice in this entry the thirdness in the sub-title and then read through the paragraph beginning p. 25, the one that begins with "The effort to bring Nazi war criminals to justice…divides roughly in three" plus the paragraph. "When Germans discuss the Second World War, they often do so in term of generations. There is the Tatergeneration…those who carried out the war…then the sweite Generation children of the war, then there is the dritte Generation, the perpetrators' grandchildren Elizaeth

81. When you look ahead how many generations can you see? your children, your grandchildren, great-grand children?

82. Karl Popper's taxonomy distinguishes between heuristic (to illustrate a theory), critical (against a theory) and apologetic (in favor of a theory) thought experiments (see Popper, 1959). (From Stanford Philosophy, "Thought Experiments")

83. Tennyson, Lotus Eaters ll 10-19: they saw three mountains

84. Three things necessary for unhealthy smog in Northern Utah: Car emittion, smoke, cows; snow on the ground, cold temperature.

85. "Unger begins ith three 'irreparable flaws' in the human condition: our mortality, our 'groundlessness' (we can find no ultimate basis for the existence of the cosmos or our place in it) andour 'insatiability'-our anguish as we walk the treadmill of desire in a vain attempt o assure ourselves that there is an unconditional place for us in the world" (TLS, Feb 6: 15: 28; rev. Robt Unger: The Religion of the Future).


87. Church w/ three spires, Gothic style: St. Thomas Church on campus of Villanova University, Pennsylvania. Each spire has a cross affixed to the top.

88. Self, World, and Time. Olivier O'Donovan (London: Eerdmans, 2915. Show how self, world and time are connected wih, and perfected in, the redemptive threefold pattern of faith, love and hope" TLS, Feb 13, 14: p. 28.

90. 3 years Penelope (Πηνελόπεια) wove, and unwove the burial shroud for Odysseus' father while waiting for Odysseus to return. (The Odyssey, XXIV: 140-146.)

91. Any use of a triangle as a metaphor. E. g. closing the triangle. To solve a murder. Maigret TV series; love triangle, menage a'trois"

92. Rule of Three (Wikipedia).

93. Obama's "three pillars of a plan to lift the middle class….The first consists of tax and regulatory provisions aimed at supporting middle-income ….The second pillar is policies aimed at making workers more productive….The third pillar is policies aimed at increasing overall economic growth" (The New York Times: February 26, 2015: p. A3).

94. Peter denied Christ three times

95. Punctuation: Full stop (period, colon), degrees of pausing, semi-colon and comma

96. Emergence: The chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties different from those of either of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together (Mill 1843).

97. Rotation locks and three settings. Typically a start number, say 21, then a second turn to the right to, say,, 7, and then a turn to the left to say, 2.

98. "Pret-ty, pret-ty, pret-ty" a signature saying of Larry David on his TV show "Curb You Enthusiasm" and play, "Fish in the Darrk."

99. Rust as the third of three: the result of the interchanges between oxygen and iron>


100. Three classes of broadway theaters, Broadway, Off Broadway, and Off Off Broadway.

101: Third rail. The electrified one and so dangerous.
102. Three-value logic: indicating true, false and some indeterminate third value. This is contrasted with the more commonly known bivalent logics (such as classical sentential or Boolean logic which provide only for true and false.

103. The three cusion shot in billiards.

104. Scene where Aeneas attempts to embrace is dead father, Anchises, now a "shade" in the underworld: Three times he, Aeneas, tried to reach arms around that neck/Three times the form reached for in vain, escaped/Like a breeze between his hands a dream on wings. 

_Aeneid, Bk 6._

105. Can computers ever think like humans? If so, three things are necessary: 1. Memory of experiences; 2) ability to focus on an aspect of an image; 3) ability to understand and vocalize answers to questions. Example: "What is the pattern on the cat's fur on its tail?"

Possible answer "stripes." See NYT 7 March 2016: "Taking Steps for Software that can Reason Like Humans"

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THIRDNESS AND TEACHING

See notes on Aristotle's Poetics (notebook) and in Mckeon Aristotle

Thirdness flows in from every sense. C.S. Peirce

"The calendar (of ancient Egypt) was divided into three seasons linked to the river and the agricultural cycle it determined: _akhet_, or the inundation; _peret_, the harvesting season; and _shemu_, the harvest._"xxiii

_DREIHEIT (THIRDNESS)_
Three (the number) connotes great vastness, plurality, totality and completeness. Kahn

Thinking and representing with Thirdness seems to be as old as the imagination and new as the iPod. One only needs mention the linguistic first, second and third person (I, you, it), the Trinity, three-dimensional reality, Goldilocks and so on. The seminal work on this topic is perhaps Usener’s Dreiheit (1903). In the first part of his work, Usener assesses the importance of three in Greek antiquity. (H. Usener 1903: Dreiheit Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 58: 1-, 161-208, 321-362[an umlaut over "o" in "fur."]) He notes the significance of three and its continuations in various folk and religious traditions. He finds fifteen different trinities of gods in Hesiod’s Theogony. He identifies groupings composed of three gods of equal status and then goes on to men triads that entail divinities of unequal status. In the second part of his work, Usener focuses on visual depictions of the trinity, three-headed gods and goddesses, the best known being Hecate, goddess of crossroads.

In the third, and last part, of his essay, Usener (please note his use of Thirdness as an organizing principle for Thirdness) focuses on the movement from "2" to "3." Examples here are god-pairs that became trinities, the transformation of two seasons into three, paths and roads becoming perceived as three-pronged forks and the winds going from two to three. Finding symbolism in numbers appears in the Pythagorean system of "arithmetic theology." (351). Usener claims that ancient people did not simply grasping numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time
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First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is reaction to a First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example,
three kinds of reasoning, deduction, abduction and induction; three "departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and Metaphysics (Writings V and VI: 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (Essential 253). But Peirce's descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations—or what I later call here the "manifold." In the words of one of Peirce's editors, Peirce was familiar with "the fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or adicity) greater than triadic can be expressed in combinations of triadic relations. This is known as Peirce's reduction thesis" (Essential xxx). Finally, there is Peirce's use of Thirdness to showcase "novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like. In conventional terminology, the new thing (the Third) is always greater than the sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce's speculations on Thirdness one can see the influence of Aristotle's thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":

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METAPHOR: Like a game ball and a line one creates metaphors with Thirdness. A relates to B on the basis of (or because of) C. We add empirical content to A, B, and C with the following kind of "material," or world knowledge.

1. It is not the most beautiful nor the strongest who win prizes at the Olympics but (only) those who compete
   (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1099a3-6)
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One can analyze the infrastructure of #1, 2 in a number of way. What follows is one option. Another analysis, one I turn to below, is one that tries to answer the question, "What kind of WORK does an In-Between do?

1. "Compete" stands as the Middle of the In-Between, one that reciprocally relates "beautiful" to "strongest," and, by so doing, robs both of its independence. Please note that this example is the only one that uses negatives to "construct" an In-Between. With the help of Aristotle, the acknowledged master, of the form, I return to negation below (see Horn).

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In the so-called "Controversion Theory" of metaphor, the immediate above would be analyzed on the basis of "tension. Tension, defined as a sort of semantic contradiction, created by a metaphor helps us, in Fill's words, to see "both areas in a new light" (108). By "both areas" Fill means what I call here the two Extremes of an In-Between. What he means by "tension" is what I mean by Middle: "The theory that metaphor establishes a tension between two areas of life which makes us see both
areas in a new light was first established by Max Black in his book *Models and Metaphors* (1962)” (108)

Let me now generalize the work of a Middle by citing recent research on gathering and processing information. Chess players, playing against experts, sometimes think that they are playing in a different game? The short answer, supplied by recent research, is that the experts, employing both parts of the brain, use information about the chess board in a different gaming strategy. Whereas the novice chess player "looked directly at the pieces to recognize them, the experts looked on the middle of the boards." In other words, the experts were taking in everything on the board by combining information supplied by peripheral vision with a strategic next move. (Dylan Loeb McClain. "Harnessing the Brain’s Right Hemisphere to Capture Many Kings" NY Times January 25, 2011: D3.)

THIRDNESS ODDS & ENDS

TWO plays by Craig Wright w/ thirdness: “Lady,” 3 old school pals on hunting trip; “The Unseen”; 2 prisoners in adjoining cells nevr see each other; commun w/ words only; thrown off balance by a third person; new risoner a woman? One char persuaded that onverging forces sign this is day will leave prison: NY Times rev. 17 March 09; “Strangers in Prison, onnected b Words”

This is the end (deleted) from Doors AS Limina: data from The Esential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings. Vol. 1. Eds Nathan House & Christian Kloesel. Indiana UP. Bloomington and Indianapolis B945 P4125.

Let me end on a personal note of indebtedness to the American mathematician and philosopher, C. S. Peirce. Throughout this presentation I have made use of what he calls trichotomic or “the art of making three-fold divisions. Such a division depends on the conceptions of 1st, 2nd, 3rd. First is the beginning
that which is fresh, original spontaneous, free. Second is that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object, necessitated, reacting. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing about” (280). In what I have attempted to do above, following Peirce’s threefold division, is to first think of door as a “first.” In itself, it is the “beginning, original, and free”; that is it is a whole, or unit neither acting or reacting, independent of human agency, communicating nothing. Purely as a word, “door,” it stands unmodified by any possible adjective or article. At this stage, door(s) in The Fifth Column are, in critical terms, sum to zero. Being without qualities, they tell us nothing at all about the play. We can only move into a discussion of their qualities by conceiving them as a “second,” as “determined, terminated, reacting.” This forced me to think: Is there in all of this one overarching meaning to doors in The Fifth Column? If so, it perhaps lies somewhere in what the American mathematician and philosopher, C. S. Pierce, calls a “third” (or thirdness): “The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other”. “Things,” in this case, are what Peirce would call a “first” and a “second” and their realization in the play in the figures of Philip and Dorothy. Each of them would be a “first” as long as we think of them as possessing no relationship with each other or anyone else. Each is, in Peirce’s words, “present and immediate…initiative, original, spontaneous, and free.” Only when they form a relationship, a scenario of action-reaction, do they become a “second” (248). The door between Rooms 109 and 110 would then become, in Peirce way of seeing things, a “third” in its role of relating Philip to Dorothy (and vice versa) and mediating their interdependent actions and dialogue.
The true "three knowledges" are said to be constituted by the process of achieving enlightenment, which is what the Buddha is said to have achieved in the three watches of the night of his enlightenment.\textsuperscript{[16]}

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THIRDNESS  ODDS & ENDS

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Such a division depends on the conceptions of 1st, 2nd, 3rd. First is the beginning that which is fresh, original spontaneous, free. Second is that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object, necessitated, reacting. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing about” (280). In what I have attempted to do above, following Peirce’s threefold division, is to first think of door as a “first.” In itself, it is the “beginning, original, and free”; that is it is a whole, or unit neither acting or reacting, independent of human agency, communicating nothing. Purely as a word, “door,” it stands unmodified by any possible adjective or article. At this stage, door(s) in The Fifth Column are, in critical terms, sum to zero. Being without qualities, they tell us nothing at all about the play We can only move into a discussion of their qualities by conceiving them as a “second,” as “determined, terminated, reacting.” This forced me to think Is there in all of this one overarching meaning to doors in The Fifth Column? If so, it perhaps lies somewhere in what the American mathematician and philosopher, C. S. Pierce, calls a “third” (or
thirdness”): “The third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other”. “Things,” in this case, are what Peirce would call a “first” and a “second” and their realization in the play in the figures of Philip and Dorothy. Each of them would be a “first” as long as we think of them as possessing no relationship with each other or anyone else. Each is, in Peirce’s words, “present and immediate…initiative, original, spontaneous, and free.” Only when they form a relationship, a scenario of action-reaction, do they become a “second” (248). The door between Rooms 109 and 110 would then become, in Peirce way of seeing things, a “third” in its role of relating Philip to Dorothy (and vice versa) and mediating their interdependent actions and dialogue.

THIRDNESS  25 MARCH 2016

The true "three knowledges" are said to be constituted by the process of achieving enlightenment, which is what the Buddha is said to have achieved in the three watches of the night of his enlightenment.[16]

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THIRDNESS AND TEACHING

See notes on Aristotle’s Poetics (notebook) and in Mckeon Aristotle

Thirdness flows in from every sense. C.S. Peirce

"The calendar (of ancient Egypt) was divided into three seasons linked to the river and the agricultural cycle it determined: akhet, or the inundation; peret, the harvesting season; and shemu, the harvest."[34]
Three (the number) connotes great vastness, plurality, totality and completeness. Kahn

Thinking and representing with Thirdness seems to be as old as the imagination and new as the iPod. One only needs mention the linguistic first, second and third person (I, you, it), the Trinity, three-dimensional reality, Goldilocks and so on. The seminal work on this topic is perhaps Usener’s Dreiheit (1903). In the first part of his work, Usener assesses the importance of three in Greek antiquity. (H. Usener 1903: Dreiheit Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie 58: 1-, 161-208, 321-362[an umlaut over "o" in "fur."]) He notes the significance of three and its continuations in various folk and religious traditions. He finds fifteen different trinities of gods in Hesiod’s Theogony. He identifies groupings composed of three gods of equal status and then goes on to men triads that entail divinities of unequal status. In the second part of his work, Usener focuses on visual depictions of the trinity, three-headed gods and goddesses, the best known being Hecate, goddess of crossroads.

In the third, and last part, of his essay, Usener (please note his use of Thirdness as an organizing principle for Thirdness) focuses on the movement from "2" to "3." Examples here are god-pairs that became trinities, the transformation of two seasons into three, paths and roads becoming perceived as three-pronged forks and the winds going from two to three. Finding symbolism in numbers appears in the Pythagorean system of "arithmetic theology." (351). Usener claims that ancient people did not simply grasping numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but
more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time concepts, starting with the number "7" and going up. In contrast, small numbers, such as "2", were used for expressions for quantity, while three was used to communicate completeness. More problematic, however, is Usener's suggestion that the Greeks could not count above three. To support this view he cites the research of Von den Steinen that members of the Bakairi tribe (in Brazil) can only count to two. To continue counting, they construe three as 2+1, four as 2+2 and so on. (H. Von en Steinen. 1897: Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens. D. Reimer: Berlin [umlaut over "O" in Naturvolkern])

The principal modern advocate of thinking by Thirdness is C. S. Peirce. 'Thirdness," he says, "pours in upon us through every avenue of sense" (Writings 5:98) With this, and other statements, Peirce would no doubt agree with Usener that Thirdness, or Peirce's "universal categories, can represent completeness, finality, wholeness—a situation analogous to not counting beyond three. One of Peirce’s succinct definitions of Thirdness is this:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which It is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things between which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (Writings 248).
First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is reaction to a First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example, three kinds of reasoning, deduction, abduction and induction; three "departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and Metaphysics (\textit{Writings} \textit{V} and \textit{VI}: 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (\textit{Essential} 253). But Peirce's descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations—or what I later call here the "manifold." In the words of one of Peirce's editors, Peirce was familiar with "the fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or adicity) greater than triadic can be expressed in combinations of triadic relations. This is known as Peirce's reduction thesis" (\textit{Essential} xxx). Finally, there is Peirce's use of Thirdness to showcase "novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like. In conventional terminology, the new thing (the Third) is always greater than the sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce's speculations on Thirdness one can see the influence of Aristotle's thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":
A totality (what emerged or is emerging) is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts (*Metaphysics* 1045A 9-10).

The oldest things lie in the present.

According to the Peircean "reduction thesis" every explanatory principle can be phrased as a Third. Implicit in the reduction is a "sub-reduction" of language and thought to symbols, graphs, charts and the like. As an example of this let us consider briefly the following figure, one initially "empty" of empirical content:

(Adapted from Arendt *Thinking*: 209, "Parallelogram of Forces")
If we let A stand for the past, B for the future then it follows that C can stand for the present as In-Between. From here we can go on to ask questions about such things as the length of each line. Should we say that only A and B can represent infinity, the past and the future stretching both back and in front of us? C, perhaps representing a person's lifespan, would then represent finitude, a time stretching between birth and death. Furthermore, there are questions about how the lines converge, bottom left, and what such convergences represents. Bergson, for example, seems to be thinking of such convergence in the following observation about the "present moment" as an In-Between:

Nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible limit which divides the past from the future. When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet; and when we think it as existing, it is already past. If, on the other hand, what you are considering is the concrete present such as it is actually lived by consciousness, we may say that this present exists in large measure, in the immediate past. In the fraction of a second which covers the briefest possible perception of light, billions of vibrations have taken place, of which the first is separated from the last by an interval which is enormously divided. Your perception, however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable number of remembered elements; and in truth every perception is already memory. Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future." Henri Bergson Matière et mémoire (1896)
Still, one cannot afford to look away from the past and future. Here one is reminded of Walter Benjamin's "angel of history"—an angel that flies toward the future facing backward with its eyes on the facts piling up higher and higher in the past.

In theory, there are no limits on what such a line-triad (like the above) can represent. The only condition, for its individuation, is that it be "filled" with empirical content, general and specific. Such content would typically include one's actual life experiences, possible ("virtual") ones or some combination of the actual and the possible. Here two examples come to mind, the story of Goldilocks (which I return to below) and the thinking that goes into writing a cook book. Here one typically finds a list of ingredients, a menu to follow (a combining order of ingredients), cooking time and the like. Empirical content, in short, includes not only the "substance" of the content, but also how they have to be combined according to the goal one has in mind with the whole.

Let us, referring to A, B, and C, consider how two other In-Betweens might "capture" empirical content.

THE GAME BALL: Picture line C as a ball thrown by A to B or B to A. Before it is thrown, it represents certain possibilities not yet actualized. A (any person) might throw it to B (another person) or A might throw it through a hoop. Throwing the ball activates certain forces within the ball and actualizes In-Between conditions in the system. Forces intrinsic to the ball as a physical object (a per se object in a non-
relational condition) would include incidentals like spin, speed, direction and the like. With these it can be taken as a metaphor for time— insofar as such incidentals, of necessity, represent change. But a game ball is, by definition, a relational object. That is, one ultimately dependent on someone throwing it and someone, or something, receiving it. Additionally, the rules of the game help cause the ball to lose its independence.

THE LINE: Here we take A, B and C represent lines of dancers, real or imaginary, We can start filling the lines with empirical content with basics like space, time and number. In the world of dance one talks about a line of dancers as a two-dimensional contour that three-dimensional bodies describe. Consequently, one has the option of drawing a single contour or a line of dancers as a series of contours. In mathematics (especially in the language of geometry) one can represent the dancers as points on lines like A, B and C. To establish a system of measurement on the line we must assign a distinct number to each point on the lines. The numbers must be ranged along the lines in unbroken sequence. Inasmuch as a dancer can shift positions on any given line, or move to another line, we can say that each assigned number on the line must continue to be attached to a single distinct point. It follows from this that any dancers shifting positions will leave two numbers attached to the same points as before. By the law of contradiction (though for no other reason as far as I know) the points would only retain their identity as a particular point by not being "named" by the same number at the same time and place. It is clear from this that a line, in order to be in relationship to another line, must resist any attempt to
reduce it to a single point; or any attempt to stretch it to an infinite distance— that is, to an uncountable number of points. Finitude must be countable, for both real and imaginary points.

With this we have a rough conception of the interdependence of space, time and number as they relate to the (minimal) empirical contents of an In_Between. Points occupy space; as numbered points shift they reify time as change; numbers that "name" points complete the construction of the line. In order to originate empirical content for an In-Between then one must be able to do something like create (draw?) a lines-triad like that above; or, alternatively, triangulate rows of dominos (or one's friends) only connected at the base of the triangle (see Critique of Pure Reason A26-B44).

METAPHOR: Like a game ball and a line one creates metaphors with Thirdness. A relates to B on the basis of (or because of) C. We add empirical content to A, B, and C with the following kind of "material," or world knowledge.

1. It is not the most beautiful nor the strongest who win prizes at the Olympics but (only) those who compete (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1099a3-6)

2.. How is a divorce like a Texas tornado? In both you lose your trailer.

3. Poverty is a giant that uses your face as a rag to wipe a dirty world (Celine, Journey to the end of night)
One can analyze the infrastructure of #1, 2 in a number of ways. What follows is one option. Another analysis, one I turn to below, is one that tries to answer the question, "What kind of WORK does an In-Between do?

1."Compete" stands as the Middle of the In-Between, one that reciprocally relates "beautiful" to "strongest," and, by so doing, robs both of its independence. Please note that this example is the only one that uses negatives to "construct" an In-Between. With the help of Aristotle, the acknowledged master, of the form, I return to negation below (see Horn).

2. "Lose your trailer" happens with both a divorce and trailer. Therefore "lose" is the Middle that bestows similarity on both.

3. "Poverty" initiates the action of wiping a dirty world. Therefore poverty is the Middle as cause of the relationship between "face" and "world." In more technical language "poverty" is prior to both "face" and "world" in both time and in "account." That is, we can't give an coherent account of the relationship between "poverty," "face" and "world" without assuming that "poverty" was there before "face" and "world."

In the so-called "Controversial Theory" of metaphor, the immediate above would be analyzed on the basis of "tension. Tension, defined as a sort of semantic contradiction, created by a metaphor helps us, in Fill's words, to see "both areas in a new light" (108). By "both areas" Fill means what I call here the two Extremes of an In-Between. What he means by "tension" is what I mean by Middle: "The theory that metaphor establishes a tension between two areas of life which makes us see both
areas in a new light was first established by Max Black in his book *Models and Metaphors* (1962)" (108)

Let me now generalize the work of a Middle by citing recent research on gathering and processing information. Chess players, playing against experts, sometimes think that they are playing in a different game? The short answer, supplied by recent research, is that the experts, employing both parts of the brain, use information about the chess board in a different gaming strategy. Whereas the novice chess player "looked directly at the pieces to recognize them, the experts looked on the middle of the boards." In other words, the experts were taking in everything on the board by combining information supplied by peripheral vision with a strategic next move. (Dylan Loeb McClain. "Harnessing the Brain’s Right Hemisphere to Capture Many Kings" NY Times January 25, 2011: D3.)

