BETWEENNING: THE GOD OF EXPERIENCE, COGNITION AND COMPOSITION

gene washington, Utah State University
BETWEENNING: A GOD OF EXPERIENCE,

COGNITION AND COMPOSITION

Thought-Runs For Writers-Always-Reading

Gene Washington

gene.washington@usu.edu

(435) 752 441

*By the intermediate in the object I mean that
which is equidistant from each of the extremes*

(Nicomachean Ethics 1105b 29-30)

The subject of this text is a god (among other things) of thinking, representing and composition. Its name is sometimes "between," often "in-between," then "go-between" or "middle" (and others of the same "family"). It is, to take some salient examples, the god of Goldilocks (her "just right" judgment), of Aristotle's the golden mean, of Horace's "in medius res" (into the middle of things) and innumerable others. Its nature is protean, much like that of the Greek god, Proteus (Πρότεος). Like Proteus, this god can be elusive and can take many forms. To put its forms to work, make them useful, a writer, speaker, painter etc. must, as with Proteus, "catch" them, hold them fast, and make them h/h servant. In one of Virgil's stories about Proteus (the fourth *Georgic*), Aristaeus, son of Apollo, captures Proteus and
forces him to explain why the honey bees are dying. Proteus, after giving the reason for their death, stops the dying and increases the number of bees.

From the perspective of writing, speaking and reading, this god creates both order and disorder (anarchy, entropy, chaos and so on). With betweenning one can connect one thing to another to create a unity. But one can also separate one thing from another to un-unify a unity. If there is no in-between, then there can be no order. But one can also, by eliminating the anxieties of opposites, find tranquility, peace of mind:


An example the absence of a between are the "things" treated by Yeats in "The Second Coming." Please particularly note the line where he says that things "fall apart" because the "centre does not hold":

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere

Washington

Game of Between
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity. \textit{(My emph)}

To generalize from Yeats' poem: One creates order by unifying two or more "opposites" with a Between. Disorder, on the other hand, comes into being by removing the "centre" of any unity created by a Between. Order and disorder are thus relative to things, events, processes and the like. We say that these things have unity if they are "coherent," "intelligible," "whole," "congruent" and so on. On the other hand for things un-unified we say they are "juxtaposed," "jumbled," a "mess," "a heap" and so on (For Aristotle on these matters please read Part VIII of \textit{The Metaphysics}).

Please note that by the phrase, "create order and disorder," I do not mean to claim that betweening creates order and disorder in an extra-textual universe. All my reference here to such creation are to inter-textual matters. Every text, I think it good to remember, is a literary artifact, a thing made solely out of words, the relations between them, the representations they give and the patterns they make. Words of a text may well, as most philosophers of language and linguists say, have referents outside the text. But that is far too complicated a topic to discuss here (please see John Hawthorne and David Manley, \textit{The Reference Book}. Oxford UP, 2012).

It will become obvious to you in these pages that the author takes Plato and Aristotle as the two indispensable practitioners of Betweening. Go and
imitate, if you will, their uses of it in books like The Republic and Symposium and The Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics.

Here, then, are examples of "catching and holding" the changeable nature and uses of words like, "center," "between," "the intermediate," or the "middle." Only by such means can one put such form to use in the composition of the written (or spoken) text. Here this "catch and hold" process goes by quoting many different authors’ use of betweenning. In the first part of this text, The Game of Between, I borrow a salient writing technique of Wittgenstein plus his notion of language as a "game" " (Sprachspiel). In the second part of the text, The Addenda, I list examples of betweenning and suppress lengthy commentary on them in order to allow the reader the freedom to determine (or meditate on) what their uses are—or can be always with the focus on order or disorder as the end result.

In the third, and final part, From Asking to Answering, I describe how order or disorder, can be created by questions. Questions, like betweenning, has two "faces," one looking "back" or "left" and one looking "forward" (or "right). For readers knowledgeable in Roman religion (and mythology) such two-faces might put them in mind of Janus—as described, in part, in Wikipedia:

In ancient Roman religion and myth Janus is the god of beginnings and transitions thence also of gates, doors, passages, endings and time. He is usually depicted as having two

Washington 4

Game of Between
faces, since he looks to the future and to the past. The Romans named the month of January in his honor.

The word "betweenning," I realize is an inelegant one. But it does express my belief that we should, in all cases, think of forms like "between," "intermediate" and the like as verb-like. As verbs are sometimes characterized as the "sun" of the grammatical solar system, so is betweenning a similar controlling force in any textual context (Wallace Chafe, The Meaning and Structure of Language).

One of my readers has suggested that this text resembles a study in semantics—the study of meaning. If so, it would belong to the "family" of studies that includes I. A Richards and C. K. Ogden, The Meaning of Meaning (London: 1923); C. E Osgood and P. H. Tanenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1957); and, perhaps more importantly, Trevor Eaton, Literary Semantics (Ely, Cambridgeshire UK: Melrose Press, 2010).

But I only mention the above in passing. It is a mute point as to what category of rhetoric or linguistics betweenning belongs. The main thing at stake here is its usefulness to the writer (or speaker) in composing the text and to the reader in judging the quality of order (or disorder) communicated by the text.

As you read, you will often find the phrase "textual betweens." The word "textual" means that forms of betweenning can be taken as representations (or Washington Game of Between
"transfers") from our sensory experiences of the world and ourselves to the pages of a text. Nothing, it seems fair to say, is more plausible than to think that there is a relationship, and interaction, between language and what may be called "the presence of the body," as both whole or parts of a whole. A question this provokes concerns the nature, the how and why, of the relationship and interaction. That is, what biological features should we focus on in order to trace, and understand, the linguistic correlates of the body's presence? Caplan suggests, for example, that body:language relationships should be understood as "self-referent loops," a processes that allow us to "know" that we are capable, through language, of experiencing ourselves both as subject and object (Language: Structure, Processing and Disorder). For Chomsky, there are biological invariants of our species that govern the form and function of language. The sensory system, after a preliminary analysis of sensory data (of our bodies and the world), feeds the data to the brain which then shapes it into a "universal grammar," one underlying all languages. In his formulation, a linguistic process called "recursion" is the essence of such "grammar" (Syntactic Structures). Lenneberg, Bickerton and others, playing this tune a few octaves higher, say we can only map the body:language correlates by a deep study of the evolution of the body and mind and their interactions with reality (The Biological Foundations of Language; The Roots of Language).

The main issue for them is our biological survival and with developing linguistic strategies for furthering that end. This evolution challenge appears primarily in the increased complexity of the verb through history (Bickerton).
I want to suggest, with betweenning, we have a high probability that there exists a correlation between the specific way the eye works, the "accommodation convergence" mechanism, and betweenning. Words like "between, "middle" and the like then represent what the eye "accommodates" itself to, whatever lies between two other things, be they objects, events, or constructs of the mind (see, for example, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1444-0938.1962.tb01603.x/abstract).

One can not only see, feel and hear forms of betweenning but also imagine and "hallucinate" them.

More details on this can be found online, under the name of "Game of Between," at http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/washington_game_of_in_between.htm

In his introduction to Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, (a Penguin Publication) Christopher Ricks rises the problem every writer knows: where do I begin? Is there a beginning, not just a place to start, but the right place?

I propose to start, like Hamlet, with the most protean, and most powerful, pair of verbs in all languages, "to be" and "not to be." Is it better to represent things from the "middle," if it exists, or is it better to start from the (at least) two things separated by the "middle" or a gap? If there is a gap between two extremes when I start, should I construct a bridge, an intermediary, between them? What would be the purpose in this?

The purpose of Hamlet's "to be" "not to be" is to provide the reader (or
audience) with a roadmap of two possible, and universal, thought runs. These "runs" then continue with the progeny verbs of "is" with ones like "to sleep," "to die" "to go" and so on—"progeny" because every verb in every language presupposes a "to be" verb.

Every (numbered) thought run here rests, because of "to be, " on the assumption of existence and its offspring, location and duration. If X exists, then X must exist somewhere and have a certain time-span.

So what is a thought run? Mini-thought experiments that move, not in a linear way, but one step forward, one back and one to the side, slightly askew.

Please notice that this text, with the common appearance of betweenning, is self-referential—or, if you like, recursive. It uses betweenning to discuss betweening.

**THE GAME OF BETWEEN**

Abbreviations in the following are:

NYT (*The New York Times*)

TLS (*The Times Literary Supplement*)

NYR (*The New York Review of Books*)

NY (*The New Yorker*)

Now please consider these examples of betweenning:

A. The Mirage of a Space *Between* Nature and Nurture. i

B. As in so many of her poems, (Elizabeth) Bishop brings us to such a
place of utter poise, balancing between the real and the ideal...between the dreamt-of and the impossible, between love and loss; between sleep and waking, between solitude and communion

C. Edgelands in England are for the most part the zone of the in-between, places neither urban nor rural, often marked by desire paths, dead cars and hawthorn trees.

D. Between the idea/And the reality/Between the motion/And the act/Falls the Shadow (T. S. Eliot "The Hollow Men.")

E. Present state, past state and the space in-between.

F. Don't mess with Mr. In-Between.

```
BETWEEN
  □   |   \
Extreme   Middle   Extreme
(Center)

(Before)   (Now)   (After)
(Past)   (Present)   (Future)
(Periphery)   (Core)   (Periphery)
(Outer Wall)   (Hub)   (Outer Wall)
(Husk)   (Core)   (Husk)
(Peel)   (Core)   (Peel)
(X)   (***))   (Y)
```

Washington

Game of Between
Where words in parenthesis are, depending on their referent, alternate terms for Extremes and the Middle. The last item in this list, X/***Y, stands as a model for a mind representing absence, ignorance, or silence—in essence, the inability to find an existing Middle that would combine X and Y into a whole—or give them a value.

Let us start our Thought Runs.

1. Searching for a Middle: We are the species always searching. We search our memories, *ala* Proust, for what is lost or dimly remembered. We search for answers to questions. A few of us have searched for what may not exist. To continue
the search for what may not be we put our trust in the *possibility of existence* of that we search for.

If we don’t find what we are searching for we sometimes leave behind a record of our search—phases of our search, sometimes forward, sometimes back and often to the side, somewhat skewed. Such, it seems, is the case, for example, with Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and a recent article (below) in the NYT.

According to Werner Jaeger, an Aristotelian scholar, the *Metaphysics* is a "new discipline...the science that we are seeking. In contrast to all other sciences it starts not from a given subject-matter but from the question whether its subject-matter exists." v

What Aristotle was searching for was "being as being" (*ens*). The search continues today (2013) with philosophers and some mathematicians that...
consider themselves searchers in pursuit of a "thing" that would unify, and explain, everything.

What Aristotle "left behind," a record of his search, turned out to be one of the most influential works in western history.

In NYT article, the Harvard physicist, Lisa Randall, describes the present day search for the so-called "God Particle," or Higgs Boson. The article is in the form of an interview with Randall. The context is a coming report from the Large Hadron Collider (L.H.C), near Geneva, as to whether or not the I.H.C has found the Higgs Boson.

Here is an excerpt from the article:

Q: What is the Higgs and why is it important?

A: First of all, there is a Higgs mechanism, which is ultimately responsible for elementary particle masses...essentially something like a charge...permeates the vacuum, the state with no particles.

Q: How will we know it when we find it?

A: In the simplest implementation of the Higgs mechanism, we know precisely what the properties of the Higgs boson should be....Knowing the interactions (with the Higgs mechanism) we can calculate how often the Higgs boson should be produced

and the ways in which it should decay.

Q: What does its (the Higgs boson) mass make?
A: No one thinks the Higgs is the final word ...(about) the theory that describes the most basic elements of matter and the forces through which they interact.

Q: Is the L. H. C (the Large Hadron Collider near Geneva) a flop if we don't find the Higgs boson?

A: The great irony is that not finding a Higgs boson would be spectacular from the point of view of particle physics, pointing to something more interesting than the simple Higgs model.

(Emphasis mine)

"Not finding" the Higgs boson more "interesting" than finding it? Why? Because it keeps one searching. Randall's and Aristotle's representation of searching are essentially alike. A search as searching, not finding, is the real issue.

Isn't this true of Searching for a Middle? That if we don't find a Middle that will unify Extremes, that we at least should leave a record of our search behind?

Call it a basic human condition? Or is dilemma a better word?

(Please see below The Immediate, The Unknown Middle, Negation).

2. 3D Space of a Between; I want to say that we must think of a Between as a virtual space of three dimensions. It is virtual because it has no identity as one thing. But at the same time it is the ground of things (events, processes) that do possess an identity. The virtual, like a stem cell, is Washington Game of Between
"pluripotent." It has the potential to be the genesis of all other cells in the body, bone, brain, muscle and so on. (Please see Actual/Virtual, below).

Thinking of a Between as a virtual 3D space is useful because of the differences it establishes for members of the space. Here the image that comes to mind is the nucleus of a cell. Lodging within it are chromosomes, which, in turn, contain genes and molecules that regulate the behavior of genes. Each is different from the other because of its structure, position in the nucleus, and function. Following this analogy, we can say that the members of a Between, what we are calling Extremes and a Middle, likewise differ in structure, position and function.

Again, as with the nucleus of a cell, we can say that differences arise from performing, or mis-performing, functioning properly where such function can be briefly defined as what work it has done in the past and what we expect it to do now and in the future. For example, members of a cell has certain tasks to perform in order for the cell to reproduce itself as exactly as it has been. If they perform in an improper way, they may produce cancerous cells. In the same way, if the members of a Between act in an improper way then they may impede the Flow of information in a text. vii (Please see Flow of Information, p.15).

Perhaps a diagram, and a quotation from Carlo Levi, will help clarify possible uses of a Between within a virtual 3D space:
Let us suppose, first, that a Between, or a series of Betweens, can operate within the boundaries ABCD. Next, let us suppose, even though the figure itself is 2D, that it can represent a 3D space. Suppose further that 0, signifying the Middle of a Between, is the position of a Betweening Mind (Please see "Mind" in Note on Notation, p. 67).

ABCE, we find it tempting to say, are "directions" in which the Betweening Mind can move, back and forth, or make stationary observations. In most cases, Mind encounters different objects that can be "sensed" in each direction. Sensing different objects gives a different identity to ABCD. In the spaces created by AC, CB, BD and DA stand objects as potential Betweens for the Betweening Mind.

Why does the Mind create Betweens? Plainly, to control Flow of Information which a Receiving Mind understand, ideally, as reliable information.

By moving, back and forth, along AB and CD, Mind opens up a 2D space. To open a 3D space, Mind has to rotate itself inside the space made by the convergence of AB:CD. This means that what is present to Mind at one stage of rotation is absent at another; what Mind "senses," for example, along A at time2 becomes absent (missing) at time3, present at time4, absent at time5 and so on.
2D space may be compared to following a straight road that has only two termini. 3D space, by contrast, is more like a forking road. An infinite number of termini, lying in all possible directions, are possible.

Should we also imagine ABCD as a system orbiting 0?

Please consider this example of a Betweening Mind (the narrator at the diagrammatic 0 position) opening up a 3D space by rotating its gaze. This passage is from Carlo Levi's *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (p. 167 *op. cit.*) Levi is describing a scene in the village of Grassano

To right and left, above and below, there were only alleys paths, and flights of wide steps running *between* the peasant huts. These huts were even poorer and dirtier than those of Gagliano. Here there were no vegetable gardens or orchards around the houses.

Can we say that looking up and down, right and left, are forms of Stacking? Is Stacking evidence of a 3D space?

Here we might want to raise the question, "what lies *between* "right" and "left" and "above" and "below"? Say, *between* the "alley paths" and "flights of wide steps"? Perhaps the reason the narrator ignores these Betweens is because he wants to make certain things, for example, the "alley paths, the "huts," the lack of "vegetable gardens" salient in the scene? (Please see Salience, p. 10).
Is there any justification for suggesting that there may be a space 

*between* 2D and 3D which is neither one: does an equation like \((x^2-y^2)=(x+y)(x-y)\) exhibit this state? Or is it totally tautological?

3. Switching: By their functions, to direct, re-direct, prevent flow back, switches constitute an In-Between. Getting data to a particular location, electricity to a fridge, a train to its destination, all depend on switches. In some sense we can say that doors, corridors and stairs perform switching functions for someone moving through a house.

So what about switches for textual Flows of Information? Here I'm inclined to say that writers use divisions in a text, for example, paragraphs, sections and chapters, to "switch" to a different topic, introduce a new character or replace one kind of narration, say the description of weather, with dialogue.

Or, more generally, one might replace one kind of information with another kind in order to maximize innovation and forestall (or reduce the possibility of) monotony.

4. Salience. From Latin, *salire*, "to leap." The word establishes, along with many others, a three-way relationship between mind, concept and reality (or Context, p. 60). If the context is military, then to be salient signifies an installation that sticks out toward the enemy. If the contest is a tragic play, then death, or a foreshadowing of it, will usually be salient.

In most cases, we surmise, that the Middle of a Between is the feature that "leaps out." I say often throughout this text that it is self-referential.
uses itself as an example of Betweening as both whole and the parts of the whole. When we Between we make (or at least attempt to make) Betweening salient, especially the Middle of a Between. Here the analogy might be to the verb. In the linguistic solar system, the verb is the sun. Other parts, nouns, adjectives and the like are merely satellites of the verb. The verb largely determines what other parts of speech can, or cannot, do.

5. The Verb: I am inclined to suggest that in the common SVO syntactical pattern the V (verb) can be taken as the Middle of a Between. But how would we describe its function? As add-on information? Information added to our first conception of the subject (S).

Take, for example, the sentence "Jack loves Jill." Before we get to "loves" we know very little about Jack. We don't know how he stands with other persons. We don't even know if he is human. "Jack" is, after all, a possible name for a tool. On this view, we might want to say that the verb, by informing us that "Jack" is a person, forestalls an erroneous judgment about "Jack." "Loves" informs us, although in a minimal way, that "Jack" does not refer to a mechanism for lifting, or rotating, objects.

Negating a judgment about X is as effective as affirming something about X. 6. The Hands. Imagine what it would like for us if evolution (or God) had not equipped us with hands, what Aristotle calls the "tool of tools" (orgonon ou orgononi) By reasoning analogically, we can say that the hands are as the soul is to the body and the senses to the things sensed (On the Soul, III, part VIII).

Washington

Game of Between
Say we hold X in our left hand and strike it with our right hand—or, of course, hold in the right hand and strike it with the left. May we take it for an analogy of what a verb "does" for an object? What if there is no X to strike? Say a piece of wood or a flint stone? In that case, the hands remain separate, like the Extremes of a Between without a Middle.

Again, the negative way of reasoning is essential to definitions of X—or even exemplifications of X.

7. Mental Time Travel. There is reliable evidence that animals, as well as humans, think ahead. Chimps in zoos have been observed to collect stones to later throw at visitors to their cages. In order to collect beetles from a tree, members of the crow family manipulate sticks held in their mouth. Chess instructors sometimes advise students of the game to "think (at least) three moves ahead." In order to make par, golfers have an image of three different clubs, the driver, wedge and putter.

"A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be" (A statement attributed to Wayne Gretzky, the hockey player).

Mental time travel is essential to first person narrative. In this example please notice the repetition of "I would...." Michael Murphy, the narrator, is playing golf with two other persons and planning his next moves:

When frustration grew to the breaking point during a round of golf I would do either one of two things—get ostentatiously slap-happy and hit my shots in any direction as if it were the Washington Game of Between
outing that was important, or play with concentrated fury.

I went into the latter mode on hole number four—I would show them. Paying that way, I would think of Ben Hogan…. 

I would begin an interior conversation, or rather a stream of incantations that had as their goal the willing of the ball to the target (Golf in the Kingdom, pp. 27-28; my emphasis)

The Game of Between begins, and ideally ends, when mental time travels starts and stops. Minimally, the player recalls to mind (or images) the position of X, its capabilities (what it can do) and its goal. H/s images not only what is here and there but also what must come between here and there. In a dialogue speakers must, in order to sustain the dialogue, "insert" their own mind into the consciousness of the other: "What is he/s thinking? "What does h/s know?" "Does h/s know that I'm inserting my mind into h/h consciousness?" The term often used for this activity is "recursion." Essentially, this involves communicating by embedding linguistic structures within other structures, noun phrases, for example, in other noun phrases: "Jill loves Jack" non-recursive; "Jill, who lives to ski, loves Jack," recursive. ix

On the golf course, the betweeness between the tee and hole typically includes hazards like trees, the rough and a sand trap or two. The archetypical Night-Sea Journey, central to Jungian psychology, is another example. The between home and non-home is a place of danger and risking taking.

Washington

Game of Between
Sir Gawain's journey, in the Medieval poem, to the Green Knight's abode is through a pathless wilderness populated by wild beasts.

Conceivably one could construct characters, having different capacities for mental time travel, and put them in opposition to each other. Perhaps character A, for example, would be able to think three moves ahead but character B something less than that. Differentiating characters would then start from how far they can travel to the past and future. Is this the case with many of Shakespeare contrasting types, Caliban and Propero, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, or Falstaff and Prince Hal?

Is there a correlation here between thinking and moving in a two-dimensional space versus those in a three-dimensional one? When we say that X is "well-rounded" are we making such a correlation? That we have left a two-dimensional space behind? Without forgetting that a two-dimensional space supports a three-dimensional one? Don't we have more options on how and what to think and where to move in the latter?

Two dimensional space, as a subtraction from three dimensional space, robs us of possibility that there is a third possibility, an alternate way of thinking or doing.

On this point Wittgenstein states:

To say that between two points a straight line is—

geometrically—

always possible means: the proposition 'The points...
lie on a straight line’ is an assertion about the position of the points only if more than 2 points are involved.\textsuperscript{x}

"My every third thought is of my grave" (Prospero, \textit{The Tempest}, V, ii)

8. Time: How we think about Betweenness seems to involve how we think about (divide, respond, escape from) time. For Mircea Eliade, for example, one can only understand the human condition from the perspective of an "in-between time." Before "now" was the "in those days" time (\textit{in illo tempore}) and after "now" will be "that time" (he future or \textit{illud tempus}). "Now" stands as the Middle of a Between.

So what is the nature of a temporal Between? For Eliade it is mainly a time of suffering; a locus of the "terror of history" and a motivating force for attempts to annihilate time by means of rituals and festivals.\textsuperscript{xi}

Eliade, a Christian, believes that faith in God is the only escape from history, and consequently, eternal suffering—in effect, freedom from Betweenness.

I suggest here that there are many other (secular?) interpretations one can give to the between time, ones commonly exploited by writers. This assumes that we should avoid looking for a hierarchy of interpretations for it. All interpretations are equal in value. All interpretations are also problematic, subject to revision, expansion or rebuttal.
9. Flow of Information: In an interview with *The New Yorker*, Tom Stoppard (the playwright) makes this observation about his writing practice:

> It's about controlling the flow of information—arriving at the right length and the right speed and in the right order….if the audience is made to do not enough work, they resent it without knowing it. Too much and they get lost. There's a perfect pace to be found. And a perfect place that is different for every line of the play.\textsuperscript{xii}  

Is this one reason language users have invented the Game of Between? If so, then the image that comes to mind is that of a pipe of finite length; one that controls the flow of liquids. At each end of the pipe there is a valve to open and close the flow. The Stoppardian variables of information flow, speed, order and quantity, would be the result of how the "valves" are managed.

Can we say that such management depends on the intention and the skill of the operator of the "valves"? The skill and intention of the writer with the flow of information?

Please notice that Stoppard plays the Goldilocks version of the Game of Between (the Middle as "just right"). This comes with his remarks on the audience's reception of information. If they don't do "enough work" with the information, they "resent it without knowing it." If they do "too much" work they "get lost." Between these two Extremes there lies the "perfect pace."
In what follows I allow the Extremes of a Between to represent both a moving (temporal) and non-moving (non-temporal) Between. A "before" and "after" typically conditions a moving Between; or, as Aristotle has it, a "now" of time that moves from earlier to later. Linguistic representations of time-cycles like the seasons, equinoxes, phases of the moon and the like employ such a moving "now." A non-moving "now" is essentially an arrest of time as process. "Dry," for example, represents the arrest of "wet;" night the arrest of day, and all the properties that make it day, and so on. "Now" is still "now." But it is one cut off from time.

But the boundary between moving and non-moving "now" is fuzzy. One can often find examples in which the movement of time seems to be episodic, now appearing, now vanishing:

Riss and Woodhead suggest a three-way dynamic *between*

the individual and the social mediated through religious symbols. The reciprocal flow seldom remains *static* because the connections—and disconnections—*between* self, society and symbols alter as emotional ordering is continuously produced and reproduced with adaptations to changing circumstances.

Extremes have many names, "limits," "borders," "demarcation," "boundaries" and expressions like "as far as we can go," "the extent of my reach," "the scope of our inquiry" and the like.
We, and other animals, mark our territory. We all know where our boundaries are. When we leave the center and go to the boundaries of our territory our mortality rate goes up.

The Game of Between is, like language and mathematics, a human invention. It does not present reality (whatever that is). It represents reality, largely by putting constraints on it. And what is the effect of a linguistic constraint? A form of tunnel vision. What you are seeing is only a small part of what's going on, inside and outside you. Perhaps these lines will clarify this a bit more:

Beware of having a plan.

Your gaze is focused on the plan.

That’s the moment when things start happening,

Just outside your range of vision.

So what should we expect from the Middle of a Between? In what follows I want to explore the possibility of the Middle being and doing three things; namely, showcasing novelty (the new), separating or bringing together (mediating) the Extremes. The Middle, in short, may be said to have, at times, an instrumental function.

Presenting novelty, I suggest, is the main work of the Middle. In fact, the other two doings of the Middle, separating (repulsing) and combining (attracting) can be the ground of novelty. Because we separate, or combine, X and Y, we set up the condition for the Middle-as-new. xv
We may take the example of Goldilocks and the Three Bears as a paradigmatic example of the protagonist of a story finding, and showcasing, the Middle as new—the "just right" porridge, chair and bed.

But isn’t it true that we can showcase the Middle as the "typical?" The Extremes as the "atypical"? Think of the triad, None/SOME/All. Don’t we hear folks using SOME, more than None or All, as an expression for the "typical"?

"Based on the true story of Jung, Freud and the patient who came between them." Description of movie, "A Dangerous Method," which opened in LA and NYC 23 November 2011. Stars Keira Knightley (patient); Viggo Mortensen (Freud) and Michael Fassender (Jung).

10. Center of Gravity: I want to say, following an analogy from physics, that the Middle has much in common with the Center of Gravity of X. But what does this mean? In one representation it implies that the Middle is the point of potential energy in a Between. Releasing the potential energy of a Middle, converting it into kinetic energy, might then to be said to occur when a writer-always-reading plays the Game of Between. The Middle, that is, acts on the Extremes of a Between as a conversion of potential energy to kinetic energy. It causes something to act or become intelligible.

The potential energy of springs is to stretch. The kinetic energy of the springs is the action of stretching. One restores potential energy to the springs
by allowing them to return to their initial (un-stretched) state. No energy is lost.

Potential energy can be said to keep the heavily bodies in a stable rotation around each other. It thus becomes a way of explaining and clarifying what is happening there—as in a report about the planet Kepler 16b orbiting two stars.xvi

Is it too much of a stretch to claim that the Middle keeps the Extremes of a Between in a stable orbit around the Middle?

11. Copia: Here I trace some of the footprints of Wittgenstein's sense of unanswerable but meaningful questions. Mixed in with this are my own uses of the Game of Between and certain elements of classical rhetoric, especially as interpreted by Erasmus in his work On Copia (1512)xvii Please recall that On Copia contains hundreds of ways of saying, "I was so happy to receive your letter." Erasmus asks the reader, in short, to strive for as much variety as possible. Why? Because it is pleasurable; try writing it and you will see how it fosters playfulness and witty elaboration, as well conveying a lot of information about language.xviii

I hope that you will find the same results as you play the Game of Between

Copia (abundance, variety, playfulness) is suggestive of we can expect, as writers-always-reading, from the Game of Between—it is always
"something more." It is always a work of more explanation and further clarification. Writers-always- reading of the future will know more about it than we do. They will have a clearer understanding of the limits of its uses. They will know where one passes into the area of its unuseability and how to avoid the area. The practical uses of the Game of Between appear primarily in the examples quoted here from many different kinds of authors. In the act of raising questions about Betweens, and playing them as a game, we attempt to use the Game as a way to describe the Game and explore its possibilities.

The writer-always-reading as a reader would typically use the Game of Between as an heuristic template. That is, to discover the structure, rhetorical stance and (sometimes) the genre of the text h/s is reading.

A text like this should always question itself.

12. Thought Runs: Please think of this text as a series thought runs: Short, quick, in and out, forward, back, sideways, slightly skewed. Often inconclusive. Invitation to the reader to argue with presuppositions and assertions of the author. An abundance of unanswered (and unanswerable?) questions with the conviction that the questions are, in themselves, worthwhile to ask.

One might also think of thought runs as we would a garden or farm. Agriculture, by nature, is brutally reductive, simplifying nature's incomprehensible complexity to something manageable. Similarly, language, like nature, is near unintelligble without some sort of management. We keep Washington Game of Between
certain things out of the garden, weeds and animals, and we play a game of exclusion when we play the Game of Between.

Since language does not plant neat rows, we need to make certain furrows through it and fence off aspects of it.

Beware of certainty in everything you write. Hear the words of Benjamin Paul Blood on this matter:

Certainty is the root of despair. The inevitable stales, while doubt
and hope are sisters. Not unfortunately the universe is wild—
game
flavored as a hawk's wing. Nature is miracle all. She knows no laws;
the same returns not, save to bring the different. The slow round of
the engraver's lathe gains but the breadth of a hair, but the difference is distributed back over the whole curve, never an instant true—ever not quite. (emphasis mine).xix
Fractions stand as the Middle between one and zero.

Imaging, thinking, writing and questioning one's thoughts about a "fact," as a Game, moves the activities out of the realm of consequences and servitude into the realm of play and freedom—one might add, following

Washington 28
Game of Between
Plato's allegory of the cave, out of the shadows into the light (please see Gaming and Shades, p. 94 and Shadows, p. 104).

Is the Game of Between, in an analogy with the game of make-believe of children, always or only sometimes, a perpetual possibility?

One plays the Game of Between, minimally, with a linguistic form composed of two Extremes (Sides) that "bracket" a Middle. We might call these the minimal "props" in the Game.

Taking sides is evidence of a nascent Game of Between.

This tertiary structure of a linguistic Between reminds us of the DNA double helix, made up of two polynucleotide chains (many nucleotides joined) that coil around each other. The two nucleotides join by hydrogen bonds between the matching bases or complimentary base pairing.

As we play the Game of Between we will also be playing, from time to time, the Game of Assuming. Assumptions are propositions, not that something is true, but ones that assert that something might be true. Related to the family of Assumptions, but not members of it, are Doubt, uncertainty, the questionable and the like.

With Questioning we simultaneously state Assumptions and question them (please see Doubt, p. 43 and Questioning, p. 111).

13. Assumption #1: That the reader of this text has:

* A trained mind.

* S/he expects only the accuracy and precision that the subject admits.

* H/s is curious about certain aspects of language, mainly the use of

Washington

Game of Between
analogy (metaphor), ways of going on from one word to another, one sentence to another or how to structure a text (of any genre) as a Game of Between.