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**INTERSUBJECITY, CONSTRAINTS AND THE POWER OF THIRDNESS.**

In everyday life it seems obvious that every use of "I," "You," "She/It/He" presupposes the existence of the other. The other can be either ourselves, in a dialogue with ourselves, or with some external other, the reader or the listener. With this we generally assume that the other has some understanding of what we address to him or her. No claim is made that the other always understands what is addressed to him or her. We only assume that there is a possibility of them understanding us, even if it's not a perfect one.

Perhaps the best proof that speaking and writing rest on a prior assumption of intersubjectivity is to assume the contrary and attempt to conduct everyday affairs as if no one could ever understand what we say. Try ordering lunch in a restaurant while at the same time assuring yourself that the waiter cannot possibly understand your order. If we are honest, then we would have to confess that the subsequent appearance of our food under our noses is miraculous and accidental, or
that the waiter somehow divines our meaning without understanding it. The emptiness of solipsism is that no one can truly be a solipsist and live in the world in accord with only h/h beliefs.

If we truly believe that no one could understand us, then why, aside from mere caprice, speak or write at all?

A problem in teaching creative writing is showing how intersubjectivity underlies both dialogue and narrative. What one is looking for is not simply a list of possible relationships, diachronic (father-son, mother-daughter, three generational) and synchronic (brother-sister, wife-husband, same sex) but the fundamental units of intersubjectivity. What must exist prior to, and be a cause or condition of, intersubjectivity? Standing in the way of arriving at an understanding of such causes and conditions is the very nature of language: as Wittgenstein puts it, Die Sprache is ein Layinth von Wegen. Du kommst von einter Seite und kennst dich aus; du kommst von einer andern zur selben Stelle, and kennst dich nich mehr aus (Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about) (#203).

In my career as a teacher of creative writing I find it productive to focus on what I take to be the three salient foundations of intersubjectivity—all found in everyday language, namely, constraints, thirdness and context. But examining these in detail let me give an overview, one I present to students, of the structure and meaning of everyday language. Much of this, I suspect, will be familiar to the reader
conversant with works on the pragmatics of language, or its meaning as use (Wittgenstein, Lyons, Tyler, Chafe, Bates, Bickerton and others).

No meaning as use resonates more with everyday opinion than the view that words are the names of things. There are things in the environment and words to refer to them. The word "book" refers to the name of the object we use a certain way. One can say that "book" is a kind of substitute for the object. We know the meaning of the word "book" because we have prior knowledge of the object it represents in our everyday performance of reading or writing a book. The object, we might want to say, is the worldly counterpart of the word. This is perhaps most apparent in the act of pointing, "the paragon of the act of referring" (Tyler 168). This means we know what a word means because we know by other than linguistic means what the word stands for. The environment and the things within it are objects of sense. We can see them, touch them, smell them and so on. Since the environment and language are separate, meaning as a product of use, can be seen as a bridge between them.

This, as I will discuss later, is where Thirdness comes into the conversation I want to have here with the reader.

**Constraint.** A constraint, following Wittgenstein, can be seen as a member of a "family." It appears in different contexts than other members, but it shares common characteristics of use.

In a review of the play, "Ugly Lies the Bone," a reviewer writes: Jess, the main character, has returned to her Florida home from a third tour in Afghanistan,
enduring intense pain from injuries and the many surgeries that followed. We can read how much she suffers, from the grimaces and winces that flicker across the actress’ face. One leg is cramped. Jess uses a complicated walker to move around. There are skin grafts over most of her body as well. Jess’s psyche is under severe stress, too, because of her sardonic responses to her sister (Isherwood C1).

Character Constraints of body, constraints of mind: Body: limping, sick, old, ; mind: language, history, culture, religion. Blake’s "mind forged manacles."

WORKS CITED


PREPARATIONS FOR A PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE APPLICATION OF PEIRCEAN THIRDNESS TO CREATION, COMPOSITION AND MEANING

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), philosopher, mathematician, chemist and Episcopalian is best known for his work on the uses of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.

I use the concept in everything I write.

Exerpts from Peirce:
Thirdness pours in on us from all directions.
First and Second, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience, and they satisfy the mind for a very long time. But at last they are found inadequate, and the Third is the conception which is then called for. The Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and brings them into relationship.

We are told that every science has its Qualitative and its Quantitative stage; now its qualitative stage is when dual distinctions,—whether a given subject has a given predicate or not,—suffice; the quantitative stage comes when, no longer content with such rough distinctions, we require to insert a possible half-way between every two possible conditions of the subject in regard to its possession of the quality indicated by the predicate.

Ancient mechanics recognized forces as cause as which produced motions as their immediate effects, looking no further than the essentially dual relation of cause and effect. That is why it could make no progress with dynamics. The work of Galileo and his successors lay in showing that forces are accelerations by which a state of velocity is gradually brought about. The words cause and effect still linger, but the old conceptions have been dropped from mechanical philosophy; for the fact now known is that in certain relative positions bodies undergo certain accelerations.

Now an acceleration, instead of being like a velocity a relation between two successive positions, is a relation between three; so that the new doctrine has consisted in the suitable introduction of the conception of Threeness. On this idea, the whole of modern physics is built.
The superiority of modern geometry, too, has certainly been due to nothing so much as to the bridging over of the innumerable distinct cases with which the ancient science was encumbered; and we may go so far as to say that all the great steps in the method of science in every department have consisted in bringing into relation cases previously discrete.

(Selections from C.S. Peirce, “A Guess at the Riddle”, Collected Papers, 1.354–416)

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Here are some of the uses I have noticed in my reading plus some of my writings on Thirdness.

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Thirdness flows in from every sense. C.S. Peirce

"The calendar (of ancient Egypt) was divided into three seasons linked to the river and the agricultural cycle it determined: akhet, or the inundation; peret, the harvesting season; and shemu, the harvest."xxxv

\[DREIHEIT\] (THIRDNESS)

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The oldest things lie in the present.

According to the Peircean "reduction thesis" every explanatory principle can be phrased as a Third. Implicit in the reduction is a "sub-reduction" of language and thought to symbols, graphs, charts and the like.

If we let A stand for the past, B for the future then it follows that C can stand for the present as In-Between. From here we can go on to ask questions about such
things as the length of each line. Should we say that only A and B can represent infinity, the past and the future stretching both back and in front of us? C, perhaps representing a person's lifespan, would then represent finitude, a time stretching between birth and death. Furthermore, there are questions about how the lines converge, bottom left, and what such convergences represents. Bergson, for example, seems to be thinking of such convergence in the following observation about the "present moment" as an In-Between:

> Nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the indivisible limit which divides the past from the future. When we think this present as going to be, it exists not yet; and when we think it as existing, it is already past. If, on the other hand, what you are considering is the concrete present such as it is actually lived by consciousness, we may say that this present exists in large measure, in the immediate past. In the fraction of a second which covers the briefest possible perception of light, billions of vibrations have taken place, of which the first is separated from the last by an interval which is enormously divided. Your perception, however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable number of remembered elements; and in truth every perception is already memory. Practically we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future." Henri Bergson Matière et mémoire (1896) Matter an Memory (1919). (qtd Paul Muldoon. "Open Invitation" TLS 24 & 31, 2010: 17)
Still, one cannot afford to look away from the past and future. Here one is reminded of Walter Benjamin’s "angel of history"—an angel that flies toward the future facing backward with its eyes on the facts piling up higher and higher in the past.

In theory, there are no limits on what such a line-triad (like the above) can represent. The only condition, for its individuation, is that it be "filled" with empirical content, general and specific. Such content would typically include one’s actual life experiences, possible ("virtual") ones or some combination of the actual and the possible. Here two examples come to mind, the story of Goldilocks (which I return to below) and the thinking that goes into writing a cook book. Here one typically finds a list of ingredients, a menu to follow (a combining order of ingredients), cooking time and the like. Empirical content, in short, includes not only the "substance" of the content, but also how they have to be combined according to the goal one has in mind with the whole.

Let us, referring to A, B, and C, consider how two other In-Betweens might "capture" empirical content.

THE GAME BALL: Picture line C as a ball thrown by A to B or B to A. Before it is thrown, it represents certain possibilities not yet actualized. A (any person) might throw it to B (another person) or A might throw it through a hoop. Throwing the ball activates certain forces within the ball and actualizes In-Between conditions in the system. Forces intrinsic to the ball as a physical object (a per se object in a non-relational condition) would include incidentals like spin, speed, direction and the like. With these it can be taken as a metaphor for time—insofar as such incidentals,
of necessity, represent change. But a game ball is, by definition, a relational object. That is, one ultimately dependent on someone throwing it and someone, or something, receiving it. Additionally, the rules of the game help cause the ball to lose its independence.

THE LINE: Here we take A, B and C represent lines of dancers, real or imaginary, We can start filling the lines with empirical content with basics like space, time and number. In the world of dance one talks about a line of dancers as a two-dimensional contour that three-dimensional bodies describe. Consequently, one has the option of drawing a single contour or a line of dancers as a series of contours. In mathematics (especially in the language of geometry) one can represent the dancers as points on lines like A, B and C. To establish a system of measurement on the line we must assign a distinct number to each point on the lines. The numbers must be ranged along the lines in unbroken sequence. Inasmuch as a dancer can shift positions on any given line, or move to another line, we can say that each assigned number on the line must continue to be attached to a single distinct point. It follows from this that any dancers shifting positions will leave two numbers attached to the same points as before. By the law of contradiction (though for no other reason as far as I know) the points would only retain their identity as a particular point by not being "named" by the same number at the same time and place. It is clear from this that a line, in order to be in relationship to another line, must resist any attempt to reduce it to a single point; or any attempt to stretch it to an infinite distance— that
is, to an uncountable number of points. Finitude must be countable, for both real and imaginary points.

With this we have a rough conception of the interdependence of space, time and number as they relate to the (minimal) empirical contents of an In_Between. Points occupy space; as numbered points shift they reify time as change; numbers that "name" points complete the construction of the line. In order to originate empirical content for an In-Between then one must be able to do something like create (draw?) a lines-triad like that above; or, alternatively, triangulate rows of dominos (or one's friends) only connected at the base of the triangle (see Critique of Pure Reason A26-B44).

METAPHOR: Like a game ball and a line one creates metaphors with Thirdness. A relates to B on the basis of (or because of) C. We add empirical content to A, B, and C with the following kind of "material," or world knowledge.

1. It is not the most beautiful nor the strongest who
   win prizes at the Olympics but (only) those who compete
   (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1099a3-6)

2. How is a divorce like a Texas tornado? In both you lose your trailer.

3. Poverty is a giant that uses your face as a rag to
   wipe a dirty world (Celine, Journey to the end of night)
One can analyze the infrastructure of #1, 2 in a number of way. What follows is one option. Another analysis, one I turn to below, is one that tries to answer the question, "What kind of WORK does an In-Between do?

1."Compete" stands as the Middle of the In-Between, one that reciprocally relates "beautiful" to "strongest," and, by so doing, robs both of its independence. Please note that this example is the only one that uses negatives to "construct" an In-Between. With the help of Aristotle, the acknowledged master, of the form, I return to negation below (see Horn).

2. "Lose your trailer" happens with both a divorce and trailer. Therefore "lose" is the Middle that bestows similarity on both.

3. "Poverty" initiates the action of wiping a dirty world. Therefore poverty is the Middle as cause of the relationship between of "face" and "world." In more technical language "poverty" is prior to both "face" and "world" in both time and in "account." That is, we can't give an coherent account of the relationship between "poverty," "face" and "world" without assuming that "poverty" was there before "face" and "world."

In the so-called "Controversion Theory" of metaphor, the immediate above would be analyzed on the basis of "tension. Tension, defined as a sort of semantic contradiction, created by a metaphor helps us, in Fill's words, to see "both areas in a new light" (108). By "both areas" Fill means what I call here the two Extremes of an In-Between. What he means by "tension" is what I mean by Middle: "The theory that metaphor establishes a tension between two areas of life which makes us see both
areas in a new light was first established by Max Black in his book *Models and Metaphors* (1962)” (108)

Let me now generalize the work of a Middle by citing recent research on gathering and processing information. Chess players, playing against experts, sometimes think that they are playing in a different game? The short answer, supplied by recent research, is that the experts, employing both parts of the brain, use information about the chess board in a different gaming strategy. Whereas the novice chess player "looked directly at the pieces to recognize them, the experts looked on the middle of the boards." In other words, the experts were taking in everything on the board by combining information supplied by peripheral vision with a strategic next move.  (Dylan Loeb McClain. "Harnessing the Brain’s Right Hemisphere to Capture Many Kings” NY Times January 25, 2011: D3.)

Lifeless things organize themselves into something alive, three sets of things must be present.

The three key words where are "lifeless, organize, alive, present. See item 50

1. FIRST SECOND THIRD: this is a bottom up procedure, vs a top down one.

2. HERE THERE OVER THERE; Aqui, ahi alli

3. Negation makes a third?

4. Epistemic, nonepisemic and nonseeing

5. 3 generational play
6. Miller essay on maical number seven
7. Aristotle: syllogism; what makes a family (opening politics)
8. Freud: id, ego suer ego
9: feeling, thinking willing
10 Crossroads (trivia)
11. graph as a third: vertical, horizontal lines and diagonal line
12 A concept representing both infinity and finitude (a road w/ two terminal versus a crossroads
13Swift and three
14. 6 degrees of separation 6 directions from the body
15. Ed Leach and maraige
16. Venn Diagrams
17. 3 primary colors
18. Time Space, Agency
19. Hemingway's use of three characters: Hills; Macomber; Clean well lighted
20. Using Peirces procedure we can reduce Aristotle's 4 causes to 3.
21. 3 grammatical genders
22. Archaic Triad: Jupiter Mars, Quirinus
23. Convergence of characters: American captain, the Spanish slaver, and the African rebel: make their way to their fateful meeting. Melville:Benito Cereno; see meal in winter: convergence of German soldiers, Polish citizens and captured Jews. Hardy's Convergence of the Twain.
25. Emergence of the third: "One of the distinctive features of Christianity is its understanding of monotheism as one God in three persons-traditionally named Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Frequently, the doctrine comes across as an excessive intellectual puzzle, even to many Christians. Why three? In fact, a Trinitarian structure to more subtle aspects of reality has been discerned in other spheres of life. Mature love can be thought of as triangular: there is A's love for B, and B's love for A, but also, thirdly, the jointly created life that emerges between them." (TLS, March 7: p. 23; rev of Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality and the Self. An Essay on the Trinity. Cambridge UP 2014)

26. Thirdness and narrative structure: Martin Amis Holocaust novel, Zone of Interest. Novel told from point of view of three central characters, Paul Doll, Camp commandant of death camp; Golo Thomsen, nephew of Martin Borman and Szmul, Jew assigned to dispose of dead. Feast in Winter

27. Triage


29. 3 riotous youths of Chaucer’s Pardner’s Tale.


31. Movie: "Remembrance" three groups, Gestapos; poles; jews.

32. 3 colors, red, white, blue French & American flags.

33. 3 colors to make a map

34. 3 character scenes in move "What"s Up Pussycat," Peter sellers, Peter O Toole, Woody Allen: steam room scene. And library scene: 2 character active, one idle.

33. Add MS "Guesses at the Riddle."


Hermann Usener


38. St. Paul, Corinthians: 13 And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.

39: META=ETHICS: According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen,[1] there are three kinds of meta-ethical problems, or three general questions:

1. What is the meaning of moral terms or judgments?

2. What is the nature of moral judgments?

3. How may moral judgments be supported or defended?

40. Land, Sea, Air (metaphor for the whole earth)

41. "Companion" (from Latin "to be with the bread," *panus*) presupposes three conditions: two eat eat and the third thing (between them) food. Meals are common in TV series like Blue Bloods, in films, "Fury," and religious ceremonies. The Last Supper of Christ is an obvious example.

42. "The very cross was the tribunal of Christ; for the Judge was placed in the middle; one thief, who believed, was set free; the other, who reviled, was condemned; which signified what he was already about to do with the quick and dead; being about to set some on his right hand, but others on his left." St. Augustine

43. Three number combination locks.
44. Rather, his (Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*) description involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a subject matter (being), and (3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied (qua being).

45. Tri-border area: Israel, Syria, Lebanon.


47. In number theory, Fermat’s Last Theorem (sometimes called Fermat’s *conjecture*, especially in older texts) states that no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation \(a^n + b^n = c^n\) for any integer value of n greater than two. *(Wikipedia)*

48. Three Cushion Billiards. The object of the game is to *carom* the *cue ball* off both *object balls* and contact the *rail cushions* at least 3 times before the last object ball. A point is scored for each successful carom. In most shots the cue ball hits the object balls one time each, although hitting them any number of times is allowed as long as both are hit. The contacts between the cue ball and the cushions may happen before and/or after hitting the first object ball. The cue ball does not have to contact 3 different cushions as long as they have been in contact at least 3 times in total. *(Wikipedia)*


50. "For lifeless chemical compounds to organize themselves into something alive, scientists generally agree, three sets of things must be present:

Standing water, light and an energy source

*Five basic elements: carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, phosphorus and nitrogen."
*And time, lots of time." "Rover Finds Stronger Potential for Life"; NY Times Dec 9, 2014: p. D6

51. Categorization: "There are many variations and subgenres of Bildungsroman that focus on the growth of an individual. An Entwicklungsroman ("development novel") is a story of general growth rather than self-cultivation. An Erziehungsroman ("education novel") focuses on training and formal schooling, [citation needed] while a Künstlerroman ("artist novel") is about the development of an artist and shows a growth of the self." [10]

(Wikipedia)

52. "The Tao gives birth to One/One gives birth to Two/Three gives birth to all things."


53. "A wife is useful at all stages of a man’s life - a mistress in youth, a companion in middle age, a nurse for old age." Francis Bacon, Of Marriage and the Single Life.

54. MOVIE The Third Man.

55: 3 roman soldiers in Hemingway's "Today is Friday."

56. "This article may contain excessive, poor, or irrelevant examples. (April 2013)"

(Wikipedia, "Real Time").

57. A Threefold Cord is not easily broken: Eccliiasties 4:12.

58. A sign, and interpreter of the sign, the meaning of the sign. C. S. Peirce.

59. The three kings from the east who followed the star to Bethlehem to see Jesus.

Mathew2:1-12
60. Then at dawn we came down to a temperate valley, Wet, below the snow line, smelling of vegetation; With a running stream and a water-mill beating the darkness, And *three trees* on the low sky, And an old white horse galloped in away in the meadow.

(T. S. Eliot; "Journey of the Magi.")

61. Trial

62. Swift's triumvirate bk 3 of GT.

63 Third time is charm.

64. I know there is no happiness for man except in pleasure and enjoyment while he lives. And when man eats, and drinks and finds happiness in his work this is a gift from God….What is, already was, what is to be, has been already (Ecclesiastes 3:12-15)).

65. Three daughters of Job; three friends from three different towns,; three bands of Chaldeans, three messengers.


67. Christ has died; Christ has risen; Christ will come again.

68. Tao: beyond is and is not.

69. A to B via C. Ballet company; NY Times 13 Jan 15.70.

70. Three fates, Morai: Clotho "spinner" spins thread of life from her distaff onto her spindle; Lachesis (allotter or drawer of lots); measures the thread of life allotted to each person w/ her measuring rod; Atropos, inexorable or inevitable, literally unturning, cutter of the thread of life ; chooses manner of each person's death and cuts the thread w/ her "adhored shears.: Cf the three weird sisters of Macbeth.
71. BCE Before current era.

72 Three Card Trick

73. Three Cushion Shot

74. Convergence of three cultures in movie: Mongolian, Brazilian Indians, Beduins (Desert folk)

75. One left over: "five, Seven, 13." Mime Math; NYT Apr 16: 15.

***

DEATH: IDENTIFICATION, ETERNITY, THIRDNESS

(Prolegomena to any Future Grammar of Death)

Thirdness pours in upon us through every avenue of sense—C. S. Peirce.

With the possible exception of love (sex), nothing is more common in imaginative writing than representations of death—not death itself, which, in itself, cannot instantly be experienced or represented. It is "the undiscovered country, a bourn from which no man returns" (Hamlet 3:1). But death can, and is, feared because it is "undiscovered." Two well known responses to the fear of death, according to Michalski's account, are those of Plato (in the Phaedo) and St. Mathew:

The dying Socrates wanted to give us concepts that would provide peace, concepts that will soothe our anxiety in the face of death. The Gospel of Matthew, as I understand it, is the complete opposite: it testifies to the incurable presence of the Unknown in every moment of my life, a presence that rips apart every human
certainty built on what is known, that disturbs all peace, all serenity -- that severs
the continuity of time, opening every moment of lives to nothingness, thereby
inscribing within them the possibility of an abrupt end and the chance at a new
beginning. Two visions of death, two visions of the human condition (88-89).

We might want to add to this Epicurus' take on death, part of a letter to his friend
Menoeceus:

Accustom yourself to believing that death is nothing to us, for good and evil
imply the capacity for sensation, and death is the privation of all sentience;
therefore a correct understanding that death is nothing to us makes the
mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life a limitless time, but by taking
away the yearning after immortality. For life has no terrors for him who has
thoroughly understood that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish,
therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when
it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance
when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death,
therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are,
death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either
to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no
longer.