*S/he likes to play games and also (sometimes) theorize about Games. What are they? How do they differ from typical actions in life and so on.xx

14.Assumption #2: What should the reader assume, before s/h goes any further, about the author of this text? First, that he is a writer-always-reading, playing both activities with the Game of Between. Secondly, you should assume that I'm your guest here; that this guest knows that his presence here is contingent on his talk, behavior, manners and the like. Thirdly, that what appears to the author to be true, or reasonable, may only be true, or reasonable, for him—that all knowledge is personal knowledge. This, in part, is what Aristotle has to say about personal knowledge:

Those who seek to be compelled by argument, and at the same time allow themselves to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists for him to whom it appears, and when, and to the senses to which, and under the conditions under which it appears. Otherwise, they will find themselves contradicting themselves.xxx

If you keep on reading, you will discover that Aristotle and Wittgenstein are not just two other writers-always-reading but indispensable masters of those activities. They complement each other nicely. Aristotle writes with a great deal of certainty, Wittgenstein with a lot of doubt mixed in with certainty. He would claim, and I think

Washington

Game of Between
rightly so, that both doubting and undoubting are essential in overcoming (if such exists) writer's block.

15. The Middle as Privileged Space  Take a walker on a road or street. The road or the street is a space defined by what occupies it. To the left and right of h/h are different kinds of spaces. As h/s walks the spaces seem to empty of objects and fill with different ones. H/s may imagine this emptying/filling to be an illusion. The things that occupy the spaces distort them. The shape of the spaces changes through changes in their three dimensions. The spaces to the left and right of h/h represent copia or abundance of things. The spaces in front and back of h/h describe what they see, not only things they see front and back (in the Middle), but also things in the Extremes—what's on either side of them. This excerpt from Carlo Levi's *Cristo si è fermato a Eboli* (*Christ Stopped at Eboli*) will perhaps clarify what I mean. Levi, a stranger in the town, is a moving observer:

A group of houses stood in untidy fashion on either side of the road, surrounded by shabby vegetable gardens and a few sparse olive trees. The houses were nearly all of only one room, with no windows, drawing their light from the door. The doors were latched because the men were in the fields; in the doorways young women dangled their babies or old women spun wool. They waved and looked after me with wide-open eyes.

Elsewhere, Levi is a stationary observer from his living quarters in the elevated center of Gagliano. In the following passage, please notice how he "plays" the scene from the

Washington

Game of Between
Middle. Phrases (my italics) like *toward the east, beyond* and *At my right toward the north* divide the scene into a series of Betweens, spaces where he describes houses, features of the landscape and people. With terms like "I felt as if I were on the roof of the world" and *At my left* and *At my right*.

In short, Levi takes our gaze up, down and around. In all we feel ourselves in a 3D space of a Between:

> From my terrace the sky seemed immense, covered with constantly changing clouds; I felt as if I were on the roof of the world or on the deck of a ship anchored in a petrified ocean. *Toward the east* the piled-up huts of Lower Gagliano cut off the rest of the village from view…behind their yellowish roofs appeared the edge of a mountain *above* the cemetery, and *beyond* this…a valley *beneath* the sky. *At my left*, *toward the south*…(were) endless stretches of clay…. *At my right*, *toward the north*, the landslide tumbled into the ravine (pp. 108-109).

Please compare this with Seeing Things from the Middle, p. 92.

16. Thinking: Should we, following the rule of three, add to writing and reading the act of thinking? That, a would-be writer-always-reading, should spend h/h days, and a considerable part of h/h nights, studying the great thinkers?

17. Thirdness (Dreiheit): Does The Game of Between have a *permanent* infrastructure? One that never changes no matter the content or use of the Game? Let us start with thirdness. Before one creates a Between does s/h think in thirds? But no other number (quantity) lower or higher than three?

Washington 32

Game of Between
(Please note that thirdness is not just a number. It is also a condition, an essential one.)

Or is it the case that thirdness simply has salience over other numbers? Or that three is usually considered the first prime number? As mathematicians know anything can be thought with numbers arrayed in a proper order.

Certainly thinking and representing a subject with Thirdness seems to be as old as the imagination and new as the iPod. One only needs mention the linguistic first, second and third person (I, you, it), the Trinity, three-dimensional reality, Goldilocks and so on. The seminal work on this topic is perhaps Usener's *Dreiheit* (Thirdness 1903). In the first part of his work, Usener assesses the importance of three in Greek antiquity. He notes the significance of three and its continuations in various folk and religious traditions. He finds fifteen different trinities of gods in Hesiod's *Theogony*. He identifies groupings composed of three gods of equal status and then goes on to mention triads that entail divinities of unequal status. In the second part of his work, Usener focuses on visual depictions of the trinity, three-headed gods and goddesses, the best known being Hecate, the goddess of crossroads.

In the third, and last part, of his essay, Usener (please note his use of Thirdness as an organizing principle for Thirdness) focuses on the movement from "two" to "three." Examples here are god-pairs that became trinities, the transformation of two seasons into three, paths and roads becoming perceived as three-pronged forks and the winds going from two to three.

Finding symbolism in numbers appears in the Pythagorean system of Washington
"arithmetic theology" (p. 351). Usener claims that ancient people did not grasp numbers as establishing a sequence, 1, 2, 3... but more as a formative principle: Large numbers, for examples were used for time concepts, starting with the number "seven" and going up. In contrast, small numbers, such as "two", were used for expressions for quantity, while three was used to communicate completeness. More problematic, however, is Usener's suggestion that the Greeks could not count above three. To support this view he cites the research of Von den Steinen that members of the Bakairi tribe (in Brazil) can only count to two. To continue counting, they construe three as 2+1, four as 2+2 and so on. The same claim is made by Gamow about the "Hottentots" (Khoikhoi), said to have words only for "one", "two", "three", and "many".

The principal modern advocate of thinking in Thirds is C. S. Peirce. 'Thirdness," he says, "pours in upon us through every avenue of sense." With this, and other statements, Peirce would no doubt agree with Usener that Thirdness represents completeness, finality, wholeness—a situation analogous to not counting beyond three. One of Peirce's succinct definitions of Thirdness is this:

The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is second. The Third is that which is what it is owning to

Washington 34
Game of Between
things *between* which it mediates and which it brings into relation to each other (*CP*, p 248).

First, in other words, is whatever is present and immediate; Second is a reaction to a First; Third is mediate between First and Second. For Peirce there are, for example, three kinds of active forces in the world, law, chance, habit-taking; three "departments" of philosophy, namely, Phenomenology, Normative Science and Metaphysics (*CP*, p. 78). One can, he adds, see three phases in the evolution of the cosmos, "no-thing-ness" or "un-determinant potentiality," "determinate potentiality" and "actuality" and "three grades of Thirdness" (*Essential*, p. 253). But Peirce's descriptions, and uses, of Thirdness go far beyond categorizing sensory information or theorizing about evolution. Three examples, out of many others, can be given. First, there is his use of Thirdness to "find the Middle as the ideal"; second is his use of Thirdness as a reductive procedure for analyzing complex situations.

In the words of one of Peirce's editors, Peirce was familiar with "the fundamentality of triadicity [that found] that monadic, dyadic, and triadic relations are irreducible, while relations of any degree (or adicity) greater than triadic can be expressed in combinations of triadic relations." This is known as Peirce's "reduction thesis" (*Essential*, p.xxx). Finally, there is Peirce's use of Thirdness to showcase "novelty." Whatever is new is a Third. That is, it is a product of combining Firsts with Seconds to produce new knowledge, the unexpected, a fresh start and the like. In conventional terminology, the new
thing (the Third) is always greater than the sum of its parts (Firsts and Seconds). In all of Peirce's speculations on Thirdness one can perhaps see the influence of Aristotle's thoughts on "emergence," or how order comes from disorder, to produce the "new":

A totality (what emerged or is emerging) is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts.

(Metaphysics 1045A 9-10).xxvi

"The day after tomorrow." Does this expression presuppose that the mind can only think (or imagine or plan) only three days ahead—plan with any certainty?

Or, what about this? Build a sentence with three nouns and stop: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend."

18. The Unexpected: What we do not expect can often be expressed as a three stage Thought Run. Stage one: Discover that the universe began in a fiery explosion (the Big Bang) 13.7 years ago. Stage two: Determine how fast the universe is "slowing down." Stage three: Discover, unexpectedly, that it is speeding up.xxvii

19. Thirdness and Plenitude: Usener and Peirce have it that thirdness represents completion. In this essay I suggest that completion occurs only when we "reach the Middle."

Washington 36

Game of Between
But what about substituting "plenitude" for "completion." What if, in order to understand a reason for such a substitution, that we attend to Sartre's words about "plenitude" and "filling up the holes" of our lives?

To plug up a hole means originally to make a sacrifice of my body in order that the plenitude of being may exist. Here at its origin we grasp one of the most fundamental tendencies of human reality, the tendency to fill. A good part of our life is passed in plugging up holes, in filling empty places, in realizing and symbolically establishing a plenitude (qtd Murphy Golf in the Kingdom, p 139; emphasis mine).

Only by "reaching the Middle" do we fill up a hole in our life?

Can the universe be explained with three numbers? No, according to Martin Rees. We need at least six. But he has no quarrel with implying that three is the most foundational. We have our being in a world of three dimensions. xxviii

Quantum theory says we need only four "dimensions" to describe the universe, length, breadth, height and time. String theory postulates we need at least eleven dimensions. Others might say that there are "hidden dimensions," ones uncountable.

Einstein counted 299,792,458 meters per second at which lights travels through a vacuum. Physicists at CERN, Europe's main physics laboratory
claim that they have detected subatomic particles that travel at 60-billionths of a second faster than light. xxix

Take your choice.

It seems easy to describe doing and being as a three-stage procedure:

*There are three stages: Thoughtless being. Thought. Return to thoughtless being.*

*Do not confuse the first and third stages. Thoughtless being is attained by everyone., the return to thought being by a very few.* xxx

Perhaps thirdness is too easy to think? Perhaps it causes us to miss a lot of X, things necessary for understanding the *essence* of X?

So how do you become a writer-always-reading and how do you end your days as one. Please give some thought to this excerpt from an English nursery rhyme: "Sow an act, reap a habit; sow a habit, reap a character sow a character, reap a destiny."

Language, as a larger context for a Between, is composed of "labyrinthine paths" always willing to lead us astray. xxxi Every thinker, it seems fair to say, becomes lost in the labyrinth of language at one time or another. Are we then allowed to say that this is one reason we have Betweens? As an attempt to avoid the labyrinth? Or, more likely, find an efficient way through it.

Does the Game of Between rise from liminal thinking? From the act of crossing a threshold? (Please see Liminality, p. 107).

The gecko can climb walls and walk across ceilings. Its secret is that its toes are Washington 38

Game of Between
covered with a fine structure like the ridges of fingerprints with deep impressions between them. Here we seem to have a special kind of Betweenness, one between walls and ceilings and the feet of the gecko. Using a linguistic representation we might want to say that the molecules of gecko's feet attract a surface with an electrostatic phenomenon.

Australopithecus sediba, a creature from 1,977 years ago, can be said to be a "transitional species" *between* australopithecines and the emergence of homo erectus 1.9 millions ago. Sediba exhibits "novel combinations" of australopithecine and erectus.xxxii

But what if we don't have a name for the Middle? That we just *sense* that one is there, there as, perhaps, something new? Then might we not have confidence to write the following statements?

* Libeskind's plan (for the new World Trade Center in New York) struck a careful *balance between* commemorating the lives lost and reestablishing the life of the site itself (emphasis mine).xxxiii

* This peculiar being is never wholly explained. He remains a benign Nosferatu, *halfway between* the demon that dogs romantic souls, luring them into a hellfire of trouble, and a treasured imaginary friend (emphasis mine).xxxiv

Might it be the case that in examples like these the author tacitly asks the reader to "name" the Middle? Name it for the purpose of visualizing the new?

Can we image X without first having a name for X? Can we effectively pray for someone, or call them, without knowing their name?

Please see the Immediate, p.109.
20. The Unknown Middle: But what if there is no discernible Middle? Or one not represented? An example might be what physicists call "quantum intermediacy" or some unknown Middle? If no Middle exists can the Extremes of a possible Game of Between come into being?

21. The Silent Middle: Nadine Gordimer, a notable writer-always-reading, has this to say about what she learned from Hemingway:

   From Ernest Hemingway's stories I learned to listen, within myself, when writing, for what went unsaid by my characters; what can be, must be conveyed in other ways, and not alone by body-language but also in the breathing space of syntax: the necessity to create silences which the reader can interpret from these signs.xxxv

   Is it fair to say then that the Middle of a Between can not only be unknown but also silent? Silent as a "breathing space" for the interpreting reader?

22. Causation? Throughout this text the author seems to believe that minds, the "I," the "we" "they" and the like cause Betweens. Betweens are intentional objects that serve some purpose in thinking and acting. But what if the author is "fooled by randomness," in somewhat the ways described by Nassim Taleb?xxxvi That things can happen, not by design, but by accidents mistaken as intentional acts or as coincidental with caused acts?

   In short, the author seems to ignore the possibility of error; or more generally, the possibility that all thinking can be subject to illusions. If we couldn't think, then it would be impossible to be deluded.

Washington

Game of Between
But does it matter whether a Between happens by design or by chance? What matters is whether one can falsify evidence for the existence of Betweens and the range of their possible effects. As Aristotle points out things that happen by design and those that happen by chance can have the same effect. It would only matter if someone could prove such effect is two not one, appearing to be the same but actually different—falsification is often more effective than verification (Physics, 196a-198a).

23. If/Then: Please consider this "riddle" of Epicurus as he presents it with the "if/then" form::

God either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants to and cannot, then he is weak - and this does not apply to god. If he can but does not want to, then he is spiteful - which is equally foreign to god's nature. If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful, and so not a god. If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fitting for a god, where then do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them?

Notice the triadic structure of this, the situation ("if"), the effect of the situation ("then") and the conclusion that can be drawn from the effect ("then he is weak"). This is essentially the form of a syllogism and a metaphor.

But does it have the same rhetorical intention?

"Or if I have to choose between two subjects, I won't choose the boring one." (Christopher Hitchens).xxxvii

Washington 41

Game of Between
24. The Middle as Messenger: The thought often comes to me (usually in the Middle of the night) that this essay can stand as a messenger between you and me. Or between them and us, you and them and so on.

Should we say that a Messenger, in this context, is a Temporal Middle? By going from here to there, from me to you, that time passes and, as it passes, certain things happen to the Messenger?

A literary example here might be Browning's *Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came*.

A scientific example is resistance to the cancer drug Xalkori. There is evidence that the resistance is caused by is the RNA messenger, Mediator -12 (MED12) being blocked. The function of MED12 is to help transcribe genes from DNA into RNA messengers in order to maintain the structure of chromosomes. "Presumably, resistance to Xalkori is being caused by disabling mutations in one or more of these genes."xxxviii

"Don't shoot the messenger" (*Henry IV, Part 2*).

25. Aristotle. One can justly say that Aristotle was the first to show how the Game of Between can be used to set up a text, explicate an existing text, or bring into being a "new" idea. Aristotle typically plays the Game by starting with a question about the meaning of a certain state, idea or action: for example, what is courage? He then finds the answer in a balance between cowardice and recklessness. Courage, that is, is the Middle state between two Extreme states. Similarly with the moderation of middle age; a state that avoids the selfishness of old age and the intemperance of youth. The Game for Washington
Aristotle thus proceeds back and forth between two Extremes in order to reach the Middle, often called the "golden mean."

The Middle emerges from taking parts from the Extremes. Aristotle would perhaps say that the Middle is the "goal" of the Game of Between. Once the goal is reached the ideal as something new emerges.

26. Wittgenstein: Aristotle is a star player of the Game. But he does not write the rules for it. Wittgenstein, by contrast, attempts to make explicit actual and possible rules for playing the Game. He does this in three of his books, *On Certainty*, *Philosophical Investigations* and *The Foundations of Mathematics*. We didn't discover language. We invented it, like we invented games. Language can then be seen as a "game" (*Sprachspiel*). Since Betweenes (In-Betweenes) are a part of language we can say they are part of the language game—a vital part.

Certain rules, both actual and possible, link them.

27. Family Resemblances (*Familianähnlichkeiten*): Please expect to hear in these Thought Runs the expression "Family Resemblances." The expression is Wittgenstein's(*PI #66, 67*). The immediate reference is to games.

I use it, however, to characterize words and concepts that have the same function but differ in ways they "appear" and carry out their function.

In Wittgenstein's words, family resemblances form:

(A) complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes

similarities of detail....I can think of no better expression to Washington

Game of Between
characterize these similarities than "family resemblances" 

(Familianähnlichkeiten) For the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes…

For Wittgenstein the problem one has as a language user is that of Going on. Going on is the paterfamilias of a "family" of terms like "inferring," "extrapolating," "projecting" and "following a rule." On one level Going on refers to proceeding from one word to another, one sentence to another and so on. But on another, deeper level, it means Going on in a useable way. Speaking in a useable way is meaning with a practical outcome, like asking someone to pass the bread. An unuseable utterance has no meaning, no practical effect. In effect, it means that we haven't Gone on. We lose in the Game of Between.

28. Emergence: An important result of Going on is what we can call Emergence. Something new, even unexpected, results or, more generally, "makes an appearance." Wittgenstein, following his notion of "family resemblance," has many related terms for Emergence, "unfolding" (FM #85, 86, 100), "essence" (FM 67, 73, 85), "proof" (FM #63, 69, "rule" (FM 81, 83, 112). Here Emergence refers to both the process of Going on and the results of Going on. But there is no principled way of distinguishing between an inexorable or non-exorable (contingent) result from Going on.

So if an emergent, appears, something that needs explaining, how do you make such an appearance intelligible to a second person? An example
might be the occurrence of "antibiotic resistance." What causes it to happen? What would prevent it from not happening? One answer is a recent discovery of bacteria in 30,000 year old DNA genes; genes from Yukon permafrost shown to be capable of resisting antibiotics. One conclusion from this is that no drug can be powerful enough to overcome "resistance." In the words of one discoverer:

The fact that the genes for resistance are so ancient and widespread means there is no easy solution to the problem of resistance—we will never invent a super antibiotic that clears everything up.\textsuperscript{xi}

We might want to say then that we have here something like a Game of Between; one between nature and man. Man invents antibiotic drugs. Nature, by opposing the action of the drugs with ancient genes, creates resistance. Man invents more powerful drugs. Nature responds with still more powerful resistance to them.

Stalemate.

Are we justified in calling a "stalemate" the Middle that emerges from the Game? Manufactured antibiotics and natural anti-antibiotics the Extremes in the Game?

29. Convergence: I often suggest here that we should, in most cases, see the Middle as a new thing; or, more generally, as an emergent expressing novelty.

Washington

Game of Between
Is this one reason for the common use of the word "converge?" When other given things come together, either by accident or human agency, do they sometimes create novelty? Or is all this merely a case of linguistic representation? Or does it matter either way?

Please give some thought to these examples.xi

1. The accoutrements of modernity—heavy industry, atomic energy, antiseptic architecture, petroleum waste, and a little boy's scientific precocity—converge to shatter the psyche of an engineer's wife in the Italian port of Ravenna (Review of the movie Red Desert; emphasis mine).

2. With his Triple Theory, (Derek) Parfit, believed that he had achieved convergence between three of the main schools of moral thought, but even this didn't satisfy him (p.51).

3. If all those years he (Derek Parfit) and (Bernard) Williams had not actually been disagreeing but just talking past each other, then there was hope for convergence after all (comment about the relationship between two Oxford philosophers, p. 52).

In #1 the author plays the Game of Convergence with several Extremes; in #2 with three, and in #3 with two Extremes. But they all converge on one Middle.
We must then consider the possibility that the Middle is *always* a unity that expresses novelty.

Or should we?

Writing, like planning a journey, is easy to do but hard to justify.

30. Krishna: If we need a "god" dwelling within our Thought Runs about the Game of Between we might call to mind the many transformations of Krishna. In Hindu folklore he is, according to Amit Chaudhuri,

A lover of numberless women...a politician, an inscrutable trickster and strategist...Krishna is a reminder that play and creation are synonymous and inexhaustible....(he) is identified with "leela...." The light and shade of the created universe. xiii

31. Metaphor/Analogy. The foundation of Metaphor/Analogy is the possibility of "transfer." X can be transferred to Y on the basic of Z—please recall that the word "metaphor" comes from the Greek *metapherein*, a verb used by speakers to describe carrying something from one place to another.

Aristotle characterizes Metaphor/Analogy as "in the highest degree instructive" (Poetics 21, 1457b9–16; please compare 20-22). So how does it instruct? Presumably, Aristotle would say that Metaphor/Analogy brings things "closer" to us; makes things more palpable and imageable. Please call to mind Homer's likening the fear and grief of the Achaians to the onslaught of winds from the north on the dark sea (*Iliad* 9:1-8) or the approach of an army to the tide of the sea rolling in and out (*Iliad: 9: 412-13).
Aristotle does not speculate on the source of Metaphor/Analogy. But others, Lakoff and Johnson, for example, claim that it comes from the "neural learning of children." The Metaphor "affection as warmth" comes, for example, from "the common experience of a child being held affectionately by a parent; here, affection occurs together with warmth" (qtd Fill, p. 103).

Can we then say that the Game of Between belongs, if only loosely, to the family of Metaphor/Analogy? That when we play the Game we are essentially "transferring" meaning and information both within the Game and with the environment of the Game?

Does the Game of Between originate with a child's "neural" experiences? If so, does this suggest that the Game has its origins independent of language acquisition?

32. Comparison: Can comparing X with Y be called a Game of Searching for the Middle? Please consider these statements of Friedman:

1. Identity requires sameness in difference, difference in sameness—in a word, comparison (p. 756).

2. Comparison is rudimentary for human cognition, identity, and culture. (p. 757).

3. Comparison puts incommensurability and commensurability into a dynamic interplay reflected in the slash that separates and connects: in/commensurability (p. 758).
Is there danger in not comparing $X$ with $Y$? Would it limit our ability to conceptualize the world around, and within, us? What if we couldn't say things like "Jim is taller than Joe?"

We might want to Go on and say that the story of Goldilocks is essentially a story about (in Friedman's terms) incommensurability/commensurability. "Too hot" "too hard," "too small" seem to presuppose both concepts: they help Goldilocks organize her thoughts about the Bears' house.

33. The Space of Interruption: Can we not hazard the guess that Between "interrupt" a larger order of meaning? That within the Space of Interruption that they offer a different order of meaning? Different from the one preceding. An analogy would be to someone suddenly lost in a pathless woods. It would alter h/h perception of h/herself and the world.

One thinks here of Dante "una selva oscura…ché la diritta via era smarrita" and its association with "nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita"—that is, a mid-life crisis allegorized as becoming lost in a dark woods. Life for the narrator has changed, taken on a different meaning.

What is the different meaning? That the meaning of life has become more obscure? The idea that meaning does not lie here but elsewhere? Perhaps in a detachment from action?

Does this mean that for the memoirist that the narrator of h/h life should be punctuated by Betweens? Betweens that describe the changes in the course of h/h life?
34. Meta-Thought Run: Thought Runs in this essay can be said to be "actual." They are conditioned by time, space and intention. They can be counted. In contrast with a Thought Run are Meta-Thought Runs. These are possibilities stripped of any empirical content. They are uncountable. Yet they are as "real" as any actual Thought Run and can be made actual by Minds. They are, in some sense, "in all Minds" waiting to be actualized as ink and air—but with no guarantee that they will take those forms.

(Please see the Actual and the Virtual, p. 98.)

It is possible for an individual to be a guest in the White House. It is possible for a person with an intact Mind to tell a story about being a guest in the White House without ever going there. It is possible to tell a true story about being a guest there. One can represent possibilities but not count them. Innumerability makes it impossible to arrive at the end of listing the possibilities.

What can we conclude from this? That there is no end of what we can say in a Thought Run and no end what we can say about the Game of Between? Our knowledge about the Game will always seem to be incomplete as long as space, time and intention rule the Mind (please see Note on Notation below).

35. Framework: What often comes to mind with the word Meta is "something other than the subject," something more general and inclusive. We usually call it a "frame." If X frames Y then it seems possible to say that X may explain Y—including why Y exists. We might want to say that

Washington
mountains exist, for example, because there are plates on the earth's surface that slowly collide and crumple up against each other. Or that the moon exists because of X's collision with the earth.

Fear frequently visits the Space of Possibility.

36. Going On as Fascination: For Wittgenstein a salient problem of thinking (and writing) is Going On and eliminating what causes you not to go on. ("weiss ich weiter" PI #323; "Wir merzen also die Sätze aus, die uns nicht weiterbringen" OC #33).

Now that I'm here, how can I go on from here? How can I identify, and expunge, what keeps me from Going on?

I might add should I go on from here? What is "here"? Since we are gaming Betweening, let us re-frame the question as a philosophical golfer might. "Why am I going from hole to hole, from number one to number two, from two to three and so on?" One answer might be "fascination." Golf, like certain other things in life, fascinates me. The Game of Between, like golf, fascinates me.

There's no use playin' [golf] if the fascination doesna' take ye....Fascination holds us there, makes us believe 'tis all-important.

Now, and this is the point...which I love so much, fascination has a gravity of its own. It can draw upon the subtle forces, draw them

Washington 51

Game of Between
round us lik' a cloack, and create new worlds (Scottish dialect as represented by Michael Murphy; emphasis mine).\textsuperscript{xliv} Gravity seems a good analogy for Fascination. It pushes and pulls us along.

But we must add mystery and a possible answer to the question of Going on and ultimately to a point where I can say "I won't (can't/need to) go on."

But how far do I have to go before I know where to stop? (Please see Wittgenstein \textit{PI} #245, "Wie kann ich denn mit der Sprache....").

I am tempted to say that every Though Run here is like the next hole in golf.

"Replacing a divot changes your consciousness" (Murphy, p. 55).

37. Doubting and non-doubting. Wittgenstein say that "There is the first (doubting) only if there is the second(non-doubting)." ("Zweifelndes und Nichtzweifelndes Benehmen. Es gift das erste nur, wenn es das zweite gibt"

\textit{OC} #334)\textsuperscript{xlv}

Should we then say that we do not doubt that Betweens exist, either as a mode of thinking or as an orderly string of words; and, consequently, that we have no grounds for doubting that the Game of Between is a way to explicate Betweens? Or should we say that Betweening as a Game violates rules of simplicity and economy along the lines of Occam's Razor?

But where do we start non-doubting that Betweens exist? With certainty that the Language Game can exist? With knowing that the external world can exist? Probably not but probably maybe.
Doubting and non-doubting that X exists, that it behaves in a certain way or has certain characteristics seem to embody start, pause and stop procedures. An example might be cancer. Since we know certain things about DNA and the genome, we non-doubt certain things about cancer. But the more we know about cancer the more we doubt what we know. The more we doubt what we know the more we want to know. Language typically maps these "procedures" as a transition from statements like "X is Y" or "X acts like this" to questions like "what is happening between the Xs and Ys of cancer," "what is happening within a cancer cell?" and the like:

Why, for example, does the Epstein-Barr virus cause different cancers in different populations? Why do patients with certain neurological diseases like Parkinson's, Huntington's, Alzheimer's and Fragile X seem to be at a lower risk for most cancers? Why are some tissues more prone than others to developing cancers? 

I attempt to keep the non-doubting/doubting attitude toward the Game of Between throughout this essay. The more I know about Betweening the more I doubt that I know that I know. It helps me to keep Going on.

But perhaps not the reader.

Smile.

38. Game Ball: What comes to mind in seeing a golf ball in flight? Here is one answer to the question: "The flight of the ball, the sight of it hanging there in space, anticipates our desires for transcendence....The ball in flight Washington
brings dim memories of our ancestral past and premonitions of the next manifesting plane: (Murphy p. 54).

We also might say that any Game ball (basketball, baseball, or tennis ball) represents certain possibilities not yet actualized. A (any person) might throw it to B (another person) or A might throw it through a hoop. Throwing the ball activates certain forces within the ball and actualizes Between conditions in the game system. Forces intrinsic to the ball as a physical object (a per se object in a non-relational condition) would include incidentals like spin, speed, direction and the like. With these it can be taken as a metaphor for time— insofar as such incidentals, of necessity, represent change. But a game ball is, by definition, a relational object. That is, one ultimately dependent on someone throwing it and someone, or something, receiving it. Additionally, the rules of the game help cause the ball to lose its independence.

Is it too much to say that any Game Ball in flight exemplifies Betweenness? That its origin, on the face of a club say, and its destination, the hole on the green, its flight in-between them, are all necessary "pieces" in golf as a specimen of the Game of Between?

39. Telling a Story/Describing a Story: My hope is that the reader will see these Runs as possible starting points for writing, or telling, a story and for describing a story. These are the two ways I have used them, with modest success, in writing fiction, poems, essays and plays. In other words, playing the Game of Between starts, proceeds and ends, ideally, as a story or a Washington Game of Between

54
description of one—or, more broadly, a narrative (ink and air) with the
recognizable structure of a Between.

What is a story? There is not enough space here to give an adequate
answer to the question. But let me say, following hints from Benjamin and
Stump, that it always involves the "sharing" of "second-person...real or
imagined" experiences. The storyteller, that is, takes the experiences of
h/himself and others and makes it "available to a wider audience."xlviii

So where does the storyteller start? In the context of the Game of
Between one answer would be "With the Middle." We imagine the story
unfolding with the author taking the reader/listener through the Extremes
that bracket the Middle. The Middle can thus be seen as a destination, an
ideal, an act, a behavioral trait and the like. But at the same time, one would
assume that for the Player of the Game the Middle is always contingent. It is
contingent on the way the Player (storyteller) represents the Middle, how
explicit the Extremes are, or the intention (as judged by an audience) of the
whole.

Two other soft claims are that many other, auxiliary Games, "play" into
storytelling as a Game of Between. An important one is the Game of
Entrances and Exits, p. 100; another is the Game of Preparation, p. 81,
starting with the name of a possible Middle, "umpire, "reconciliation,"
"merger" and the like. In this, the Middle in question lays a preliminary
ground (or raises the question) of what kind of game we are going to play plus
how it should be played.
40. Storytelling and Death. "Like the Arabian Nights it is a book (The Tiger's Wife) about storytelling and its power to enchant as it wards off death and postpones the inevitable."\textsuperscript{xlix}

If the Game of Between is a possible foundation for storytelling,, then are we allowed to say that the Game can be a means of warding off death? Or postponing the inevitable, whatever it may be?

Why not? Isn't that something, excluding being detracted by the details of daily life, we're doing here?

A young couple are set to be married. On the day before the wedding the man dies in a mining accident. The bride-to-be carries on for years unmarried. One day the body of groom-to-be is found and brought to the surface perfectly preserved. His bride recognizes him.

How does the author "fill in" the years between the man's death and the recovery of his body? Please see Benjamin's account of such "fill in" in The Storyteller. The story in question is Johann Hebel's "Unexpected Reunion" in Schatzkästlein des rheinischen Hausfreundes (please see Benjamin, pp. 94-95).

Judging by the chronology of the story Hebel's method was to work from the Extremes, the deaths of the young groom and the elderly bride, and fill in the years separating their deaths with what went on locally and globally.

I want to say that "what went on between..." is a Middle of great amplitude, in causality, necessity and value.
The amplitude of the Middle is determined by the nature of the Extremes.

41. Weather: Writing to Dos Passos (26 March 1932) Hemingway tells him "remember to get weather in your damn book...weather's very important." Weather is certainly important to Hemingway. In *A Farewell to Arms*, for example, it marks the passing of the seasons and seems to symbolize the changing emotions of Frederick Henry. Rain is a cause of Nick and Bill coming together to discuss their ideals in "A Three-Day Blow" as does snow occasion the action of both "Cross Country Snow" and "An Alpine Idyll."

Is this an example of Ruskin's "pathetic fallacy"? A correlation between the emotions of a character and the weather?

Should we say, then, that readers and writers ought to look for literary representation of weather as a Game of Between? One possibility would be to play the Game from the point of view of the Extremes, one without an explicit Middle. One thinks here of depictions of extreme weather, hurricanes, tornadoes, hailstorms and the like. (Please see Immediate, a Game with no Middle, p. 109.)

42. Pyrrhic Victory: Does every narrative, notably the present one, carry the possibility of a Pyrrhic Victory? Understood by a mind that takes understanding as a win.

Or would we be closer to the truth in calling winning, as a defeat, a paradox? If you think long enough you always end up with a paradox.—the mind in a state of mindlessness? A win at too great a cost?

Washington 57

Game of Between
43. Truth: Should we say that every numbered Perspective here—like Truth—and the commentary on it are only true in the Game of Between? Unlike scientific discourse, traffic directions or a recipe for Black Forest Cake, we typically don't see the need to falsify them. Here we are reminded of Coleridge's dictum about reading poetry, "a willing suspension of disbelief" (Biographia Literaria 169).

Telling what you think is the truth about X may involve refuting, or modifying, what someone else says about X. A case in point is John Strain's discussion of an agnostic's "reasonable belief." Here Strain plays the Game of Between with the two Extremes of skepticism and credulity: "Just as generosity might be the desirable midpoint between profligacy and meanness, so faith...would be the midpoint between skepticism and credulity" (emphasis mine).

44. Un-Googleability: Presumably not everything is googleable. Not everything is in digital form, things going on down the street, around the corner or in mine, or your, head. But the encyclopedic mind set (Pliny the Elder comes to mind) lives on in the assumption that "all human knowledge" is collectable. But what about sources? If we can't find the source for X are our citations reliable? What if we run out of sources should we say our encyclopedia is incomplete and a possible failure?

"I find the air of failure bracing" (Beckett)

Every numbered Perspective on the Game of Between here has a source, mostly from what I have heard, seen or read. But other entries come Washington
from nowhere, usually when I'm walking, skiing, meditating or swimming. Or just sitting still.

But is personal testimony about X coming from nowhere reliable? Is it a hoax? Or just another way for information to go out of date quickly?

45. Eyelevel: Merchandisers typically try to display their wares at eyelevel. Can we then say that the Middle is more likely to represent eyelevel than the Extremes?

If so, then playing the Game of Between can replicate, if only in a rough way, a merchandiser shelving wares on a level with the Eyelevel of buyers. The most saleable items occupy the space most easily seen without moving the head up or down.

In the early years of the Roman Empire, Vitruvius claimed that the most useful and beautiful architecture should correspond with the proportions (ratio between the parts) of the human body.

To understand the "architecture" of a Between play with the possibilities of Eyelevel. Can we begin the search at what we observe at Eyelevel? What we take to be Extremes only at boundary positions as Eyelevel changes?

46. Standin: Are there any standins for Betweens? On the general order of horror films (and stories) standing in for cultural, political or sexual anxiety?

"Women are border creatures" *Mittelstufe* (Schopenhauer).
47. Eucharist: Can the Christian Eucharist be likened to a Game of Between? Does it enact a ritual of bringing together or communion of rivals? On a literal level, if one is allowed to use the word in this context, it resembles a dinner of like minded persons sharing food and drink. Most Christians, however, give it an additional transcendent meaning. By a (symbolic?) eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ one becomes one with Him and closer to God.

So can we say that the Eucharist has a Middle similar to the Middle of the Game of Between? If so, it most likely appears by means of the two material objects, the cup of wine and bread.

But do these objects, as props in the ritual, present anything new? Or are they ways of telling us not to forget who and what we are plus what we can become? That the reach of the Eucharist is both into the material absence of Christ and His transcendent presence?

Who meets in a Middle? The young, old, male, female, the poor and the wealthy, black and white and so on. The Middle then can be seen as a egalitarian space. Is this ultimate meaning of the Eucharist as a Middle?

48. Nothingness: "Why is there something rather than nothing"? As Sorenson observes, this question is as "old as Parmenides in the fifth century BCE."^lii

The problem here, according to Sorenson is method. Where do we start in support of the proposition "There is nothing"? We might, he suggests, start,
as Descartes does, with an empty world and then only let things in that can "prove they exist" (p. 2)

St. Augustine, on the other hand, claims we should start "where we are in the middle" (my emphasis). In Sorenson's words:

We reach a verdict about the existence of controversial things by assessing how well these entities would harmonize with the existence of better established thing. If we start from nothing, we lack the bearings needed to navigate forward (p. 2).

Like Aristotle, the author of Goldilocks, and others, Augustine seems to be saying we are compelled to play the Game of Between not only with Something but also with Nothing. In order to begin in the Middle we have to have at least two game pieces, ones like absence/presence, privation/possession, silence/sound, and blindness/sight, that exist before the Game begins.

In the course of the Game we may create the Middle. One possibility would be Sorenson's extended discussion of Nothingness.

A salient example of playing with such pre-existing pieces is Lord Rochester's poem, "Upon Nothing" (1676).

49. Nowhere: Mohammed Idris Ali lives in an enclave of Bangladesh surrounded entirely by India. "The Indians say we are not Indian; the Bangladeshis say we are not Bangladeshi...We are nowhere."
Measuring (Value/ Precision/Accuracy): Precision implies a degree of permissible latitude around the exact value of X. Accuracy expresses the deviation between that value and an actual, often variant, observation of X.

Accuracy and precision belong to a larger family of concepts headed by "measurement." The exact value of X guides our measuring X. Does this mean that Shakespeare "measures" the exact value of X better than other writers? That his words, consequently, are more accurate and precise? Even though he never "measures" the exact value of X?

Perhaps. But doesn't this kind of thinking run up against the murky uses of "exact value." Does the term have enforceable uses and meaning?

When we measure something do we think about who invented measurement? Do we think about who, or what, enforces measurement? Probably not. Does this mean that we can recognize the value of X while performing X with no clue as to where X came from? Possibly.

Is playing the Game of Between something like measuring X? That we enter the Game with the recognition that it has an exact value? That we have a chance to follow the rules of the Game in a precise and accurate way? Isn't it possible to keep playing the Game without knowing who invented it; give it its authority or who or what enforces it?

Saying whoever invented language invented the Game seems like a tautology.

Context as Middle: Does the phrase I used above, "Start with the Middle," have validity as Middle if the Middle turns out to be Context? Please Washington
consider, as an example, an excerpt from my play *Yielding*; a play performed in several locations, New York, Brisbrane Australia, Salt Lake City, at my university and others. In *Yielding* the context I started with was a ski-lift as a nascent foundation for constructing a relationship between a newly married couple. The couple, just married at the top of a ski life, are on their way down when the lift stalls midway down the mountain. To them, the stalled lift has become a "new thing" and the subject of the dialogue between them. Here is the excerpt from the play:

The format is one used by playwrights:

```
SOUND: Machine (chairlift)
  humming.

BRIDE

(Rubbing her face.)

I hate this shit.

GROOM

You know what I wanted. Something simple, ordinary clothes, the open air. We could have a quick bite, make a fast video. Plus do a little baseline bird-watching on the way up and it’s done.

BRIDE

Mom wanted me to wear cosmetics. They're itchy…what happened to our wedding gifts?

GROOM

Washington 63

Game of Between
Uncle Larry is looking after them.

    BRIDE

Uncle Larry! We'll never see them again.

    GROOM

Well, you can't expect him to always act normal. The war didn't give him the experience he wanted.

    SOUND: Machine

    (lift) humming stops.

    BRIDE

What was that? I think we're stopping.

    GROOM

    (Laughing.)

And no air-bags?

    BRIDE

Would you get serious? We're not moving!

    GROOM

It's O.K. It's just the wind. **BRIDE**
Why can't I hear the sound of the gears and things?

GROOM

We're still moving. Lifts today are quiet.

BRIDE

On just THIS part of the line?

GROOM

Well, why would we stop here? We're not even half way down.

BRIDE

(Quickly; moving away from the Groom)

How should I know why? Getting married at a ski-resort in fall, taking the lift up and down, that was your idea, remember?...Look up and see if something is wrong with the connecting rods.

GROOM

(Craning his neck, looking up.)

Hard to see up here. Looks all right to me.

BRIDE

Look again. Try standing up this time.
GROOM

What?

BRIDE

Try standing up.

GROOM

On my boots?

BRIDE

Yes, on your boots.
GROOM

I think I have a nail in one of them.

BRIDE

I can fix that. Take your boot off.

GROOM shakes his foot gently.

GROOM

Uhhh….It's all right now. It must have been something else.

BRIDE

Good. Now climb up there and check the cable.

GROOM

Okay, I'll try. But you'll have to give me more room.

BRIDE

(Trying to move over.)

Oh shit. My dress is stuck on something.

GROOM

Stuck? It sticks to everything. I can't move unless you do.

BRIDE

I 'm stuck, damnit

Washington 67

Game of Between
GROOM

Let me help.

(Starts pulling Bride's dress up.)

Now I see, here's the problem.

BRIDE, knocks the GROOM's hands away; she yanks her dress down and pulls it away from the seat.

BRIDE

Forget it.

51. Context (or Scene) can perhaps be viewed from three different perspectives. First, and perhaps most obvious, we can take it as "present for conversation." The ski-lift, in the above, gives the two characters something to talk about. The ski-lift, as specific thing, avoids the abstraction of general things and increases the possibility of the audience picturing the scene. Secondly, the scene depends on the ski-lift stalling. Consequently a space opens up for the couple to work on certain differences. We see this as an instrumental function of Context. Finally, we might advance the claim that an object like a ski-lift can function as a Character? In the case of Yielding a third character?

Washington 68

Game of Between
Let us take a minute to consider this possibility. The argument starts from the assumption (more like a soft claim) that language has the ability to "animate the inanimate." In the Barbara Johnson way of thinking about apostrophe, the authorial intent is to humanize an “absent, abstract or inanimate” subject. In this there is always an “I” (addressor) and a “you” (the addressee). The “I” “calls” the “you” into the text as a “mute” responder. Such a presence “informs without speech”.

Two perspectives come to mind. X can inform Y of Z with or without speech. Humans can inform with speech or, in the case of gestures, without it. Inanimate objects, like a ski-lift, can only inform without it. They inform because we "animate" them. Without us there would be no informing by means of a Middle.

For Chekhov, the seagull (The Seagull) and the cherry orchard (The Cherry Orchard) are objects that inform without speaking. Here Chekhov seems to make this implicit with Trigorin describing a story he is writing. The dead seagull is there with him in the scene:

Idea for a short story. The shore of lake, and a young girl
who's spent her whole life beside it, a girl like you [Nina]....
She loves the lake the way a seagull does, and she's happy and free as a seagull. Then a man comes along, sees her, and ruins her life
because he has nothing better to do. Destroys her like this

Washington 69

Game of Between
In the *Cherry Orchard* the loss of the orchard not only brings grief to Liubov, and other members of the family, but it also serves as a symptom of Lopakhin's ruthlessness (who brought the orchard) and the (sometimes) inhumanity of capitalism:

And now the cherry orchard is mine! *(A loud laugh)* My God, the cherry orchard belongs to me! Tell me I'm drunk, tell me it's all a dream, I'm making this up—*(Stomps on the floor)*....[I'm] the boy they [the estate owners] beat, who went barefoot in winter and never went to school, see how that poor boy just bought the most beautiful estate in the whole world! *(Act 3, p. 373).*

The play ends with the sound of axes cutting the cherry trees down. It too informs without speaking—inform from the orchard as Middle.

52. Convergence of the Extremes: In "Water," Eiko and Koma, at the Paul Milstein Pool at Lincoln Center's Hearst Plaza, begin their performance by wading from opposite directions to meet in the middle of the pool. There, in the words of the reviewer, begins a "narrative...[that takes ] the two performers through what looked like a hazardous ford, a fraught meeting, drowning, attempts at rescue, a raft, corpses borne on a current and a funeral bier at sea. At times the two artists were as motionless and supine in the water as waiting crocodiles or floating logs. But the drama seemed always heroic, even epic."
We have characterized the Middle as a "space" of novelty. Something new comes into being. Is this consistent with the reviewer's representation as Eiko and Koma enact a "narrative"? If so, then we can submit that different positions of the performers, new items in their space, heavenward gestures and the like, sustain the narrative. It ends when they separate and return to their start positions.

Should we be reminded here of Hardy's "The Convergence of the Twain?" (1912). Like "Water," the action takes place in water (the Atlantic Ocean). The two "performers," an iceberg and the liner Titanic, meet to create a singular, novel, narrative.

Other literary examples of Convergence as meeting are Michael Frayn's play, *Copenhagen* and Dava Sobel *A More Perfect Heaven: How Copernicus Revolutionized the Cosmos*. In *Copenhagen* the action arises from a presumed meeting between the physicists Heisenberg and Niels Bohr; Sobel's book raises from an alleged meeting between Copernicus and Georg Joachim von Lauchen, a young mathematician.

We might infer from these examples that convergence, while it represents novelty, also presupposes Inertia. That is, Eiko and Koma, the iceberg and the Titanic, *Copenhagen* and *A More Perfect Heaven* start the narrative of each by a disruption in their Inertia, the tendency of any object to resist any change in its motion. To present a Middle in the Game of Between one has to disrupt (change, modify) the Inertia of the Extremes (please see Inertia, p. 97).
53. Vortex: Vortices, ss seen in whirlpools, maelstroms, tornadoes, spiral columns of insects (gnats or firefires) leaves caught in a spiraling updraft have a center. Can we justify ourselves in calling the center the Middle of a Between? If so, does this make the circumference of a Vortex into something like the Extremes of a Between?

With the Vortex is nature playing the Game of Between? Within a Vortex things are caught in a cycle of creation, transformation and destruction. Is this cycle something we would like the Game of Between to represent?

Recently (December 6, 2011) scientists report detecting two of the largest black holes found so far. One, thought to weigh as much as 21 billion suns, is known to lie in the center of the galaxy NGC 4889 which is about 6 million light years from us in the Coma Constellation. The other black hole, in the galaxy NGC 3842, is equivalent in mass to 9.7 billion suns. It’s about 1 million light-years in the constellation of Leo.

Scientists believe that a black hole rotates about 1,150 times a second.

Nowadays we think that nature has no purpose—at least no intelligible one. Still, we might hazard the guess that the purpose of a black hole, or any land, sea and air one, has a transformational function? Specifically, one to restore order or to keep the universe in balance around some gigantic center? That the whirling Extremes of the outer rims of a vortex, like a black hole, or whirlwind, stabilize and re-stabilize, a center that finds itself in a state of disequilibrium?

Can we say the same for an Between? That its Extremes have the function of keeping the Center stabilize—where stabilization implies existence?
54. Thesis and Emergence of the Middle. A thesis statement can be defined in different ways. It may inform the audience how the subject will be interpreted; or it may be a short description of the "roadmap" of what follows. It may contain a response to a question about the subject, a rebuttal of another claim about the subject or a new claim about the subject—one that presents new evidence about the subject.

Perhaps the most succinct way to state a thesis is by Emergence of Novelty from the Convergence of Extremes on a Middle—the "names" of the Extremes being, in the following example, "the ancient" and "the modern": "The World Wide Web...signals the emergence of a new way of being and thinking to rival the ancient and the modern, even as it draws elements of both."lviii

55. Conflict and Violence: The Game of Between seems to be particularly appropriate for storytellers interested in conflict and violence. Class warfare, and its possible effects, is one example. War is another, love triangles another (please see Triangles, p. 78). In these we might hazard the guess that the Extremes of a Between represent the warring parties and the Middle the effects of their "war."

The Middle as effect seems to be the reasoning behind Fukuyama's "Game" of state formation. Violent acts, he claims, is a principal cause in bringing new states into being. Creation of new states, with new forms of bureaucracy and centralization, has a direct correlation with the persistence, quantity and quality of warfare. A salient example of this were the Qin Dynasty (221-226 B.C.) and the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D) of China.lix
Persistent warfare helped to lay the ground for the creation of their "modern" states.


Telling stories about failure seem common today (6:10 AM, 25 July 2011). If one writes, or recites, a successful story about failure can we say that some version of failure justifies telling the story?

That was an odd way of putting it.

57. Self-Similarity: We imagine, think, dream, and create and destroy Betweening. We imagine true, false and no-meaning Betweens. In all of this we are, in a sense, Betweening Betweens, cognitive behavior suggestive of being conscious of our consciousness.

Metaphysics is the "study of what exists...(including) "the limit case where nothing exists"\textsuperscript{xix}

Should we stop here or attempt to find a way to go on? We might start by asking who the players in this Game are? Let us assume that they are two minds reflecting on one another. In order to keep going they have to share information about X. X can be either present and actual or absent and possible and the relationship between the minds is reciprocal. Information flows back and forth between them.

We further assume that one person can represent the two minds: "I am of two minds."

Washington  74

Game of Between
I'm tempted to say add two "Ts" together to form "we."

As an example take this (partial) account (a friend of mine) of his ascent of Mt. Kilimanjaro:

And how had we doctors and lawyers responded to the snow, the footing, and the exhaustion? What kind of judgment had we applied to the increased danger, the obvious cognitive decline, and the physical sickness? It seemed to vary between two poles, poor judgment and no judgment. But we reached the summit.\footnote{58}

One mind of my friend raises the question the other mind answers it with a Between, "between two poles...."

X stands for the mountain.

58. My Version: I am tempted to say that telling a story by means of the Game of Between is my version of telling a story just as my life is a version of a possible kind of life. By having lived this possible life I have, at the same time, excluded every other possible life. Living a life is bounded and irreversible.

We might analogize from this that every Game of Between begins and ends as my version of a possible Game. At the end of the Game all other possible Games have disappeared as an option for me—but not for other players of the Game.

Here we seem to have a transition from my version of the Game to your version.
59. Triplets: Ice: water: steam; three-cushion billiards; a puzzle wrapped in a mystery within an enigma.

Suggested exercise: How would you use them to structure a text? Or at least a comment about X?

60. Note on Notation Please be aware that the author is using the notation, X and Y, and sometimes Z, A, B, and C, in the same way he is using Thirdness; that is, as part of the *invariable infrastructure* of the Game of Between.

By terms like "I," "one," "you," "we," "use," "my," "h/s" I mean, broadly, the "mind," and by extension, "meaning." "Mind" and "meaning," I hasten to add, have the same general etymology—from the Indo-European "*men."

Following Buck we are allowed to say that "mind" can also (sometimes) encompass "emotion," "soul" and activities of the mind, thinking, perceiving, understanding and the like. lxii

Notations like the above, in the manner of chess pieces, delimit the space in which the Game of Between can begin

How the Game ends is unpredictable.

61. Food: "Middle" stands as the *pater familia* of the Between family. Members of his family are words already mentioned and many more unrecorded. One that now appears in the family is "mean"
In one of its derivations it comes from the Latin *communis* in the sense of "vulgar" or "unpleasant": "A mean spirit." In another descent from Latin, from *medianus*, it has the sense of "the mean between X & Y" or "halfway between extremes."

In "mean's" transition to a plural form, "means," it took on an instrumental use: "X by means of Y." Here we have a sense of movement, of time passing and the transformation of X by means of Y.

We have, in short, a way to represent Food.

Please consider *Lebensmittel*. German for "the means of living."

62. Assumption of the Existence of X. All knowing, according to Aristotle, proceeds from "pre-existing (or) old knowledge." (*Posterior Analytics* 71a 1-5). What we can know starts from what we do know. If we can't know it, then it may be sign either it doesn't exist or we have no knowledge of its existence.

Should we assume then that there are persons who cannot play the Game of Between? Perhaps such persons live in a culture that has no name for either "Game" or "Between?" Or perhaps their language has the words as names but the would-be player has to be taught the words before he can become a player?

Is there any difference between the word "player" and "gamer"? Do we change contexts when we change from one to the other?

To know the existence of X we have to experience X.
63. Metrical Representations. In mathematics a matrix typically appears as "entries" arranged in rows (horizontal) and columns (vertical) numbers. The general purpose is to allow the mind to predict what holds a system together and allow it to function a certain way. Like many other linguistic and quantitative representations, including the Game of Between, matrices are presumably reductive.

A real world representation of a matrix is a machine, a fire-truck, a printer, a pair of scissors, something composed of parts linked to other parts—the purpose of the whole being to do a certain kind of work. On my university campus, for example, there is an apparatus called an Environmental Observatory. The Observatory, as one may surmise, measures ten different weather conditions: temperature (air, or "it feels like X"); wind (speed, direction); relative humidity; solar radiation; barometric pressure; and atmospheric visibility.

Can we say that anything we perceive as a matrix has a Middle? One that can be found and, accordingly, can qualify as a nascent Game of Between? If so, does the Middle correspond (roughly) to what literary folks call a "thesis," "a point," or even a "genre?"

(Please see The Fractal Character of Between, p. 103).

64. Difference: Above I quoted this passage about the poetry of Elizabeth Bishop:

As in so many of her poems, (Elizabeth) Bishop brings us to such a place of utter poise, balancing between the real and the ideal…between the
dreamt-of and the impossible, between love and loss; between sleep and waking, between solitude and communion.

The repetition of "between" seems to indicate we are witnessing different Games of Between with different subjects. But it is possible to find examples of one Game played with different subjects. Here is a writer describing Beckett's *Malone* as a work "devoid of definitional boundaries":

Malone's narrative [is] …about staking out a space…precariously suspended between subjective and objective, me and not me, the past and present, possession and non-possession, love and hate.\textsuperscript{xiii}

In such cases, we wonder about authorial intentions. Does anything nameable lie between, for example, "subjective and objective"? If so, can it be described or understood? Or is the reader left looking into a void?

65. Suppressing the Why (die Frage 'warum' unterdrucken). Wittgenstein advises us to avoid asking "why" if we want to become "aware of the important facts…[that can] lead us to an answer" (die wichtigen Tatsachen gewahr…zu Antwort fuhren) (PI #471).

In this context we might take this to mean "look at many examples of a Between before you start theorizing about the nature, function, presence or absence of Between. Or Wittgenstein might be inviting us to picture "why" as a detraction, a way of "missing the point" of the facts of a particular Between—what brought it into being, where does it occur in the text, what does it represent, or not represent, what are its effects on the text as a whole and the like. .

Likely literary examples of not suppressing the "why" are Walter (Tristram Shandy's father) and Toby, Tristram's uncle. Walter's "whying" has mainly to do with Washington
marriage, child-bearing and child-rearing. Toby's focus is on warfare, fortifications and the Battle of Namur.

The result of this is a certain kind of existential tunnel vision, of not observing, and understanding, of what is going on around them with the household women, Tristram's mother, Susannah, the Widow Wadman and so on. Tristram, the narrator, summarizes the mental process of his two relatives in the following way:

It is the nature of an hypothesis, when once a man has conceived it, that it assimilates everything to itself as proper nourishment; and, from the first moment of your begetting it, it generally grows the stronger by every thing you see, hear, read, or understand. This is of great use.\textsuperscript{lxiv}

Can everything we see, hear, read or understand be reduced to a Between? That would be of great use.

66. Suppressing the Possibility of Failure: An important question for Wittgenstein is knowing (finding out) how "to go on" (weiss ich weiter, \textit{PI} 323)—going on, for example, by seeing a pattern in a series of numbers or an algebraic expression (\textit{PI} 151, 185).

The capacity to go on seems related to the capacity to imagine failure and success.—not so much as actualities but more as possibilities. Should the player of the Game of Between, in order to sustain going on, always suppress the possibility of failure and enlarge the possibility of success? Or at least entertain the possibility of enlarging success?

Or should h/s go on by suppressing both the possibilities of success and failure?
Wouldn't that leave us in the awkward position of trying to annihilate the possibility of possibilities?

One is reminded of Benjamin "angel of history" that flies toward the future while looking backwards.

67. Hedonic Ethology: (Or animal, include human, pleasure). Seeking pleasure, basking in the sun, listening to music, writing fiction, sex, or eating are adaptive behaviors. Pleasure, like pain, means evolutionary strategies of avoiding danger (pain) and seeking something pleasant.

Does playing the Game of Between give us pleasure? And by so doing give us an edge, in the game of evolution, over those who do not play the Game?

How would you go on from here?

68. That Static and the Moving Between: We are tempted to say that every Between can represent its subject as either static or moving—somewhat in the way that trigonometry represents static nature while calculus represents it as moving. Here one can envision counting both a moving "now" and a non-moving one. A moving "now" makes the duration of X both moving and non-moving. Moving "nows" make duration. The time it takes to process a Between plus understanding what such duration represents. Non-moving "nows" represent time as co-existence, X and Y in the same place at the same time. The "now" is always in reference to the Middle of an Between. It can either "stand still" or "move" between the Extremes of a Between. In most prose, the non-moving Middle is the case. In the performing Washington Game of Between
arts, it is usually the moving Middle. The character that represents the Middle comes and goes on stage.

69. *Una trinitas et trina unitas* (One in trinity and three in unity). The existence of a writer's muse is problematic today. But if one should ask me if something like a muse was at work in this text, then I would have to say that it is related to St. Augustine's (paradoxical?) remark about God. My muse spoke (and continues to speak) to me of Betweenness as opening up the possibility of looking at the subject from three different perspectives; from the point of view of a creator (the mind that creates a Between); from the perspective of a unity formed of three parts and as a thirdness that creates a unity. Taken together, we have the possibility of something like a mind working in both a top-down and a bottom-up way.

70. Asymmetry: An assumption about the relationship between the three parts of a Between is asymmetry. They exhibit three-way differences while still maintaining a common purpose. But why do we assume this? Why not assume the opposite? That they have a symmetrical relationship? Or that they have an equal amount of substance and purpose?

Modern cosmology assumes that there is an asymmetrical relationship between matter and anti-matter. Otherwise, they would have destroyed each other. If they were perfect opposites, equal amounts of the two would have been made in the Big Bang, and they would have annihilated each other long
since, leaving only light and other forms of electromagnetic radiation to fill the cosmos.

On the face of it, this seems to be a sort of answer to Heidegger's question, "Why is there actually something and not rather nothing?" ("Warum ist überhaupt etwas und nicht vielmehr Nichts").\textsuperscript{lxvi}

We have something because there is "more" matter than anti-matter. We suppress the why.

But what does this "more" mean? An analogy here might be the Christian Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As in Heidegger's formulation ("nicht…Nichts") we might go on and distinguish them by means of double negation as something missing leading to something present. God lacks movement. The Holy Spirit moves in the cosmos \textit{in place} of God. God lacks worldly peculiarity. Jesus, God made manifest, exhibits the perfection of particulars. Jesus touches us and is, in return, touchable.

What one lacks the other makes up. Together, what is made up is perfect in three ways. Can we not take this as a good example of Plenitude? (please see p. 29).

Should we then expect to find double negation in every instance of a Between? Is it, like Thirdness, a permanent infrastructure of the Game of Between?

71. \textit{Is/Ought: Mapping what is and what ought to be into a Between (or a Between into an Is/Ought) might take the following form. Suppose you want to "bring fun back to golf." The reason you give for thinking it's not fun Washington Game of Between}
anymore, at least for the average (non-tour or recreational, player), is that the latter wants to tee off from the pro tees. Since the average drive of a pro is 280 yards (to the 200-220 of the recreational player) frustration with one's driving skills is bound to occur—or so the theory goes.

So what you want to see happen, to bring the fun back, is "to tee forward," or shorten the distance between tee and the pin.

So you form a campaign called Tee It Forward and set out to educate recreational golfers to adopt the concept. You gather statistics about length of drives from the tee and those with irons from the fairway. You calculate that a pro would have to play a course measuring 8,100 yards in order to use the same clubs on approaches as an amateur who drives the 230 yards on 6,700 yard course. You claim that even with the most expensive clubs nothing will close the gap between length of a pro and a recreational player.

Are we justified then in calling this a Between situation? Between the Is and the Ought of recreational golf lies a Middle one must traverse in order to get from the Extremes of Is and Ought?

The Middle, in short, is essentially the stuff of persuasion based both on evidence (statistics) and an argument about what makes golf "fun" for the recreational player.

72. Patterning. Does a Between correspond to any of these traditional elements of rhetoric? Does it have a family resemblance, in structure or function, with traditional forms like metaphor, topic, motif or trope?

Following hints from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Quintilian's *Institutes* do we Washington Game of Between
have warrant for advising a student of rhetoric (oratory) to include Betweenes in h/h bag of tricks along with metaphor and the like?

Again, this would imply that h/s look closely at examples like the following—look closely before classifying them either one way or another:

1. "A number of plot threads explore the mixing of cultural identities in the zone between colonizer and colonized."

2. "Like Evelyn Waugh he creates comedy from the tension between the elegance of his prose and the often indecorous things he is describing, and so the reader is caught between amusement and exhilaration when someone with a terrible hangover staggers to the lavatory where he is 'sick.'"

3. "They [James Joyce and his wife] settled in a flat on the first floor of a house at 28b Campden Grove...almost midway between the rooms where...Ezra Pound...had lodged and ...South Lodge, the house Ford Madox Ford had shared with his mistress Violet Hunt."

With #3 the writer seems to be following Aristotle's advice to "put the scene before the eyes" which he associates with the effect of metaphor (Rhetoric (1410b 33). It is far more imageable than #1 and #2 and a sort of Google map of the area.
#1 and #2 function much like a promise by the writer to specify later what "between" refers to. In this it has a family resemblance to what I call Preparation for a future, complete, Between—or, in more technical terms, a cataphoric structure formed by later terms co-referring with earlier ones. (See Preparation, p. 81).

So, are we justified in classifying a Between as a figure of speech like a trope or topic? Can a Between be, like a trope or topic, ready made, off the rack? Or does it have to be custom made? It would seem that it is more like the latter than the former. Unlike a trope or topic, one can only create a Between by way of two Extremes that converge on a Middle, even an indefinite (cataphoric) Middle like #1 and #2 (above). Tropes and topics, in other words, have no discernible Middle.

In the Game of Between one has to reach the Middle in order to win the Game.—or at least complete it.

73. Collocations: Linguists often classify groups of words on the basis of their "tightness." Idioms and clichés are perhaps the best example. They are the "tightest." They are easy to remember and speakers repeat them often. Typically one learns them as one would an individual word early in life: "only two things are certain in life, death and taxes"; "He has bats in the belfry"; "You can't judge a book by its cover" and so on.

Midway between an idiom and a new expression, are expressions that lack such "tightness." These are Collocations. Of these, some are formed from "between" and "middle.": "He was torn *between X & Y*": "The difference
between X and Y"; "Halfway between X and Y"; "Caught in the middle," "Gray zone" and many more.

74. Judging: To what extent can Between represent the judging (evaluating) mind? Since judging seems to represent a mind in motion, the Between would be the context for such motion. This suggests that X, Y, and Z (parts of a Between) can represent different "minds" judging the same thing, the publishability of a MS, an alleged criminal act, the constitutionality of a law and so on.

In this case judging could potentially go from X to Y to Z for a final judgment. This allows for three outcomes. If X and Y agree then judging would stop. If they disagree then it would proceed to Z. Z would then either agree or disagree with X and Y's judgment. The judgments of X and Y are necessary ones, that of Z a possible (contingent) one.

. In this example X and Y might stand for the Extremes of Between and Z for the Middle. Z stops the process only if the behavior of the player Game "times" the process out at Z.

Here is an example the X, Y, Z judging process from the editor of a journal about my submission:

We have sent your essay, anonymously, to two readers [X and Y] for peer review, both of whom are specialists in the essay's field. We ask readers to return their reports within four weeks. Sometimes, however, readers are not available to review the essays we send them, or they need extra time.
We do stay in touch with reviewers and make every effort to expedite the process. If the first two readers disagree in their recommendations, we seek a third review [Z], which can also lengthen the review process.

If an article receives two recommendations against publication, it is generally declined within about eight weeks of submission and following a final review by the editor [Z]. If an article receives two [X and Y] recommendations for publication, it is sent to the …Editorial Board, [Z] perhaps after the author revises in response to the reviewers' suggestions. The board meets three times a year, generally in October, January-February, and May. For articles reviewed by the board, the entire review process usually takes between four and eight months.

"Between four and eight months" describes what I referred to above as "timed out."

75. Triangles: Here are some examples of character "triangles" in two movies and dance routine, the last being one borrowed from the movie Rashomon:

A. A triangle composed of the characters Laurie, Martin and Charley. Laurie has to decide which person she will marry. She then represents the possible "Middle." The Searchers, starring John Wayne.

B. A triangle between Nickie, the man, his fiancée and Terry. Here Nickie is the Middle. An Affair to Remember.
C. One between Man in Blue, Man in Green and Woman in Red. Paul Taylor's "Three Dubious Memories" a dance based on the Kurosawa's film *Rashomon*. In the dance the story is told in three different ways, from three points of view. The Woman in Red is the Middle.

D. A triangle between Jerrie, Tom and Mary in the movie "Another Year." Jerrie and Tom are a couple with one adult son. Mary, lonely, alcoholic and neurotic is a friend who wants desperately to be part of the family, Mary wants, for example, to participate in the funeral of Tom's sister in law; she wants to be close to Tom's brother and she takes Tom's son as a prospective husband.

Do we need, with these examples, further criteria? Such as the context in which the Triangles as Betweens come into being? How physical positions and gestures correlate with Dialogue?

As script and playwrights are we always concerned with seeing that dialogue, action and motive point to one end? Isn't that what the writer of *Genesis* accomplished with great skill with Eve, the Snake and God?

Typically, such triangles are formed by first two characters coming (or appearing) together, through marriage, friendship or common interest, to form a stable, and relatively simple, relationship. So why a third character?

Most playwrights and short story writers, such as myself, will tell you a two character play or story typically generates less interest to an audience than a three character one. The reason seems to be related to what Washington 89
Wittgenstein calls "going on." A two character story does not allow the storyteller to go "as far" as a three character one.

So what do we mean by "as far as?" Let us, using the example of Don Quixote. In the first book the knight sets out in the early morning and ends up at an inn, which he believes to be a castle. He asks the innkeeper, who he thinks to be the lord of the castle, to dub him a knight. He becomes involved in a fight with mule drivers. Eventually, the innkeeper dubs Quixote a knight, and sends him on his way.

The story, that is, builds from one to two to three characters, from the knight, to the innkeeper to the muleteers. In subsequent quests the knight picks up a squire, Sancho, and the pattern of meeting-the-third character continues, with types like priests, prostitutes, escaped prisoners, lovesick couples and so on.

Please note the "fractal" nature of these quests. These nest in each other and they replicate the way each one ends, in the defeat of the knight. (See The Fractal Character of a Between, p. 103)

Note also that the adversaries the knight frequently encountered, for example, the mule drivers, lovesick couples, townspeople, seem to illustrate the three in one unity and a one in three unity of every Between. (Please see again Una trinitas et trina unitas, p.73 )

And what about a third quest of the knight, alluded to at the end of Book One? Does Book Two represent that? Or is it a hiatus in the text? Or is it a space, deliberately left open by Cervantes, for the reader to compose his own quest-story?

So have we answered the "as far as" question? Perhaps. To some degree. But let us go on to the three-generation play or story, the one with the "I," the grandparents and Washington Game of Between
the children. Examples include *Lost in Yonkers*, *On Golden Pond* and Flannery

O'Connor's *A Good Man Is Hard to Find*. All of these involve conflict, of one sort or
another, between the generations. But in all of them the "rules" of the Game of Between
require that the middle generation, the generation between grandparents and their own
children, play the major role in the conflict. (Please see Kinship Relations, p. 120)

Here we might claim that the question "as far as" is answered by "as far as we can
go with the middle generation."

76. Self-Reference. Can we use Betweens to represent Between? Can
we pretend that without Betweens there would be no possibility of
representation on the order of "if X and Y can have meaning as use then it is
because of the prior existence of Z where Z has the capacity to take on the
nature of such things as the goal of X and Y, their ideal, their DNA and the
like?

Let us then go on to pretend that it is possible. But let's not pretend
that we have succeeded in our pretence. Between the idea and the act many
shoes are worn out (Italian proverb).

77. Preparation. There seem to be many singular terms that presuppose
what can be called a *preparation* for a Game of Between:

Reconciliation

Revenge (between a past wrong and a current payback)

Merger

Twilight

Umpire

Washington 91

Game of Between
Limbo (between action and inaction)

Meanwhile

Crepuscular

Suggestion: Pick one item from this list and build a story around it. Start with the term, say "Twilight," as a Middle and then go on to creates two Extremes for it. What foundation elements of the Extremes are contained, or presupposed, in "Twilight?"

Preparing for a Game of Between, however, involves working out the details. A merger, of banks, social networks and the like takes time and mistakes (seen in hindsight) are often made. An example from The New York Times is a report on the merger of Delta and Northwest Airlines. The merger took 18 months and 1,200 systems had to be integrated. Agreements with unions had to be worked out. Planes had to be repainted. Questions such as these arose: "How many chimes should pilots ring to signal the plane is about to land—two or four? Should flight attendants first pour drinks into a cup or just hand over the can?" The custom at Delta was to pour the drinks into a cup. At Northwest one was handed the can.

78. Between Versus In-Between: One would like to say that there is a difference between Between and In-Between. The latter seems richer than the former. But where does the richness lie? With the prefix "In" we seem to be taken into something underlying Between. An additional movement of the mind is involved. (Is this because more syllables are at work in In-Between.

In-Between sounds richer, more dynamic, than Between).
Compare the German "zwischen" with "dazwischen." Does the latter seem to take you deeper, into something more fundamental, than the former? Is that because, in part, that "dazwischen" sounds more fundamental—and this is because it takes longer to pronounce? The mind is held in one place longer? The movement of the breathe is longer, more complex?

79. The Joy of In-Betweenness: Michael Murphy quotes a remark about Shivas Irons on walking between golf holes as an "in-between" Shivas tells Murphy, his pupil, what a "rotten shame" it is that Murphy is so occupied with the next hole that he doesn't "enjoy the walkin'":

'Tis a shame, 'tis a rotten shame, for if ye can enjoy the walkin', ye can probably enjoy the other times in yer life when ye're in between. And that's most o' the time; wouldn't ye say! (op. cit., p. 187; Murphy's emphasis)

Are we, as Shivas says, "in between...most of the time"? If so, then does this condition presuppose being in a state of double consciousness? Being conscious of being conscious of at least two other things, the Extremes, and being conscious of having some relationship with them?

In Murphy's representation being conscious of the Extremes (the tee and the hole) becomes a detraction from the joy of "walkin in between" them.

80. The Middle as Evidence: What did Z do between X and Y? How did h/s play the Game of Between? Say Z has been accused of committing a crime. Suppose further he went from the alleged crime scene (X) to a possible point of escape, an airport, a train station or bus depot (Y). Finally, suppose h/s was Washington
observed at lunch between X and Y. Did h/s's behavior give evidence that he committed the crime at X? Or is it evidence of h/s's innocence?

Please see "Behavior at Lunch May Play Key Role in Strauss-Kahn's Abuse Trial." lxxii

81. The Dharmic Middle Way"In eastern philosophy, Anicca (Sanskrit anitya) or "impermanence" describes existence. It refers to the fact that all conditioned things (sankhara) are in a constant state of flux. In reality there is no thing that ultimately ceases to exist; only the appearance of a thing ceases as it changes from one form to another. Imagine a leaf that falls to the ground and decomposes. While the appearance and relative existence of the leaf ceases, the components that formed the leaf become particulate material that goes on to form new plants. Buddhism teaches a middle way, avoiding the extreme views of eternalism and nihilism. The middle way recognizes there are vast differences between the way things are perceived to exist and the way things really exist. The differences are reconciled in the concept of Shunyata by addressing the existing object's served purpose for the subject’s identity in being. What exists is in non-existence, because the subject changes."lxxiii

82. Flat Versus Three-Dimensional Figures: "It seems queer that with some drawings our impression should be a flat thing, and with some a three-dimensional thing" (Wittgenstein PI # 202e). Can a Between be a "drawing?" Certainly with three lines, three squares and the like we can represent one as lying between two others. (Perhaps we would want to color, or some other notation, to mark the Middle line or square).
But how would this help our understanding of the use of a Between?

Between as Expression. It seems likely that a Between can both express something, new or given, or express nothing. This reason for this may be because, as Beckett has it, there is an "obligation to express": "The expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express."\textsuperscript{llxiv}

Expressing nothing seems straightforward enough. Lord Rochester does exactly that in his great poem, "Upon Nothing" (1679). Here he presumably felt the obligation to express nothing in six or seven ways, as lying, as political speech, as the principal narrative of \textit{Genesis} and so on.

But wait a minute. Shouldn't we make a distinction between "nothing" as word and "nothing" as concept? The crux seems to be perception. Can I perceive nothing? Or only imagine perceiving it? We might look at a river running between its banks and think "a bridge needs to be built here." The bridge is imageable but materially non-existent. The river as a Between (between two banks) goes on unbridged. Because it cannot be perceived by means of certain perceptual qualities, its supports, its location on the river, its colors, and so on. One cannot use a non-existent bridge to cross the river without getting wet. Suppose then we decide to swim across.

Isn't it possible to imagine that swimming across the river is the effect of there not being a bridge? That nothingness has causal force? That the

Washington

Game of Between
nothingness of the bridge can have consequences?: "Rien n’est plus réel que rien" ("Nothing is more real than nothing") (Beckett).

Suppose we need to express our take on the human condition. Might we want to begin our representation with the two Extremes of finitude and infinity. Then we put mankind in the Middle conscious of their finiteness (conscious of death). Now what? Mankind has consciousness. They are conscious that they have consciousness. The question then becomes, not what they should do with such consciousness, but rather should they do anything with it?

Here playing the Game of Between seems to shuttle the mind back and forth between finiteness and infinity.

83. Separating, Combining, Novelty: Does preparing to play the Game of Between begin with a picture of separating and combining Extremes? With the preparatory word "merger" we seem to see the Extremes come to together to form a new thing. Here the rule of the Game is "combine X with Y to form Z." With "reconciliation" the rule is essentially the same but with the added notion of "re-combine." That is, to bring together what (the Extremes) were once together but are now separated. "Reconciliation" implies a state, "conciliation," prior to "reconciliation." It has a "history" lacking in "merger."

Both "merger" and "reconciliation" involve working out the details. This too can be seen as a Game with certain rules.

84. At Stake: What's at stake in completing a Between like a merger?

Customer loyalty in the case of airlines or banks? What's at stake in Washington 96

Game of Between
sustaining an Between like a marriage? The possibility of divorce? What’s at stake in not dissolving a relationship, a connection or a contract?

Here the image of crossing a threshold comes to mind. One might say to oneself: should I continue over and beyond it? Should I turn and go back? Should I pause on the threshold and think about which way to go?

What if an abyss (Abgrund) yawns beyond this threshold? (Wittgenstein PI #84). (Please see Crossing a Threshold, p. 118).

What image do I see when I use the phrase "there is the difference between….?" Is it an attempt to foreground, bring to front and center stage, what has hitherto occupied the background?