As a long time teacher of writing and literature (in several languages) I have
long struggled with the problem of teaching students a way of interpreting what is
going on with textual representations of death. Is there a common infrastructure for
them and a common purpose? Or will the subject always remain a mystery, "the undiscovered country, the bourne from which no traveler returns"?

What I propose here is a sketchy map of this "country," one the reader is invited to "piece out our imperfections with your thoughts" (Prologue, *Henry V*). Let me begin with some classic (with one exception) representations of death and then go on to the "map" I have in mind for interpreting them:

A: No longer mourn for me when I am dead
Than you shall hear the surly sudden bell
Give warning to the world that I am fled
From this vile world, with vilest worms to dwell:
Nay, if you read this line, remember not
The hand that write it; for I love you so
That I in your sweet thoughts would be forgot
If thinking on me then should make you woe.
O, if, I say, you look upon this verse
When I perhaps compounded am with clay,
Do not so much as my poor name rehearse,
But let your love even with my life decay,
Lest the wise world should look into your moan
And mock you with me after I am gone.
(Shakespeare, Sonnet 71).

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B: After attending a memorial for young skiers killed in an avalanche.
Hearing the young voices in that long place,
Grieving in their loss, for their dead friends.
I sadly remember the faces, their grace,
My own friends, now gone, from the Winds,
Copper Mountain, Zermatt, Yosemite, Vail,
Trailheads now remote in sight, out of touch,
Steel Canyon, the Sinks, Sun Valley, Quail
Hollow, it was freedom vested by toil, gruff
joy, Mammoth and Whistler, not then having
Children and wives to care for, to look after,
We forced the high frozen surfaces, skiing,
Climbing, till we could go no higher, master
Of breathless air, scheming the next ascents
Of the blood, Alta, Cortina, Aspen, the Dents.
(Washington).

***

C: Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume,
labuntur anni nec pietas moram
rugis et instanti senectae
afferet indomitaque morti,
non, si trecenis quotquot eunt dies,
amice, places illacrimabilem
Plutona taurus, qui ter amplum
Geryonen Tityonque tristi
compescit undà, scilicet omnibus
quicunque terrae munere vescimur
enavigandâ, sive reges
sive inopes erimus coloni.
frustrâ cruento Marte carebimus
fractisque rauci fluctibus Hadriae,
frustrâ per autumnos nocentem
corporibus metuemus Austrum:
visendus ater flumine languido
Cocylos errans et Danai genus
infame damnatusque longi
Sisyphus Aeolides laboris.
linquenda tellus et domus et placens
uxor, neque harum quas colis arborum
tee praeter invisas cupressos
ulla brevem dominum sequetur;
absumet heres Caecuba dignior
servata centum clavibus et mero
tinguet pavimentum superbo,
pontificum potiore cenis.
(Horace Odes 2:14)
***

D: From my mother’s sleep I fell into the State,
And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze.
Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters.
When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.
(Randall Jarrell, "Death of the Ball Turret Gunner").

***

D: Men die because they cannot join the beginning to the end
(Alkmeon of Croton 6th BC).

***

E: Adieu, farewell, earth’s bliss;
This world uncertain is;
Fond are life’s lustful joys;
Death proves them all but toys;
None from his darts can fly;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Rich men, trust not in wealth,
Gold cannot buy you health;
Physic himself must fade.
All things to end are made,
The plague full swift goes by;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Beauty is but a flower
Which wrinkles will devour;
Brightness falls from the air;
Queens have died young and fair;
Dust hath closed Helen’s eye.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
Strength stoops unto the grave,
Worms feed on Hector brave;
Swords may not fight with fate,
Earth still holds open her gate.

“Come, come!” the bells do cry.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Wit with his wantonness
Tasteth death’s bitterness;
Hell’s executioner
Hath no ears for to hear
What vain art can reply.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
Haste, therefore, each degree,
To welcome destiny;
Heaven is our heritage,
Earth but a player’s stage;
Mount we unto the sky.

I am sick, I must die.

Lord, have mercy on us!

(Thomas Nashe 1567-1601)

In all these passages, it seems fair to say, the writers are talking essentially about the human condition as a whole. Moreover, the structure of such "talking" is triadic, or what C. S. Peirce calls "Thirdness" and the German scholar, "Dreiheit." The claim of both these writers is that the mind processes information (objective and subjective) in three, increasingly abstract, way:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things *between* which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (*Writings* 248).

sensory data by a three stage." To be human, in short, is not only to fear death but to respond to it with a plan to control one’s fear of it. To a person with common experience and intact mind, death, in its physical reality, is "the If death itself cannot
be materially experienced, and so not described, unlike our experiences of pain, hunger and other bodily states, it seems then an imaginative writer is left with thoughts about the "before" and what I will call the "afterlife" of death—not just those of h/h-self but also those of others.

Further distinctions between the "before, after and afterlife" of death are these. All of these distinctions, please notice, depend on how we treat what can be called the "now-consciousness" or how I see and imagine death from the present moment as not the present moment, as the "not-now" yet an event still possible. Language, of course, principally represents such event with conditional and modal verbs.

A: I express the "before' of my own death with forms like "I am dying," "me estoy muriendo," "je meurs" and "ich sterbe." That is, with forms representing an incomplète state, a coming but not yet évènt.

One night Edison Pefia moaned as he tried to sleep, "I'm dying" I'm dying," he said. Sepulveda was lying next to him....He launched into a movie-like death-speech, "This is the end, Edison, he moaned Weakly, "I'm dying, I'm going. Tell...my...wife...that." (Tobar 67-68)

B: Imaginative writing, as I use the term, is any linguistic représentation contingent on the imagination, the not là and the not now. The chief linguistic marker is négation, specifically, the réduction of the positive to the négative, something to nothing, by what Sorenson calls an "exhaustive" procedure.
Since I cannot actually experience what will happen after my own death, I have to imagine it—but from what I know now. Imagining follows knowing as smoke is contingent on fire, steam on water.

I take "afterlife" in the way Scheffler takes it. Not as any personal life after death, but as the life of those who come after my death, my children, grandchildren, the species itself—in short, all the unborn.

Here is a list of the salient possible representations of death I suggest any future rhetoric should feature—all within the context of "before" and the "afterlife:"

1. Necessary versus contingent
2. Stated or implied
3. Affirmed or denied.
4. Subjective versus objective
5. My death versus the death of the other.
6. Metaphor./analogy. Death as X.
7. Paradox or death as the presence of absence.
8. Excess meaning (according to David Tracy). This is only applicable to what Tracy calls a "classic" text: such as Hamlet, The Odyssey, or Divine Comedy.

This list is an important aspect of the multiple (and often overlapping) uses of the plural form "prolegomena." Each "prolegomenon" (single form) functions as
a starting place, closure and sometimes thesis of a particular part of the proposed rhetoric. Item #9, above, often stands in, as a thesis.

Here are some examples of what I mean by the overarching structure of the "before" and "afterlife" of death. I simply quote them here and will return to discuss them in more detail later.

A: No longer mourn for me when I am dead
Than you shall hear the surly sudden bell
Give warning to the world that I am fled
From this vile world, with vilest worms to dwell:
Nay, if you read this line, remember not
The hand that write it; for I love you so
That I in your sweet thoughts would be forgot
If thinking on me then should make you woe.
O, if, I say, you look upon this verse
When I perhaps compounded am with clay,
Do not so much as my poor name rehearse,
But let your love even with my life decay,
Lest the wise world should look into your moan
And mock you with me after I am gone.
(Shakespeare, Sonnet 71).

B: After attending a memorial for young skiers killed in an avalanche.

Hearing the young voices in that long place,
Grieving in their loss, for their dead friends.
I sadly remember the faces, their grace,
My own friends, now gone, from the Winds,
Copper Mountain, Zermatt, Yosemite, Vail,
Trailheads now remote in sight, out of touch,
Steel Canyon, the Sinks, Sun Valley, Quail
Hollow, it was freedom vested by toil, gruff joy, Mammoth and Whistler, not then having Children and wives to care for, to look after,
We forced the high frozen surfaces, skiing,
Climbing, till we could go no higher, master Of breathless air, scheming the next ascents Of the blood, Alta, Cortina, Aspen, the Dents. (Washington).

C: Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume,
   labuntur anni nec pietas moram
   rugis et instanti senectae
   afferet indomitaeque morti,
   non, si trecessis quotquot eunt dies,
   amice, places illacrimabilem
   Plutona taurus, qui ter amplum
   Geryonen Tityonque tristi
   compescit undâ, scilicet omnibus
   quicumque terrae munere vescimus
   enavigandâ, sive reges
   sive inopes erimus coloni.
   frustrâ cruento Marte carebimus
fractisque rauci fluctibus Hadriae,
frustrâ per autumnos nocentem
corporibus metuemus Austrum:
visendus ater flumine languido
Cocyts errans et Danai genus
infame damnatusque longi
Sisyphus Aeolides laboris.
linquend a tellus et domus et placens
uxor, neque harum quas colis arborum
te praeter invisas cupressos
ulla brevem dominum sequetur;
absumet heres Caecuba dignior
servata centum clavibus et mero
tinguet pavimentum superbo,
pontificum potiore cenis.
(Horace Odes 2:14)
D: From my mother’s sleep I fell into the State,
And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze.
Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life,
I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters.
When I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose.

(Randall Jarrell, "Death of the Ball Turret Gunner").

D: Men die because they cannot join the beginning to the end (Alkmeon of Croton
6th BC).
E: Adieu, farewell, earth's bliss;
This world uncertain is;
Fond are life's lustful joys;
Death proves them all but toys;
None from his darts can fly;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Rich men, trust not in wealth,
Gold cannot buy you health;
Physic himself must fade.
All things to end are made,
The plague full swift goes by;
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Beauty is but a flower
Which wrinkles will devour;
Brightness falls from the air;
Queens have died young and fair;
Dust hath closed Helen's eye.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!
Strength stoops unto the grave,
Worms feed on Hector brave;
Swords may not fight with fate,
Earth still holds open her gate.
“Come, come!” the bells do cry.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Wit with his wantonness
Tasteth death’s bitterness;
Hell’s executioner
Hath no ears for to hear
What vain art can reply.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

Haste, therefore, each degree,
To welcome destiny;
Heaven is our heritage,
Earth but a player’s stage;
Mount we unto the sky.
I am sick, I must die.
Lord, have mercy on us!

(Thomas Nashe 1567-1601)

Before going on to raising questions about what a "future" rhetoric can (and often should look like), let me briefly give an account of how I propose to use "prolegomena," "textual" and "rhetoric." Following Wittgenstein, I take the "meaning" of a word to be its "use" in a specific context (Philosophical Investigations # 11, 12, 43, 77) Using a word then is much like using a tool. We also use a tool, say a drill, in a certain context, as a preparation, for example, for hanging a picture. In this we have an image of where the picture will be hung, a wall, plus a hole in which to insert a hanger for the picture. "Use" then involves an exclusionary process. Just as a drill cannot be used in any context with any purpose, a word cannot not be used just anywhere for every purpose.

As the immediate following will hopefully show, much of the "use" of "prolegomena," "textual" and "rhetoric" is determined by their history.

Prolegomena: The plural form of the present participle of prolegein, "to say something before (saying) something else"

Textual: Since every text (written and spoken) is a textual artifact, then every text-occurrence of "death" is textual. "Death" may or may not have reference to an actual death. Obituaries, epitaphs, elegies generally presuppose an actual (biological) death.
THIRDNESS:


2. Reaction
   B. "My father's wife died. My mother said we should drive down to his place
      And see what might be in it for us." (Amy Bloom. "Lucky Us." P. 1)

3. Interpretation (of event)
   A. Moral indignation by friends and family of the crash victims. News media coverage and interpretation of the event.
   C. "Mask of tears concealing the smiles of the heir." (Voltaire).

Does death exist?

What is it?

Cause/effect

Horace Eheu Posome

Larkin's Aubade

Washington Trailheads

SCOTT NEWSTOK, Quoting Death in Early Modern England.

See Hemingway's Theater of Mortality
Article on Chileans miners, Nyrker: July 7 * 14. 14

NOTES

Brombert, Victor. Musings on Death. Chicago UP

Eliot, T. S. What is a Classic?


Die Sprache is ein Labyrinth von Wegen. Du kommst von einer Seite und kennst dich aus; du kommst von einer andern zur selben Stelle, und kennst dich nich mehr aus.


Man kann für eine grosse Klasse von Fallen der *Benutzung* des Wortes "Bedeutung," — wenn auch nicht für alle Falle seiner *Benutzung* — dieses Wort so erklären. Die *Bedeutung* eines Wortes is sein *Gebrauch in der Sprache*. Und die
Bedeutung eines Namens erklärt man manchmal dadurch, dass man and seinen Trager zeigt

* Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.*


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** THE GAME OF BETWEEN **

** Thought-Runs For Writers-Always-Reading **

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By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes,

*(Nicomachean Ethics 1105b 29-30)*
In C. S. Peirce's words not everything needs clarification or explanation. Among this class of things are what philosophers have called "ultimate facts." Ultimate facts are facts that exhibit "isolated aggressive stubbornness and individual reality." Why a fact, say a grain of sand, got to be here and now, an isolated place on a beach, is "not a question to be asked; it is simply an ultimate fact." Nor would it be unfair to ask for the "general fact" underlying why some things are frequent and some are rare (Essential p. 275). What facts do stand in need an of explanation, however, are "every fact of a 'general or orderly nature."

Kant, in accordance with Peirce, characterizes such a "fact" as one that exhibits a "regulative principle." One attempts to explain it on the basis of its potential intelligibility. Accordingly, one does not attempt to explain, or clarify, neither the "impossible" nor the "necessary" (qtd Essential, p. 275).

The subject, or perhaps better, the puzzle, here rises from the common use of what appears to be a "general linguistic (and perhaps a cognitive and psychological) fact." But is it, in the Peircian definition, "orderly? " Does it have certain conditions of use? Are we justified in calling it a "fact?" In order to give these questions an intelligible context, I would like to discuss them as the Game of Between—specifically a Game, presumably, anchored to the Language Game ("Sprachspiel," Wittgenstein).
But it's possible that the Game of Between, as I think of it, has nothing at all to do with Wittgenstein's conception of Sprachspiel. Still, I like to think so.

Please consider these examples of the kind of textual Betweens I have in mind:

A. The Mirage of a Space Between Nature and Nurture.

B. As in so many of her poems, (Elizabeth) Bishop brings us to such a place of utter poise, balancing between the real and the ideal…between the dreamt-of and the impossible, between love and loss; between sleep and waking, between solitude and communion.

C. Edgelands in England are for the most part the zone of the in-between, places neither urban nor rural, often marked by desire paths, dead cars and hawthorn trees.

D Between the idea/And the reality/Between the motion/And the act/Falls the Shadow (T. S. Eliot "The Hollow Men.")

E. Present state, past state and the space in-between.

Where the alleged Middle, or the (sometimes) reciprocal relational term, is italicized.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extreme</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Center)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

(Before) (Now) (After)

(Past) (Present) (Future)
Where words in parenthesis are, depending on their referent, alternate terms for Extremes and the Middle. The last item in this list, X/***Y, stands as a model for a Mind representing absence, ignorance, or silence—in essence, the inability to find an existing Middle that would combine X and Y into a whole. (Please see **Immediate, The Unknown Middle, Negation**).

**3D Space of a Between;** I want to say that we must think of a Between as a virtual space of three dimensions. It is virtual because it has no identity as one thing. But at the same time it is the ground of things (events, processes) that do possess an identity. The virtual, like a stem cell, is "pluripotent." It has the potential to be the genesis of all other cells in the body, bone, brain, muscle and so on. (Please see Virtuality).

Thinking of a Between as a virtual 3D space is useful because of the differences it establishes for members of the space. Here the image that comes to mind is the nucleus of a cell. Lodging within it are chromosomes, which, in turn, contain genes and molecules that regulate the behavior of genes. Each is different from the other because of its structure, position in the nucleus and function.

Following this analogy, we can say that the members of a Between, what we are calling Extremes and a Middle, likewise differ in structure, position and function.
Again, as with the nucleus of a cell, we can say that differences arise from performing, or misperforming, **Proper Function** where such **Function** is briefly defined as what work it has done in the past and what we expect it to do now and in the future. For example, members of a cell has certain tasks to perform in order for the cell to reproduce itself as exactly as it has been. If they perform in an improper way, they may produce cancerous cells. In the same way, if the members of a Between act in an improper way then they may impede the **Flow of information** in a text. xxxv (Please see **Flow of Information** below).

In short, if we emphasize differences, not identity, then we can say more about the members of a Between than we otherwise could.

**Time:** How we think about Betweenness seems to involve how we think about (divide, respond, escape from) time. For Mircea Eliade, for example, one can only understand the human condition from the perspective of an "in-between time." Before "now" was the "in those days" time (in illo tempore) and after "now" will be "that time" (he future or illud tempus). "Now" stands as the Middle of a Between.

So what is the nature of a temporal Between? For Eliade it is mainly a time of suffering; a locus of the "terror of history" and a motivating force for attempts to annihilate time by means of rituals and festivals.xxxv

Eliade, a Christian, believes that faith in God is the only escape from history, and consequently, eternal suffering—in effect, freedom from betweenness.

I suggest here that there are many other (secular?) interpretations one can give to the between time, ones commonly exploited by writers. This assumes that we should avoid looking for a hierarchy of interpretations for it. All interpretations
are equal in value. All interpretations are also problematic, subject to revision, expansion or rebuttal.

**Flow of Information:** In an interview with *The New Yorker*, Tom Stoppard (the playwright) makes a this observation about his writing practice:

It’s about controlling the flow of information—arriving at the right length and the right speed and in the right order....if the audience is made to do not enough work, they resent it without knowing it. Too much and they get lost. There's a perfect pace to be found. And a perfect place that is different for every line of the play.xxxv

Is this one reason language users have invented the **Game of Between**? If so, then the image that comes to mind is that of a pipe of finite length; one that controls the flow of liquids. At each end of the pipe there is a valve to open and close the flow. The Stoppardian variables of information flow, speed, order and quantity, would be the result of how the "valves" are managed.

Can we say that such management depends on the intention and the skill of the operator of the "valves"? The skill and intention of the writer with the flow of information?

Please notice that Stoppard plays the Goldilocks version of the **Game of Between** (the Middle as "just right"). This comes with his remarks on the "audience" reception of information. If they don’t do "enough work" with the information, they "resent it without knowing it." If they do "too much" work they "get lost." Between these two Extremes there lies the "perfect pace."
In what follows I allow the Extremes of a Between to represent both a moving (temporal) and non-moving (non-temporal) Between. A "before" and "after" typically conditions a moving Between; or, as Aristotle has it, a "now" of time that moves from earlier to later. Linguistic representations of time-cycles like the seasons, equinoxes, phases of the moon and the like employ such a moving "now." A non-moving "now" is essentially an arrest of time as process. "Dry," for example, represents the arrest of "wet," night the arrest of day, and all the properties that make it day, and so on. "Now" is still "now." But it is one cut off from time.

But the boundary between moving and non-moving "now" is fuzzy. One can often find examples in which the movement of time seems to be episodic, now appearing, now vanishing:

Riss and Woodhead suggest a three-way dynamic between the individual and the social mediated through religious symbols. The reciprocal flow seldom remains static because the connections—and disconnections—between self, society and symbols alter as emotional ordering is continuously produced and reproduced with adaptations to changing circumstances.

Extremes have many names, "limits," "borders," "demarcation," "boundaries" and expressions like "as far as we can go," "the extent of my reach," "the scope of our inquiry" and the like.
We, and other animals, mark our territory. We all know where our boundaries are. When we leave the center and go to the boundaries of our territory our mortality rate goes up.

The **Game of Between** is, like language and mathematics, a human invention. It does not *present* reality (whatever that is). It *represents* reality, largely by putting constraints on it. And what is the effect of a linguistic constraint? A form of tunnel vision. What you are seeing is only a small part of what’s going on, inside and outside you. Perhaps these lines will clarify this a bit more:

Beware of having a plan.

Your gaze is focused on the plan.

That’s the moment when things start happening,

Just outside your range of vision.

So what should we expect from the Middle of a Between? In what follows I want to explore the possibility of the Middle *being* and *doing* three things; namely, showcasing novelty (the new), separating or bringing together (mediating) the Extremes. The Middle, in short, may be said to have, at times, an *instrumental* function.

Presenting novelty, I suggest, is the main work of the Middle. In fact, the other two doings of the Middle, separating (repulsing) and combining (attracting) can be the ground of novelty. Because we separate, or combine, X and Y, we set up the condition for the Middle-as-new.
We may take the example of Goldilocks and the Three Bears as a paradigmatic example of the protagonist of a story finding, and showcasing, the Middle as new—the "just right" porridge, chair and bed.

But isn't it true that we can showcase the Middle as the "typical?" The Extremes as the "atypical"? Think of the triad, None/SOME/All. Don't we hear folks using SOME, more than None or All, as an expression for the "typical"?

**Center of Gravity:** I want to say, following an analogy from physics, that the Middle has much in common with the **Center of Gravity** of X.. But what does this mean? In one representation it implies that the Middle is the point of potential energy in a Between. Releasing the potential energy of a Middle, converting it into kinetic energy, might then to be said to occur when a writer-always-reading plays the **Game of Between.** The Middle, that is, acts on the Extremes of a Between as a conversion of potential energy to kinetic energy. It causes something to act or become intelligible.

The potential energy of springs is to stretch. The kinetic energy of the springs is the action of stretching. One restores potential energy to the springs by allowing them to return to their initial (un-stretched) state. No energy is lost.

Potential energy can be said to keep the heavily bodies in a stable rotation around each other. It thus becomes a way of explaining and clarifying what is happening there—as in a report about the planet Kepler 16b orbiting two stars.
Is too much of a stretch to claim that the Middle keeps the Extremes of a Between in a stable orbit around the Middle?