85. Interstellar Travel (Or Going From Here to There): Should we take any conceivable "Here" and "There" as the Extremes of a Between? What if "Here" is earth and "There" is Alpha Centauri, a star 4.4 light years from earth? What if the journey would take, in a spaceship traveling 38,000 miles an hour, 70,000 years to traverse the distance between the earth and Alpha Centauri?

Who ever goes on such a journey would never come back. Whoever goes won’t be born for 200 years from now (19 August 2011). Whoever plans a journey of 70,000 years in 200 years time manages to think of things deep in the past that are far in the future.

We can imagine Middles traversable in a finite length of time. This is because we can count? Can we imagine an uncountable, indivisible< Middle? (For more details on interstellar travel please see Darpa [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]).

Washington 97

Game of Between
86. The Middle as Modes of Time: Sometimes time seems to "go fast"; at other times to "creep by." The Middle between now-here and then-there can expand or contract. In the movie "One Day" (2011), starring Jim Sturgess and Anne Hathaway, the action starts and stops on one day, July 15, 1988. Between the beginning and the end of the movie the character go from early adulthood to middle age.

Here we seem to be invited to think about action viewed by creatures with abnormal conceptions of time. For one, going from an early adult to middle age is normal. For the other it is impossible.

But wait a minute. July 15 is the feast day of St. Swithin, a bishop of Winchester in the 9th century. So what? I'll tell you what. What ever the weather is on the feast day, rain or shine, it will continue same for the next 40 days.

St Swithin's day if thou dost rain
For forty days it will remain
St Swithin's day if thou be fair
For forty days 'twill rain nae mare

Playing the Middle as time begins to appear more and more difficult.

87. The Problem of "Between" as a Word: The familiarity and apparent clarity of the word "between," makes, for some, a word hard to grasp. Usually, when we are told that Z is happening between X and Y we know how it is supposed to be true, but that depends on a ground (conceptual or theoretical)
that is not conveyed by the "between" alone. We may know how both Y and Z" refer, and the kinds of things to which they refer; and we may have a rough idea how the two referential paths might converge on a single thing, an object, a person, or process. But when the two terms of the identification are different it may not be so clear how the convergence might be true.

We would like to say that every Game of Between adds new life to X, the subject of the Game. Here we have in mind a picture of X taking on new life by becoming Y, Z....

88. Anomalous Middles (Middles Without Names): If there is a place to start here, it might be with nameless, or un-nameable, Middles. Are we, in our imagination, one with Adam observing objects he can't "call" or teach Eve how to call? Perhaps the word "animal," as a candidate for a name, isn't available to Adam. Consequently, reports to God and us about the animals cannot be named or categorized.

Still, we suppose he could point at the animals and engage in a primitive form of naming with Eve and God, "this one," "that one," "those over there." If we want to be generous with him we might grant him a certain number of color terms as names, "roan," "brindle," "tawny" and the like.

Perhaps "nameless" is the wrong word here. Perhaps we should say that any word can name something but in so doing it tends to reveal different states of being of the thing named? Perhaps we should say that some names, especially proper names, strive to reveal the perfect, or complete, nature of

Washington

Game of Between
things while other reveal, in various degrees, their imperfect, or *incomplete* nature? Is "shadow," say, the name of an imperfect being? Was that what Eliot was driving at with "Between the motion and the act Falls the shadow"? Insofar as shadows presuppose a casting body (a bird) and a light source (the sun) then we might want to say that imperfect being is parasitic on complete being.

But don't we often have an inkling that something *ought to lie* between two other known things (Extremes)? Perhaps we feel the need to fill a gap between them and by so doing bring into being something new? How, for example, would you feel about yourself if you are a star athlete but have never played on a championship team? Would you feel stuck in a kind of no-man's land between winning and losing? Being a star makes you a sort of winner. But your team failing to win a championship might make your career seem incomplete. Lxxvi

Between failure and success lies a space of unnamed possibilities

Possibilities are what lie just around the corner.

89. The Sorenson Reduction: If I say to myself I am neither this nor that, neither a winner nor a loser (a success or a failure), then I have executed what can be called a Sorenson Reduction. I have, that is, employed double negation to "exhaust" the possibilities of "this" and "that." I have robbed them of life and meaning without robbing them of existence. But have I, in the process, discovered something new? Or created a space for something new? Lxxvii

Washington 100

Game of Between
90. The Mystery of Meaning: What does it all mean? Life, the cosmos, my being here? Everyone, it seems fair to say, have been distracted by those questions at one time or another. Trying to answer them tends to produce more distractions: "distracted from distraction by distraction" (T. S. Eliot). We respond to the questions with literature, philosophy, theology, music and art. In his review of "The Tree of Life," a movie that deals with questions about cosmic matters ("where did it all come from? Where is it going") as well as mundane ones ("should I eat now or wait?" "Should I answer the phone?") A.O Scott comes to the weary conclusion that our answers are always "provisional."

Yet there is the expectation that it 'will all make sense...sometime between now and Judgment Day.\textsuperscript{\textbullet}xxxviii

Scott's use of "between" comes at the end of the review. It dams the stream of words. It takes us beyond the movie and its unanswerable questions to the future where the questions "make sense," become answerable. For some of us, it might open a space where we search for answers.

Between now and then will time end and a space of infinite possibilities open up? But will we be conscious of them?

91. Pure Between: Can we imagine a "pure" Between. One without empirical content (Kant). One not anchored in space, intention and time? Certainly, on an analogy with a Venn Diagram we can draw, in succession, three overlapping circles. In themselves the circle represent nothing but Washington

Game of Between
themselves. But, as such, they represent the possibility of any empirical content or operation. We can go on with them to calculate probabilities, predator:prey ratios, surface to volume relationships and the like.

Are we then lead to the conclusion that "pure" is an imaginary place to start doing sums, going on to something, attempting to make the implicit explicit? Or is it a tacit admittance of "I don't know what comes first when I imagine X?"

92. Gaming: I said above I would like to create an explanatory context for Between (and possibly In-Between) by means of a game analogy. The analogy is not to any particular game, for example, golf, tennis, or any board game. Rather it is to what seems common to them all, a network of relationships between the moves of the game, its rules, its purpose, instruments used in the game and the like.

Should we take the Game of Between as a leisure activity? Here we are tempted to say that our relationship with the Game, although always possible, and frequently actual, is always contingent? Or are we faced here more with the causes of contingency?

What seems important with the game analogy is what follows the mention of analogy. Please allow your mind to follow what follows from this chess analogy:

It was a day filled with legislative chess moves, back-to-back party caucuses and closed-door meetings that ended with a nationally Washington
televised presidential address followed by a rebuttal by the House speaker, John A. Boehner.

Movies that use a chess as a metaphor include "The Chess Player" (Le Joueur d'Echecs 1927) and "Queen to Play" (2010).

Every game, it seems fair to say, can be used as a metaphor for any human behavior, actual or virtual. But chess seems to be the most often used with golf a close second. Why is this the case?

Suppress the "why" and look at how chess and golf are used as metaphors.

93. Seeing Things From The Middle: Playing the Game of Between seems to involve seeing things from a Middle. Here the analogy to a real world game might be to chess. Novice chess players, playing against experts, sometimes think that they are playing in a different game. The reason, supplied by recent research, is that the experts, employing both parts of the brain, use information about the chessboard in a unique gaming strategy. Whereas the novice chess player "looked directly at the pieces to recognize them, the experts looked on the middle of the boards." In other words, the experts were taking in everything on the board by combining information supplied by peripheral vision with a strategic next move.

It would appear that Wittgenstein had something like this in mind in his comments on the lack of a clear view of "the use of our words." "Our grammar (lacks) perspicuous representation...which consists in 'seeing
connexion's. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases" (PI, #122.). In other words, using words and moving chess pieces effectively depends on finding the interrelationships between them—their intermediate cases.

94. "A" Versus "The": Should we take note of the difference between "a Between" and "the Between?" Should we inform our audience, that is, that "a" signifies a new Between (not mentioned before) and "the" a given one?

But how would we inform the audience? Isn't it enough to assume that they know the difference?

Are we ever certain what our audience is thinking about? Are we communicating with the audience or disrupting its thinking?

95. Hierarchy: Can a hierarchy exist among the three parts of a Between? One might imagine this happening if we think of a Between as we do the solar system; as a system in which planets rotate around a central sun. With this analogy we might go on and say that the Middle, as the "sun" of the whole system, supplies energy and direction to at least two of its satellites, the Extremes of a Between.

This might draw attention to the importance of the Middle. But where does this lead us? It might motivate us to look more closely at the Middle as a composite of qualities one can associate with life, light, heat, movement (tides, the circulation of water through its various stages, creation of new elements for the periodic table and so on).
Planets, comets and asteroids rotates around a central sun. The sun, in turn, rotates around the Milky Way which does it own rotating around a mega black hole.

Does this line of reasoning lead to a clearer understanding of the complexity of a Between?

96. Fear of the Infinite  Does a Between, by putting sides on a sequence of words, show a fear of the unlimited? Do writers (and speakers) fear what language can do to thinking? Can one employ Betweenness to allay such fear? For Wittgenstein thinking involves fighting against the "bewitching of our intelligence by means of language" (verhexung Sprache, PL, #109)\textsuperscript{xxx}, for T. S. Eliot language always threatens to break the levies of cognitive control: "the intolerable wrestle/With words and meanings" (The Four Quartets).

On the other hand, it seems that language has the potential to allay fear, especially of what the Greeks call "fear of the infinite," or "all-ness" (apeirophobia). Horace, recall, characterizes the all-ness of death as "un-house-broken" (indomitaque morti, Odes, Liber Alter XIV). Milton shows us hell as a fiery space with no boundaries (Paradise Lost bk 7). Aristotle, in his unemotional way, demotes infinity (apeiron) from an actuality to a harmless potentiality (Physics 7.5).

I am tempted to say this suggests an All-ness into something less than All, a domesticated Nothingness as Something.

Every statement about fear is an attempt to allay fear?
Does playing the Game of Between give us comfort in the face of death, of time as destroyer? With time we can easily imagine it as an arrow carrying all of us, along with the cosmos, to a future heat death. Following Gilead (who perhaps follows Aristotle's footprints into the wilderness of future truth) we might want to call this a "pure possibility. Or is it? Can a heat death be inferred from Newtonian physics? Isn't it true that Chaos Theory questions that assumption?

Time, leading a train of death, decay and destruction, has no intention. We argue with it, plead with it, and ask for its forgiveness—to no effect. But we can, with a thought experiment, remove it temporally from the actual to the virtual realm. —assuming, with Ryan, that fiction is essentially about the virtual.

97. Tragedy and Comedy: "The un-resolvable antinomy in the human subject between the infinite and finite produces tragedy; every claim to resolve the antinomy can, in the end, be seen as comic."

Can this definition be the basis for an extending discussion of the difference between tragedy and comedy?

98. Mute responder (Speaking Absence): Everyone talks at some point about the dead or the unborn. In so doing we make an imagined present of a material absence. Can we then say that talking about them makes them "mutely respond." Here we might want to say that mute voices, as a third agent between us, sustain our talk. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle raises the question, do the actions of the living affect the dead? (Bk 1, chps 10 and 11). His conclusion? Yes, but in a weak way. In Hemingway's The Hills Like Washington
White Elephants the unborn child of Jig affects the relationship between her and the American. The male character wants to abort the child. The woman doesn't.

They have "taken sides" on the issue of abortion.

Isn't all this referring to absences a way of going on? Please consider this bit of dialogue between the two characters of Hills:

If I do it you won't ever worry?
I won't worry about that because it's perfectly simple.
Then I'll do it. Because I don't care about me….
We can have everything.
No, we can't.
We can have the whole world.
No, we can't.\textsuperscript{lx}\textsuperscript{xv}

The woman's child is yet unborn. Her abortion is only a possibility. Yet the child is present, as Middle, in a story of extreme attitudes. Its presence is heavier, one might say, than the hills of the title.

Is this something more than double deixis? How far, in the interest of going on, can a author take this? Is there a limit to an author making the absent present?

Making the absent present. Isn't this what every epitaph (or elegy) attempts to do? Think of Yeats' poem on Swift's, self-composed, epitaph or Gray's \textit{Elegy In A Country Church Yard}.

99. Bracketing Punctuation: Enclosing words in structures like parenthesis, dashes, brackets and the like seems to invite us to pause and focus on what lies between the enclosing forms. In some texts, for example, \textit{Gulliver's Travels}, many parentheses are
signs of revision, of something added on or replaced. In other cases parenthetical
comments seem to be sideway movements of authorial thinking—like a traveler noticing
something off to the side of the road (path, walk) s/he is on.

What's in our mind when we write (think about) parenthesis? Creating digressions
in the text? Revealing a hitherto secret about ourselves? A sign that, as an author, we are
interested in covering all bases?

Can we then say that the overall purpose of parenthetical forms is to reduce
uncertainty as to where the author is taking the reader?

Are we, with this Thought Run, digressing from digressions with digressing?

100. Inertia. "The vis insita, or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting by
which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavors to preserve its present state, whether it
be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a straight line." (Isacc Newton, the first law
of motion, Principia Mathematica)

Can we state, as our first "law" of a Between, that its Middle always "endeavors
to preserve its present state?" We might take this to mean that the present state of a
Middle is timeless because it is changeless. Time, according to Aristotle, follows change
(Physics IV, 10-14). But isn't it more plausible to say that the present state of a Middle of
the Between is a thing of the past? Like every form of life its present state is always being
disrupted, its course changed?

More intuitively, we might conclude that it is the Middle of a Between that is
more likely to be inert. That the Extremes are always in a state of agitation? A person
walking from A to B to C can be said to pass from one Extreme through a Middle to
another Extreme. Does h/s pass from a state of inertia to a kinetic state? If h/s dies along the way, should we say h/s has passed into a final present state?

101. Play the Game of Between as Actual and Virtual. Let us take one step back and consider a possible "problem" of writing (and thinking). Roughly speaking, it is the problem of "using up the actual," of some completed act conditioned by the senses at a particular moment. This phenomenon occurs at many levels of life. Once we have finishing building our house and furnishing it, we have used up one kind of actuality. Similarly with completing a poem or finishing a bottle of wine. Not only are the reasons for writing and drinking used up in the act of writing and drinking but also the form and context of the act in each. One feels that the completed act cannot be revived by information from either the senses or imagination. No new information is available. One might say to oneself "what has to be done is done. There is no more to be done on this account."

In most cases the feeling of the used-up creates the need for reversal, a feedback loop; a way to go back to the time when the actual was in a nascent state, just coming into being, bearing its novelty. One feels the need to find a way to return to the time before the actual became used up. Not a final state of entropy, perhaps, but a gesture toward it.

One needs, in short, a way to revive (and transform) the actual, animate the phoenix from its ashes. On way to accomplish this, it seems fair to say, is by reference to the "virtual." Aristotle was perhaps one of the first to
see that much of language, the representations of "what if," is not about the actual, "what is," but about what could be—so his musings on the negative and, more to the point, invention (discovery?) of modal logic. By employing modal verbs, "can," "should," "must," the subjunctive and the "if/then" form and the like, one could create a feedback loop between discourse controlled by verbs of actuality, "is," "was," "had been" and the discourse of virtuality. In contemporary modal logic (building on Aristotle in the *Organon*) all it takes to turn a proposition about actuality, p, ("it is raining") into a virtual p ("it might be raining") is to add the possibility operator ◊ to p. In Aristotle, this operation is reversible, in theory, an infinite number of times: p<→◊p.

Plato, referring to his allegory of the cave, might say that the virtual is just another name for misrepresentation; a fake, a simulacra cloaking the false. For others, the dark side of the virtual appears in the consequences of acting on "what could have been but wasn't." Our fall from Eden comes to mind. What if Eve had not believed the words of the serpent and acted on them? What if Adam had not eaten the forbidden fruit? What if God had been absent during these transactions?

But to Levy and Ryan the virtual is, in Levy's phrase, ""fecund and powerful":

The virtual, strictly defined, has little relationship to that which is false, illusory, or imaginary. The virtual is by no means the
opposite of the real [actual]. On the contrary, it is a fecund and powerful mode of being that expands the process of creation, opens up the future, injects a core of meaning beneath the plenitude of immediate physical presence (16; qtd Ryan Narrative as Virtual Reality 35.

In a more systematic representation Levy says:

—The relation of the virtual to the actual is one-to-many
—The virtual is not anchored in space and time. Actualization [i.e., of the virtual] is the passage from a state of timelessness and deterritorialization to an existence rooted in here and now [i.e., the actual]. It is an event of contextualization.
—The virtual is an inexhaustible resource. Using it does not lead to its depletion (qtd Ryan, p. 25)

The virtual, in other words, gives substance to the absent, the anonymous and the insubstantial and makes them present in a (possible?) infinite number of places and in an endless number of forms. In this the example of a game of chess, without end in its possible moves, comes to mind.

102. Is Every Exit an Entrance Elsewhere? Analogous to a Between is a space, or spaces, with exits and entrances. The Extremes that bracket the Middle have "doors."

With this, as a thought experiment, we can have, in Bachelard's words, "the entire story of one life in opening and closing doors......a primal image." With any given story authors have their characters enter and exit. Why (and when and how) they enter and leave give their actions purpose. Add dialogue to appearances and disappearances and
meaning emerges. With every appearance and disappearance new information becomes available. Such information can either add to given information or subtract from it. In a play, the entrances and exits of the actors as changes in the flow of information to the audience.

For these, and other reasons, the game of entrances and exits are important for interpreting the story (play, narrative, plot). So we find, for example, Bachelard's meditation on these matters. In the course of a discussion of "Doors as Limina," Claude Gandelman suggesting that scholars, by failing to deal systematically with doors in a literary text (or group of texts), often fail to understand what may be a "metaliterary tale" within the text(s). For De Sousa, entrances and exit through enclosures encapsulate how Shakespeare, in selected plays, gives individuality to his characters. In the absence of e/e nothing new can appear. Indeed nothing could happen for there would be no ground for the new to happen.

Opening the lid of a coffin to reveal a vampire (long fingernails, pale flesh, blood around the mouth) introduces us to a specific genre. How does a vampire occupy your house? Not by just walking (flying") in, but by being invited in. There is always the possibility of a vampire (or two) in or outside your door.

In the video game, "Portals 2" (2011), we are in a virtual dungeon composed of many rooms but supposedly no way out. Deranged robots there threaten to kill us. How to escape? Fortunately, we are equipped with a "portal gun" which we can use to create a tunnel with an exit (through one door)
door) and an entrance (through door) in another wall. Two openings in two different walls are necessary for escape. The first opening will not open until we create the second one.xc

We distinguish ourselves from every other thing, object or organism, by "living" in cyberspace. The virtual is not sensory. But we can pretend that it is real as reality. We are conscious of being conscious of the real and the non-real. Double consciousness makes the virtual, in Levy's words, "inexhaustible." We can never use it up. If we happen to use up the real, then we can always go to the virtual.

In the game of exit and entrance we have the possibility of going into, or leaving, the virtual or being in the Middle as virtual—the dungeons of Portals 2 for example, or those in video games of the same "genre."

(Please see Crossing a Threshold, p. 118)

103. The Middle as No Exit: In his short parable, HE, Kafka represents the Middle as holding the protagonist captive:

He has two antagonists; the first presses him from behind, from his origin. The second blocks the road in front of him. He gives battle to both. Actually, the first supports him in his fight with the second for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But it is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but himself as well, and who really

Washington 113

Game of Between
knows his intention? His dream, though, is that some
time in an unguarded moment—and this would require a night
darker than any night has ever been yet—he will jump out of
the fighting line and be promoted, on account of His
experience in fighting, to the position of umpire over his
antagonists in their fight with each other.

Representing the Middle as an unending battle between the past and the
future sets up a dialogue of the "we" with the "non-we" and the actual with
the virtual—where the actual and the "we" are conditioned by time, space and
contingency and the virtual and the "non-we" as the absence of them. Out of
time, space and contingency the virtual and the "non-we" are unchanging and
always necessary. They are eternal, unlimited, inexhaustible. Beckett's Godot
comes to mind as a "non-we" in this sense as do the characters of Satre's No
Exit and, of course, Lemuel Gulliver. There is no one around in the narrative
to give them a proper name by which they can be "called" to appear.

104. The Fractal Character of a Between. It seems reasonable to assume
that a writer can nest one Between in another. An example might be a
narrative in which the life of the protagonist (between birth and death;
between success and failure; between divorce and marriage and the like) is
embedded in other narratives with protagonists undergoing Between states.
Novels that have family members as protagonists, for example, Tristram
Shandy, Pride and Prejudice or War and Peace are salient examples.
105. The Vertical (Sacred) and the Horizontal (Secular): In works like Martin Buber's *Ich-Du* (I-You), St. Augustine's *Confessions* and Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* one sees duality as a preparation (or ground) for reaching a third state or conclusion. In the vertical mode the third can be God, faith, fate or a higher power. In the horizontal mode, the third is communion through dialogue with other persons and relations with real world objects.

Let us say that a person goes to a market (say a gardeners market) on Saturday and to church on Sunday. In the market he hears the voice of common concerns, commercial, familial, political and the like. In church h/s might hear, from the parishioners similar concerns. But h/s would likely hear the voice of theological concerns, salvation, redemption, atonement and the like. .

Are we justified in claiming that such "concerns" stand as the Middle of two different kinds of Beweens? That the concerns call the Beweens into being and ground the difference between them? This might suggest that every public space, accessible to everyone, can be the ultimate ground of all possible Beweens.

106. Shades, Shadows, Photon Subtraction: As Sorenson shows in great detail, shadows (and silhouettes) come into being, by an object, like the leaves of a tree, subtracting photons from a light source, the sun, and the reduced photons falling on a surface (*Seeing Dark Things;* op. cit, pp 24-87).

We might call this process "photon subtraction."

Washington 115

Game of Between
The infrastructure of a shadow, in short, is the transit of photons from sun (or some other light source) to a surface through a subtracting (filtering) intermediary. The intermediary, or Middle, then presupposes two other Extremes that initiate and close the process.

It is risky to say what exactly writers like Plato, Shakespeare and Hemingway have in mind with their uses of shadow imagery. Even the best mind reader is bound to come up short. Do they mean for shadows to mean one thing or a plurality of different things? Are there certain unique emotions attached to shadows? Is shadow imagery a way of presenting information economically?

Since shadows are real world phenomena should we would expect to find more shadow imagery in realistic fiction than in non-realistic fiction?

At any rate, let us imagine how the Game of Between might be played with shadow imagery.

Outside my north window is a beech tree. The sun is up. I look under the tree and I see its shadow. I then look out the south window and see the shadow of a linden tree. The shadow of the beech tree is much heavier and darker than that of the linden tree. This might suggest that every shadow, depending on the number and distribution of photons, has a different quality and texture than any other possible shadow.

Should I use this visual information in character representations? How can I use it? Suppose I depict character X is sitting in the shadows while A, B and C are in the sun. Should we take this to mean that I have subtracted Washington
something from X? That something is absent from h/h? Cognitively, emotionally, physically?

With these remarks in mind, please reflect on Hemingway's use of shadows in this passage from "A Clean Well Lighted Place":

They [the waiters] sat together at a table that was close against the wall near the door of the café and looked at the terrace where the tables were all empty except where the old man sat in the shadow of the leaves of the tree that moved slightly in the wind (CSS 288; emphasis mine) xcii

Shadows cast by the leaves of a tree are typically dappled. In this case, they are also moving “slightly.”

So what is involved in the “making” of dappled shadows? To answer that (or appreciate the difficulty of answering it) we first have to put ourselves in the position of the old man sitting in the shadows cast by the leaves. We are alone, drinking. We have lived a long time and have experienced, and observed, many “dark things,” loneliness, fear, despair and the like. Now suppose we begin, looking at the shadows around us, putting together cause and effect: what is producing the shadows and what is their effect, physically as well as emotionally? We look up and note that the wind is moving the leaves and look out toward the “electric light” (CSS 288). We conclude that the light is the source for the shadows. (We observe that there is no moon or stars).
The shadows, we note, are produced by blocked light.—leaves, in this case, being the blocking object. But, since the shadows cast by the leaves, are dappled, we reason that the leaves are blocking only part of the light. We don’t know what species of tree the leaves belong to, but we can hazard the guess, from their size and shape of their shadows, that the “ratio” of dark to light it takes to make a dappled shadow is roughly, 70/30. (The exact ratio would involve the [impossible?] task of counting the number of photons emitted by the street light and subtracting the number of photon that compose the light lying outside, and between, the boundaries of the shadows.)

Can we then say that literary representations of shadows rise from a Game of Between? That it takes at least two Extremes, a light source and a light terminus plus a Middle, to create a shadow? Where the Middle is anything that comes between the Extremes as a photon-subtracting intermediary?

In the Hemingway story the leaves of the trees serve as the intermediary.

107. Suspended Animation: As Mitchell shows in some detail this term has had many uses since the eighteenth century xciii The Royal Humane Society used it to refer to one might be perceived to be dead from drowning; Coleridge saw the effects of the mass media in the "morbid trance" or "suspended animation" of readers. Roger Dodsworth's "The Reanimated

Washington 118
Game of Between
Englishman” (a short story) tells the tale of a man revived after having spent more than a hundred years frozen in ice.

Does this word and concept have a place in a Game of Between? Intuitively, we might let it lead us to a half-way point between living and being dead.

Does it seem odd to you that we can't say in English, unlike Mandarin Chinese say, "deading"? That suspended animation is somewhere between "living" and "deading"?

As discussed by Mitchell suspended animation is essentially "to be alive but appear dead" (109). Does this mean we are not allowed to say "to be dead but appear to be alive"; a statement that seems to indicate a state somewhat like a zombie?

Are we then being asked here to think of time in a queer way?

108. Liminality. In Latin, *limen*, has three basic uses. 1) It refers to a threshold, lintel or sill; 2) a house, or dwelling place; 3) a sign of a new beginning. The image that comes to mind with these is one crossing from one state, or place, across a dividing line, into a new, or different, state or stage. Such an image divides easily into a triad, namely, entering/exiting, crossing, entering.

Liminality thus seems to have a family resemblance to our Game of Exit and Entrance and, more generally, to the Game of Between. Liminality, that is, seems to presuppose the possibility of visualizing a door that opens onto a different (perhaps a new) space. We might want to go on a say that the Washington

Game of Between
space that one comes from represents one Extreme of a Between. The space one enters is another Extreme. The space between the Extremes is the Middle.

What then are some of the symbolic possibilities here? One might be the expression of fear. The space beyond the door, over the threshold, is unknown and potentially threatening. Or perhaps a land of enchantment lies beyond the door? Or perhaps the space beyond is part of an initiatory rite, entrance into manhood?

The possibilities seem endless.

We can, however, be fairly certain that Liminality, like the Game of Between, always exhibit a temporal use:

The temporal dimension of liminality can relate to moments (sudden events), periods (weeks, months, or possibly years), and epochs (decades, generations, maybe even centuries). Twilight serves as a liminal time, between day and night.. The name is from an actual zone observable from space in the place where daylight or shadow advances or retreats about the Earth. Noon and, more often, midnight can be considered liminal, the first transitioning between morning and afternoon, the latter between days.\textsuperscript{xciv}

104. Between as Coordination: We often say that X and Y are coordinates. Or, more generally, "coordinate X with Y"; that is, as a directive. For example, advances
in medicine is coordinate with social progress; that the temporality of a living human body correlates with smoking, being a male, eating red meat and the like.

Here we seem to have Extremes of a Between acting as coordinates. If so, does this speak against what we have called the (presumed) Asymmetry of the Extremes? That the Extremes are never equal in quality or quantity?

Has the Middle disappeared here? That there is no ground of similarity between X and Y coordinates? Is the Middle, as it were, in the shadows, there but concealed from a mind not trained to uncover it?

105. The Immediate. No mediation, no Middle of two Extremes, say of existence and non-existence. No interval between now and then, this entrance and that exit, this side and that side. Running through much of T. S. Eliot’s poetry, especially *The Four Quartets*, is what can be called attempts to represent the "Immediate." Presumably, insofar as time figures heavily in the poems, Eliot intends for the Immediate to stand in as a replacement for time realized (since Aristotle?) as movement between a "before" and "after." For Eliot, the Immediate, in other words, is just another term for "no-time." "Time past and time future are perhaps both contained in time present" ("Burnt Norton").

But if all time is reduced to the present moment, what does this do to representations of memory?
Here we seem to be faced with something like St. Augustine's paradox about time; namely, one only knows what time is as long as one doesn't ask what time is (Quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me quaerat; scio si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio [Confessions 11, 14]).

How do we attempt to understand the Immediate? Only by not asking what it is? When we do ask then we seem to be surrounded by a cloud of negatives, one that exhaust not only its actuality but also its possibility. We want to say that we are in a stage of no-time before the Big Bang.

Visual depictions of the Immediate, we may imagine, are more effective than linguistic ones. Suppose, for example, we want to show the unbridgeable gap (in status and value) between the Queen of England and her husband, the Duke of Edinburgh. Here we might want to pose them as the German photographer, Thomas Struth, does. He shows them sitting on a couch. The Duke sits to the right of the Queen. He sits in half shade, she in full light. Most of the features on the left side of the Duke’s face are obscured by shadows. He wears a dark suit. The Queen, in a bright colored dress, seems to come forward toward the viewer; the Duke does the opposite; he seems to retreat into the background.

Their bodies don't touch. The Queen's right hand lies in her lap. Darkness half-conceals the Duke's left arm The space between them lies in heavy darkness.\textsuperscript{xcv}

---

Washington

Game of Between
Duns Scotus, the Medieval philosophy, contrasts "intuition," or unmediated (immediate) thinking with analytic, mediated, thinking.
xcvii

108. Dry Wall Versus Wet Wall: Can we say that what makes separate parts into a whole is entitled to be called a Between? If so, then what brings parts of a dry wall together is gravity and friction. But for a wet wall we would have to say it's mortar. Does it make any difference that one is invisible (dry wall) and the other perceptual (wet wall)? If there is a difference then it has to be duration and looks. Which will last the longer? Which is the more attractive?

Should we add "fun to make" to this mix?

109. Between them and us: Say you have observed (or heard reports of) an atrocity, like that which occurred on June 10, 1942 when all the inhabitants of the Czech village of Lidice were killed by German troops. The act was a reprisal for the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich a chief planner of the liquidation of Jews.

How would you record, as a writer, your outrage at the horror? The answer, according to W. H. Auden was not to luxuriate in your own guilt for not feeling horrorstruck enough, but rather to pay attention to the imponderable distance between "them" (the victims) and "us."

Auden's poem, "Musée des Beaux Arts" (1938) represents, according to Joanna Bourke, how this "imponderable distance between "them" and "us" can be achieved. xcvii

Washington 123

Game of Between
110. Questioning : The linguist, John Lyons, says that questions result from "the grammtalization of the feature of doubt." He then goes on to say that the essential thing about a question is the distinction between "posing" a question and "asking" one (*Semantics*). The difference between "posing" and "answering" a question is essentially what the questioner expects from h/h addressee. With the first, posing, we simply "externalize our doubt." We may not expect the addressee to answer the question or we may think it is unanswerable. With asking, on the other hand, we both externalize our doubt and expect the addressee to answer the question.

If Questioning can be seen as a Game of Between then we have to make several assumptions. One is the assumption of Thirdness. Can Questioning be divided into three asymmetric, but intelligible, parts? Will this division adversely affect the ability of Questioning to express Doubt? (For more on this see the next entries through #112 and Part three of this text, *From Asking to Answering*).

All the languages I have some knowledge of (Greek, Spanish, Latin, German, French, Italian, English) have a three terms (three family members) that might give some hints about how to answer the question of division. English, classical Greek and German have, for example, the following forms (It should be said that these are not the only members of the Questioning family that perform the same functions)

(Please note we are asking, not posing, a question here.)
Washington 124

Game of Between
111, Asking (erotan/fragen); Question (erotensis/ Frage); Answering (antworten; antilegein). Asking, it might be said, is a Preparation for expressing Doubt. Question is the expression of Doubt and Answering is (ideally) the settling of Doubt. In the context of the Game of Between, Question would stand as the Middle, a halfway "house' between the uncertainty of Asking and the certainty of Answering.

One analogy here to the tripartite structure of Questioning might be the problem; discussion as the problem: solution. With Asking we state the problem. With Question we discuss the details of the problem and with Answering we state (or suggest) a solution to the problem. This, at any rate, is a procedure often followed by Aristotle.

The rules of a game can be seen as constraints on how we play the game. Constraints tell us what we must not do to keep playing the game. In golf, we must not neglect to record every intentional contact of the club with the ball as a stroke. In chess we must not move a pawn more than one space and never diagonally. We must not, in a card game, draw aces from the middle of the desk—und so weiter.

Language gives us warrant for saying that it has three possible ways to express Doubt:

1) Yes/No. Here we ask if X exists: "Is the universe getting hotter?"
2) Wh- Here we can "run" X through a series of information seeking forms: "How do we know that X is getting hotter? Why would it be getting hotter" and so on.

3) Indirect: "I wonder if the universe is getting hotter."

The main difference between a question and other utterances, commands, statements and the like is the expression of doubt. Its presence is there in every question, yes/no ("is the universe getting larger") and in wh-questions ("what," "who" and so on). The only exception is the so-called "rhetorical question," one that contains its own answer.

Does the Game of Between play into any of this? Can playing the Game help us to understand how we express, and settle, doubt? In order for questioning to qualify as the Game it would minimally have to exhibit the triadic structure of the Game, two Extremes and a Middle. In addition the Middle would have to function as either a separating or combining space and as that of novelty.

Can we then say that the triad, ask/question/answer, fits the bill? "Ask," we might say, stands as a Preparation to express doubt; "question" as the expression of doubt and "answer" as (sometimes) the settling of doubt. In the context of Entrances and Exits, we might want to say with asking we "open

Washington 126

Game of Between
the door" to the "house of doubt"; with the question we enter the house and with the answer we leave it. But this assumes that the question is answerable. If it turns out to be unanswerable, we may enter the house of doubt but we never leave it.

Within the house are various kinds of rooms with different windows. Let us go on to say that each window represents a specific kind of doubt—doubt about what we sense outside the window. In the first room are the windows that raise doubt about the existence of X. This kind of doubt grammatises as yes/no questions, "does X exist?"; "Should I be afraid of X?" In the second room are windows that open up gaps in our information about X: "What is X?"; "Where did X come from?" "Why is X there?" Ignorance of X here grammatises who-questions. In the third, and last room, are windows that make us curious about X: "I wonder what that is." "I wish I knew more about that." Here we grammatisize indirect questions.

We said above, following Wittgenstein, that there can be doubt only if there is non-doubt. Some things have to be exempt from doubt. In order to enter the house of doubt we first must not question that the house exists, that it can be entered and (sometimes) left.

Have we played the Game of Questions with the "rules" of the Game of Between? That is to say, do the Extremes of the Game correspond with entering into doubt (ask) and exiting with non-doubt (answer)? Between these Extremes does doubt stand as the Middle? As rooms in the house of doubt?

Washington 127

Game of Between
Some people live a "question driven life."\textsuperscript{xcix}

112. The Game of Between as an Answer to a Question: When we raise the question, "what happened between now and then?" we often lay the ground for the Game. Edward Epstein, for example, raises the question, "What Really Happened to Strauss-Kahn?" Strauss-Kahn, the erstwhile head of The International Monetary Fund, was imprisoned for a time in New York City for an alleged sexual assault.

The operative word in "What Really Happened to Strauss-Kahn?" is the word "to," not "with" or "about." We are, presumably, dealing with accidental events that happened to the subject on May 14, 2011. Epstein's narrative goes from 10:07 AM on that day to 3:57 PM.

113. Translation: As the saying of the Russian poet goes, "translation is like a woman. If it is beautiful, it is not faithful. If it is faithful, it is not beautiful" (Yevgeny Yevtushenko). Please notice the double negation, "not…not." This is what I called The Sorenson Reduction above (p. 90). The effect is exhaustive. It represents translation as essentially nothing, neither the language translated from nor the one translated into.

Can we say, then, that this "neither…nor" effect constitutes a Between? That it references two different languages without joining them? Or making one the replica of the other? Or we might want to say, inasmuch as the perfect translation is impossible, that the "way" between two different language is defective—the Between impedes the perfect Flow of Information between them?
Don't we understand "missing in action" as a "neither...nor" situation? That we are not allowed to say that the soldier is alive or dead? That we need "neither...nor" to exhausts the possibilities of dead or alive?

Readers of Spanish (and of course English) are invited to test the above hypotheses about my translation of Monterroso's "El Dinosaurio" ("The Dinosaur"). Here is the text:

Is there a perfect one-sentence novel? Candidates might be Vanessa Place's *Dies: A Sentence* or Thomas Bernhard's *On The Mountain*. Then there is my own *When Stein Eriksen Ran Over My Skis*. These last two achieve their one-sentence status by "withholding the period," mine for three pages, Bernhard's for 120. But there is, to my knowledge, no collection of one-sentence, or one-line, novels. Perhaps the closest thing to it is an anthology of very short tales edited by Jorge Borges and Bioy Casares, *Cuentos Breves y Extraordinarios* [Brief and Extraordinary Tales, 1955].

My own choice for the perfect one-sentence "novel" (if such can exist) would be Augusto Monterroso's *El Dinosaurio* ["The Dinosaur"]: "Cuando despertó, el dinosaurio todavía estaba allí." [When h/s awoke, the dinosaur was still there]. The "novel" has been praised by such writers as Italo Calvino and Umberto Eco for its economical beauty and mystery. It is widely
studied in Italy and South America and the Italian writer, Italo Calvino, took it for the standard by which all other one-sentence tales should be measured (Six Memos For The Next Millenium).

"Dinosaur" has what I want to call here "pregnant brevity." This means, on the whole, that it gives birth to multiple meanings. First, we are not sure who woke up. It could be a "he," a "she," an "it" or the dinosaur itself. Secondly, we can't pin down what kind of "waking" it is. It could be from sleep, from a daydream, from fainting on seeing the dinosaur or from a drunken stupor in which case the dinosaur might be a hangover. Moreover, these "meanings" are all stable under different kinds of syntactical transformations and word substitutions.

For example, instead of "Cuando despertó, el dinosaurio todavía estaba allí," the original version, we can write, without changing the meaning, "Allí despertó, cuando el dinosaurio todavía estaba,"

"Cuando se despertó, el dinosaurio seguía allí," or "Cuando se despertó el dinosaurio, todavía estaba allí."

Umberto Eco's Italian translation, "Quando si sveglio, il dinosauro era ancora lì," also preserves the original meaning.
Furthermore, the meaning of the "novel" can be enriched by tracing the history of some of its words. "Todavía," for example, is a compound of two Latin based words, "totus" [all or every] and "via" [way]. Similarly with "estaba." It comes from the early Latin, "sto" (or "sta"), with the general meaning of "stand." With these associations in mind, we can then propose a rougher, but perhaps richer, meaning: "the dinosaur was everywhere [in every way] standing there."

But, it seems fair to say, "novels" especially one-sentence ones mean more than what they "say" to just one reader. Or, to put the matter another way, what would you have to imagine for this particular "novel" to be true in all situations? So, in conclusion, I would like to pose the question: what does the dinosaur truly represent for you? c

114. Crossing a Threshold: As Susanne Hart, a 41 year old New York advertising executive, was stepping into an elevator she was caught between the door of the elevator and its shaft and crushed to death. ci

115. Textual In-Between Closure: How should you close your text? Please give some thought to this observation by the producer of the TV series "Homeland" on its last episode: cii

Your have to find the right amount of closure so the audience feels satisfied for the time invested, but you also want the

Washington 131
Game of Between
right amount of tantalizing for next year.

116. Zombie:Undead:Walking Dead: "You see them all across the country, in shopping malls and street corners, suburban towns and city centers: zombie restaurants. Many of the *undead* are part of familiar chains that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection this year….The *zombie restaurant*, barely bringing in enough cash to cover basic expenses, always seem to be one sizzling fajita or glazed chicken skewer away from a merciful end, but some how keep hanging on…."There's a lot of *walking dead*," said (a) vice present for a consulting firm." ciii

"Zombie, "undead," "walking dead." Here we seem to have Betweenness represented as a state neither fully alive nor fully dead. Please notice, as we discussed above (under The Sorenson Reduction, p. 90) the use of double negatives to create a Middle between the Extremes (not stated) of "full" (complete) and "empty" (deficient).

Can we say that the effect is to "animate" the "inanimate?" Is this a common effect of language creating a Between by borrowing a term like "zombie" from a different realm, a neither…nor state?

But is the strategy rhetorical (cognitive) effective? What is the purpose of the triad, "zombie," "undead" and "walking dead." Do they all evoke a picture of the same situation?

Wouldn't it be better for the writer to discuss the topic in the context of bankruptcy, not in that of popular mythology?

Washington 132

Game of Between
117. Kinship Relations. "Homo sapiens is obsessed with kinship." (Pinker op cit, p. 430). It is perhaps trite to say that one has to think in order to think, describe, gossip about, kinship relations—who I am related to, who you are, who she is and so on. Could Shakespeare have written King Lear, Midsummer Night's Dream, the sonnets or any other work without placing the action and dialogue within the context of kith and kin? Would there be any three-generational drama, Lost in Yonkers, Upon Golden Pond or Downton Abbey, without familial relationships?

Kinship is a common arena for conflict, father against offspring (King Lear), brother against brother (Cain and Abel) or husband against wife (Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?). The conflict generally arises from different concerns. A child wants a different career from h/h parents; a wife wants a different set of friends from her husband; a sister would like to have the same parental respect given to her brother; an uncle tries to change the course of his nephew's education.

Soap operas and TV sit-coms thrive on kinship issues. In an episode of Harry's Law (a TV show about lawyers and their cases) a recent episode (January 4, 2012) took up the issue of who should get custody of a child, its biological or adoptive parents. The judge awarded the child to the adoptive parents.

In the Game of Between the judge always plays the Middle role. Please recall that "trial" (three parts) presents a Between as plaintiff (Extreme):judge and sometimes jury (Middle):defendant (Extreme).

Kinship relations can, in short, be compared to a vast continent populated by innumerable conflicts. The individual writer can only hope to establish a narrow and
shallow beachhead on the continent. But here, using an example of parents' conflicts with their children, are a few such preparatory "beachheads."

*Establish causes and conditions. Are the parents at odds with the child because h/h is spending more time with their friends than h/s is spending with them? Did a daughter marry the wrong man? Did a son choose the wrong profession?

*Sustain the conflict. Have relatives argue about money, the division of property, who should inherit what.

*Closure. Stop the conflict by either leaving it open (unresolved) or closed (resolved). With an open closure one enters the territory of tragedy; with the closed one, that of comedy, or tragicomedy.

*Base your story on the obsession with genealogy. Why does X (the protagonist) spend so much time and effort tracing down h/h ancestors? How does this affect h/h relationships with h/h family, friends and acquaintances?

*Pinker observes that kinship is "digital": "You're either someone's mother or you aren't. You might be eighty percent sure that Bill is John's father, but that is not the same as thinking that Bill is eighty percent of a father to John" (op. cit., p. 430).

In short X is not (is not kin to) Y. If X is your protagonist, how would this affect X's relationship with Y (no kin) and how does it differ from that with Z (h/h kin)?
*Are the *obligations* of your protagonist different for h/h kin and for no-kin, say a friend or business associate? Describe the difference(s) by their causes and effects. How does h/h *talk* differ? H/h actions and motives?

*What if your protagonist is an adoptee? Might this status affect h/h relationship with other non-adoptees (natural) children of the family?*

* Write about the gap (or gulfs) that exist between you and your grandparents and the gulfs that may later exist between you and your grandchildren. Can you remember the names of your grandparents? Or will your children's grandchildren remember your name?

With kinship, in sum, you can seemingly play the Game of Between forever.

118. Love: It can be said that to know a language is to know how to say the same thing with different words. One might further claim that saying the same thing with different words is a form of translation. How many different words can you use to express your love for someone or something? In this you might want to consult a thesaurus (from the Greek "treasure"). Remember that "love" can be either a noun or a verb and always presupposes Betweeness as a third condition:

Now play the Game of Between by observing what shades of meaning separate one word for love with another; say, "love, "affection," "enamored."

Now read Philip Larkins' poem, "An Arundel Tomb," and notice how many different words the poet uses for love between the couple.
119. The Fate of the Game of Between. Several scenarios have been proposed for the ultimate fate of the universe. One is heat death or final entropy. The temperature of the universe will eventually become the same in all its parts. Consequently, no work can be done. Another, more recent theory, is that the universe is expanding so fast (faster than expected) that all its parts will lose contact with each other. Eventually, all energy will be gone. Behind it all, as cause, is dark matter.\textsuperscript{civ}

Is this a reasonable expectation for Betweenness? That its parts, the Extremes and the Middle, will eventually drift apart into dark isolation? Or will the parts collapse together in what cosmologists call the Big Crunch, leaving no spatiotemporal distinction between them?

"Overhead, without any fuss, the stars were going out."\textsuperscript{cv}

120. More examples of writers betweening in various genres and contexts:


5. "3" a 2011 German film by Tom Tyker. Three characters, one female and two males, Hanna, Simon and Adam. Adam is the common lover of Simon and Hanna.

6. St. Paul: For to me, living is Christ and dying is gain. If I am to live in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me, and I do not know which I prefer. I am hard pressed between the two: my desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better, but to remain in the flesh is more necessary for you (emphasis mine). *Philippians* 1:21-24.

7. Kafka's HE: He has two antagonists; the first presses him from behind, from his origin. The second blocks the road in front of him. He gives battle to both. Actually, the first supports him in his fight with the second for he wants to push him forward, and in the same way the second supports him in his fight with the first, since he drives him back. But It is only theoretically so. For it is not only the two antagonists who are there, but himself as well, and who really knows his Washington 137 Game of Between
intention? His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded
moment—and this….would require a night darker than any night has
ever been yet—he will jump out of the fighting line and be
promoted, on account of His experience in fighting, to the
position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other

8. Rebecca Zorach, *The Passionate Triangle* (Chicago: University of

alternative.

the Goldilocks principle.

11. "The entire movie is balanced *between* terror and beauty."
    David Denby on the movie "Empire of the Sun" (1987). cvii

12. Movie, "Father of Invention," starring Kevin Spacey. Fabrication,
conceiving and making new products as an In-Between
process. Slogan, "all things are related." Chief product is
is a wireless halter parents use to control their child. With it
two concerns are brought together to create a third thing
(the halter), the parents' safety for their child concern and
the concern of the child for entertainment. The halter has
an attachment the child can use to hear music, send messages,
take pictures, and so on.

13. Lisa Randall, *Knocking on Heaven’s Door; How Physics and Scientific Thinking Illuminate the Universe and the Modern World* (New York: Ecco, 2011). Essentially a work that describes searching as a Middle that is 1) new 2) unifying and 3) an explanation that needs no further explanation. One might say, using Aristotelian language, that the goal sought is "being as being."


16. Sir Francis Bacon, "Of Innovations." An essay written with a perspective from the middle; that is, from present time. Innovation, Bacon writes, is the "new," "novelty," the "stranger" among us. But, respecting the new and sometimes taking advantage of what it brings (for example, new kinds of medications), one should not neglect things of the past or those things yet to come.

   And lastly, that the novelty, though it be not rejected,
yet be held for a suspect; and, as the Scripture saith,
'that we make a stand upon the ancient way, and then
look about us, and discover what is the straight and
right way, and so to walk in it.

17. Things it means to be Episcopalian: We believe “Faith” means
being willing to live in tension between tradition and change;
knowing and not knowing.

18. "Middle childhood is when the parts of the brain most closely
associated with being human finally come online: our ability to
control our impulses, to reason, to focus, to plan for the future."cviii

19. Always distinguish "between the facts of political life and the values

20. Margaret Talbot, "Stumptown Girl," NY, January 2,
2012), pp. 24-36. Description of the substance of a double
Betweenness (relationship) between Carrie Brownstein and Fred
Armisen actors in the TV series "Portlandia." On the one hand, there is
the relationship they have in the series (the on stage one) plus the
personal (off-stage) one.

This is an example of a writer "going on," lengthening a narrative,
by adding incremental bits of information to two different
kinds of human relationships.

21. Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W. W. Norton
& Company, 1999). Please see keywords like "interaction"
Perhaps the most important use of Betweenness here is in Pinker's "search" for connecting links between the mind and the world. See chapter 2, "Thinking Machines."

22. Mary Beard, "Do the Classics Have a Future," *The New York Review of Books?"* (January 12, 2012), pp. 49-54. Here the author employs Betweenness as the thesis for her article: "To put this as crisply as I can, the study of the classics is the study of what happens in the gap between antiquity and ourselves." (p. 54; emphasis mine).

Now smile.

The art of being a good guest is knowing when to leave.

INDEX OF PERSPECTIVES, OR CONTEXTS OF USE, ON THE GAME OF BETWEEN.

Katsushika Hokusai (September 23, 1760 – May 10, 1849), a Japanese artist, became famous with his 36 views of Mt. Fuji. (He was later to add 64 views to his the 36). Gathered below is a list of the Thought Runs I have made on The Game of Between. Much like Hokusai's views of Mt. Fuji, these Runs can be seen as rising out of my fascination with Betweeness and the space it occupies in thought, imagination and language.

Mt. Fuji, rising to 12,389 feet, is the highest mountain in Japan. My job is to persuade you to give Betweeness the highest linguistic priority in your thinking, reading and writing.—to confront your subject, not from one perspective, but from many.
Taken as a whole, these Runs can be said to fall into three large groups, 2D, 3D and neither 2D nor 3D. 2D may be likened to the Von Neumann style of computing. Information processing, and representation, with a Between goes in sequential stages, first the Extremes then the Middle or first the Middle and then the Extremes. 3D processing, by contrast, is to see a Between as a biologist sees a cell, a 3D space of actual and virtual activities. The position of an Extreme or Middle in the 3D space, plus the ways it can move, are determined by its function. When the position changes, then so does its function where function is seen as the communication (and control) of textual information.

***

Searching for a Middle, p. 4
3D Space of a Between, p. 6
Switching, p. 9
Salience, p. 10
The Verb, p. 10
The Hands, p. 11
Mental Time Travel, p. 11
Time, p. 14
Flow of Information, p. 15
Center of Gravity, p. 18
Copia, p. 19

Thought Runs, p. 20.

Washington

Game of Between
Assumption #1, p. 22

Assumption #2, p. 22.

The Middle as Privileged Space, p. 23.

Thinking, p. 25.

Thirdness (Dreiheit), p. 25

The Unexpected, p. 28.

Thirdness and Plenitude, p. 29.

The Unknown Middle, p. 32.

The Silent Middle, p. 32.

Causation, p. 32.

If/Then, p. 33.

The Middle as Messenger, p. 34.

Aristotle, p. 34.

Wittgenstein, p. 35

Family Resemblances (*Familianähnlichkeiten*), p. 35.

Emergence, p. 36.

Convergence, p. 37

Washington 143

Game of Between
Krishna, p. 39.

Metaphor/Analogy p. 39

Comparison, p. 40.

The Space of Interruption, p. 41

Meta-Thought Run, p. 41.

Framework, p. 42.

Going On as Fascination, p. 42

Going on as Doubting and Non-Doubting, p. 43.

Game Ball, p. 45.

Telling a Story/Describing a Story, p. 43.

Storytelling and Death, p. 47.

Weather, p. 48.

Pyrrhic Victory, p. 48.

Truth, p. 49.

Un-Googleability, p. 49

Eyelevel, p. 50.

Standin, p. 50

Washington Game of Between
Eucharist, p. 50

Nothingness, p 51..

Nowhere, p. 52.

Measuring (Value/ Precision/Accuracy), p. 52.

Context as Middle, p. 53.

Context (or Scene), p. 60.

Convergence of the Extremes, p. 61.

Vortex, p. 63.

Thesis and Emergence of the Middle, p. 64.

Conflict and Violence: The Game of Between, p. 64.

Justification, p. 65.

Self-Similarity, p. 65.

My Version, p. 66.

Triplets?, p. 66.

Note on Notation, p. 67.

Food, p. 67.

Assumption of the Existence of X, p.68.

Washington 145

Game of Between
Metrical Representations, p. 68.

Difference, p. 69.

Suppressing the Why, p. 70.

Suppressing the Possibility of Failure, p. 71.

Hedonic Ethology, p. 71.

That Static and the Moving Between, p. 72.

Una trinitas et trina unitas, p. 72.

Asymmetry, p. 73.

Is/Ought, p. 74.

Patterning., p. 75.

Collocations, p. 76.

Judging, p. 77.

Triangles, p. 78.

Self-Reference, p. 81.

Preparation, p. 81.

Between Versus In-Between, p. 82.

The Joy of In-Betweeness, p. 83.

The Middle as Evidence, p. 83.

The Dharmic Middle Way, p. 84.

Flat Versus Three-Dimensional Figures, p. 84.
Between as Expression, p. 84.
Separating, Combining, Novelty, p. 86.
At Stake, p. 86.
Interstellar Travel (Or Going From Here to There), p. 87.
The Middle as Modes of Time, p. 87.
The Problem of "Between" as a Word, p. 88.
Anomalous Middles (Middles Without Names), p. 89.
The Sorenson Reduction, p 90.
The Mystery of Meaning, p. 90.
Pure Between, p. 91.
Gaming, p. 91.
Seeing Things From The Middle, p. 92.
Hierarchy, p. 93.
Fear of the Infinite, p. 94.
Tragedy and Comedy, p. 95.
Mute responder (Speaking Absence), p. 95.
Bracketing Punctuation, p. 96.
Inertia, p. 97.
Play the Game of Between as Actual and Virtual, p. 98.
Is Every Exit an Entrance Elsewhere, p. 100.
The Middle as No Exit, p. 102.
The Fractal Character of a Between, p. 103.
Washington 147
Game of Between
The Vertical (Sacred) and the Horizontal (Secular), p. 103.

Shades, Shadows, Photon Subtraction, p. 104.

Suspended Animation, p. 106.

Liminality, p. 107.

Between as Coordination, p. 108.

The Immediate, p. 109.

Dry Wall Versus Wet Wall, p. 110.

Between Them and Us, p. 111.

Questioning, p. 111.

Asking, p. 112.

The Game of Between as an Answer to a Question, p. 115.

Translation, p. 115.

Crossing a Threshold, p. 118.

Textual In-Between Closure, P. 119

Kinship Relations, p. 120.

Love, p. 124.

The Fate of The Game of Between, p. 125

Examples of Authors Betweening, p. 126.

Index of Perspectives on the Game of Between, p. 127.

WORKS CITED


Washington 148

Game of Between
NOTES


8 The reader might want to make further applications of this analogy, the 3D Space of a Between as the nucleus of a cell, by reading Tom Misteli's "The Inner Life of the Genome" The Scientific American (February 2011), pp 66-73.

9 Barbara Corballis, "Not as different as all that," The Times Literary Supplement (October 28, 2011), p. 25.


15. Sir Francis Bacon, "Of Innovations." An essay written with a perspective from the middle; that is, from present time. Innovation, Bacon writes, is the "new," "novelty," the "stranger" among us. But, respecting the new and sometimes taking advantage of what it brings (for example, new kinds of medications), one should not neglect things of the past or those things yet to come. And lastly, that the novelty, though it be not rejected, yet be held for a suspect; and, as the Scripture saith,'that we make a stand upon the ancient way, and then look about us, and discover what is the straight and right way, and so to walk in it.


18. Here I have in mind works like Cicero's *De Oratore* and *De Inventione*; Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* (1553); George Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (1589); Hugh Blair *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1785).

19. Readers of Latin will perhaps detect the playfulness of *On Copia* in the words of its original title: *De duplici copia rerum ac verborum commentarii duo*.


21. Please see Roger Caillois *Les jeux et les homes* (*Games and Mankind*) (Paris: Gallimard, 1957); also entry "Games," *Wikipedia*


_Essential_ hereafter.


29 _Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe_ (New York: Phoenix 2003)

30 Please consult, for example, these articles in _The Economist_ (October 1-7, 2011): "Faster t+han the speed of light" (p. 15); "So long, and thanks for all the quarks" (pp 85-86).


PART TWO: ADDENDA

As I mentioned earlier, the god of betweenning is one that creates order from the middle. The god creates order by connecting at least two opposing "sides. This god, not unlike the Trinity of Christianity, is a triune one, one that works with a three part structure, namely two opposing "side" and a middle (between). But this god can also, by deleting, omitting, or forgetting to supply a middle, be destructive, a god of disorder.
Think again (quoted above) of Yeats' poem, "Second Coming," and its depiction of disorder as a lack of a "centre."

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

If you are one who likes to categorize then you can think of what follows as specimens of betweenning that fall under three heads: Between, In-Between and Go-Between.

1. "Intermediate morphology" between a grooming claw and nail: 47-million-year-old primate, Notharctus tenebrosus. CT scan of a block of rock at American Museum of Natural History, Manhattan. NY Times January 17, 2012, P. D3. See also Wikipedia entry under "Transitional Fossils": In 1859, when Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species was first published, the fossil record was poorly known. Darwin described the perceived lack of transitional fossils as "the most obvious and gravest objection which can be urged against my theory", but explained it by relating it to the extreme imperfection of the geological record."
2. Leap Seconds: 86,440 seconds in a day measured by atomic clock. Leap seconds used to match clock time w/ rotation of the earth, solar time. Earth is slowing its rotation; project to abolish leap seconds: *The Economist*, p. 77 January 14, 2012. See also: Kenneth Chang, "A Second Here a Second There May Just Be a Waste of Time," *The New York Times*, January 19, 2012, P. A1, p. A3. "…starting in 1972 leap seconds have been added to keep the two sets of clocks synchronized"

3. Contemplating Betweenness a way to "unpack the presuppositions" of terms like Inertia, synchronization, or switching.

4. Scope: "Unsurprisingly, the construction of communal identity occurs in part through acts of distinction and differentiation. These are relational acts, often bilateral ones. But the axes along which differentiation occurs, and the parties from whom we distinguish ourselves, are wholly contingent. The examples above suggest this at a synchronic level; who I am, which is to say, what communal membership I claim, depends in part on whom I am relating to. " Clifford Ando, "Constellations of peoples," *The Times Literary Supplement*, January 13, 2012, p. 10

5. Jonah Lehrer, "Groupthink." *The New Yorker*, January 30, 2012, pp 22-27. Rejects "brainstorming" as being creative, brainstorming was a notion put forth by Alex Osborn in his book "Your Creative Power" (1948); Lehrer explores the alternate practice of a mix of persons familiar and unfamiliar with each other is more creative. "The most creative spaces are those which hurl us together. It is the human friction that makes the sparks." P. 27
6. "I used to play golf with my father-in-law. It was fun. After he died, I played a game or two by myself. It was no fun. It was the relationship that was fun." (Friend of the author).

7. Can we say that birth is an example of the Middle as novelty? Embryo result of union of sperm & egg. See ted talk.
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/he/alexander_tsiaras_conception_to_birth_visualized.html


9. "We call it a grain of sand,/but it calls itself neither grain nor sand./It does just fine without a name,/ whether general, particular, permanent, passing, incorrect, or apt." Wislawa Szymborska "View with a Grain of Sand." New York Review of Books, December 22, 2011, p. 30. What does the god of betweening call h/h?


11. Man as a creature that oscillates between light and dark. Deus absconditus (God out of sight; Blaise Pascal) God offers signs that provide "enough light for those who desire to see, and enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition" see Paul K. Moser: The Washington Game of Between

12. Metaphor: Writing as base camp; goes from there to scaling the mountain

13. The 2.5 (two and a half) second noble truth: cause of suffering and end of suffering:

14. A metaphor for lessening of suffering. Sharon Salzberg. Part/whole; whole numbers/fractions examples of betweening?


16. Gunpowder as a one in third substance: nitrate salt, carbon, sulfur. can we say that the explosion of gunpowder, is the Middle? (like the trinity, one in three, three in one; ignition: chemical reaction for the explosion of gunpowder can represented as potassium nitrate + carbon + sulfur → carbon dioxide + carbon monoxide + nitrogen + potassium carbonate + potassium sulfide (where all the elements to the right of the arrow are molecules of gas). Can we make the claim that the "equation" can be resolved into a Between or just Thirdness. Is Thirdness a degenerate form of a Between?

17. Alchemy as between: Jonathan Franzen, "A Rooting Interest," The New Yorker, February 13 and 20, 2012; p. 63: "In every case…the alchemical agent by which fiction transmutes my secret envy or my ordinary dislike of 'bad' people into sympathy is desire." (rev of Edith Wharton's fiction. "Desire" is the Middle

19. Negation (linguistics) wikipedia: the question is "What is not Betweeness"?

20. Categorization is the process in which ideas and objects are recognized, differentiated and understood. WIKIPEDIA; Or should it be called "labeling"? Categorization satisfies the three criteria better than labeling?

21. THIRDNESS: Troika; trifecta, triad, triumph, triumvirate, trinity, trial.

22. Mating as closing a gap: yeast genetics. One haploid orienting itself to mate w/ another haploid. To a haploid the single state is undesirable. NY Times, feb 14. 2012. Science Times

23. "My son asked me to explain the difference between a Conservative and a Liberal. I went on at some length. He thought for a while and said 'then, basically, it's the difference between the Heavenly Dream and the God-Awful Reality


25. 2 Kings 2, 1-12.

26. Nothingness: "Dr Krauss (a cosmologist) delineates three different kinds of nothingness. First is what may have passed muster as nothing with the ancient Greeks: empty space. But we now know that even empty space is filled with energy, vibrating with electromagnetic fields and so-called virtual particles dancing in and out of existence or borrowed energy courtesy of the randomness that characterizes reality on the smallest scales, according to the rules of quantum theory. Second is nothing, without even space Washington
and time…little bubbles of space-time …could bubble out of this nothing. There is a deeper nothing in which even the laws of physics are absent…the multiverse, a nearly infinite assemblage of universes…” Dennis Overbye, "There is more to Nothingness than we Know,'": NY Times 21 Feb 2012, p. D 1, D3. Ref. to Lawrence M. Krauss, *A Universe From Nothing.*


28. Representation by both Vertical & horizontal Betweens: Peter Brown, "A Tale of Two Bishops and a Brilliant Saint," March 8, 2012, NY Rev Bks, pp. 29-32. Rev of Ambrose and John Chrysostom: Clerics between Desert and Empire by J. H. W. G Liebeschuetz (Oxford UP 2011). "To establish the true weight of Ambrose, Liebeschuetz reaches back in time to the long roots of his thought and action in a Stoic moralism that enjoyed a new flowering in Christian circles as a result of the ascetic movement. He also reaches eastward in space to Ambrose neat contemporary in the Greek world, John Chrysostom." P. 29. Asceticism meant "engagement in the world in the name of another world, more brilliant, more enduring, and more certain than their own (heaven, "the true days, full of light and everlasting brilliance")….both (men) stove to combine the classical tradition of public courage, summed up in the long-cherished virtue of outspokenness-parresia-with the tone of a Hebrew prophet bearing a message from God." P. 29; conflict "between court and church" (p. 30); religious and secular not disengaged (like today) in early church, 4thc; baptism both a horizontal and vertical ritual?
Metaphor: "human nature" like a "leaky ship on the high seas, kept afloat by the constant creak of the bilge pump. The salt water of small insidious sins dripping through its timbers."

"The poignancy of the present is that we are betwixt and between 'Though their bodies are (temporarily) in nature, humans are not of nature.' P. 32.

29. What is happening in the space between poetry and philosophy today? The thirteen essays collected in the March 2012 edition of Mosaic (Canadian journal) special issue take up this question—in thirteen different ways. For example, in one essay, Heidegger’s question, “What is the thing?” is directed to the “thingness” of poetry; another essay reads Mark McMorris’s experimental (postcolonial) poetics alongside the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas; still another reads Erin Mouré’s O Cadoiro with Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever. Plato is brought together with Giorgio Agamben, Wallace Stevens with Roland Barthes, and the poet with the philosopher in Nietzsche’s writing. This is a special issue.

30. Temporal versus spatial meanings of betweenness: "Gene, I have discovered that betweenness is relative, not absolute. The proof is that it can be used for a test of whether a person is a Mormon or a gentile. Take the phrase, 'He is between wives.' To a gentile, this will mean something different than it does to a Mormon." (Personal communication from CHARLES ROMESBERG 2 mar 2012).
31. Galileo argues that the set of squares $S = \{1, 4, 9, 16, 25, \ldots \}$ is the same size as $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, \ldots \}$ because there is a one-to-one correspondence: $1 \leftrightarrow 1, 2 \leftrightarrow 4, 3 \leftrightarrow 9, 4 \leftrightarrow 16, 5 \leftrightarrow 25, \ldots$ WIKIPEDIA "Infinite set."

32. The last scene in The Phantom of the Opera, Christine is forced to make a decision between the Phantom and Raoul de Chagny her childhood friend: an axiom of choice?

33. The genitive absolute in Greek can be analyzed as a triadic representation: "τοῦ δεσπότου κελεύσαντος, οἱ δοῦλοι ργαζον τοῦ despótou keleúsantos, hoi doúloi ērgazon"

(After their master has ordered it, the slaves begin to work).

Another example: "τῶν ἀνδρῶν πολεµούντων, αἱ γυναικεῖς μόναι ὁικοί εἰσίν" (While the men are waging war, the women are at home by themselves).

This first example shows how a genitive absolute with a present participle is used with simultaneous actions. The independent clause is "αἱ γυναικεῖς μόναι ὁικοί εἰσίν" ("...the women are at home by themselves"). The dependent clause and genitive absolute in this example is "τῶν ἀνδρῶν πολεµούντων" ("While the men are waging war"). It explains to the reader why the women are home alone, and yet is additional and not required information. Note the usage of the conjunction while, indicating the two facts occurring at the same time.

34. See http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=in-between ; Examples: An erection not quite hard and not quite soft; a turd halfway in. From The Urban Dictionary Washington

Game of Between
35. Sentences from NY Review of Books April 5, 2012: Ian Buruma, "Tony Judt: The Right Questions" p. 28: "The constant tension between his affinities, chosen or inherited, and his politics, between the aspirations of the 'universalist' intellectual and the man in search of an anchor, gave zest to his thinking."

36. Gilles Deleuze, Wikipedia: Repetition and difference. Apparent identities such as "X" are composed of endless series of differences, where "X" = "the difference between x and x'", and "x" = "the difference between...", and so forth. Difference goes all the way down.

37. Check out Christine Brooke-Rose novel "Between." (London: Michael Joseph 1968) "Between the enormous wings the body of the plane stretches its one hundred and twenty seats or so in threes on either side towards the distant brain way up, behind the dark blue curtain and again beyond no doubt a little door. In some countries the women would segregate still to the left of the aisle, the men less numerous to the right. But all in all and civilization considered the chromosomes sit quietly mixed among the hundred and twenty seats or so that stretch like ribs as if inside a giant centipede. Or else inside the whale, who knows, three hours, three days of maybe hell. Between doing and not doing the body floats." Between the enormous wings the body floats." P. 181.

38. "The structure of the story of the Titanic has the elegant symmetry of literature…the hero is caught between an energetic savior (the Carpathia) and an obtuse villain (the Californian)." P. 72, The New Yorker, "Unsinkable" Daniel Mendelsohn , p. 16 April 2012,
39. Christine Smallwood. "The In-Between World." *The New Review of Books, May 10, 2012*, p. 24-26. "Abandoned by the government and by their families, the films' characters inhabit in-between zones like the riverbanks below the highway, the small forests around housing projects, service roads, administrative offices. The Dardennes are curious about things in-between. They love, for example, to photograph the in-between bodies of boys-long-limbed, incense, serious, focused, violent, spookily mature, physically dextrous boys." Review of a film "The Kid with a Bike," by Luc Dardenne and Jean-Pierre Dardenne.

40. "Sexual intercourse began/In nineteen sixty-three/Which was rather late for me)/*Between* the end of the Chatterley ban/And the Beatles' first L.P./ Up till then there'd only been/A sort of bargaining,/A wrangle for a ring,/A shame that started at sixteen/And spread to everything," Philip Larkin *Annus Mirabilis*.


42. *Betweenness* as "*between, middle, mid-ocean, half*" Word like "vale, cleft mountains" emphasize betweenness; what about "*seem*" half way between certainty ad uncertainty? Mariners in a space of in=between: seal/shore; land/sky/ rest/toil/Troy/home. Birth/death; past/present. See Tennyson's *The Lotus Eaters,* " Choric song:

There is sweet music here that softer falls

Than petals from blown roses on the grass,

Or night-dews on still waters *between* walls

Washington 162

Game of Between
Of shadowy granite, in a gleaming pass;

Music that gentler on the spirit lies,

Than tir’d eyelids upon tir’d eyes;

Music that brings sweet sleep down from the blissful skies.

Lo! in the middle of the wood,

The folded leaf is woo’d from out the bud

With winds upon the branch, and there

Grows green and broad, and takes no care,

Sun-steep’d at noon, and in the moon

Nightly dew-fed; and turning yellow

Falls, and floats adown the air.

half-dropped eyelids

Than labor in the deep mid-ocean, wind and wave and oar;

43. "COMMON GROUND" = Betweenness

44. Mental imagery always seems vague. When rising suddenly after a prolonged crouch, I “see stars before my eyes”. I can tell there are more than ten of these hallucinated lights but I cannot tell how many. Is this indeterminacy in thought to be reduced to indeterminacy in language? Why not vice versa? Language is an outgrowth of human

Washington 163

Game of Between
psychology. Thus it seems natural to view language as merely an accessible _intermediate_ bearer of vagueness.

Roy Sorensen, Stanford Enchy of Phil. "Vagueness"

Vagueness can reside in the object, our thoughts, or language. Language is he intermediate bearer.


48. Adam Frank "Alone in the Void," NY times July 25, 2012: p. A23. Trapped bet our obsession w/ expectations of rapid interstellar space travel, a "deep meme" and the impossibility of such travel. It would take 700 centuries, at today speed of a space craft (like Voyager 1, sent in space 35 yrs ago) to reach the nearest star. Our planet is becoming overcrowded; have to make good w/ what we have "for a long, long time."

49. Michael Ostling, _Between the Devil and the Host_. (Oxford UP 2012): Polish witchcraft, persecution, use of the communion host to solve problems; stealing the host and having sex w/ the devil, cause of persecution. ; witchcraft banned in 1787. Rev TLS July 13, 2012, p. 22

51. "In-Betweeners." TV show. 4 teenager losers navigating highschool and scoring with girls.

52. "Betweenity" coined by garden writer John Sedding to describe a real and peculiarly long-lasting Engoish compromise between the stiff formality Le Notre and the more casual flow of William Kent and Capability Brown, a compromise warmly applauded as 'one of landscape archecitecture's most accomplished forms.': p. 5 TLS August 17 & 24, 2012


54. The students of the Department of Comparative Literature and of the Italian Specialization at the CUNY Graduate Center present the annual interdisciplinary conference entitled IN TRANS: Reading Between and Beyond, to be held on November 8 and 9, 2012.

The prefix *trans-* implies the fundamental patterns that lie at the heart of artistic and other modes of creation and reception. It entails the act of moving simultaneously beyond, between and through the limits of a concept or an idea. From Translation to Game of Between
Transcendence, from Transnationalism to Transsexualism, from Transcription to Transgression, the study of phenomena that occur in between or beyond traditional definitions and principles has captured the attention of the academic world over the past twenty years. Words that begin with the prefix trans- describe cultural and artistic creations that attempt to defy standard notions of identity, authorship, completeness, meaning or interpretation. This conference will explore the study of what lies between and beyond the customary through the use of words that contain the very idea of being “in trans”.

We invite papers from all disciplines focusing on works from any period that explore the multiplicity of the prefix trans- in literature, philosophy, theory, visual arts, film, or social sciences. Some of the questions this conference seeks to answer include, but are not limited to:

- What role does transience play in the work of art as it goes from the first draft to a possible final product? What does this condition entail?
- Do the notions that challenge standard definitions and principles become immutable standards themselves?
- How has literary theory dealt with the issues of deception and sincerity? Can any cultural expression, whether literary, audiovisual, philosophical, or political, be transparent?
- How has the idea of national, racial or cultural identity been challenged by literature, cinema, or the arts? How does transnationalism affect contemporary cultural
expressions?

• How does transferring from one space to another affect the creation and the reception of the work of art?

• How have the theological concepts of transubstantiation and transfiguration been developed in literature and the arts? Can literary theory use these concepts to understand the problem of creation and influence?

• How are the identities of the author and the translator affected by the shift from one language to another? How is the reception of a text influenced by translation?

• What happens to a work when it is transcoded from one symbolic system to another?

• How are transsexual modes of self-identification expressed or challenged in a work of art?

• What is the relation between the transcendent and the sublime? Does the presence of transcendence push the limit of a work of art?

• How is transmission, in terms of broadcasting, cultural transplantation, or even disease, exemplified in art and literature? How has transmission been approached by literary theory?

• How does the author transfer his fears and desires to the work of art and the reader? How can the processes of transference and transferal be interpreted?

• How has the concept of transgression been portrayed and studied by literature, the arts or the social sciences?

Author's stance on modality; opposes those of Quine and Lewis. A modal actualist takes seriously both actual things (incl people) and possible ones what is necessary vs what is possible (contingent).

56. Visible light (part of the electromagnetic spectrum) (commonly referred to simply as light) "Visible light is electromagnetic radiation that is visible to the human eye, and is responsible for the sense of sight.[1] Visible light has a wavelength in the range of about 380 nanometres to about 740 nm – between the invisible infrared, with longer wavelengths and the invisible ultraviolet, with shorter wavelengths. (From Wikipedia "Light.")

God's keyboard. We perceive only one octave.