**Copia:** Here I trace some of the footprints of Wittgenstein’s sense of unanswerable but meaningful questions. Mixed in with this are my own uses of the Game of Between and certain elements of classical rhetoric, especially as interpreted by Erasmus in his work *On Copia* (1512) Please recall that *On Copia* contains hundreds of ways of saying, "I was so happy to receive your letter." Erasmus asks the reader, in short, to strive for as much variety as possible. Why? Because it is pleasurable; try writing it and you will see how it fosters playfulness and witty elaboration, as well conveying a lot of information about language.

I hope that you will find the same results as you play the **Game of Between**

*Copia* (abundance, variety, playfulness) is suggestive of we can expect, as writers-always-reading, from the **Game of Between**—it is always "something more." It is always a work of more explanation and further clarification. Writers-always-reading of the future will know more about it than we do. They will have a clearer understanding of the limits of its *uses*. They will know where one passes into the area of its *unuseability* and how to avoid the area. The practical uses of the **Game of Between** appear primarily in the examples quoted here from many different kinds of authors. In the act of raising questions about Betweens, and playing them as a game, we attempt to use the **Game** as a way to describe the **Game** and explore its possibilities.
The writer-always-reading as a reader would typically use the **Game of Between** as an heuristic template. That is, to discover the structure, rhetorical stance and (sometimes) the genre of the text h/s is reading.

A text like this should always question itself.

**Thought Runs:** Please think of this text as a series Thought Runs:

Short, quick, in and out, forward, back, sideways, slightly skewed.

Often inconclusive. Invitation to the reader to argue with presuppositions and assertions of the author. An abundance of unanswered (and unanswerable?) questions with the conviction that the questions are, in themselves, worthwhile to ask.

One might also think of a **Thought Run** as a "mental sphincter," one opening and closing to let a new idea appear or disappear.

Beware of certainty in everything you write. Hear the words of Benjamin Paul Blood on this matter:

Certainty is the root of despair. The inevitable stales, while doubt
And hope are sisters. Not unfortunately the universe is wild—game Flavored as a hawk's wing. Nature is miracle all. She knows no laws;
The same returns not, save to bring the different. The slow round of The engraver's lathe gains but the breadth of a hair, but the Difference is distributed back over the whole curve, never an Instant true—ever not quite. (emphasis mine).xxxv
Fractions stand as the Middle between one and zero.

Imagining, thinking, writing and questioning one’s thoughts about a "fact," as a Game, moves the activities out of the realm of consequences and servitude into the realm of play and freedom—one might add, following Plato’s allegory of the cave, out of the shadows into the light (please see Gaming and Shades and Shadows below).

Is the Game of Between, in an analogy with the game of make-believe of children, always or only sometimes, a perpetual possibility?

One plays the Game of Between, minimally, with a linguistic form composed of two Extremes (Sides) that "bracket" a Middle. We might call these the minimal "props" in the Game.

Taking sides is evidence of a nascent Game of Between.

This tertiary structure of a linguistic Between reminds us of the DNA double helix, made up of two polynucleotide chains (many nucleotides joined) that coil around each other. The two nucleotides join by hydrogen bonds between the matching bases or complimentary base pairing.

As we play the Game of Between we will also be playing, from time to time, the Game of Assuming. Assumptions are propositions, not that something is true, but ones that assert that something might be true. Related to the family of Assumptions, but not members of it, are Doubt, uncertainty, the questionable and the like.

With Questioning we simultaneously state Assumptions and question them (please see below Doubt and Questioning).
Assumption #1: That the reader of this text has:

*A trained mind.
*S/he expects only the accuracy and precision that the subject admits.
*H/s is curious about certain aspects of language, mainly the use of analogy (metaphor), ways of going on from one word to another, one sentence to another or how to structure a text (of any genre) as a Game of Between.
*S/he likes to play games and also (sometimes) theorize about Games.

What are they? How do they differ from typical actions in life and so on. xxxv

Assumption #2: What should the reader assume, before s/h goes any further, about the author of this text? First, that he is a writer-always-reading, playing both activities with the Game of Between. Secondly, you should assume that I'm your guest here; that this guest knows that his presence here is contingent on his talk, behavior, manners and the like. Thirdly, that what appears to the author to be true, or reasonable, may only be true, or reasonable, for him—that all knowledge is personal knowledge. This, in part, is what Aristotle has to say about personal knowledge:

Those who seek to be compelled by argument, and at the same time allow themselves to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists for him to whom it appears, and when, and to the senses to which, and under the conditions under which it appears. Otherwise, they will find themselves contradicting themselves. xxxv
If you keep on reading, you will discover that Aristotle and Wittgenstein are not just two other writers-always-reading but indispensable masters of those activities. They complement each other nicely. Aristotle writes with a great deal of certainty, Wittgenstein with a lot of doubt mixed in with certainty. He would claim, and I think rightly so, that both doubting and undoubting are essential in overcoming (if such exists) writer's block.

**Thinking:** Should we, following the rule of three, add to writing and reading the act of thinking? That, a would-be writer-always-reading, should spend h/h days, and a considerable part of h/h nights, studying the great thinkers?

**Thirdness (Dreiheit):** Does The Game of Between have a permanent infrastructure? One that never changes no matter the content or use of the Game? Let us start with thirdness. Before one creates a Between does s/h think in thirds? But no other number (quantity) lower or higher than three?

Or is it the case that thirdness simply has salience over other numbers? Or that three is usually considered the first prime number? As mathematicians know anything can be thought with numbers arrayed in a proper order.

Certainly thinking and representing a subject with Thirdness seems to be as old as the imagination and new as the iPod. One only needs mention the linguistic first, second and third person (I, you, it), the Trinity, three-dimensional reality, Goldilocks and so on. The seminal work on this topic is perhaps Usener’s Dreiheit (Thirdness 1903).xxxv In the first part of his work, Usener assesses the importance of three in Greek antiquity.. He notes the significance of three and its continuations in
various folk and religious traditions. He finds fifteen different trinities of gods in Hesiod’s *Theogony*. He identifies groupings composed of three gods of equal status and then goes on to mention triads that entail divinities of unequal status. In the second part of his work, Usener focuses on visual depictions of the trinity, three-headed gods and goddesses, the best known being Hecate, the goddess of crossroads.

In the third, and last part, of his essay, Usener (please note his use of Thirdness as an organizing principle for Thirdness) focuses on the movement from "two" to "three." Examples here are god-pairs that became trinities, the transformation of two seasons into three, paths and roads becoming perceived as three-pronged forks and the winds going from two to three. Finding symbolism in numbers appears in the Pythagorean system of "arithmetic theology" (p. 351). Usener claims that ancient people did not grasp numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time concepts, starting with the number "seven" and going up. In contrast, small numbers, such as "two", were used for expressions for quantity, while three was used to communicate completeness. More problematic, however, is Usener’s suggestion that the Greeks could not count above three. To support this view he cites the research of Von den Steinen that members of the Bakairi tribe (in Brazil) can only count to two. To continue counting, they construe three as 2+1, four as 2+2 and so on. The same claim is made by Gamow about the "Hottentots" (Khoikhoi), said to have words only for "one", "two", "three", and "many".
The principal modern advocate of thinking in Thirds is C. S. Peirce. 'Thirdness,' he says, "pours in upon us through every avenue of sense." With this, and other statements, Peirce would no doubt agree with Usener that Thirdness represents completeness, finality, wholeness—a situation analogous to not counting beyond three. One of Peirce's succinct definitions of Thirdness is this:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to things *between* which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (*CP*, p. 248).

First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is a reaction to a First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example, three kinds of active forces in the world, law, chance, habit-taking; three "departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and Metaphysics (*CP*, p. 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (*Essential*, p. 253). But Peirce's descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations.
In the words of one of Peirce’s editors, Peirce was familiar with "the fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or adicity) greater than triadic can be expressed in combinations of triadic relations." This is known as Peirce’s "reduction thesis" (*Essential*, p.xxx). Finally, there is Peirce’s use of Thirdness to showcase "novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like. In conventional terminology, the new thing (the Third) is always greater than the sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce’s speculations on Thirdness one can perhaps see the influence of Aristotle’s thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":

A totality (what emerged or is emerging) is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts.

(*Metaphysics* 1045A 9-10).

"The day after tomorrow." Does this expression presuppose that the mind can only think (or imagine or plan) only three days ahead—plan with any certainty?

**The Unexpected:** What we do not expect can often be expressed as a three stage **Thought Run**. Stage one: Discover that the universe began in a fiery explosion (the Big Bang) 13.7 years ago. Stage two: Determine how fast the universe is "slowing down." Stage three: Discover, unexpectedly, that it is speeding up.
Thirdness and Plenitude: Usener and Peirce have it that thirdness represents completion. In this essay I suggest that completion occurs only when we "reach the Middle."

But what about substituting "plenitude" for "completion." What if, in order to understand a reason for such a substitution, that we attend to Sartre' words about "plenitude" and "filling up the holes" of our lives?

To plug up a hole means originally to make a sacrifice of my body in order that the plenitude of being may exist. Here at its origin we grasp one of the most fundamental tendencies of human reality, the tendency to fill. A good part of our life is passed in plugging up holes, in filling empty places, in realizing and symbolically establishing a plenitude (qtd Murphy Golf in the Kingdom, p 139; see endnote # xxxvip. 139; emphasis mine).

Only by "reaching the Middle" do we fill up a hole in our life?

Can the universe be explained with three numbers? No, according to Martin Rees. We need at least six. But he has no quarrel with implying that three is the most foundational. We have our being in a world of three dimensions.xxxv

Quantum theory says we need only four "dimensions" to describe the universe, length, breadth, height and time. String theory postulates we need at least eleven dimensions. Others might say that there are "hidden dimensions," ones uncountable.
Einstein counted 299,792,458 meters per second at which lights travels through a vacuum. Physicists at CERN, Europe’s main physics laboratory claim that they have detected subatomic particles that travel at 60-billionths of a second faster than light. xxxv

Take your choice.

It seems easy to describe doing and being as a three-stage procedure:

3. There are three stages: Thoughtless being. Thought. Return to thoughtless being.

33. Do not confuse the first and third stages. Thoughtless being is attained by everyone, the return to thoughtless being by a very few. xxxv

Perhaps thirdness is too easy to think? Perhaps it causes us to miss a lot of X, things necessary for understanding the essence of X?

So how do you become a writer-always-reading and how do you end your days as one. Please give some thought to this excerpt from an English nursery rhyme: "Sow an act, reap a habit; sow a habit, reap a character sow a character, reap a destiny."

Language, as a larger context for a Between, is composed of "labyrinthine paths" always willing to lead us astray.xxxv Every thinker, it seems fair to say, becomes lost in the labyrinth of language at one time or another. Are we then allowed to say that this is one reason we have Betweens? As an attempt to avoid the labyrinth?; or, more likely, find an efficient way through it.
Does the **Game of Between** rise from liminal thinking? From the act of crossing a threshold? (Please see below **Liminality**).

The gecko can climb walls and walk across ceilings. Its secret is that its toes are covered with a fine structure like the ridges of fingerprints with deep impressions between them. Here we seem to have a special kind of Betweenness, one between walls and ceilings and the feet of the gecko. Using a linguistic representation we might want to say that the molecules of gecko's feet attract a surface with an electrostatic phenomenon.

**Australopithecus sediba**, a creature from 1,977 years ago, can be said to be a "transitional species" *between* australopithecines and the emergence of *homo erectus* 1.9 millions ago. Sediba exhibits "novel combinations" of australopithecine and *erectus*.\textsuperscript{xxxv}

But what if we don’t have a name for the Middle? That we just *sense* that one is there, there as, perhaps, something new? Then might we not have confidence to write the following statements?

*Libeskind’s plan (for the new World Trade Center in New York) struck a careful *balance between* commemorating the lives lost and reestablishing the life of the site itself (emphasis mine).*\textsuperscript{xxxv}

*This peculiar being is never wholly explained. He remains a benign Nosferatu, *halfway between* the demon that dogs romantic souls, luring them into a hellfire of trouble, and a treasured imaginary friend (emphasis mine).*\textsuperscript{xxxv}

Might it be the case that in examples like these the author tacitly asks the reader to "name" the Middle? Name it for the purpose of visualizing the new?
Can we image X without first having a name for X? Can we effectively pray for someone, or call them, without knowing their name?

Please see below the **Immediate**.

**The Unknown Middle:** But what if there is no discernible Middle? Or one not represented? An example might be what physicists call "quantum intermediacy" or some unknown Middle? If no Middle exists can the Extremes of a possible **Game of Between** come into being? I want to return to this subject below under **Unmediation** and **Double Negation**.

**The Silent Middle:** Nadine Gordimer, a notable writer-always-reading, has this to say about what she learned from Hemingway:

> From Ernest Hemingway's stories I learned to listen, within myself, when writing, for what went *unsaid* by my characters; what can be, must be conveyed in other ways, and not alone by body-language but also in the breathing space of syntax: the necessity to create *silences* which the reader can interpret from these signs.xxxv

Is it fair to say then that the Middle of a Between can not only be unknown but also silent? Silent as a "breathing space" for the interpreting reader?

**Causation?** Throughout this text the author seems to believe that minds, the "I," the "we" "they" and the like *cause* Betweens. Betweens are *intentional objects* that serve some purpose in thinking and acting. But what if the author is "fooled by randomness," in somewhat the ways described by Nassim Taleb?xxxv That things can
happen, not by design, but by accidents mistaken as intentional acts or as coincidental with caused acts?

In short, the author seems to ignore the possibility of error; or more generally, the possibility that all thinking can be subject to illusions. If we couldn’t think, then it would be impossible to be deluded.

But does it matter whether a Between happens by design or by chance? What matters is whether one can falsify evidence for the existence of Betweens and the range of their possible effects. As Aristotle points out things that happen by design and those that happen by chance can have the same effect. It would only matter if someone could prove such effect is two not one, appearing to be the same but actually different—falsification is often more effective than verification (Physics, 196a-198a).

If/Then: Please consider this "riddle" of Epicurus as he presents it with the "if/then" form::

God either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants to and cannot, then he is weak - and this does not apply to god. If he can but does not want to, then he is spiteful - which is equally foreign to god's nature. If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful, and so not a god. If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fitting for a god, where then do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them?

Notice the triadic structure of this, the situation ("if"), the effect of the situation ("then") and the conclusion that can be drawn from the effect ("then he is weak"). This is essentially the form of a syllogism and metaphor.

But does it have the same rhetorical intention?
"Or if I have to choose *between* two subjects, I won't choose the boring one."

(Christopher Hitchens).

**The Middle as Messenger:** The thought often comes to me (usually in the Middle of the night) that this essay can stand as a messenger *between* you and me. Or between them and us, you and them and so on.

Should we say that a Messenger, in this context, is a *Temporal Middle*? By going from here to there, from me to you, that time passes and, as it passes, certain things happen to the Messenger?

A literary example here might be Browning's *Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came*.

A scientific example is resistance to the cancer drug Xalkori. There is evidence that the resistance is caused by is the RNA messenger, Mediator -12 (MED12) being blocked. The function of MED12 is to help transcribe genes from DNA into RNA messengers in order to maintain the structure of chromosomes. "Presumably, resistance to Xalkori is being caused by disabling mutations in one or more of these genes."

"Don't shoot the messenger" *(Henry IV, Part 2).*

* Aristotle. One can justly say that Aristotle was the first to show how the Game of Between can be used to set up a text, explicate an existing text, or bring into being a "new" idea. Aristotle typically plays the Game by starting with a question about the meaning of a certain state, idea or action: for example, what is courage? He then finds the answer in a balance between cowardice and recklessness. Courage, that is, is the Middle state between two Extreme states. Similarly with the moderation of
middle age; a state that avoids the selfishness of old age and the intemperance of youth. The Game for Aristotle thus proceeds back and forth between two Extremes in order to reach the Middle, often called the "golden mean."xxxv

The Middle emerges from taking parts from the Extremes. Aristotle would perhaps say that the Middle is the "goal" of the Game of Between. Once the goal is reached the ideal as something new emerges.

Wittgenstein: Aristotle is a star player of the Game. But he does not write the rules for it. Wittgenstein, by contrast, attempts to make explicit actual and possible rules for playing the Game. He does this in three of his books, On Certainty, Philosophical Investigations and The Foundations of Mathematics. We didn't discover language. We invented it like we invented games. Language can then be seen as a "game" (Sprachspiel). Since Betweens (In-Betweens) are a part of language we can say they are part of the language game—a vital part.

Certain rules, both actual and possible, link them.

Family Resemblances (Familianähnlichkeiten): Please expect to hear in these Thought Runs the expression "Family Resemblances." The expression is Wittgenstein's(PI #66, 67). The immediate reference is to games.

I use it, however, to characterize words and concepts that have the same function but differ in ways they "appear" and carry out their function.

In Wittgenstein's words, family resemblances form:

(A) complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail...I can think of no better expression to characterize these
similarities than "family resemblances" (Familianähnlichkeiten) For the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes...

For Wittgenstein the problem one has as a language user is that of Going on. Going on is the paterfamilias of a "family" of terms like "inferring," "extrapolating," "projecting" and "following a rule." On one level Going on refers to proceeding from one word to another, one sentence to another and so on. But on another, deeper level, it means Going on in a useable way. Speaking in a useable way is meaning with a practical outcome, like asking someone to pass the bread. An unuseable utterance has no meaning, no practical effect. In effect, it means that we haven’t Gone on. We lose in the Game of Between.

Emergence: An important result of Going on is what we can call Emergence. Something new, even unexpected, results or, more generally, "makes an appearance." Wittgenstein, following his notion of "family resemblance," has many related terms for Emergence, "unfolding" (FM #85, 86, 100), "essence" (FM 67, 73, 85), "proof" (FM #63, 69, "rule" (FM 81, 83, 112). Here Emergence refers to both the process of Going on and the results of Going on. But there is no principled way of distinguishing between an inexorable or non-exorable (contingent) result from Going on.

So if an emergent, appears, something that needs explaining, how do you make such an appearance intelligible to a second person? An example might be the occurrence of "antibiotic resistance." What causes it to happen? What would prevent it from not happening? One answer is a recent discovery of bacteria in
30,000 year old DNA genes; genes from Yukon permafrost shown to be capable of resisting antibiotics. One conclusion from this is that no drug can be powerful enough to overcome "resistance." In the words of one discoverer:

The fact that the genes for resistance are so ancient and widespread means there is no easy solution to the problem of resistance—we will never invent a super antibiotic that clears everything up.xxxv

We might want to say then that we have here something like a Game of Between; one between nature and man. Man invents antibiotic drugs. Nature, by opposing the action of the drugs with ancient genes, creates resistance. Man invents more powerful drugs. Nature responds with still more powerful resistance to them.

Stalemate.

Are we justified in calling a "stalemate" the Middle that emerges from the Game? Manufactured antibiotics and natural anti-antibiotics the Extremes in the Game?

Convergence: I often suggest here that we should, in most cases, see the Middle as a new thing; or, more generally, as an emergent expressing novelty.

Is this one reason for the common use of the word "converge?" When other given things come together, either by accident or human agency, do they sometimes create novelty? Or is all this merely a case of linguistic representation? Or does it matter either way?

Please give some thought to these examples.xxxv

1. The accoutrements of modernity—heavy industry,
atomic energy, antiseptic architecture, petroleum waste,
and a little boy’s scientific precocity—converge to shatter the
psyche of an engineer’s wife in the Italian port of Ravenna
(Review of the movie Red Desert; emphasis mine).

2. With his Triple Theory, (Derek) Parfit, believed that he had
achieved convergence between three of the main schools
of moral thought, but even this didn’t satisfy him (p.51).

3. If all those years he (Derek Parfit) and (Bernard) Williams
had not actually been disagreeing but just talking past each
other, then there was hope for convergence after all (comment
about the relationship between two Oxford philosophers, p. 52).

In #1 the author plays the Game of Convergence with sev-
eral Extremes; in #2 with three, and in #3 with two Extremes. But they all
converge on one Middle.

We must then consider the possibility that the Middle is always a unity that
expresses novelty.

Or should we?

Writing, like planning a journey, is easy to do but hard to justify.

Krishna: If we need a "god" dwelling within our Thought Runs about the
Game of Between we might call to mind the many transformations of Krishna. In
Hindu folklore he is, according to Amit Chaudhuri,

A lover of numberless women...a politician, an inscrutable trickster
and strategist...Krishna is a reminder that play and creation are
Metaphor/Analogy. The foundation of Metaphor/Analogy is the possibility of "transfer." X can be transferred to Y on the basic of Z—please recall that the word "metaphor" comes from the Greek metaphorin, a verb used by speakers to describe carrying something from one place to another.

Aristotle characterizes Metaphor/Analogy as "in the highest degree instructive" (Poetics 21, 1457b9–16; please compare 20-22). So how does it instruct? Presumably, Aristotle would say that Metaphor/Analogy brings things "closer" to us; makes things more palpable and imageable. Please call to mind Homer's likening the fear and grief of the Achaians to the onslaught of winds from the north on the dark sea (Iliad 9:1-8) or the approach of an army to the tide of the sea rolling in and out (Iliad: 9: 412-13).

Aristotle does not speculate on the source of Metaphor/Analogy. But others, Lakoff and Johnson, for example, claim that it comes from the "neural learning of children."xxxv The Metaphor "affection as warmth" comes, for example, from "the common experience of a child being held affectionately by a parent; here, affection occurs together with warmth" (qtd Fill, p. 103).

Can we then say that the Game of Between belongs, if only loosely, to the family of Metaphor/Analogy? That when we play the Game we are essentially "transferring" meaning and information both within the Game and with the environment of the Game?
Does the **Game of Between** originate with a child's "neural" experiences? If so, does this suggest that the **Game** has its origins independent of language acquisition?