58. The mediocres, the "in-betweeners," the "little big men" …not at the bottom or top of society, …went…unnoticed by historians….kept things working when society between fall of Rome and rise of Christianity (350-550). Mediocres included small Campanian farmers, local priests, administrators, etc. NY Rev of Books, October 11, 2012, p. 43. Rev of Peter Brown: Through the Eye of a Needle (Princeton UP)


Washington 168

Game of Between

61. "I read somewhere…that life is in the getting there—the time spent negotiating a path *between* point A and point B. That is also true of math, especially geometry, which is all about getting from A to B." Shing-Tung Yau: *The Shape of Inner Space*. New York (2010): p. 320. This suggests that *betweenness* only becomes intelligible in a spacetime manifold. If so, this would make *betweenness* have four dimensions, three of space and one of time. We might want to write this $a^2+b^2+c^2=d^2$.

62. It seems likely that one cannot write an equation without some idea of *betweenness*. Take the example of the Pythagorean Theorem: $a^2+b^2=c^2$.


Subatomic particle, light or electron can be a wave or a particular depending on how to look at it; causes are not guaranteed to be linked to effects. Electron can be in two places at once, until something measures it. Heisenberg … Erwin Schrodinger…a cat in a box would be both alive and dead until somebody looked at it.

Boundary bet quantum reality and normal life. To detect light is to destroy it, photons are absorbed in our retinas or chips in our cameras…count the photons…send in an atom as a "spy"


66. "Somewhere between": expression used to identify something that exists but is unclassifiable. An example is from The Economist October 27, 2012, p. 84. The subject is "self-similarity" a characteristic of fractals. "Georg Cantor cut chunks out of a line, and chunks out of what remained, to make a self-similar 'dust.'…Such constructs seemed unclassifiable, somewhere between solid and gossamer-and impervious to the traditional tools of geometers.'

In this example "somewhere in-between" is the unclassifiable thing (or condition) between two classifiable things, "zero" and "a hundred." "It is funny, with so much media and stuff, it's kind of like zero or a hundred….But I know realistically it's going to be somewhere in between." Jeremy Lin talking about his basketball career with the Knicks and his trade to the Rockets. NY Times November 19, 2012, p. D5.

Washington

Game of Between


69. "it is only at the scale of our direct, sensory interactions with the land around us that we can appropriately notice and respond to the immediate needs of the living world." This seems to try make the case for no in-betweeness. Notice the words "sensory interactions" and "immediate needs." David Abram. *The Spell of the Sensuous*. New York: Pantheon (1996) 268

70. Purgatory, "the wide zone between Heaven and Hell that leaves room for the human soul to change for the better over long stretches of time. Purgatory helped missionaries to offer the heathen something more comfortable and appealing than the stark dichotomy of Heaven or Hell. Purgatory was a "middle zone in which the dead could linger less comfortable than Heaven, but closer to earth and to the prayers of their kinsfolk and descendents. Purgatory made sure that the dead would be remembered." Peter Brown, "The Risks of Being Christian," *The New York Review of Books*, December 29, 2012: 76. A review of Isabel Moreira. *Heaven's Purge: Purgatory in Late Antiquity*. Oxford UP 2011.

The "idea" of purgatory apparently started with Origen of Alexandria (187-254) and was expanded by Bede (672-735).
Cf. limbo (Latin Limbus, edge, border, akin to English "limp."

71. History, Pierre Nora writes in "Between History and Memory: Les Lieux de Memoire," is an objective enterprise. It is a contrivance. At best, it is or it seeks as its most sacred goal an unbiased truth. At worst, it is a construction. History remakes what we now call the past or yesterday into a series of colorful mini-dramas in which cantankerous, divided factions (who change over time and space) drive the narrative up and down, to and fro. In contrast, memory is unapologetically subjective. It is deeply flawed. It is racist, sexist, class oriented; it is an ethnocentric thing. Perhaps because of its nuance, its muddiness, memory, Nora insists, is destroyed by history because history is a less complicated endeavor. At the middle of that ensuing conflict are Gerald Kahler's The Long Farewell and Seth Bruggeman's Here, George Was Born.

72. Balanced between oversimplifying the serious and taking a joke too seriously. TLS, p. 27


74. "Seeing the intermediate" Astrochemistry. Detecting chemical elements in space. The Economist, March 16-22, p. 81. "The ability to study chemical reactions stage by stage will be...important. High -school chemistry lessons, with their neat equations transforming, say $2H_2 + O_2$ into $2H_20$ miss out on a plethora of intermediate steps such as (in this case) the formation of hydroxyl, OH."

Washington 172

Game of Between
75. "Dreams, suggests Stewart, should be seen as ways of linking the present with both the past and the future: they are best understood as a "historical consciousness" "Teeth and Hair." Rev of Charles Stewart's *Dreaming and Historical Consciousness in Island Greece*. Harvard UP 2013. *TLS March 8, 2013, p. 3.*

76. "Upon looking back from the end of the last chapter and surveying the texture of what has been wrote, it is necessary, that upon this page and the five following, a good quantity of heterogeneous matter be inserted, to keep up that just balance betwixt wisdom and folly" (*Tristram Shandy* 9:12).

77. Computing in the subatomic realm of quantum mechanics. Common sense logic no longer applies. A one can be a one, or it can be a one and a zero and everything in-between all at the same time. D-wave computing. NY Times March 22, 2013, p. B1, B2.

78. Chesterton said the essay is the joke of literature, it can do what good Jokes do and keep open boundaries between the various disciplines *Between* expertise and experience and *between* literature and life.

Qtd: *TLS, March 22, 2013, p. 11*

79. "Attitudes are nothing,, madam—'tis the transition from one attitude to another—like the preparation and resolution of the discord into harmony, which is all in all" (*Sterne's Tristram Shandy*, 4:6).

80. The gray area. Vagueness.

81. Midwife.

82. Finding Common Ground.

Washington 173 Game of Between

84. Half-ness: "A corrective to whatever is spongy, soft, indistinct, sloppy, half-hidden, half-formed, half-baked, or only half-right." (comment about David Berlinski's book, *The King of Infinite Space*, in The New Yorker, April 22, p. 106. Book is about Euclid's Elements).

85. How does memory work: Aleida Assmann, author of *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization*, has this theory: She posits a triangular relationship between 'symbol,' 'affect' and 'trauma,' where the middle term is decisive: "if "affect-memories" are properly processed and integrated, they become part of the symbolic stock of memories; if they exceed a psychologically tolerable threshold, they are traumatically foreclosed before they can cause further damage" (*TLS*, April 19, 2013, p. 24; my emphasis).

86. Henry Adams: *The Education of HA*. (Boston: Houghton-Miflin 1961; American Heritage book). Author portrays himself as being in the middle; p. 60; abysmal fracture 381; bet God as unity, devil as complexity 397; bet 2 forces of inertia, race and sex p. 447

87. Black box in-betweeness: "What scientists have now are two ends of a system with a black box in the middle that is not fully understood. At one end are place cells. At the other are gride cells. As to what exactly happens in between, and how the grid cells form in the first place, Dr. Edvard Moser said, 'That's still a 10-, a 20-year research problem.'" D7. Report on discovery of "grid cells" in rat's brain that function as a kind of navigation system that informs him of where they are, where they are going and where they have

Washington

Game of Between
been. With grid cells one is "constantly creating a map of the outside world. It may be the basis of all memory. This idea resonates with the memory palaces of the Renaissance, imagined buildings that used spatial cues as memory aids. The technique dates to the ancient Greeks." James Gorman: "A Sense of Where You Are." NY Times April 30, 2013: D1, D6, D7.

88. The word "beyond" presupposes in-between state between a "here" and a "there."

Please watch the movie, "The Place Beyond the Pines." Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil," is structured around mankind's in-between state.

89. Plato. See Loeb Republic: God has his seat "in the Middle" 437; we identify what opinion is by finding it located between "is" and "is not," existence (knowledge) and non-existence (ignorance) 477; 520. We seek the middle.

90. "Since nothing can be in two places at the same time, the conditions for creating contrastive sets of place identifiers seem ideal." P. 376; George A. Miller & Philip N. Johnson-Laird. Language and Perception. (Cambridge MA: Harvard 1976). For dealing with the space we live in we have an extensive system of labels in for various kinds of containers, pathways, and boundaries:

Containers: bags, attics, baskets bins, bottles…; Pathways: aisles alleys, drives, detours, footpaths…; Boundaries: beaches, bounds, ceiling contours, fences, rims, sides, tops, thresholds… 377; to navigate a city one needs to distinguish among districts, nodes, landmarks, paths and edges. 377
91. There is a story about two mountain climbers lost in the Alps who consult their map until one suddenly points to a distant peak and says, "We are on that mountain over there."

92. Of the 23 locative prepositions tested on children when they began to form sentences (between the ages of 15 to 21 months) "in" was the easiest to use, "on" was the 10th most difficult, "between" was the most difficult. P. 383 (Miller & Johnson-Laird). Between involves, as do "in," "on," "at" and "with," the search for a referent.

"One can use the space concept to describe the relative locations of objects around any given individual (with special priority given to the locations relative to ego) or describe more abstractly the relation between any two objects." 395. Space has one vertical coordinate, up/down, and two horizontal coordinates, left/right, front/back. Horizontal difficult to learn; vertical easy because of gravity. P 397.

93. Ivan Ilyich is a highly regarded official of the Court of Justice, described by Tolstoy as, "neither as cold and formal as his elder brother nor as wild as the younger, but was a happy mean between them—an intelligent, polished, lively, and agreeable man.

94." Dialogic relations have a specific nature: they can be reduced neither to the purely logical (even if dialectical) nor to the purely linguistic (compositional-syntactic). They are possible only between complete utterances of various speaking subjects... Where there is no word and no language, there can be no dialogic relations; they cannot exist among...
objects or logical quantities (concepts, judgments, and so forth). Dialogic relations presuppose a language, but they do not reside within the system of language. They are impossible among elements of a language." Mikhail Bakhtin. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Trans. Vern W. McGee. (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press 1986): 117.

95. Conceptualists hold a position intermediate between nominalism and realism, saying that universals exist only within the mind and have no external or substantive existence. Wikipedia "Nominalism."

96: "A mind map is a diagram used to visually outline information. A mind map is often created around a single word or text, placed in the center, to which associated ideas, words and concepts are added. Major categories radiate from a central." (*Wikipedia* "Mind map."; my emphasis)


98. "Our dilemma is between 'self-shaping' and 'self-acceptance.' Neither seems satisfactory on its own, but it may be difficult to see how he two can be reconciled" p. 23, *TLS*, May 10, 2013. Ref is to Kierkegaard & books about him

99. Nick Carraway, narrator of *The Great Gatsby* refers to himself as "within and without" the societies of Tom and Daisy Buchanan and that of Jay Gatsby. This is a betweenness creaed by words like "neither/nor."

99. The Twin Prime Conjecture. Prime numbers are ones that can only divided by themselves or 1. 3 and 5 are prime numbers. So are 11 and 13. What separates them is the number 2. The theory is that for every prime Washington 177
number (which are assumed to be infinite) there will always be a larger pair than the largest one found.

Yitang Zhang, a professor mathematics at the University of New Hampshire, has now shown (2013) that at the level of large primes (where primes become more scarce) that separation of the pairs is 70 million: which can possibly be reduced. (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/that-figures-professor-who-had-to-work-at-subway-dazzles-world-of-maths-after-solving-centuriesold-prime-number-riddle-8625637.html).

Given any two things of the same kind can they still retain their identity (like primes do) by having the "gap them red" between reduced or even expanded?

100. Hexadactyly: The presence of an extra digit, a sixth finger or toe, which is a very common congenital malformation (birth defect). This condition is called hexadactyly. The word hexadactyly literally means six digits. In medical usage, hexadactyly does not specify whether the six digits are fingers or toes (although in Greek "dactylos" is without equivocation a finger).

The 6th digit can be located in three different locations: on either side of the extremity or somewhere in between. With the hand for example, the extra finger can be out beyond the little finger (which is called ulnar hexadactyly) or out beyond the thumb (radial hexadacyly) or, finally, between two of the normally expected fingers (intercalary hexadactyly).

101. The Littoral Zone: "Ruby had talked about the littoral zone, that space between high and low watermarks where organisms struggled to adapt to the daily rhythm of

Washington Game of Between

102: Quantum Tunneling: Breaking through the vacuum that separates atoms. The Economist. To understand the phenomenon particles attempting to travel between potential barriers can be compared to a ball trying to roll over a hill (see Wikipedia).

103. "Serge's memoirs span the years 1906-41. They are a drawn-out exercise in self-resistance, sustained by the dynamic tensions between Marxist theory and historical reality, between faith and doubt." TLS June 14, 2013. p. 4 (ref is to Victor Serge: Memoirs of a Revolutionary)

103. Gulliver, Swift's Gulliver's Travels, is an In-Between creation: he is a human, a middle class Englishman, but he and the Yahoos possess similar characteristics of shape, size and behavior. Upon Gulliver's arrival in Houyhnhnmland, the Houyhnhnms, identify him as a new species (what might be called "Human:Yahoo, neither completely human nor completely Yahoo). This species identification is reinforced by what can be called "spatial In-Betweeness." His lodging, assigned to him by his Master Houyhnhnm, is "but Six Yards from the House (the house of Gulliver's Master Houyhnhnm) and separated from the Stable of the Yahoos." (Book 4, Chapter 2).

104. Failure of the middle: "The Celinian universe remains dichotomous; without a third term, or because of the latter's failure, two terms rise up facing each other, Woman and Lover, Sex and Corpse...Death and Word, Hell

See also Yeats' poem, "The Second Coming," and the first stanza about things falling apart because the "centre cannot hold."

Turning and turning in the widening gyre  
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;  
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;  
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,  
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere  
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;  
The best lack all conviction, while the worst  
Are full of passionate intensity.

105. "In America, Chekhov's reputation began its rise slightly later, partly through the influence of Stanislavski's system acting, with its notion of 'Subtext.': 'Chekhov often expressed his thought not in speeches,' wrote Stanislavski, 'but in pauses or *between* the lines or in replies consisting of a single word... the characters often feel and think things not expressed in the lines they speak.' " (Wikipedia, "Anton Chekov").

106. Movie "The Searchers," man played by John Wayne; cannot make transition from older to newer values. An example of the "threshold person."

Washington 180  
Game of Between

108. "Ancient Egyptians took the supernatural seriously. It was, for them, reality. The path between life on earth and life in an earthlike place beyond was continuous. The sun traveled it every day, moving across the sky from east to west, dropping from sight to continue its circuit through the netherworld, then turning up on earth again." Holland Cotter. "Its Reign Was Long, With Nine Lives to Start." NY Times, July 26, 2013, p. C17. Reference is to exhibit of the figures of cats at the Brooklyn Museum. The exhibit is called "Divine Felines: Cats of Ancient Egypt."

109: There are many examples of BetweeDning in Harry Eyres, Horace and Me: Life Lessons from an Ancient Poet (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2013). The author explicates Horace's well known expression, in medius res (in the middle of things p. 186) and aurea mediocritas (golden mean).

*The title of Eyres' book implies a process of finding, and establishing, a "common ground" between himself and Horace.

*On the subject of religion, Eyres says "I find myself somewhere in the middle

...not a paid-up member of any faith, but not a militant atheist or devotee of scientism either " (p.. 179).
*On the last stanza of Horace's ode (I:10): "It (the poem) closes on something like a profound chord, linking the worlds for upper and lower, the glorious world of the gods on Mount Olympus and the dark Underworld of Pluto...life and death...poetry, and Horace's poetry in particular, is a sort of magic conductor, easing the passage between higher and lower realms, between life and death" (p. 175).

The most "global" use of Betweenning in Eyres' book is to "reconnect" the author with Horace—to cross, as it were, the old bridges they had crossed earlier and to build new ones. These "bridges" include love of wine, love of nature, slowness in living, love poetry and so on. Here is a salient example: "The point—and here is the reconnection with Horace—is that I became penetrated and fertilized by another language, culture and poetry at the level of soul." (91).

110. In a study of how children from fifteen to eighteen months begin to combine words (23 prepositions) into sentences "in" was the easiest to learn; "on" was the tenth most difficult; "between" was the most difficult. George Miller & Philip Johnson-Laird. *Language and Perception* (Harvard UP 1976: 383).

111. "Oh Rosalie, my precious maid./I think thou thinkest love is true/And on thy fragrant bosom laid/I almost could believe it too./O in our nook, unknown, unseen./We'll hold our fancy like a screen/Us and the dreadful fact between." Arthur Clough, "Dipsychus."
112. The Kepler Spacecraft, launched in 2009, had the mission of locating planets in the *Goldilocks Zone*, earth-like planets with water and possibly capable of supporting earthlike creatures. By 2013, Kepler had identified 130 earthlike planets in the Milky Way and 1,200 other candidates.


114. "It's hard to imagine a more beautiful or humbling connection between the sacred and the profane, the microscopic and the large, inner space and out space." *(NYT*, August 6, 2013: D6. This passage is from an article, "Stars, Gold, Dung Beetles and Us," and the connections between them. The key point is that we are all star-dust. "We organic beings who call ourselves humans are made of the same stuff as the stars."

115. Shakespeare's messengers as *Go-betweens*. Think also of Mercury the Roman god. He is the patron god of financial gain, commerce, eloquence (and thus poetry), messages/communication (including divination), travelers, boundaries, luck, trickery and thieves; he is also the guide of souls to the underworld.

116."In environmental parlance, he ecozone is the zone where two habitats *merge*, that *threshold* where water meets he shore, where the forest comes to meadow, or where woodland ends at a cultivated lawn. It is the *edge* habitat where everything, soil content, vegetation, moisture, humidity, light pollination, changes. It's also where species from *both sides converge*,

Washington 183

Game of Between
rendering it a place of complex interaction and diversity." NYT December 27, 2013: A21.

PART III:

FROM ASKING TO ANSWERING: MAKING QUESTIONS EXPLICIT

In this section betweenness appears as questions linking asking and answering (or not answering). Some questions are answerable some not. In short, betweenness is used a "tool" to make the space between asking and answering explicit.

This section, unlike the previous two, has a strong pedagogical style to it.

* Action simply translates an initially implicit being into a being that is made explicit. Hegel.

*The question and answer method seems suitable for introducing almost any one of the fields of human endeavours. A.M. Turing.
Teaching writing is always, at some level and some way, making it explicit.¹ And making it explicit essentially involves asking for, and giving reasons for, a particular stretch of discourse (word, phrase, sentence, etc.), the choice of the subject, or title, length of a paragraph, or text, punctuation, probable audience response to the text, and so on. In my years of teaching the several major genres of writing (creative, expository and technical), I have put a special emphasis on Questions and the various forms they can take in text-times, the various times associated with composing and reading the text²

Salient among them are 1) composing time (Questions as seen from the perspective of the writer in the process of composing, revising, etc. the text), 2) timing (essentially, how Questions affect the "speed" of the reading time of the text, its structure, duration, etc.,) and 3) comprehending time (how Questions influence the reader's understanding of the text, information in it and its overall intelligibility). With both 2) and 3) the perspective is generally

¹ In most pedagogical situations, the terms "local" and "global," levels are useful. "Local" refers to anything not "global," that is, not the complete text.

² Questions have, of course, received a great deal of attention by teachers of composition: see, e.g., Fred D. White and Simone J. Billings, The Well-Crafted Argument: A Guide and a Reader (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002), p. 155 ("audience-based"), p. 156 ("subject-based"), p. 155 ("writer-based") and pp. 156-57 ("purpose-based") Questions; Joseph M. Williams et al., The Craft of Argument with Readings (New York: Longman, 2003): 80-83; Gary Goshgarian, et al., An Argument Rhetoric and Reader (New York: Longman, 2003): 69-70, 109, 205. Each of these is motivated by a desire, not so much as to make Asking itself explicit, but more what explicit role Asking may take for text-construction in such important matters as finding a subject, understanding audience etc. Williams has an important section on "So What"? Questions. Goshgarian makes useful observations about "interview Questions."
that of the reader, who, of course, can also be the writer of the text. With all of these "times," however, we can speak them as authorial "destinations" of Questions—where "destination" is thought of as both a "goal" of Questions and as an effect of them. Judgment about the success, or failure, of such effect is usually the collaborative work of student-writer, instructor and class peers.

**ASKING AND ANSWERING**

The "big picture" about Questions, I tell my students, lies in what precedes and follows them—in Asking and Answering. Questions are not only the middle ground between Asking and Answering, but, more importantly, the "way" we get from one to the other; and, in the process, execute such vital writing procedures as structuring information, stating problems, or creating dialogue. This means, essentially, that we take the view that Questions have their main value to writers, not as something in themselves, but, like a coin, in the "exchange" of information between Asking and Answering. But coins, to continue the analogy, also have value in themselves. And so, as I try to show throughout this essay, that this is also true of Questions. For one thing, it allows us to isolate, and discuss, Questions as they are (presumably) in themselves plus the force they exert on things "around" them. In this, we are reminded of a statement from the Book of Changes (I-Ching) that "by
observing what each gathers to itself, it is possible to understand the inner nature of all things in heaven and earth."

Intuitively, terms for Asking might include ones like "ground" of Questions, "context" for Questions or "frame" for Questions. But recently we have to come to think of Asking as the "initial conditions" of Questions. When we "ask a Question" we essentially do two things: first we reveal that "ask" is prior to "Question," not just in its syntactical position, but also (as I will try to show) is prior in our knowledge and representation of the world. When a Question "no longer needs to be asked," then the priority of Asking disappears. But when we "ask a Question" we also establish a relationship, largely implicit, of the relationship that exists between Asking and Questions. When


3 Hexagram 45, p. 174.

4 The expression, "raise a question" also presupposes this priority of Asking. The notions of *apriori* and *aposteriori* knowledge originate, of course, in Aristotle who wrote treatises on both notions.
we revise a Question, or substitute another for it, then we revisit, or "go back
to," Asking in order to understand what conditions make up our last Question.
Such Asking to Questions process may be likened to how the "hardware" of
Asking can be modified, or changed, by some specific intention, with the
"software" of Questions. That is, Asking can be thought of as "programmable"
by the need to execute a specific linguistic act with discrete utterances. This
means, to continue the analogy, that the "initial states" of Asking exit as pure
potentiality. What makes them actual, working toward some end, are the
Questions that rise from them. Obvious examples of Questions, as the result
of programmed activity, are direct Questions like yes-no Questions, "Should
we have invaded Iraq?" "Is it raining outside?" etc.; wh-Questions, "What,
who, how? etc. and any utterance that expresses doubt and neediness. So we
commonly employ sentences like "I wonder if I should shop today," "They

5 To those familiar with stratificational grammar, the "idea" of the present
paragraph might seem reminiscent of the downward and upward processes of
"tactic patterns" and "realization portions." Intuitively, it seems true to say
that Asking is a "tactic" that finds, or can find, its "realization" in first a
Question and then an Answer. But there is, to my knowledge, no empirical
evidence that this is the case—nor that it increases the explicitness of Asking-
Question-Answer by putting it in the such grammar.

6 In Aristotle's famous phrase, the potentiality of a thing is to its actuality, its
"end," as the acorn is to the oak.

7 The reader may recognize that certain notions expressed here—as well as
elsewhere in this paper—are reminiscent of similar ones of A.M. Turing. See
his classic paper, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," Mind, 59, no. 236
want to get more rest," etc. Such utterances are often formed from what some linguists refer to as Question-embedding verbs, "doubt, need, desire, " and the like.\(^8\)

In general, then, we can say that the conditions named by Asking decompose into three main "groups," (a) needs and doubts, (b) sense data, and (c) memory.\(^9\) So a typical Question from (a) might be, "Would you pass the butter?" from (b) "What are those men doing at the irrigation ditch?" (a scene I'm now viewing from my window while I write this) and from (c) "Do you remember where I put the book on Venice I was reading?" In these examples, the Questions from (a) and (c) are represented as being addressed to some second person, the "you," or addressee. ([b] is addressed to the reader of this text). But Questions from any of the "groups" can also be addressed to oneself. And one must also admit that there is considerable overlapping of the groups. The main reason for this is that most Questions, perhaps all, (with the

\(^8\) Comorovski, p. 172

exception of rhetorical Questions) have one of their origins in group (a). All Questions, that is, express doubt or neediness residing in Asking. We may go further and say that such neediness is akin to a feeling of emptiness, of rooms missing expected occupants, of objects without places, or impermanent, transitive, things, a topic given special attention by Aristotle in his treatment of "privation." The need to "fill" such emptiness, or satisfy some "need," gives Asking, through Questions, the general quality of "moving into" some other, new, state or action. Seeking an answer to a Question is always accompanied by this "moving into" feeling. The answer, we believe, is out "there," in some yet inexperienced spatio-temporal field. Like any utterance, a Question can have a past, and prior, reference (see REFERENCE/ANAPHORA; BALANCE/BRIDGING below), but unlike any other utterance it is always carries—as part of its "moving into" quality—a "preview" of the "next" thing, the next set of words, the next piece of information, the next problem. Thus is it common to find, as in the following example, such a "preview" in the middle portion of a text. The example is from a novel about mountain climbing and the mystery surrounding the death of an experienced climber:

10 Neediness, we might notice in passing, is expressed in the word for "ask" or "Question" in most European languages. Cf. Latin, cupere, desiderare, Italian, desiderare, bramare; French, desire souhaiter; Greek, epithuke, potheo.

11 For example, Metaphysics, 4.22.1022b-1023a.4; Physics, 1.9.192a.5.


Washington 190

Game of Between
Could the veteran climber have been trying to commit suicide?

It's a question for which the bulk of the novel is designed to provide

an answer to.\(^{13}\)

Questions can be left unanswered, as many of Hamlet's are. But where the intent is to answer them, the case in most pedagogical situations, instructor and student need some guidelines to go by in understanding, and manipulating, Answering. What, in other words, constitutes an answer and how do we use it in an effective way? Not every string of words following a Question can be its answer. Nor, it seems fair to say, can a Question following another Question be an answer. What needs to happen for Answering to occur is for a string of words after a Question to settle the doubt, or eliminate the neediness, expressed in the Question. This is perhaps best seen in answers given to yes/no Questions:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Are you married?} & \quad \text{No} \\
\text{Are you divorced?} & \quad \text{Yes.} \\
\text{Would you lend me some money?} & \quad \text{No.}
\end{align*}
\]

Insofar as yes/no Questions can be seen as propositions, then we can say that Answering such Questions always presupposes certain truth-conditions. The

Answerer, that is, is obliged—whether or not he or she actually executes it—to utter the truth. Truth is also an issue with answers to wh-Questions. But here the answer, in order to raise to full answerhood, must supply enough information to eliminate the ignorance (need for information) expressed in the Question. A brief list of the types of information for such Questions would be the following:

What? Name of subject, substance, matter, of subject, etc.

Who? Name of person, gender, etc.

And so on through the rest of the Questions, "How, Where, When, How much (many)" and "Why."\(^{14}\)

Answers to the third class of Questions, utterances that lack the "?" in written discourse, but contain question-embedding verbs ("wonder," "surmise," etc.) are under the same constraint as answers to the other classes of Questions. Responses to them, in other to constitute a full answer, must minimally (a) eliminate doubt (or need), (b) eliminate ignorance with information. And (c) be truthful—where being truthful would include a "I don't know" answer. .

\(^{14}\) "Which," which has the form of a wh-Question is excluded from this list.

Washington 192

Game of Between
Yogi Berra once observed that "it's tough to make predictions, especially about the future." The same may be said about Answering. From one perspective, the "future" of a Question is its answer. But from another perspective, depending on the nature of the Question, there may not be an answer. Alternatively, there may not be, particularly in the case of wh-Questions, any principled way of determining what the details of the answer will be. This is especially true of modal-Questions, ones containing verbs like "may, must, should" and the like. These, it seems fair to say, have set the essential agenda for many, perhaps most, discussions of the future and raised such questions as "Is the future determined? What does individual choice play in our attitude toward the future?" and "Is the present always contingent and the future determined?"

15 No one, it seems fair to say, has discussed the "difficulties" of the future, and so those of answers, as tellingly as Aristotle—especially, in his famous "sea-fight tomorrow" topic. The substance of this topic figures largely in my (forthcoming) book on Questions.

As a rule, one begins with a "top-down" approach to making Asking explicit. That is, one begins with a particular instance of Asking and then decomposes it in order to make particular aspects of it explicit. So with Heidegger's classic Question, "What is Metaphysics," we would want to begin with the asking about the subject of the utterance, then move on to Questions about its text-location, if it is answered in the text and so on. This is certainly not a hard and fast rule. But, for reasons given throughout this text, I prefer it to a "bottom-up" analysis, one that starts by looking at individual, generally linguistic, components of Asking, tense, gender, aspect, etc.

Perhaps the most celebrated Answer to what seems to be a Question about the future is Aristotle's passage on "a sea-fight tomorrow." In it, Answering takes the form of a "frame" to discuss the nature of what is "necessary" and what is not.

A sea-fight must either take place tomorrow or not,

but it is not necessary that it should take place tomorrow,

neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place tomorrow....

This passage also brings up two other important questions about Answering. For Answering to occur, should it be preceded by a text-Question, a Question that actually occurs, as a text-utterance? Secondly, can every utterance, identified as an Answer, be paraphrased as a Question? With both Questions the quick Answer would seem to be "yes." Aristotle's sentence, "A sea-fight must either take place tomorrow or not" can easily be paraphrased as "Is it true to say that a sea-fight must either take place tomorrow or not? Must a sea-fight take place tomorrow or not?" or several other variations. With the first Question, the issue is more problematic. In both the original and

---

(March, 1968); Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (London, Duckworth, 1983).

17 On Interpretation, 18b23-25, 30-35.

Washington 194

Game of Between
translations (that I am aware of) the "sea-fight" utterance is a statement, not a
text-Question. So are we then justified in taking the words that follow it as an
Answer? Where is the Question that called it into being? One reason for
taking it as an Answer to a Question is that most commentators on the
passage take it as such.\textsuperscript{18} The other reason, following Collingwood's lead, is to
take every utterance, with the exception of every Question, as an Answer to a
Question.\textsuperscript{19} If so, then where is the Question it answers? If we don't "see" the
Question, then how can we determine that the Answer satisfies (resolves,
settles) the Question? Discussion of such Questions, in my experience, is best
left to conferences with one's best and brightest students. For all the others,
the Questions are best left unasked

Answering implies "being silent." That is, in order to answer a
Question one have to first be "silent" in order to hear the Question–one has to
"listen" to the Question\textsuperscript{20} On this view, Asking a Question and Answering it
appear as terms for talk followed by silence followed by more talk. Neither
can exist, or be significant, without the other, the main evidence for this (at

\textsuperscript{18} E.g., Paul Fitzgerald, "The truth about tomorrow's sea fight," \textit{The Journal

\textsuperscript{19} R. G. Collingwood, \textit{An Essay in Metaphysics} (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1972):
23. "Every statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a
Question."

\textsuperscript{20} See Buck. 18:23, entry "Be Silent."
least to my mind) being that every known language has words for "being silent" which, in turn, stand as synonyms for "listen." Such talk:silence:talk has a parallel in the written text whenever we interpret a text-Question as opening up a zone of silence. Someone, including the writer, has to listen to the Question. Answering it, by closing the zone of silence, signifies that someone has listened. This process is most noticeable, perhaps, when the Question forms the title of a text. The reader is cautioned, however, that this line of reasoning works best with professionals in the field or one's best students.

My immediate purpose here is not to attempt to give all the details of how this model of Asking and Answering works in class and conferences with students. (That is part of the subject of a forthcoming book). Rather I would like to present, in rather skeleton form, two procedures for making all the above more explicit. The first is what I called "The Categories" approach. The second is the "Crime Scene" one. Colleagues who have read this essay tell me

21 Buck, 1821-18:25.

22 In the book, Answerhood, like Asking, is represented, and discussed, as a "programmable" activity. Unlike Asking, however, answers to Questions do not possess the quality of neediness, doubt or ignorance. Answers "settle" things and are always have the linguistic representation of a proposition or declarative sentence. A good example of this appears in the language of patents: "No. 6,484,443, Method of covering a potted plant," "No. 6,467634, Casket-display system," or "No. 6,481,341, Antiburn toaster." See The New York Times Magazine, December 15, 2002, "A sampler of this year's crop of patents."

Washington 196

Game of Between
that the "Categories" approach appeals more to the linguistic (theoretical?) mind; the "Scene" one more to the practical (traditional rhetoric) one. The present reader, depending on his or her preference, might then chose to skip one of the approaches or come back to it later. It's all up to you.

THE CATEGORIES

These, eleven in all, exist in non-hierarchical form; that is, none is "more important," or more salient, than any other one and one may start with anyone of them. But all, to some degree, presuppose the existence of all the others. Some instructors, depending on time, the experience of their students, or genre of writing they are teaching may want to reduce the number, or modify them in some way. But I am convinced, after more than thirty years of teaching writing, that they are essential in the pedagogy of any instructor who believes, as I do, that making it explicit is what teaching writing is, in large part, all about.  

We may also speculate that Questions are answered when the need they expresses is satisfied—analogous to satisfying hunger with food in which food stands as a complete "answer" to the "hunger" of a Question. But successful answers, it seems fair to say, presuppose a localized and determined object of Questions. The thing we ask about, say, cat food at the local grocery store, means we possess a determination of cat food (what it is) but we do not know where it is—its location. Or, conversely, we may know the location of the object we seek, but we don't know what it is, it is undetermined. Someone may say to us "There's an easy-out in the garage on the red shelf." We know where the shelf is in the garage. We may not know, however, what an "easy-out" is, what it looks like, feels like and so on. So we may be required to ask more Questions of the person who told us where it is. Finding the easy-out (responding to a need) corresponds to a successful answer to the Question of determination and location.
(Readers will have noticed by now that this text is replete with text-Questions, utterances that actually occur in the text for the reader to see. They are invited to take these as illustrative of the relationship between Asking, Answering and Questions being discussed here and part of the process of making that relationship explicit.)

The names of the categories are these: 1) EXEMPLIFYING/CLASSIFYING, 2) STRUCTURE/INTENTION, 3)

It follows from this that a successful response to Questions cannot occur without this tripartite condition of need, determination and location of an object of Questions. It is perhaps not something an instructor would want to bring up in every class, but we can go further and say that there are antiobjects that deny existence to a successful response to Questions–objects that have no location, determination or do not satisfy some need; alternatively, express a need that is undetermined and unlocalized. In this category are things denoted by terms like "truth, virtue" or "freedom," plus what Todes calls "inconceivable conditions," conditions like those at Auschwitz. Such conditions, being unimaginable and inconceivable, are "holes in the world."23 This does not mean, of course, that we cannot ask about them–only that responses to our Questions will be undetermined, subject to objection, controversy or mere opinion. Questions that leads to more Questions, rather than a closing response, seems to presuppose an undetermined object–as seems to be the motivation for unfavorable reviews of Steven Pinker's The Modern Denial of Human Nature, a book that attempts to answer the Question, "What is human nature?"23 Human nature, to the reviewers, is not only an undetermined object but also an undeterminable one.

23 The thinking used to make Questions explicit owes much to Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge: Harvard, 1994). The categories themselves be seen as Questions about the writer's Questions, ones that may or may not appear in the text. In the process of using Questions to perform all the tasks a writer normally has to do (develop a subject, topic, or theme t, structure information in it, etc.) the categories may be employed to "revisit" the Questions in order to delete, modify or expand them.

Washington 198

Game of Between
Alluded to earlier, each of these can be thought of as a "control" on how Questions can be discussed with student writers in class or conference. I return to this topic after a survey of the categories.

Henceforth, Questions will be written as Qs or Q.

EXEMPLIFYING/CLASSIFYING. Asking, Answering and Q are a linguistic universal. And Qs exist, in three different forms, in all languages: direct Qs, (yes/no, wh-Qs and tag-Qs) and utterances with Q-embedding verbs. Utterances that have the outward form of a Q, an "?" or rising intonation, do not necessarily constitute a Q— as in the case of the rhetorical Q. Qs, in order to be genuine, must express need and the response, or answer, to it must be

"outside," or never presupposed, by the Q.\textsuperscript{25} (For more on this point see BALANCE/BRIDGING below.)

I introduce, and later discuss in classes and conferences, these kinds of Qs in the following general way.

(a) Use a yes-no Q to state a proposition that you want to debate; say, "will India and Pakistan begin a nuclear war?"; to take issue with a proposition of someone else, "is that right?"; or to repeat, or paraphrase, an earlier point (thesis or proposition). A Q, like all sentences, can occur anywhere in the text, in the title, the first sentence of a section or paragraph, in the middle or end, and so on.