**Comparison:** Can comparing X with Y be called a **Game of Searching for the Middle**? Please consider these statements of Friedman:\textsuperscript{xxxv}

1. Identity requires sameness in difference, difference in sameness—in a word, comparison (p. 756).

2. Comparison is rudimentary for human cognition, identity, and culture. (p. 757).

3. Comparison puts incommensurability and commensurability into a dynamic interplay reflected in the slash that separates and connects: in/commensurability (p. 758).

Is there danger in *not* comparing X with Y? Would it limit our ability to conceptualize the world around, and within, us? What if we couldn’t say things like "Jim is taller than Joe?"

We might want to **Go on** and say that the story of Goldilocks is essentially a story about (in Friedman's terms) incommensurability/commensurability. "Too hot," "too hard," "too small" seem to presuppose both concepts: they help Goldilocks organize her thoughts about the Bears' house.

**The Space of Interruption:** Can we not hazard the guess that Betweens "interrupt" a larger order of meaning? That within the **Space of Interruption** that they offer a different order of meaning? Different from the one preceding. An
analogy would be to someone suddenly lost in a pathless woods. It would alter h/h perception of h/herself and the world.

One thinks here of Dante "una selva oscura…,ché la diritta via era smarrita" and its association with "nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita"—that is, a mid-life crisis allegorized as becoming lost in a dark woods. Life for the narrator has changed, taken on a different meaning.

What is the different meaning? That the meaning of life has become more obscure? The idea that meaning does not lie here but elsewhere? Perhaps in a detachment from action?

Does this mean that for the memoirist that the narrator of h/h life should be punctuated by Betweens? Betweens that describe the changes in the course of h/h life?

**Meta-Thought Run:** Thought Runs in this essay can be said to be "actual." They are conditioned by time, space and intention. They can be counted. In contrast with a Thought Run are Meta-Thought Runs. These are possibilities stripped of any empirical content. They are uncountable. Yet they are as "real" as any actual Thought Run and can be made actual by Minds. They are, in some sense, "in all Minds" waiting to be actualized as ink and air—but with no guarantee that they will take those forms.

(Please see the Actual and the Virtual below).

It is possible for an individual to be a guest in the White House. It is possible for a person with an intact Mind to tell a story about being a guest in the White House without ever going there. It is possible to tell a true story about being a guest there.
One can represent possibilities but not count them. Innumerability makes it impossible to arrive at the end of listing the possibilities.

What can we conclude from this? That there is no end of what we can say in a Thought Run and no end what we can say about the Game of Between? Our knowledge about the Game will always seem to be incomplete as long as space, time and intention rule the Mind (please see Note on Notation below).

Framework: What often comes to mind with the word Meta is "something other than the subject," something more general and inclusive. We usually call it a "frame." If X frames Y then it seems possible to say that X may explain Y—including why Y exists. We might want to say that that mountains exist, for example, because there are plates on the earth's surface that slowly collide and crumple up against each other. Or that the moon exists because of X's collision with the earth.

Fear frequently visits the Space of Possibility.

Going On as Fascination: For Wittgenstein a salient problem of thinking (and writing) is Going On and eliminating what causes you not to go on. ("weiss ich weiter" PI #323; "Wir merzen also die Sätze aus, die uns nicht weiterbringen" OC #33).

Now that I'm here, how can I go on from here? How can I identify, and expunge, what keeps me from Going on?

I might add should I go on from here? What is "here"? Since we are gaming Betweening, let us re-frame the question as a philosophical golfer might. "Why am I going from hole to hole, from number one to number two, from two to three and so
on?" One answer might be "fascination." Golf, like certain other things in life, fascinates me. The Game of Between, like golf, fascinates me.

There's no use playin' [golf] if the fascination doesna' take ye....Fascination holds us there, makes us believe 'tis all-important. Now, and this is the point...which I love so much, fascination has a gravity of its own. It can draw upon the subtle forces, draw them round us lik' a cloak, and create new worlds (Scottish dialect as represented by Michael Murphy; emphasis mine).

Gravity seems a good analogy for Fascination. It pushes and pulls us along. But we must add mystery and a possible answer to the question of Going on and ultimately to a point where I can say "I won't (can't/need to) go on."

But how far do I have to go before I know where to stop? (Please see Wittgenstein PI #245, "Wie kann ich denn mit der Sprache....").

I am tempted to say that every Though Run here is like the next hole in golf. "Replacing a divot changes your consciousness" (Murphy, p. 55).

Going on as Doubting and Non-Doubting: Wittgenstein says that (there is) "Doubting and non-doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the second." ("Zweifelndes und Nichtzweifelndes Benehmen. Es gilt das erste nur, wenn es das zweite gibt" OC #334)

Should we then say that we do not doubt that Betweens exist, either as a mode of thinking or as an orderly string of words; and, consequently, that we have no grounds for doubting that the Game of Between is a way to explicate Betweens?
Or should we say that Betweening as a Game violates rules of simplicity and economy along the lines of Occam’s Razor?

But where do we start non-doubting that Betweens exist? With certainty that the **Language Game** can exist? With knowing that the external world can exist? Probably not but probably maybe.

Doubting and non-doubting that X exists, that it behaves in a certain way or has certain characteristics seem to embody start, pause and stop procedures. An example might be cancer. Since we know certain things about DNA and the genome, we non-doubt certain things about cancer. But the more we know about cancer the more we doubt what we know. The more we doubt what we know the more we want to know. Language typically maps these "procedures" as a transition from statements like "X is Y" or "X acts like this" to questions like "what is happening **between** the Xs and Ys of cancer," "what is happening **within** a cancer cell?" and the like:

Why, for example, does the Epstein-Barr virus cause different cancers in different populations? Why do patients with certain neurological diseases like Parkinson’s, Huntington’s, Alzheimer’s and Fragile X seem to be at a lower risk for most cancers? Why are some tissues more prone than others to developing cancers?

I attempt to keep the non-doubting/doubting attitude toward the **Game of Between** throughout this essay. The more I know about Betweening the more I doubt that I know that I know. It helps me to keep **Going on**.

But perhaps not the reader.
**Game Ball:** What comes to mind in seeing a golf ball in flight? Here is one answer to the question: "The flight of the ball, the sight of it hanging there in space, anticipates our desires for transcendence....The ball in flight brings dim memories of our ancestral past and premonitions of the next manifesting plane: (Murphy p. 54).

We also might say that any *Game ball* (basketball, baseball, or tennis ball) represents certain possibilities not yet actualized. A (any person) might throw it to B (another person) or A might throw it through a hoop. Throwing the ball activates certain forces within the ball and actualizes Between conditions in the game system. Forces intrinsic to the ball *as* a physical object (*a per se object* in a non-relational condition) would include incidentals like spin, speed, direction and the like. With these it can be taken as a metaphor for time— insofar as such incidentals, of necessity, represent change. But a game ball is, by definition, a relational object. That is, one ultimately dependent on someone throwing it and someone, or something, receiving it. Additionally, the rules of the game help cause the ball to lose its independence.

Is it too much to say that any *Game Ball* in flight exemplifies Betweenness? That its origin, on the face of a club say, and its destination, the hole on the green, its flight in-between them, are all necessary "pieces" in golf as a specimen of the *Game of Between*?

**Telling a Story/Describing a Story:** My hope is that the reader will see these *Runs* as *possible* starting points for writing, or telling, a story and for describing a story. These are the two ways I have used them, with modest success,
in writing fiction, poems, essays and plays. In other words, playing the **Game of Between** starts, proceeds and ends, ideally, as a story or a description of one—or, more broadly, a narrative (ink and air) with the recognizable structure of a Between.

What is a story? There is not enough space here to give an adequate answer to the question. But let me say, following hints from Benjamin and Stump, that it always involves the "sharing" of "second-person...real or imagined" experiences. The storyteller, that is, takes the experiences of h/himself and others and makes it "available to a wider audience."xxxv

So where does the storyteller start? In the context of the **Game of Between** one answer would be "With the Middle." We imagine the story unfolding with the author taking the reader/listener through the Extremes that bracket the Middle. The Middle can thus be seen as a destination, an ideal, an act, a behavioral trait and the like. But at the same time, one would assume that for the Player of the **Game** the Middle is always contingent. It is contingent on the way the Player (storyteller) represents the Middle, how explicit the Extremes are, or the intention (as judged by an audience) of the whole.

Two other soft claims are that many other, auxiliary Games, "play" into storytelling as a **Game of Between**. An important one is the **Game of Entrances and Exits** (discussed below); another is the **Game of Preparation**, starting with the name of a possible Middle, "umpire," "reconciliation," "merger" and the like. In this, the Middle in question lays a preliminary ground (or raises the question) of what kind of game we are going to play plus how it should be played.
Storytelling and Death. "Like the Arabian Nights it is a book (The Tiger's Wife) about storytelling and its power to enchant as it wards off death and postpones the inevitable."xxxv

If the Game of Between is a foundation for storytelling, then are we allowed to say that the Game can be a means of warding off death? Or postponing the inevitable, whatever it may be?

Why not? Isn't that something, excluding being detracted by the details of daily life, we're doing here?

A young couple are set to be married. On the day before the wedding the man dies in a mining accident. The bride-to-be carries on for years unmarried. One day the body of groom-to-be is found and brought to the surface perfectly preserved. His bride recognizes him.

How does the author "fill in" the years between the man's death and the recovery of his body? Please see Benjamin's account of such "fill in" in The Storyteller. The story in question is Johann Hebel's "Unexpected Reunion" in Schatzkästlein des rheinischen Hausfreundes (please see Benjamin, pp. 94-95).

Judging by the chronology of the story Hebel's method was to work from the Extremes, the deaths of the young groom and the elderly bride, and fill in the years separating their deaths with what went on locally and globally.

I want to say that "what went on between..." is a Middle of great amplitude, in causality, necessity and value.

The amplitude of the Middle is determined by the nature of the Extremes.
Weather: Writing to Dos Passos (26 March 1932) Hemingway tells him "remember to get weather in your damn book...weather's very important." xxxv

Weather is certainly important to Hemingway. In *A Farewell to Arms*, for example, it marks the passing of the seasons and seems to symbolize the changing emotions of Frederick Henry. Rain is a cause of Nick and Bill coming together to discuss their ideals in "A Three-Day Blow" as does snow occasion the action of both "Cross Country Snow" and "An Alpine Idyll."

Is this an example of Ruskin's "pathetic fallacy"? A correlation between the emotions of a character and the weather?

Should we say, then, that readers and writers ought to look for literary representation of weather as a Game of Between? One possibility would be to play the Game from the point of view of the Extremes, one without an explicit Middle. One thinks here of depictions of extreme weather, hurricanes, tornadoes, hailstorms and the like. (Please see Immediate, a Game with no Middle.)

Pyrrhic Victory: Does every narrative, notably the present one, carry the possibility of a Pyrrhic Victory? Understood by a mind that takes understanding as a win.

Or would we be closer to the truth in calling winning a defeat a paradox? If you think long enough you always end up with a paradox.—the mind in a state of mindlessness? A win at too great a cost?

Truth: Should we say that every boldfaced term here—like Truth—and the commentary on it are only true in the Game of Between? Unlike scientific discourse, traffic directions or a recipe for Black Forest Cake, we typically don’t see
the need to falsify them. Here we are reminded of Coleridge's dictum about reading poetry, "a willing suspension of disbelief" (Biographia Literaria 169).

Telling what you think is the truth about X may involve refuting, or modifying, what someone else says about X. A case in point is John Strain's discussion of an agnostic's "reasonable belief." Here Strain plays the Game of Between with the two Extremes of skepticism and credulity: "Just as generosity might be the desirable midpoint between profligacy and meanness, so faith...would be the midpoint between skepticism and credulity" (emphasis mine).

Un-Googleability: Presumably not everything is googleable. Not everything is in digital form, things going on down the street, around the corner or in mine, or your, head. But the encyclopedic mind set (Pliny the Elder comes to mind) lives on in the assumption that "all human knowledge" is collectable. But what about sources? If we can't find the source for X are our citations reliable? What if we run out of sources should we say our encyclopedia is incomplete and a possible failure?

"I find the air of failure bracing" (Beckett)

Every entry (boldfaced terms) in this essay has a source, mostly from what I have heard, seen or read. But other entries come from nowhere, usually when I'm walking, skiing, meditating or swimming. Or just sitting still.

But is personal testimony about X coming from nowhere reliable? Is it a hoax? Or just another way for information to go out of date quickly?

Eyelevel: Merchandisers typically try to display their wares at eyelevel. Can we then say that the Middle is more likely to represent eyelevel than the Extremes?
If so, then playing the **Game of Between** can replicate, if only in a rough way, a merchandiser shelving wares on a level with the **Eyelevel** of buyers. The most saleable items occupy the space most easily seen without moving the head up or down.

In the early years of the Roman Empire, Vitruvius claimed that the most useful and beautiful architecture should correspond with the proportions (ratio between the parts) of the human body.

To understand the "architecture" of a Between play with the possibilities of **Eyelevel**. Can we begin the search at what we observe at **Eyelevel**? What we take to be Extremes only at boundary positions as **Eyelevel** changes

**Standin:** Are there any standins for Betweens? On the general order of horror films (and stories) standing in for cultural, political or sexual anxiety?

"Women are border creatures" **Mittelstufe** (Schopenhauer).

**Eucharist:** Can the Christian Eucharist be likened to a **Game of Between**? Does it enact a ritual of bringing together or communion of rivals? On a literal level, if one is allowed to use the word in this context, it resembles a dinner of like minded persons sharing food and drink. Most Christians, however, give it an additional transcendent meaning By a (symbolic?) eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ one becomes on with Him and closer to God.

So can we say that the **Eucharist** has a Middle similar to the Middle of the **Game of Between**? If so, it most likely appears by means of the two material objects, the cup of wine and bread.
But do these objects, as props in the ritual, present anything new? Or are they ways of telling us not to forget who and what we are plus what we can become?

That the reach of the Eucharist is both into the material absence of Christ and His transcendent presence?

Who meets in a Middle? The young, old, male, female, the poor and the wealthy, black and white and so on. The Middle then can be seen as a egalitarian space. Is this ultimate meaning of the Eucharist as a Middle?

**Nothingness:** "Why is there something rather than nothing? As Sorenson observes, this question is as "old as Parmenides in the fifth century BCE."xxxi

The problem here, according to Sorenson is method. Where do we start in support of the proposition "There is nothing"? We might, he suggests, start, as Descartes does, with an empty world and then only let things in that can "prove they exist" (p. 2)

St. Augustine, on the other hand, claims we should start "where we are in the middle" (my emphasis). In Sorenson’s words:

> We reach a verdict about the existence of controversial things by assessing how well these entities would harmonize with the existence of better established thing. If we start from nothing, we lack the bearings needed to navigate forward (p. 2).

Like Aristotle, the author of *Goldilocks*, and others, Augustine seems to be saying we are compelled to play the **Game of Between** not only with Something but also with Nothing. In order to begin *in the Middle* we have to have at least two game pieces,
ones like absence/presence, privation/possession, silence/sound, and blindness/sight, that exist before the Game begins.

In the course of the Game we may create the Middle. One possibility would be Sorenson's extended discussion of Nothingness.

A salient example of playing with such pre-existing pieces is Lord Rochester's poem, "Upon Nothing" (1676).

Nexthere: Mohammed Idris Ali lives in an enclave of Bangladesh surrounded entirely by India. "The Indians say we are not Indian; the Bangladeshis say we are not Bangladeshi...We are nowhere." xxxv

Measuring (Value/ Precision/Accuracy): Precision implies a degree of permissible latitude around the exact value of X. Accuracy expresses the deviation between that value and an actual, often variant, observation of X.

Accuracy and precision belong to a larger family of concepts headed by "measurement." The exact value of X guides our measuring X. Does this mean that Shakespeare "measures" the exact value of X better than other writers? That his words, consequently, are more accurate and precise? Even though he never "measures" the exact value of X?

Perhaps. But doesn't this kind of thinking run up against the murky uses of "exact value." Does the term have enforceable uses and meaning?

When we measure something do we think about who invented measurement? Do we think about who, or what, enforces measurement? Probably not. Does this mean that we can recognize the value of X while performing X with no clue as to where X came from? Possibly.
Is playing the Game of Between something like measuring X? That we enter the Game with the recognition that it has an exact value? That we have a chance to follow the rules of the Game in a precise and accurate way? Isn’t it possible to keep playing the Game without knowing who invented it; give it its authority or who or what enforces it?

Saying whoever invented language invented the Game seems like a tautology.

Context as Middle: Does the phrase I used above, "Start with the Middle," have validity as Middle if the Middle turns out to be Context? Please consider, as an example, an excerpt from my play Yielding; a play performed in several locations, New York, Brisbane Australia, Salt Lake City, at my university and others. In Yielding the context I started with was a ski-lift as a nascent foundation for constructing a relationship between a newly married couple. The couple, just married at the top of a ski life, are on their way down when the lift stalls midway down the mountain. To them, the stalled lift has become a "new thing" and the subject of the dialogue between them. Here is the excerpt from the play:

The format is one used by playwrights:

SOUND: Machine (chairlift) humming.

BRIDE

(Rubbing her face.)

I hate this shit.
GROOM

You know what I wanted. Something simple, ordinary clothes, the open air. We could have a quick bite, make a fast video. Plus do a little baseline bird-watching on the way up and it's done.

BRIDE

Mom wanted me to wear cosmetics. They're itchy…what happened to our wedding gifts?

GROOM

Uncle Larry is looking after them.

BRIDE

Uncle Larry! We'll never see them again.

GROOM

Well, you can't expect him to always act normal. The war didn't give him the experience he wanted.

SOUND: Machine

(lift) humming stops.
BRIDE

What was that? I think we're stopping.

GROOM

(Laughing.)

And no air-bags?

BRIDE

Would you get serious? We're not moving!

GROOM

It's O.K. It's just the wind.

BRIDE

Why can't I hear the sound of the gears and things?

GROOM

We're still moving. Lifts today are quiet.

BRIDE

On just THIS part of the line?
Well, why would we stop here? We're not even half way down.

BRIDE

(Quickly; moving away from the Groom)

How should I know why? Getting married at a ski-resort in fall, taking the lift up and down, that was your idea, remember?…Look up and see if something is wrong with the connecting rods.

GROOM

(Craning his neck, looking up.)

Hard to see up here. Looks all right to me.

BRIDE

Look again. Try standing up this time.

GROOM

What?

BRIDE

Try standing up.

GROOM
On my boots?

BRIDE

Yes, on your boots.

GROOM

I think I have a nail in one of them.

BRIDE

I can fix that. Take your boot off.

GROOM shakes his foot gently.

GROOM

Uhhh….It's all right now. It must have been something else.

BRIDE

Good. Now climb up there and check the cable.

GROOM

Okay, I'll try. But you'll have to give me more room.

BRIDE

(Trying to move over.)
Oh shit. My dress is stuck on something.

**GROOM**

Stuck? It sticks to everything. I can't move unless you do.

**BRIDE**

I 'm stuck, damnit.

**GROOM**

Let me help.

(Starts pulling Bride's dress up.)

Now I see, here's the problem.

**BRIDE**, knocks the **GROOM's** hands away; she yanks her dress down and pulls it away from the seat.

**BRIDE**

Forget it.
**Context (or Scene)** can perhaps be viewed from three different perspectives. First, and perhaps most obvious, we can take it as "present for conversation." The ski-lift, in the above, gives the two characters something to talk about. The ski-lift, as specific thing, avoids the abstraction of general things and increases the possibility of the audience picturing the scene. Secondly, the scene depends on the ski-lift stalling. Consequently a space opens up for the couple to work on certain differences. We see this as an instrumental function of **Context**. Finally, we might the claim that an object like a ski-lift can function as a **Character**? In the case of **Yielding** a third character?

Let us take a minute to consider this possibility. The argument starts from the assumption (more like a soft claim) that language has the ability to "animate the inanimate." In the Barbara Johnson way of thinking about apostrophe, the authorial intent is to humanize an “absent, abstract or inanimate” subject. In this there is always an “I” (addressee) and a “you” (the addressee). The “I” “calls” the “you” into the text as a “mute” responder. Such a presence “informs without speech” xxxv

Two perspectives come to mind. X can inform Y of Z with or without speech. Humans can inform with speech or, in the case of gestures, without it. Inanimate objects, like a skylift, can only inform without it. They inform because we "animate" them. Without us there would be no informing by means of a Middle.

For Chekhov, the seagull (*The Seagull*) and the cherry orchard (*The Cherry Orchard*) are objects that inform without speaking. Here Chekhov seems to make this implicit with Trigorin describing a story he is writing. The dead seagull is there with him in the scene:
Idea for a short story. The shore of lake, and a young girl who’s spent her whole life beside it, a girl like you [Nina]....

She loves the lake the way a seagull does, and she’s happy and free as a seagull. Then a man comes along, sees her, and ruins her life because he has nothing better to do. Destroys her like this seagull here. (Act 2, p. 135)

In the Cherry Orchard the loss of the orchard not only brings grief to Liubov, and other members of the family, but it also serves as a symptom of Lopakhin's ruthlessness (who brought the orchard) and the (sometimes) inhumanity of capitalism:

And now the cherry orchard is mine! (A loud laugh) My God, the cherry orchard belongs to me! Tell me I'm drunk, tell me it's all a dream, I'm making this up—(Stomps on the floor)....[I'm] the boy they [the estate owners] beat, who went barefoot in winter and never went to school, see how that poor boy just bought the most beautiful estate in the whole world! (Act 3, p. 373).

The play ends with the sound of axes cutting the cherry trees down. It too informs without speaking—informs from the orchard as Middle.

Convergence of the Extremes: In "Water," Eiko and Koma, at the Paul Milstein Pool at Lincoln Center’s Hearst Plaza, begin their performance by wading from opposite directions to meet in the middle of the pool. There, in the words of the reviewer, begins a "narrative...[that takes ] the two performers through what looked like a hazardous ford, a fraught meeting, drowning, attempts at rescue, a raft,
corpses borne on a current and a funeral bier at sea. At times the two artists were as
motionless and supine in the water as waiting crocodiles or floating logs. But the
drama seemed always heroic, even epic.\textsuperscript{xxxv}

We have characterized the Middle as a "space" of novelty. Something new
comes into being. Is this consistent with the reviewer’s representation as Eiko and
Koma enact a "narrative"? If so, then we can submit that different positions of he
performers, new items in their space, heavenward gestures and the like, sustain the
narrative. It ends when they separate and return to their start positions.

Should we be reminded here of Hardy’s "The Convergence of the Twain?"
(1912). Like "Water," the action takes place in water (the Atlantic Ocean). The two
"performers," an iceberg and the liner Titanic, meet to create a singular, novel,
narrative.

Other literary examples of Convergence as meeting are Michael Frayn’s play,
Copenhagen and Dava Sobel A More Perfect Heaven: How Copernicus Revolutionized
the Cosmos.. In Copenhagen the action arises from a presumed meeting between the
physicists Heisenberg and Niels Bohr; Sobel’s book raises from an alleged meeting
between Copernicus and Georg Joachim von Lauchen, a young mathematician.

We might infer from these examples that convergence, while it represents
novelty, also presupposes Inertia. That is, Eiko and Koma, the iceberg and the
Titanic, Copenhagen and A More Perfect Heaven start the narrative of each by a
disruption in their Inertia, the tendency of any object to resist any change in its
motion. To present a Middle in the Game of Between one has to disrupt (change,
modify) the Inertia of the Extremes (please see Inertia below).
**Vortex:** Vortices, seen in whirlpools, maelstroms, tornadoes, spiral columns of insects (gnats or firefires) leaves caught in a spiraling updraft have a center. Can we justify ourselves in calling the center the Middle of a Between? If so, does this make the circumference of a Vortex into something like the Extremes of a Between?

With the Vortex is nature playing the Game of Between? Within a Vortex things are caught in a cycle of creation, transformation and destruction. Is this cycle something we would like the Game of Between to represent?

**Thesis and Emergence of the Middle.** A thesis statement can be defined in different ways. It may inform the audience how the subject will be interpreted; or it may be a short description of the "roadmap" of what follows. It may contain a response to a question about the subject, a rebuttal of another claim about the subject or a new claim about the subject—one that presents new evidence about the subject.

Perhaps the most succinct way to state a thesis is by **Emergence of Novelty from the Convergence of Extremes on a Middle**—the "names" of the Extremes being, in the following example, "the ancient" and "the modern": "The World Wide Web…signals the emergence of a new way of being and thinking to rival the ancient and the modern, even as it draws elements of both.xxxv

**Conflict and Violence: The Game of Between** seems to be particularly appropriate for storytellers interested in conflict and violence. Class warfare, and its possible effects, is one example. War is another, love triangles another (please see below Triangles). In these we might hazard the guess that the Extremes of a
Between represent the warring parties and the Middle the effects of their "war."

The Middle as effect seems to be the reasoning behind Fukuyama’s "Game" of state formation. Violent acts, he claims, is a principal cause in bringing new states into being. Creation of new states, with new forms of bureaucracy and centralization, has a direct correlation with the persistence, quantity and quality of warfare. A salient example of this were the Qin Dynasty (221-226 B.C.) and the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D) of China. Persistent warfare helped to lay the ground for the creation of their "modern" states.

**Justification:** What justifies telling a story? What justifies how you tell a story? Does success alone justify storytelling or simply what persons accept as storytelling?

Telling stories about failure seem common today (6:10 AM, 25 July 2011). If one writes, or recites, a successful story about failure can we say that some version of failure justifies telling the story?

That was an odd way of putting it.

**Self-Similarity:** We imagine, think, dream, and create and destroy Betweening. We imagine true, false and no-meaning Betweens. In all of this we are, in a sense, Betweening Betweens, cognitive behavior suggestive of being conscious of our consciousness.

Metaphysics is the "study of what exists...(including) "the limit case where nothing exists"
Should we stop here or attempt to find a way to go on? We might start by asking who the players in this Game are? Let us assume that they are two minds reflecting on one another. In order to keep going they have to share information about X. X can be either present and actual or absent and possible and the relationship between the minds is reciprocal. Information flows back and forth between them.

We further assume that one person can represent the two minds: "I am of two minds."

I'm tempted to say add two "I's" together to form "we."

As an example take this (partial) account (a friend of mine) of his ascent of Mt. Kilimanjaro

And how had we doctors and lawyers responded to the snow, the footing, and the exhaustion? What kind of judgment had we applied to the increased danger, the obvious cognitive decline, and the physical sickness? It seemed to vary between two poles, poor judgment and no judgment. But we reached the summit.  

One mind of my friend raises the question the other mind answers it with a

Between, "between two poles...."

X stands for the mountain. (Please see below The Game of Questions).

My Version: I am tempted to say that telling a story by means of the Game of Between is my version of telling a story just as my life is a version of a possible kind of life. By having lived this possible life I have, at the same time, excluded every other possible life. Living a life is bounded and irreversible.
We might analogize from this that every **Game of Between** begins and ends as my version of a possible **Game**. At the end of the **Game** all other possible Games have disappeared as an option for me—but not for other players of the **Game**.

Here we seem to have a transition from *my version of the Game* to *your version*.

**Triplets?** Ice:water:steam Three-cushion billiards.

Suggested exercise: How would you use them to structure a text? Or at least a comment about X?

**Note on Notation** Please be aware that the author is using the notation, X and Y, and sometimes Z, A, B, and C, in the same way he is using thirdness; that is, as part of the *invariable infrastructure* of the **Game of Between**.

By terms like *"I," "one," "you," "we," "use," "my" "h/s"* I mean, broadly, the "mind," and by extension, "meaning." "Mind" and "meaning," I hasten to add, have the same general etymology—from the Indo-European "*-men."

Following Buck we are allowed to say that "mind" can also (sometimes) encompass "emotion," "soul" and activities of the mind, thinking, perceiving, understanding and the like. xxxv

Notations like the above, in the manner of chess pieces, delimit the space in the **Game of Between** can begin

How the **Game** ends is unpredictable.
Food: "Middle" stands as the *pater familia* of the Between family. Members of his family are words already mentioned and many more unrecorded. One that now appears in the family is "mean"

In one of its derivations it comes from the Latin *communis* in the sense of "vulgar" or "unpleasant": "A mean spirit." In another descent from Latin, from *medianus*, it has the sense of "the mean between X & Y" or "halfway between extremes."

In "mean's" transition to a plural form, "means," it took on an instrumental use: "X by means of Y." Here we have a sense of movement, of time passing and the transformation of X by means of Y.

We have, in short, a way to represent Food. Go on w/ hoe & plow instrumental use of Bet

**Assumption of the Existence of X.** All knowing, according to Aristotle, proceeds from "pre-existing (or) old knowledge." (*Posterior Analytics* 71a 1-5). What we can know starts from what we do know. If we can't know it, then it may be sign either it doesn't exist or we have no knowledge of its existence.

Should we assume then that there are persons who cannot play the **Game of Between**? Perhaps such persons live in a culture that has no name for either "Game" or "Between?" Or perhaps their language has the words as names but the would-be player has to be taught the words before he can become a player?

Is there any difference between the word "player" and "gamer"? Do we change contexts when we change from one to the other?

To know the existence of X we have to experience X.
Metrical Representations. In mathematics a matrix typically appears as "entries" arranged in rows (horizontal) and columns (vertical) numbers. The general purpose is to allow the mind to predict what holds a system together and allow it to function a certain way. Like many other linguistic and quantitative representations, including the **Game of Between**, matrices are presumably reductive.

A real world representation of a matrix is a machine, a fire-truck, a printer, a pair of scissors, something composed of parts linked to other parts—the purpose of the whole being to do a certain kind of work. On my university campus, for example, there is an apparatus called an Environmental Observatory. The Observatory, as one may surmise, measures ten different weather conditions: temperature (air, or it feels like X); wind (speed, direction); relative humidity; solar radiation; barometric pressure; and atmospheric visibility

Can we say that anything we perceive as a matrix has a Middle? One that can be found and, accordingly, can qualify as a nascent **Game of Between**? If so, does the Middle correspond (roughly) to what literary folks call a "thesis," "a point," or even a "genre?"

(Please see below **The Fractal Character of Between**).

**Difference:** Above I quoted this passage about the poetry of Elizabeth Bishop:

As in so many of her poems, (Elizabeth) Bishop brings us to such a place of utter poise, *balancing between* the real and the ideal…*between* the dreamt-of and the impossible, *between* love and loss; *between* sleep and waking, *between* solitude and communion.
The repetition of "between" seems to indicate we are witnessing different Games of Between with different subjects. But it is possible to find examples of one Game played with different subjects. Here is a writer describing Beckett's Malone as a work "devoid of definitional boundaries":

Malone's narrative [is] …about staking out a space…precariously suspended between subjective and objective, me and not me, the past and present, possession and non-possession, love and hate.xxxv

In such cases, we wonder about authorial intentions. Does anything nameable lie between, for example, "subjective and objective"? If so, can it be described or understood? Or is the reader left looking into a void?

**Suppressing the Why** (die Frage 'warum' unterdrucken). Wittgenstein advises us to avoid asking "why" if we want to become "aware of the important facts…[that can] lead us to an answer" (die wichtigen Tatsachen gewahr…zu Antwort führen) (PI #471).

In this context we might take this to mean "look at many examples of Between before you start theorizing about the nature, function, presence or absence of Between. Or Wittgenstein might be inviting us to picture "why" as a detraction, a way of "missing the point" of the facts of a particular Between—what brought it into being, where does it occur in the text, what does it represent, or not represent, what are its effects on the text as a whole and the like. .

Likely literary examples of not suppressing the "why" are Walter (Tristram Shandy's father) and Toby, Tristram's uncle. Walter's "whying" has mainly to do with marriage, child-bearing and child-rearing. Toby's focus is on warfare, fortifications and the Battle of Namur.
The result of this is a certain kind of existential tunnel vision, of not observing, and understanding, of what is going on around them with the household women, Tristram's mother, Susannah, the Widow Wadman and so on. Tristram, the narrator, summarizes the mental process of his two relatives in the following way:

It is the nature of an hypothesis, when once a man has conceived it, that it assimilates everything to itself as proper nourishment; and, from the first moment of your begetting it, it generally grows the stronger by every thing you see, hear, read, or understand. This is of great use.\textsuperscript{xxxv}

Can everything we see, hear, read or understand be reduced to a Between? That would be of great use.

\textbf{Suppressing the Possibility of Failure?} An important question for Wittgenstein is knowing (finding out) how "to go on" (weiss ich weiter, \textit{PI} 323)—going on, for example, by seeing a pattern in a series of numbers or an algebraic expression (\textit{PI} 151, 185).

The capacity to go on seems related to the capacity to imagine failure and success—not so much as actualities but more as possibilities. Should the player of the \textbf{Game of Between}, in order to sustain going on, always suppress the possibility of failure and enlarge the possibility of success? Or at least entertain the possibility of enlarging success?

Or should h/s go on by suppressing both the possibilities of success and failure?

Wouldn't that leave us in the awkward position of trying to annihilate the possibility of possibilities?
One is reminded of Benjamin "angel of history" that flies toward the future while looking backwards.

**Hedonic Ethology:** (Or animal, include human, pleasure). Seeking pleasure, basking in the sun, listening to music, writing fiction, sex, or eating are adaptive behaviors. Pleasure, like pain, means evolutionary strategies of avoiding danger (pain) and seeking something pleasant.

Does playing the **Game of Between** give us pleasure? And by so doing give us an edge, in the game of evolution, over those who do not play the Game?

How would you go on from here?

**That Static and the Moving Between:** We are tempted to say that every Between can represent its subject as either static or moving—somewhat in the way that trigonometry represents static nature while calculus represents it as moving.

Here one can envision counting both a moving "now" and a non-moving one. A moving "now" makes the duration of X both moving and non-moving. Moving "nows" make duration. The time it takes to process a Between plus understanding what such duration represents. Non-moving "nows" represent time as co-existence, X and Y in the same place at the same time. The "now" is always in reference to the Middle of an Between. It can either "stand still" or "move" between the Extremes of a Between. In most prose, the non-moving Middle is the case. In the performing arts, it is usually the moving Middle. The character that represents the Middle comes and goes on stage.

**Una trinitas et trina unitas** (One in trinity and three in unity). The existence of a writer’s muse is problematic today. But if one should ask me if something like a
muse was at work in this text, then I would have to say that it is related to St. Augustine's (paradoxical?) remark about God. My muse spoke (and continues to speak) to me of Betweenness as opening up the possibility of looking at the subject from three different perspectives; from the point of view of a creator (the mind that creates a Between); from the perspective of a unity formed of three parts and as a thirdness that creates a unity. Taken together, we have the possibility of something like a mind working in both a top-down and a bottom-up way.

**Asymmetry:** An assumption about the relationship between the three parts of a Between is asymmetry. They exhibit a three-way differences while still maintaining a common purpose. But why do we assume this? Why not assume the opposite? That they have a symmetrical relationship? Or that they have a equal amount of substance and purpose?

Modern cosmology assumes that there is an asymmetrical relationship between matter and anti-matter. Otherwise, they would have destroyed each other. If they were perfect opposites, equal amounts of the two would have been made in the Big Bang, and they would have annihilated each other long since, leaving only light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation to fill the cosmos.

On the face of it, this seems to be a sort of answer to Heidegger’s question, "Why is there actually something and not rather nothing?" ("Warum ist überhaupt etwas und nicht vielmehr Nichts").

We have something because there is "more" matter than anti-matter. We suppress the why.
But what does this "more" mean? An analogy here might be the Christian Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As in Heidegger’s formulation ("nicht….Nichts") we might go on and distinguish them by means of double negation as something missing leading to something present. God lacks movement. The Holy Spirit moves in the cosmos in place of God. God lacks worldly peculiarity. Jesus, God made manifest, exhibits the perfection of particulars. Jesus touches us and is, in return, touchable.

What one lacks the other makes up. Together, what is made up is perfect in three ways. Can we not take this as a good example of Plenitude?

Should we then expect to find double negation in every instance of a Between? Is it, like Thirdness, a permanent infrastructure of the Game of Between?

Is/Ought: Mapping what is and what ought to be into a Between (or a Between into an Is/Ought) might take the following form. Suppose you want to "bring fun back to golf." The reason you give for thinking it’s not fun anymore, at least for the average (non-tour or recreational, player), is that the latter wants to tee off from the pro tees. Since the average drive of a pro is 280 yards (to the 200-220 of the recreational player) frustration with one’s driving skills is bound to occur—or so the theory goes.

So what you want to see happen, to bring the fun back, is "to tee forward," or shorten the distance between from tee and the pin.

So you form a campaign called Tee It Forward and set out to educate recreational golfers to adopt the concept. You gather statistics about length of drives
from the tee and those with irons from the fairway. You calculate that a pro would have to play a course measuring 8,100 yards in order to use the same clubs on approaches as an amateur who drives the 230 yards on 6,700 yard course. You claim that even with the most expensive clubs nothing will close the gap between length of a pro and a recreational player.

Are we justified then in calling this a Between situation? Between the Is and the Ought of recreational golf lies a Middle one must traverse in order to get from the Extremes of Is and Ought?

The Middle, in short, is essentially the stuff of persuasion based both on evidence (statistics) and an argument about what makes golf "fun" for the recreational player.xxxv

**Patterning.** Does a Between correspond to any of these traditional elements of rhetoric? Does it have a family resemblance, in structure or function, with traditional forms like metaphor, topic, motif or trope? Following hints from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Quintilian's *Institutes* do we have warrant for advising a student of rhetoric (oratory) to include Betweens in h/h bag of tricks along with metaphor and the like?

Again, this would imply that h/s look closely at examples like the following—look closely before classifying them either one way or another:

1. "A number of plot threads explore the mixing of cultural identities in the zone between colonizer and colonized"xxxv

2. "Like Evelyn Waugh he creates comedy from the tension
between the elegance of his prose and the often indecorous things he is describing, and so the reader is caught between amusement and exhilaration when someone with a terrible hangover staggers to the lavatory where he is 'sick.' 

3. "They [James Joyce and his wife] settled in a flat on the first floor of a house at 28b Campden Grove...almost midway between the rooms where...Ezra Pound...had lodged and ...South Lodge, the house Ford Madox Ford had shared with his mistress Violet Hunt."

With #3 the writer seems to be following Aristotle's advice to "put the scene before the eyes" which he associates with the effect of metaphor (Rhetoric (1410b 33). It is far more imageable than #1 and #2 and a sort of Google map of the area.

#1 and #2 function much like a promise by the writer to specify later what "between" refers to. In this it has a family resemblance to what I call Preparation for a future, complete, Between—or, in more technical terms, a cataphoric structure formed by later terms co-referring with earlier ones. (See Preparation).

So, are we justified in classifying a Between as a figure of speech like a trope or topic? Can a Between be, like a trope or topic, ready made, off the rack? Or does it have to be custom made? It would seem that it is more like the latter than the former. Unlike a trope or topic, one can only create a Between by way of two Extremes that converge on a Middle, even an indefinite (cataphoric) Middle like #1 and #2. Tropes and topics, in other words, have no discernible Middle.

In the Game of Between one has to reach the Middle in order to win the Game.—or at least complete it.
Collections: Linguists often classify groups of words on the basis of their "tightness." Idioms and clichés are perhaps the best example. They are the "tightest." They are easy to remember and speakers repeat them often. Typically one learns them as one would an individual word early in life: "only two things are certain in life, death and taxes"; "He has bats in the belfry"; "You can't judge a book by its cover" and so on.

Midway between an idiom and a new expression, are expressions that lack such "tightness." These are Collections. Of these, some are formed from "between" and "middle.": "He was torn between X & Y"; "The difference between X and Y"; "Halfway between X and Y"; "Caught in the middle," "Gray zone" and many more.

Judging: To what extent can Between represent the judging (evaluating) mind? Since judging seems to represent a mind in motion, the Between would be the context for such motion (Please compare Static Versus Moving Between). This suggests that X, Y, and Z (parts of a Between) can represent different "minds" judging the same thing, the publishability of a MS, an alleged criminal act, the constitutionality of a law and so on.

In this case judging could potentially go from X to Y to Z for a final judgment. This allows for three outcomes. If X and Y agree then judging would stop. If they disagree than it would proceed to Z. Z would then either agree or disagree with X and Y's judgment. The judgments of X and Y are necessary ones, that of Z a possible (contingent) one.
In this example X and Y stand for the Extremes of Between and Z for the Middle. Z stops the process only if the behavior of the player Game "times" the process out at Z.

Here is an example the X, Y, Z judging process from the editor of a journal about my submission:

We have sent your essay, anonymously, to two readers [X and Y] for peer review, both of whom are specialists in the essay's field. We ask readers to return their reports within four weeks. Sometimes, however, readers are not available to review the essays we send them, or they need extra time.

We do stay in touch with reviewers and make every effort to expedite the process. If the first two readers disagree in their recommendations, we seek a third review [Z], which can also lengthen the review process.

If an article receives two recommendations against publication, it is generally declined within about eight weeks of submission and following a final review by the editor [Z]. If an article receives two [X and Y] recommendations for publication, it is sent to the …Editorial Board, [Z] perhaps after the author revises in response to the reviewers' suggestions. The board meets three times a year, generally in October, January-February, and May. For articles reviewed by the board, the entire review process usually takes between four and eight months.

"Between four and eight months" describes what I referred to above as "timed out."
Triangles: Here are some examples of character "triangles" in two movies and dance routine, the last being one borrowed from the movie Rashomon:

A. A triangle composed of the characters Laurie, Martin and Charley. Laurie has to decide which person she will marry. She then represents the possible "Middle." The Searchers, starring John Wayne.

B. A triangle between Nickie, the man, his fiancée and Terry. Here Nickie is the Middle. An Affair to Remember.

C. One between Man in Blue, Man in Green and Woman in Red. Paul Taylor’s "Three Dubious Memories" a dance based on the Kurosawa’s film Rashomon. In the dance the story is told in three different ways, from three points of view. The Woman in Red is the Middle.

D. A triangle between Jerrie, Tom and Mary in the movie "Another Year."
Jerrie and Tom are a couple with one adult son. Mary, lonely, alcoholic and neurotic is a friend who wants desperately to be part of the family, Mary wants, for example, to participate in the funeral of Tom’s sister in law; she wants to be close to Tom’s brother and she takes Tom’s son as a prospective husband.

Do we need, with these examples, further criteria? Such as the context in which the Triangles as Betweens come into being? How physical positions and gestures correlate with Dialogue?

As script and playwrights are we always concerned with seeing that dialogue, action and motive point to one end? Isn’t that what the writer of Genesis accomplished with great skill with Eve, the Snake and God?
Typically, such triangles are formed by first two characters coming (or appearing) together, through marriage, friendship or common interest, to form a stable, and relatively simple, relationship. So why a third character?

Most playwrights and short story writers, such as myself, will tell you a two character play or story typically generates less interest to an audience than a three character one. The reason seems to be related to what Wittgenstein calls "going on." A two character story does not allow the storyteller to go "as far" as a three character one.

So what do we mean by "as far as?" Let us, using the example of Don Quixote. In the first book the knight sets out in the early morning and ends up at an inn, which he believes to be a castle. He asks the innkeeper, who he thinks to be the lord of the castle, to dub him a knight. He becomes involved in a fight with mule drivers. Eventually, the innkeeper dubs Quixote a knight, and sends him on his way.