Tag-Qs. The name comes from the fact that the Q part of the utterance comes at its end and "Qs," just as yes/no Qs do, the proposition of the utterance. Jill, a character in Hemingway's \textit{The Hills Like White Elephants} asks her male companion this tag-Q: "That's all we do, isn't it—look at things and try new drinks?"\textsuperscript{26} All tag-Qs can be paraphrased (are reducible to) as ordinary yes/no Qs. "Isn't that all we do, look at things and try new drinks?"

\textsuperscript{25} An utterance like "Why we love war" (\textit{Utne Reader}, Jan-Feb, 2003: 53-58) seems, insofar as it calls for a response, to have a quasi-status as a Question. Its relationship with the "initial conditions" of Asking, however, seems much weaker than in an utterance like "Do we love war?"

Washington 200

Game of Between
An important sub-set of yes/no Qs are "modal" yes/no Qs. The most important of these are: "can," "should" ("must"), "may" and "will."

(b) Wh-Qs: Use these to alert readers to the kind of information you are going to supply them with. "How?" for example tells them that you are going to discuss how to do something, perform an action, complete a task, etc; "why?" makes them expect a discussion of the causes of something. Note that this is not the usual motive for verbal wh-Qs. In this case, assuming that we are not being ironic, we seek usable information—such as in Asking for directions to a particular place.

(c) Use Q-embedding verbs, like "wonder," "suppose," "suspect" and the like to express doubt, uncertainty or problems.

STRUCTURE/INTENTION: Qs have both a local and global structuring effect. That is, they structure elements like the sentence, paragraph and section plus that of the whole text. In this we should always note the internal as well as the external effects of Qs. The internal effects are those that influence readers' expectations about what comes next—or what the writer's rhetorical intention is with a Q or series of them. This is equivalent to knowing how it would be correct to enact the action given in a Q or believe

26 A rhetorical Question, "Who's buried in Grant's tomb?" contains its own answer. It is no part of Asking in this book.
what is being stated in it. Intention finds its goal in its fulfillment by readers. The intention of "Would you please pass the salt?" for example is fulfilled in the appropriate action as is belief is in the truth of "Is the universe infinite?" by how it is answered—by evidence used to support either a "yes" or "no" answer. This means that to grasp a writer's intention with a Q is to be able to distinguish a correct, from an incorrect, use of such Q. This view is not restricted to meaning and belief but extends as well to actions and the success, or failure, of such actions. A writer's intention may or may not settle how readers think, or act, but the content of a Q will always determine whether or not it was appropriate to think or act a certain way.

The external effects of a Q appear in what it causes to happen with readers, both in their beliefs about the subject and their (including physical) response to it. A Q may alert them to what comes next, what the writer promises, as well as standards for judging what the correct response to a Q is. In this the written and the verbal Q exhibit the same relationship between the intention of the Q and our understanding of its intention and our response to it. Walking out of the room after being asked to pass the salt shows either a misunderstanding of the intentional content of the Q, a defect in hearing, or an ironic attitude toward the person asking. But none of these possibilities deny the fact that a normative condition (a "must") exists between the intention of a Q and the way we respond to it. That is, either in an appropriate (correct) or inappropriate (incorrect) way.

Washington

Game of Between
Another way of stating the above is that Asking, as the initial states of a Q, resides in the doubts (or ignorance) of a community. Without such a community there would be no Asking, nor any understanding of why people deliberately refuse to ask. Asking is a social, human, construct and does not, and never can be, a spontaneously occurring natural event, like snow or a change of barometric pressure.

REFERENCE/ANAPHORA: This feature of a Q appears as relation between a pronoun and its antecedent. In the following example "it" is an anaphoric relationship with "car":

Bob worked on my car. Is that why it won't start?

The usual situation is for the antecedent to occur, in writing and reading time, before the pronoun. But the antecedent can also come after the pronoun:

Is that why it won't start? Because Bob worked on my car. 27

Anaphora thus serves the function of economy and repetition by the pronoun not overtly replicating its antecedent. The pronoun also adds gender (neuter in the above example), number (singular) information to a Q and so plays an important role in its unity and the way the reader understands the utterances. But anaphora may also be seen as a form of substitution (one term

27 The term "cataphora" is sometimes used to designate this arrangement.
substituting for another one) and, by extension, as possessing inferential content. A Q is always directed at some object, usually some determined object, "car," "Bob" and the like. For this to happen, some understanding of how the object stands to a description of it (usually the predicate of a sentence representing the description). So a reader infers from the above that it and car are the same object and that in any application of the terms one can replace the other without any loss of meaning.

Note also that an object like car can change its properties, lose its color say, without our losing a sense that it is the same object as car before the change in its properties.

For the anaphoric relationship to exist, and be successful, it must cause the reader to form a recognition-judgment. Such judgment presupposes an identity claim, a claim that (in this example) it and car refer to the same object. Moreover, the claim is subject to true and false determinations. Is it true to say that, in this particular instance, that it and car are the same object? Or can it be shown that they are not the same? Such Qs, at one level, may sound trivial, but they have consequences for the survival of the written text. Hamlet exists, in part, today because playgoers (and readers) have determined, over the centuries, that the "objects" of Hamlet's attention (Ophelia, his mother, or his thoughts) represent those objects are they really are. They may not be, from a historical point of view, "real," but they are "realistic."

Washington

Game of Between
The truth or falsity of an *identity-claim*, that *it* and *car* refer to the same object, ultimately involves recognizing them as the same *after* substituting one for the other. The relationship between *it* and *car* must have the form of $a=b$, $b=a$. Note also that a writer can introduce a new term, say, *vehicle*, for *it* and *car*, and feel confident that the *identity-claim* does not change for the reader. He or she still recognizes the object as the same as a condition for distinguishing it from all other objects. In most cases, the new term is a singular term already available in the language. Place or proper names, "Logan, Utah," "Gene Washington," and so on, can be made to obey the *identity-claim* as long as they distinguish themselves by means of spatio-temporal characteristics: "Gene Washington just came through the door," "Logan, Utah is a university town of 55,000 in northern Utah." Later references to them would be made by singular terms, *he* and *it*, insofar as the writer's aim is to link a new term to a familiar (given) one and have the reader recognize it as referring to the same object. Such new/familiar referring are subject, of course, to the memory of the reader. The terms, using an earlier example, *it* and *he*, must be "close" enough (in a given stretch of text) for the reader to remember which comes first and where it occurs in order to relate the second term to the first on the basis of the *identity-claim*.

All the above can be read as implicit *directions* to the reader of the following sort:

*Take *car* and *it* to refer to the *same* object.*
*Ignore the fact that they occur at different places in the text.

*Read them as a=b, b=a.

*Understand the content of "a" as being identical with that of "b."

*Understand it and car to be the determined object each refers to. Something is the object because it and car refer to it.

*Take the object as information.

*Recognize that it and car, if they occur in an utterance where doubt is being expressed in a specific example of Asking, that it, that it is the attributes of car (red car, old car, etc.) that help us identify the intention of the Q.

CLAIMS/COMMITMENTS: With every Q a claim is made. And a claim is essentially a belief which always, in turn, presupposes some linguistic social practice. A claim, in other words, can only be understood as a relationship between persons and not as that between natural events. A claim does not raise the temperature in the room or cause a barometer to rise or fall.

With every Q, the speaker makes a claim about the subject, promises to do something or states what he is going to do with it. With "How much should we love love?" the speaker claims, among other things, that he is an authority on "love" and that he intends to discuss the consequences of it and also at Washington Game of Between 206.
what point it may become a problem to the lover. "Can I help you?" carries the commitment to do something. One can say that the speaker is taking responsibility for asking the Q as well as the answer he gives to it. Answers always "carry over" the responsibility raised in the Q. This is tantamount to following a rule, which is to say it specifies what ought to be done to satisfy the claims of the Q. The Qer's claim is that he will make true the content of the Q. "Why then publish?" makes true its promise by following the Q with the pros and cons of publishing together with the rewards, risks and failures of so doing. Although making true is the principal constraint of the speaker, of "Why then publish?" its intelligibility depends directly on the reverse, the possibility of making false or failing to rise to the level of making true.

Note that a speaker can have two attitudes toward his or her commitment. He or she can acknowledge it or attribute it to someone else. With "Is there a hot potato in your pocket?" the speaker acknowledges, from the behavior of the addressee, that something is amiss and that he has a suggestion (not yet uttered) on what it is. (This rises from a possible social situation.) With "Did you say that you were blinded by the light?" on the other hand, the speaker denies that a commitment (that the light is blinding) is his and, by so doing, hands the responsibility for it over to the other's commitment (in a previous utterance). Attribution, in this sense, presupposes responsibility for a commitment and tacitly acknowledges that this commitment: responsibility for the commitment is a social norm. Whatever

Washington 207

Game of Between
ensues from "Did you say that you were blinded by the light" ideally (if consistent with a social norm) is obliged to make true the commitment while at the same time being denied by the speaker as his own and attributed to an earlier utterance of the speaker.

An important kind of Q is that which inquires about the behavior of a thing, procedure, or system. "Why does my truck pull to the right?" This is equivalent, no matter how we may answer the Q, to ascribing to "truck" an intentional nature. Had the Q not been asked, the intentional nature of "truck" would not exist and no description of its behavior possible. This does not mean that we have to act on the need to describe "truck" but simply that attributing an intentional state to it involves us in giving reasons for asserting that "my truck pulls to the right." The Qing element of this adds the constraint—amount to a virtual command—to give reasons for its pulling to the right as the principle substance of the answer.

We take it as axiomatic, then, that no distinction needs to be made between a system (a thing, event, procedure) with an intentional character and one without it. Whatever we consciously treat as having an intention has, ipso facto, an intention and consequently a ground for describing its behavior. This is our claim about the behavior of a system and our commitment to making its intention intelligible. What subjects an intention to a role in giving reasons, however, is our personal knowledge and history. What we know and what we have experienced is, at some level, unique, unshared by anyone else,
living or dead. (This was expressed, metaphorically, by Wescott's characterization of life as more like a "perch" than a "nest."). What's out there, facts, the given and the like can never override personal knowledge in the manner and way of our Asking. It exists at the highest level (however defined) of our consciousness and descends to the most minute part of syntax—whether or not, say, an instance of Asking begins with "is," "should," or "why."

ENTITLEMENT/INERENCE: With entitlement the Q is always what warrants a particular Q. What reasons can he, or she, give for raising a Q? In this entitlement differs from commitment in the appropriateness of a certain utterance. With commitment we are constrained to give reasons for the utterance—it always involves a must or have to. The constraint, however, does not apply to entitlement. We may be entitled to ask a Q, but it does not mean that we have to give reasons for asking it, or even to ask it. Entitlement, unlike commitment, does not necessarily lead to a performance.

What, or who, we are entitled to ask about depends on what we know, plus what we take to be answerable. No doubt there is a considerable amount of person to person variation in this. What a detective asks about differs from what a farmer does and so on throughout the variables of human nature and history. But facts are only part of what we ask about. We can ask Qs of the unreal, the unseen, the things (presumably) no longer here. Here are some Qs the poet Stephen Knight asks of the dead: "Are you well?" "Would you like to

Game of Between
look around?" "What did you lose? Where?" 28 Nor does entitlement presuppose hierarchy of authority. Every subject of a king, say, is as entitled to ask Q as the king himself and about the same thing. "Is it raining?" can be asked by a peasant without requesting permission of his king or any of his representatives. This, in essence, points to a rule of incompatibility. If we are committed to the belief that only a king has the right to ask about the weather, then we are of necessity committed to the view that no one but a king is entitled to ask about the weather—though he may not, in his entire reign, ask the Q. If, on the other hand, we make the claim that everyone is entitled to ask about the weather, then a claim about who cannot raise the Q makes one claim incompatible with the other. One claim stands in an incompatible relationship with the other if either one denies entitlement to what can be asked.

Inference involves, as we all know, the Q of what follows from what. Or what should come next after what is now. But the relationship between now and what comes next (as the futurity of should demonstrates) is always contingent. Rain may or may not follow from thunder, lightning and an overcast sky. Even though probability and contingency rule inference in the world of fact, they are essential in the construction of a text more than one Q (or assertion) long. At one level, every answer to a Q is an inference, of what the answer can and should contain in order to constitute a sufficient response.

to the *inference*. From "Is Sparrow a horse?" we may not only *infer* that Sparrow is a mammal of a certain sort but also we may also acknowledge the possibility that Sparrow may be something else. We ask both that the addressee verify or deny the proposition of the Q by *inferring* from it information that precludes that both "yes" or "no" be true.

**DOSAGE/DISTRIBUTION:** With DOSAGE we ask the Q of how many Qs should occur in a text. What is not enough and what is too much? The answer, in most cases, depends on the genre, and the intention, of the text. Qs, for example, would not ordinary appear in an obituary, a manual or a web-site giving travel instructions. A few examples might appear in an elegy, more in an interview and still more in a philosophical text. Where speculation, doubt and the like exist so do Qs. Conversely, where there is certainty, or an inconvertible fact, there is the absence of Qs. Death, the subject of an obituary, is an obvious example.

The DISTRIBUTION of Qs in a text depends, by inference, not only on where the author wants need (or doubt) to appear but also the scope of such need. Where the scope is global (over the entire text) then a Q, or Qs, form the title; where scope is local, limited, say, to a particular section, then they form the initial sentence of the section and so on. Again, the rules for determining both DOSAGE and DISTRIBUTION are, at times, fuzzy. What makes them less so are teacher and peer reviews of texts in their beginning stage and author Washington Game of Between
revision—plus the author's study of texts that have a similar format and
INTENTION as his or her own.

I find it is often useful to begin by dividing all Text-Qs into the title
and non-title positions. Title-Q, inasmuch as it is unique in the text, can be
said to have a one-to-many relationship with all other (including all non-title
examples of Qs) text-utterances. The title (the one) refers to all other text-
utterances (the many) This allows the reader to "access" the utterances and,
consequently, evaluate them for the quality of their Answerhood, on how well
they answer the title-Q. 29 On this reading, the title-Q stands as the "unique
initial" sentence which give meaning to all succeeding sentences by laying
down conditions for Answerhood.

If the reader chooses to follow the procedure recommended in this
essay, then he or she would also subject the title-Q to the remaining "terms" of
explicitness.

DISTRIBUTION can also be seen, perhaps more abstractly, as a unique
position in a text-structure, a sentence, paragraph, etc. It has no existence, or
significance, independent of the structure. An obvious analogy is with the
natural numbers. The number 3, for example, does not exist independently of

29 An analogy here would be to any kind of "relational data base" in which
various sorts of information about a person (name, address, credit rating, etc.)
can be accessed by one unique number.

Washington 212

Game of Between
its position in a succession of numbers, 1, 2, … 4, 5, etc.\(^\text{30}\) If the replica of a Q occurs in another text-structure, as is the case in quotation, then its meaning is similarly set by its position in that structure. The pitcher in one baseball game may pitch in a second, third, and so on game. But his role in any of these games is uniquely determined by his position in the game, the pitcher as pitcher. Thus the relationship of a Q to text-structure, discussed often by linguists, is the one-over-many. Redness is the property of all red things. Asking is the (underlying) property of all texts that have Text-Qs.

SCOREKEEPING: With this we keep score on the claims and commitments we make—both the speaker and the addressee—with Qs. More specifically, we keep score on the norms, implicit in any social interaction, that govern Qs. Norms, as has been mentioned, are a form of promise, to either do something or say something. From the writer’s side, this means following up, or satisfying, the claims and commitments of a particular Q. The reader cooperates in this by checking to see if they have been satisfied, how they have been, and where in the text they have been satisfied. Readers do this, on the whole, in an implicit way. But it always involves readers checking to see if every Q in the text has been either answered or reasons given why it cannot be answered. This, in turn, minimally involves keeping

\(^{30}\) For more on this general idea see Stewart Shapiro, Thinking About Mathematics: The Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University, 2000).
track of such matters as 1) where the writer has put a Q, or Qs, in the text (title, section, beginning, middle or end of a paragraph, etc.), 2) what kind of Q, or Qs, they are, wh-, yes-no, or a Q-embedded verb like "wonder" and 3) at what level of specificity the Qs have been answered—or what reasons have been given for not answering them. In all this, we surmise, the reader would keep count, at some level of consciousness, of the number of Text-Qs. Such counting, depending on the reading competence of the reader, has the form of "first," "second," and "third," rather than "1," "2," and "3" and will be ranked by varying kinds of importance, that is, how specific, or how "long," the answers to each Q ought to be.

1), 2) and 3), above, can be considered, in large, by the following examples:

A). Got the Giggles? Join the Club

B). Porter necessarily begins by formulating the key conundrums for any history of this subject [madness]: What is the meaning and mystery of mental illness?

C) Have You Ever Faked an Orgasm?

---

Washington 214
Game of Between
 SCALE: One can ask about a tree and a forest, a drop of water or the ocean. Each of these "subjects," ideally, constrains the answer to a Q. One of the constraints is knowing something of the nature of the individual subject. And this, in turn, presupposes knowing what it is not, that a tree is not a forest, a drop of water is not an ocean. Each has different qualities and these, and only these, as discussed above, generate Qs. This is equivalent to saying that doubt, a main condition of some Qs, can only operate on the qualities, or "accidents," of a thing, not on the thing as a whole. Different "accidents" of a tree—its appearance, is size, its healthy or diseased condition, etc.—result from time passing, the weather, certain animals, etc.

If a Q does not conform to the constraints of SCALE, then confusion may result. There are an infinite number of "places" in a country, an infinite number of "places" within each of these "places" and so on. Any Q about any


223.

Washington 215

Game of Between
one of them, presupposes knowledge of SCALE. If you are in the train-station in Munich, Germany, for example, you would always ask the "where am I?" Q (assuming you have an intact mind) in order to elicit information about a place you want to go. You have, in addition to a sense of where you are (you're in a train-station, not just in Munich or in Germany) an "image" of where you want to go – you have a goal in mind. Any answer that informs you that you are "in Munich" or "in Germany" violates the constraints of SCALE.

SUCCESSION: From the reader's point of view this is the Q "what follows the Q?" Additionally, one of expectation: "Is it what I expect to follow the Q?" From the writer's point of view, the Q is more the "should" type, "what should follow this Q? Will it satisfy the expectations of the reader?" None of this is as straightforward as "I expect 3 to follow 2," or "I expect night to follow day, or vice versa." We expect, minimally, a Q to be followed by a string of words that add up to an answer, reason given for no answer or one given for replacing one Q with another.34 Any string of words that settles doubt raised by the Q, in theory, satisfies the criterion of Answerhood. With it, belief replaces doubt and with it, a more pleasant feeling. But there is always the option of answering the same Q in several different ways. Three

34 The replacement of one Question by another is a strategy, of Turing in his classic article, cited above.

Washington 216

Game of Between
options, QA, Q(c)A, and Q(d)A, are especially common. Variations on these can usually be made intelligible in terms of them.

1) QA. In this the Q is succeeded by a direct answer with eliminates all other possible answers.

   Should I get married? Yes.

2) Q(c)A: Here a "commentary" on the Q succeeds the Q and serves as an answer to the Q. Any sentence like "the Q is unanswerable," "the Q should be raised?" etc. falls under this category.

   Should I get married? That Q can only be answered if you think you are financially able to support and wife and family, if you complete your degree....

3) Q(d)A. In this pattern, a "delay" to answering the Q is executed before the Q is answered.

   Should I get married? Before answering that, we need to consider what may happen if you do get married now....No, I don't think you should
Note that the first Q of a text—often the title—is not the successor of any other Q or answer to a Q. In this, it is like the zero ("o") of the natural number or the initial position of a chess piece.

SUCCESSION defines Qs that succeed Qs and answers used to create a flow-chart like the following:

**TO SCHMOOZE OR NOT TO SCHMOOZE**

Emrys Westacott, an associate professor of philosophy at Alfred University in south central New York, developed this flowchart to help people navigate the protocol of morally acceptable and unacceptable gossiping.

Is it a lie? □ Yes (unethical)

□ No

Does it violate someone's rights? □ Yes (unethical)

□ No

Does it disregard someone's claims? □ Yes (unethical)

□ No

Does it directly promote more harm than good? □ Yes (unethical)

□ No

Washington 218

Game of Between
Does it directly promote more good than harm? [ ] Yes (ethical)

[ ] No

Is it contrary to the wishes of the subject? [ ] No (ethical)

[ ] Yes

Is it merely contrary to the subject's hopes? [ ] Yes (ethical)


CONTEXT/GOAL. Here we are concerned about answers to Qs like "Where am I?" and "Where am I going?" Ginzburg gives these examples:

Jill is exiting a plane that has just landed in Helsinki:

Flight Attendant: "Do you know where you are?"

Jill: "Helsinki."

Jill is about to step out of a taxi in Helsinki.

Driver: "Do you know where you are?"

Jill: "Helsinki."

---

Only in A is the Q of "where?" resolved. Jill, by answering "Helsinki," shows that she possesses knows of a preexisting GOAL. Such knowledge, partly from memory and partly from sense data, is sufficient to settle the attendant's Q. In B, however, Jill obviously doesn't have enough GOAL information to satisfy the driver's Q—which obviously requires Jill's answer to contain "facts" about some particular place (area, street, building, etc.) of Helsinki. In this, CONTEXT/GOAL have an immediate correlation with SCALE as determined by CONTEXT. If we don't know where we are, where as fixed by the specifics of a CONTEXT (a plane or a taxi), not just any CONTEXT, then we have no way to determining if we have reached our GOAL. In this, CONTEXT seems to serve as a causal force in reaching a GOAL or destination.

With the issue of CONTEXT/GOAL we alter the balance between Qs about the nature of answerhood and ones about the resolvedness of a specific Q. That is, the salient Q becomes, not what answer "meets" the Q, but what and how the Q was resolved—one that no longer needs to be asked. In this view, although both in A and B (above) the "where" Q asked of Jill raises from Doubt, only in A is the Q resolved and doubt turned to belief. Minimally, how Jill resolved the Q in A was by her understanding of a destination plus what was previously known to her about Helsinki and how it presented itself to her as she about to step out of the plane at its airport.

---

36 See, for a discussion of "resolvedness" and "exhaustiveness," Resolving Questions, I:460

Washington 220

Game of Between
But aren't there Qs that cannot be resolved? Consider, for example, King Lear (Shakespeare) standing over the corpse of his beloved Cordelia. The Earl of Kent, observing the scene, asks "Is this the promised end?" Kent's Q, by not being resolved (at least by Shakespeare), raises the situation to a universal, but at the same time, a highly personal, one.

BALANCE/BRIDGING: A Q, like any utterance, can be likened to the upright posture of the body in its gravitational field. While our body maintains its upright posture (even though we may take it completely for granted), we can be said to be balanced. BALANCE, in this sense, presupposes all parts of the body working together, as a coordinated unit, to perform basic actions like walking, running, throwing a ball, etc. Loss of BALANCE, by contrast, results in an inactive body, an odd assortment of parts, "parts outside of parts," or a body that "gets in its own way." A Q, to continue the analogy, is constantly subject to gravity, to maintaining its BALANCE, always intent on not losing it. When we see a Q in control of itself by itself we see it in a balanced state.37

BRIDGING is the Q of whether or not a particular Q successfully "bridges" the gap between a past and a future time–where time is conceived of as a "container" of information. Here we enter the realm of "shoulds." Past time

37 The preceding paragraph owes much to Todes, 46, 65-66, 72. Washington Game of Between
should contain given information (information known to the reader/addressee). Future time should contain "new" information (that unknown to the reader/addressee). In terms of cause and effect, given information is the immediate cause of a Q while new information is its effect. A Q, as a bridge, then allows the reader to move over from state of lesser, to greater, information about the subject of the Q. In this, BALANCE, on an analogy the body in a gravitational field, plays the essential role of seeing that the two salient parts of BRIDGING, past and future, distribute the "weight" of information equally. A Q, in perfect BALANCE, often occurs midway in the text. A case in point is Jonathan Swift's Q (in A Modest Proposal), "The Q therefore is: How this Number shall be reared, and provided, for?," where "this Number" refers back to given information about the population of Ireland and "reared and provided for" points forward to promised new information about how to deal with that population.

The BALANCE of a Q, however, does not depend on its text-position. Qs often, of course, appear as a text-title. Such is the case with Louis Menand's Q, "Does evolution explain who we are?" (The New Yorker, November 25, 2002.). "Evolution," though it has no direct reference (as Swift's Q does) to previous stretches of text, forces our attention on given information from memory and hands us on to new information, promised, but not yet presented, in "who we are." "Evolution," whether we have it right or not, evokes a repository of facts, opinions, theories, etc. about evolution.
So, with BALANCE, the Q is always "Does this Q gain or lose explicitness by its treatment of given-new information?" With BRIDGING, a related notion, the Q is always how well a Q allows the mind to move from given to new information. Obviously, with both of these "categories" most instructors would want to make a correlation with the categories of REFERENCE/ANAPHORA.

VOICE/PERSONA. This, essentially, is the question of what the writer, Asking and Answering "sounds like" to the reader, ironic, whimsical, serious, and so on. Where the author's VOICE is not his or her own, or one manufactured for a particular genre of text, then we refer to it PERSONA or "mask." An author may create a PERSONA in order to make a specific point, establish a tone, or tell a story with a particular slant. PERSONAE are especially important in satire and various forms of comedy. A PERSONA can also appear in memoirs and autobiographies, forms of writing that purport to tell the story of the writer's life, family, or some personal experience—like a bout with cancer. But it is important to keep in mind that the PERSONA and the writer are often separate selves. They do not live the same lives and they are not obliged to express themselves in the same way. On a memoir she wrote about her mother, herself and a friend, Vivian Gornick has this to say: "I soon discovered that if I wanted to speak truthfully in this memoir—that is, without cynicism or sentiment—I had to find a tone of voice normally not mine. The one I habitually lived with wouldn't do at all: it whined, it grated,
it accused; above all it accused. Then there was the matter of syntax: my own ordinary, everyday sentence—fragmented, interjecting, overriding—also wouldn't do; it had to be altered, modified, brought under control....I had a narrator on the page who was telling the story that I alone, in my everyday person, would not have been able to tell. Devotion to this narrator—this persona—became, while I was writing the book, an absorption that in time went unequaled."

A passage (below) from Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's The Little Prince illustrates what one kind of VOICE sounds like with Asking and Answering. Others may be found, for example, in classic texts like Turing's (the scientific VOICE), Plato (Socrates' ironic VOICE) or a modern text like an author interview (the fact-find VOICE) in The Paris Review.

Grown-ups like numbers. When you tell them about a new friend

They never ask questions about what really matters. They never ask:

"What does his voice sound like?" "What games does he like best?"


Washington 224

Game of Between
"Does he collect butterflies?" They ask: "How old is he?" How many brothers does he have?" "How much does he weigh?" "How much money does his father make?" Only then do they think they know him. 39

SPATIOTEMPORAL SENSITIVITY. Asking a Q, as mentioned earlier, is an act that reveals our ignorance plus our need to know. Such ignorance-knowledge is typically specific to a particular place and time. A thirteenth-century person could not have knowledge, or be ignorant of, a computer nor could he or she possess the need to have a TV. So neither machine could be the subject of his or her Qs. Present concerns, memory of recent events, and sense perception, generate most Qs. This does not mean, of course, that we can’t, or shouldn’t, ask Qs like "What is truth? Are we really free? or "Is beauty truth, truth beauty?" Such Qs, being free of common concerns, "float" over specific places and times. Rather, what meaning and force SPATIOTEMPORAL SENSITIVITY has lies mainly in pedagogical situations. We want student-writers to be "sensitive" to present concerns, recent (as opposed to distant) memory, and to sharpening their sense-impressions, all things that make up what we call Asking. We also want them to ask Qs that they can

39 Quoted, TLS, December 20, 2002, p. 26
"handle," typically those that originate in the consensus, and communal affairs, of their time and place.

**CATEGORIES AS INSTRUCTIONS**

Once the categories of *explicitness* have been introduced, and briefly discussed, the instructor will want to move on to their application to examples of Asking. These, obviously, can start from this text (as mentioned above) a student text or from existing (classical) texts, like *A Modest Proposal* or A.M. Turing's "Computing Machinery and Intelligence." My preference, however, is to start with the latter. Such forms of Asking have survived in repeated readings. The Q from *Proposal*, recall, is this: "The Q therefore is: How this Number shall be reared, and provided, for?" Turing Q, a yes/no one, is "Can machines think?" The procedure is then to ask the students to read the text and then to apply the categories, one by one, to a Q like Swift's and Turing's. The second phase is to go on to an analysis of a complete text and then, finally, on to the students own texts. The categories, discussed in class, then can be "tweaked" in conferences with the instructor. What often happens here is that a student can be lead to see that a category that may not seem

40 The genre of the text, obviously, might call for a reversal of this order. That is, the instructor of technical writing might want to begin with a complete text, a "model," and then proceed to an individual Question—or even ignore the Question completely.

Washington 226

Game of Between
applicable (or included in other categories) can, with deliberation, come to be vital in making a Q sharper or more accessible to the reader.

In essence, what we are doing here is to take each category of explicitness as an instruction to perform a certain task with Qs. In order to make the task as intelligible as possible, the Qs we put to students (in class and conference) are of the sort, "Do you understand what COMMITMENT you are making with your Q? Is it one you can satisfy? As the reader of your text, are you keeping SCORE on the Qs you have asked? Are any of your Qs ones designed to BRIDGE the gap between present and future, given and new information? Qs like these are necessary to impress on students the importance of what we characterized earlier as "asking for, and giving, reasons" where "asking" is broadly defined as student asking student, instructor asking student and student asking instructor. This three-way process further heightens the push towards making Asking, Answering and Questions more explicit.

CRIME SCENE

(A Classroom Exercise)

We begin by dividing the class into groups of no more than seven students. Each group is then asked to elect 1) a Recorder, someone who will record the kinds of Qs discussed in the group; 2) a Reporter, someone who will "report" to the class and 3) a Facilitator, the member who keeps things
going and on track. The instructor then says something like the following:

The main purpose of each group is not to "solve" an actual crime or even investigate a "fictive" one. Instead it is to employ a scene (real or imagined) as a way of illustrating how it serves to make Qs Explicit (less Implicit). Our starting point is Collingwood’s thesis that everything, even a Q, can be seen as an answer to a Q. Since every scene contains (or can be made to contain) a multitude of "things," then obviously every scene potentially Answers a large range of Qs. The Q then is: What are the salient Qs this scene Answers and how do they, in turn, tell us about the purpose of Q-ing? Or, to put it another way, what would our situation be if language lacked Q-ing? Can a crime scene exist in the absence of Q-ing?

The instructor then asks the groups to consider the following yes/no Q:

Is This The Scene Of A Crime?

Please see, as a starting point, David Baron, The beast in the garden, p. 134.

---


vii The reader might want to make further applications of this analogy, the 3D Space of a Between as the nucleus of a cell, by reading Tom Misteli's "The Inner Life of the Genome" The Scientific American (February 2011), pp 66-73.

viii Barabara Corballis, "Not as different as all that," The Times Literary Supplement (October 28, 2011), p. 25.


The New Yorker (May 7, 2011), p.27.


16. Sir Francis Bacon, "Of Innovations." An essay written with a perspective from the middle; that is, from present time. Innovation, Bacon writes, is the "new," "novelty," the "stranger" among us. But, respecting the new and sometimes taking advantage of what it brings (for example, new kinds of medications), one should not neglect things of the past or those things yet to come. And lastly, that the novelty, though it be not rejected, yet be held for a suspect; and, as the Scripture saith,'that we make a stand upon the ancient way, and then look about us, and discover what is the straight and right way, and so to walk in it.


xvii Here I have in mind works like Cicero's *De Oratore* and *De Invenzione*; Thomas Wilson's *Arte of Rhetorique* (1553); George Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie* (1589); Hugh Blair *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1785)

xviii Readers of Latin will perhaps detect the playfulness of *On Copia* in the words of its original title: *De duplici copia rerum ac verborum commentarii duo.*


xx Please see Roger Caillois *Les jeux et les homes* (*Games and Mankind*) (Paris: Gallimard, 1957); also entry "Games," *Wikipedia*


Game of Between

*Essential* hereafter.


xxviii *Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces That Shape the Universe* (New York: Phoenix 2003)

xxix Please consult, for example, these articles in *The Economist* (October 1-7, 2011): "Faster than the speed of light" (p. 15); "So long, and thanks for all the quarks" (pp 85-86).


Washington 232

Game of Between
Daniel Libeskind is the architect for the new Trade Center.

Anthony Lane, "Private Wars," The New Yorker (September 12 2011), p. 89. Lane's reference is to the protagonist of the movie "Gainsbourg."


"Grabbing cancer by the short and curlies" The Economist (September 24, 2011), p. 1002

Please see the "Golden Mean" in Wikipedia.


The New Yorker (September 5, 2011).


lviii David Theo Goldberg, "Praise the Web," PMLA (March 2011) vol. 126, # 2, p. 448


Washington 235

Game of Between
1. plato.stanford.edu/entries/nothingness/


Confessions, 12:8.

Was ist Metaphysik? (What is Metaphysics?).


Washington 236

Game of Between


*Wikipedia*, "Existence."


Washington 237

Game of Between


This is consistent with Wittgenstein's insistence on seeing thought as an "airy," or "insubstantial," a person to person conduit of information ("Die pneumatische Auffassung des Denkens" PI, #109). See also PI, #34, 187, 291,


Washington

Game of Between


Wikipedia, entry on "Liminality."

Washington Game of Between
"23.06.11 Windsor, Berks" *Times Literary Supplement* (July 1, 2011), p. 3.


Washington 240

Game of Between


cvii *The New Yorker* (December 5, 2011), p.15.


INDEX OF AUTHORS

Reference is to the endnote number, not the page.

Angier, Natalie. 110

Aristotle: 7, 23, 28

Augustine, St.: 67.

Washington 241

Game of Between
Bacon, Sir Francis: 16

Bachelard, Gaston: 89

Baker, Carlos: 52

Bellos, David: 102

Benjamin, Walter: 50

Bernard, April: 4

Blair, Hugh: 19

Banville, John: 21

Brooks, David: 101

Burke, Joanna: 99

Buck, Carl: 64

Buckley, Cora: 103

Caillous, Roger: 22

Carter, Bill: 104

Chekov, Anton: 57

Chaudhuri, Amit: 44

Washington 242

Game of Between
Cicero: 19

Clarke, Arthur: 107

Coope, Ursula: 15

Corballis, Barbara: 10

Corballis, Michael: 11

De Sousa, Geraldo: 91

Dorman, Larry: 69

Duns Scotus, John: 98

Eliade, Mircea: 13

Erasmus: 20

Fill, Alvin: 45

Fly, Richard: 17

Friedman,, Susan: 46

Fukuyama, Francis: 61

Gamow, George: 26

Gandelman, Claude: 90

Washington 243

Game of Between
Gilead, Amihud: 84

Goldberg, David: 60

Goldberger, Paul: 35

Hemingway, Ernest: 87, 94

Heidegger, Martin: 68

Henighan, Stephen: 70

Hitchens, Christopher: 39

Hulse, Carl: 81

Ingham, Mary Beth: 98

Johnson, Barbara: 56

Johnson, George: 49

Kahn, Paul: 86

Kafka, Franz: 108

Keller, Evelyn: 10, 93

Lane, Anthony: 36

Levi, Carlo: 24

Washington

Game of Between
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lyons, John</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maddox, Brenda</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGrath, Charles</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McClain, Dylan</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macaulay, Alstair</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mason, Wyatt</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell, Robert</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misteli, Tom</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouawad, Jad</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murphy, Michael</td>
<td>47, 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuman, William</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Brien, Sean</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overbye, Dennis</td>
<td>2, 9, 18, 59, 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parker, Peter</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peirce, C. S.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polgreen, Lydia</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Washington: 245**

Game of Between
Puttenham, George: 19

Rashbaum, William: 74

Rees, Martin: 30

Rhoden, William: 78

Ross, Claran: 6, 65

Ryan, Marie-Laure: 85, 96

Schiesel, Seth: 92

Scott, O. A: 80

Simic, Charles: 51

Sorsenson, Roy: 54, 62, 79

Spring, Frank: 63

Sterne, Laurence: 66, 71

Stoppard, Tom, 15

Strain, John: 53

Taleb, Nassim: 38

Toibin, Colm: 37

Washington 246

Game of Between
Usener, Heinrich: 25

Wade, Nicholas: 34, 42

Washington, Gene: 102

Waterlow, Sarah: 88

Weinberger, Eliot: 76

Wilson, Thomas: 25

Wittgenstein, Ludwig: 12, 33, 48