The story, that is, builds from one to two to three characters, from the knight, to the innkeeper to the muleteers. In subsequent quests the knight picks up a squire, Sancho, and the pattern of meeting-the-third character continues, with types like priests, prostitutes, escaped prisoners, lovesick couples and so on.

Please note the "fractal" nature of these quests. These nest in each other and they replicate the way each one ends, in the defeat of the knight. (See The Fractal Character of a Between below)

Note also that the adversaries the knight frequently encountered, for example, the mule drivers, lovesick couples, townspeople, seem to illustrate the three in one unity and
a one in three unity of every Between. (Please see again *Una trinitas et trina unitas* above)

And what about a third quest of the knight, alluded to at the end of Book One? Does Book Two represent that? Or is it a hiatus in the text? Or is it a space, deliberately left open by Cervantes, for the reader to compose his own quest-story?

So have we answered the "as far as" question? Perhaps. To some degree. But let us go on to the three-generation play or story, the one with the "I," the grandparents and the children. Examples include *Lost in Yonkers*, *On Golden Pond* and Flannery O'Connor's *A Good Man Is Hard to Find*. All of these involve conflict, of one sort or another, between the generations. But in all of them the "rules" of the *Game of Between* require that the middle generation, the generation between grandparents and their own children, play the major role in the conflict.

Here we might claim that the question "as far as" is answered by "as far as we can go with the middle generation."

**Self-Reference.** Can we use Betweens to represent Between? Can we pretend that without Betweens there would be no possibility of representation on the order of "if X and Y can have meaning as use then it is because of the prior existence of Z where Z has the capacity to take on the nature of such things as the goal of X and Y, their ideal, their DNA and the like?"

Let us then go on to pretend that it is possible. But let's not pretend that we have succeeded in our pretense. Between the idea and the act many shoes are worn out (Italian proverb).
Preparation There seem to be many singular terms that presuppose what can be called a *preparation* for a **Game of Between:**

- Reconciliation
- Revenge (between a past wrong and a current payback)
- Merger
- Twilight
- Umpire
- Limbo (between action and inaction)
- Meanwhile
- Crepuscular

Suggestion: Pick one item from this list and build a story around it. Start with the term, say "Twilight," as a Middle and then go on to creates two Extremes for it. What foundation elements of the Extremes are contained, or presupposed, in "Twilight?"

Preparing for a **Game of Between,** however, involves working out the details. A merger, of banks, social networks and the like takes time and mistakes (seen in hindsight) are often made. An example from *The New York Times* is a report on the merger of Delta and Northwest Airlines. The merger took 18 months and 1,200 systems had to be integrated. Agreements with unions had to be worked out. Planes had to be repainted. Questions such as these arose: "How many chimes should pilots ring to signal the plane is about to land—two or four? Should flight attendants first pour drinks into a cup or just hand over the can?" The custom at Delta was to pour the drinks into a cup. At Northwest one was handed the can.
**Between Versus In-Between:** One would like to say that there is a difference between Between and In-Between. The latter seems richer than the former. But where does the richness lie? With the prefix "In" we seem to be taken into something *underlying* Between. An additional movement of the mind is involved. (Is this because more syllables are at work in In-Between. In-Between *sounds* richer, more dynamic, than Between).

Compare the German "zwischen" with "dazwischen." Does the latter *seem* to take you deeper, into something more fundamental, than the former? Is that because, in part, that "dazwischen" *sounds* more fundamental—and this is because it takes longer to pronounce? The mind is held *in one place* longer? The movement of the breathe is longer, more complex?

**The Joy of In-Betweeness:** Michael Murphy quotes a remark about Shivas Irons on walking between golf holes as an "*in-between" Shivas tells Murphy, his pupil, what a "rotten shame" it is that Murphy is so occupied with the next hole that he doesn't "enjoy the walkin'":

'Tis a shame, 'tis a rotten shame, for if ye can enjoy the walkin', ye can probably enjoy the other times in yer life when ye're *in between*. And that's most o' the time;

wouldn't ye say! (p. 187; Murphy's emphasis)

Are we, as Shivas says, "in between...most of the time"? If so, then does this condition presuppose being in a state of double *consciousness*? Being *conscious* of being *conscious* of at least two other things, the Extremes, and being *conscious* of having some relationship with them?
In Murphy's representation being *conscious* of the Extremes (the tee and the hole) becomes a detraction from the joy of "walkin *in between*" them.

**The Middle as Evidence:** What did Z do *between* X and Y? How did h/s play the Game of Between? Say Z has been accused of committing a crime. Suppose further he went from the alleged crime scene (X) to a possible point of escape, an airport, a train station or bus depot (Y). Finally, suppose h/s was observed at lunch between X and Y. Did h/s’s behavior give evidence that he committed the crime at X? Or it is evidence of h/s's innocence?

Please see "Behavior at Lunch May Play Key Role in Strauss-Kahn's Abuse Trial." xxxv

**Flat Versus Three-Dimensional Figures:** "It seems queer that with some drawings our impression should be a flat thing, and with some a three-dimensional thing" (Wittgenstein *PI* # 202e). Can a Between be a "drawing?" Certainly with three lines, three squares and the like we can represent one as lying between two others. (Perhaps we would want to color, or some other notation, to mark the Middle line or square).

But how would this help our understanding of the use of a Between?

**Between as Expression.** It seems likely that a Between can both express something, new or given, or express nothing. This reason for this may be because, as Beckett has it, there is an "obligation to express": "The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the *obligation to express*." xxxv
Expressing nothing seems straightforward enough. Lord Rochester does exactly that in his great poem, "Upon Nothing" (1679). Here he presumably felt the obligation to express nothing in six or seven ways, as lying, as political speech, as the principal narrative of Genesis and so on.

But wait a minute. Shouldn't we make a distinction between "nothing" as word and "nothing" as concept? The crux seems to be perception. Can I perceive nothing? Or only imagine perceiving it? We might look at a river running between its banks and think "a bridge needs to be built here." The bridge is imageable but materially non-existent. The river as a Between (between two banks) goes on unbridged. Because it cannot be perceived by means of certain perceptual qualities, its supports, its location on the river, its colors, and so on,. One cannot use a non-existent bridge to cross the river without getting wet. Suppose then we decide to swim across.

Isn't it possible to imagine that swimming across the river is the effect of there not being a bridge? That nothingness has causal force? That the nothingness of the bridge can have consequences?: "Rien n’est plus réel que rien" ("Nothing is more real than nothing" (Beckett).

Suppose we need to express our take on the human condition. Might we want to begin our representation with the two Extremes of finitude and infinity. Then we put mankind in the Middle conscious of their finiteness (conscious of death). Now what? Mankind has consciousness. They are conscious that they have consciousness. The question then becomes, not what they should do with such consciousness, but rather should they anything with it?
Here playing the **Game of Between** seems to shuttle the mind back and forth between finiteness and infinity.

**Separating, Combining, Novelty:** Does preparing to play the **Game of Between** begin with a picture of separating and combining Extremes? With the preparatory word "merger" we seem to see the Extremes come to together to form a new thing. Here the rule of the Game is "combine X with Y to form Z." With "reconciliation" the rule is essentially the same but with the added notion of "re-combine." That is, to bring together what (the Extremes) were once together but are now separated. "Reconciliation" implies a state, "conciliation," prior to "reconciliation." It has a "history" lacking in "merger."

Both "merger" and "reconciliation" involve working out the details. This too can be seen as a Game with certain rules.

**At Stake:** What’s at stake in completing a Between like a merger? Customer loyalty in the case of airlines or banks? What’s at stake in sustaining an Between like a marriage? The possibility of divorce? What’s at stake in not dissolving a relationship, a connection or a contract?

Here the image of crossing a threshold comes to mind. One might say to oneself: should I continue over and beyond it? Should I turn and go back? Should I pause on the threshold and think about which way to go?

What if an abyss (Abgrund) yawns beyond this threshold? (Wittgenstein *PI* #84).
What image do I see when I use the phrase "there is the difference between....?" Is it an attempt to foreground, bring to front and center stage, what has hitherto occupied the background?

**Interstellar Travel (Or Going From Here to There):** Should we take any conceivable "Here" and "There" as the Extremes of a Between? What if "Here" is earth and "There" is Alpha Centauri, a star 4.4 light years from earth? What if the journey would take, in a spaceship traveling 38,000 miles an hour, 70,000 years to traverse the distance between the earth and Alpha Centauri?

Whoever goes on such a journey would never come back. Whoever goes won’t be born for 200 years from now (19 August 2011). Whoever plans a journey of 70,000 years in 200 years time manages to think of things deep in the past that are far in the future.

We can imagine Middles traversable in a finite length of time. This is because we can count? Can we imagine an uncountable, indivisible< Middle? (For more details on interstellar travel please see Darpa [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]).

**The Middle as Modes of Time:** Sometimes time seems to "go fast"; at other times to "creep by." The Middle between now-here and then-there can expand or contract. In the movie "One Day" (2011), starring Jim Sturgess and Anne Hathaway, the action starts and stops on one day, July 15, 1988. Between the beginning and the end of the movie the character go from early adulthood to middle age.

Here we seem to be invited to think about action viewed by creatures with
abnormal conceptions of time. For one, going from an early adult to middle age is normal. For the other it is impossible.

But wait a minute. July 15 is the feast day of St. Swithin, a bishop of Winchester in the 9th century. So what? I'll tell you what. Whatever the weather is on the feast day, rain or shine, it will continue same for the next 40 days.

St Swithun's day if thou dost rain
For forty days it will remain
St Swithun's day if thou be fair
For forty days 'twill rain nae mare
Playing the Middle as time begins to appear more and more difficult.

The Problem of "Between" as a Word: The familiarity and apparent clarity of the word "between," makes, for some, the word hard to grasp. Usually, when we are told that Z is happening between X and Y we know how it is supposed to be true, but that depends on a ground (conceptual or theoretical) that is not conveyed by the "between" alone. We may know how both Y and Z refer, and the kinds of things to which they refer; and we may have a rough idea how the two referential paths might converge on a single thing, an object, a person, or process. But when the two terms of the identification are different it may not be so clear how the convergence might be true.

We would like to say that every Game of Between adds new life to X, the subject of the Game. Here we have in mind a picture of X taking on new life by becoming Y, Z....
Anomalous Middles (Middles Without Names): If there is a place to start here, it might be with nameless, or un-nameable, Middles. Are we, in our imagination, one with Adam observing objects he can’t "call" or teach Eve how to call? Perhaps the word "animal," as a candidate for a name, isn't available to Adam. Consequently, reports to God and us about the animals cannot be named or categorized.

Still, we suppose he could point at the animals and engage in a primitive form of naming with Eve and God, "this one," "that one," "those over there." If we want to be generous with him we might grant him a certain number of color terms as names, "roan," "brindle," "tawny" and the like.

Perhaps "nameless" is the wrong word here. Perhaps we should say that any word can name something but in so doing it tends to reveal different states of being of the thing named? Perhaps we should say that some names, especially proper names, strive to reveal the perfect, or complete, nature of things while other reveal, in various degrees, their imperfect, or incomplete nature? Is "shadow," say, the name of an imperfect being? Was that what Eliot was driving at with "Between the motion and the act/Falls the shadow"? Insofar as shadows presuppose a casting body (a bird) and a light source (the sun) then we might want to say that imperfect being is parasitic on complete being.

But don’t we often have an inkling that something ought to lie between two other known things (Extremes)? Perhaps we feel the need to fill a gap between them and by so doing bring into being something new? How, for example, would you feel about yourself if you are a star athlete but have never played on a championship
team? Would you feel stuck in a kind of no-man’s land between winning and losing? Being a star makes you a sort of winner. But your team failing to win a championship might make your career seem incomplete.  

Between failure and success lies a space of unnamed possibilities. Possibilities are what lie just around the corner.  

**The Sorenson Reduction:** If I say to myself I am neither this nor that, neither a winner nor a loser (a success or a failure), then I have executed what can be called a Sorenson Reduction. I have, that is, employed double negation to "exhaust" the possibilities of "this" and "that." I have robbed them of life and meaning without robbing them of existence. But have I, in the process, discovered something new? Or created a space for something new?  

**The Mystery of Meaning:** What does it all mean? Life, the cosmos, my being here? Everyone, it seems fair to say, have been distracted by those questions at one time or another. Trying to answer them tends to produce more distractions: "distracted from distraction by distraction" (T. S. Eliot). We respond to the questions with literature, philosophy, theology, music and art. In his review of "The Tree of Life," a movie that deals with questions about cosmic matters ("where did it all come from? Where is it going") as well as mundane ones ("should I eat now or wait?" "Should I answer the phone?") A.O Scott comes to the weary conclusion that our answers are always "provisional."

Yet there is the expectation that it 'will all make sense...sometime between now and Judgment Day.
Scott's use of "between" comes at the end of the review. It dams the stream of words. It takes us beyond the movie and its unanswerable questions to the future where the questions "make sense," become answerable. For some of us, it might open a space where we search for answers.

Between now and then will time end and a space of infinite possibilities open up? But will we be conscious of them?

**Pure Between:** Can we imagine a "pure" Between. One without empirical content (Kant). One not anchored in space, intention and time? Certainly, on an analogy with a Venn Diagram we can draw, in succession, three overlapping circles. In themselves the circle represent nothing but themselves. But, as such, they represent the possibility of any empirical content or operation. We can go on with them to calculate probabilities, predator:prey ratios, surface to volume relationships and the like.

Are we then lead to the conclusion that "pure" is an imaginary place to start doing sums, going on to something, attempting to make the implicit explicit? Or is it a tacit admittance of "I don't know what comes first when I imagine X?"

**Gaming:** I said above I would like to create an explanatory context for Between (and possibly In-Between) by means of a game analogy. The analogy is not to any particular game, for example, golf, tennis, or any board game. Rather it is to what seems common to them all, a network of relationships between the moves of the game, its rules, its purpose, instruments used in the game and the like.

Should we take the **Game of Between** as a leisure activity? Here we are tempted to say that our relationship with the Game, although always possible, and
frequently actual, is always contingent? Or are we faced here more with the causes of contingency?

What seems important with the game analogy is what follows the mention of analogy. Please allow your mind to follow what follows from this chess analogy:

It was a day filled with legislative chess moves, back-to-back party caucuses and closed-door meetings that ended with a nationally televised presidential address followed by a rebuttal by the House speaker, John A. Boehner.xxxv

Movies that use a chess as a metaphor include "The Chess Player" (Le Joueur d'Echecs 1927) and "Queen to Play" (2010).

Every game, it seems fair to say, can be used as a metaphor for any human behavior, actual or virtual. But chess seems to be the most often used with golf a close second. Why is this the case?

Suppress the "why" and look at how chess and golf are used as metaphors.

Seeing Things From The Middle: Playing the Game of Between seems to involve seeing things from a Middle. Here the analogy to a real world game might be to chess. Novice chess players, playing against experts, sometimes think that they are playing in a different game. The reason, supplied by recent research, is that the experts, employing both parts of the brain, use information about the chessboard in a unique gaming strategy. Whereas the novice chess player "looked directly at the pieces to recognize them, the experts looked on the middle of the boards." xxxv In
other words, the experts were taking in everything on the board by combining information supplied by peripheral vision with a strategic next move.

It would appear that Wittgenstein had something like this in mind in his comments on the lack of a clear view of "the use of our words." "Our grammar (lacks) perspicuous representation...which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases" (*PI*, #122.). In other words, using words and moving chess pieces effectively depends on finding the interrelationships between them—their intermediate cases.

"A" Versus "The": Should we take note of the difference between "a Between" and "the Between?" Should we inform our audience, that is, that "a" signifies a new Between (not mentioned before) and "the" a given one?

But how would we inform the audience? Isn’t it enough to assume that they know the difference?

Are we ever certain what our audience is thinking about? Are we communicating with the audience or disrupting its thinking?

Hierarchy: Can a hierarchy exist among the three parts of a Between? One might imagine this happening if we think of a Between as we do the solar system; as a system in which planets rotate around a central sun. With this analogy we might go on and say that the Middle, as the "sun" of the whole system, supplies energy and direction to at least two of its satellites, the Extremes of a Between.

This might draw attention to the importance of the Middle. But where does this lead us? It might motivate us to look more closely at the Middle as a composite of qualities one can associate with life, light, heat, movement (tides, the circulation
of water through its various stages, creation of new elements for the periodic table
and so on).

Planets, comets and asteroids rotates around a central sun. The sun, in turn,
rotates around the Milky Way which does it own rotating around a mega black hole.

Does this line of reasoning lead to a clearer understanding of the complexity
of a Between?

**Fear of the Infinite** Does a Between, by putting sides on a sequence of
words, show a fear of the unlimited? Do writers (and speakers) fear what language
can do to thinking? Can one employ Betweenness to allay such fear? For
Wittgenstein thinking is fighting against the "bewitching of our intelligence by
means of language" (verhexung Sprache, *PI*, #109) for T. S. Eliot language
always threatens to break the levies of cognitive control: "the intolerable
wrestle/With words and meanings" (*The Four Quartets*).

On the other hand, it seems that language has the potential to allay fear,
especially of what the Greeks call "fear of the infinite," or "all-ness" (*apeirophobia*).
Horace, recall, characterizes the all-ness of death as "un-house-broken"
(indomitaeque morti, *Odes, Liber Alter* XIV). Milton shows us hell as a fiery space
with no boundaries (*Paradise Lost* bk 7). Aristotle, in his unemotional way, demotes
infinity (*apeiron*) from an actuality to a harmless potentiality (*Physics 7.5*).

I am tempted to say this suggests an All-ness into something less than All, a
domesticated Nothingness as Something.

Every statement about fear is an attempt to allay fear?
Does playing the **Game of Between** give us comfort in the face of death, of time *as destroyer*? With time we can easily imagine it as an arrow carrying all of us, along with the cosmos, to a future heat death. Following Gilead (who perhaps follows Aristotle’s footprints into the wilderness of future truth) we might want to call this a "pure possibility. Or is it? Can a heat death be inferred from Newtonian physics? Isn't it true that Chaos Theory questions that assumption?

Time, leading a train of death, decay and destruction, has no intention. We argue with it, plead with it, and ask for its forgiveness—to no effect. But we can, with a thought experiment, remove it temporally from the actual to the virtual realm. —assuming, with Ryan, that fiction is essentially about the virtual.

**Tragedy and Comedy:** "The un-resolvable antinomy in the human subject *between* the infinite and finite produces tragedy; every claim to resolve the antinomy can, in the end, be seen as comic." 

Can this definition be the basis for an extending discussion of the difference *between* tragedy and comedy?

**Mute responder (Speaking Absence):** Everyone talks at some point about the dead or the unborn. In so doing we make an imagined present a material absence. Can we then say that talking about them makes them "mutely respond." Here we might want to say that mute voices, as a third agent between us, sustain our talk. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle raises the question, do the actions of the living affect the dead? (Bk 1, chps 10 and 11). His conclusion? Yes, but in a weak way. In Hemingway's *The Hills Like White Elephants* the unborn child of Jig affects the relationship between her and the American. The male character wants to abort the child. The woman doesn't.
They have "taken sides" on the issue of abortion.

Isn't all this referring to absences a way of going on? Please consider this bit of dialogue between the two characters of *Hills*:

If I do it you won't ever worry?

I won't worry about that because it's perfectly simple.

Then I'll do it. Because I don't care about me….

We can have everything.

No, we can't.

We can have the whole world.

No, we can't.xxxv

The woman's child is yet unborn. Her abortion is only a possibility. Yet the child is present, as Middle, in a story of extreme attitudes. Its presence is heavier, one might say, than the hills of the title.

Is this something more than double deixis? How far, in the interest of going on, can a author take this? Is there a limit to an author making the absent present?

Making the absent present. Isn't this what every epitaph (or elegy) attempts to do? Think of Yeats' poem on Swift's, self-composed, epitaph or Gray's *Elegy In A Country Church Yard*.

**Bracketing Punctuation:** Enclosing words in structures like parenthesis, dashes, brackets and the like seems to invite us to pause and focus on what lies between the enclosing forms. In some texts, for example, *Gulliver's Travels*, many parentheses are signs of revision, of something added on or replaced, In other cases parenthetical
comments seem to be sideway movements of authorial thinking—like a traveler noticing something off to the side of the road (path, walk) s/he is on.

What's in our mind when we write (think about) parenthesis? Creating digressions in the text? Revealing a hitherto secret about ourselves? A sign that, as an author, we are interested in covering all bases?

Can we then say that the overall purpose of parenthetical forms is to reduce uncertainty as to where the author is taking the reader?

Are we, with this Thought Run, digressing from digressions with digressing?

Inertia. "The vis insita, or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting by which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavors to preserve its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a straight line." (Isacc Newton, the first law of motion, Principia Mathematica)

Can we state, as our first "law" of a Between, that its Middle always "endeavors to preserve its present state?" We might take this to mean that the present state of a Middle is timeless because it is changeless. Time, according to Aristotle, follows change (Physics IV, 10-14). But isn't it more plausible to say that the present state of a Middle of the Between is a thing of the past? Like every form of life its present state is always being disrupted, its course changed?

More intuitively, we might conclude feel that it is the Middle of a Between that is more likely to be inert. That the Extremes are always in a state of agitation? A person walking from A to B to C can be said to pass from one Extreme through a Middle to another Extreme. Does h/s pass from a state of inertia to a kinetic state? If h/s dies along the way, should we say h/s has passed into a final present state?
Play the Game of Between as Actual and Virtual. Let us take one step back and consider a possible "problem" of writing (and thinking). Roughly speaking, it is the problem of "using up the actual," of some completed act conditioned by the senses at a particular moment. This phenomenon occurs at many levels of life. Once we have finishing building our house and furnishing it, we have used up one kind of actuality. Similarly with completing a poem or finishing a bottle of wine. Not only are the reasons for writing and drinking used up in the act of writing and drinking but also the form and context of the act in each. One feels that the completed act cannot be revived by information from either the senses or imagination. No new information is available. One might say to oneself "what has to be done is done. There is no more to be done on this account."

In most cases the feeling of the used-up creates the need for reversal, a feedback loop; a way to go back to the time when the actual was in a nascent state, just coming into being, bearing its novelty. One feels the need to find a way to return to the time before the actual became used up. Not a final state of entropy, perhaps, but a gesture toward it.

One needs, in short, a way to revive (and transform) the actual, animate the phoenix from its ashes. On way to accomplish this, it seems fair to say, is by reference to the "virtual." Aristotle was perhaps one of the first to see that much of language, the representations of "what if," is not about the actual, "what is," but about what could be—so his musings on the negative and, more to the point, invention (discovery?) of modal logic. By employing modal verbs, "can,"
"should," "must," the subjunctive and the "if/then" form and the like, one could create a feedback loop between discourse controlled by verbs of actuality, "is," "was," "had been" and the discourse of virtuality. In contemporary modal logic (building on Aristotle in the *Organon*) all it takes to turn a proposition about actuality, p, ("it is raining") into a virtual p ("it might be raining") is to add the possibility operator ◊ to p. In Aristotle, this operation is reversible, in theory, an infinite number of times: p<→◊p.

Plato, referring to his allegory of the cave, might say that the virtual is just another name for misrepresentation; a fake, a simulacra cloaking the false. For others, the dark side of the virtual appears in the consequences of acting on "what could have been but wasn’t." Our fall from Eden comes to mind. What if Eve had not believed the words of the serpent and acted on them? What if Adam had not eaten the forbidden fruit? What if God had been absent during these transactions?

But to Levy and Ryan the virtual is, in Levy’s phrase, ""fecund and powerful":

The virtual, strictly defined, has little relationship to that which is false, illusory, or imaginary. The virtual is by no means the opposite of the real [actual]. On the contrary, it is a fecund and powerful mode of being that expands the process of creation, opens up the future, injects a core of meaning beneath the plentitude of immediate physical presence ([16; qtd Ryan *Narrative as Virtual Reality* 35 [please see endnote #70]).

In a more systematic representation Levy says:
—The relation of the virtual to the actual is one-to-many

—The virtual is not anchored in space and time. Actualization
   [i.e., of the virtual] is the passage from a state of timelessness
   and deterritorialization to an existence rooted in here and
   now [i.e., the actual]. It is an event of contextualization.

—The virtual is an inexhaustible resource. Using it does not
   lead to its depletion (qtd Ryan, p. 25)

The virtual, in other words, gives substance to the absent, the anonymous and the
insubstantial and makes them present in a (possible?) infinite number of places and
in an endless number of forms. In this the example of a game of chess, without end
in its possible moves, comes to mind.

**Is Every Exit an Entrance Elsewhere?** Analogous to a Between is a space, or
spaces, with exits and entrances. The Extremes that bracket the Middle have "doors."
With this, as a thought experiment, we can have, in Bachelard's words, "the entire story
of one life in opening and closing doors…..a primal image." With any given story
authors have their characters enter and exit. Why (and when and how) they enter and
leave give their actions purpose. Add dialogue to appearances and disappearances and
meaning emerges. With every appearance and disappearance *new* information becomes
available. Such information can either add to given information or subtract from it. In a
play, the entrances and exits of the actors as changes in the flow of information to the
audience.

For these, and other reasons, the game of entrances and exits are important for
interpreting the story (play, narrative, plot). So we find, for example, Bachelard's
meditation on these matters. In the course of a discussion of “Doors as Limina,” Claude Gandelman suggesting that scholars, by failing to deal systematically with doors in a literary text (or group of texts), often fail to understand what may be a “metaliterary tale” within the text(s).xxxv For De Sousa, entrances and exit through enclosures encapsulate how Shakespeare, in selected plays, gives individuality to his characters. In the absence of e/e nothing new can appear. Indeed nothing could happen for there would be no ground for the new to happen.xxxv

Opening the lid of a coffin to reveal a vampire (long fingernails, pale flesh, blood around the mouth) introduces us to a specific genre. How does a vampire occupy your house? Not by just walking (flying”) in, but by being invited in. There is always the possibility of a vampire (or two) in or outside your door.

In the video game, "Portals 2" (2011), we are in a virtual dungeon composed of many rooms but supposedly no way out. Deranged robots there threaten to kill us. How to escape? Fortunately, we are equipped with a "portal gun" which we can use to create a tunnel with an exit (through one door) and an entrance (through door) in another wall. Two openings in two different walls are necessary for escape. The first opening will not open until we create the second one.xxxv

We distinguish ourselves from every other thing, object or organism, by "living" in cyberspace. The virtual is not real. But we can pretend that it is real as reality. We are conscious of being conscious of the real and the non-real. Double consciousness makes the virtual, in Levy’s words, "inexhaustible.” We can never use it up. If we happen to use up the real, then we can always go to the virtual.
In the game of exit and entrance we have the possibility of going into, or leaving, the virtual or being in the Middle as virtual—the dungeons of Portals 2 for example, or those in video games of the same "genre."

**The Middle as No Exit:** In his short parable, HE, Kafka represents the Middle has holding the protagonist captive:

He has two antagonists; the first presses him from behind, from his origin. The second blocks the road in front of him. He gives battle to both. Actually, the first supports him in his fight with the second for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but himself as well, and who really knows his intention? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment—and this would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet—he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of His experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other.

Representing the Middle as an unending battle between the past and the future sets up a dialogue of the "we" with the "non-we" and the actual with the virtual—where the actual and the "we" are conditioned by time, space and contingency and the virtual and the "non-we" as the absence of them. Out of time, space and contingency the virtual and the "non-we" are unchanging and always necessary. They are eternal, unlimited, inexhaustible. Beckett's *Godot* comes to mind as a "non-we" in
this sense as do the characters of Satre's No Exit and, of course, Lemuel Gulliver.

There is no one around in the narrative to give them a proper name by which they can be "called" to appear.

**The Fractal Character of a Between.** It seems reasonable to assume that a writer can nest one Between in another. An example might be a narrative in which the life of the protagonist (between birth and death; between success and failure; between divorce and marriage and the like) is embedded in other narratives with protagonists undergoing Between states. Novels that have family members as protagonists, for example, Tristram Shandy, Pride and Prejudice or War and Peace are salient examples.

**The Vertical (Sacred) and the Horizontal (Secular):** In works like Martin Buber's Ich-Du (I-You), St. Augustine's Confessions and Kierkegaard's Either/Or one sees duality as a preparation (or ground) for reaching a third state or conclusion. In the vertical mode the third can be God, faith, fate or a higher power. In the horizontal mode, the third is communion through dialogue with other persons and relations with real world objects.

Let us say that a person goes to a market (say a gardeners market) on Saturday and to church on Sunday. In the market he hears the voice of common concerns, commercial, familial, political and the like. In church h/s might hear, from the parishioners similar concerns. But h/s would likely hear the voice of theological concerns, salvation, redemption, atonement and the like.

Are we justified in claiming that such "concerns" stand as the Middle of two different kinds of Beweens? That the concerns call the Between into being and
ground the difference between them? This might suggest that every public space, accessible to everyone, can be the ultimate ground of all possible Betweens.

**Shades, Shadows, Photon Subtraction:** As Sorenson shows in great detail, shadows (and silhouettes) come into being, by an object, like the leaves of a tree, subtracting photons from a light source, the sun, and the reduced photons falling on a surface (*Seeing Dark Things;* please see endnote #64)

We might call this process "photon subtraction."

The infrastructure of a shadow, in short, is the transit of photons from sun (or some other light source) to a surface through a subtracting (filtering) intermediary. The intermediary, or Middle, then presupposes two other Extremes that initiate and close the process.

It is risky to say what exactly writers like Plato, Shakespeare and Hemingway have in mind with their uses of shadow imagery. Even the best mind reader is bound to come up short. Do they mean for shadows to mean one thing or a plurality of different things? Are there certain unique emotions attached to shadows? Is shadow imagery a way of presenting information *economically?*

Since shadows are real world phenomena should we would expect to find more shadow imagery in realistic fiction than in non-realistic fiction?

At any rate, let us imagine how the **Game of Between** might be played with shadow imagery.

Outside my north window is a beech tree. The sun is up. I look under the tree and I see its shadow. I then look out the south window and see the shadow of a linden tree. The shadow of the beech tree is much heavier and darker than that of
the linden tree. This might suggest that every shadow, depending on the number and distribution of photons, has a different quality and texture than any other possible shadow.

Should I use this visual information in character representations? How can I use it? Suppose I depict character X is sitting in the shadows while A, B and C are in the sun. Should we take this to mean that I have subtracted something from X? That something is absent from h/h? Cognitively, emotionally, physically?

With these remarks in mind, please reflect on Hemingway's use of shadows in this passage from "A Clean Well Lighted Place":

They [the waiters] sat together at a table that was close against the wall near the door of the café and looked at the terrace where the tables were all empty except where the old man sat in the shadow of the leaves of the tree that moved slightly in the wind (CSS 288; emphasis mine)

Shadows cast by the leaves of a tree are typically dappled. In this case, they are also moving “slightly.”

So what is involved in the “making” of dappled shadows? To answer that (or appreciate the difficulty of answering it) we first have to put ourselves in the position of the old man sitting in the shadows cast by the leaves. We are alone, drinking. We have lived a long time and have experienced, and observed, many “dark things,” loneliness, fear, despair and the like. Now suppose we begin, looking at the shadows around us, putting together cause and effect: what is producing the shadows and what is their effect, physically as well as emotionally? We look up and
note that the wind is moving the leaves and look out toward the “electric light” (CSS 288). We conclude that the light is the source for the shadows. (We observe that there is no moon or stars).¹

The shadows, we note, are produced by blocked light—leaves, in this case, being the blocking object. But, since the shadows cast by the leaves, are dappled, we reason that the leaves are blocking only part of the light. We don’t know what species of tree the leaves belong to, but we can hazard the guess, from their size and shape of their shadows, that the “ratio” of dark to light it takes to make a dappled shadow is roughly, 70/30. (The exact ratio would involve the [impossible?] task of counting the number of photons emitted by the street light and subtracting the number of photon that compose the light lying outside, and between, the boundaries of the shadows.)

Can we then say that literary representations of shadows rise from a Game of Between? That it takes at least two Extremes, a light source and a light terminus plus a Middle, to create a shadow? Where the Middle is anything that comes between the Extremes as a photon-subtracting intermediary?

In the Hemingway story the leaves of the trees serve as the intermediary.

**Suspended Animation:** As Mitchell shows in some detail this term has had many uses since the eighteenth centuryxxxv The Royal Humane Society used it to refer to who might be perceived to be dead from drowning; Coleridge saw the effects of the mass media in the “morbid trance” or “suspended animation” of
readers. Roger Dodsworth's "The Reanimated Englishman" (a short story) tells the tale of a man revived after having spent more than a hundred years frozen in ice.

Does this word and concept have a place in a Game of Between? Intuitively, we might let it lead us to a half-way point between living and being dead.

Does it seem odd to you that we can't say in English, unlike Mandarin Chinese say, "deading"? That suspended animation is somewhere between "living" and "deading"?

As discussed by Mitchell suspended animation is essentially "to be alive but appear dead" (109). Does this mean we are not allowed to say "to be dead but appear to be alive"; a statement that seems to indicate a state somewhat like a zombie?

Are we then being asked here to think of time in a queer way?

Liminality. In Latin, limen, has three basic uses. 1) It refers to a threshold, lintel or sill; 2) a house, or dwelling place; 3) a sign of a new beginning. The image that comes to mind with these is one crossing from one state, or place, across a dividing line, into a new, or different, state or stage. Such an image divides easily into a triad, namely, entering/exiting, crossing, entering.

Liminality thus seems to have a family resemblance to our Game of Exit and Entrance and, more generally, to the Game of Between. Liminality, that is, seems to presuppose the possibility of visualizing a door that opens onto a different (perhaps a new) space. We might want to go on a say that the space that one comes from represents one Extreme of a Between. The space one enters is another Extreme. The space between the Extremes is the Middle.
What then are some of the symbolic possibilities here? One might be the expression of fear. The space beyond the door, over the threshold, is unknown and potentially threatening. Or perhaps a land of enchantment lies beyond the door? Or perhaps the space beyond is part of an initiatory rite, entrance into manhood?

The possibilities seem endless.

We can, however, be fairly certain that Liminality, like the Game of Between, always exhibit a temporal use:

The temporal dimension of liminality can relate to moments (sudden events), periods (weeks, months, or possibly years), and epochs (decades, generations, maybe even centuries). Twilight serves as a liminal time, between day and night. The TV show, "The Twilight Zone," where one is 'in the twilight zone, in a liminal nether region of the night' describes this, as "the middle ground between light and shadow, between science and superstition" in one variant of the original series opening. The name is from an actual zone observable from space in the place where daylight or shadow advances or retreats about the Earth. Noon and, more often, midnight can be considered liminal, the first transitioning between morning and afternoon, the latter between days.xxxv

**Between as Coordination:** We often say that X and Y are coordinates. Or, more generally, "coordinate X with Y"; that is, as a directive. For example, advances in medicine is coordinate with social progress; that the temporality of a living human body correlates with smoking, being a male, eating red meat and the like.
Here we seem to have Extremes of a Between acting as coordinates. If so, does this speak against what we have called the (presumed) **Asymmetry** of the Extremes? That the Extremes are never equal in quality or quantity?

Has the Middle disappeared here? That there is no ground of similarity between X and Y coordinates? Is the Middle, as it were, in the shadows, there but concealed from a mind not trained to uncover it?

**The Immediate.** No mediation, no Middle of two Extremes, say of existence and non-existence. No interval between now and then, this entrance and that exit, this side and that side. Running through much of T. S. Eliot’s poetry, especially *The Four Quartets*, is what can be called attempts to represent the "Immediate."

Presumably, insofar as time figures heavily in the poems, Eliot intends for the **Immediate** to stand in as a replacement for time realized (since Aristotle?) as movement between a "before" and "after." For Eliot, the **Immediate**, in other words, is just another term for "no-time." "Time past and time future are perhaps both contained in time present" ("Burnt Norton").

But if all time is reduced to the present moment, what does this do to representations of memory?

Here we seem to be faced with something like St. Augustine’s paradox about time; namely, one only knows what time is as long as one doesn’t ask what time is (Quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat; scio si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio [*Confessions* 11, 14]).

How do we attempt to understand the **Immediate**? Only by not asking what it is? When we do ask then we seem to be surrounded by a cloud of negatives, one
that exhaust not only its actuality but also its possibility. We want to say that we are in a stage of no-time before the Big Bang.

Visual depictions of the **Immediate**, we may imagine, are more effective than linguistic ones. Suppose, for example, we want to show the unbridgeable gap (in status and value) between the Queen of England and her husband, the Duke of Edinburgh. Here we might want to pose them as the German photographer, Thomas Struth, does. He shows them sitting on a couch. The Duke sits to the right of the Queens. He sits in half shade, she in full light. Most of the features on the left side of the Duke's face are obscured by shadows. He wears a dark suit. The Queen, in a bright colored dress, seems to come forward toward the viewer; the Duke does the opposite; he seems to retreat into the background.

Their bodies don't touch. The Queen's right hand lies in her lap. Darkness half-conceals the Duke's left arm The space between them lies in heavy darkness.³³v

**Dry Wall Versus Wet Wall:** Can we say that what makes separate parts into a whole is entitled to be called a Between? If so, then what brings parts of a dry wall together is gravity and friction. But for a wet wall we would have to say it's mortar. Does it make any difference that one is invisible (dry wall) and the other perceptual (wet wall)? If there is a difference then it has to be duration and looks. Which will last the longer? Which is the more attractive?

Should we add "fun to make" to this mix?
Questioning: The linguist, John Lyons, says that questions result from "the grammaticalization of the feature of doubt." He then goes on to say that the essential thing about a question is the distinction between "posing" a question and "asking" one (p.755). The difference between "posing" and "answering" a question is essentially what the questioner expects from h/h addressee. With the first, posing, we simply "externalize our doubt." We may not expect the addressee to answer the question or we may think it is unanswerable. With asking, on the other hand, we both externalize our doubt and expect the addressee to answer the question.

If Questioning can be seen as a Game of Between then we have to make several assumptions. One is the assumption of Thirdness. Can Questioning be divided into three asymmetric, but intelligible, parts? Will this division adversely affect the ability of Questioning to express Doubt?

All the languages I have some knowledge of (Greek, Latin, German, French, Italian, English) have a three terms (three family members) that might give some hints about how to answer the question of division. English, classical Greek and German have, for example, the following forms (It should be said that these are not the only members of the Questioning family that perform the same functions)

(Please note we are asking, not posing, a question here.)

Asking (erotan/fragen); Question (erotensis/Frage); Answering (antworten; antilegein). Asking, it might be said, is a Preparation for expressing Doubt. Question is the expression of Doubt and Answering is (ideally) the settling
of **Doubt**. In the context of the **Game of Between, Question** would stand as the Middle, a halfway "house" between the uncertainty of **Asking** and the certainty of **Answering**.

One analogy here to the tripartite structure of **Questioning** might be problem; discussion of the problem; solution. With **Asking** we state the problem. With **Question** we discuss the details of the problem and with **Answering** we state (or suggest) a solution to the problem. This, at any rate, is a procedure often followed by Aristotle.

The rules of a game can be seen as constraints on how we play the game. Constraints tell us what we must not do to keep playing the game. In golf, we must not neglect to record every *intentional* contact of the club with the ball as a stroke. In chess we must not move a pawn more than one space and never diagonally. We must not, in a card game, draw aces from the middle of the desk—*und so weiter*.

Language gives us warrant for saying that it has three possible ways to express **Doubt**:

1) Yes/No. Here we ask if X exists: "Is the universe getting hotter?"

2) Wh- Here we can "run" X through a series of information seeking forms: "How do we know that X is getting hotter? Why would it be getting hotter" and so on.

3) Indirect: "I wonder if the universe is getting hotter."
The main difference a question and other utterances, commands, statements and the like is the expression of doubt. Its presence is there in every question, yes/no ("is the universe getting larger") and in wh-questions ("what," "who" and so on). The only exception is the so-called "rhetorical question," one that contains its own answer.

Does the Game of Between play into any of this? Can playing the Game help us to understand how we express, and settle, doubt? In order for questioning to qualify as the Game it would minimally have to exhibit the triadic structure of the Game, two Extremes and a Middle. In addition the Middle would have to function as either a separating or combing space and as that of novelty.

Can we then say that the triad, ask/question/answer, fits the bill? "Ask," we might say, stands as a Preparation to express doubt; "question" as the expression of doubt and "answer" as (sometimes) the settling of doubt. In the context of Entrances and Exits, we might want to say with asking we "open the door" to the "house of doubt"; with the question we enter the house and with the answer we leave it. But this assumes that the question is answerable. If it turns out to be unanswerable, we may enter the house of doubt but we never leave it.

Within the house are various kinds of rooms with different windows. Let us go on to say that each window represents a specific kind of doubt—doubt about what we sense outside the window. In the first room are the windows that raise doubt about the existence about X. This kind of doubt grammatizes as yes/no
questions, "does X exist?"; "Should I be afraid of X?" In the second room are windows that opens up gaps in our information about X: "What is X?"; Where did X come from?" "Why is X there?" Ignorance of X here grammatizes who-questions. In the third, and last room, are windows that make us curious about X: "I wonder what that is." "I wish I knew more about that." Here we grammate indirect questions.

We said above, following Wittgenstein, that there can be doubt only if there is non-doubt. Some things have to be exempt from doubt. In order to enter the house of doubt we first have to not question that the house exists, that it can be entered and (sometimes) left.

Have we played the Game of Questions with the "rules" of the Game of Between? That is to say, do the Extremes of the Game correspond with entering into doubt (ask) and exiting with non-doubt (answer)? Between these Extremes does doubt stand as the Middle? As rooms in the house of doubt?

Some people live a "question driven life."xxxv

The Fate of The Game of Between. Several scenarios has been proposed for the ultimate fate of the universe. One is heat death or final entropy. The temperature of the universe will eventually become the same in all its parts. Consequently, no work can be done. Another, more recent theory, is that the universe is expanding so
fast (faster than expected) that all its parts will lose contact with each other. Eventually, all energy will be gone. Behind it all, as cause, is dark matter.xxxv

Is this a reasonable expectation for Betweenness? That its parts, the Extremes and the Middle, will eventually drift apart into dark isolation? Or will the parts collapse together in what cosmologists call the Big Crunch, leaving no spatiotemporal distinction between them?

"Overhead, without any fuss, the stars were going out."xxxv

**Bibliography:** Here are a few more items that show the effects of writers playing the Game of Between—and who were published for doing so.


5. "3" a 2011 German film by Tom Tyker. Three characters, one female and two males, Hanna, Simon and Adam. Adam is the common lover of Simon and Hanna.
6. St. Paul: For to me, living is Christ and dying is gain. If I am to live in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me, and I do not know which I prefer. I am hard pressed between the two: my desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better, but to remain in the flesh is more necessary for you (emphasis mine). *Philippians* 1:21-24.

7. Kafka’s HE: He has two antagonists; the first presses him from behind, from his origin. The second blocks the road in front of him. He gives battle to both. Actually, the first supports him in his fight with the second for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But It is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but himself as well, and who really knows his intention? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment—and this....would require a night darker than any night has ever been yet—he will jump out of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of His experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other xxxv


Now smile.
The art of being a good guest is knowing when to leave.